WORLD WAR

J. A. HAMMERTON

1914

1918

VOLUME ONE

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WORLD WAR

FIRST VOLUME

Field of Glory!

PASSCHENDAELE

WORLD WAR
1914—1918

A PICTURED HISTORY

Edited by
SIR JOHN HAMMERTON

VOLUME ONE



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WORLD WAR 1914 – 1918



Boots—boots—boots—boots, movin'
up and down again.
There's no discharge in the war!
Kipling

Editor's Foreword

TWENTY years ago the civilization of Western Man suffered an immeasurable catastrophe, and many generations must pass before the havoc then wrought will be repaired. A chief cause of that catastrophe was the unrestrained pride, arrogance and predatory designs of one European nation. A race of ordinarily peaceable folk transformed by a minority of war-mad leaders into a war-mad nation. A nation that, having brought upon the world and itself an unimagined agony of body and soul, an incalculable impoverishment of spiritual and material well-being, having been beaten to its knees and seen all its military pomp and pride made a scorn before mankind, dreams even now of sacrificing its new generation of youth at the altar which still reeks of the blood of its slaughtered millions.

From those of us who endured the agonies of 1914–1918, who know what foulness, folly and obscenity a world war implies when stripped of the shams of national patriotism, "glory," and military adventure, no sacrifice of racial pride, no earnest striving after peace would demand too much if it could prevent the coming again of any comparable calamity.

But in all lands since 1914, a younger generation has come into being to whom the memory of these blood-sodden years is at best a confused and vague sense of excitement and alarm conveyed to them in the anxieties and mental anguish of their parents and elders. For the instruction of that younger generation in our own land this pictured history of the World War is intended to provide a carefully written narrative of events in association with a large and representative selection of actual photographs which will serve to build up such a vivid mental picture as may leave a young reader with no distorted vision of so vital a period in modern history.

FOR all of the World War generation who survive, here is also a new record of those frightful years which, could we forget their horrors, should be thrillingly remembered for calling forth the nobler qualities of manhood and endurance in the nations that had to take up arms in defence of their liberties, and in so doing attained to high ideals of heroism and self-sacrifice.

Indeed, for all who are interested in the endless drama of the modern world this new pictured history, compiled after a sufficient lapse of time to permit of that calmness of judgement and detachment deemed necessary to "historical perspective," can hardly fail to hold much that is memorable and instructive.

IT was the privilege of the present Editor throughout the whole period of the War to publish week by week two important contemporary records of events, both of which were circulated throughout the British Empire and the fighting forces more widely than any other publications of that time. One of these, *The War Illustrated*, was mainly pictorial, all the most interesting contemporary pictures of the War, from private and official sources, finding a place in its pages; the other, *The Great War*, was a more elaborate and carefully documented literary review of the events. Both publications, as the years of the War rolled on, grew to considerable proportions and, although they must exist in more or less their original bulk in hundreds of thousands of British homes today as a source of the most vivid impressions of the War years, it cannot be pretended that they provide the reader of this later generation with that conciseness of historical statement which is desirable, or with such ordered presentment of the pictured history as can be achieved today, and as we hope to achieve in this newly written and freshly illustrated record of those epic years of human strife

PERHAPS the severest test to which any author or journalist may be put is to have his hurried work—work that he has accomplished in the heat and flurry of the moment while the press is waiting—resuscitated twenty years after. There may be, therefore, some excusable personal satisfaction in the present Editor's asserting that a careful re-examination of the twenty-two massy volumes comprising the above-mentioned War publications has left him undaunted before the contemplation of such an ordeal. In the quickly produced pages of these twenty-year-old

E.N.A.

GERMANY'S 'CANNON FODDER'

Beside this battalion of German infantry, marching off to entrain for the front at the outbreak of the War, walk wives, mothers, sisters and young brothers, all smiling, and confident in the belief that in a few weeks the soldiers will be sending home picture postcards from Paris

volumes he finds it possible to recover once again the thrilling interest of the days they picture and, save for what today appears some needless bitterness in references to the brutality of our enemies, there is little that he could wish erased.

But still more striking than the general literary and pictorial contents of the publications in question was a remarkable contribution by Mr. H. G. Wells which gave particular distinction to the first number of *The War Illustrated:* an article a mere thousand words in length, yet so instinct with the genius of its author for expressing large and universal ideas in meaningful phrase that, re-read after the lapse of twenty years, it still stands unrivalled as a quick and comprehensible explanation of the reasons for Britain entering the War. At the time of its publication, indeed, it was the most widely read contemporary utterance by any man of letters, and in America also it served for millions of readers as the pithiest statement of Britain's attitude by a British writer of international fame.

THE achievement and reputation of Mr. Wells before the War seemed at their apex. But the War, which was soon to bring into a somewhat feverish eminence many new writers, most of whom have long since receded in reputation with the lowering of the fever, brought to the genius of Mr. Wells so vast a mass of new matter for the exercise of his philosophic mind and the employment of his brilliant and imaginative pen that, one of the foremost of contemporary critics before the War, his pre-eminence as the greatest writer of our day is now unquestioned. He has passed, in the literary sense, from strength to strength and, in that superb emanation of his genius, "The Shape of Things to Come," he has made the whole world of thoughtful people his debtors.

As a prophet of social change and progress Mr. H. G. Wells is in his most characteristic mood; the eager, forward-reaching mind of him is prominent in his earliest writings; but in the nature of our present work we are less concerned with the things to be than with those that were, and it is fortunate that this short contribution of his to *The War Illustrated* reprinted today should serve as the best glimpse we can hope to secure of the temper of the time in which it was written. So it seemed good to the Editor to reprint this noteworthy old article at the beginning of this new work, and still better to test his belief in Mr. Wells's stability of conviction and perspicacity of outlook by inviting him at this distance of twenty years to re-read the article in question as well as another, which we are also reprinting, written by him in February, 1915 for *The War Illustrated* on the theme "Will the War Change Britain?" and to tell our readers of WORLD WAR, 1914–1918, what are his mental reactions today. In short, to get Mr. Wells, the prophet and seer, to look backward for once instead of forward.

AT the moment of writing the Editor has not the vaguest idea on what lines Mr. Wells may choose to comment upon his reconsideration of the circumstances in which he originally wrote these contributions and his present opinion of the matters with which he was then concerned. But the Editor is well content that Mr. Wells should do him the honour of using this twenty-years-later chronicle of the Great War as a vehicle for expressing his second thoughts in an equally brief and, we can be sure, no less arresting way.

WAR'S ELEGY IN A CHURCHYARD

On the pretence that its steeple might be used as an observation post, the village church was constantly the mark for German guns firing upon Allied positions even in the earliest days of the War. Here is one of hundreds of these shrines of lowly piety, the church at Friess, shattered beyond recognition by a ruthless rain of shells

Central Press



THE WAR TWENTY YEARS AFTER

RECONSIDERATION AND AVOWAL

Expressly Written for 'World War'

By H. G. WELLS

This important contribution by our foremost British author has been expressly written by Mr. Wells as an introductory study to our Pictured History of the War in the interesting circumstances described in the Editor's Foreword. The first of the two articles reprinted from 'The War Illustrated' appears in pages 7, 8 and 9, and the second one begins at page 47

FOR some years a younger generation of writers has ragged and bullied me so persistently—and I have been so disinclined to engage in apologetics—that I have come to believe there was something almost scandalously wrong in my reactions to the events of August, 1914. I launched the phrase "The War to End War"—and that was not the least of my crimes. I questioned the rightness of mere abstinence from war, and threw doubts upon the moral perfection of the conscientious objector. I felt that no one had that much right to contract out of a community to which he or she belonged. The conscientious objectors had a knack of surviving the war, and they did so with a heavy grievance against me. But recently I have been exploring my past and writing an autobiography about it, and I find myself much more disposed than I thought I should be to defend myself against the indictments of the intelligentsia of the nineteen-twenties.

I think if in 1904, let us say, I had had more vision of the possibilities of warfare that then I should have been working more strenuously than I did to avert the catastrophe; I should have been throwing my inappreciable weight, for all that it was worth, on the side of arbitration, mutual security pacts, international organization and the like—especially international organization and world services; but also I think that, confronted with the situation of August 4, 1914, over again, and with the knowledge which I then possessed, I should have written very much as I wrote in the two articles Sir John Hammerton has resuscitated. Since they were written I like to think that I have learned a good many things, but I do not think that I have learned anything that makes me anxious to repudiate or reverse those articles. Taken together with an article I wrote in 1917 called *A Reasonable Man's Peace*, which had considerable circulation as a pamphlet, and was seized in some quantity by the police, and with my record at Crewe House and in the early formation of the League of Nations Union, I think my war writings were, on the whole, reasonable and satisfactory writings.



I endorse my criticisms of pre-war England in these two articles, and if I was so optimistic as to anticipate peace in 1916 and a change of heart in the English schoolmaster, it was plainly because I had failed to carry my manifestly very poor opinion of the Allied military direction and of upper-class English education to its logical conclusion. I thought the war would end in 1916, and I said as much, but our ruling class stuck tightly in the saddle, and muffed a winning war for us, for two more years of unnecessary strain. When the second article which Sir John reproduces was written, I had still to learn of the sanguinary foolishness of the summer offensives of 1916, and to realize the complete impotence of our gallant admirals in face of the North Sea and Baltic problems. The lazy-minded old rascals had never thought about those problems, and that was a stunning discovery for me. Yet there are quite manifest inklings and forebodings of these coming failures in both these reprinted articles.

IT sounds abusive and beneath my dignity to call the pre-war British Admiralty lazy-minded old rascals, but really, what else *can* you call them? From 1900 onward it was as plain as daylight that, if the British Navy was ever to face a great war again, it would be almost certainly with Germany, and that, unless we were to abandon the aggressive and the Nelson tradition and all that, we should have to go into the shallows of the German coast. We did abandon the Nelson tradition, we never took the aggressive anywhere; we waited for the weaker German forces to hit us. The Navy had nothing worth saying to say about Heligoland, and nothing to say about Constantinople. Before the war the British Navy had become primarily an organization for buying large, expensive battle ships—and it was hardly anything else. Harsh words these and difficult to digest, but true ones.

But that is by the way.

What is, I think, of greater interest about these two old articles than whether they were right or wrong, is the question

of what isn't in them—and what would be in them if they had to be written over again today. I find that they are bright and intelligent within limits, but I find them, by my previous standards, decidedly shallow. I think they are a very good reflection of the advanced liberalism of their time, but I think that today an advanced young liberal, in the same position I occupied then, would have a much clearer, fuller, and wider grasp of the world situation. In other words, and in spite of many discouraging contemporary realities, from the bawlings and outrages of Hitler's gangsters to civil commotions in Ireland, and the pedantic unwillingness of Russia to line up frankly with the general reconstructive movement in the West, I do find that there is an ampler and deeper liberalism in the mind of the world today than anything we had got to a score of years ago. I know it is the fashion to be despondent about contemporary political thought; to point to the feebleness of our party leading and the prevalence of narrow self-seeking and hysterical and sordid nationalism everywhere; but I am persuaded that nevertheless there is a powerful current of ideas flowing towards a greater social order than our world has ever seen before, and that such ideas are accumulating and gathering force.

THE very triteness, weakness and inconclusiveness of much of our contemporary political life are, I think, evidence of the gravity of these gathering forces. We did not grasp all at once the huge intimations the war was conveying to us. We misinterpreted the war, and war itself, as being not symptoms, but things in themselves. It is only now, after ten years of false starts and reflections and self-correction, that we begin to realize the real nature of the changes in human conditions, of which the world war was only a terrific manifestation. The scale and range and power of human activities have been altered by a complicated development of inventions and discoveries, and this has made it imperative to adjust the methods of human association and government to new requirements.

The old forms of governments, the old boundaries of states, the old standards of obligation, the old methods of production and distribution under scarcity conditions, are now disastrously inappropriate; they strangle and crush human life, and until we can work out new conceptions of relationship and co-operation our collective existence is necessarily a system of violent blunderings and frustrations. Until the new is not only conceived broadly and distinctly, but believed in, men will have to go on using the old phrases, the old forms and the old usages. What else can they do? They have lost their faith in the old, and for a time they are powerless to pass on to the new, and to that, to the fact that we are, so to speak, in a climax of transition, we must, I think, ascribe the peculiar cynicism, inadequacies, vehemences and hysteria, of the general public life of the world at the present time. It is a necessary breaking-up and voiding of institutions, customs and morale, before the lines of the new order can be made plain.

BUT that new order is appearing. Day by day and year by year, since the war, I have found in my own mind, and seen in myriads of minds about me, the steady emergence to clearness and definition of the main lines of this new world order. Things that were seen first as if through the magic mists of a Utopian dreamland, are presently found to be real possibilities within the scope of actual practical effort. As the outlines grow firmer and more convincing, the will to realize those outlines gathers force. A new social and political objective is, I believe, taking shape in the minds of an increasing number of people altogether outside the world of ostensible politics and economic direction; they are setting out to find the way to that objective, and they will find it and it will be attained. This objective is nothing less than a federal world state, a World Pax, which will absorb, flatten out and replace the present sovereign governments of the world altogether.

AT first this objective has been seen by many as a purely political federation for the abolition of war. This was how it appeared, for example, to President Wilson and his followers. The League of Nations was a first crude attempt to solve the problem of a world pax. The horrors of the Great War, and the widespread fear of still greater horrors and destruction if there is further warfare in Europe, keep the minds of many people concentrated still upon this purely preventive and political conception of world federation. But that is not enough. It does not meet the occasion. The experiences of the past decade have demonstrated more and more plainly that a purely political world league against war is entirely ineffective, unless there is also some sort of economic and financial pacification. Actual war is only the acute form of a chronic disease of the world's affairs. Since 1918 the nations have been, and are now with a gathering intensity, warring against each other by tariff and dumping and by monetary and financial strategy, with a social destructiveness that is at least comparable to the results of formal military aggression. It becomes plainer and plainer that a political pax is almost entirely empty, a mere "gesture," unless there is also a considerable measure of financial and economic federation. There is no peace for human beings without co-operation. People put that idea in the form of a demand for a "world-money" and a "world-credit system"; and a major riddle in the path of world statesmanship is how to evoke some conference or council or other federal authority with sufficient prestige to discharge so dominating a task.

SUCH an authority could not exist alone. World peace is like a table that must have all its legs to stand firm. Another associated world interest is transport. Sea transport and air transport alike cry aloud for their proper development, for a control transcending merely national and imperial boundaries. And transport, again, is linked inextricably with the world production and the gross marketing of staple commodities. All these are common interests which demand a common government. All these are interests that appeal imperatively to men of technical ability, to energetic and able people, to men of imagination and with such ultimately rests the leadership of mankind. On a realization of these urgent everyday practical needs of the human community, far more than on war-fear, will the coming world federation rest. It is intelligence and not sentiment that will give us world peace. A direct attack merely on war and political fragmentation will never abolish these ancient evils. A pooling of economic interests, on the other hand, would outflank war, and any effective federal control of interstate transport, once it could be set up, would render it impossible for evermore.

Common sense, I think, is all on the side of the federal solution to our present human difficulties. It involves the least disturbance of existing sentiments and loyalties. Many of us—and I am one of the sinners—have talked too freely, and without sufficient explicitness, of the World State. A World State, as liberal thought conceives it, will not be anything like a national state magnified to planetary dimensions. It is not to be thought of in that way. It will be something quite different. I do not see any "World President" and "Parliament of Mankind" coming into being in the future. The League of Nations at Geneva is much too like a Parliament of Mankind, and that is one of the reasons for its impotence. But I am at one with most serious liberal thought nowadays in desiring to see a permanent monetary and credit conference, a world transport board with complete control of the air, and an industrial and agricultural council, overriding and setting aside the internecine nationalistic conflicts that now waste and

E.N.A.

SINISTER PARLOUR MANNERS

From every vantage point that afforded cover, the snipers did their deadly work. This photograph shows a farm parlour in which the floor has been removed and a shallow trench, while through embrasures cut in the walls five marksmen pick off enemy stragglers

destroy our lives. They will not be consultative bodies ; they will be legal, fully empowered bodies, entrusted with full authority. It is along these lines that hope will presently return to mankind.

OF course, you cannot change human institutions without a corresponding change in human minds, and beneath the struggle to bring about these new world arrangements there will have to be a mental warfare on the most intense and far-reaching scale. Everywhere, in schools, colleges, books, newspapers, pulpits, radio talks, the conception of the New Scale of dealing with human affairs must be spread, incessantly. That campaign is beginning, but it is still only beginning. There is a vast resistance of honest stupidity and prejudice to be overcome, and much scoundrelism lurking by the way. There is a gigantic task before the persuasive factors in human life. The idea of a New Scale has imposed itself enormously upon the more active-minded of us in the twenty years since 1914, but it has still to be made a primary conception in common thought throughout the world. It is the major fact of contemporary history. As we get it clearer, we shall be able to make it clearer to other people. When it has been fully grasped, and its political, social and mental implications begin to be realized, then we shall be entering upon a new phase in the history of our race. We shall realize better than we do now that, after all, the Great War was the beginning of the end of human fragmentation ; that it was at any rate the opening phase of a process of convulsive adjustment which will ultimately abolish war. The adjustment is a vastly bigger and more difficult job than we realized in 1914 ; there may be some huge jars and dislocations still ahead, but it is going on.

Human thought is sounder and ampler than the daily newspapers would have us believe. We have immense armies numerically, and vast accumulations of expensive and rather aimless munitions, which the traders, under an organized system of bribery and public intimidation, have sold to our various governments, but nowhere in the world—not even in the Far East—are there now armed forces ready to start off for an objective, " according to plan," at the word " go," as the German armies started off in 1914. The hosts of today have none of that early simplicity of purpose. A vast proportion of existing armament is the result of jobbery and salesmanship in a muddle-headed world ; it has nothing of the informing intelligence of the military organizations of Europe in the year 1914. Some or all of this inflammable stuff may catch fire, blow up, and become infinite misery and destruction—but that will be quite a different catastrophe from the definite and destructive comprehensiveness of the Great War. I am quite prepared to believe that there are governments in the world senseless enough to declare war, but I do not think there remain any governments in the world with the moral force and the intelligence to hold a war together, as the Great War was held together until 1918. I believe this is more widely known and understood than our old-fashioned military authorities like to think.

I AM not one of those who believe in any more " inevitable " wars. Man is not perhaps a very reasonable animal, but he is not wholly an instinctive one. In the light of the obvious, he is capable of reasonable collective action. Thirty or forty years is a big piece of a human life, but it is only a page in human history. The lessons of the war are still being assimilated, slowly but surely. Who can say, in the world today, whether adjustment may not win out in our present discords and perplexities ? Who dare deny even now that the Great War of 1914–1918 was not only the first but the last World War ?

os: W. Tausch

LAST SALUTE

On June 28, 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his morganatic wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, left the town hall at Serajevo. A little later, while travelling in their motor car, they were both shot dead by a Bosnian student, Gavrilo Princip

THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, MONDAY, JUNE 29, 1914.

TRAGEDY OF THE AUSTRIAN THRONE.

MURDER OF ARCHDUKE FRANZ FERDINAND AND HIS WIFE.

THE LATE ARCHDUKE.

SPECIAL MEMOIR.

THE DUCHESS OF HOHENBERG

COMMENT IN PARIS.

From Our Own Correspondent.

GRIEF IN SARAJEVO.

IMPRESSION IN TURKEY.

TOLL OF THE SEA.

SOME QUERIES.

Courtesy of the Daily Telegraph

THE ASSASSIN

No sooner were the shots fired than Princip was seized. As he was being hustled off to the police-station he was followed by infuriated crowds against whose desire for summary vengeance the police had great difficulty in protecting him

WHY BRITAIN WENT TO WAR

By H. G. Wells

Following is the article which Mr. Wells wrote for 'The War Illustrated' of August 22, 1914. The Editor still regards this as the most effective brief statement, published at that time or since, of the British attitude to the War

THE cause of a war and the object of a war are not necessarily the same. The cause of this war is the invasion of Luxemburg and Belgium. We declared war because we were bound by treaty to declare war. We have been pledged to protect the integrity of Belgium since the kingdom of Belgium has existed. If the Germans had not broken the guarantees they shared with us to respect the neutrality of these little States we should certainly not be at war at the present time. The fortified eastern frontier of France could have been held against any attack without any help from us. We had no obligations and no interests there. We were pledged to France simply to protect her from a naval attack by sea, but the Germans had already given us an undertaking not to make such an attack. It was our Belgian treaty and the sudden outrage on Luxemburg that precipitated us into this conflict. No power in the world would have respected our Flag or accepted our national word again if we had not fought.

So much for the immediate cause of the war.

BUT now we come to the object of this war. We began to fight because our honour and our pledge obliged us; but so soon as we are embarked upon the fighting we have to ask ourselves what is the end at which our fighting aims. We cannot simply put the Germans back over the Belgian border and tell them not to do it again. We find ourselves at war with that huge military empire with which we have been doing our best to keep the peace since first it rose upon the ruins of French Imperialism in 1871. And war is mortal conflict. We have now either to destroy or be destroyed. We have not sought this reckoning, we have done our utmost to avoid it; but now that it has been forced upon us it is imperative that it should be a thorough reckoning. This is a war that touches every man and every home in each of the combatant countries. It is a war, as Mr. Sidney Low has said, not of soldiers but of whole peoples. And it is a war that must be fought to such a finish that every man in each of the nations engaged understands what has happened. There can be no diplomatic settlement that will leave German Imperialism free to explain away its failure to its people and start new preparations. We have to go on until we are absolutely done for, or until the Germans as a people know that they are beaten, and are convinced that they have had enough of war.

WE are fighting Germany. But we are fighting without any hatred of the German people. We do not intend to destroy either their freedom or their unity. But we have to destroy an evil system of government and the mental and material corruption that has got hold of the German imagination and taken possession of German life We have to smash the Prussian Imperialism as thoroughly as Germany in 1871 smashed the rotten Imperialism of Napoleon III. And also we have to learn from the failure of that victory to avoid a vindictive triumph.

This Prussian Imperialism has been for forty years an intolerable nuisance in the earth. Ever since the crushing of the French in 1871 the evil thing has grown and cast its spreading shadow over Europe. Germany has preached a propaganda of ruthless force and political materialism to the whole uneasy world. "Blood and iron," she boasted, was the cement of her unity, and almost as openly the little, mean, aggressive statesmen and professors who have guided her destinies to this present conflict have professed cynicism and an utter disregard of any ends but nationally selfish ends, as though it were religion. Evil just as much as good may be made into a Cant. Physical and moral brutality has indeed become a cant in the German mind, and spread from Germany throughout the world. I could wish it were possible to say that English and American thought had altogether escaped its corruption. But now at last we shake ourselves free and turn upon this boasting wickedness to rid the world of it. The whole world is tired of it. And "Gott!"—Gott so perpetually invoked—Gott indeed must be very tired of it.

This is already the vastest war in history. It is a war not of nations but of mankind. It is a war to exorcise a world-madness and end an age.

And note how this Cant of public rottenness has had its secret side. The man who preaches cynicism in his own business transactions had better keep a detective and a cash register for his clerks; and it is the most natural thing

BRITISH COMMANDER ARRIVES

Sir John French with his personal staff left London on August 14 and travelled straight through to Amiens. When he landed on French soil, his army had reached Boulogne and its other bases, and was making its way towards its battle positions

THEIR REASONS WHY:

July 5. FRANCIS JOSEPH, Emperor of Austria-Hungary, writes to the Kaiser:

According to all the evidence so far brought to light, the Serajevo affair was not merely the bloody deed of a single individual, but was the result of a well-organized conspiracy, the threads of which can be traced to Belgrade, and even though it will probably prove impossible to get evidence of the complicity of the Serbian Government, there can be no doubt that its policy, directed towards the unification of all countries under the Serbian flag, is responsible for such crimes, and that the continuation of such a state of affairs constitutes an enduring peril for my house and my possessions.

July 6. HERR VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG, the German chancellor, telegraphs to the German ambassador in Vienna:

His Majesty desires to say that he is not blind to the danger which threatens Austria-Hungary, and thus the Triple Alliance, as a result of the Russian and Serbian Panslavic agitation. As far as concerns Serbia, His Majesty of course cannot interfere in the dispute now going on between Austria-Hungary and that country, as it is a matter not within his competence. The Emperor Franz-Josef may, however, rest assured that His Majesty will faithfully stand by Austria-Hungary as is required by the obligations of his alliance and of his ancient friendship.

July 24. THE TSAR OF RUSSIA telegraphs to Alexander, prince regent of Serbia:

When your Royal Highness applied to me at a time of especial stress, you were not mistaken in the sentiments which I entertain for you, or in my cordial sympathy with the Serbian people. So long as the slightest hope exists of avoiding bloodshed, all our efforts must be directed to that end; but if in spite of our earnest wish we are not successful, your Highness may rest assured that Russia will in no case disinterest herself in the fate of Serbia.

July 31. RENÉ VIVIANI, prime minister of France, writes to the French ambassador in St. Petersburg:

He (the German ambassador) told me that he would come for my reply to-morrow (Saturday) at 1 o'clock. I have no intention of making any statement to him on this subject, and I shall confine myself to telling him that France will have regard to her interest. The Government of the Republic need not indeed give any account of her intentions except to her ally.

in the world to find that this system, which is outwardly vile, is also inwardly rotten. Beside the Kaiser stands the firm of Krupp, a second head to the State; on the very steps of the throne is the armament trust, that organized scoundrelism which has, in its relentless propaganda for profit, mined all the security of civilization, brought up and dominated a Press, ruled a national literature, and corrupted universities.

CONSIDER what the Germans have been, and what the Germans can be. Here is a race which has for its chief fault docility and a belief in teachers and rulers. For the rest, as all who know it intimately will testify, it is the most amiable of peoples. It is naturally kindly, comfort-loving, child-loving, musical, artistic, intelligent. In countless respects German homes and towns and countrysides are the most civilized in the world. But these people did a little lose their heads after the victories of the 'sixties and 'seventies, and there began a propaganda of national vanity and national ambition. It was organized by a stupidly forceful statesman, it was fostered by folly upon the throne. It was guarded from wholesome criticism by an intolerant censorship. It never gave sanity a chance. A certain patriotic sentimentality lent itself only too readily to the suggestion of the flatterer, and so there grew up this monstrous trade in weapons. German patriotism became an "interest," the greatest of the "interests." It developed a vast advertisement propaganda. It subsidised Navy Leagues and Aerial Leagues, threatening the world. Mankind, we saw too late, had been guilty of an incalculable folly in permitting private men to make a profit out of the dreadful preparations for war But the evil was started; the German imagination was captured and enslaved. On every other European country that valued its integrity there was thrust the overwhelming necessity to arm and drill—and still to arm and drill. Money was withdrawn from education, from social progress, from business enterprise and art and scientific research, and from every kind of happiness; life was drilled and darkened.

SO that the harvest of this darkness comes now almost as a relief, and it is a grim satisfaction in our discomforts that we can at last look across the roar and torment of battlefields to the possibility of an organized peace. For this is now a war of peace.

WORDS BEFORE ACTION

It aims straight at disarmament. It aims at a settlement that shall stop this sort of thing for ever. Every soldier who fights against Germany now is a crusader against war. This, the greatest of all wars, is not just another war—it is the last war! England, France, Italy, Belgium, Spain, and all the little countries of Europe, are heartily sick of war; the Tsar has expressed a passionate hatred of war; the most of Asia is unwarlike; the United States has no illusions about war. And never was war begun so joylessly, and never was war begun with so grim a resolution. In England, France, Belgium, Russia, there is no thought of glory.

We know we face unprecedented slaughter and agonies; we know that for neither side will there be easy triumphs or prancing victories. Already, after a brief fortnight in that warring sea of men, there is famine as well as hideous butchery, and soon there must come disease.

Can it be otherwise?

We face perhaps the most awful winter that mankind has ever faced.

But we English and our allies, who did not seek this catastrophe, face it with anger and determination rather than despair.

THROUGH this war we have to march, through pain, through agonies of the spirit worse than pain, through seas of blood and filth. We English have not had things kept from us. We know what war is; we have no delusions. We have read books that tell us of the stench of battlefields, and the nature of wounds, books that Germany suppressed and hid from her people. And we face these horrors to make an end of them.

There shall be no more Kaisers, there shall be no more Krupps, we are resolved. That foolery shall end!

And not simply the present belligerents must come into the settlement.

All America, Italy, China, the Scandinavian powers, must have a voice in the final readjustment, and set their hands to the ultimate guarantees. I do not mean that they need fire a single shot or load a single gun. But they must come in. And in particular to the United States do we look to play a part in that pacification of the world for which our whole nation is working, and for which, by the thousand, men in Belgium are now laying down their lives.

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August 2. SIR EDWARD GREY, foreign minister of Great Britain, tells the French ambassador in London:

I am authorised to give an assurance that if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coast or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power. This assurance is, of course, subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place.

August 3. ALBERT, King of the Belgians, telegraphs to King George V:

Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium.

August 1. THE KAISER addresses the people of Berlin from the balcony of his palace in Unter den Linden:

A fateful hour has fallen for Germany. Envious people everywhere are compelling us to our just defence. The sword has been forced into our hands. I hope that if my efforts at the last hour do not succeed in bringing our opponents to see eye to eye with us, and in maintaining peace, we shall with God's help so wield the sword that we shall restore it to its sheath again with honour. War would demand of us enormous sacrifices in property and life, but we should show our enemies what it means to provoke Germany. And now I commend you to God. Go to church and kneel before God and pray for His help and for our gallant army.



August 6. Mr. H. H. ASQUITH, prime minister of Great Britain, speaks in the House of Commons:

If I am asked what we are fighting for I can reply in two sentences. In the first place to fulfil a solemn international obligation—an obligation which, if it had been entered into between private persons in the ordinary concerns of life, would have been regarded as an obligation, not only of law but of honour, which no self-respecting man could possibly have repudiated. I say secondly we are fighting to vindicate the principle, in these days when material force sometimes seems to be the dominant influence and factor in the development of mankind, that small nationalities are not to be crushed, in defiance of international good faith, by the arbitrary will of a strong and overmastering power.

FROM WATERLOO TO . . . . ?

A regiment of Guards march through the London streets to the terminus at Waterloo, which for them, and a multitude of others, is the gateway to the fields of glory all over the world

À BERLIN

The scenes that followed France's entry into the War resembled in some respects those that marked the declaration of war on Prussia in 1870. A Berlin! was heard once more on the boulevards of Paris, and there and at the termini the departing troops were speeded on their way by excited midinettes

NACH PARIS

"Free trip by way of Liège," reads the inscription on this train. It carries companies of German soldiers eager to come to grips with the French—but no date of arrival in the French capital is guaranteed

CHAPTER I

HERALDS OF WAR

Our opening chapter gives a bird's eye view of the chain of events beginning with the murder of the Archduke on June 28 and ending with the British declaration of war on August 4

IN Greek legend it was the sowing of the dragon's teeth that caused armed men to spring out of the ground, and a woman's face that, in Marlowe's immortal phrase, " launched a thousand ships." Incidents equally trivial, though perhaps not equally romantic, have been the causes—at least the immediate and ostensible though not the real and ultimate ones—of most of the great wars of history. A rough jest about the Conqueror's increasing corpulence made by Philip I, King of France, led William, although then an old man, to renew the war against his ancient foe. The throwing of the two Bohemian regents out of a window in Prague on May 23, 1618, gave rise to the Thirty Years' War. The attempt of Charles I to arrest the five members of the House of Commons on January 4, 1642, is regarded as the cause of the Great Civil War. The declaration by the Emperor and the King of Prussia, made at Pilnitz in April, 1791, was responsible for the outbreak of the Napoleonic Wars, although the name of Napoleon himself was not yet associated with them.

The hanging of John Brown at Charlestown on December 2, 1859, contributed to the American Civil War, although in this case a longer interval elapsed between the deed and its consequence. Bismarck's action in changing the wording of a telegram sent to him from his sovereign at Ems and then publishing it, precipitated the war between France and Germany in 1870, and a deed in itself hardly more memorable than some of these was the immediate cause of the Great War.

On Monday, June 29, 1914, the following paragraph appeared in The Times :

The Austro-Hungarian heir presumptive, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, and his wife, the duchess of Hohenberg, were assassinated yesterday afternoon at Serajevo, the capital of Bosnia. The actual assassin is described as a high-school student, who fired bullets at his victims with fatal effect from an automatic pistol as they were returning from a reception at the town hall.

The outrage was evidently the fruit of a carefully laid plot. On their way to the town hall the archduke and his consort had narrowly escaped death. An individual described as a compositor from Trevinje, a garrison town in the extreme south of Herzegovina, had thrown a bomb at their motor-car. Few details of this first outrage have been received. It is stated that the Archduke warded off the bomb with his arm, and that it exploded behind the car, injuring the occupants of the second carriage.

Fuller details of the crime were soon available. The Archduke, who had just been directing the army manoeuvres, had been joined by his wife at Ilidzhe, a watering-place not far from Serajevo. On the morning of the 28th they arrived in the city with their suite, four cars in all, and passed along a wide street and over three bridges spanning the river Milyatsa. Conspirators were at each bridge, and near the first one, as stated by The Times correspondent, a bomb, which wounded one of the attendants, was thrown. The rest of the party drove on to the town hall, where the mayor, ignorant of the untoward happening, made a speech of welcome, which the Archduke interrupted with a sarcastic reference to a welcome with bombs. The archducal pair then drove to the hospital to visit the wounded attendant.

As a measure of safety the route was changed, but unfortunately the driver of the leading car kept to the original one, turning into Franz Josef Street instead of going straight on. The governor of Bosnia called out to the driver of the Archduke's car that he was going the wrong way, and he put on the brakes, causing a momentary stoppage. A youth named Princip then dashed forward and fired. The first bullet hit the Archduke, and the second the duchess, who had flung herself forward to protect her husband. They were taken to the palace, but the duchess was dead when they reached the building. The Archduke died about ten minutes later, just after 11 a.m. The day was the anniversary of the wedding of the unfortunate pair, and the 525th anniversary of the battle of Kossovo, or the field of blackbirds, where the

KHAKI COMES TO FRANCE

On August 7, 1914, the first details of the British Army which fought in France and Flanders came down the gangway from a British troopship at Boulogne

RIVERS TO CROSS

No better equipped army than the British Expeditionary Force ever crossed the seas. Its numbers were small, but in every arm there was a high degree of efficiency. The photograph shows a pontoon train at Boulogne

Sport and General

HOT ON THE UHLAN TRAIL

'Have any Germans passed this way?' is the question put by the French dragoons to the Belgian peasant-women. As scouts the Uhlans generally formed the invaders' vanguard in the opening campaign

old Serbian empire was destroyed by the Turks in 1389.

The Archduke Francis Ferdinand was born on December 18, 1863, being the eldest son of the Archduke Charles Louis and a nephew of the Emperor Francis Joseph. His mother was a daughter of Ferdinand II, king of the Two Sicilies, and he inherited the Italian possessions of the house of Este. With indifferent health, he remained in the background until the tragic death of the crown prince Rudolf in 1889 made him the heir, after his father, to the throne of Austria-Hungary. His relatives and friends contemplated his marriage with a cousin, a daughter of the Archduke Frederick; but to their disappointment his choice fell upon a lady who was neither of imperial nor of royal birth. This was the countess Sophie Chotek, who belonged to a Czech family and was a member of the court circle. At length the opposition to this marriage was overcome, and it was celebrated in Vienna on June 28, 1900. The lady was created duchess of Hohenberg, but the Archduke took a solemn oath of renunciation which, signed and sealed in both the German and the Magyar languages, excluded their descendants from the throne.

The Archduke had to some extent been an unknown factor in European politics. His hostility to the Magyars was known and he made no secret of his association with the so-called policy of "Trialism," which aimed at adding to the Dual Monarchy a great Slav state. Yet there were limitations to the Archduke's leanings to the southern Slavs. It was the Catholic Croats who chiefly attracted him and he hoped through them to fulfil the Catholic mission which he conceived to be imposed upon the monarchy in the Balkans. He had a good deal to do with the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, and if he had had his way the change would have been made earlier.

The Archduke exercised a good deal of influence in military affairs and to him was mainly due the appointment of Conrad von Hotzendorf as chief of the staff in 1906. He also took an interest in the small Austrian navy. He delighted in his farms and gardens, and spent a good deal of time and money on a beautiful estate which he had bought at Konopischt. Here, early in June, 1914, only about a fortnight before the murder, he was visited by the Kaiser William II, and a report gained credence that on this occasion the two potentates had come to an agreement about the future of Europe. Russia was to be provoked to a war for which Germany and Austria were ready. France was to be reduced to impotence by a few vigorous strokes, and the abstention of England was considered certain. The kingdom of Poland, with Lithuania and the Ukraine, was to be reconstituted, and stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea was to be the reward of Francis Ferdinand himself: unlike the imperial throne, it was to pass to the elder of the two sons

INHERITORS OF FULFILLED RENOWN

A squadron of French Cavalry are here seen moving quietly down a Belgian road. These troopers inherit a tradition of gallant service from their predecessors, who won such a high reputation in the wars carried on by Louis XVI and Napoleon

BELGIUM DEFENDS HER NEUTRALITY

King Albert of the Belgians never wavered in his determination to maintain the neutrality of his country at all costs. His call to his army and his people met with an heroic response, but the price paid was a high one. Above, a bridge over the Meuse has been blown up; below are the remains of Fort Loncin which covered the railways running north and west through Liége. The Belgian General Leman, the heroic defender of the city, was captured, badly wounded, in this fort, and accorded all the honours of war

Imperial War Museum

DEUTSCHLAND ÜBER BRUSSELS!

Outside the Gare du Nord in Brussels the picked troops of the conquering invaders are drawn up on parade for inspection by the 'All Highest' or one of his marshals, while their bands, grouped on the flank, crash out the music of victory

that his morganatic wife had borne him. For his younger son a new realm, comprising Bohemia, Hungary, Serbia and Dalmatia was visualised. Other re-arrangements of the map of Europe were planned, and the so-called pact ended with an undertaking for close co-operation between the German Empire and these two new kingdoms.

Undertakings of this definite nature were, it is certain, never made, but the two potentates undoubtedly discussed the relations between Greece and Turkey, the position of the Hungarians inside the Austrian empire, and of the Rumanians outside it and other matters of local interest. In such informal conversations much must remain unknown or disputable, but what is known has been carefully examined by Mr. Wickham Steed in "The Nineteenth Century and After" for Feb., 1916.

The assassination of the Archduke gave rise, and not without some reason, to the idea that the Austrian authorities, disliking his political outlook, had shown themselves lukewarm in affording him protection on his visit to Serajevo. No soldiers lined the streets, as had been the case when the Emperor visited the city in 1910, and there were very few extra police on duty. If there is any truth in this suspicion, the blame must rest primarily upon the governor of Bosnia, General Potiorek.

Prof. S. F. Fay in his book "The Origins of the World War", states the case for the Austrian complicity, in which he strongly disbelieves, as follows: "It was said that he had plotted to displace his uncle; and was planning to break up the Dual Monarchy in alliance with the Emperor William by seizing Poland and Venice and by creating two new states over which his sons might ultimately rule, while German Austria was to be added to the German empire as the Emperor William's reward. It was darkly hinted that his tragic death was due to the connivance of Austrian officials, who wanted to prevent these suspected designs, or at least wanted to throw the blame on Serbia and so have a pretext for the annihilation of this neighbouring kingdom. Other rumours alleged that his assassination was due to the fact that, being an ardent Roman Catholic, he was planning to attack Italy and restore the temporal power of the Pope."

A more serious and sustained allegation concerns the complicity of the Serbian authorities in the murderous deed. It has been freely asserted that the Serbian government was aware that this crime was in contemplation and was thus an accessory before the fact. In 1924, M. Ljuba Jovanovitch, who was a cabinet minister in 1914, explicitly stated in a book entitled "The Blood of Slavdom", that these rumours were true; that M. Pasitch, the Serbian premier, and other ministers, knew the plot was being hatched, and decided that the youths concerned should not be allowed to cross the frontier into Bosnia. Nothing, however, was done to carry out this order, if such it was, and no direct warning was given to the Austrian authorities. It has been stated, however, that an indirect warning was sent; but here again the facts are in dispute.

Professor Fay, who has gone very carefully into the evidence in "The Origins of the World War", after remarking that there is no good reason to doubt the accuracy of M. Ljuba Jovanovitch's revelations of 1924, adds: "Until M. Jovanovitch's revelations are

E.N.A.

HIGH HORSE AND LOWLY WAIN

In the photographs on this page we have contrasted the pageantry of the crack cavalry of the German army, trotting past the royal palace in Brussels, with the wearied insouciance of the "foot-slogging" infantry who, on their march to the fighting zone, welcome a lift in a farmer's wain, which humble vehicle is here seen carrying a group of them through a Belgian village

Sport and General

AVALCADE OF INVASION

These Prussian cuirassiers have just crossed the Belgian frontier from Germany and are now hastening to join in the attack on Liége. In their grey uniforms and steel helmets they constitute a grim procession, heralds of a grey tomorrow

definitely proved to be untrue, impartial historians will conclude that M. Pasitch and members of the Serbian government had a guilty knowledge of a murder plot, but concealed it in oblivion of the fact that murder will out." On the other hand, it should be said that the eminent English authority, Dr. R. W. Seton-Watson, hesitates to accept the statements of M. Jovanovitch.

Just fifteen weeks passed before the twenty-five prisoners concerned in the crime were brought before their judges at Serajevo. Chief among them was Gavrilo Princip, a student at Belgrade, a Serbo-Orthodox Christian, a youth of 19, who, with two shots from a Browning pistol, had effected the double assassination which others of the gang had previously failed to bring about with bombs. The trial was essentially a political one. The public prosecutor, Franjo Svara, in opening the proceedings on October 12, 1914, described the murders as the result of Pan-Serbian propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, an attempt on the part of Serbia to liberate Bosnia and Herzegovina from Austrian dominion.

All the principal accused were young students who, he declared, had been politically influenced by the Narodna Odbrana, the organization responsible for anti-Hapsburg propaganda, to decry the Hapsburg dynasty and exalt that of King Peter Karageorgevitch of Serbia, whose throne had itself been erected on a crime: the assassination of his predecessor Alexander with his Queen Draga, whose deaths on the night of June 1, 1903, had ended the unpopular Obrenovitch dynasty. During the trial the lines of cleavage between the various Slav populations of the Balkan states emerged very clearly into view: chiefly that between the Pan-Serbian and the Yugo-Slav movements. A glance at the map of Europe will show how these lines of demarcation found expression in the Peace Treaties of 1919.

Among the Slavs whose hostility to the Dual Monarchy was not quite so pronounced were the Croats and the Mussulmans of Bosnia-Herzegovina. These Mussulmans presented a rather complicated problem. They were

HARBINGERS OF THE STORM

Troops of Uhlans, pushing far ahead of the slower-moving main body, were the first intimation many of the Belgian villagers had of their country's invasion. Here some half-dozen troopers are watering their horses in the trough in the square of a Belgian hamlet

FIRST FRUITS OF WAR

One of the first Belgian towns to feel the heavy hand of Prussian militarism in the first flush of victory was Termonde. On many of the towns they entered the enemy levied a fine. The alternatives were payment or destruction. Termonde could not pay. The guns opened fire on a defenceless town and fire completed the havoc

RISEN FROM THE FLAMES

At Termonde, as in all the other Belgian towns that were destroy during the War, every effort has been made to reproduce in t new buildings the charm that made their predecessors so attracti How successfully this has been done is shown by this photograph the Grand Place at Termonde as it is today

THE TORTURE OF LOUVAIN

The top picture shows the ruins of the University Library at Louvain, the burning of which, with its priceless treasures, by the Germans was a wanton act of vandalism. Below are the ruins of Louvain cathedral as they appeared in 1918. Right is the same street as that shown above, the Rue de Namur, with the library rebuilt. Most of the great libraries of the world gave books to replace those that had been destroyed

DEVASTATION AND RESTORATION

The small coast town of Nieuport marked the extreme northwestern point of the Allied line. It was reduced to ruins, as the two photographs show, and the endurance of the people was recognized in 1920 by the bestowal of the Croix de Guerre. The restoration was completed in 1928, and was effectively carried out as the photograph of the Esplanade (left) proves

NG FAMOUS GLORIES

At Ypres, as at Louvain and Reims, the enemy did not spare architectural glories that were a priceless heritage from the past. This photograph shows the thirteenth century Cloth Hall in the Grand Place at Ypres, Belgium's finest Gothic building, as it was before its destruction by German fire during the War

IMMEMORIAL SHAMES

The aerial photograph reproduced below shows Ypres after four years of bombardment. In the centre is the broken shell that was once the Cloth Hall, while above it are the ruins of the Cathedral. The town has been rebuilt, but the bare walls of the Cloth Hall, wrecked beyond possibility of restoration, were left standing for some years as a grim memorial of the War



FLEEING FROM THE GERMAN TERROR

Panic-stricken by the invader's approach, thousands of Belgians left their homes and made their way first to Brussels and then, when the tide of invasion came nearer, to the ports whence many of them crossed the seas

descendants of Bosnian nobles who had followed the Manichaean heresy which at one period formed the religious storm centre of Christian Europe, and who had passed over to Islam in order to preserve their worldly possessions, after their subjection by the Turks in 1463, ten years after the fall of Constantinople, and ten years before the Turkish conquest of Herzegovina. But if they had sold their religious convictions for material gain, they had nevertheless adhered with religious zeal to their national language and customs. Strange as it may seem, therefore, to English readers, and unfortunate as it may have been for the prisoners, it is perhaps understandable that at the Serajevo trial one of the defending counsel, Dr. Premuzic, opened his speech by saying that it was painful to him as a Croat to defend Serbs who had sought to dig the graves of his king and people . while another, Wenzl Malek, stated that he would prefer to be sitting on the bench than pleading at the bar! Of the twenty-five accused persons, twenty-two were charged with high treason, and three with complicity. The grounds of the charge of high treason were "attempting to modify by force the geographical relations of Bosnia and Herzegovina as regards Austria-Hungary and to reincorporate those states with Serbia, and, with that view, having assassinated the heir to the throne, Francis Ferdinand."

As was expected in Vienna, all the prisoners were convicted. On October 29, 1914, five of them were sentenced to be hanged, and one to imprisonment for life. Under the Austrian penal code the death penalty could not be inflicted on a prisoner who was under 20 at the time the crime was committed, and therefore Princip, whose date of birth, after some discussion, was accepted as July 13, 1894, together with two others, was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment, with the curious addition of one day's fast each month, and solitary confinement in darkness on June 28 each year, the anniversary of the crime. Three of the prisoners were hanged on February 3, 1915, while Princip and eight others died in their fortress prison during the war period. They did not, therefore, live to see the curtain fall

NECESSITY KNOWS NO SACRILEGE

In those early days of the War many a Belgian soldier spent a night or two on a bed of straw spread out in the nave of some village church. Here three infantrymen are taking their rest, rifles in hand, in the sanctuary

Topical Press

FATEFUL PLACARD: AUGUST 4, 1914

A group of deeply-interested young men at the Horse Guards, London, read the Proclamation of the existence of a state of war between Britain and Germany. Seven or eight days later, they are reading another poster (reproduced below from the "Daily Telegraph"), which calls to them to enlist and 'do their bit' for 'Your King and Country Need You'

on the tragedy for which they were immediately responsible. Yet, as it turned out, the fortune of war achieved the object of their crime.

Exactly a month elapsed between the murder at Serajevo and the first of the several declarations of war, and these thirty days were filled with diplomatic and other exchanges. Both in Vienna and Berlin there was a strong belief, not without reason, that Serbia was partly responsible for the crime, as it was the outcome of a plot hatched in Belgrade. It was therefore thought that the time had come for a full and final reckoning.

The party in Austria which demanded strong action against Serbia had as its most prominent members the chancellor, Count Berchtold, and the chief of the staff, Conrad von Hotzendorf. Their first business was to assure themselves of German support, and on Sunday, July 5, an important memorandum was handed to the Kaiser at Potsdam. When, a few days before, he had heard of the crime he had expressed himself very strongly about Serbia's complicity therein, but on this occasion he adopted a more pacific, although by no means a pacifist attitude. He was averse, for the present at any rate, to warlike measures, but before leaving for Kiel he took the precaution of warning the representatives of the army and navy.

The answer to the Austrian communication was sent off on the following day, Monday, July 6, after the Kaiser had consulted his chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, who signed it. Having stated that the Kaiser was "not blind to the danger threatening Austria and consequently the Triple Alliance from the agitation carried on by Russia and Serbian Pan Slavs," the note ended with the assurance that Francis Joseph may be sure that his majesty, "in accordance with his treaty obligations will stand true by Austria's side."

In Vienna Berchtold welcomed this assurance and the despatches from, and conversations with, other diplomatists may have led him to read into it more than its authors intended. His next task was to secure the assent of the emperor Francis Joseph and the prime minister of Hungary, Count Tisza, to the strong line which he intended to take. By July 9 the Emperor and the count had agreed that some demands should be made upon Serbia, though not in the form of an ultimatum.

Berchtold then set to work to prepare the fateful document, and on July 14 Tisza consented that it should be an ultimatum with a short time limit, provided it stated that, apart from slight regulations of boundary, Austria

Courtesy of the Daily Telegraph

THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, TUESDAY, AUGUST 11, 1914.

Your King and Country Need You!

A CALL TO ARMS!

An addition of 100,000 men to His Majesty's Regular Army is immediately necessary in the present grave National Emergency. Lord Kitchener is confident that this appeal will be at once responded to by all those who have the safety of our Empire at heart!

TERMS OF SERVICE:
General Service for a period of 3 years or until the War is concluded.
Age of Enlistment between 19 and 30.

HOW TO JOIN.
Full information can be obtained at any Post Office in the United Kingdom or at any Military Depot.

Daily Mirror

ADVERTISING FOR AN ARMY

Although when the struggle began there were some who spoke of 'peace by Christmas,' Lord Kitchener knew better, and on August 7, 1914 issued the first of his appeals for recruits for his New Army. This poster is one of those which helped to bring the 'first one hundred thousand to the colours'.

FIRST IN FRANCE

Many a time the British Army invaded France, but the "Old Contemptibles" who landed at Boulogne in August, 1914, came as allies, not as foes. This photograph shows one of the first battalions to land resting in a French market square

Sport and General

RED WAR AMONG THE YELLOW CORN

Hostilities in 1914 broke out during a spell of high summer, when the fields were almost ripe for the harvest. But the sword superseded the sickle, and armed men trampled down the uncut grain. These Belgian troops are resting light-heartedly before going into action

" seeks no acquisition of territory as the result of the war with Serbia." The exact terms of the ultimatum were finally settled at a council of ministers held on Sunday, July 19, but before its presentation an important decision must be taken. Should it be shown to the rulers of Germany and Italy, Austria's partners in the Triple Alliance ? While these points were under discussion the note was sent by a courier to the Austrian representative in Belgrade with instructions to present it on the following Thursday, the 23rd.

During these days there were constant communications between the foreign office in Vienna and the one in Berlin where, with the Kaiser and Bethmann-Hollweg away, Herr von Jagow was in charge. He seemed averse to any precipitate action and drew Austria's attention to the need for coming to an arrangement with Italy before any decisive steps were taken. Like high officials in other European countries he knew that the note was being prepared and was acquainted with the general tenor of its terms ; but it was not until the 22nd that he actually saw the text, a copy being handed to him on that day. He then told the Austrian ambassador that he considered it too sharp in tone, and this opinion was shared by Bethmann-Hollweg ; but it was too late to make any alterations. The note was presented as ordered at 6 p.m. on Thursday, July 23, and a reply was requested within 48 hours.

The note contained a number of drastic and humiliating demands, two of which could not be accepted without impairing Serbian sovereignty. Of these two, the first was to the effect that Serbia should accept the collaboration of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government in the repression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial interests of the monarchy ; the second was that judicial proceedings should be taken against the accessories to the plot of June 28 who were in Serbian territory and that Austro-Hungarian delegates should take part in the investigations relating thereto.

The rulers of Germany, while willing that Austria should undertake punitive measures against Serbia, were at this time in favour of making the war a local one ; but the interest of Russia in the fate of the Slav nations made this somewhat difficult. On the very day that the note was presented in Belgrade the French president, Raymond Poincaré, was just concluding a short visit to St. Petersburg, and the Serajevo murder and its implications were certainly discussed by him and M. Sazanoff.

Made known on the 24th, the contents of the Serbian note were regarded by most European statesmen as exceptionally harsh. Sir Edward Grey said it was the " most formidable document he had ever seen addressed by one state to another that was independent." But it was in Russia that the seriousness of the note was most clearly appreciated, and when he heard of it, M. Sazanoff said to a subordinate, " C'est la guerre Européenne." On the same day, he summoned a council of ministers, and it was then decided to try to obtain an extension of the time limit, and to advise Serbia not to resist in case of invasion ; also to mobilize the army in the four districts nearest to Austria.

If Russia's hasty order to mobilize contributed to the coming war, Austria's precipitate action in Belgrade was equally culpable. Just before six o'clock on the 25th the Serbian reply was handed to the Austrian minister in Belgrade. Seeing at a glance that it was not a complete surrender, he sent a note to the foreign office saying that he was leaving the capital at once with his staff. Actually he caught the 6.30 p.m. train, and a few minutes later was on Austrian soil. Three hours previously the Serbian Government had ordered a general mobilization, and arranged for the state departments to leave Belgrade for a safer spot in the interior. War was distinctly nearer.

Two great powers were mobilizing, but four others were anxious—at least, so they professed—for peace. Various proposals were put forward by the statesmen of Great Britain, Germany and Italy, one being for a conference, but none of them was accepted. The grave news that reached London and the other capitals on Sunday, July 26,

CAMPAIGNING IN CHAMPAGNE

War came to France at the moment when the grape harvest was about to be gathered in. An infantry battalion is marching along the dusty high road, while old men, women and children stop in their task of stripping the vines to watch the troops go by

AFTER THE VICTORY

The photograph shows a battlefield in France in the opening days of war when the countryside had not yet been pitted by shell-fire. A successful movement has been carried out, but on the ground are the bodies of those who have paid the price of victory

Photos: Daily Mirror



THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 5, 1914.

ENGLAND'S DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST GERMANY.

INVASION OF LUXEMBURG.

GERMAN ADVANCE

BOOTS POURING IN.

REPORTED FIGHTING.

From WILLIAM MAXWELL

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KING'S MESSAGE TO THE FLEET.

SHIELD OF BRITAIN.

WAR BEGUN BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY.

MINELAYER SUNK BY THE KAISER'S FLEET.

CRUISER CHASED.

ENGLAND DEFIED BY GERMANY.

WARNING DISREGARDED.

BERLIN'S ULTIMATUM TO THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT.

STERN BRITISH REPLY

COMPLIANCE DEMANDED

MIDNIGHT YESTERDAY.

THE KING AND THE OVERSEAS DOMINIONS.

A UNITED EMPIRE.

PEACE AND ARBITRATION.

FRENCH FRONTIER

From WILLIAM MAXWELL

DREADNOUGHTS FOR THE BRITISH FLEET.

INCREASE OF STRENGTH

AN EXPENDITURE OF OVER £5,250,000.

MR. CHURCHILL'S COUP.

ASSURANCES DEMANDED.

THE KING'S MESSAGE.

GREAT PROMOTIONS.

Courtesy of the Daily Telegraph

led, however, to further efforts in this direction. The British Foreign Office learned from its ambassador in St. Petersburg (Sir George Buchanan) that France had given Russia a definite promise of support, and that "unless Germany can restrain Austria, I (the ambassador) regard the situation as desperate." In the afternoon a proposal was sent out from London that the dispute should be referred to a conference of ambassadors, but this was unacceptable partly because Germany urged that a chance should be given for "direct conversations" between Russia and Austria. These direct conversations, begun at the instance of the German ambassador there, took place in St. Petersburg on Sunday and Monday, but failed in their object.

Saturday, July 25, was a day of fate in St. Petersburg, as in Belgrade.

'FALL-IN AND FOLLOW ME!'

In Great Britain, where there was no compulsory military service, came immediately after the declaration of war the first call for more men for the army. Recruiting processions marched through the streets to encourage those who still hesitated, while outside the Whitehall recruiting office queues waited to take the "King's shilling." The centre illustration speaks for itself

'CIVIES' ANSWER THE CALL

The Horse Guards Parade was London's recruiting centre in the early days of the War. Led by a couple of drummers and the recruiting sergeant, a batch of men who have just joined Kitchener's Army are marching off to a regimental depot

Daily Mirror

Outwardly the city, bathed in the summer sunlight, was even more animated than usual, but as a centre of glittering imperial life its end was near, very near. Over the palaces of the Tsar there brooded, as over the castle of Macbeth, a sense of impending doom, and the head of the house of Romanoff was to meet a fate more terrible than that of Duncan. The day of the oracle was long past or Nicholas, wiser perhaps than Croesus, might have hesitated on hearing that aggressive action would mean the end of a great empire.

On this day, M. Sazanoff called a second council of ministers, and thereat five vital decisions were taken. The order for a partial mobilization, *i.e.* against Austria, was confirmed ; troops were recalled to their standing quarters ; cadets were promoted to the rank of officer ; a state of war was proclaimed in the areas nearest to Germany and Austria, and the period preparatory to war was declared. Before the day was over rumours of these proceedings leaked out and there was excitement everywhere, heightened when the populace witnessed the Imperial Guards marching back to the capital and the trains crowded with shouting soldiers, while the Tsar addressed the cadets who were given their commissions at a ceremony at Krasnoe Selo. The military authorities protested strongly against the partial mobilization on the ground that it would make a general mobilization, if and when ordered, very difficult.

On Monday, the 27th, there was much excitement in Berlin. The Kaiser and his principal advisers, again in the capital, decided that localization of the impending struggle would be difficult. Reports of military movements in Russia reached them, and it was resolved to make another effort for peace, one reason being the receipt of an urgent appeal from London. Proposals for mediation, originally those of Sir Edward Grey, were sent to Vienna, but "England's move is made too late," was Vienna's comment ; for just before noon on the 28th Austria declared war on Serbia. This took the form of an uncoded telegram in French, signed by Berchtold. While the telegram was on its way the Kaiser was putting forward a proposal for mediation on the basis that Austria's demands should be met, but that no Serbian territory should be annexed. This proved useless, and on the 29th he had recourse to an exchange of telegrams with the Tsar, each monarch professing his desire for peace.

The declaration of war by Austria led Russia to prepare for a general mobilization. The Tsar signed the necessary order on the morning of the 29th, but in the evening, having received a telegram from the Kaiser, he cancelled it, and during the next day there were close discussions with the German ambassador. In the afternoon of the 30th Sazanoff persuaded his imperial master to sign the order again, and this time there was no drawing back. At four on the morning of the 31st an English traveller in a remote Siberian village was awakened by some shouting, and was told, "There is war."

On the same day the French Ministry, after full consideration, telegraphed to St. Petersburg that, although still hopeful of peace, "France is resolved to fulfil all the obligations of the alliance." On the same day (July 30) France and Russia made great efforts to induce Great Britain to issue a like declaration of support, but without success. The people of that country, which, whatever critics of democracy may say, still controls its own destinies, were not yet prepared to take arms in a quarrel that as yet mainly concerned the peoples of eastern Europe.

In Germany democracy was less powerful, and, moreover, that country was nearer the scene of action. On the 30th the chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, still hoped for peace, but Moltke, the chief of the staff, and many others, wanted mobilization. Austria ordered a general mobilization on the morning of July 31, and urgent telegrams were exchanged between the heads of the German and Austrian armies as to possible operations against Russia. In

SERVICES SUSPENDED

Mile after mile of Belgian railway track was destroyed by the retreating armies to delay the German advance. This single line of railway running through the pleasant countryside has received the attention of Belgian engineers, and been reduced to a twisted length of steel

the afternoon Germany proclaimed the period preparatory to war.

The rest of the story can soon be told. Russia was asked by Germany to suspend her warlike measures, or the latter country would be compelled to arm. A reply was requested within 12 hours, and before noon on Saturday, August 1, the answer came that suspension was impossible. About the same time France was asked what her attitude would be in the event of war, and at 1 p.m. on August 1 came the answer: "France will act in accordance with her interests." On the same day France and Germany ordered general mobilization—France at 4.45 and Germany at 5 p.m. Before the Saturday was over Germany had formally declared war on Russia, but a similar communication to France was not made until 6.15 p.m. on Monday, August 3.

It was next the turn of Belgium and Great Britain to make decisions. On August 2 Germany presented a formal demand for permission to march her troops through Belgium. The King of the Belgians after emphatically refusing the German demand made a direct appeal to King George, and early on Tuesday, August 4, Sir Edward Grey instructed Sir Edward Goschen, the British ambassador in Berlin, to request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium should not be proceeded with and that her neutrality would be respected by Germany.

This request of Great Britain was, in fact, an ultimatum, as a reply was asked for by eleven o'clock that night (midnight by German time). As the German government vouchsafed no reply, Great Britain and Germany were at war when the hour struck. It has been universally conceded that Great Britain's entry into the Great War was the direct result of Germany's determination to trample on Belgium. That Germany herself realized the fact, and also realized it as the death knell of her dreams of world domination, is abundantly clear from the despatch in which the British ambassador reported the incidents of his final interviews with the German secretary of state, Herr von Jagow. These interviews took place on Tuesday, August 4, but in the morning German troops had already crossed the Belgian frontier.

On that occasion Herr von Jagow quite frankly informed Sir Edward Goschen that the Imperial Government had been obliged to violate Belgian neutrality because it was essential that they should invade France with the least possible delay and strike a decisive blow at once. The violation was a *fait accompli*, and there would be no drawing back. From the despatch sent by Sir Edward Goschen to London the following passage may be quoted:

During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the same date and, in compliance with the instructions therein contained, I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the secretary of state that unless the Imperial Government could give the assurance by twelve o'clock that night that they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial Government that His Majesty's Government would have to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium, and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as themselves.

Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely that the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the imperial troops should advance through Belgium.

No reply was sent to the British ultimatum, and at 12.15 a.m. on August 5, 1914, the Foreign Office in London issued the following statement:

Owing to the summary rejection by the German Government of the request made by His Majesty's Government for assurance that the neutrality of Belgium will be respected, His Majesty's ambassador at Berlin has received his passports and His Majesty's Government have declared to the German Government that a state of war exists between Great Britain and Germany as from 11 p.m. on the 4th August.

CHAPTER II

MARCHING MILLIONS

Some estimate of the military, naval and air strengths of the seven combatants who were at war on August 4, 1914 precedes the story of the actual fighting which will begin in our next chapter

BY the evening of August 5, the chief European powers—three great Empires, Germany, Austria and Russia, France with her tradition of military glory, and Britain with her incomparable navy—as well as Belgium and Serbia, were involved in a struggle about which, as the prime minister of Great Britain said, "No man can foresee the end." Some account of the forces upon which these nations could draw is therefore essential and comes appropriately here.

The total populations of these countries amounted to something like 325,000,000. Assuming that twenty per cent of this vast total were able-bodied males, the available man-power was something like 65,000,000, but in actual fact, owing to one reason or another, it was considerably less. It may be said that the military authorities on both sides had collectively at their disposal, in the event of the war being prolonged, something like 40,000,000 men.

This vast total was divided between the two groups of combatants roughly speaking in the proportion of two to one, the advantage being with the Allies, as the British-French-Russian alliance came to be called. But this enormous preponderance was destroyed by the fact that, as competent observers then knew, Russia would find it impossible to arm and transport her millions of potential fighters, and in actual fact, at the outbreak of war, any numerical advantage there was lay probably on the side of the Central Powers.

They had the advantage of their geographical position, which made it possible for them to attack wherever they wished, but against this the Allies had two advantages which may be mentioned. The first was the command of the sea, which, it was confidently expected, the British navy would exercise, and the second, dependent upon it, was the assistance which Britain and France might expect from their overseas empires. These contrasting considerations

TRENCH WARFARE BEGINS

This photograph, which was taken in Belgium in October, 1914, shows a group of British 'Tommies' in one of the earliest trenches

A MIRROR OF DESTRUCTION

The château of Boesinghe, a beautiful country seat near Ypres, was seriously damaged by French gunfire, the reason being that it was on the German side of the fighting line

MINOR TRAGEDIES OF A TRAGIC WHOLE *Photos: E.N.A.*

The bleached and broken skeleton of a German soldier who, caught by the withering fire of the French, crawled in a thicket to die, is here shown. When discovered several months later only his boots and metal buttons indicated his nationality. Below, Austrian troops are shooting blindfolded Bosnian peasants who have been found guilty of treachery

may perhaps be said to cancel one another out, and at the beginning of hostilities the two groups were nearly equal in strength, with the important proviso that, providing the Allies continued to command the sea, the teaching of all history was that, come what might they must win in the end. Conversely, if that command was lost, nothing could prevent the Central Powers from gaining a smashing victory.

In Great Britain, the regular army, which had been reorganized by Mr. R. B. Haldane, afterwards Lord Haldane, in 1907, consisted, when fully mobilized by calling up the reserves, of about 300,000 men. Of these, six divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, a total, with details, of something like 160,000 men, were organized as an expeditionary force, ready to take the field at very short notice. Each infantry division was provided with a full complement of artillery.

Behind the regular army was the special reserve consisting mainly of men who had passed through the ranks and numbering about 60,000. Auxiliaries were provided by the Territorial Force, also created during Lord Haldane's term of office as war minister, which numbered about 250,000 men and was embodied on the outbreak of war. Most of these men had enlisted for home defence only, but almost at once they volunteered for service overseas.

This force of some 600,000 men, however, was clearly inadequate for the task before it, although the trained soldiers of the expeditionary force, volunteers to a man, were at least the equals of any in Europe. Lord Kitchener, who had

ecome secretary for war a few days fter the outbreak of hostilities, called t once for 100,000 men, then for a econd 100,000, and then for others, ntil by September 15 this New, or Kitchener's, army, as it was called, was 00,000 strong. These men, however, ould not be fit for service in the field r some months to come.

To prepare for the coming storm the rench nation had accepted, a few years efore the war began, a measure for ncreasing the period of compulsory ilitary service from two to three years, ut this change was only just beginning o bear fruit in 1914. Her regular army as something like 670,000 strong, sing on the mobilization of reserves to 200,000, but behind it were the older en who had passed through the ranks nd it was stated that the country could ut into the field a force of 3,800,000 en with 92,000 officers a fortnight fter the declaration of war. This stimate, however, was much too sanuine, but the total fighting strength f the nation may perhaps be put down t 5,000,000. The French army, like he German, was organized on an rmy corps basis. Roughly speaking, n all the armies alike, the units were attalion 1,000, brigade 4,000, division 2,000 to 18,000, and army corps 0,000 to 40,000.

France's ally, Russia, may next be onsidered, and the army of the Tsar as superior to all others in numbers, lthough not necessarily so in efficiency. ts peace strength was upwards of ,200,000 men of all ranks, a figure hich on mobilization could easily be rought up to 2,000,000. Its total war trength was estimated at between ,000,000 and 7,000,000. As events ere to prove, however, it was one hing to possess these vast hosts, but uite another to equip them with the rms and ammunition required in odern warfare and to transport hem from place to place as and when equired.

Against the forces of these three ountries, together with those of Belgium nd Serbia, was pitted the strength of he two Germanic empires. The German egular army, like the French and the Russian, consisted of conscripts who erved with the colours for two or three ears and then passed into the reserve. t numbered some 800,000 men, organzed in 26 districts each supporting one rmy corps. On mobilization it was nlarged by calling upon the men of the rst reserve, those who had just completed their years of service, and in this ay its fighting strength was raised to bout 1,300,000. Further additions ere made by calling upon the two sections of the reserve; the first of these was the Landwehr, which numbered about 2,000,000, and the second, composed of the older men, was the Landsturm, which may have numbered as many as 4,000,000, although by no means all these were fit for active service.

In efficiency this vast army was second to none. Its officers were zealous students of the art of war, devoted to their profession. Its guns and equipment were the best that scientific skill and long experience could devise. Its activities were directed by a general staff, which had proved its mettle in the struggles of 1866 and 1870–1. By it plans of campaign had been prepared which were unrivalled for the elaboration of their detail and the precision of their facts.

The Austrian contribution, although not to be compared either in size or efficiency with that of Germany, was by no means negligible. Its regular army, raised and organized in very much the same way as that of its ally, numbered something over 400,000, brought up on mobilization to 600,000. The Landwehr numbered about 230,000, and altogether the Dual Monarchy could perhaps put a million men into the field very shortly after the outbreak of war, bringing this figure up to 2,000,000 after some months of preparation. Of the two smaller nations Belgium had a regular army of about 50,000 men and the country's war strength may be put at

PRUSSIANS AWAIT THE 'STEAM ROLLER'

Peering into the distance to observe the advancing enemy, these German troops, in a position strongly defended by barbed wire entanglements, are prepared to operate their armoured machine guns. An incident of the campaign in East Prussia

FRANC-TIREURS' MARCH OF DOOM

These franc-tireurs—irregular combatants not in uniform—have been captured by the Germans and, without even the formality of a court-martial, are being conducted to face the firing squad. Hundreds, maybe thousands, of Belgian free lances were thus shot by the invaders

the maximum figure of 350,000. The Serbian army was about the same size, but its arms and equipment were not equal to those of its opponents and it was also lacking in transport facilities.

The war, however, was not to be fought on land only, but also on the sea, and the chief combatants were eager to test in the stern ordeal of battle the value of the gigantic engines of destruction on which they had lavished so much skill and money in the years of peace. Great Britain, although weaker than many thought prudent, still possessed the strongest navy in the world. Its strength consisted, like that of the German and other navies, in battleships divided into super-dreadnoughts, dreadnoughts, and pre-dreadnoughts, cruisers, destroyers and submarines.

The pre-dreadnoughts were battleships built before the advent of the dreadnought and were of comparatively little fighting value, although, if the dreadnoughts were crippled or destroyed, they would at once become dominant. The dreadnoughts were ships which carried ten or twelve big guns, either 12 in. or 13·5 in., in distinction from the earlier battleships which usually carried only four of these weapons and a number of 6 in. guns. The super-dreadnoughts were armed with 15 in. guns. The cruisers were divided into protected and unprotected according to the strength of their armour, or into light and heavy according to their size; the battle cruisers, which carried all big guns, were classed as dreadnoughts.

The strength of the British navy, like that of others, varied from time to time as new ships were put into commission and older ones withdrawn. This fact accounts for the apparently contradictory statements which appeared from time to time about naval strength. Official figures estimated the strength of the British navy at the end of 1914 as 16 super-dreadnoughts, 15 dreadnoughts, 40 battleships of lesser strength, 50 cruisers, i.e. large cruisers, 75 light cruisers, 248 destroyers and 85 submarines. There were a number of ships in the course of construction. The personnel numbered 145,000 officers, seamen and marines, with reserves of about 50,000.

The German fleet was inferior in strength only to the British. As far as can be ascertained its effective strength in August, 1914 consisted of 21 dreadnoughts and 20 other capital ships. In smaller craft its numbers were: cruisers 47, destroyers 152 and submarines 45. Its personnel numbered 73,000 officers and men, with about 110,000 in reserve.

The French navy, at about the same date, consisted of seven dreadnoughts, 21 other capital ships and 31 cruisers, with their complement of destroyers and submarines. In submarines the French navy was especially strong, these numbering 76. It was located almost entirely in the Mediterranean. The Russian navy was divided between the Baltic and the Black Seas. In the Baltic were four dreadnoughts, five other capital ships and nine large cruisers. In the Black Sea were three dreadnoughts, seven other battleships and two armoured cruisers. The Austrian navy was negligible.

To complete the enumeration mention must be made of an arm which made its first appearance in the Great War. In 1912 Great Britain had formed a Royal Flying Corps, and connected with her navy was a branch known as the Royal Naval Air Service. In August, 1914 the strength of these forces was slight, perhaps some 1,000 officers and men with about 100 machines, but expansion was instant and rapid. France, Germany and Russia were all, at the opening of the struggle, stronger in the air than was Great Britain. France was said to possess 334 aeroplanes, Germany 475 and Russia 500. In addition France and Germany had a certain number of military airships.

Especially in Germany great attention had been paid to the details of mobilization, and in Berlin, Paris, and St. Petersburg, elaborate plans were ready for the day whereon, by despatching a telegram containing perhaps but a single word,

'I WAS A SPY!': DEATH AT DAWN

A German spy, caught amid the ruins of Termonde by some returning Belgians, stands blindfolded against a wall, and in a moment will have paid the price of detection

KAISER'S LEGIONS HURRY PAST

Through the Brussels streets the German hordes surge in an endless stream, dusty and footsore, but impelled by the hope of speedy victory. One marcher, remembering perhaps his own children, stoops to pat the head of a Belgian youngster

he whole machinery of war could be t in motion. Each army should then e prepared " to the last gaiter button," s a French general had boasted—very nfortunately as the sequel proved—in 870. Obviously, no country attained hat ideal, even in 1914, but Germany as perilously near it.

The three great empires, Germany, rance and Russia, organized their onscript armies on an army corps basis, nd in this respect there was little ifference between them. The country as divided into districts, each with a ilitary centre, and each responsible or an army corps which were formed of nen living in that area. On hearing he word mobilize, the reservists were ound to report themselves for service.

First came the younger men who had nly just left the ranks of the regular rmy. They brought the battalions of he army corps up to full strength and n a given time, very few days indeed, his marched towards the guns. As oon as these units had gone to the front, rmy corps were formed from the other rained reservists who poured into the epot, and in this way, at least in ermany, the strength of the army was oubled in a very short time. Other eservists, older men, were then called p and then still older ones, these being sed to fill the gaps in the ranks on ctive service, while further recruits ere obtained from the young men who ere steadily reaching the age for ilitary service.

In Great Britain mobilization was on much smaller scale, but it worked in much the same way. Reservists joined their units in order to bring them up to full strength for service in the field. Recruits were called for to fill the gaps due to casualties. The main difference between Great Britain and the other combatants was that the former country had to rely upon persuasion.

Mr. Winston Churchill in " The World Crisis, The Eastern Front," puts down the number of men who were called upon for active service in the first few weeks of the war at 12,000,000, and in his own graphic way comments upon the event thus :

> Such were the plans and compacts which underlay the civilization of Europe. All had been worked out in the minutest detail. They involved the marshalling for immediate battle of nearly twelve million men. For each of these there was a place reserved. For each there was a summons by name. The depots from which he would draw his uniform and weapons, the time tables of the railways by which he would travel, the roads by which he would march, the proclamations which would inflame or inspire him, the food and munitions he would require, the hospitals which would receive his torn or shattered body—all were ready. Only his grave was lacking ; but graves do not take long to dig. We know no spectacle in human history more instinct with pathos than that of these twelve million men, busy with the cares, hopes and joys of daily life, working in their fields or mills, or seated these summer evenings by their cottage doors with their wives and children about them, making their simple plans for thrift or festival, unconscious of the fate which now drew near, and which would exact from them their all. Only a signal is needed to transform these multitudes of peaceful peasants and workmen into the mighty hosts which will tear each other to pieces year after year with all the machinery of science, with all the passions of races, and all the loyalties of men.

In addition to providing field armies, Germany, France, and Russia had to garrison the fortresses that defended their frontiers, and to these certain units were sent. Germany divided her fortresses into ten groups, each with a central stronghold. Among them were Berlin and Munich, which were inland, but the other eight were on or near the frontiers. They were Königsberg, Posen, Cologne, Mainz, Metz, Strasbourg and Kiel. Each was connected with every other by underground telegraph lines, while strategic railways led from the principal railway centres towards the frontiers. The command of the whole force was vested in the emperor, but the actual director was the soldier who occupied the position of chief of staff to his majesty.

The fortresses of France were Paris, the centre of defence, Verdun, Toul, Epinal, and Belfort, and behind them Maubeuge, La Fère, Reims, Langres, Dijon, and Besançon. The director of the army was, as in Germany, the chief of the general staff, but the place of the emperor was taken by the superior council of war, which, consisting of 12 generals, was presided over by the minister of war. Russia possessed a number of fortresses, the strongest being Kovno in the Vilna district and the four called the quadrilateral that defended Poland—Novo Georgievsk, Ivangorod, and Warsaw on the Vistula and Brest-Litovsk on the Bug. Austria's most prominent fortress was Przemysl in Galicia.



Central News

MY HOUSE SHALL BE CALLED A HOUSE OF PRAYER

The bombardment of Reims was one of the tragedies of the War that deeply seared the soul of France. The cathedral, the city's most sacred shrine, was not spared by the German gunners. Shell after shell shattered the carvings and statues which had been inviolate for centuries

CHAPTER III

SCOURGING OF SERBIA

The earliest fighting in the Great War took place in Serbia, and the following chapter describes the Austrian invasion of that country which ended before the close of the year

IN October, 1912, there was a general Christian uprising in the Balkans, and the Serbians avenged their débâcle at Kossovo in 1389 by inflicting a severe defeat on Turkey at Kumanovo. Austria retaliated by creating the kingdom of Albania, and, in combination with Germany, detached Bulgaria from the Balkan League which had been the hope of the population of the Balkans. The Germanic powers calculated that once peace was signed with Turkey the Balkan League would destroy itself, a calculation which was very nearly justified, for the League dissolved in a new and fratricidal war in the course of which Bulgaria was defeated. From this war, which ended with the treaty of Bucharest, on August 10, 1913, Serbia emerged victorious but exhausted.

The political situation, then, as it existed at the outbreak of the war, was as follows: The Austro-Hungarian and the German Empires had common interests. The ascendancy of Austria-Hungary in the Balkan peninsula was essential to Germany's own ascendancy in Constantinople, upon which depended the success of her far-reaching schemes of expansion in Mesopotamia and Asia Minor.

For the purpose of creating a Greater Germany the acquisition of Asia Minor was of importance. That country possesses vast natural resources in the shape of a fruitful soil, enormous mineral deposits, and excellent harbours; the Turks of Asia Minor afforded excellent material for conversion into military forces; and Asia Minor itself forms a gigantic natural fortress which separates and connects the three continents of the Old World. The Serbian writer, Dr. Niko Zupanic, pointed out, in the early days of the war, that the natural route from Central Europe to Constantinople runs along the Danube valley as far as Belgrade. Near Belgrade the broad valley of the Morava opens. This leads from the neighbourhood of Belgrade to the south, running in an almost straight line to Salonika.

At Nish (Niš) this natural high road branches. One branch runs south-east and, after crossing the mountain ranges by easy passes, descends into the valley of the Maritza, follows that river to a point beyond Adrianople, and thence proceeds to Constantinople. The other branch follows the river Morava beyond Nish, and then threads its way through the mountains until it reaches the valley of the Vardar. Following that river, it eventually arrives at the commodious and excellent harbour of Salonika. Modern highroads and railways follow nature's routes; therefore, the railroads from Berlin and Vienna towards Salonika and Constantinople follow these river routes.

Obviously, the German policy was to deny Serbia an outlet to the sea, and to isolate her from her friends. It was essential that the part of the great strategical highroad to Salonika and Constantinople which was in Serbia's keeping should pass into that of the Central Empires. The Kaiser saw quite clearly what might be accomplished by a combination of German organization, German intelligence and German industrial power with Mahomedan fanaticism, and it became vitally clear during the war that the railway line from Belgrade to Salonika was Serbia's spinal cord. Salonika was the only harbour whence the Allies could send her help by rail.

The morale of the troops at the outbreak of war was excellent, for Serbia's army was experienced in modern warfare. On the other hand there was a very serious shortage of war material and especially of rifles. In order to replace the wastage of their late campaigns against Turkey and Bulgaria orders for artillery, rifles, ammunition, uniforms and war material of all kinds had been placed with the European factories, but nothing had been delivered except a small quantity of clothing. Beyond the facilities provided by the national arsenal of Kraguyevatz the Serbs themselves possessed no means of making good their recent losses in war material, and the activities of the arsenal were confined to the manufacture of ammunition and the repairing of damaged rifles. At the outset many of the regiments, consisting of an effective strength of over four thousand men, possessed only two thousand six hundred rifles apiece. The number of men available for military service was about 250,000.

For the enterprise the Austrian General Staff had provided 19 divisions divided into three armies, numbered the 2nd, 5th and 6th, the whole being under the command of Potiorek, formerly governor of Bosnia. One of the three armies, however, the 2nd, was under orders to march to Galicia, where the Russian advance was developing more rapidly than was expected, but it did not move away at once. The Serbian forces, under the command of Marshal Putnik, were also divided into three armies, but these were numerically weaker than the Austrian ones. They were arranged behind the frontier formed by the rivers Save and Drina, their centre being Valievo. Behind them were 40,000 Montenegrins who had come to the aid of their ally.

The frontier between Austria and Serbia extended for a distance of nearly 340 miles, and was formed on the north by the rivers Danube and Save and on the west by the Drina. Both the Save and the Drina are comparatively shallow, and at various points there are places at which military forces can cross. To some of these points Austria had constructed strategic railways.

Austria declared war on Serbia on July 28, 1914, and proclaimed to the world that her action would only take the form of a punitive expedition. The intention of her General Staff was to make an enveloping movement by four

E.N.A.

HE DIED FOR SERBIA

A Serbian gunner lies dead beside his ammunition wagon, the gun having been rescued by his comrades. Serbia saw some of the earliest fighting in the War

CHARGE! ACT I OF A BELGIAN BALACLAVA

Under the eyes of the waiting infantry some 300 Belgian cavalrymen ride out to make an attempt to delay the German advance. Long, however, before they come to grips with the foe they are mown down by machine guns and only seven return

army corps with Nish as the objective. Two corps were to cross the Danube at or near Belgrade, and the third was to cross the Save near Shabatz (Sabac) and act as a guard to the main advance. The fourth corps moving from Serajevo was to turn the flank of the Serbian line of defence and at the same time, by invading the Novibazar district, to separate Serbia from Montenegro, which country, immediately after Austria's declaration of war, had thrown in her lot with her neighbour and was preparing to send her forces through Bosnia to join the Serbs.

In the Crown Prince Alexander, later king of Yugo-Slavia, and General Putnik the Serbians had two leaders of proved ability. The crown prince was among the few generals of the allied armies with experience of modern warfare, for he had commanded a Serbian army during the war against Turkey and Bulgaria in 1912–13. He was fortunate in his chief-of-staff, General Putnik, who had served in both the first and second Balkan wars. The crown prince was wise enough to appreciate the fine qualities of Putnik, who was virtually generalissimo of the Serbian army from the outbreak of war until the great retreat in 1915. Unfortunately Putnik did not live to see the liberation of his country as he died in May, 1917

The Austrian attack began by bombarding Belgrade with guns firing across the river and during the first week in August the Austrian army corps made repeated efforts to cross the Danube and the Save. The points of crossing were successfully disputed by the Serbians and in no case did the Austrian attempts meet with any measure of success, while an effort to invade Serbia from the extreme east at Orsova resulted in a minor disaster for the Austrian army. The three battalions that formed the Austrian advance guard lost touch with their

HELP FROM FRIEND AND FOE

When the Germans were nearing the Belgian coast their approach was heralded by Uhlan scouts, some of whom were routed by the French cavalry. Those who were wounded were rushed to Ostend, then still in Belgian hands, and shipped to England. On the quay at Ostend a wounded Uhlan is being helped by his comrades and French soldiers to a stretcher

Sport and General

own main body, and at the same time fell into a trap and suffered heavy losses. This success produced a wholesome effect upon the morale of the Serbians, who had resented the bombardment of their capital from across the Danube, to which they had been unable to make an effective reply.

On August 11, under cover of a heavy combined rifle and artillery fire along the whole of the front from Losnitza on the Drina to Shabatz on the Save, a reconnaissance in force was carried out in which the Austrian aircraft were particularly active, but still no success resulted. These Austrian efforts were only preliminary. The real attack began on the 12th.

On August 12 an Austrian advance guard crossed the Drina, pushing eastward, while a detachment of the 4th Austrian corps easily effected a crossing of the Save near Shabatz. On the following day, pontoon bridges having been constructed at several points, the Austrians began to pour across the river into Serbia. During the whole of August 13 the Serbian rearguard showed the utmost pluck, and only when night came to cover its movements did it fall back and occupy positions facing the Austrian 8th and 13th corps. On the 14th the Austrians resumed their forward movement, and the confused fighting that followed is usually divided into two principal operations known as the battle of the Jadar and the battle of Shabatz. The Jadar may be described first.

E.N.A.

'TURN OUT YOUR POCKETS!'

Although when caught the Belgian franc-tireurs were generally shot out of hand, for some little time they maintained a guerilla warfare against the invaders. The Germans were naturally suspicious of every stray civilian who fell into their hands, especially in the early days of the occupation, and subjected them to a rigorous search for hidden weapons.

The 8th corps marched on Tzer; the 13th corps had a division on either bank of the river Jadar as it moved along the valley, while a third division and the regiment of mountain artillery threatened the Serbian flank. As soon as it was evident that the Austrian main armies were committed to this forward movement, while the 4th and 9th Austrian corps were still held up at Shabatz by a Serbian containing force, Serbian reinforcements were dispatched on August 15 to endeavour to turn the Austrian left flank. All through the 15th and 16th the Serbians resisted the attacks of the 13th corps along the Jadar valley, and only abandoned their trenches when the Austrian flanking column had completely turned their position. Then during the night they again retired, and took up a third line of defences near Zavlaka. Serbian reinforcements were rushed as rapidly as possible and throughout the 17th, 18th, and 19th those reinforcements concentrated so as to outflank the Austrian movement.

By the afternoon of the 18th it became evident that the Austrian offensive movement was giving way. Their losses had been heavy; they had entirely failed to shake the Serbian defensive; and they had not been able to obtain any assistance from their 4th and 9th corps, who were still held up at Shabatz.

On the 19th the Austrian offensive broke up altogether. The Serbians had succeeded in driving a wedge between the Austrians. The plight of the Austrian 8th and 13th corps was desperate. In front and on their flank was an unbeaten enemy, while on their rear a river separated them from a country the inhabitants of which were, if not hostile, at least disloyal. Nevertheless they could do nothing but retreat, and throughout August 20, 21, and 22 the Serbians pushed the pursuit, eventually driving the remnants of the 13th and

SUSPICION ENCOUNTERS STOLIDITY

This Belgian peasant is suspected of being something even more dangerous than a franc-tireur, and his captors are doing their utmost to get him to incriminate himself as a spy behind the German lines. If they succeeded the penalty, a quick one, was death

E.N.A.

TARGET! FRENCH GUNS FIND THEIR MARK

German lorries conveying munitions and stores for those in the firing line have been sighted by the French artillery observers. In a few minutes the target has been registered, the shells rain down and convert the train of lorries into a mass of tangled scrap

8th corps either into the Drina or across it. Of the 130,000 Austrian troops who had crossed the Drina on August 12 and 13 some 20,000 were killed or wounded, and over 5,000 were taken prisoners. The Serbians captured over sixty pieces of artillery and an immense amount of other military stores and equipment. This ended the battle of the Jadar.

During this period the Serbian containing force in front of Shabatz had been able to hold off the Austrian 4th and 9th corps. As soon as the rout of the other two corps became pronounced, the Serbian main army at Tzer broke off the pursuit and turned north-eastwards with a view to encircling the Shabatz army. The general commanding this Austrian force, under cover of a violent assault upon the Serbian positions, drew off the major portion of his army, and made for the banks of the Save. The attack was defeated with great loss to the Austrians, and it was only because of the excellent work of a flotilla of Austrian war vessels lying in the Save that the remnants of the Austrian army were able to cross the river and to avoid capture.

On Monday, August 24, the last detachment of this Austrian army made its escape from Serbian territory and the battle of Shabatz was over. In less than a month the Serbian forces, which numbered at most 250,000 men, had inflicted an overwhelming defeat upon a slightly superior Austrian army of invasion, capturing nearly half its war material. But the battles of Shabatz and the Jadar had even greater consequences. They compelled the Austrian and German general staffs to reconsider their plans. Two Austrian corps which were destined to help the Germans in Alsace were hastily recalled. Reserve troops which were to have been sent to meet the Russians in Galicia were ordered southwards instead of eastwards, while Germany had to consider transferring troops from Belgium and France to replace the Austrian forces that had been diverted to Serbia.

The communiqué issued on this occasion by the Vienna press bureau is instructive :

Since owing to the intervention of Russia in our dispute with Serbia we find it necessary to concentrate our entire force for the great combat in the north, the war against Serbia must be considered only as a *strafe-expedition* which for the same reason has become a matter of only secondary interest. . . . This operation was limited to a short incursion into the enemy's territory, after the successful accomplishment of which it was necessary to return to an attitude of expectancy, in adjourning the offensive

DOGS OF WAR

In the early days of the War Belgians made good use of machine-guns mounted on light dog-carriages, thus making one of the most mobile arms employed in modern warfare still more mobile

NUTS WITHOUT WINE

Belgian peasant women showed high courage in ministering to the troops. These two women are distributing walnuts to soldiers in the trenches between Duffell and Lierre during the defence of Antwerp, at a time when an attack might come at any moment

to a more favourable occasion. . . . The fact that our troops in parts suffered heavy losses should not astonish us, for our enemy possessed a numerical superiority, and was, in addition, fighting for his existence . . . Our troops left the enemy completely enfeebled on the field of battle.

It is desirable to a certain extent to draw a veil over the atrocities which took place during the Austrian retreat. They are amply vouched for with numerous authentic photographs in the works of the neutral writer, Dr. R. A. Reiss, the French writer Henry Barby, and others who made their observations on the spot. Neither sex nor age was spared; torture and mutilation, and wholesale massacres of the inhabitants took place. Atrocities took place in other fields of the Great War, but they cannot be compared to those established by proof as having been committed by the Austrian army against the Serbian peasantry. That these atrocities were not only countenanced but were further encouraged by the Austrian military authorities is proved by orders to the troops issued by the high command, of which the following may be quoted:

You are engaged in war in a hostile country possessed of a fanatical hatred towards us, in a country where cowardly assassination, as the catastrophe of Serajevo showed, is held to be permissible even by the upper classes, and where it is glorified as an act of heroism. In dealing with such a population any disposition towards humanity and kindliness would be entirely misplaced. . . . I therefore order that during the entire course of the war an attitude of extreme severity, extreme harshness and extreme distrust is to be observed towards everybody. In the first place I will not allow persons armed but wearing no uniform, whether encountered singly or in groups, to be taken prisoners. They must be executed without exception.

Owing to a shortage some of the troops of the reserve had received no uniform but the cap, and it is possible that in some cases even the cap was absent owing to the delayed deliveries of uniforms, but as a French writer points out, the Austro-Hungarian high command were well aware of the position, and their instructions, therefore, amounted to an order to massacre the Serbian soldiers.

The elated Serbians celebrated their victory by taking the offensive in the early days of September. Their troops crossed the Drina and made their way into Bosnia, but the effort was too much for them, and in a day or two it was abandoned. The welcome which the Serbian soldiers had received had an unfortunate sequel, for when the Austrians returned they made it an excuse for taking vengeance upon the unfortunate inhabitants.

In September, 1914, the Austrians made a second attempt to invade Serbia. The battle usually known as the battle of the Drina began with the Austrians crossing that river on September 8 and 9. Under great pressure the Serbians yielded ground, and on September 11 the Austrians again held Shabatz. The Serbians had been reinforced, however, and after a preliminary repulse they drove the Austrians back towards the Drina. After an exhausting struggle both sides settled down to trench warfare, but the Austrians soon withdrew and the second invasion of Serbia had definitely failed. In the meantime Serbian and Montenegrin forces made several raids into Bosnia.

The third Austrian invasion of Serbia began early in November and met with a more rapid success than its predecessors. For it the Austrians had assembled an army of 300,000 men under General Potiorek. To aid the Serbians supplies from Great Britain and France were shipped to a Mediterranean port and sent up to Nish, but these were insufficient, and exhausted by their previous efforts the Serb soldiers were clearly unable to meet the new menace. The Austrians speedily advanced and General Putnik was compelled to order his troops to retreat to the mountains.

A LESSON IN DEFENCE

Every army had its untrained levies who had quickly to be accustomed to the emergencies of war. Along a canal outside Antwerp a Belgian non-commissioned officer is training a squad of youthful soldiers to concentrate their fire on one of the roads by which the enemy may advance

YOUTH GUARDS THE ROAD

During the invasion of Belgium many gallant stands were made by small bodies of troops in the effort to hold up the German advance. Here a juvenile detachment has entrenched itself along a village road and is prepared to give the German scouts a warm reception

The retreat was not carried out in good order. The Austrians attacked furiously all along the frontier from Orsova to Visegrad, and the Serbian rearguards could not hold back the enemy. They swept over the frontier and converged upon the town of Valievo which commanded the roads to Belgrade, Obrenovac, and other strategical points. By the capture of Valievo, on November 11, the Austrian commander surmounted the first series of barriers which formed the natural defences of Serbia, and planted the centre of his army in the middle of the Serbian highlands. At the same time he swung his right wing over the heights far to the south. Ridge after ridge was lost by the Serbs, who grew more demoralized as superior numbers and artillery pressed them back.

All along the line the Serbian forces gave way. Their centre was thrown back on the Kolubara river on November 20, and on November 28 the greater part of the mountain defences, including the passes of the Suvobor heights, was stormed and turned by the invaders. Belgrade was entered, and the line of the Austrian advance stretched for 70 miles from the Danube towards Chachak, or Cacak, in the Morava valley.

On December 1 the weakening Serbian army held only the rocky wedge between the Morava valleys. In the middle of this wedge was the arsenal town of Kragujevatz, defended on the northwest by the Rudnik ridge, with peaks rising from 3,000 to 4,500 feet. Some fifteen miles westward of the Rudnik ridge was another high tract of mountain, the Maljen ridge. Between the Rudnik and the Maljen extended the lower heights of Suvobor, over which ran the passes to Chachak and Kragujevatz. Suvobor was the gateway into the central highlands of Serbia, and the 1st Serbian army surrendered it to the enemy almost without a blow and withdrew to the lower slopes.

All the ridges of Maljen westward were also lost on November 25 and the 4th army was retreating up the valley on the western Morava. Far to the south, along the railway leading to Salonika, by which the Serbians usually received their supplies, bands of Moslems and other insurgents broke their line of communication with the outer world. The Austrian staff believed that with the forcing of the Suvobor ridges the resistance of the Serbians had been completely broken.

But the Serbian forces had by now obtained supplies of shells and ammunition, and its leaders resolved on a further desperate effort. The troops had been reorganized in four armies, and to them the order for the counter-attack was given on December 2. General Mishich, with the 1st army, had halted on the little mountain stream—the Dicina. He suddenly advanced in an attack on the morning of December 3, 1914, and completely surprised the Austrians. Capturing the overlooking hills, the Serbs shot down the hostile columns while the Austrians were still wondering where they should place their artillery. So overwhelming was the onset of the Serbs that Potiorek and his staff evidently thought all the Serbian armies had been massed for the attack on Suvobor.

Under these conditions the Austrian commander attempted to alter entirely his disposition for battle. He ordered both his wings to send large reinforcements to his centre. But the movement of large bodies of troops through snowstorms in the mountain chains of the Balkans, intersected only by a few rough roads, was not a quick or easy



HOMMAGES, MESDAMES

One of Belgium's greatest needs was succour for the wounded, and many British nurses crossed the Channel to face the dangers and hardships of a nurse's work just behind the lines. These Belgian soldiers are giving a hearty welcome to two such sisters of mercy

MISSIONERS OF MERCY

Such a scene as this was common in the streets of many a Belgian and French town during the War. The wounded are coming in and there are ready hands to help, as well as trained assistance in the form of nurses, but as just behind the lines such tragedies have already become familiar the people of the town go on their way with but a passing glance

Sport and General

E.N.A.

ACTION FRONT!

Germany's greatest victory in the war was won at Tannenberg in East Prussia. The campaign was one of movement. There were no deep trenches, but improvised positions such as that shown in the photograph formed cover for the troops

matter. The guns were also held up, with the supply wagons, and as a result most of the Austro-Hungarian troops had little or nothing to eat for two days or more.

The Serbian artillerymen did admirable work. As soon as their infantry had rushed a good gun position they got their pieces up, and then poured their shrapnel on the enemy, bunched up in the valley and plainly outlined against the snow. The targets were large and extraordinarily clear, and the Serbian artillerymen, with guns firing twenty rounds a minute, wrought terrible havoc. It was the remarkable increase in the power of the Serbian artillery that made the Austrian general staff reach the conclusion that all the forces of Serbia were concentrated in front of Suvobor.

At the end of ten hours of fierce, incessant conflict the Austrian first line was thrown back with the loss of some of its mountain howitzers. The troops retired on the positions defended by their heavy guns. But the Serbians, exhilarated by their preliminary success, swept on in the darkness, gaining ground over which it would have been impossible for them to advance in daylight in the teeth of the long-range Austrian guns. After midnight they snatched a little sleep and ate what food could be brought up; and before the winter dawn broke they had hauled their light guns closer to the enemy.

Then came the grand attack. After a short struggle the enemy's front was broken, and his entrenched positions were enfiladed and captured. Line after line of rising crests, each commanding the other, and all with a wide field of fire, dominated the ground which the Serbians approached. Each assault up the slopes, against machine guns, artillery and rifle fire, was an arduous business, and if the snow had not been trampled into mud by the retreating invaders the storming parties could have been marked down miles away. But the Serbs went up in widely extended order, throwing up little mounds at the end of every rush. Then, as their

TROPHY AND TOMB

Paul von Hindenburg, the German president, who died August 2, 1934, lies buried beneath the grandiose memorial which his countrymen erected to commemorate his victory at Tannenberg in August, 1914

E.N.A.

FRIENDS AT BREAKFAST

The tide of German invasion swept more than once over the placid countryside of Poland. These German officers, passing through a Polish village, breakfast on one side of the farmyard, leaving the other to the pigs

guns in the rear beat down the fire from the heights, they closed for the final charge on the enemy positions.

The end came near Gorni Toplitza, where the road runs round a great height overhanging the river valley. On the edge of the mountain the Austrians had a battery of field guns in an orchard. In the road below was a string of ammunition wagons, from which guns were served. The Serbian artillerymen hauled up their guns on the flank of this position and poured on it a devastating fire. The torrent of shrapnel shot down men and horses, and the high-explosive shells which followed wrecked the batteries, limbers and ammunition carts. Some men tried to escape, throwing away their packs as they made for a neighbouring ravine. But they were all caught before they reached it, and after the slaughter the Austrians did not stay even to put their own abandoned artillery out of action. They left behind them also their machine guns and their unexhausted stores of ammunition.

Map of Serbia illustrating the fighting during the Austrian invasion. It took place chiefly in the north-western part of the country along the rivers Drina, Save, and Jadar

At Valievo there was at last a rally of the best regiments of the 15th army corps and the several brigades of the 16th corps brought up to reinforce it, together with some Hungarian regiments, sent hurriedly down from the neighbourhood of Belgrade to stop the rout. The Hungarians and Austrians entrenched along the main road from the Suvobor region, and got their guns into position. The Serbs could be seen slowly advancing along the road. But a considerable time passed before an attack was made, and then it was an overwhelming surprise. For the troops seen along the road were only a reserve, waiting to pursue the enemy when he was broken. The main force crept over the mountains, attacked on the flank and threatened the rear, with the result that no battle took place. The rout was only intensified.

When the 1st Serbian army, under Mishich, was winning this success, the

ARTILLERY IN RETREAT

The hour of Louvain's doom is approaching. Through a deserted street, a column of Belgian artillery is falling back before the enemy. In the distance a column of smoke from a burning village rises into the still air, a sinister portent of the destruction to come

3rd army, under Sturm, and the 2nd army, under Stephanovitch, came down from the slopes of the Rudniks. Sturm's men worked through the turned flanks of the central Austrian forces on December 5, and then broke a large part of the enemy's northern wing by a night attack in which thousands of prisoners were taken. At the same time Stephanovitch, with the 2nd army, drove hard into the middle of the Austrian northern wing, and caught it as it was still extended in its movement round the Rudniks towards Kragujevatz, a town 60 miles S.E. of Belgrade.

Although the powerful northern wing of the Austrian army was severed from its centre and thrown back, no overwhelming victory over it was achieved. Being very much outnumbered, Putnik could not spare the forces necessary to rout the enemy's strong northern force. Having broken the centre of Potiorek's front, the Serbian commander gave his chief attention to capturing the Austrian southern wing, operating in the western Morava valley. Here the 4th Serbian army, usually known from its base town as the Ushitza army, was placed across the river valley above Chachak.

For some days the Serbians in this sector of the front could only hold their own by a great effort against superior forces, brought against them. But when Mishich stormed the Suvobor ridges the Austrian southern wing began to withdraw on December 5, and the commander of the 4th Serbian army did not allow the withdrawal to take place in orderly fashion. Waiting till nightfall, when he knew the roads would be choked with the enemy's heavy artillery, he delivered an attack, and as dawn came the Austrians were in full retreat. They threw out rearguards in the river valley, but the Serbians came down behind the entrenchments, making continual hauls of guns and prisoners as they moved forward.

On December 7 some of Mishich's men captured the summit of Maljen. Then, linked with the advancing edge of the 4th army, they achieved the enveloping operation which the Austrian commander had vainly hoped to accomplish. The three fugitive army corps which had constituted the centre and southern wing of the invading forces were cut off from the northern wing and shepherded to destruction. There was little fighting. It was merely a race towards the Drina and Save rivers, through the mountains in north-west Serbia. The Austrians kept to the valley roads, and the Serbians cut them off in thousands by using the straighter mountain paths with which they were familiar. By December 10 Sturm with the 3rd army was nearing Obrenovac, a town situated where the Kolubara joins the Save a few miles below Belgrade.

Eastward, meanwhile, Potiorek was trying to retain Belgrade with his detached northern wing. Formed of the 8th and a mixed army corps, this force had checked the advance of the 2nd Serbian army, under Stephanovitch, and had pressed hard against the garrison of Belgrade, which on the fall of the Serbian capital, had retired to the mountain of Kosmai, north of the Rudnik range.

Here it was attacked by part of the Austrian northern wing on December 7 and the two following days. On the last day, however, the complete overthrow of the main forces of the enemy enabled Putnik to rearrange his forces. He moved part of his 3rd army towards the Save, some twenty miles south of Belgrade. Another part he attached to his 2nd army, and added his cavalry to it, and also the Belgrade garrison. The combined force was placed under the command of Stephanovitch. He had just received assistance from France in the shape of some new batteries of guns and something like 20,000 shells, which had been landed on the coast of the Adriatic and thence pushed through to Serbia through a district in which transport was particularly difficult.

When by December 10, Stephanovitch assumed full command of the eastern operations, the Austrian forces had been bent back from the Rudnik ridge and the heights of Kosmai. Their

LOUVAIN: EVE OF DESTRUCTION

Louvain as it appeared on Sunday, August 23, S. Bartholomew's Eve, and the day of the battle of Mons. The Belgian army was already in retreat, and three days later the Germans wreaked their terrible vengeance on the beautiful and historic city

TRAGIC RENDEZVOUS

Somewhere, miles away in enemy possession, is the home of this large Belgian family, and none of their possessions remain to them except a few bundles of clothes. They are resting during a weary trek which will end, perhaps, in the security of England

Photos: Sport & General

CLOUDS OF INVASION BURST

Even the skies wept as the German invaders marched through the streets of Brussels. This regiment of German infantry is crossing the Place Charles Rogier, through lines of heavy-hearted citizens, and there is no sound heard but the steady tramp of their feet

front stretched from Grocka on the Danube to Konatice on the Kolubara river. Some fifteen miles behind them was Belgrade, which they were endeavouring to retain.

Right in the centre of the Austrian front was a hill through which ran the railway from Salonika to Vienna. General Stephanovitch brought up his heavy guns by this railway on the night of December 10, and then at dawn he sent his troops forward; under the cover of his gun fire, they stormed up the hill. At the same time his left wing advanced up the Kolubara river towards its junction with the Save, some eight miles behind the Austrian front. The enemy drew back, for fear of being suddenly taken in the rear, and sent two monitors up the river to check the Serbian cavalry division, which was trying to work over the marshes and cut off the Austrian force.

But this movement of the Serbian left wing was only a feint. While Potiorek was manœuvring his troops in answer to it, Stephanovitch made another frontal attack. Then for three days there was a battle along the base of the little triangle of Serbian soil that ended in a point at Belgrade. The Austrians fought manfully. Instead of merely clinging to their hill entrenchments, they made fierce attempts to pierce the Serbian front. But it was in one of these counter-attacks near the central height where the railway entered a tunnel, that they were broken. After the Serbian riflemen, with their machine guns, had thrown back the enemy, the Serbian artillery caught the retiring troops and inflicted a good deal of damage.

This produced a panic in the retreating column, and the Serbian infantry left their trenches at a run, afterwards continuing to advance steadily. By December 14 they had approached the line of hills forming the southern defence of Belgrade. Here Potiorek had constructed a system of earthworks, consisting of deep trenches with shrapnel cover, and well-concealed gun positions, with heavy howitzers and field pieces. He intended to stand a siege on this fragment of Serbian territory, holding Belgrade as a bridge-head for another advance along the main Morava valley. In this way something would be saved from the débâcle. But his troops had received such punishment that they could not garrison the siege defences. On the central height of Torlak, on the evening of December 14, the Serbians routed two Austrian battalions. Then in the darkness they captured the heights after a stern struggle.

The Serbians dragged or man-handled their guns towards Belgrade, and placed them on heights commanding the pontoon bridge by which the enemy were fleeing over the Save. At dawn on December 15, 1914, the pontoon bridge was destroyed by shell fire. Fog veiled the scene, but the gunners knew the position of their mark, and, breaking down the bridge, they cut off the retreat of the remnant of the two Austrian army corps. The rearguard outside the city was destroyed, and then the Serbian cavalrymen, accompanied by King Peter, swept from the height of Torlak and entered the streets of the capital, killed a detachment of Hungarians who would not surrender, and began to round up the prisoners to the number of ten thousand. As the street fighting between the cavalrymen and the Hungarians was going on, the king entered the cathedral to give thanks for the salvation of his nation.

Of the Austro-Hungarian army of 300,000 men which had crossed the Drina and Save rivers, not more than 200,000 returned; it was estimated that 323 officers and 41,215 men were taken prisoners, while the casualties in killed and wounded amounted to approximately 60,000 men. The Serbians also lost heavily, and the occupation of Valievo was accompanied by an outbreak of typhus which gradually spread over the country, and no fewer than 70,000 Serbians succumbed.

WILL THE WAR CHANGE BRITAIN?

CONTEMPORARY FORECAST OF EVENTS

By H. G. Wells

This special article is reprinted from "The War Illustrated" of February, 1915, because of its compelling interest as a contemporary forecast of the development of events by one of the acutest minds of the day. Together with the same author's contemporary pronouncement on "Why Britain went to War," which is reprinted in pages 7, 8 and 9, this "anticipation" has been reviewed by Mr. Wells in his important new contribution to WORLD WAR, which appears in pages 3, 4 and 5. The reader with twenty years of accumulated knowledge at his command has to remember how easy it is to prophesy after the event. The following article was written twenty years ago, and it is no less instructive in the instances where the forecast fails than in the many where it is uncannily correct—EDITOR

SO far as superficialities go there is no answer to this question but Yes. There will be the widest modification of fashions and appearance all over the world as the outcome of this world convulsion. There will be, moreover, at least a temporary and conceivably even a permanent impoverishment that will leave its mark upon the arts, upon the way of living, upon the social progress of several generations. All sorts of little things that were already on the wane will vanish for ever, and their disappearance will give a character to books and pictures and photographs. If presently one sees a picture with men in silk hats or British soldiers in busbies and red-coats or servants in livery, or if one comes upon a spiked helmet, or a piece of Morris furniture, or a cricket-bat, or a coachman with a cockade, one will be reminded pleasantly of the good old times. And we shall develop a superstition that all men wore silk hats in town, or carried cricket-bats in the country before 1914. But these are the mere outward shows of life. What we would speculate upon now is the probability of deeper changes in the national attitude and the general way of taking life in Britain, and more especially in England, which is—so to speak—the writer's field of observation.

In such changes what is called national character necessarily plays a large part, and what may happen to the English soul may differ in several respects from the reaction of the Irish, who are so much more closely akin to the Russians; of the Welsh, who have touches that make them resemble the Indian and the Ruthenian; or of the Scotch, who are so peculiarly northern and Protestant, to the same influences.

NO doubt all over our islands there will be much of our experiences in common, but it is quite impossible to generalize accurately of so quadruple an abstraction as a Briton. So let an Englishman deal with the English, with the confession that the East Anglian and the Kentish and Wessex men and Cockney are chiefly in his thoughts. Such an England has a very definite character of its own, and is likely to react as a whole to the tremendous impact of this war.

Now, first, it has to be remarked that our English mind and soul has not been hit hard by any general human fact since the late cholera epidemics, which won it over to sanitation. It has not been pressed upon the keen edge of urgency since that time. Before that little crisis there was nothing after the economic stresses that followed the Napoleonic wars, and ended in the adjustments of the Reform Bill and Free Trade. The rest of British experience was an experience of irresponsible immunity. And neither of these realities I have cited, neither the pestilence nor the economic stress, can be described as supreme human stresses. One must go much further back than these things to find England profoundly stirred—stirred that is, to the extent of regeneration.

It was, really, not so deeply stirred by the Napoleonic wars as many people imagine. Read for that the tranquillities of Jane Austen, and remember that these were tales of the days of Trafalgar and Waterloo. The Napoleonic wars simply continued the older French wars "away there," that had become almost a habit with the English. Taxes were rather heavy. Occasional young men went off soldiering, and came back or did not come back. Sometimes the church bells rang. That was the sum of it in the national consciousness. The Jacobite revolt, that made a great epoch for Scotland, was a mere little raid in English experience.

INDEED, the last fundamental system of convulsions in English life was the system of disturbances that began with the Reformation, and ended with the establishment of aristocratic parliamentarianism, and the rule of our influential families under our present German monarchy. Then it was that the England of today—or rather, let us say the England of 1914—was made and settled. Since then there has been nothing fundamental. People talk and write about an Industrial Revolution, meaning the coming of coal, factories, railways, and the great towns, but these changes were not a revolution; they were a growth.

They changed England only as fatness, or cancer, or, if you will, the enlargement of a limb, might change the character of a man. They added something perhaps, but they reconstructed nothing. The monarchy, the aristocracy, the Church, the universities and education, the well-adapted literature, the ruling conceptions of social relationship went on essentially unchanged. They have an air of going on now—as a house seems still to stand when it is brightly afire. Because now less swiftly than in France or Belgium, but as steadily, as thoroughly, as profoundly, this war burns its way through all the substance of England. It is touching everything, it is seizing upon everything. It is our fact. All our talk, all our living, all our judgements, though they may resist for a time, swing round at last and orient themselves to it. And we are still far from the climax of the war. The Empire is only at the beginning of its effort; the greater burthen and heat of this tremendous task is still to be felt. The bulk of our Army, for example, is still training at home.

NOW the psychology of England is not to be understood until this great period of unstimulating security, of which this war is the end, has been apprehended. We have been going by inertia for two centuries. Generation after generation of English people have been born with the persuasion that, whatever realities tore the rest of the world, Britain was safe and established for ever, and that here at least things would go on as they were going—interminably. War, famine, earthquake were the exciting but dubious privileges of foreigners. So it has been for two hundred years in England and Wales, for a century and a half in Scotland, for half a century in Ireland—so it is and has been now for fifty years in the United States of America—and necessarily this has involved a spectacular attitude towards life, a certain unreality, a levity, and a detachment.

We were the happy people in the boxes; if we went down into the arena we did it for fun and some added advantage, not of necessity, and always with the possibility of coming back to our box when we had had enough of it. And it is still true, after six months of world-wide and fundamental warfare

that the English are mentally still half spectators. Every third man is in khaki, London is in darkness of a night, and the papers are filled with inconceivable photographs of smashed houses and bodies in Scarborough—Scarborough of all places—and Yarmouth, English homes and people blown to pieces by German shells and air bombs; and yet we are still far short of realizing that *this is ourselves*

WHEN people talk of the apathy of the English they must grasp this peculiar aloofness and unreality in English life for the last ten generations or so. For all that time England has been to the English like home to a child—a place from which one went out upon adventures; a place in which one sat in absolute security, reading of romance, tragedies, martyrdoms, wild beasts, and stellar distances. The Channel, and the wasting of the strength and honour of France by the two Napoleons, gave us through all that time a detachment from the struggle for life such as no other people but the Chinese before the Manchurian conquest, and the citizens of the United States of America since their Civil War, have ever enjoyed. Now, upon this long-secure people come beating a gigantic hate and the call for our help of those who have trusted us. "Fight!" cries destiny. "Use your utmost effort. Vae victis! Save your friends who have trusted you, and yourselves, or such ignominy, such hardship, such shame shall fall upon you as will make the lot of an Englishman too bitter for life." Englishmen and Englishwomen and children are killed by the shot and shell of their enemies in the streets of quiet English towns. What will be the effect upon our nation? Will it be found that two hundred years of safety have been two hundred years of wasted opportunity, degeneration, or have we, beneath much superficial ineffectiveness, reserved and even gathered force? Has peace husbanded or destroyed us? Are we a people softened, or only a people unprepared?

Now, there was some ground for doubting whether England was capable of rising to any supreme call such as this German challenge. The Germans certainly did not believe she could. Very many considerable observers in Britain and America were troubled by these doubts. There were many signs that her two hundred years of security had made her indolent; it was a question whether she had not also softened and decayed morally and intellectually. The Boer War displayed her at the outset slovenly, ill-prepared, ignorant, wanting in foresight, but she roused herself to an effort; she displayed a toughness, an obstinacy that in that issue at least atoned for her general shortcomings. The ending of the Boer War was a creditable effort, and she emerged not merely triumphant in a military sense but successful politically. She did not merely conquer; she did what is more difficult—she won back. And then—then she lapsed again. It seemed at first as though a national renaissance might follow the searchings of heart that followed the strains and shames of the South African struggle. But for the most part the "Wake up, England!" movement seemed to fade out again. National vanity had been chastened; loud, aggressive and threatening "Anglo-Saxonism" that was so closely akin to "Pan-Germanism," the "professor's Imperialism" of Froude and Freeman, became sensibly less offensive, and has never recovered such ascendancy as it formerly had over the British imagination. That much was to the good.

THERE was a real modernization of the Army, a new determination of officers and gentlemen to be good professional soldiers; there was an increase in the seriousness of popular literature, and a greater keenness in the younger generation. But there was no vigorous fresh development of educational organization such as many had hoped to see, and the tone of political life mended not at all. Reconstruction decayed into wrangling. The forces making for renascence seemed to be unable to take hold at any point of the social and legislative organization The Court remained a damp discouragement to reconstructive initiative, as indeed since the coming of the alien Hanoverians, with the exception of the brief phase of the Prince Consort's influence, it has always been. The schools and universities compromised by accepting cadet corps and resisting science and modern thought.

The mercantile class continued to fall behind the advances in technical and industrial science and organization made by the Germans and Americans. After a spurt of social constructiveness, the great political parties settled down to their old discreditable exploitation of the two aspects of Irish disloyalty, and the ignorance and prejudice of Larkinism on the one hand and Ulsterism on the other were stirred up and pitted against each other until Ireland was within a measurable distance of civil war. The shameless sale of peerages and honours by the Party machines continued—a rottenness only equalled in all history by the sale by the venial Polish nobility of their national crown and honour.

It seemed as manifest in 1914 as it was in 1899 that to do anything well, to serve one's country faithfully, to give one's life to art or literature or research, was the way to live in Great Britain without respect or influence, while to the toady, the self-advertising impostor, the Party hack and the financial adventurer, whether alien or British, were given honour, influence and the control of the Empire. True, there were some strident voices in protest, but they seemed of small effect. Whatever new vigour had come from the Boer War into British life was certainly no longer upon the surface of things in the spring of 1914. A new generation was growing up which had been too young to be chastened by the long-drawn humiliations of South Africa. It danced an indecent dance called the Tango to express itself. "Tangoism" was not a chance phenomenon in British life; it was allied to a movement of irrational extravagance in art, to such phenomena as the diseased growth of night clubs in London, and to the violent last hysteria of the feminist movement.

The secure young people had rebelled against a movement towards gravity and discipline that had neither power nor authority. What was the good of it? What did it matter? England in the beginning of 1914 was like Russia after 1906. It had an extraordinary appearance of spent forces and intellectual despair; its life seemed to be divided between dense stupidity on the side of authority, venal muddle-headedness in politics, and an almost insane personal irresponsibility. Every idiot in the country was professing to be a "Rebel," and trying to do something more conspicuously mischievous and silly than the others. And then with the suddenness of a summer thunderstorm came the War.

THERE were intimations of the coming cataclysm. One of the most notable incidents before the black crisis of the first days of August was the King's effort to settle the Irish squabble, to persuade Sir Edward Carson and his opponents to cease from distressing Ireland. Things were very near us then, and there was a certain knowledge of their nearness. But these men were the creatures of the time, professionals playing at the lawyers' game of politics, men who would still gamble for a party advantage if they were starving upon a raft, and Sir Edward remained "firm" and to this day he is "firm"; the thunder burst upon us, the lightnings lit the heavens the German millions poured down through

BOTTLE PARTY

German officers with their sergeant-major sit discussing orders for the following day. Not unnaturally they have made free of the cellars of the Belgian café in the background, and this informal council of war promises to have a convivial ending

ROUGH MUSIC

The complex German character is not devoid of a strong streak of fun. An improvised band, led by the inevitable accordion, is entertaining some of the small inhabitants of a village in Russian Poland which the Germans and Austrians had invaded

A LITTLE CHILD SHALL LEAD THEM

A French naval brigade was called up to assist in the defence of Antwerp. The French boy scout is the proud guide of a detachment of this force which unfortunately arrived too late to take part in the operations for the defence of the city

THREE ROUNDS RAPID

An early war scene. A French battalion in full marching equipment is lining the bank of a river. Their rifles are directed on the retreating enemy whose retirement is evidently taking place over the exposed country across the river

SEND FOR THE HEAVIES

Although the Germans were at first immensely superior in heavy artillery, the British Expeditionary Force possessed some useful specimens of large calibre. Here is one making its laboured way to a position some miles behind the line

THE FIRST TRENCHES

Trench warfare really dates from the battle of the Aisne in September, 1914, when the opposing lines became locked in the positions which roughly they were to hold for four years. This picture shows the primitive nature of some early British trenches

INDIA'S OFFERING

At the end of September the Indian corps began to disembark at Marseilles and before many days had passed were fighting beside British troops on the Western front. They suffered much from the climatic conditions and the unaccustomed nature of the warfare

STRANGE CONGREGATION

Many of the French and Belgian churches which had not been destroyed by shell fire were used by the Germans as barrack rooms. In this church somewhere in Northern France the invaders have made themselves extremely comfortable

Belgium upon Paris, but to anyone who cares to listen, this disgruntled mischief-maker is still ready to declare his irreconcilable obstructiveness to peace in Ireland and between English and Irish. He passes dwarfed but unchanged through a world catastrophe.

Because now Britain is up against things. No partial victory will save her. She has to beat her enemy to his knees and disarm him, she has not only to recover the freedom of Belgium, she has to reinstate and enlarge Belgium, she has to do her loyal utmost for her every ally, or quite plainly she has to prepare for the destruction of her Empire and a dwindling and dishonourable future. It is no defeat at the ends of the earth that we shall suffer if we are defeated, a defeat that can be lied about and forgotten at the tennis-net; it will be defeat that will sit at table with us, that will shame us in the streets, that will darken us in our homes and persecute us by day and night. And the issue is so plainly before the British that they cannot fail to see it; the situation is elementary and direct. And our country is rising to it; she was not dead but inattentive, and this time she is setting herself in order upon a scale that justifies us in believing that what the Boer War was insufficient to teach us is now to be exhaustively learnt. She rises and she must rise; that is the tragic excellence of this situation.

Only by learning her lesson can she prevail. If she slackens after some partial success, if presently her century-long habits of indolence turn her thoughts to a premature peace, then the pressure will lift only to recur. That Song of Hate, which is being taught to little children in the schools of Berlin is the ultimate guarantee that the long lethargy of easy-going England is for ever at an end.

NOW what are the chief changes that are necessitated by the great struggle in which we are involved? The essential change, the change that involves all the others, is the abandonment of that spectator's attitude into which our long age of immunity has lured us. The Englishman will cease to be a looker-on, not only at cricket matches and football matches, but at military reviews, at the political "arena," at the life of art and literature, at the pageant of royalty. That idea of modest and respectable detachment and irresponsibility must vanish from our lives. So, too, will the feeling that Government is something to be resisted, avoided, and neglected; that some clever fellow round the corner can be trusted to keep research going and everything straight, and that it is rather wise and kind to under-educate our children and be amiably fatuous in speech and thought. Such sections of the population as may still cling to these will ultimately be dragged in by the effects of taxes, requisitions, and the approach of conscription. The average Englishman of 1913 was conspicuously out of the great game of human life; he was in the Empire but not of the Empire, his ideal was to drum along in that state of life to which it has pleased God to call him, to be "left alone" by the Government and to escape public service and taxation; the average Englishman of 1916 will be consciously *in* the process of humanity, he will be a conscious part of the Empire, he will be as much in the game as a half-back at football and as keen that the goalkeeper and forwards should play their keenest and best.

HE will, to the number of two million or more, have recently put off khaki and come back to a civil life, that will still be calling imperatively for able organization, or he will still be in khaki while the economic life of the country reorganizes. If he has not actually been a soldier, he will have been working under emergency conditions because of the War; he will be none the less dislocated. All the old pre-war time habits will have gone. He will, as chemists say, be "nascent," unsubmissive, critical. He will want to know the good of this and that. And about a great number of things; about his relations to Indians and Irishmen and all sorts of alien people, about how the State may control finance and railways, and how when the greed of "private enterprise" is a little in suspense, men may be very well fed and clothed and shod by the million, he will have had illuminating experiences.

He will be impatient with a Government that "fools about"; he will want it to go on doing things. So that I do not see that the old forensic party game is likely to return to British political life with the ending of the War. There will be too much to do and too much will that it should be done. And it is not beyond the wit of man to improve our methods of representation so as to prevent altogether that relapse of Parliamentary Government into a party struggle which is inevitable under our present electoral system.

And this return of reality will not be a change of mind simply in the mass of the English people. The slow process of Anglicising our Hanoverian Kings must be completed. The Court must cease to think and speak with a German accent. Unless the King is henceforth certain to be an active and disinterested Englishman, it would be better for the Empire to become a republic. The present indecent Teutonic restriction upon the marriages of the Royal family, which kept the British Court an alien deadening influence at the head of our national life for two enervating centuries must be abolished. An English Court in touch with English thought and character, and inter-marrying freely with British and American families, is the only conceivable monarchy for the coming days. Few people realize the deep obstructive mischief this head of clay has worked in the past with the thought and vigour of our people.

But the present occupant of the throne has shown throughout a strongly patriotic and Anglicising disposition, and it is not too much to hope that the British Court will presently be playing its part vigorously in the general renascence. Presumptuous Teutonic royalty with semi-divine claims and preposterous etiquette is inconceivable in the England of the coming days, but an energetic, able, apologetic *English* King is probably the very best conceivable head of our great Empire under existing conditions.

BUT where the movement towards reality and participation is most likely to be evident is in our educational life. This war has already been a liberal education for the whole Empire. It has indeed gone further than that, for it has aroused America to the importance of international politics. But it has also brought out into a glaring light the defects and deficiencies of British technical and higher education No doubt this war has been altogether glorious for the British fighting man as a fighting man. It has brought to light our tremendous resources of cheerful pluck and unassuming devotion. All the more is it necessary to point to the many evidences of dullness, clumsiness, and want of imaginative foresight in the conduct of the War. The record of the War Office, in relation to recruiting and to the general helpful willingness of the country, has been one almost of unmitigated stupidity. The deficiency of military supplies in the country and the unsuitable nature of these supplies, has and will cost the Empire and Europe months of avoidable fighting and hundreds of thousands of lives. The British Admiralty went into the War not only short of mines, but without any adequate schemes or apparatus for sweeping up and destroying minefields although for ten years and more the only probable war has been war with Germany. There

UHLANS' CANINE CONSCRIPT

These Uhlans, entering Mouland, near Visé, are using to convey their stores one of the little carts drawn by dogs that used to be much favoured by the people of the district

were, and still are, no special shallow-water gun-platforms for counter-attacks upon German ships in port.

The aviators' equipment was as insufficient as the aviators themselves were admirable. The Army was equally unprepared, either with guns or with a proper machinery for turning out a sufficiency of rifles. The showing of the influential and intellectual classes in Britain has, in fact, been as poor as the response of the common people has been admirable. The elementary schools have produced pluck, cheerfulness, willing patriotism in unlimited abundance; they have swamped the recruiting offices and all our resources of weapons and equipment; the public schools, though they have been patriotic enough, have produced no equivalent leadership and mental vigour. We must have schools that will fill our children's minds with the habitual veracities of science, with a knowledge and understanding of France, India, and Russia, and of the great world outside genteel British life. We want schools alive with criticism and intolerant of cant. The thing is so patent, it continues so conspicuously obvious, that no class conceit, no vested interests, no "social" influence can now stand in the way of a vigorous overhauling of our universities and higher schools.

From these considerations one may deduce that the Englishman of the future will be a keener, abler, better educated, and more responsible type than the Englishman of the immediate past. He will have learnt the danger and absurdity of giving respect to position rather than capacity; he will be more jealously alive to the national honour in politics, and with a new hostility to that venal ennoblement of financiers and contractors and suchlike stuff, which he has hitherto been disposed to regard as part of the jest of life. He will be more alert about the monarchy and more helpfully critical of it. He will be more impatient of humdrum and cant. He will feel that he owns his country as he has never felt that ownership before; he will have bought it in the trenches of Flanders and the battlefields of Prussia. He will have come into his own. And being alive and awake, he will no longer read for slack amusement, but to inform and fine his mind, which will be a good thing for literature; and having a quickened mind he will no longer tolerate sham and pretentiousness in art. Even now he changes visibly to this new strength and dignity. You can imagine no conceivable sort of success in this War, no sort of event, that would give rise to the rowdy follies of Mafeking night now. It is Berlin that will maffick, they will wave flags and decorate and sing of being "over all," and of the splendours of their hate—until the chill of what is happening touches the Berliners to their bones and their shouts die away. England has come back to reality at last; she carries her life in her hand.



Sport & General

OLD BUS ON A NEW ROUTE

In the early days of the War some of London's motor omnibuses were hurriedly conveyed across the Channel and played an invaluable part in the transport of troops and wounded. Here is an old omnibus of the B type, which a few weeks before had plied the streets of London, carrying slightly wounded Britons from Antwerp to Ghent

CHAPTER IV

BRITAIN ABLAZE

The excitement which, after a hundred years of European peace broken only by the Crimean War, was aroused in Great Britain by the declaration of war on Germany is the subject of this chapter

A MARKED change of outlook took place in Britain between the date of Queen Victoria's diamond jubilee and the outbreak of the World War. In 1897 a somewhat aggressive spirit of imperialism prevailed and two years later Britain embarked on the Boer War in a spirit of confidence which almost amounted to levity. After the peace of Vereeniging (1902) the imperialistic spirit gradually gave way to more democratic ideals and the growing economic and military menace of Germany failed to evoke the attention it deserved. The ignorance of all classes about what was happening on the Continent was noticeable, and in the early summer of 1914 armies and battles seemed to the man in the street mere matters of history.

It was difficult for Continental nations to understand how small a part militarism played in the British outlook. The diplomatic tension immediately preceding the war had little reflection in popular feeling. Writers had preached the economic futility of armed aggression and for any nation wantonly to embark on war appeared to be not only a crime but a blunder impossible to imagine in the 20th century. Thus it happened that though after a time Britain made a real national effort to meet the changed situation, a good deal of persuasion was necessary at first to convince the nation of its gravity. As late as August 31, 1914, Lord Roberts, in addressing the Royal Fusiliers, said:

> You have come forward to take your place in the ranks as private soldiers, not seeking, as the vast majority of men in your station are seeking, to be given commissions as officers. How very different is your action to that of the men who can still go on with their cricket and football, as if the very existence of the country were not at stake. This is not the time to play games, wholesome as they are in days of piping peace. We are engaged in a life and death struggle.

This drastic criticism was directed at a national peculiarity of which the enemy took full stock. The Cologne Gazette remarked a month later:

> The English are evidently lacking in understanding of the high seriousness of the war and totally lacking in appreciation of its moral importance. For the Englishman war is a very dramatic, very intense, and very profitable sport.

That the preliminaries of armed conflict failed to make much impression on the popular imagination at first was further due to the fact that the nation was holiday making. They happened in the week-end that included the August bank holiday and there was a pleasant feeling of exhilaration in the air. On the Sunday there was a considerable exodus of foreigners by the 11 a.m. boat train from Victoria, but very few English people were among the travellers.

To that extent people appreciated the crisis, and on the same day in London large crowds wandered down Whitehall in the direction of Downing Street, while in Trafalgar Square there was an anti-war demonstration organized by the internationalist bureau. But this made little impression, for, as the days passed, it became perfectly clear that the nation was united on the issue of war even if it took some time to transmute enthusiasm into action.

Once the die had been cast the leaders of political parties spoke with no uncertain voice. For the Liberals, then controlling affairs, Mr. Asquith declared that the nation was fighting in the first place to fulfil a solemn international obligation and in the second to indicate the principle that small nationalities are not to be crushed in defiance of international good faith by the arbitrary will of a strong and overmastering power. "This is not merely a material, it is also a spiritual conflict," he announced. Sir Edward Grey declared that the whole of western Europe would fall under German militarism if Germany were successful in the war: it was not the German people but

AIDING THE AIRMEN

Attached to the Royal Flying Corps, later the Royal Air Force, were a number of armoured cars. This photograph shows one of these vehicles with a Maxim gun on the top of its little conning tower

RETURNING TO BILLETS

Belgian soldiers are returning to their billets from a turn of duty. The bleak Flanders winter is already approaching and each man is huddled in his blanket, but the thought of good food and a roof over their heads brings smiles to their faces

German militarism that had driven Germany and Europe into it. Mr. Lloyd George, in a characteristic address to a deputation of municipal associations said "We are fighting a very tough enemy. We must work as partners and work together—all parties, all sections of the people, the Government and the municipalities—until we carry the old country through to a triumphant conclusion." In the Liberal press, A. G. Gardiner, editor of the Daily News, proclaimed passionately: "It is an idol of iron that stands today in a sea of blood. It is this idol which Europe has to break. We cannot live under the sanction of Attila and his Huns."

The Unionist chiefs, Mr. Bonar Law, Mr. Balfour and Lord Curzon, spoke in the same vein, whilst the leaders of northern and southern Ireland agreed for the first time in their lives. Sir Edward Carson's message to the Ulster Volunteers on Aug. 8 was: "You were formed to defend our citizenship in the United Kingdom and the Empire, and so preserve our civil and religious liberty. Now the United Kingdom and the Empire are threatened we must fight with our fellow Britishers until victory is assured." Five days before this Mr. John Redmond had announced in the House of Commons that the Government might at once withdraw every one of their troops from Ireland and that the armed Roman Catholics in the south would gladly join forces with the armed Protestants in the north.

The self-possession of Londoners when diplomatic relations with Germany were broken off contrasts strongly with the fury of the Berlin mob. The German ambassador left London early on the morning of Aug. 6 and went to Harwich direct by motor car, to board a special vessel provided by the British Government to convey him and his staff. Just after 11 that morning workmen arrived at the German embassy and began to remove the brass plates from the door. The brass eagle immediately over the door of the front entrance was being taken down when a man standing opposite the embassy began to boo. Shouts from the crowd of "stop that!" were immediately raised and the police hurried across to the man, who thereupon walked away. Good humour was apparent everywhere and the King and other members of the royal family met with demonstrations of loyalty whenever they appeared in public.

General mobilization was proclaimed on Aug. 4, and within less than a fortnight the British Expeditionary Force was landed on French soil, although this was not known to the nation until Monday, Aug. 17, when Lord Kitchener, the new war minister, issued an announcement through the Press Bureau. The embarkation, transportation and disembarkation of men and stores were carried through with the greatest precision and without a single casualty. There was perfect co-ordination between the staffs of England and France who prepared the plan of transport; and perfect co-operation between the railway and steamship companies that carried the troops, who marched off silently, without the farewell scenes so conspicuous during the South African war, and the navy that silently covered the transports from attack.

At this point it may be said that long before the despatch of the British Expeditionary Force to the Continent, the War, unknown to the nation at large, had begun on the home front. About 1902 the Kaiser had begun to dream of world domination, and it may be said that, not long after that, the German spy system in Great Britain was born. The man charged with its organization was Gustav Steinhauer, who became known as the Kaiser's master spy and who was responsible for most of the German espionage that took place in Europe for twenty years before the War. As regards Great Britain the Kaiser was indifferent to the contemptible little British army and the attention of the German

'POUR LA FRANCE!'

Some French soldiers lie dead in a wood near Péronne. In an attempt to advance they have been caught by machine gun fire and shot down while seeking to gain a few yards of ground The battle has died down and the dead await burial on the spot on which they fell

Topical

DEATH OF A TRAITOR

One of war's grimmest tragedies is shown in this photograph. A French soldier has been found guilty of signalling to the Germans the position of French guns, and has been bound to a wayside post and shot. Nailed above him is the traitor's epitaph: 'Espion Traitre à son pays'

UNWORTHY TO BEAR ARMS

Worse perhaps than death is the fate of this French soldier. After being sentenced to imprisonment for life for espionage he has been degraded in the barrack square, and the buttons and badges have been stripped from his uniform

PARTING SHOTS

A section of a railway line in Belgium has been blown up to check the enemy's advance. While the smoke of the explosion still hangs in the air two infantrymen, who have been covering the operations, take a shot at the German advance guard

Sport and General

CHIVALRY OF FRANCE

While the War was still one of movement the passing of cavalry towards the front was a heartening sight for civilians, for it portended an advance. This squadron is passing through Epernay, which was occupied by the Germans for a brief period in 1914, to join in the pursuit after the enemy had evacuated the town

secret service was centred on the British navy. Admiral von Tirpitz wanted all the latest reports of the submarines and torpedo practice; the All Highest would personally thank the man who could produce inside information about Rosyth or an official plan of Kirkwall or Scapa Flow. Britain's naval ports were infested with German spies, and the system might have had more success had it not been for the short-sighted policy of the pundits of Potsdam, who underpaid their hirelings.

But soon a small group of British officers became alive to the fact that Germany had established a widespread network of espionage in Great Britain. These officers immediately realized the danger, but found themselves confronted by a blank wall of officialism. The War Office was unsympathetic and referred them to Scotland Yard. Scotland Yard was sceptical; moreover, they had little belief in the somewhat cumbrous police machinery. What was required for the delicate work of counter-espionage was a special military intelligence department, and they did not relax their efforts until the little department was formed.

At first the department consisted of four officers, three detectives and seven clerks. At the end of the War the staff numbered something like 700. From first to last this branch of the War Office brought to justice over 30 German spies, of whom 11 were shot in the Tower, one was hanged, and one committed suicide. Six others were sentenced to death, the sentence being, however, commuted to penal servitude for life, while six received lesser terms of imprisonment. Apart from this a multitude suffered internment.

One of the most dangerous German spies in England before the war was Frederick Adolphus Schroeder, alias Gould, who had an English mother, and who spoke perfect English. A public house in Rochester was bought for him with German money, and here it was easy enough for him to obtain naval information. All went well until 1913, when he retired, and his successor found quantities of maps and incriminating documents in the public house. His correspondence was then intercepted, and as a result he was arrested. At the trial he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to six years penal servitude.

But there were many others. William Klauer, alias Clare, a hunchbank dentist of Portsmouth, used to extract information from his patients whilst extracting their teeth, and was lucky in obtaining considerable sums from Germany for perfectly worthless statements. A sentence of five years penal servitude was the result of his confiding in Levi Rosenthal, a loyal naturalized British subject, who promptly reported him to the local authority. This was in 1912.

But a few days before the outbreak of war the whole elaborate system collapsed like a house of cards. The counter-espionage department, which had so long worked in secret, struck. The net was drawn, there was a great haul, and on Aug. 4, 1914, Germany was without a spy system in England. An historic conference at Potsdam followed. The Kaiser raved. Something must be done at once. So they sent over Karl Lody, a naval lieutenant, who arrived in the name of Charles Inglis, armed with a false American passport, and proceeded to Rosyth. He blundered about, openly asking questions with a strong American accent.

In the hope of trapping an accomplice, the authorities gave him his head until October, when it was found that he was playing a lone hand; and he was arrested. He was tried by court martial and sentenced to be shot. He was offered his life in return for information about the German secret service, but refused the offer. For a week he occupied a room in the married quarters at the Tower, the women and children having been sent elsewhere until the grim business was over. On the fatal morning he faced the firing squad: a lieutenant,

Sport and General

MAN-HANDLING THE GUNS

These German field guns are being moved forward during an engagement. For the last few yards to reach the brow of the hill neither horses nor tractors are available, and the gunners put their shoulders to the wheel to gain a few yards before the next salvo

LIGHTER MOMENTS

A pause in the fighting has given these German soldiers in Russian Poland a chance to enjoy the autumn sunshine and a few hours' relaxation in front of their dug-out. A game of cards is in progress, and even the accordion player stands by to watch the cards turned

E.N.A.

Sport and General

THIS WAS ONCE A HOSPITAL

Cardinal Mercier, one of the heroic figures of Belgium during the War, gave up his palace at Malines to be used as a military hospital, but in August, 1914 the city was bombarded by the Germans. This photograph shows a room which Cardinal Mercier had converted into a hospital ward as it appeared after the German bombardment

and a sergeant, and eight men of the Guards. Lord Athlumney, the provost marshal, was present. Lody refused to have his eyes bandaged. To Lord Athlumney he said: "I suppose you would not care to shake hands with me, a mere spy?" "Perhaps not," replied Lord Athlumney. "But it is always pleasant to shake hands with a brave man."

The German secret service had communicated with their spies in Britain through a system of clearing houses. No communications were sent to spies direct. There were very few of these clearing houses, and the pivot of the whole system was Karl Gustav Ernst, a German barber, with an address in the Caledonian Road, London. Like the rest of the German agents, this man was grossly underpaid, and his activities were thoroughly well known to the authorities. Ernst was purposely allowed to carry on his activities for some time, but none of the information, for which he was responsible, reached the enemy. Eventually he was arrested, and on Nov. 13, 1914, was sentenced to seven years penal servitude for espionage.

One of the most valuable assets of the British secret service was the close co-operation between the postal authorities and the special branch of military intelligence. Hence the ease with which arrests were made just before the outbreak of war, followed by imprisonment or internment. Hence, also the remarkable fact that Germany was totally unaware, until it had become a *fait accompli*, that the British Expeditionary Force had landed in France and had taken up its position in the field.

These results were not produced without the acquisition by the military authorities of powers which were but faintly realized by the civil population of that time. It is no exaggeration to say that a military despotism was unobtrusively established over the civil population of the British islands such as their history had never known—established for the purpose of sterilizing the enemy spy system in the country and preventing leakage of information to the enemy or weakening of civilian morale. The department became a military dictatorship acting behind the constitutional mask of the Home Office. Neither the British civilian, nor the enemy, realized at first the perfection of the intelligence system in all its ramifications. The military intelligence, naval intelligence, Foreign Office, Home Office and Scotland Yard were the big five of the British secret service.

On Aug. 9, 1914, the first Defence of the Realm Act, popularly known as Dora, was passed, and the power of arrest, without warrant and on suspicion only, was vested in the military authorities. Power of trial by court martial was obtained. For offences tried under Dora penal servitude for life could be inflicted: if tried by court martial, the death penalty could be awarded. A few short quotations from the emergency legislation of those days will give some idea of the powers secured.

Where on the recommendation of the competent military authority it appears to the secretary of state that for securing the public safety or the defence of the realm, it is expedient in view of the hostile origin or association of any person that he shall be subjected to such observations and restrictions as are hereinafter mentioned . . .

If any person in respect of whom any order is made under this regulation fails to comply with any of the provisions of the order, he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations and any person interned under such order may be dealt with as a prisoner of war . . .

This regulation (14B) shall apply in relation to any person who is suspected of acting, or having acted, or being about to act, in a manner prejudicial to the public safety or the defence of the realm as it applies in relation to persons of hostile origin or association.

Acts of Parliament sped through both Houses within two days. Under the

BATHING PARADE

A group of British prisoners have been supplied with towels preparatory to being marched off for a bath. The Germans were generally ready to afford their captives this hygienic privilege, perhaps as much in their own interests as that of the prisoners who had to work for them

E.N.A



Sport & General

MURDER MOST FOUL

During the battle of Meaux in 1914 a train carrying French wounded to the back areas was crossing the river Ourcq when charges already laid were exploded. The collapse of the bridge dragged the coaches down into the river and many of the injured men were drowned

Aliens' Restriction Act the military oligarchy were empowered to clear all possibly dangerous people from areas of military importance. Registration of all people keeping homing, or carrier, pigeons became compulsory, and the houses, clubs and places of business of all suspect enemy aliens were searched for firearms. Some 9,000 Germans and Austrians of military age were handed over to the military authorities by the police and incarcerated as prisoners of war.

In the early days of the War the country itself was suddenly and without apparent reason stirred with a perfect storm of spy mania. It is difficult to explain with any certainty the reason of this outbreak. It may have been due to an early official communiqué to the Press which partially lifted the veil as regards the pre-war German spy conspiracy. That communiqué revealed the fact that for some years before the War a number of tobacconists, newsagents, bakers, and other small fry of Teutonic origin had been suborned by Potsdam to transmit information to the fatherland. The efforts of these people had been only half-hearted and as events proved had produced little result. But the official communiqué revealed an underlying note of nervousness, as is shown in the following paragraph :

In carrying out their duty the military and police authorities would expect that persons having information of cases of suspected espionage would communicate the grounds of the suspicion to the local military authority or to the local police who are in direct communication with the special intelligence department, instead of causing unnecessary alarm and possibly giving warning to the spies by letters to the press.

Be this as it may, having been told officially that the enemy was in their midst, the general public began to bombard the authorities with a flood of letters containing the most fantastic allegations. Neighbours began to look askance at one another. Rioting broke out in London. The shops of many small bakers, newsagents and tobacconists were wrecked.

Cases included that of an old gentleman in the north of England who had a private observatory. He had been brought to England by his parents as a baby and could not speak German. His star gazing was cut short by internment. A similar fate befell the owner of a hard tennis court near the east coast. It was said to be a potential gun emplacement to be used by the enemy in the event of a German landing. German hotel waiters and governesses were suspected. Anybody, indeed, bearing a foreign name was liable to be labelled a spy.

The popular clamour against alien enemies came to a head with a newspaper attack on Prince Louis of Battenberg, who at the time was first sea lord. It was widely rumoured, though without the slightest foundation, that Prince Louis had been confined to the Tower on a charge of treason. In the circumstances the first sea lord decided to resign his position, which he did on Oct. 30, offering as a reason that his birth and parentage to some extent impaired his usefulness. He was succeeded by Lord Fisher of Kilverstone.

The restrictions passed on the British press were by no means as stringent as those to which the presses of France and Germany were subjected, and the French press in particular looked with considerable jealousy on the comparative liberty which its English confrères enjoyed. The formation of the official Press Bureau was announced in the House of Commons by Mr. Winston Churchill, then first lord of the Admiralty, on Aug. 7, 1914. Up to that date semi-official censorship had existed under the military censors at the War Office and in the informal consultations

THE SPIRIT OF ADVANCE

The German army advanced through Belgium almost in parade order, believing that this display of efficiency would impress upon the people the invincibility of the Kaiser's war machine. This photograph shows the excellent marching discipline of the men of a crack German regiment entering a village while the N.C.O. keeps them up to scratch

held by newspaper editors with representatives of the War Office and Admiralty. The result was found to be far from satisfactory, as a great many disconcerting rumours began to find currency, owing to the negative attitude maintained by the naval and military authorities.

In default of facts the newspapers showed a tendency to fill up their columns with gossip reaching them from irresponsible quarters along the coast where nervousness was naturally prone to show itself. The main function of the Press Bureau, therefore, was to issue a steady stream of trustworthy information specially supplied by both the Admiralty and the War Office for publication. In addition to the issuing department, there was a cable department and a department for dealing with press matter voluntarily submitted.

There is no doubt that this departure produced popular confidence in both the Government and the press. After the war was over, Sir Eric Geddes said at a press dinner that it was the unity of the press which gave the Government power during the War. On this occasion he related the story of an agricultural labourer who told him one day that he "never believed in a battle till he saw it was off." Sir Eric was mystified by this remark until he realized that the man was referring to the abbreviation of the word official appearing on posters and in the columns of newspapers.

That the organization did not always work smoothly is shown in the general consternation produced by the accounts of the retreat from Mons published in The Times and the Daily Mail, which were then issuing Sunday editions, on Sunday, Aug. 30. The Times referred to the British army as a "retreating and broken army" while the Daily Mail referred to the retreat as "a pitiful story" and appealed for immediate reinforcements. In the afternoon Lord Kitchener issued a reassuring report, and on Monday the lord chancellor severely condemned the alarmist accounts as a regrettable exception to the patriotic reticence of the press. It

ORDER IN RETREAT

A retreat, but not a rout, is shown in this photograph of Belgian infantry passing through Ghent. The Germans are just behind, and the men are facing the sternest test of discipline, a retirement before overwhelming force. Their ranks are broken, but not their spirit

ubsequently appeared, however, that he Press Bureau had officially requested its publication and that the appeal for reinforcements in fact emanated personally from Mr. F. E. Smith, afterwards Lord Birkenhead, who was the first head of the department.

Reference may be made to two other measures which led to the restraint of the press. Under the international telegraph convention a notification was issued suspending the telegraphic and radio-telegraphic services subject to certain conditions. The second measure consisted in the regulations issued under the Defence of the Realm Act concerning the publication of information generally.

That money talks is an old and true saying, and we must now describe the way in which this commodity raised its voice in the days preceding the outbreak of war. Early in the week beginning Monday, July 27, international and other securities were sold rather heavily on the London Stock Exchange and all the signs of monetary nervousness appeared. On July 29 seven firms, unable to meet their obligations, failed. On Friday, July 31, the Stock Exchange was closed until further notice and the bank rate was raised from 4 to 8 per cent, the highest figure since 1873. On the following day it was raised to 10 per cent. On the Friday there was a conference of bankers with the Government, after which the following announcement was made :

Interviews have taken place today between the prime minister, the chancellor of the exchequer and representatives of the Bank of England and the leading joint stock banks with regard to the financial situation. It is understood to have been decided that the situation is not at present such as to justify any emergency action in regard to the supply of legal tender currency, but in the event of further development taking place necessitating government action, the Treasury will be prepared to take such action immediately.

In all branches of finance and trade business was curtailed, though at Lloyds a large business was transacted in war risks, exceptionally high rates being quoted. The demand for money at the Bank of England was so great that eventually as much as 10½ per cent was paid for loans for a week. The question of suspending the Bank Charter Act of 1844 came under consideration. This had been done in 1847, 1857 and 1866. It would enable the Bank to issue notes far in excess of the £18,500,000 which was the legal limit of the value that could be issued without holding gold to cover them.

At the end of the week there were long queues anxiously waiting outside the Bank of England to obtain gold for paper. There was much nervousness in the minds of the public, but it would hardly be correct to say that conditions of panic prevailed. In an interview given to the United Press of America in 1916, Lord Revelstoke, the banker, said :

> London, like other credit centres, was unprepared for the crisis which accompanied the outbreak of war ; whatever may have been the case in Berlin, English bankers at least had no foreknowledge of the calamity that was to strike Europe in August, 1914.

On Monday, August 3, Mr. Lloyd George, who was then chancellor of the exchequer, held a further conference with the financial magnates and the heads of the great banks. The result was the extension of the Bank Holiday to Friday, August 7, and the proclamation on the Monday of a moratorium which was subsequently extended to October 4, with an extension for a month for bills that fell due up to that date. The moratorium finally expired on November 4.



Sport and General

WINGED WIRELESS

Carrier pigeons were much used in 1914 to carry messages, for field telephones and wireless had not been brought to the state of efficiency achieved later. The pigeons were carried in specially constructed carts and were handled by experts. The French trooper in charge of these messengers is releasing a bird taking a message to headquarters

PROUD MESSENGER

Dogs, as well as pigeons, were used by the French as messengers. The photograph shows 'Pusco,' a famous dog of war, smiling at his admirers while he sits in the side-car waiting for the scout to attach a message to his collar before he sets off to headquarters

Sport and General



Sport and General

THEY SHALL NOT PASS

A retreating army must leave no bridge intact. It is the work of an army's engineers both to destroy and to build. How well the French engineers did their work is shown in this photograph. The graceful steel arch has sunk into the river bed leaving only an impassable switchback track where the iron road once ran

On August 7 the banks re-opened and treasury notes for £1 and 10s. were new issued. The good offices of the press were enlisted to exhort people not to withdraw their deposits from banks for hoarding purposes. The trouble, while it lasted, was serious, and quite a large number of people were faced with a real shortage of ready money Previous to closing on Saturday, Aug. 1, the banks had paid cheques in notes instead of gold and had then closed for a week In the circumstances general difficulty was found in cashing these notes and large numbers of people found themselves unable to meet their current expenses.

It was not long, however, before common sense re-asserted itself and conditions began to stabilize themselves.

The way Englishmen dealt with the crisis is well summed up in the words of Mr. W. W. Wall ("The War and Our Financial Fabric"):

> The prophets predicted confidently that when the world war came the financial crisis would be far worse than the military crisis and that this country would be in the throes of a panic the dimensions of which no human imagination could conceive. Foreign countries with vast credits here would take away every sovereign and every bar of gold they could lay their hands on.
>
> Nothing of this happened. There was no financial panic, no raid upon our gold reserves. If there was any apprehension it was mild and momentary, thanks to the soundness of our banking system, the strength of our financial structure, and the wisdom of our Government, to say nothing of the soul of the nation.
>
> So far from the predictions being fulfilled, that has come to pass never dreamt of in the wildest of dreams—a land towards which in the midst of war, the golden river was flowing, fed by tributary streams and undiminished in volume by huge purchases of warlike stores and materials from neutral countries. It was calm confidence and serene faith in intellectual ability that enabled the country to go through the crisis with success and that evoked the profound gratitude of all.

At the outbreak of the war the position of agriculture was not unfavourable, and the question of getting in the harvest was not complicated, as on the Continent, by a wholesale depletion of man power. The Board of Agriculture issued a statement to the effect that the year's wheat crop of the United Kingdom before 1914 was grown on an acreage four per cent. greater than in the preceding year and that the yield of the crop would be above the average.

There was in the country sufficient wheat to supply the whole population for about four months, irrespective of all future imports from abroad. There was at first a feeling of uneasiness in the popular mind as regards future wheat supplies and a somewhat unreasoning clamour arose that wheat alone should be grown, that other crops should be displaced, that grass land should be broken up; in fact, that all rules of good husbandry should be violated to enlarge the country's wheat area. The farmers, however, resisted the popular clamour with sturdy good sense and followed the course which practical experience had shown them to be best adapted to their holdings.

The prohibition of the importation of live cattle was a matter which came into prominence. Apprehension was felt that contagious diseases might be introduced into the country with these cattle, with the result that it was made obligatory to destroy them at the port of arrival. Thus the home breeder of stock for the time being enjoyed an absolute monopoly.

As voluntary enlistments grew in number a certain shortage of agricultural labour showed itself, and there was a movement towards the employment of women on the farms, particularly for such work as milking. In Great Britain women did not take so readily to farm work as they did in France and Germany, though after a time a considerable army of land girls rendered very efficient service.

Labour-saving machinery did not come into such prominence as in France, owing to its costliness. Under the

auspices of the Agricultural Organization Society, a company called the Isle of Wight Farmers Agricultural Outfit Society, Ltd. was formed and started operations about the end of the year by hiring out a steam plough to its members. This form of co-operative enterprise subsequently spread into other districts, but never became so prevalent as it did in France. It is stated on good authority that, in spite of the shortage of milkers, milking machines were almost unknown, while such things as potato diggers, shearing machines, and manure distributors were rare.

In the first few months of the war no considerable rise took place in the price of corn or meat, but towards the end of the year the price of corn, for some unexplained reason, advanced to a figure unknown in the memory of living men. One effect of the war was the establishment of a number of new industries in commodities which had been previously imported from enemy countries, such as oil cakes and beet sugar. Horse dealers made excessive profits, and there were cases of excessive charges for forage.

Profiteering also took place in service revolvers, officers' kits and in many other directions, and eventually had to be dealt with by vigorous legislation. An emergency measure rushed through on August 10 provided that where the Board of Trade was of opinion that foodstuffs were unreasonably being withheld from the market, the Board might be empowered by royal proclamation to commandeer such foodstuffs at prices agreed upon with the owner, or determined by the arbitration of a judge of the high court. Evictions for non-payment of rent became so numerous that the public outcry produced a measure on August 31 compelling landlords to go to court for a magistrate's order before evicting tenants or distraining on their goods. The first Trading with the Enemy Act was passed on August 23, and the following proclamation was issued by the Treasury:

(1) For the purpose of deciding what transactions with foreign traders are permitted the important thing is to consider where the foreign trader resides and carries on business and not the nationality of the foreign trader.

(2) Consequently there is as a rule no objection to British firms trading with German or Austrian firms established in neutral or British territory. What is prohibited is trade with any firm established in hostile territory

This half-hearted measure shows that at the outset the authorities had not yet realized the far-reaching possibilities of the war and were apprehensive of any steps which might tend to shake British credit. But these provisions were revoked a few days later by royal proclamation; the whole situation was rapidly tightened up, and complete restrictions imposed. Amongst other measures taken by the Government a state insurance office was set up in London, and it was officially announced that the state was prepared to insure 80 per cent. of the risk on ships and to insure cargoes at moderate fixed rates. A tremendous boom in shipping shortly arose as the result of this state guarantee and of the protection afforded to shipping by the fleet, and old ships which a few weeks before had been unsaleable were sold at fantastic figures. Shipowners, great and small, began to make large fortunes.

The railways came under state control on the night of August 4, in virtue of the powers possessed by the Government under the Regulation of the Forces Act, 1871. Such a measure was, of

Photo: Central News

ENEMY KITCHEN, BUT FRIENDLY FOOD

The most welcome of all the bugle calls that the soldier can hear brought these Belgian soldiers to an open-air kitchen. The savoury odours of the meal that is being served to them were, no doubt, all the more pleasant because the kitchen had been captured

MORNING COFFEE

These soldiers of Belgium take their morning coffee under alfresco conditions. Tin cans and a fire of twigs give them war's substitute for the café au lait of their own homes, and this they will enjoy as soon as the appetising liquid boils

Photo: Sport and General

DEATH AT THE CROSS ROADS

Night is falling on the deserted streets of Soissons where there has been fighting during the day. The troops have moved on, leaving only their dead to mark their progress through the little town that stands on the Aisne

course, essential in order to facilitate the movements of troops, stores and food supplies. That these powers were used in moderation so as not to create any general dislocation is shown by the wording of the order in council issued under the Act:

> It is expedient that the Government should have control over the railroads of Great Britain. . . . Although railway facilities for other than naval and military purposes may for a time be somewhat restricted, the effect of the use of the power under this Act will be to co-ordinate the demands on the railways of the civil community with those necessary to meet the special requirements of the naval and military authorities. More normal conditions will in due course be restored, and it is hoped the public will recognize the necessity for the special conditions, and will in the general interest accommodate themselves to the inconvenience involved.

The general work of organization was performed by the war railway council, on which sat representatives of the War Office, Admiralty and Board of Trade. The administrative work fell to the railway executive committee, a board composed of the general managers of the railways. Though the civil population suffered some inconvenience, military needs were served with unfailing efficiency.

As the gravity of the position became more apparent plans for home defence became operative. Trench digging began along the coasts, which were patrolled by Territorials. Numbers of special constables were enrolled to take the strain off the regular police, strategic points, such as railway stations, bridges and water and lighting works were placed under military guard, and even under the charge of Boy Scouts, who carried out their responsibilities with great seriousness and efficiency.

It is related that a pedestrian approaching a bridge that was guarded by a boy scout found his way barred. He laughingly asked the boy how he proposed to prevent his crossing the bridge, whereupon the scout, without offering any information on the subject, blew his whistle, as the result of which, within a very short time, the remainder of the troop appeared on the spot. The pedestrian returned on his tracks.

There were considerable fluctuations in the supplies of men produced under the system of voluntary enlistment, and ceaseless efforts were made to stimulate recruiting. Public men and speakers of all shades of political opinion attended meetings to explain the true causes of the war. Courses of lectures on the subject were arranged by the universities, posters calling for recruits were seen everywhere, and touching personal appeals were even published in the agony columns of the press. On Sept. 11 a great demonstration to aid recruiting was held at the London Opera House under the joint auspices of the National Liberal and Constitutional Clubs, and during the month of October the recruiting campaign increased considerably in energy.

Towards the end of the year a valuable impulse to recruiting was given by the first German air raiders, although the damage they did was inconsiderable. On Christmas Eve a German aeroplane attempted to drop a bomb on Dover Castle, but missed the mark by some 400 yards, and only succeeded in damaging some cabbages in a field. On Christmas Day another one was engaged within sight of Southend, but escaped. But the effect of these early raids was to arouse popular anger and to increase very noticeably the flow of recruits into the army.

The general attitude of the business community at the outset was reflected in the press " Business as usual " campaign. It was quickly perceived that the outbreak of war afforded an excellent opportunity for attacking German trade in the South American market, in China, and in other parts of the world where German competition had hitherto been keen, but it was soon obvious that this was not the vital issue and the campaign died a natural death. The necessity of arming, clothing, and equipping

the new armies threw an impossible task on the factories of the north and midlands and the emergency was met by the transformation of plant belonging to firms who had never before manufactured any such things. As time went on the output of military supplies by these firms became subject to government regulations and the Defence of the Realm Act gave the Government power, if necessary, to take full control of the mills and factories themselves.

During the months of August and September attention became focussed on the possibility of distress and unemployment among the working classes during the coming winter, and to meet the eventuality the Prince of Wales's Fund was established. The Fund at once became popular and within the first nine months reached the enormous figure of £5,000,000. These fears, however, proved groundless. After a short period of uncertainty willing workers found plenty to do, and the tendency of wages was upwards rather than downwards. Women flocked to take the place of the men in shops and warehouses and the wages paid to them added to the amount of money in circulation.

It may be said, therefore, that at the end of 1914 the internal condition of Great Britain was, on the whole, satisfactory. As the result of enlistment serious crime had become rare and unemployment was below the normal. Home production had been stimulated and the economic outlook was hopeful. On November 4 the moratorium came to an end and on December 23 it was announced that the Stock Exchange would re-open on January 4, with stringent provisions designed to prevent operations in stock held by enemy nations. The British nation felt itself entitled to look forward to the issue of the struggle with quiet confidence and to possess its soul in patience until a vigorous offensive should become possible in the spring.

The attitude of the trade unionists was expressed in a manifesto that was issued on Sept. 3 by the parliamentary committee of the trade union congress:

The prospect of having to face conscription, with its permanent and heavy burden on the financial resources of the country and its equally burdensome effect upon nearly the whole of its industry, should in itself stimulate the manhood of the nation to come forward in its defence, and thereby demonstrate to the world that a free people can rise to the supreme heights of a great sacrifice without the whip of conscription.

Upon the result of the struggle rests the preservation and maintenance of free and unfettered democratic government.

The dislike felt by the trade unionists for conscription expressed in this extract was brushed aside by the socialist, Robert Blatchford, who had himself been in the regular army. He wrote:

There are no classes now, no parties; we are all Britons united for a common cause and in the common danger. It is not only the professional soldiers and sailors who must fight; we must all fight. We must fight or go under; more than that, we must win or go under.

Those who were opposed to British intervention in the war were an almost negligible minority; but they existed. After Sir Edward Grey's announcement that Britain had declared war on Germany, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald said:

I think Sir Edward Grey is wrong. I think the Government which he represents and for which he speaks is wrong. I think the verdict of history will be that they are wrong. Whatever may be said of us, whatever attacks may be made upon us, we will say this country ought to have remained neutral.

This view, however, was not very widely shared and, although there were two resignations from the Cabinet, Viscount Morley, the lord president, and Mr. John Burns, the president of the Board of trade, it cannot be said that the unity of the nation was impaired in the face of its unprecedented ordeal,

Photo: Sport and General

HIS MAJESTY'S JOLLIES

A brigade of Royal Marines was landed at Ostend on August 27–28, 1914. Their role was to create a diversion and bring support to the hard-pressed Belgians. The inhabitants are watching with quiet satisfaction the arrival of the hardy British veterans

OUTPOST AT OSTEND

On sentry duty on the outskirts of Ostend these two marines are objects of the grateful curiosity of a small crowd of civilians. The Germans greatly exaggerated the strength of the small British force that landed to protect Belgium's popular seaside resort

FORWARD THE GUNS!

War was gaily caparisoned in its early months. French cavalry wore their cuirasses and German horsemen concealed the brightness of their helmets by protecting them with cloth covers. This was done so that they should not catch the glitter of the sun and so attract attention

NOW THANK WE ALL OUR GOD

With the regimental band in attendance, a German battalion attends church parade. It may be assumed that the service included the singing of the famous German hymn of thanksgiving translated as 'Now Thank We All Our God'

CHAPTER V

BELGIUM'S AGONY

In the West the World War began with the German invasion of Belgium, and before August was out much of that country was in enemy possession, Brussels being entered on August 20

HOSTILITIES having been begun, every military consideration urged the German command to take the Belgian route to Paris. With or without permission, and at any risk, they determined to strike at the northern frontier of France and seek a quick decision before the full weight of the Russian attack could develop on their eastern border.

Had they respected the neutrality of Belgium and attacked through Lorraine, as they had done in 1870, they would certainly have succeeded in rolling back the French armies, but it would have taken them far longer and they would have suffered incalculably greater losses. But such a plan, which might have delayed the intervention of Great Britain, was never seriously contemplated, and the shrewdest military observers had prophesied that Germany would not scruple to march through Belgium.

This invasion had formed part of the scheme mapped out by the great German strategist, Field-Marshal Alfred Schlieffen, who was chief of the Prussian general staff in 1890. The Schlieffen plan had been docketed in the year of its author's retirement, 1905, and envisaged an offensive war against France, possibly in alliance with England and with or without an attack from Russia. Its aim was, in any case, utterly to crush France before turning to deal with any eastern menace.

Schlieffen's scheme was to divide his striking force into two unequal parts. The stronger one, on the German right, was to make a great sweep through the south of Holland and Belgium, to wheel south of Paris, and gradually force the French to the line of the Moselle fortresses, the Jura and Switzerland. As was said by General von Seeckt, "everything was risked on the strength and rapidity of the first blow." The weak left wing might expect to be attacked and driven in, but this would only improve the chances of the major operation by driving the French armies into a trap from which they could not escape. It was not proposed to issue any ultimatum to Belgium or France. Sufficient that France, in her own defence, might be obliged to invade Belgium, and thus dispose of the troublesome accusation of breaking the guarantee of neutrality.



The black lines show the various stages of the German advance through Belgium between August 3, 1914, and October when the lines became static and remained so for nearly four years

Photo: Sport and General

A BITE BY THE WAY

A peaceful countryside and the shelter of a haystack have been the scene of many a happy picnic party, but these Belgian officers are snatching a hasty meal with no thought of pleasure, for the Germans are advancing through their country

The plan, with modifications, was carried into effect. It was decided that it was too dangerous to risk the hostility of Holland, and thus the opportunity of turning Liége was lost. Fewer divisions were available for the right wing than had been anticipated, but every material preparation had been made which could ensure success.

A vast and efficient railway system had been built up by which rapid concentration was ensured, and once in Belgium there was a further excellent system which would facilitate a quick advance. Though no modern guns had yet tested the fortresses of Liége and Namur, they were known to be weak compared with those which the French had built along their eastern border, and the Germans could feel confident that their siege guns were capable of reducing them. Moreover, a rapid advance through Belgium could be followed by a turning movement which would separate the left flank of the French army from its base in Paris. Had all the German calculations been fulfilled they might easily have been victorious, as the Kaiser had prophesied, by the Christmas of 1914. They had not counted on the stout Belgian resistance

NUNS AND CONVENT COMMANDEERED

Château and convent were alike commandeered to provide quarters for the officers of the advancing German armies. In this scene the nuns have been compelled to wait upon their country's despoilers who, as the table shows, exercised a conquerors' privilege

which delayed them for a number of days. They had banked on the unsettled state of British politics, pre-occupied with a disturbed Ireland, to cripple the British government. And thirdly, they failed entirely to foresee the effect which the violation of Belgian neutrality would have in unifying all forms of opinion in Great Britain and the Empire. One further miscalculation served also gravely to embarrass them. They had imagined that some time must elapse before the unwieldy Russian army could be effectively mobilized. In fact, the Russians had moved and were overrunning the German border before the German mobilization was complete.

The German intention was sufficiently revealed by August 2nd, when they occupied another neutral and, in this case, quite defenceless country, the duchy of Luxemburg, turning it at once into an effective military base. On that same day Germany made formal application to the Belgian government for permission to march through Belgium. The German note was presented by the German minister in Brussels to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Reliable information, it was said, had been received by the German government to the effect that French forces intended to march on the line of the Meuse by Givet and Namur. It was quite certain that France intended to march through Belgian territory toward Germany, and it was unlikely that Belgium would be able, without assistance, to repel so considerable a French invasion. In any case, she could not provide sufficient guarantee against danger to Germany. It was essential for the self-defence of Germany that she should anticipate any such hostile attack. But it would be a matter of the "deepest regret" if Belgium regarded as an act of hostility the invasion of Belgian territory which was necessarily implied.

More specific declarations followed. Germany had in view no act of hostility against Belgium. As long as Belgium maintained an attitude of friendly neutrality the German government bound itself, at the conclusion of peace, to guarantee the possessions and independence of the Belgian kingdom in full. It undertook at that time to evacuate all Belgian territory and during the occupation to purchase all necessaries for the troops against a cash payment and to pay an indemnity for all damage done. But, on the other hand, should Belgium oppose the German troops, and in particular, should she throw difficulties in the way of their march by a resistance of their fortresses on the Meuse or by destroying railways, roads, tunnels or other works, Germany would, to her regret, regard Belgium as an enemy. In that event Germany could undertake no obligations towards Belgium and the eventual adjustment of the relations between the two states must be left to the decision of arms. The German government, however, entertained the distinct hope that this eventuality would not occur, and that the Belgian government would know how to take the necessary measures to prevent the occurrence of incidents such as those mentioned. In this case the friendly ties which bound the two nations would grow stronger and more enduring.

Had Belgium agreed to these dishonourable proposals and allowed her country to become a mere corridor to Northern France the course of history might well have been altered. But in King Albert she had a ruler of admirable integrity and resolution who, until the last possible moment, preserved a scrupulous neutrality, but when openly threatened, knew, to his lasting honour, how to reply.

The Belgian answer was ready by 7 a.m. on the morning of August 3. Recapitulating the German demands, it declared that these had made a deep and painful impression upon the Belgian government. It was pointed out that

Photo: Sport and General

WHERE BROWN GUARDS WHITE

Native troops from the French colonies in North Africa did good service in France. In this photograph Spahis, the name given to the Algerian and Tunisian cavalry regiments, officered by Frenchmen, are supplying an escort for German prisoners

the intentions attributed to France by Germany were in contradiction to the formal declarations made to Belgium on August 1 in the name of the French government. If Belgian territory were violated by France, Belgium intended to fulfil her international obligations and offer the most vigorous resistance to the invader. The treaties of 1839, followed and confirmed by the treaties of 1870, vouched for the independence and neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee of the powers and notably of the government of his majesty of Prussia.

Belgium, the note continued, had always been faithful to her international obligations, she had carried out her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality, and had left nothing undone to maintain and enforce respect for her neutrality. The attack upon her independence with which the German government threatened her constituted a flagrant violation of international law which no strategic interest could justify. The Belgian government, if it had accepted the proposals submitted to them would have sacrificed the honour of the nation and betrayed its duty towards Europe. Conscious of the part which Belgium had played for more than eighty years in the civilization of the world, its spokesmen refused to believe that the independence of the kingdom could only be preserved at the price of the violation of her neutrality. If this hope was disappointed the Belgian government was firmly resolved to repel by all the means in its power, every attack upon its rights.

The Germans, however, were perfectly determined in their course, regarding the threatened Belgian resistance as negligible and their own strategic necessities as overriding all considerations of international honour. This is clearly shown in the speech delivered by the chancellor in the Reichstag on August 4. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg spoke without disguise thus :



Liége with its forts and the surrounding districts watered by the river Meuse

We are in a state of legitimate defence and necessity knows no law . . . . Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and have perhaps already entered Belgium. This is contrary to the dictates of international law. France has, it is true, declared at Brussels that she was prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as it was respected by her adversary. But we knew that France was ready to invade Belgium. France could wait ; we could not. A French attack upon our flank in the region of the Lower Rhine might have been fatal. We were, therefore, compelled to ride rough shod over the legitimate protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and Belgium. For the wrong which we are thus doing, we will make reparation as soon as our military object is attained. Anyone in such grave danger as ourselves and who is struggling for his supreme welfare, can only be concerned with the means of extricating himself.

Doubtless Germany might have dealt generously with Luxemburg and leniently with Belgium had that military object been attained, but meantime they had taken a diplomatic step which was to prove completely fatal to her designs. King Albert, as has been said, had remained strictly neutral with the divisions of his army facing his three frontiers and the sea, ready to repel attack from any quarter. He had asked for no assistance from the guaranteeing powers, and had, indeed, made it clear that he wished to avoid the embarrassment of proffered help and to deal with the situation alone. But on August 3

Photo: Sport and General

THE MAYOR IS NOT AT HOME

When the Germans occupied a Belgian city they made the Hôtel de Ville their headquarters. The burgomaster became a mere intermediary, if he was not completely deposed. Here the German flag has been run up outside the civic offices of Ghent, and crowds of anxious inhabitants are waiting to hear the worst that may befall them

he and his government had made known their decision, and, resistance having been decided upon, he made an eleventh hour appeal to France and Great Britain to save his country from invasion. To King George he sent a telegram in these terms :

> Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and the proof of friendship which you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium.

The direct result of this appeal was to unite in an overwhelming majority the wavering British cabinet, and to make the British declaration of war both inevitable and popular. It was to lead to a coalition of the nations against Germany beyond even her great powers and genius to defeat.

Belgium could command an army of six divisions and a cavalry division in the field as well as fortress troops garrisoning Antwerp, Liége and Namur. The military organization of the country was in process of revision, and there were actually available for the field army a number of troops less than could be supplied by the British regular army. The chief fortress was Antwerp, but the arrangement and defensive value of its outlying forts were out of date for modern warfare, and they were negligible against modern siege artillery. Liége and Namur were defensive outposts designed rather to enable Belgium to fulfil the obligations of her neutrality than to resist indefinitely the full flood of invasion. These obligations implied that resistance should be offered to any belligerent country which attempted to take and gain advantage by making use of the strategic route through Belgium. Her armies were not expected to fight at this point to the last ditch, but so to delay the offensive measures of the fighting armies that neither one nor the other could take advantage of the element of surprise. That was Belgium's role as a neutral and one which she would honourably have fulfilled whoever the aggressor had been. But on August 4 the position changed ; Germany declared war on Belgium, and the fortresses of Liége and Namur became the first bulwarks of national defence.

King Albert, as commander-in-chief of his armies, ordered the divisions garrisoning the fortresses to stay where they were, and to hold them at all costs. The four divisions remaining and one cavalry division were ordered to proceed via the zone Tirlemont-Perwez-Louvain towards the Meuse. Belgium intended to repel the invader by all the means in her power though, indeed, these were slender enough.

German troops had, in fact, crossed the frontier in small parties as early as August 2, but these advance reconnaissances were conducted in an entirely friendly spirit, and the detachments withdrew to rejoin the main German concentration which at this time was said to number 160,000 men. On the morning of August 4 the Germans began to advance against Belgium as an enemy. Their first objective was the control of the bridges and railways leading towards Liége and Brussels, and crossing the frontier their cavalry

moved upon the small town of Visé, not far to the south of Maastricht. On arrival at the bridgehead on the Meuse they found the central spans blown away, the west bank held by Belgian troops and their advance covered by the guns of the outer forts of Liége. Thus checked a party consisting of two regiments felt their way to Lixhe, where they crossed the river by a ford, and the way to Liége was then open.

The forts of Liége had been constructed in 1890, under Leopold II, by the great Belgian military engineer, Henri Alexis Brialmont, who was also responsible for the defences of Antwerp and Namur. His forts were adapted to long range artillery fire, practically sunk into the earth, cased in concrete and surrounded by a deep ditch. From the interior the gun turrets were raised and lowered, and this interior contained quarters for the garrison, stores and ammunition.

Liége was surrounded by twelve of these forts, six large and six small ones, commanding the main approaches. Each was situated about four miles from the city and with an average distance between them of 4,000 yards. It had been intended by Brialmont that the intervals between them should be entrenched and held by infantry but, in effect, this was not done, though some infantry was sent to strengthen the garrisons.

Farthest north was the fort of Pontisse, about nine miles from the Dutch frontier, and it must be remembered that this gap was undefended except by cavalry patrols, and was the temptation which led the Germans to make their first attempt at Visé. Across the Meuse were the fort Barchon, the *fortin* of Evegnée, the fort of Fléron, and the *fortins* of Chaudfontaine and Embourg which dominated the main railway to Germany through Vervier. In the valley of the Ourthe, still on the right bank of the Meuse, was the fort of Boucelles and surrounding Liége at the back were the fort of Flemalle in the south, the *fortin* of Hollogne, the fort of Loncin and between Loncin and Pontisse, the *fortins* of Lantin and Liers. Of these the most important was Loncin, covering the railways running north and west through Liége.

Each fort had a complement of two 15 cm., two 12 cm. guns, and two 21 cm. howitzers besides some minor artillery. As a preliminary step the Belgian general Leman destroyed all communications possible in front of his position. It was to avoid time being given for such destruction to become wholesale on the proposed route of march that the Germans had decided to carry Liége with the utmost speed.

Their plan involved a night attack by General von Emmich's force of 35,000 troops and 127 guns, during which the forts should be covered by the concerted action of men and artillery, while the intervals between them were penetrated by the advancing columns. At 10 p.m. on August 5 the battle opened in earnest, but with a very different result from the coup de main which had been anticipated. The Belgian garrison had been raised to five times its normal strength, and the first onslaughts, made in a heavy thunderstorm, suffered costly repuises.

Four brigades on the right bank were completely checked, and severe losses were inflicted on those which attacked farther south. The Germans advanced in mass formation, and their casualties were in consequence heavy. The first attempt to carry the line of forts must have been exceedingly discouraging. By a strange freak of battle a small body of Germans was actually in the town

Photo: Topical

STRETCHER CASES

A French hospital train is being unloaded of its shattered human freight in a railway siding at the base. The wounded men on stretchers are some of the many casualties which the French suffered during their fierce defence of Arras in October, 1914

FROM FOUR TO TWICE FOUR MILLION

Roughly constructed crosses, tribute of the living to their dead comrades, marked the burial places of many a fallen soldier. Here the graves of four French officers, killed in the early fighting, are decorated by a small tricolour and a tribute of flowers

Photo: Topical

Photos: Sport and General

ROUND ABOUT AND HOME AGAIN

After the fall of Namur, General Michel's defending force managed to effect a retreat to the south-east and join up with the French. It eventually reached Havre, and from there was transported to Ostend in time to take part in the defence of Antwerp. The photograph shows Belgian troops landing at Ostend

of Liége in the early morning, having met with no opposition. They were, however, but half a company and were speedily dealt with, although their sortie was successful in deluding the Belgian general Leman as to the number of German troops which had crossed the river. This led to the withdrawal of the Belgian defending troops from the right bank of the river, although the forts remained intact.

About this time the German general von Ludendorff made his first dramatic appearance in the War. As the strategist who in peace time had evolved the plan for the reduction of Liége which was now being put into operation, chance gave him the opportunity of directing some part of it in the field. He had reached Aix-la-Chapelle on August 2, having been appointed deputy chief of staff to the 2nd German army under General von Bülow. On tours of inspection he was present at some of the earliest fighting, and on the night of August 5–6 he was with General von Emmich and rode to Micheroux, two or three kilometres from Fort Fléron, where the 14th infantry brigade under Major-General von Wussow was preparing for the attack. Riding to the head of the column, Ludendorff was told that the general had been killed, and though, as he afterwards explained, he had no authority to give orders, his task being one of co-ordination, he took command of the column and led it forward to the heights of La Chartreuse immediately overlooking the town of Liége. He encountered heavy street fighting in Queue de Bois, but successfully broke through the ring of forts and reached the heights about two o'clock on the afternoon of August 6.

Ludendorff had an excellent view of the town, but little ammunition with which to bombard it, and he regarded his position as exceedingly precarious. He was without information as to the progress of other brigades, and spent the night of the 6–7 in the greatest anxiety. When morning broke he decided, in consultation with Emmich, to enter the city, and this he achieved without great difficulty. A colonel in command of the advance guard had been ordered to occupy the citadel, but varied his instructions on his own initiative.

Ludendorff, under the impression that they had been carried out, rode to the gates with his adjutant in a commandeered Belgian car, only to find that the fortress was still in the hands of the enemy. Undeterred, he banged on the gates with his sword and demanded admittance. This was granted to him, and he personally received the surrender of the garrison numbering some hundreds. For this dashing feat he received the order Pour le Mérite from the Kaiser, and through it established

Photo: Sport and General

DEATH'S REAPER

For many months of the War the Germans had a superiority in the power and range of their artillery which outmatched the lighter guns of the Allies. Often they brought their howitzers into the open, fairly sure that they could not be ranged

himself in that favour which was to lead to his advancement to highest positions.

The city and the citadel having fallen, the Germans addressed themselves systematically to the reduction of the forts. These held out with the greatest tenacity and courage until, one by one, they were literally blown to pieces. A new German siege army was formed under General von Einem, strengthened by heavy artillery, including 24 cm. mortars and 42 cm. howitzers. Attacks were now directed against each fort singly, and the overwhelming bombardment forced them to surrender. In Fort Loncin was the Belgian commander, General Leman, who badly wounded was taken prisoner. The last fort surrendered twelve days after the first attack on August 16.

The obstinate defence of Liége was of incalculable benefit to the Allies. It is generally estimated that it saved four or five days, an invaluable breathing space for both France and Britain. The German command, according to Bülow, had hoped to begin their advance on August 13, five days earlier than was possible. The Germans claim that the rapid retreat of the French made it possible for them to overtake their programme and that they were actually on the line Thionville-Sedan-Mons slightly ahead of their schedule, on August 23.

BACKCLOTH TO WAR

Louvain has been burnt and its houses have become charred silhouettes forming a gruesome background to the marching of a victorious enemy. The German cavalry proceed to further conquests, leaving behind them a trail of death and destruction

The Belgian field army, about 90,000 strong, had been entrenched behind the river Gette, and while the Liége forts were still holding out a German force appeared before them. An attack was made at Haelen on August 12 by a mixed body of cavalry and infantry numbering about 10,000 men, but after a fight lasting some ten hours, it was defeated by a Belgian force of equal strength. The battle was notable for cavalry charges by both sides, but it was the Belgian artillery that decided the issue. Numerous setbacks of this kind, however, could not stem the relentless advance of the gathering battalions of Germany. Troops and guns were poured into Belgium and, though a general retreat could be delayed, it was from the first inevitable.

On Saturday, August 15, the Germans were in position for their main advance; the forts of Liége were all but demolished. The town of Huy, on the right bank of the Meuse, had fallen and laid open a new line of approach. Four German army corps began to move forward into the heart of Belgium. The first took the route Hasselt-Aerschot-Brussels, the second Tongres-

Photo: Sport and General

'IN THE PINK'

A friendly sergeant major lends his cap to a Tommy anxious to inform his family that he is 'in the pink.' The captured German wagon suggests that the sergeant major's next duty will be to hand over this spoil to his divisional headquarters

Tirlemont-Louvain, and the two corps of the second German army swung round respectively through Wavre and Gembloux towards Mons and Charleroi. An attack in force was made on August 16 against the position to the south-east of Wavre at the junction of the French and Belgian armies and, on the following day, the Germans advanced along their front extending from Liége to the Dutch frontier.

On August 18 they bombarded Tirlemont, which fell to them, and next day were in front of Louvain, where the Belgians made some resistance, but were in the end forced to retire. On this August 19 they were beyond Aerschot on their right, in possession of Wavre and Louvain in their centre and approaching Gembloux on their left. The Belgian army were falling back on their ultimate fortress, Antwerp, and the way to Brussels was open. There was small hope of defending the capital. An open town protected by international agreement from bombardment must be left to the occupation of the enemy without resistance, and that this unhappy fate awaited the city became perfectly clear on the night of August 19–20.

Brussels had as its burgomaster Adolphe Max, a man of singular courage and resolution. He was journalist, lawyer, and a student of municipal government. When the crisis came he proved himself to be a fearless patriot prepared to fight defenceless for the rights of his city. He had been an advocate of resistance and when this became clearly impossible and the menace was at the city gates he issued a memorable proclamation. It was pasted on the walls of Brussels on the evening of August 19 and was framed in these terms:

Fellow-citizens,—Despite the heroic resistance offered by our troops, seconded by the allied armies, there is reason to fear that the enemy may occupy Brussels. Should such an event come to pass, I trust I may count upon the calm and the *sang froid* of the population. Above all, one should not lose one's head or give way to panic. The municipal authorities will not desert their post. They will continue to perform their duties with the firmness which you have a right to expect from them in such circumstances.

It is hardly necessary for me to remind my fellow-citizens of their duty towards their country. The laws of warfare forbid the enemy to use force to obtain from the population information concerning the national army and its means of defence. The inhabitants of Brussels should know that they are within their rights in refusing to furnish any information whatsoever to the invader. None of you must think of acting as guides to the foe. This refusal is indispensable in the interests of the country.

Everyone should be on his guard against spies and foreign agents who should attempt to obtain information or provoke any form of manifestation. The enemy cannot legally attack either the honour of families or the life of citizens or private property, or religious or philosophical convictions; nor can they interfere with the freedom of public worship.

Any abuse committed by the invader should be immediately notified to me. So long as I am in possession of life and liberty I will protect, with all my might, the rights and the dignity of my fellow-citizens. I implore the population to assist me in my task by abstaining from any hostile act, any use of arms, and any participation in fights or discussions.

Fellow-citizens, whatever may happen, listen to the voice of your burgomaster and continue to trust in him. He will not betray you!

Long live Belgium, free and independent. Long live Brussels.

ADOLPHE MAX.

At two o'clock on the afternoon of August 20 the German army began its march into the Belgian capital. The Germanization of control immediately followed. Railways, telegraphs and telephones were immediately taken possession of and an acting German governor appointed in the person of Count von Arnim. The requisition of food and other supplies followed and a grave warning was issued to the civilian population that any independent action of a hostile character would be met by the most severe measures.

Burgomaster Max took up an attitude which might have seemed merely foolhardy if it had not sprung from a fine integrity of mind which knew no fear. He refused absolutely to act under the orders of a German commandant, he denied all knowledge of any funds wherewith to meet the demanded indemnity of £6,000,000. He placed every obstacle in the way of German requisitions, issued protests against the abuses of the occupation and on the other hand through a *Comité National* was unceasing in his efforts to safeguard supplies to his fellow citizens.

It says much for the inherent respect which the Germans must have felt towards an implacable non-combatant that they suffered this turbulent mayor for a month before finally placing him under arrest and sending him to imprisonment in Germany, and this need not be discounted by the fact that they must have realized the value of his authority in restraining the population from the appalling dangers of revolt. Burgomaster Max remained a prisoner throughout the War, but escaped in November, 1918, and made a dramatic reappearance in Brussels shortly after its evacuation, to be acclaimed a national hero.

Meanwhile the Belgian field army which had held the line along the river Gette was in retreat and five divisions were effectually withdrawn

NAVAL MIGHT IN GERMAN WATERS

Light cruisers and destroyers of the German fleet are manoeuvring in the Baltic. Their main exit into the North Sea was partially closed by minefields and the British navy was on the watch for any ships that might slip through. Only in the Baltic could the Germans emerge from port with any degree of security

IN LINE AHEAD

Although they spent most of their time bottled up in their seaports and protected by their minefields, the German squadrons occasionally put to sea for exercise. A squadron of light cruisers is here seen steaming in line ahead. The three leading ships are turning to port, preparatory to making a new formation

THE BLÜCHER'S GRAVE

On January 24, 1915, a battle squadron under Vice-Admiral Beatty, supported by a destroyer flotilla, engaged a force of German battle cruisers, cruisers and destroyers under Admiral Hipper off the Dogger bank. In the course of the action the armoured cruiser Blücher was the target of intense fire, and was finally sent to the bottom after a most determined resistance. She is here seen with the crew clinging to the wreck a moment before her sinking

OFF THE BELGIAN COAST

When war broke out three monitors had just been completed in British shipyards for the Brazilian government. These were impressed and renamed Humber, Mersey and Severn, and became immediately useful for service off the Belgian coast

BURYING HER NOSE

This British cruiser on patrol in the North Sea is making the rough passage common in these waters where the sea is "short" and constantly washes the decks on a stormy day. The necessity for hourly vigilance called for much hard service of this character

to Antwerp, there to remain for some weeks a menace to the Germans. The fact that this was not idle is shown by the German admission that two army corps which had been intended to take part in the march to the coast were detained to cover the fortress, a task already employing a considerable number of troops. There was always a threat that the Belgian garrison might attempt a sortie which, had it been effective, would have had most serious consequences to the German advance. So though inactive, the Belgian army was still rendering invaluable service.

The scene of action now passes to Namur, the second of the two great frontier fortresses. Although German patrols had been in touch with Belgian patrols as early as August 5, and again on August 7, Namur itself was left unmolested until a fortnight later. Then a considerable force drawn from the 2nd and 3rd German armies and under the command of Gallwitz deployed north and south-east of the fortress.

Defending Namur was the Belgian 4th division which on August 19 was joined by the 8th brigade. These troops had been isolated at Huy, had blown up the bridge over the Meuse and retired on the fortress. About 30,000 men were thus available for the defence, but the investing force was overwhelmingly superior, consisting of six divisions and 500 guns.

The attack differed essentially from that made on Liége. The surprise element was eliminated and there was no attempt at a *coup de main*. General von Gallwitz employed the Guard reserve corps, three pioneer regiments, and a large mass of artillery north of the fortress and two divisions of the 11th German corps to the south-east. Supporting the artillery were four batteries of Austrian 30·5 cm. howitzers.

On August 20 the Germans drove in the Belgian outposts and on August 21 their artillery was in position to begin the bombardment of the forts. The first attack was on the eastern and south-eastern forts and was at once effective. The Belgians possessed no artillery which was capable of keeping the German siege guns out of range. They were impotent to silence or to lessen the bombardment and could only rely on occasional counter-attacks for offensive measures. Within two days two of the chief forts were almost demolished. The Belgians did, in fact, make two counter-attacks on August 22, but both these failed. Gradually the bombardment effected its purpose, and by the evening of August 23 five out of nine forts had been demolished.

The French had sent reinforcements to the extent of three battalions, and these also had joined in ineffectual counter-attacks. Indeed, the garrison as a whole was in that invidious position of suffering deadly and increasing losses without any effective means of retaliation. On the morning of the 23rd the Germans launched an infantry attack en masse with odds of three divisions against nine battalions. The mixed Belgian and French force met this onslaught with great bravery, and by a determined resistance did delay the advance of the Germans, who did not reach the outskirts of the city until the evening.

The battle and the fortress were by this time lost, and it only remained for the Belgian general Michel to prevent his garrison from being surrounded and taken prisoner. This he effectually did, ordering a forced retreat to the south-east. The bulk of the garrison, after marching for two days, were able to join the French, and later were transferred to Antwerp, where they played their part in the defence of that city. A rear-guard of over 5,000 men was, however, trapped and obliged to surrender.

The fall of Namur was a moral victory for the Germans, and correspondingly a highly depressing incident in the early misfortunes of the Allies. But looked back upon from a distance of time it can be regarded as part of that fine Belgian resistance of eighteen days, which was so unexpected and so disconcerting to Germany and so valuable to France and Great Britain.

After the occupation of Brussels the Germans had swept on through a defenceless Belgium. The open towns of Bruges and Ghent were occupied without resistance and the Germans could then afford a breathing space before the attack on Antwerp which was to complete their conquest of the little country, save for that narrow strip between Ypres and the sea which was to be a cockpit for four more years.

A further German organization of Belgium followed the fall of Namur. The Germans fully interpreted their conquest as implying annexation. A governor-general was appointed in Field-Marshal von der Goltz, the country was divided into military commands, and everything was done to foster the age-old conflict of Flamand and Walloon. German time was introduced and all public services were placed under German control. The complete subjection of Belgium became an established fact, and persisted during the whole course of the War.

In bringing this about Germany showed a ruthlessness which to neutral and contemporary observers savoured more of the Middle Ages than of modern times, and by deliberate barbarities alienated much of the goodwill of the non-combatant peoples. Equally did they inflame the hatred of their enemies and provide fuel for their propaganda, which in the end they recognized as one of the chief contributory factors in their defeat.

It is not the purpose of this narrative to recapitulate tales of horror. Those which blacken the history of the German invasion of Belgium may be read in all their gruesome details in the report of the committee of inquiry presided over by Lord Bryce. Here there is authenticated

Photo: Sport and General

GRATEFUL AND COMFORTING

Along the line of march a rough and ready field-kitchen was sometimes set up for the benefit of the walking wounded. This poilu, injured in the bombardment of Reims, finds a rest and a plate of hot soup a not unpleasant prelude to a spell in hospital

Photo: Sport and General

SHOTS AT A VENTURE

Behind a stack in a field of stubble, these two French soldiers, evidently picked marksmen, have made an ambush. Uhlans are about, and if the quarry are unlucky, and the marksmen lucky, these German horsemen will be caught as they come into the open

evidence of unlicensed brutality, of rapine, of murder more familiar in the unbridled warfare of undisciplined armies than in the military history of civilized peoples. Moreover, there is confirmation of the fact that they were not the unstudied acts of a soldiery inflamed by victory, but were part of a deliberately planned and ordered campaign of terrorism that was designed to crush all spirit of resistance out of a defeated people.

To be perfectly fair it is necessary to listen to the German defence. Undoubtedly during the early days of the invasion there were many instances of *franc-tireurs* firing on the advancing enemy, and firing not in the open but from ambush. The laws of war recognize only the death penalty for such action, and it is arguable that some mass punishment may be necessary for its suppression. However much we may sympathize with the outraged civilian who picks an ancient fowling piece from its rack to fire one shot for his country, it is in fact an illegal act which any army must regard as one of treachery and punish accordingly. Nine times out of ten the culprit cannot be caught red-handed, and the danger must be met by the damnable expedient of executing the innocent or by the wanton destruction of public property.

The Germans have always excused themselves by this plea. It was, says Ludendorff, this *franc-tireur* warfare which " aroused that intense bitterness that during those first years characterised the war on the Western front in contrast to the feeling prevailing in the East." He accuses the Belgian government of systematically organizing civilian warfare, and even suspects Belgian soldiers of carrying civilian clothes in their knapsacks. We can discredit both, while still admitting that sharp-shooting by Belgian civilians did occur, and that the Germans were justified in suppressing this lurking danger by the most severe measures.

But this point having been admitted, the Germans cannot be exculpated from an extraordinary amount of unnecessary brutality and wanton destruction. The burning of Louvain alone was a crime which no provocation could justify. Individual acts of a bestial character are testified to by witnesses too numerous and too honest to be ignored, and though these have for years been dismissed by the pacifically minded as the figments of an unscrupulous propaganda, more recent events in Germany have shown too well that this great nation is not incapable of a revengeful cruelty abhorrent to all right thinking people.

Again the military excuse availed them nothing when the facts were brought before the impartial tribunal of the neutral nations. As was to happen many times afterwards, the expedient which showed the quickest way to victory was to turn gradually but certainly into the surest way to defeat. Great Britain, who for centuries had relied on her professional forces to fight her battles by land and sea, was spurred to those efforts which were to lead to the creation of a vast civilian army. Feeling in the United States was embittered against Germany, and though some long time was to pass before they took action, undoubtedly the treatment of Belgium weighed in the scales of their decision.

But for the moment the Germans had successfully carried out their plan, and there seemed no reason why it should not be pushed to a victorious conclusion. The French had wasted valuable days meeting an illusory attack in Lorraine and penetrating to no purpose the frontier of Upper Alsace. Events seemed to be moving favourably enough for the central powers, although we now know that the delay caused by the Belgian resistance was far more serious than it appeared at the time.

SIMPLE BUT WELCOME FARE

A motherly French woman in a beet field hands a slice from a loaf to a young cuirassier. In the opening days of the War French cuirassiers took the field in full uniform, steel breast-plate and plumed helmet. They were thus an easy mark for enemy snipers

Photo: Sport and General

CHAPTER VI

FRANCE AT WAR

A description of life in France at the outbreak of the World War, like the companion chapter on Great Britain, is a desirable preliminary to the battle stories of the next four years

THE eve of war found a chaotic state of affairs in France, and especially in Paris. The nation was neither morally nor materially ready. Questions of national importance were obscured by polemics concerning the measure extending from two to three years the period of military service, and by scandals such as the Caillaux case.

There appears to have been a certain apathy as regards Germany's warlike preparations. France in general had been inclined to focus her attention on Germany's literature and industry and to believe in the Kaiser's pacific intentions and in the legendary German professor absorbed in theoretical speculations. For some two years the country had been suffering from financial depression, and the discovery that many foreign loans were precarious was influencing the Bourse. Industry was languishing and the fear of taxation, especially the new income tax, was affecting the national spirit. There had been runs on the banks, in particular on the Société-Général. Ministries, as usual, had short lives.

The income tax had always been a bugbear to the French. M. Poincaré's budget of 1906 involved new taxation and proposed the income tax which had regularly been announced in ministerial declarations for four years past. In 1913 M. Caillaux, the finance minister, introduced a bill establishing a special income tax limited to incomes above 10,000 francs (£400) a year to meet the expenditure entailed by the three years' service bill. M. Caillaux drew an alarming picture of the financial crisis, and declared that the proposed income tax was the only remedy. A few days later the Government fell, but on December 11, 1913, M. Doumergue's new ministry issued a declaration that the Government would faithfully carry out the law enacting three years' military service and would strive for the passing of the income tax bill instead of attempting to raise the required money by loan. This pledge was fulfilled, but before ministers had time to put the measures into operation the storm broke upon them.

As a neutral writer has said: "With a Bourse demoralized before the War by causes which are not connected with the War, with the two years period of depression, which had grown progressively worse in the second year, just passed through, with banks weakened, with fiscal derangements of a serious sort, with political turmoil and ministerial instability, France entered the War."

Paris was in a state of feverish excitement over the Caillaux case, an excitement very difficult for English people to understand. Joseph Caillaux had become minister of finance for the first time in 1899, and had greatly distinguished himself during his three years in office. In 1902 he was forced to resign, but he was reappointed finance minister by M. Clemenceau in 1906. In 1911—the year of the Agadir incident—he became prime minister and he represented France in the difficult negotiations with Germany. In 1912 he resigned, but November, 1913, found him finance minister once more.

The Caillaux case arose out of a violent press campaign started against him in *Le Figaro*, and part of the campaign consisted in the publication of certain letters which had passed between M. Caillaux and his wife before their marriage. Madame Caillaux conceived that her honour had been attacked, and shot the editor of *Figaro*, M. Calmette. Caillaux's resignation followed, and the subsequent trial of his wife, which opened on July 20, divided Paris into two hostile camps. It resulted in the acquittal of Madame Caillaux, chiefly owing to the eloquence and ability of her husband who, on the outbreak of war, was appointed paymaster-general to the forces.

A little earlier M. Humbert, a senator from Lorraine, had startled France by a speech in the Senate, in the course of which he declared that the organization and administration of the French

Photo: Sport and General

DIRECT HIT

The battered tower of Barcy church is here shown. So well and truly did the masons of old lay its stones that it still stands four-square above the ruined aisle shown on page 86

AIR SCOUTING BEGINS

In the first months of the War the aeroplanes used for reconnaissance were primitive compared with the perfect types of machine that both sides used later. A French general is here seen inspecting one of the early monoplanes which carries no weapons

Photo: Sport and General

Photo: Topical

DUMB VICTIMS OF WAR

These two wagon horses, engaged on their peaceful labours in the town of Soissons, were the victims of a shell which also wrecked the house behind them. Soissons was the centre of very heavy fighting during the autumn of 1914

army was defective in practically every branch. "If war should break out," he declared, "each French soldier would find himself with three boots—two on his feet, one in his knapsack, and all thirty years old."

Guns were without ammunition; Verdun could not work its wireless if that of Metz were in action; French forts were out of date. The gravity of these revelations drew from M. Clemenceau the severe comment: "We are neither defended nor governed." The result was that the minister of war was compelled to lay before the Senate figures showing the great superiority of Germany over France in every department of army equipment.

On Friday, July 31 while the atmosphere of Paris was in this hectic condition, Jean Jaurès was assassinated at the Café du Croissant, Rue Montmartre, just before ten in the evening, by Raoul Villain, who fired two shots at him. Jaurès, who had earned a high reputation as a leader of socialist thought, had, in spite of a brilliant academic career, set his heart on a parliamentary future in early manhood, and in 1885 he was elected deputy for Tarn. He attached himself to no party, and found himself incapable of sacrificing his principles to parliamentary compromises, as the result of which attitude he suffered a temporary setback and for a time resumed his academic career.

In 1893 Jaurès re-entered political life and when the Dreyfus *affaire* convulsed France, he became one of Dreyfus's stoutest champions. The socialism of Jaurès was not of the Marxian type; he declared that he was a socialist because "the domination of one class is an outrage against humanity." He gave expression to these principles in the newspaper *L'Humanité*, which he had founded with Aristide Briand on April 17, 1904. When the two groups of French socialists coalesced in 1905, Jaurès became their chief.

The attitude of Jaurès towards the war was the natural corollary of these views. His ideal was to avert war by simultaneous international action of the proletariat. Yet the threat of war found him, like the socialists in all the other belligerent countries, above all a patriot. "If our country should be threatened," he declared, "we should be first at the frontier to defend that France whose blood flows in our veins, and whose proud genius forms all that is best in us."

The assassination of Jaurès at this juncture might have precipitated a catastrophe in France. For the first time leapt to every mind the possibility of civil war in the face of the invader. The government placarded Paris with laudatory notices of the dead leader. The prime minister, M. Viviani, issued a dignified appeal to the nation:

> In the grave crisis which our country is undergoing the government counts on the patriotism of the working classes, of the whole population, to remain calm and not to further disturb public emotion by an agitation which might provoke disorder in the capital. The assassin has been arrested: he shall be punished. Have confidence in the law and let us present a calm and united front to the grave perils which surround us.

In the event the people remained calm, and the danger was averted.

During these days of excitement the president of the republic, Raymond Poincaré, who survived until October 15, 1934, returned from his visit to Russia. Reaching Kronstadt on July 20, he had held during the next three days long conversations with the tsar and his foreign minister, M. Sazanoff, and before he left St. Petersburg they had agreed upon a line of action.

The disturbed condition of the public mind at last came to an end at four

SOISSONS SOUVENIR

When the front lines became more stabilized and attacks were made on prepared trenches, the number of prisoners captured was naturally far fewer. Three German privates, by no means unhappy in appearance, are posing in Soissons

Photo: Topical

Photo: Sport and General

THIN BLUE LINE

When this photograph was taken war had only just come to the Aisne, the district along which was later the scene of such terrific fighting. The trench is lined by French infantry, who still wear the dark blue uniform which was customary in time of peace

o'clock on Saturday afternoon, August 1, when mobilization orders were posted all over France. These included special instructions to the commanders of the five corps that were stationed along the frontier. They were instructed that on no pretext were they to allow their troops to approach the actual frontier or go beyond a line which was indicated by naming towns and villages. This was done to avoid any untoward incident and roughly speaking represented a withdrawal of 10 kilometres, or just over six miles. In telegraphing this information to the French ambassador in London, the prime minister, M. Viviani, said: "In thus delivering a strip of territory undefended to the sudden aggression of the enemy, the government of the republic hopes to prove that France does not bear, any more than Russia, the responsibility for the attack."

These precautions, however, proved useless, for on August 2 Luxemburg, whose neutrality had been guaranteed by Prussia, as well as by other powers, was invaded by the German armies. At the same time the invaders crossed the French frontier, notably at Joncherey, north of Delle, where a German officer shot a French soldier, the first victim of the war.

France, in the presence of the invader, became a united nation. All doubt as to the intentions of their formidable antagonist disappeared. "The Germans," says a French writer at the time, "consider themselves blessed above all races, the only pure, the only just, in fact, the only race. They know it, and they announce it publicly. In the name of their god they exact empire. They claim Europe, they award themselves the world."

On August 13 the Paris correspondent of "The Times" wrote: "Paris is full of rumours . . . But it is surprising to find people so calm, with none of the war fever which one expects in the capital of a nation that is fighting for its life. Tales of carnage and massacre are repeated without emotion. It is understood that this is the *Revanche* for which the nation has been waiting for years. It must be bought for a price, and that price the nation is willing to pay . . . It is a whole nation that is fighting, and not a man, woman, or child believes that it can fail." In this respect the national spirit of France and Germany was singularly alike.

Paris itself, though gaily decorated with flags, became like a deserted city. Shops were closed, each with a list of those of its staff who had left for the front painted on its shutters. Gustav Hervé wrote in *La Guerre Sociale* on August 8:

> Like everybody else, I have seen in the last week things hardly possible to believe. I have seen a people thought to be rotten with individualism, plunged up to the neck in material enjoyment, torn by religious, political and social antagonisms, suddenly abandon without protest their interests, their pleasures, their animosities, to rush to arms as one man in the hour of their country's danger. I have seen mothers, sisters, daughters accept the painful sacrifice with sublime resignation. I have seen monks beg for a rifle from the Republic which had expelled them.

At this time, France, in spite of the prevalence of materialism, showed considerable religious fervour. Church and state had long been in conflict. The atheists and sceptics who hated the Church were in the habit of referring to her as "the clerical terror" and "the scarlet woman"; but the outbreak of war changed everything. Priests every-

SHATTERED SANCTUARY

The village church of Barcy has suffered a direct hit from a shell during the battle round Meaux, and it was many a long day before it saw a congregation once more. Altar, pews and pulpit have been completely shattered by masonry falling from the roof

Photo: Sport and General

where distinguished themselves by their heroism and their devotion was shared by many members of religious orders, both men and women. A neutral observer gives some instances. The Abbé Luchat became a sergeant in the Cyclists Corps and was killed on the field of battle. The Abbé Monbru, a lieutenant of the infantry, fell at the head of his company. Another, the Abbé Drenier, was struck down while leading his men in a charge. Abbé Fumin, an ensign, died also in battle. Abbé Buscog dashed to the attack with his men crying, " I am a priest. I fear not death. *En avant !* "

It was hardly to be expected that in the conditions created by a general mobilization in a country subject to compulsory military service no incident of disorder should have occurred. On the Sunday evening, the first day of mobilization, the hooligan element got to work and started smashing up German and Austrian shops. There is no record of insolence to British subjects in the French capital, but during the two or three days of uncertainty which elapsed before Great Britain declared war on Germany their position was one of considerable discomfort. Their suspense was, however, ended on the night of August 4,. and was amply compensated for by the wave of delight which passed through France on the entry of Great Britain into the War.

Sir Philip Gibbs, who was then in Paris, has described in " The Soul of the War " the working of the mobilization order that had such grave consequences on the lives of millions.

The quietness of Paris was astounding, and the first mobilization orders were issued with no more publicity than attends the delivery of a trade circular through the halfpenny post. Yet in hundreds of thousands of houses in France, and in all the blocks and tenements of Paris, there was a drama of tragic quietude when the cards were delivered to young men in civilian clothes, men who sat at table with old mothers or young wives, or in lowly rooms with some dreams to keep them company, or with little women who spoilt the dream, or fostered it, or with comrades who had gone on great adventures with them between the Quartier Latin and the Mountain of Montmartre. *It has come !*

As in Britain the authorities had to contend with a crop of rumours, usually false and always exaggerated. The newspapers vied with one another in supplying sensational information, and in their struggle for existence were by no means scrupulous as to the accuracy of the news they foisted on the public. The effect of this on public opinion became so serious that the authorities were driven to take action.

On August 5 a law was passed " to repress the indiscretions of the press in time of war." Under this enactment publication was forbidden of any information on matters of mobilization, defence works, armaments, appointments to the high command, naval or military movements, unless supplied by the government or the military authorities. A ban was further placed on the publication of any information relating to military or diplomatic matters which might assist the enemy or have a depressing influence on the spirit of the army or the civil population. The minister of the interior took power to forbid the introduction into France, or circulation therein, of any foreign newspaper or other written matter.

The public accepted the resulting meagreness of news with admirable patriotism, and, generally speaking, the censorship soon began to work smoothly. The newspapers formed a habit of sending advance proofs of their pages to the censor's department in order to avoid delay in publication. The result

FEMININE TOUCH

The French peasants gave the friendliest welcome to the Sengalese troops when they came to France. In this scene in the Champagne country a company of French colonial troops is marching towards the front

RUIN SPURS REVENGE

The invading Germans have passed through this village twice. On the second occasion they ruthlessly burned every house. The sight of the ruins will steel the hearts of the company of French infantry who are marching up to the front line

Photo: Sport and General

Photo: Sport and General

PARIS LEAVE

Friendly curiosity marked the attitude of the people of Paris towards the first English wounded to arrive there. These two officers have suffered wounds that may not be blighty ones, but which have given them the next best thing, a few days in Paris

was that in many cases blank spaces appeared in their columns. At the same time there was a considerable amount of dissatisfaction amongst certain newspapers at the restrictions of the censorship and unfavourable comparisons were drawn between the French press bureau and its English counterpart. The defiance of M. Georges Clemenceau resulted in the suppression of his newspaper *L'Homme Libre*, which, however, reappeared on the following day under the title of *L'Homme Enchainé*, although in its new form the newspaper found it no easier to take liberties with the authorities.

That irrepressible writer Gustav Hervé expressed his views of the censorship without mincing his words. "Instituted at the outbreak of war for the sole purpose of preventing the press from committing indiscretions concerning the movements of troops, it soon realized that its mission was much vaster and more august; that it was the brain and heart of France; that it was entrusted with the task of feeling and thinking for 39,000,000 French people."

The constitutional machinery which the Republic had in hand to enable it to deal with the national crisis differed fundamentally from that provided by the British constitution. On August 2 at noon the President signed a decree proclaiming a state of siege throughout France for as long as the War should last. The result of this step was the concentration to a large extent of all power in the hands of the military authorities. Such a measure was quite unknown in Great Britain, although the Defence of the Realm Acts were, in effect, a long step in the same direction. In France, by virtue of the state of siege, the functions possessed by the civil authorities for the maintenance of order and the control of the police were transferred in their entirety to the military. Within their particular spheres the power of the military governors was absolute. From their decisions there was no appeal.

One of the first steps taken under the state of siege was to deal with the important question of alcohol. A French writer at the time made the strong statement: "The terrible war which has been forced upon us by the insatiable ambition of German militarism has cruelly brought home to the French people the weakness resulting from the two national vices, birth control and alcoholism."

The same writer states that courts martial for breaches of discipline through drunkenness had become common, that the output of factories and workshops was on the down grade for the same reason, and that even children were addicted to the abuse of alcohol. Of all forms of alcoholic consumption in France the most dangerous was that of absinthe. The first measures, therefore, were directed to an absolute prohibition of its sale. The attitude of the authorities received the unanimous support of the press, and *Le Temps* led a press campaign which had for its object the suppression of alcoholic consumption in practically every form. One newspaper expressed the hope that the early provisional measures would become permanent. "The war will be costly to us in man power; in the future we shall need a strong, energetic and healthy generation. The men of tomorrow must not find at every street corner the horrible poison that maddens and kills."

The enforcement of the measure naturally involved many difficult questions, mainly those relating to existing

TAKE TIME FROM ME

The French armies in the field did not sing as well as the British, but in many French hospitals choirs were formed. Their performances were more serious affairs than the British sing-songs. Sheet music was provided, while the accompanist was also the conductor

Photo: Sport and General

Photo: Sport and General

IN FULL CRY

Down from the heights the German hordes advance to the attack in a series of rushes. The appalling casualties that they suffered in the early days of the War when they fought in close formation taught them the value of this extended order, which offered far fewer targets to machine gun and artillery fire

stocks of absinthe and to financial indemnities to the persons engaged in the manufacture of absinthe and in the subsidiary industries who either sustained financial loss or were thrown out of employment. The first problem was eventually solved by the conversion of existing stocks of absinthe into commercial alcohol, while as regards the latter a sum of no less than 23,650,000 fr. was paid in order to indemnify cultivators and manufacturers against actual losses, and to provide salary in lieu of notice for agents, operatives and agricultural workers, amounting in some cases to as much as six months. Naturally there were many attempts made to evade the prohibition, and it was found that the keepers of wine shops were obtaining a powder which enabled motor spirit to be converted into absinthe.

The larger question of alcoholic consumption in general was not effectively handled for some time, and it was not until December 22, 1914, that the commission of hygiene, the parliamentary anti-alcoholic group, and the national league against alcoholism got busy. By the spring of 1915 the position had become so serious that on March 23 Joffre issued a manifesto. "The military authorities appeal to the patriotism of the inhabitants to assist them in suppressing alcoholism in every form." The sale of alcohol in any shape to the forces was forbidden and its consumption was confined to military rations.

The difficulties in the way of the authorities will be more easily understood when it is realized that France, unlike other countries, had the misfortune to be a producer of alcohol in every form. There were at the time in France 1,600,000 persons engaged in the production of wine and the subsidiary industries, in addition to 500,000 employed in selling it. The total revenue from brandy, liqueurs, aperitifs, wine and other forms of alcohol, amounted to something like 400,000,000 fr.

The multiplicity of interests involved, therefore, resulted in a long delay before it was found possible to get to the root of the trouble. The sale of absinthe, as shown, was effectively checked at the beginning, but the first drastic measure dealing with the situation generally was not taken until March 4, 1915, when parliament voted a *projet de loi* putting a definite limit on the number of wine shops to be permitted. At the end of 1914 these establishments had been springing up at the rate of six or seven a day, some 2,500 a year, in addition to the 500,000 already existing. It was now enacted that no new wine shop should be established on French soil.

The decrees of the military authorities were both drastic and effective. In the turmoil the order of the military governor of Paris, General Galliéni, prohibiting the sale of absinthe in Paris and throughout the whole territory over which military government extended, aroused no protest and hardly any comment. As time passed the combined action of the military and civil authorities put an end to a state of affairs which was little less than a national danger.

The financial crisis already referred to became more serious with the outbreak of war, and drastic measures were taken to meet it. Fortunately for France the Banque de France itself had unshakable prestige, and vast supplies of hoarded funds, gold and bank notes, were in existence. The ignorance of the French peasantry as regards financial matters, coupled with their distrust of the banking system, had always resulted in the hoarding of coins in the woollen stocking (*bas de laine*)

HORIZON OF BATTLE *Photo: Sport and General*

In open warfare surprise comes from the distance and alertness saves many lives. This German posse is in an admirable position to observe the movements of the enemy, and is ready to send a withering fire into their ranks should they appear in the valley below

and in the early days of August, 1914, these stockings were unusually full.

The Banque de France itself had an enormous gold reserve, but in spite of this fact it took the drastic step of suspending specie payments, and on August 5 issued its notes with government authority under what is known as the *cours forcé*, by which irredeemable notes were made legal tender. That serious measures were needed is not surprising when it is realized that for some time past the French government had been rapidly increasing its expenditure and that at the outbreak of war the public debt was well over thirty billion francs—five times that of Germany and twice that of England.

In addition to the action of the Banque de France a moratorium, or, to be correct, a series of moratoria, was proclaimed. The first one, declared on August 5, 1914, which only affected the Bourse and the banks, was, before the year came to an end, extended to cover commercial paper, a very wide range of rents, including house rents, and all negotiable instruments except those issued by the public treasury itself and cheques presented by the drawer. As the result of many even later extensions of the moratorium there remained large blocks of pre-moratorium bills among the assets of the Banque de France at the date of the Armistice.

Two main factors made themselves felt in the economic depression that followed the outbreak of war: the demoralization of industries of all kinds throughout France owing to the mobilization of a large portion of the workers, and the commandeering of the railways for troop movements. In addition was the grave fact that, in the course of the German rush to Paris, France's manufacturing and mining sections in the north and north-east were completely overrun by the invaders.

It was not long, however, before French resiliency made itself felt in a revival of commercial and industrial activity to which the French gave the name of the *Reprise des Affaires*. The ministry of commerce itself played a leading part in instituting inquiries as to the steps that ought to be taken to revive the factories. Every effort was made to gather in the harvest, and *inscrits maritimes* were mobilized to assist in the work. To a certain extent this revival was retarded by an underlying economic fallacy very similar to that which in England was responsible for the cry "Business as usual" in the early days of the war. It was only in the course of time that the French people realized that the restoration of peace-time conditions in the midst of war, including the production of luxuries, was not a matter of practical politics.

The position of France, however, differed fundamentally from that of Germany. The British naval blockade effectually barred Germany's access to the sea, whereas, during the early months of the war, France's strong creditor position enabled her to make purchases abroad with ease and to pay for them from her immense reserves of gold. For that reason France was inclined to let the general industrial situation remain as it was and confine her efforts to the rehabilitation of her credit rather than to a revitalization of industry. The neutral writer above referred to sums up the situation in these words: "Slowly and reluctantly France came to the thorough and consciously planned industrial reorganization which Germany had put into effect at the very beginning."

Reference has been made above to the question of getting in the harvest, and in this connexion it may be said that the importance of maintaining the nation's food supply was immediately realized as an essential condition of victory. The first problem to be tackled was that of the scarcity of agricultural labour which follows on a general mobilization. An English observer has drawn attention to the fact that the French government did not suffer from the handicap experienced by the British government which was forced to employ a large amount of its energy in securing recruits under the voluntary system. In comparing British and French constitutional methods the same writer lays stress on the English tendency to secure individual liberty at the expense of general well-being, and declares that the ability of the state to

DIG IN AND WAIT!

On the plains of Flanders a battalion of Belgian infantry is advancing. As a new position is reached each man rapidly digs himself in and with that slight shelter before him awaits orders from the officer who is observing the enemy positions through his field glasses

safeguard the interests of the community as against those of the individual or class has been seriously compromised.

Be that as it may, it is a fact that the war had scarcely been declared before the prefectures of the different departments in France were found acting as extemporized labour exchanges for the distribution of a body of 20,000 sailors placed at the disposal of the ministry of agriculture to assist in saving the harvest of 1914.

For the purposes of agriculture the French co-operative societies were found invaluable as a means of spreading the use of labour-saving machines. Men partially disabled in the war were employed in tractor ploughing, and after a time prisoners of war were employed on all works of national importance, including, in particular, agriculture. Uncultivated lands were requisitioned by the authorities and the appeal of the prime minister M. Viviani, to the women of France had immediate results. "I appeal to your valour, to that of the children whom their age alone and not their courage prevents from taking part in the combat. I call upon you to maintain the work in the fields, to complete the harvest of the year, to prepare that of next year. You must safeguard adequate supplies for those who are at the frontier to defend civilization and law in defending the independence of their country."

It is related that a widow who owned an estate of about 600 acres, most of which was let to tenants, found the land deserted after mobilization, nobody being left to carry on the work. She therefore took the management of the whole estate into her hands and ran it as one huge farm with the partial assistance of ten prisoners of war given her by the authorities. In another instance a young country girl of 16 who was left on a farm with only an invalid mother, succeeded with a primitive implement and an old horse, in ploughing fifty acres of ground, in sowing seed and harvesting the crop. These are merely isolated instances of the conspicuous farming ability which women showed all over France.

Another problem which had to be faced was that of meat shortage. The meat ration supplied to troops in wartime exceeded the average individual consumption under peace conditions, and the position was complicated by the effects of the invasion of France. Large numbers of cattle were driven out of the invaded territory in the north of France at the beginning of the war and were handed over to the army authorities so that they should not fall into the hands of the enemy. These were to a large extent pastured in parks in or near Paris—in particular in the Bois de Boulogne—and afforded large supplies of milk to the hospitals and the committee of public assistance. As, however, ten departments were at least

PREPARING THE FEAST

The German leaders realized the necessity of keeping their troops well fed. Often they lived on the country, and so a butcher in their ranks was useful. In this scene, while the fire is being kindled, expert hands are preparing the carcase for the stewpot

Photo: Sport and General

WASTE OF WAR

This scrap heap of litter from the French battlefields is typical of many such salvage dumps formed behind the lines on the Western front. Shortage of all kinds of material made the collection of discarded impedimenta a work of paramount importance

EARLY TRENCHES IN THE SALIENT

One of the first trenches dug by the British in Flanders is here shown with the entrance to a dug-out. The field through which the trench runs shows the first signs of the devastation which afterwards turned 'no man's land' into a sea of mud

partly occupied by the Germans during the early fighting—namely, Aisne, Ardennes, Marne, Meurthe-et-Moselle, Meuse, Nord, Oise, Pas-de-Calais, Somme, and Vosges—a very considerable number of heads of cattle were in fact seized by the Germans, with a resulting shortage of fresh meat for the troops. In all the departments of France agricultural societies existed whose activities are directed to the general interest, and eventually arrangements were made with the British Government whereby twenty thousand tons a month of frozen meat were imported, so that it was found possible to supply the troops at the front with fresh meat about every third day.

By September 3 the military situation began to look serious and the President of the Republic and the Government left Paris for Bordeaux. This step was taken at the request of the military authorities in order that the Government might retain its freedom of action and remain in constant touch with the whole country. General Galliéni, the military governor of Paris, issued the following manifesto :

The members of the government of the Republic have left Paris to give a fresh impulse to national defence. I have been entrusted with the task of defending Paris against the invader. That task I will fulfil to the end.

The position was open to misconception, and the President's own proclamation was not an easy one to frame. In substance it was as follows :

In the north the pressure of the German forces has compelled us to fall back. In order to watch over the national welfare it is the duty of the public powers to remove themselves temporarily from the city of Paris. Endure and fight, while at sea the British aid us, cutting the communication of the enemy with the world. To ensure the utmost spirit and efficacy in the formidable fight it is indispensable that the government shall remain free to act. The government only leave Paris after having assured the defence of the city and of the entrenched camp by every means in its power. People of France, let us be worthy of these tragic circumstances. We shall gain the final victory.

Sections of the press were either openly contemptuous or gently ironical at the move. *La Guerre Sociale* remarked caustically on Sept. 4 :

The government has left to entrench itself in Bordeaux. Well done. If Paris is invested it is better that the President of the Republic and his ministers should make themselves scarce. They will have plenty to do in Bordeaux. They can organize the war from afar. We in Paris can do without them, especially with a man like Galliéni at our head.

Gustav Hervé, who was responsible for this paragraph, ended up with the proud boast "*La Guerre Sociale* will remain at the post of duty. If other newspapers pack up, it is their business."



GONE TO EARTH

The security, if precarious, of a good dry trench was not the least of the comforts enjoyed by soldiers in the line. These Frenchmen do not seem disposed to grumble, although the approach of winter is indicated by their overcoats

Some time after the departure of the Government German aeroplanes began to drop bombs on Paris, and on Sept. 29 the *Journal des Débats* took the opportunity for a little gentle raillery against the horde of Parisians who had fled from the capital in the wake of the Government.

The two German aeroplanes which yesterday dropped bombs on Paris achieved a result they were certainly not looking for. Not only did they frighten nobody, but it might be said, if two unfortunate victims had not been hit, they gave everybody pleasure.

In the first place the bombs dropped by the two Taubes gave pleasure to Parisians who had remained in Paris ; it enabled them to draw on a stock of courage for which, up to date, they had had no use. This morning nobody rushed for the south-bound trains ; on the contrary, everybody is crowding to see the effects of the German bombs. And the Parisians who had fled, and who were beginning to regret the miseries they had inflicted on themselves, the endless journeys in cattle trucks, the hours of starvation in empty buffets ; who were preparing to creep back unobserved ? Today all is well. As they had foreseen, there was danger in remaining in Paris. So the same bombs which enabled the Parisians in Paris to congratulate themselves on their courage in remaining enabled the fugitive Parisians to congratulate themselves on their common sense in fleeing. Everybody is happy.

Many jokes were made by Parisians themselves about the official flight. Perhaps the most amusing of all consisted in the name commonly applied to the government : "Tournedos à la Bordelaise." With the end of the retreat from Mons, the failure of Kluck's attempt to invest Paris, and the subsequent allied advance, the whole situation was changed and the French Government returned to the capital. Paris was freed from immediate danger and more or less normal conditions prevailed once more.

DESTRUCTION AND DESOLATION

The ruined buildings here seen were once those of a prosperous farmstead on the outskirts of the historic city of Arras. Further bursts of gunfire will soon level them to the ground, as there was almost constant fighting in this region during the next four years

IN SILENT ARRAY

In the square of Château-Thierry, a little town on the Marne, the Germans have placed close together a number of captured French guns. A relic of peace time is the notice standing near the signpost which asks motorists to drive slowly

Photo: Topical

CHAPTER VII

SEA SCRAPS

The following chapter describes the early days of the naval war, which, although a great battle was eagerly expected by many, consisted mainly of isolated encounters and losses by mine and torpedo

FOR a fortnight before August 4 the heads of the British Navy had known that war on the grand scale was at least a probability, that the wonderful and gigantic machines which, regardless of cost, the resources of science had produced might, for the first time, be tested in the stern ordeal of battle. But about the nature of that war their ignorance was complete. Not only had no existing British warship ever been in action but, with the exception of the encounters between the Russian and Japanese fleets in 1904–5, had no others of comparable size, strength and efficiency. Furthermore, the English sailor would, for the first time, be fighting an enemy whom, as often as not, he could not see, and would, in addition to the older menaces of torpedo and mine, face the newer ones of aircraft above and submarine below. The British fleet passing into the northern mists was starting on a voyage into the unknown more adventurous than those of Hanno and Columbus when they sailed their ships into new and uncharted waters.

The principles of naval strategy may, as Capt. A. T. Mahan ("The Influence of Sea Power upon History") asserts, be "applicable to all ages"; but a fact equally worth remembering is that there was far more in common between the galleys that fought at Salamis and Actium and the ships of the line that were led by Nelson and Villeneuve, than there was between the latter vessels and the Dreadnoughts of the British and German fleets; in other words, in the 50 years between 1864 and 1914 there had been far more changes in the mechanism of naval warfare than in the 4,000 years that elapsed between the time when the first Greek galleys hugged the rugged shores of their homeland and the encounters of St. Vincent, Trafalgar and Navarino. The fame of Nelson is secure. In Sir Henry Newbolt's words, he sleeps "beyond the speech of human pride"; but there is no reason whatever for believing that if by a strange miracle he could have been transported from the Victory in 1805 to the Iron Duke in 1914, his genius and experience would have solved the problems that met, and often baffled, his successors.

In 1914 Mr. Winston Churchill had been first lord of the Admiralty for about three years, and his own account in "The World Crisis" of the naval events of the eleven days that preceded Great Britain's declaration of war on Germany has, therefore, the stamp of authority. On Friday, July 24, he attended a Cabinet meeting which was chiefly occupied with discussing the critical state of affairs in Ireland. About six o'clock in the evening he returned to the Admiralty and told a high official "that there was real danger and that it might be war." He then took stock of the position and wrote out a number of headings, seventeen in all, mentioning matters to which attention should be given; even in their concise form these showed a real knowledge of the situation and a considerable amount of foresight. On the next day, Saturday, he discussed the matter with the first sea lord, Prince Louis of Battenberg, afterwards marquis of Milford Haven, and then left London for Cromer to spend the week-end.

At this time the fleet had just completed its annual manoeuvres which, this particular year, at the suggestion of Mr. Churchill himself, had taken the form of a test mobilization. This being successfully over, the reservists were paid off and returned home, but the whole of the first and second fleets was still off Portland, awaiting the order to disperse.

In his seaside retreat at Cromer, Mr. Churchill, in view of the grave European situation, contemplated the possibility of keeping the fleet together, and having during the day spoken twice on the telephone with the first sea lord, he returned to London before the Sunday was over. Again at the Admiralty, he discussed with the first sea lord, and later with Sir Edward Grey, the news which had come in from the various European capitals, and the result was that on the Monday morning the following statement appeared in the newspapers:

> Orders have been given to the first fleet, which is concentrated at Portland, not to disperse for manoeuvre leave for the present. All vessels of the second fleet are remaining at their home ports in proximity to their balance crews.

On the Monday morning, having attended a Cabinet meeting, Mr. Churchill issued a secret warning to all commanders-in-chief. It was as follows:

> This is not the warning telegram but European political situation makes war between Triple Entente and Triple

THE GRAND FLEET AT SEA

During the first few months of the War Scapa Flow, the base of the Grand Fleet, had no adequate defences against attack by submarine. It was therefore necessary that Sir John Jellicoe should take his ships to sea as often as possible until its defences were completed



Photo: Imperial War Museum

DEPTH CHARGE

Where submarines were located the most effective method of dealing with them was by a depth charge, a submarine bomb which exploded under the water and which, if it did not secure a direct hit, would upset the delicate mechanism of a submarine

Alliance powers by no means impossible. Be prepared to shadow possible hostile men of war and consider dispositions of H.M. ships under your command from this point of view. Measure is purely precautionary. No unnecessary person is to be informed. The utmost secrecy is to be observed.

The warning telegram which is here mentioned was part of the procedure laid down in the War Book which had been prepared in 1911 by the authority of the Committee of Imperial Defence. In this the duties of each department were tabulated. First came the arrangements in peace time to secure instantaneous and accurate working of the machinery. Then followed a precautionary stage which was initiated when the Foreign Office informed the Cabinet that relations with a certain country were strained. The next step was to issue a warning telegram that authorized defensive measures, and then, unless peaceful counsels prevailed, came the war telegram and war.

The telegram despatched, Mr. Churchill then sent a minute to the first sea lord asking eight questions, to which answers were returned. A further step was taken two days later, Wednesday the 29th. Cabinet authority having been obtained, regulations for the precautionary period were put into operation. Naval harbours were cleared, bridges were guarded, steamers were boarded and examined, watchers lined the coasts. On the same day the warning telegram to which reference has been made was sent off to the commanders-in-chief.

Mr. Churchill and his advisers took two important matters into special consideration. At that time the navy had an air department, the Royal Naval Air Service, and on July 29 an order was issued stating that "the primary duty of British aircraft is to fight enemy aircraft and thus afford protection against aerial attack." The next point concerned the warships that were being built for foreign powers in Great Britain.

Of these, two battleships were building for Turkey, three flotilla leaders for Chile, four destroyers for Greece and three monitors for Brazil. In the first lord's opinion the Turkish battleships "were vital to us; with a margin of only seven Dreadnoughts we could not afford to do without these two fine ships." Deciding to run no risks, on July 31 Mr. Churchill sent written instructions that adequate military guards were to be placed on board the Turkish battleship Reshadieh, which was nearly complete in Armstrong's yards on the Tyne, and that in no circumstances was she to be boarded by the Turkish crew, over 500 strong, which had already arrived to take her over and was in a steamer on the river.

Three days before this a more important step had been taken. Mr. Churchill regarded it as essential that the ships assembled at Portland, henceforward to be known as the Grand Fleet, should go to their war stations, and the reasons are best described in his own words:

It must go there at once and secretly; it must be steaming to the north while every German authority, naval or military, had the greatest possible interest in avoiding a collision with us. If it went thus early it need not go by the Irish Channel and northabout, it could go through the Straits of Dover and through the North Sea and therefore the island would not be uncovered even for a single day. Moreover, it would arrive sooner and with less expenditure of fuel.

The naval members of the Board of Admiralty consented to this course, and it was decided that the fleet should leave Portland at such an hour on the morning of Wednesday, the 29th, as to pass the Straits of Dover during the hours of darkness; it should traverse these waters at high speed and without lights and with the utmost precaution proceed to Scapa Flow. The prime minister was informed, but the matter was not brought before the Cabinet. The orders were issued and 18 miles of warships

n at high speed and in absolute black-ess through the narrow seas. Know-dge of the movement, however, came the ears of the German ambassador, ho complained about it to Sir Edward rey. Sir Edward replied that the ovements of the fleet were free of all ffensive character and the ships would ot approach German waters. Mr. hurchill and his colleagues at the Ad-iralty felt a sense of relief when they eard that the British ships were well in he centre of the North Sea, for they had lurking fear that, although war had ot been declared, submarines or mines ight be waiting for them in the narrow eas.

Two or three days of acute suspense llowed before Saturday, August 1, hen the first sea lord was informed by r. Churchill: "It seems certain that he order to mobilize will be issued after abinet this morning. Have everything n readiness." The Cabinet met and the rst lord asked that the fleet re-erves should be called out at once, elling the assembled members that the erman navy was already mobilizing. is colleagues, however, refused to take his grave step, and there the matter ested for a few hours.

Later in the day news arrived that ermany had declared war on Russia, nd learning this Mr. Churchill decided o act. He went to the prime minister, r. Asquith, told him and one or two olleagues who were with him that he ntended instantly to mobilize the fleet, notwithstanding the Cabinet decision, and that he would take full personal responsibility to the Cabinet the next morning. Answered neither with assent nor dissent, he went back to the Admiralty and issued the necessary orders His prompt action was ratified by the Cabinet on the Sunday morning, and some hours later the necessary royal proclamation appeared.

SURRENDER OR——

A German U boat has come to the surface and is demanding the surrender of a British merchantman. The fate of the crew and passengers depends on the German commander, and they may or may not be allowed time to take to the boats before the ship is sunk

The next step was to act upon a decision made some time before and place the Grand Fleet under the command of Sir John R. Jellicoe. At this time its commander was Sir George A. Callaghan, but he was called to London, while Jellicoe, his second in command, led the fleet north. On Sunday, August 2, when war was considered certain, the change was definitely made, and on August 3 Jellicoe assumed command. By this time Sir Edward Grey had given the French ambassador a definite assurance that Britain would not allow German ships to pass through the English Channel or the North Sea in order to attack the coasts or shipping of France. Thereupon the Admiralty telegraphed to the commander-in-chief to be prepared to meet surprise attacks and made arrangements with the French for joint action in the event of war.

Another matter of considerable, though secondary, importance occupied the attention of Mr. Churchill and the Admiralty during these eventful days. Britain's chief concern was to safeguard her own shores and the sea passage to France, but she had also interests in the Mediterranean and other parts of the world which needed protection. In the Mediterranean the Germans had a battle cruiser named the Goeben, which was stronger and faster than any ship in the French fleet. On July 30 the war orders of the Mediterranean command were discussed by Mr. Churchill and the first sea lord, and as a result the following order was sent to the commander-in-chief on that station:

> It now seems probable should war break out and England and France engage in it that Italy will remain neutral and that Greece can be made an ally. Spain also will be friendly and possibly an ally. The attitude of Italy is however uncertain, and it is especially important that your squadron should not be seriously engaged with Austrian ships before we know what Italy will do. Your first task should be to aid the French in the transportation of their African army by covering and if possible bringing to action individual fast German ships, particularly Goeben, which may interfere with that transportation.

HANDS ACROSS THE SEA

The French navy shared with the British the task of keeping the seas free for the passage of troops and stores. The battleship Jean Bart performed much useful service of the kind, and a group of her officers is here seen on the completion of a voyage

Photo: Sport and General

Photo: Sport and General

ALL HIGHEST NOT ALL WISEST

The German Emperor in the early days of the War sustained to the full the rôle of Supreme War Lord, and actively intervened in the planning and conduct of the campaigns, often overruling the plans of his generals. Later on the mischievous results of his interference were realized, and his generals gradually wrested control from him

You will be notified by telegraph when you may consult with the French admiral. Except in combination with the French as part of a general battle, do not at this stage be brought to action against superior forces. The speed of your squadrons is sufficient to enable you to choose your moment. You must husband your force at the outset and we shall hope later to reinforce the Mediterranean.

On the evening of August 2, Sunday, it was possible for the British Admiralty, for the first time, to give Sir Berkeley Milne, the commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, permission to consult with the French admiral. The permission, which was also sent to other British commanders-in-chief, was worded as follows :

Situation very critical. Be prepared to meet surprise attacks. You can enter into communication with the French senior officer on your station for combined attack in case Great Britain should decide to become ally of France against Germany

On the same day the Admiralty ordered Sir Berkeley Milne to see that the Goeben was shadowed by two battle cruisers, adding that the approaches to the Adriatic must be carefully watched by cruisers and destroyers.

On receipt of the warning telegram Sir Berkeley Milne had ordered the units of his scattered fleet to concentrate at Malta. This done, he sent four armoured cruisers, Duke of Edinburgh, Defence, Warrior, and Black Prince, and eight destroyers under Rear Admiral Troubridge to watch the entrance to the Adriatic. His four light cruisers, Gloucester, Chatham, Weymouth, and Dublin, were detailed for special purposes, and he was able to inform the Admiralty that the order to shadow the Goeben and the Breslau was being carried out by two of his battle cruisers, Indomitable and Indefatigable. The third battle cruiser Inflexible, with the admiral himself on board, was at Malta.

A critical moment then came and went. The exact whereabouts of the Goeben and the Breslau was unknown to the British and French admirals, but they were certainly somewhere in the neighbourhood of Sicily, and Mr. Churchill was evidently of opinion that if they menaced the French transports that were preparing to cross from Algeria they should be attacked without waiting for the declaration of war. He thereupon asked the Cabinet for authority to send out the necessary orders, but as before he failed to secure the assent of his colleagues. The Cabinet adhered formally to the view that no act of war should be committed before the expiration of the ultimatum.

At 2.5 on the afternoon of the same day (August 4) British commanders were informed that an ultimatum had been issued to Germany, and that it would expire at midnight, or by British time at 11 o'clock. The hour came, the ultimatum expired and the British navy was at war. The scene is described by Mr. Churchill :

The windows of the Admiralty were thrown wide open in the warm night air. Under the roof from which Nelson had received his orders were gathered a small group of admirals and captains and a cluster of clerks pencil in hand waiting. Along the Mall, from the direction of the palace (Buckingham) the sound of an immense concourse singing God Save the King floated in. On this deep wave there broke the chimes of Big Ben ; and, as the first stroke of the hour boomed out, a rustle of movement swept across

e room. The war telegram, which ant "Commence hostilities against rmany" was flashed to the ships and tablishments under the white ensign over the world. I walked across the orse Guards Parade to the Cabinet om and reported to the prime minister d the ministers who were assembled ere that the deed was done.

With war against the combined navies France and Britain practically cer- in, the German Admiralty paid some tention to affairs in the Mediter- nean. Early on August 3, the admiral ere was informed that Germany had ade a treaty with Turkey, and that he ould at once take his ships to Con- antinople. Later, however, according Admiral von Tirpitz in "My emories," this order was rescinded.

Before steaming for Constantinople, owever, the German admiral carried ut his intention of bombarding the rench African seaports of Philippeville nd Bona, into both of which his ships ed shots and did a little damage. He hen crossed the Mediterranean Sea and ade for the Straits of Messina, entering e harbour of the city of that name efore nightfall on August 4. The erman vessels had been seen and adowed by the battle cruiser Indomit- ble, and then by the Indefatigable and he Dublin, but as war had not yet been eclared by Great Britain on Germany, o shots were fired and the news that aly was remaining neutral prevented he British ships from following their uarry into Italian waters. The Italian uthorities refused to let the German ships take in coal; but this was obtained rom German colliers that were nearby.

Photo: Sport and General

ROYAL SALUTE

Prince Leopold of Bavaria was one of the several German princes who held high commands during the War. Ceremonial parades entered largely into their conception of the duty of a general officer, and Prince Leopold is here shown taking the salute at an inspection of German troops on the Eastern front where most of his war service was performed

While these movements were going on, Sir Berkeley Milne at Malta received the information that Great Britain had sent an ultimatum to Germany. He therefore steamed westward and proceeded to concentrate his scattered ships in order to patrol the seas between Sardinia and the coast of Africa. In selecting this area for his operations he was guided by two considerations. He had received definite orders to assist in guarding the French transports, and these were not cancelled by the knowledge that the French admiral had a fleet of ships for this purpose; and he believed that it was the intention of the Goeben to make for the Atlantic. If this proved to be the case his dispositions were excellent; but if the Goeben left the Straits by the southern exit, where he had stationed the Gloucester to report, they were useless. He sent the Indomitable to Bizerta to coal, while throughout the 5th and 6th his other ships continued their watching duties.

At 5 p.m. on August 6 the Goeben and the Breslau steamed out of Messina, and rounding the Italian coast moved rapidly eastward, leaving Sir Berkeley Milne's squadron far to the west. The only force which could now intercept them was the weaker one under Admiral Troubridge, and at midnight on Aug. 6, having heard of the German movement, he ordered his cruisers and destroyers to steam southward at full speed in order to catch the Goeben, at the same time sending word to the commander-in-chief of the course he was following.

As no reply came from Sir Berkeley Milne, Admiral Troubridge entertained second thoughts. He reflected that the 11 in. guns of the Goeben were far more powerful than the 9.2 in. guns with which his cruisers were armed. The German guns had a range of 16,000 yards, which meant that his own ships could be sunk before they could train their own guns upon the enemy; but he ignored the fact that it would be very difficult

THE DIVISION WILL ATTACK

This is a typical scene behind the German lines. A divisional commander is taking his morning coffee with his staff, when a dispatch arrives ordering a general advance. Things are going well for the Germans, and the troops to whom orders are about to be issued are far ahead of this sunny courtyard where the staff officers take their ease

Photo: Sport and General

BARBERING BEHIND THE LINES

The whole equipment of this barber's shop behind the German lines is an empty ammunition case for the customer's seat, a pair of scissors and a comb for the barber, and a pole on which rifles and equipment can be hung while the men await their turn. Though the cut is a rough and ready one, it is welcome after a spell in the trenches

if not impossible, for the Goeben to engage four armoured cruisers at once, and that in the fight there would be ample opportunities for his destroyers to close in and use their torpedoes. He was, however, prepared to fight in the dark when the advantage of the German ships would be greatly reduced, but the hour of dawn came without this being possible and he decided to cease from the pursuit. About 10 o'clock on the morning of Aug. 7 his ships entered the harbour of Zante and returned to their former task. The admiral's cautious decision was in accord with the instructions which he had received from his chief, for he considered that the Goeben was a force superior to his own, and later he was acquitted by court martial of any dereliction of duty.

As they ran rapidly in a south-easterly direction the Goeben and the Breslau were followed by the light cruiser Gloucester, while a sister ship, the Dublin, put out from Malta. On August 7 the Gloucester, commanded by Captain Howard Kelly, was near enough to open fire on the Breslau, which she did at a range of 11,500 yards. The fire was returned, and the Goeben, which was ahead of the Breslau, turned as if to join in the battle, whereupon Captain Kelly broke off his action, but continued to follow. He then received an order from the commander-in-chief not to proceed beyond Cape Matapan, and when he had reached that spot he turned about. The Dublin was not able to get within firing range of the German ships

On the following day, Saturday, August 8, Sir Berkeley Milne, having heard that the German ships were away from Messina, and having coaled his battle cruisers at Malta, entered upon the chase. He had only gone a few miles, however, when he received a wireless message saying that Great Britain had declared war upon Austria. Thereupon he turned about and gave up the pursuit.

The report, however, was false, as the admiral was informed later on the same day, August 8; but it was not until the 9th that he was ordered again to follow the German vessels. He thereupon steamed round the coast of Greece and entered the Aegean, being at this time only about 100 miles behind his prey. He spread out his ships in order to catch them, but he had not succeeded in this when he received information from Malta that the Goeben and the Breslau had entered the Dardanelles at 8.30 on the previous evening, August 10. It seems that it was not until the last minute that the German admiral was certain he would be allowed to reach Constantinople. He had decided, however, to attempt to force his way in if permission was refused; but this proved to be unnecessary. The Admiralty then sent Admiral Milne an order to blockade the exit to the Dardanelles, but the incident, the subject later of much discussion, was over.

We must now return to the main narrative. As soon as the order "Commence hostilities!" was received by the ships of the British fleet, operations were begun. The Grand Fleet put to sea at once and by noon on August 5 reported that nothing had been seen of the enemy in the North Sea. However, reports of German activity had come to hand and Sir John Jellicoe ordered two squadrons of light cruisers

DOUBLE ENTENDRE

These German cavalrymen have appropriated a farm stable for their horses and share with them the straw bedding. The familiar words: 'Ecurie sans garantie' with which the owner of a stable disclaims all responsibility for the animals he houses have a double meaning for an enemy shell may put a speedy termination to the tenancy

TO WHAT STRANGE VENTURE?

village, basking in the August sun, has ominous visitors—a company Belgian cyclist scouts—and their presence is proof that the enemy is far away. The full equipment, long coats and heavy boots are not ideal for cycling, but bicycles are less conspicuous than horses

LINES OF COMMUNICATION

During the German advance upon Antwerp only the most hastily improvised positions were available for the Belgians. Here they have entrenched themselves by merely deepening the ditch beside a double line of railway near Hofstade, where trees hide them from the enemy

Photo: Daily Mirror

Photo: Topical Press

WINTRY WEATHER

These Belgian troops, resting behind the lines, find comfortable quarters in a dry ditch under the shelter of a thicket. The fire is burning merrily and although their rifles are handy they are obviously in no fear of any immediate attack

to sweep the seas up to the coast of Norway, while the battle fleet steamed in support.

Farther to the south there was a little more excitement. At dawn on August 5, Commodore R. Y. Tyrwhitt, in command of a force appointed to guard the Straits of Dover, left Harwich in the cruiser Amethyst and with three attendant cruisers and two submarines went into the Bight of Heligoland, which he found protected by a cordon of trawlers fitted with wireless apparatus. He then sent the two flotillas of destroyers which were under his command to reconnoitre as far as the coast of the Netherlands. One of these flotillas was commanded by Captain C. H. Fox in the Amphion, who met a British trawler and was told that a ship had been seen throwing things overboard about 20 miles N.E. of the Outer Gabbard.

The flotilla steamed in that direction and two of the destroyers, Lance and Landrail, were sent on to investigate. About 11 a.m. they sighted a ship belonging to the Hamburg-Amerika Line making towards the German coast. Information obtained afterwards showed that this vessel had left Borkum the night before and had laid a chain of mines off the coast of Suffolk. She made off at full speed, but was soon sunk by the gunfire of the destroyers. Only four shots were fired, but within six minutes from the firing of the first the German ship heaved her bows in the air and went to the bottom. She proved to be the Königin Luise, a vessel of 2,163 tons and 20 knots, a passenger ship which, in anticipation of war, had been rapidly converted into a mine layer. Of her crew of about 130 something like 50 were saved by the boats of the British destroyers.

In the Amphion, Captain Fox, followed by his cruisers and destroyers, continued to search the seas, and after a time the vessels were again in the area in which the Königin Luise had been sunk. The commander was aware that there was a certain danger from mines, but he avoided this successfully until the early morning of August 6, when his own ship struck one. There was an explosion, and a sheet of flame instantly enveloped the bridge, the captain being rendered insensible. Soon, however, he recovered consciousness, and ran to the engine-room to stop the engines. It was impossible, however, to save the vessel, as she was already settling down by the bows. The only course left was to abandon her, and as the attendant destroyers closed in this was done. Three minutes after the captain had left another explosion blew up the whole forepart of the vessel, this being presumably due to the striking of a second mine. Of her crew 151 lost their lives, as did most of the prisoners who had been rescued from the Königin Luise.

This incident showed that the German mine layers were at work, and other evidence came in to prove that their submarines were active in the North Sea. On August 6 ten of these submarines, U boats as they were called, U standing for *untersee*, set out from Heligoland. One returned owing to a breakdown of her engines, seven came back with reports, but the remaining two were missing. One of these evidently met her end in the following way.

HELP YOURSELVES, MES ENFANTS!

At times the retreat of the Belgian army was so hurried that the men marched throughout the day with never a pause for a meal. These men are passing through Melle during their retreat to Ghent, and one of the inhabitants is offering them apples

Photo: Sport and General

RETREATING IN GOOD ORDER

Such scenes as this were common on every Belgian road during the days of the German invasion. A Belgian infantry battalion is falling back from Melle. Footsore and weary, each man carrying his kit-bag, they are entering Ghent, closely followed by the enemy hosts

Photo: Sport and General

On August 8 the look-out of the light cruiser Birmingham, then in the North Sea, reported that periscopes were in sight. The ship changed her course at once, so as to offer the smallest possible target to the enemy torpedoes, and went full speed ahead towards the spot where the submarine was supposed to be. The unfortunate vessel was caught and ripped open as the cruiser tore on, and sank at once. There were no survivors. The number 15 was seen on the conning tower as she went down.

In addition to watching the home waters the British fleet had a further duty, namely to protect the important trade routes in the Atlantic. To the eastern side of that ocean the Admiralty sent three squadrons. At the mouth of the English Channel was one under Admiral Wemyss. Along the coasts of France, Spain and Portugal, was the 9th cruiser squadron under Admiral de Robeck, and to the south of that, along the African coast, from the Canary to the Cape Verde Islands, was the 5th cruiser squadron under Admiral Stoddart.

Admiral de Robeck's force, however, did not leave Plymouth until August 4, and was not, therefore, at its station when war began; moreover it was well under strength. The admiral had with him only the Highflyer and the Vindictive when, on his way south, he boarded the liner Tubantia with German reservists and money on board. He sent the Highflyer to escort her to England and with his only remaining vessel captured the liner Schlesien. At Vigo he persuaded the authorities to dismantle the wireless of the German ships in the harbour, while the Highflyer, which had rejoined him, was responsible for a similar action at Lisbon, where twenty-seven ships were so treated. A little later two further cruisers joined the admiral and he carried out his duties without interference from the enemy. Likewise Admiral Stoddart, after a few days of anxiety, helped by the presence of several French cruisers, was able to continue his watch without interruption,

On the other, western, side of the Atlantic, there was a little more excitement. The British force in those waters consisted of a cruiser squadron under Sir Christopher Cradock, and before the outbreak of war it was known that two, and possibly three German cruisers were in that part of the world. One of these, the Strassburg, succeeded in getting to a home port, but two others, the Dresden and the Karlsruhe, remained at large. The Dresden was known to have been at Port au Prince, Haiti, on July 28, but the next news that came of her was that she had gone south and rounded Cape Horn into the Pacific. In her zigzag flight the Dresden had met first a British and then a French liner, and soon their stories were made known.

When war was declared the Cunard liner Lusitania was lying at New York, and it was reported that German cruisers were keeping a discreet eye on this vessel, which, besides being one of the largest and fastest boats in the British mercantile fleet, was also held at the disposal of the Admiralty for conversion into a merchant cruiser. The Lusitania left New York at midnight on August 5, and, with lights out, proceeded on a course different from that ordinarily followed by transatlantic shipping. Nevertheless, she was seen and chased by the German cruiser Dresden; but, thanks to her speed, she was able to get safely away. In this she was favoured by fortune, for hardly had she successfully shaken off her pursuer than one of the turbines broke down, and she had to complete the voyage at a speed of under 20 knots.

A similar adventure befell the French liner Lorraine. She also was at New York at the outbreak of war, ready to return to France with 450 reservists on board. Her speed was considerably less than that of the British liner, and things looked unpleasant for her when, on the very evening of her departure, she sighted the Dresden. However, the German cruiser had consumed too much fuel in her fruitless chase of the Lusitania and the Lorraine got safely away.

Very little was heard in these weeks of the German commerce destroyers, and the first which came into prominence was the Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse, a vessel belonging to the Norddeutscher

Lloyd running between Bremen and New York. She had evaded the Grand Fleet in the North Sea on August 4, and made her way to the north-east of Iceland. Here she captured and sank the English fishing vessel Tubal Cain, and within a few days she was cruising to the south of the Canary Islands.

On August 15 the Union Castle liner Galician, homeward bound from the Cape, was overhauled by the Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse. The wireless operator in the liner began to send out the S O S message, hoping that the cruiser Carnarvon would be within reach; but hardly had the first letter clicked out when the German cruiser interrupted with a peremptory: "Send one letter more and I sink you." A boat's crew from the Kaiser Wilhelm went aboard, and their first action was to destroy the wireless gear. The examination complete, the Germans went back to the Kaiser Wilhelm, and instructions were given to the Galician to follow closely. This she did, until soon after midnight the cruiser signalled: "Provision all your boats for five days. You will have to abandon your ship." But within half an hour there came another signal from the Kaiser Wilhelm: "No more orders. You are released. Good-bye!" The cruiser went off at full speed, while the Galician turned and resumed her voyage to Teneriffe.

Arriving there two days later, the Galician learned that the S O S message which the Kaiser Wilhelm had interrupted had just gone far enough to indicate to two British cruisers that a British ship was in danger somewhere to the south, and that they had set off in that direction, endeavouring to get in touch with the Galician by means of wireless, which was picked up by the Germans. Another British ship, the Arlanza, was also stopped and released by the Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse, but two others did not come so well out of the meeting. On August 16 the New Zealand Shipping Company's steamer Kaipara, from Monte Video, was approaching the Canary Islands when she was boarded. Her wireless was smashed, explosives were placed in the hold and, when the last man had left, she was sunk. Within a few hours another British ship, the Nyanga, was treated in exactly the same way. Having accomplished this, the Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse went into Rio de Oro Bay, Spanish territory, on the West African coast, where she coaled from a German tramp steamer, the Duala. On August 27 she had again to put into Rio de Oro to coal, being met this time by the colliers Magdeburg, Bethania and Arucas, and here came to the end of her career.

PRESENT FROM WOOLWICH

At the outbreak of war the French army was markedly deficient in heavy guns, and though the British army was not well equipped in this respect, Woolwich Arsenal was able to supply a few large calibre howitzers with their ammunition. A lorry carrying howitzer shells is here being unloaded amidst the smiles of French artillerymen

Whilst she was coaling the British cruiser Highflyer appeared and opened fire. A shot disabled the German's port quarter gun and took away part of the bridge. The Kaiser Wilhelm was a heavier vessel than the Highflyer, displacing over 14,000 tons as against the British cruiser's 5,600, but the latter was armed with eleven 6-in. guns, as against the German vessel's six 4·1. The issue was soon decided, and the Kaiser Wilhelm was sunk in shallow water, many of the crew escaping ashore.

Other German ships carrying supplies for the commerce raiders were captured or sunk in various places; but, apart from armed merchantmen, not a single German cruiser outside European waters was accounted for during the first seven weeks of the War. Nevertheless, by the middle of September only 12 British ships had been sunk at sea. On the other hand, German commercial shipping was everywhere held up. Only in very few cases was it necessary for a British warship to sink a captured vessel, as there was nearly always a British port near into which the ship could be sent as a prize, a facility Germany did not enjoy.

When war broke out the Australian fleet and the New Zealand squadron were under the command of Rear-Admiral Sir George E. Patey. The former consisted of the battle cruiser Australia 18,800 tons with a speed of 25·8 knots and carrying eight 12-in. guns; and four light cruisers—Sydney, Melbourne, Encounter and Pioneer, with an average tonnage of 5,500, speed 20 to 25 knots, and 6-in. guns. The squadron was completed by three destroyers. New Zealand had sent the battle cruiser New Zealand, a sister ship to the Australia, to the Grand Fleet, but there remained the light cruisers Psyche, Philomel and Pyramus, their average tonnage being 2,500, speed 20 knots, and eight 4-in. guns.

With this force Admiral Patey acted, as far as possible, in conjunction with Admiral Jerram, who had just returned to Wei-hai-wei from a cruise with the Minotaur (flag), Hampshire, Yarmouth, the gunboat Thistle and 5 destroyers. The cruisers ranged in size from the Minotaur of 14,600 tons to the Yarmouth of 5,250 tons. Their speed varied from 23 to 25 knots, their largest guns were four 9·2-in. in the Minotaur, which also carried ten 7·5-in. guns. The other cruisers carried 7·5-in. and 6-in. guns. The battleship Triumph, armed with four 10-in. guns and fourteen 7·5-in.,

LIGHTS OF LONDON

This photograph of the Thames Embankment was taken at a time London was expecting a Zeppelin raid, and night by night the sky was swept by searchlights. The glare in the sky is the result of a long exposure, in which every sweep of the searchlight has been recorded

THUNDER ON THE LEFT

Paris, equally with London, bore the menace of air-raids with equanimity. This photograph shows a scene in the Place de l'Opera, Paris. The whirr of propellers is heard, and many eyes are turned upwards to see if friends or foes are overhead

DEATH TAKES A JOURNEY

From the beginning of the War the Germans entertained the highest hopes of the destructive power of their Zeppelins. Months before they made their appearance over England they had wrought havoc in Belgium. Here one of the air monsters is seen leaving its hangar

HELP FROM THE DEEP

A small British airship of the type known as "Blimps" is in difficulties over the sea, and a British submarine has come to the rescue and is about to tow it back to port. "Blimps" were largely used in home waters for spotting German submarines

OVERSEAS TO UNTERSEE

During the Great War the Germans used seaplanes for communicating with submarines and other ships at sea. The machine here shown has flown down from Friedrichshaven on the Lake of Constance with despatches for a U-boat operating in the Mediterranean

EXPRESS DELIVERY

Motor-cyclist dispatch riders did magnificent work throughout the War, facing constant danger in order to secure delivery of their messages. Here a French soldier is delivering a despatch to an air pilot who will carry it to its destination

BOMBS FOR LONDON

The hangar at Dusseldorf, from which the first Zeppelins started out upon raids over France and England, is here shown. In October, 1914, it was attacked by a squadron of British aeroplanes; a bomb dropped from a height of 500 feet secured a direct hit

as in dock at Hong Kong. The French could assist with their Pacific division which consisted of the armoured cruisers Montcalm and Dupleix and the smaller ships Kersaint and Zéleé.

Two problems faced the two British admirals—to capture German possessions in the Pacific and to catch and engage the elusive Admiral von Spee with his Pacific squadron—Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and the light cruisers Emden, Nürnberg and Leipzig.

At first Admiral Patey concentrated his forces about New Guinea, but Admiral von Spee was many miles to the north-east at his base, Ponape, in the Caroline Islands. The faculty of not being where he had been marked down by his adversaries became so highly developed with Spee that, apart from the very great respect inspired by the giant Australia and the influence the battle cruiser exerted upon the movements of German raiders, the Australian ships at first were more active against stationary than mobile forces.

The certainty that Japan would join the Allies freed the British naval forces from duty in the China seas, and Admiral Patey could now devote his attention to the Australian and New Zealand expeditions being organized against the German possessions in the Bismarck Archipelago and Samoa. He raided Simpson Harbour and Rabaul in the Archipelago off the coast of New Guinea, on August 9, but could find no wireless. Three days later Patey learnt from the governor of New Zealand that a force had been gathered for the occupation of Samoa. He was asked if the route was safe. Before he could reach Port Moresby he learnt that the expedition had already started as the Admiralty thought the route safe as far as Suva, capital of the Fiji Islands.

After various orders and counter-orders it was decided that Admiral Patey with the Australia and Melbourne and also the French light cruiser Montcalm should meet the New Zealand expedition at Noumea in New Caledonia. The assembly took place on August 22.

On the morning of the 30th the expedition reached Samoa. Immediate surrender and the landing of a New Zealand force was the result. Having put in a garrison Admiral Patey left with the Australia, Melbourne and Montcalm to pick up the Australian expedition for his next points of attack, Rabaul and Herbertshöhe in the Bismarck Archipelago. He was thus unable to follow the suggestion of Admiral Jerram that he should search the Mariana (Ladrone) and Marshall Islands.

The Australian squadron foregathered on September 9 at Rossel Lagoon in the islands off the eastern extremity of New Guinea. The Sydney and Encounter joined him from Port Moresby with three destroyers, two submarines, five colliers and the Australian armed transport Berrima, with 1,500 troops. The Melbourne rejoined after she had completed the destruction of the German wireless station at Nauru, or Pleasant Island, 1,000 miles away in the direction of the Marshall Islands.

Landing parties from the Sydney were disembarked at Herbertshöhe and Kabakaul, adjacent spots on the northern spit of Neu Pommern, one of the islands of the Bismarck Archipelago. The landing was a complete surprise, and the two parties advanced inland to find the wireless station. The Herbertshöhe party met little opposition, but failed to discover the station and in the evening was recalled.

But the landing party on Kabakaul fell upon adventure. Guided through the bush to the wireless station by natives they fell into a species of ambush. They were fired upon and reinforcements and machine guns had to be sent ashore. The enemy consisted of 150 black police under German officers, but the Australians were no novices at bush fighting, and they soon captured the station with the loss of two officers and four men killed and one officer and three men wounded. The Germans could put up no more resistance, but their retreat 10 miles into the interior complicated matters for Admiral Patey, who had just learned that the Australia, Sydney and Melbourne would be required immediately to escort troopships to the European seat of war. Finally the German governor was brought to book, and he signed a convention surrendering the whole of German New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago including Neu Pommern (now New Britain). A cloud upon this first exploit of the Australian Navy was the loss of the submarine AE 1 while on patrol east of Cape Gazelle. The seizure of these German bases for coal and wireless turned the German raiders into fugitives. No chance of those vital refreshers—fuel and news.

The China Squadron, with the Australian, New Zealand and Japanese forces had gained such command over the Pacific that a vital blow to British trade east of Singapore was no longer to be dreaded. But the Admiralty had not yet managed to lay Admiral Graf von Spee by the heels and several German cruisers were still at large.

WHEN DID YOU LAST SEE YOUR FATHER?

A German court of inquiry is investigating the case of a Belgian peasant accused of aiding his fellow countrymen to leave occupied territory and join the Belgian army. The first witness is his son, who stands confronting his inquisitors

IN PLEASANT WATERS

A German cavalry regiment which has been in action is withdrawn in the evening to a village on the banks of the Meurthe. As the sun sets the men bring their horses down to the shallows where the sweat may be washed off in the cool waters of the running river

Photo: Sport and General

THE COMPANY WILL DIG IN

Entrenching tools were an essential part of the equipment of all armies. No ground could be held in open country unless the troops made their own cover. This photograph shows German infantry advancing and at the first pause obeying the order to dig in

CHAPTER VIII

GERMAN WAR FEVER

The arrogant confidence shown by all classes in Germany on the declaration of war is described in this chapter, which is a companion to the earlier one that depicts conditions in France

WHEN Napoleon III declared war on Germany on July 15, 1870, the French boast was that the army was ready down to the last gaiter button, a boast that was lamentably falsified in the event. Very different was the state of affairs in Germany at the outbreak of the World War. The effect of many years of preparation showed itself at once. The war organization was complete and, to use a picturesque German phrase, every soldier was provided with his death tunic. Foreign observers in Berlin noted the fact that whereas a week before the army was in Prussian blue, it was now in field grey, and wondered when the Kaiser's military tailors had begun making millions of grey uniforms. Industrial Germany practically ceased to exist, and by August 1, 1914, military mobilization was complete. Such constitutional forms as had grown up were at once superseded and the military oligarchy took charge. The civilian became a cypher and the war machine ruled supreme.

Yet there were no complaints. Neutral observers in Germany were forced to the conviction that the Germans regarded the war as a people's war. Albert Südekum, the leader of the German Social Democratic party, went so far as to say " with us it is the German working men's war." No doubt existed in the popular mind that Germany would win. The will to victory was universal.

In his Memoirs, Philipp Scheidemann, who during the war became the leader of the majority socialists and who proclaimed the German republic from the building of the Reichstag on Nov. 9, 1918, relates an amusing story by way of illustrating the Kaiser's endeavours to ingratiate himself with the Socialists at this time. At noon on August 4, members of all parties except the Social Democrats were summoned by the emperor for the opening of the Reichstag. It appears that the Kaiser had been misinformed and had got the idea that the Socialists, as well as the other parties, were present. He was so delighted with this that he rushed up to one member and exclaimed: " I am specially glad to see you, Herr Scheidemann." The member in question, owing to a cold in the head, possessed a red nose, which the Kaiser evidently regarded as the mark of a social democrat. For this reason it seemed quite natural to him to pick out of 150 people the single one with a red nose as a prominent Social Democrat.

The reasoned attitude adopted by the Social Democrats is reflected in the declaration they presented to the Reichstag on August 4. The following are excerpts:

> We are facing a critical time. The results of Imperialistic policy, by creating a prolonged period of competitive armaments and intensifying national differences, have spread like a tidal wave over Europe. The responsibility for this falls on the supporters of this policy: we refuse to take it. Social Democracy has opposed with all its might this ominous development and has, up to the very last moment, worked for the preservation of peace by demonstrations on a large scale in all countries, acting especially in complete harmony with our French brethren. Now we are up against the stern fact of war. The horrors of hostile invasion stare us in the face.
>
> . . Our fervent hopes will follow our brothers, called to the colours, regardless of their political opinions . . . We regard it as our imperative duty to stand by them, to lighten their burdens and mitigate this immeasurable disaster . . . . We trust the hard school of war will awaken in new millions of people a horror of war, and will win them over to the ideals of Socialism and of peace on earth. Guided by these principles, we vote the necessary credits

This psychological and spiritual attitude of the whole nation was fortified by a profound conviction that Germany had been wronged. The Berlin correspondent of The Daily Mail, who was present in Germany in the early days of the war, summarized the German view as follows:

> The Germans believe that the Pan-Slavist program, which is racial and religious, included the break-up of the Austrian Empire; that Serbia was the Russian agency through which this was being brought about; that with Austria destroyed, Germany would be entirely surrounded by enemies, practically cut off from the world, and her very existence imperilled. Germany was forced to strike or be overwhelmed. In the German mind, the war on Germany's part was purely defensive. It was Great Britain who arranged the entente that almost circles Germany with a band of steel. Great Britain's motive was to crush her most powerful commercial rival. She was not willing to attempt this by herself but only in company with a combination so mighty that she was sure Germany would be beaten easily and quickly.

Photo: Sport and General

ROADS TO NOWHERE

Before any movement of retreat was carried out the elementary precaution was taken to remove all signs which might give direction to the pursuer. These French soldiers are obliterating the place names on a cross road signpost in anticipation of a German advance

A woman professor at a German University wrote to a friend in Holland saying that she was aghast at the horror of the war into which her beloved country had been dragged in spite of all the Kaiser's efforts to maintain peace. " The immediate cause of the war," she declared, " is England's jealousy of Germany's commercial prosperity, and her determination to smash it. Germans are united as one man in the resolve to defend their country, and the Social Democrats are heart and soul in favour of the war."

In the course of a public address Professor Karl Lamprecht of Leipzig, historian and apostle of pan-Germanism, said the War had produced quite a new feeling of unity—not national, not cosmopolitan—but Germanic. " The Germanic world," he exclaimed, " is today one. There is only one renegade brother. English culture must be in a bad way when it allies itself with the Mongolians." Germany was now the protector and pillar of European civilization, and after bloody victories the world would be healed by being Germanized. On August 27, the " Cologne Gazette " published an article.

> Much harm has resulted from the fact that in recent years we as well as others have forgotten that for now just 200 years Europe has had only one steadfast and in its interests astonishingly tough enemy—

FAMOUS FRENCH GUNS IN ACTION

The French 75 mm. guns won a high reputation among the allied armies. They combined power, accuracy of fire and mobility to a remarkable degree, and the Germans had no light artillery comparable with them. The photograph shows a battery of these famous guns in action at the time when the Germans were advancing towards the coast

England . . . The present unnatural alliance between England, France and Russia would have been avoided if a clear insight had only once made known in Europe what a great common European interest exists against England, which has appropriated to herself the best and richest countries overseas. Instead of this the old state of things has again come to pass, that the peoples of the Continent cut themselves to pieces in wars from which England solely and alone derives the advantage. It lies deep in the essence of the English power-idea that it cannot bear a strong Continent, and above all one standing under a unified leadership. For then her colonies would be torn from her and her income diminished.

The Kaiser himself declared to his general staff: "Here is a conflict between two world conceptions: one or the other must win: the Prusso-Germanic or the Anglo-Saxon. What is the rift between them? It is simple and fundamental. The Prusso-Germans are fighting for honour and liberty: the Anglo-Saxons have inscribed on their banners 'The triumph of money.'"

To his troops he said: "Remember that the German people are God's elect. On me, the German Emperor, has the spirit of God descended. I am His armour, His sword, His instrument. Woe to those who disobey. Death to cowards and backsliders!"

It is easily understandable, therefore, that when Great Britain declared war a paroxysm of hatred against England broke out all over Germany. On the evening of Aug. 4, the Berlin newspapers issued special editions announcing incorrectly that the British ambassador had asked for his passports, and, by way of intelligent anticipation, that Great Britain had declared war.

The effect was electric. Immediately immense crowds assembled outside the British embassy in the Wilhelmstrasse, and in a few moments every window was broken. The British ambassador and his staff, seated in the front drawing room, narrowly escaped being stoned to death. Many women were among the demonstrators. A few mounted police made markedly half-hearted efforts to interfere with the riot. The American ambassador, Mr. J. W. Gerard, points out that as the neighbouring streets, Unter den Linden and the Wilhelm Platz, are paved with asphalt, the crowd must have brought with them the missiles which they used. Mr. Gerard, who offered Sir Edward Goschen and his staff the refuge of the American embassy, an offer which was not accepted, was spat upon as he returned, in the belief that he was an Englishman. It is fair to add that on August 5 the Emperor sent a message to Sir Edward Goschen expressing his regrets at the excesses committed against the embassy.

During the day British subjects, men and women alike, were arrested, wherever found, and sent to the fortress of Spandau, where there was a spy-shooting gallery. Spy mania broke out everywhere. The position of foreigners became not only unenviable but dangerous. People were seized by the crowds in the streets, and instances occurred of their being shot on suspicion of being French or Russian spies. A couple of Russian secret agents, disguised as women, were caught with basketfuls of bombs. They were riddled with bullets an hour or two later at Spandau. A writer who was at the time the Berlin representative of an important London newspaper maintains that the spy mania was directly inspired and encouraged by the Government.

It was officially intimated that Russian officers and secret agents infested the Fatherland "in great numbers." "The security of the German Empire," the people were informed, "demands absolutely that in addition to the regular official organs, the entire population should give vent to its patriotic sentiments by co-operating in the apprehension of such dangerous persons. By active and restless vigilance, everybody can in his own way contribute towards a successful result of the war." As early as August 29 a Danish subject was reported to have been shot as a spy at Hamburg, together with an English clergyman who lived with him. It was alleged that he established

wireless station in his roof and intercepted several messages from the German fleet at Kiel and Wilhelmshaven. A German airman, Hellmuth Hirth, was shot two days later in Berlin. He appears to have been suspect owing to his close association with the French airman Roland Garros, to whom he had written after the outbreak of war.

The tension in Germany was such that almost any rumour met with belief. As early as August 2 a newspaper published a statement to the effect that Japan had declared war on Russia with the result that a vast demonstration was organized outside the Japanese Embassy in Berlin. But the most astonishing rumour to gain ground perhaps was that motor cars laden with French gold were being rushed across Germany by parties of women. So categorical was the rumour that the police actually published the identification numbers of the cars. The result was a gold-hunt throughout the country. Villagers and gamekeepers armed with sticks and guns turned out and made travelling by car a perilous business. A number of tragedies occurred, and it was not until members of the aristocracy had been shot or wounded that the authorities took action.

Fortunate were the people, especially the English, who escaped from their holiday tours in Germany before the fateful August 4, instead of remaining behind to be beaten or imprisoned. Until that date England had been the subject of adulation rather than of hatred—perfidious Albion still, but an Albion whose perfidy, it was hoped, would be admirably directed against France, Belgium and Russia. After that date the position of belated English travellers was a miserable one. In their attempts to struggle through to England they were subjected to every kind of maltreatment, arrested again and again, and in many cases the men were interned as being of military age. Even the British ambassador did not escape insult. It is said that under his car windows some one chalked a John Bull drooping ignominiously from the gallows, with "race-traitor" for an epitaph. A minor poet, Emil Lissauer, wrote a war-song "Hassgesang gegen England," the famous Hymn of Hate against England which plunged theatre, music-hall and cabaret audiences into paroxysms of patriotism wherever sung. It may be said to have established a cult. The following translation of a stanza or two from it may be quoted :

French and Russian they matter not,
A blow for a blow and a shot for a shot ;
We love them not, we hate them not.
We have but one and only hate.
We love as one, we hate as one,
We have one foe, and one alone.

He is known to you all, he is known to you all,
He crouches behind the dark grey flood,
Full of envy, of rage, of craft, of gall,
Cut off by waves that are thicker than blood.

Hate by water and hate by land,
Hate of the head and hate of the hand,
Hate of the hammer and hate of the crown,
Hate of seventy millions, choking down
We love as one, we hate as one,
We have one foe and one alone
ENGLAND.

It might be said that a concrete national hate had never been before exploited as a factor in civilized warfare. Throughout the ages devastation of the enemy's lands had been regarded as a matter of military expediency, thus justifying the famous epigram of Tacitus about the Romans, "They make a solitude and call it peace." Yet the theoretical objective of warfare had

Photo: Sport and General

TAKE YOUR CHOICE

The inhabitants of the French towns behind the lines quickly adapted their trading methods to the wants of their customers. Madame la Proprietesse has here set up a stall outside her shop, where the soldiers passing through the town can quickly supply their needs. Pipes and pipe lighters, tobacco pouches, socks, handkerchiefs, and stationery are among her stock

HOLDING THE BRIDGE

The Belgian town of Termonde, also called Dendermonde, stands at the union of the rivers Dendre and Schelde. One of its bridges has been seriously damaged by the Belgians anxious to impede the German advance, and a few soldiers are here seen covering the retreat of the engineers who performed this hazardous task

Photo: Sport and General

SMILES OF VICTORY

On the side of this railway van are painted the words "Hommes 36—40—Chevaux 8," but though they do not suggest a comfortable journey, these men are happy enough. The enemy is in retreat from the Marne, and every one wears the smile of victory

been the disablement of the enemy-combatant, not his slaughter. In the Great War this cultivated personal hate showed its ugly head for the first time. Philipp Scheidemann, who regards Gustav Stresemann as one of the chief propagators of this doctrine, quotes him as saying: "There is one thing no one can expect from the German people—a reconciliation with England. Hate lies too deep; a hate that is morally justified."

Even in the Allied armies, however, there was a repercussion of the hate motif. In bayonet practice as taught to Kitchener's armies there was more than a suggestion of frightfulness. Yet, after a time even the German Press realized that manufacturing hate on a large scale had its ludicrous side, and was not being taken seriously by the simple-minded British soldiers. But the spirit was responsible for some disgraceful incidents in the early days. In Danzig the British consul, his family and entourage, had a painful experience at the outbreak of war. They were driven out of the town with the accompaniment of every kind of insult and humiliation. Their official position availed them nothing, and during the ten days which elapsed between their departure from Danzig and their arrival at Flushing, their situation was little short of calamitous. This is only a single instance of many similar cases.

There were other manifestations of the new feeling. Of recent years Berlin and other German cities had developed a spirit of gaiety and luxury which had given them almost an international character. Berlin, in particular, had long abandoned the austerity which had been so marked a feature before it became Germany's first capital. A number of cafés, bars, hotels, places of amusement and emporiums bearing English names had sprung up. All these were re-christened with strictly German names, and even menus were purged of dishes of foreign origin. Public notices adjured the people to "speak German, use German expressions, German menus"; to "expunge from their vocabularies the foreign words which soiled them: chef, service, depot, serviette, pardon, adieu."

The unnatural excitement did not, however, last long; and the military machine may be said to have closed its grip by August 15, when the Russian

PILED ARMS

Soldiers eat and rest when they can. Here a detachment of French infantry have fallen out by the roadside and are regaling themselves from their haversacks. The sentries placed over their piled arms keep their eyes steadily towards the German position

Photo: Sport and General

IN THE SERVICE OF MAN

Dogs were widely used as beasts of burden in Belgium, and the Belgian army made good use of this form of transport. The machine-guns of this battalion retreating in excellent order from Antwerp are mounted on pneumatic-tired wheels and are an easy load for a couple of dogs yoked together

dvance on East Prussia and the initial erbian victories made it necessary to all up the Landsturm. This consisted f older and more unfit sections of the opulation. Not at once were they mployed in the firing line; their ctivities were confined to garrison, nes-of-communication or labour luties. The calling up of these men neant a draining of the civilian popu-ation, which had a marked effect on the onditions of civilian life. As in other countries a sudden call was made upon the services of women in all directions. Women became tram-conductors and taxi-drivers. Yet a large number of them were thrown out of work by dismissals from stores and factories, and the charitable organizations found their hands full when suddenly called upon to deal with the situation.

The distress was aggravated by widespread unemployment among tradesmen owing to the cessation of foreign trade. The night life of Berlin, which had rivalled that of Paris, and certainly surpassed that of London, suffered a severe damper through the curtailment of the use of coal, gas and electricity and the suspension of traffic after midnight. A rigid press censorship was instituted, mainly for the purpose of muzzling the Socialist newspapers; "Vorwärts," in particular, came under the heavy hand of the military authorities. Fines were inflicted by the censor and the suspension of the journal occurred repeatedly. The unhappy editor had, for the most part, no notion what might or might not be written under a "state of siege." But the military censor, General von Kessel, expressly stipulated that nothing should appear in "Vorwärts" relating to class hatred or class warfare, a not unreasonable stipulation, considering the prevailing conditions. Rosa Luxemburg, the notorious irreconcilable, violently opposed the order, but Comrade Friedländer who, according to Scheidermann, "did not want Rosa to have it all her own way," accepted the general's conditions on behalf of the press committee, and the newspaper was allowed to continue publication.

The effect of Great Britain's naval blockade of Germany began to show itself very early. It had long been realized that the Empire's vulnerable point was her inability to feed and clothe her inhabitants, and her consequent dependence on imports of foodstuffs and raw materials. Of the total area of the German Empire 90 per cent. is fertile, but although the industrious and intelligent German farmer extracted an average yield of all crops per acre in excess of that of any other country, he could not feed and clothe more than about forty of Germany's seventy millions. When the country, therefore, found herself encircled on all sides by her enemies, and thus thrown on her own resources, the German Government found it necessary to take very drastic steps. The situation was worked out with mathematical precision

A Berlin committee of statisticians and physiologists drew up a careful and exhaustive account of internal needs and internal resources. Dr. Waller of London University, who wrote an introduction to the English version, paraphrases their message to the German nation as follows:

(1) You consumed protein during the two years before the War at the rate of 116 grammes per man per day (or 93 grammes per head of the total population per day)

(2) Your minimum physiological requirement is 80 grammes per man per day (or 64 grammes per head per day of the total population)

(3) You are producing at home 78 grammes per man per day (or 62·5

SERVING THE GUNS *Photo: Sport and General*

The Belgians are making a stand and the light artillery has come into action. The range has been found, and this gun, with an ammunition wagon drawn up beside it, is maintaining a steady fire in support of the infantry. As one shell goes into the breech, another is passed along ready for the next salvo

grammes per head of the total population per day)

(4) Therefore you must economize and increase your home-production, which can be raised to 102 grammes per man per day (or 81·5 grammes per head of the total population per day).

In this calculation nine men are supposed to require as much food as ten women, and two children as much as one man.

The conclusion drawn by the German experts was that Germany with proper care was unconquerable even with regard to her food supply, but the gravity of the situation made the greatest demands on every German, and especially on the authorities. Their campaign was backed by the authority of the church, and chemists set to work to produce synthetic flour and other foodstuffs. At the outbreak of war, therefore, all supplies of breadstuffs were taken over, and rigid rationing of all foodstuffs was instituted. It was found necessary to butcher cattle indiscriminately owing to the shortage of fodder, as potatoes, rye, and wheat could not be used for the purpose. Dogs were destroyed wholesale. The milk supply fell off by fifty per cent., and available imports of eggs to a tenth of its pre-war figures. The supply of salted and smoked fish from England and Scandinavia was cut off, and there was a difficulty in obtaining fresh fish.

In the circumstances it was of paramount importance to get in the year's harvest, and every facility and inducement was offered to volunteers of either sex, even schoolboys being commandeered for the purpose. It may be said that the measures taken proved thoroughly effective, except as regards East Prussia, which was partially overrun by the Russians in August.

A signal service was rendered to his country by a remarkable character, the German statesman and industrialist, Walther Rathenau, the son of Emil Rathenau, who founded the famous Allgemeine Elektrizitäts Gesellschaft, or German Electricity Supply Company, generally known as A.E.G. In 1899 Walther Rathenau became a director of A.E.G. and proceeded to build central stations at Manchester, Amsterdam, Buenos Aires and Baku. By 1907 he was able to describe A.E.G. as "undoubtedly the largest European combination of industrial units under a central control and with a centralized organization." But the A.E.G. did not monopolise all his activities; he was interested in electro-chemical works, transport concerns, cotton mills, mines and steel works.

Count Harry Kessler says that Rathenau "got to know the whole European machinery of production and distribution, as a racing motorist knows the machine which he has dismounted and assembled piece by piece, tested on good and bad roads, and driven in every kind of weather." But not only was Rathenau a great captain of industry, he was also a political thinker and writer of distinction and an idealist in philosophy. His anomalous position as a millionaire capitalist with socialist tendencies, his clash with the nationalists after the war, perhaps his Jewish blood, led to his eventual assassination on June 24, 1922, but though the outbreak of war horrified him and filled him with a vision of disaster, from the practical point of view he proved himself a great patriot.

His initiation of a plan based on his vast experience is referred to in his diary thus: "I went to Colonel Scheuch at the War Office and sketched out to him my ideas for the organization of raw materials." This was on August 8, 1914. The result of this interview, and of a further one with the war minister, Erich von Falkenhayn, was the institution of the war raw materials department.

SIGNAL TO FIRE

This Belgian light field-piece has been dragged into position behind the lines in the neighbourhood of Dixmude. The young non-commissioned officer, with arm uplifted, is about to give the signal to fire, while his team look expectantly into the distance

WAY FOR THE GUNS!

During the German advance on Antwerp much damage was done to clear a way for the artillery. This photograph shows the town of Willebroeck, about ten miles south of Antwerp. Some houses facing the canal have been razed to the ground to give a clear line of fire

Sport and General

e definition of the materials alt with by this department was: such materials as are needed for e defence of the state and which e not obtainable permanently or in fficient quantities within the country self." These materials, about a hunred in number, included metals, hemicals, wool, rubber, cotton, linen, tc. All were commandeered whether Germany or in occupied territory, nd dealt with by a new board of war ndustrial companies. It was Rathenau's rganization alone which made it ossible for Germany to hold out with raw material during the war. It obviated the grave peril of a shortage of nitrates without which the munition factories would have been forced into idleness, until such time as it was found possible to procure nitrogen from the air. For the time being Germany was saved.

As was to be expected all the great shipbuilding firms were at once taken over by the government and set to work on the construction of battleships, submarines, and floating docks. It was possible to take the Hamburg floating docks right down to the open sea, along the Elbe in less than two hours. Ships too disabled to sail under their own steam could be taken thereto and dealt with expeditiously. One Hamburg firm, which specialized in the erection of lighthouses, was given the task of supplementing the searchlights already possessed by the German navy by an enormous number specially constructed for an attack on the British coasts.

As in all the belligerent countries a money stringency soon made its appearance. Dr. Helfferich, the German finance minister, rapidly organized a financial system to meet the situation. It had perhaps been foreseen that in the event of hostilities with England Germany would soon be cut off from the world's markets, and would be reduced to payment for the bulk of her imports in gold. During the months immediately preceding the war much gold had been drawn into Germany.

After the outbreak of war the Imperial Bank, working through the private banks and big industrial concerns, set to work to gather in all the gold coin in the country. When this method was exhausted a general gold propaganda was organized throughout the Empire. Suburban communities established official gold collectors who extracted the people's gold from them in return for paper money, and handed it over to the Imperial Bank. More than £50,000 was collected by the school children of Berlin from their parents. The Berlin municipal savings bank conveyed over a million marks in gold to the Imperial Bank, which, like the Bank of England, was relieved of its obligation to pay gold in exchange for notes.

FRIEND OR FOE?

It was some time before the contending air forces adopted distinguishing marks underneath their wings, and both troops and civilians were often in doubt as to whether they were being approached by friend or foe. These French folk, however, seem fairly confident of their safety as they gaze at their visitor

DESERTED VILLAGE

A French battery hastening to the front passes through a village deserted by its inhabitants. The effect of German shell fire, the cause of the exodus, is seen in the burning house on the right. Soon nothing but ruins will remain of this quiet corner of France

BROKEN ON THE AISNE

During the battle of the Aisne casualties became very heavy. Arrangements for dealing with the wounded were far less efficient than they afterwards became, and these French soldiers must face a long and weary tramp before their wounds can be properly dressed

Photo: Sport and General

CHAPTER IX

FRANCE'S FIRST EFFORT

The French began operations with an offensive in the lost provinces of Alsace-Lorraine. Although of importance in the general narrative, this had no real effect on the course of the struggle which was soon transferred elsewhere

AS the German strategy was based on the wide enveloping sweep through Belgium, so the French was ominated by the expectation of an ttack and the need for an immediate ounter-offensive through Alsace and orraine. Metz was the centre of a great rtified area from which it seemed most kely that the Germans would set out crush France. Sentimental and olitical considerations also made derable some immediate success of arms the region of the lost provinces, and attempting this many valuable days re lost before the French realized that eir chief menace was from the north. Yet there is much to be said in extenation of Joffre's early moves. The rench battle plan had been carefully epared in the event of a German ttack, and its essence was a quick ffensive designed to harass the enemy's oncentration. The alternative to offenive action was to await the issue on heir own soil, a course unthinkable to rench minds. An immediate attack must be made, and the course which it hould take had long been planned. A hird course was to violate the neutrality f Switzerland. This the French were letermined not to do, and the commander-in-chief's orders on the point were explicit.

The enveloping movement employed by the Germans was not practicable, nor was it possible, as has been pointed out by Sir Frederick Maurice, for the French to use the whole of their available offensive power upon one prearranged plan, because there was no room on the stretch of frontier, much of it mountainous, between Basle and Metz for the employment of such masses of troops. Sir Frederick Maurice, an apologist for the French, says:

> They had therefore to trust that the rapidity of mobilization would enable them to forestall the enemy, and upset the enemy's concentration before it was complete; while a considerable body of troops was held in reserve as a mass of manoeuvre, ready either to confirm and complete a success, or to ward off any danger which might suddenly develop. It was not because they did not believe in envelopment that they did not attempt it, for Joffre did in fact bring about the breakdown of the enemy's plans by enveloping one of the German flanks at the very first opportunity he had of carrying out such a manoeuvre; but because under the particular political and geographical conditions which confronted the French at the outbreak of the war envelopment was impossible.

At the outbreak of war the French commander-in-chief, General Joffre, disposed his armies along the frontier in this fashion. The 1st, under Augustin Dubail, held the line from Belfort to Lunéville and faced the Alsatian cities of Mulhouse, Colmar and Strasbourg. It joined up with the 2nd, under General de Castlenau, whose left rested on a position facing Metz. The 3rd and 4th, under Pierre Ruffey and Fernand de Langle de Cary, were in position facing Luxemburg, with the left of the 4th touching Sedan.

The 5th army, under Lanrezac, extended from Sedan past Mezières to a position at Hirson, opposite Maubeuge and, with the exception of a cavalry corps under Sordet and some territorial battalions, was the only French force immediately facing the German advance through Belgium. That it was there at all, however, shows that the French had not entirely excluded the possibility of an attack from this quarter. As will be seen the British expeditionary force, under Sir John French, occupied a position on the extreme left of Lanrezac's army.



Photo: Sport and General

LIGHT THAT FAILED

In their raid on the English coast one of the German warships scored a direct hit on the lighthouse at the entrance to the harbour at Scarborough

GRAND HOTEL

The wrecked lounge of a Scarborough hotel, after the bombardment of the watering-place by the German battle cruisers, Derfflinger and Von der Tann, on December 16, 1914. Eighteen people were killed and over a hundred injured in this attack on an undefended town

DESTRUCTION OF YPRES CATHEDRAL *Photo: Daily Mirror*

The lamentable destruction of the cathedral at Ypres was gradual but remorseless, until the famous shrine became a ghostly shell enclosing a vast rubbish heap. Here is seen almost the first stage in the destruction, some of the prie-dieu chairs still standing, bearing witness to the recent presence of devout worshippers

The first clash of arms between France and Germany occurred in Alsace. On the evening of August 7 a brigade of the 1st army moved forward across the frontier, routed a weak German force holding entrenchments round Altkirch, and occupied all next day the town of Mulhouse. This successful raid met with little resistance—the Germans had never intended that it should—but it was acclaimed a victory. Joffre issued a flamboyant proclamation. His soldiers, he said, were "pioneers in the work of redemption," and this was but a first step in the emancipation of the provinces. But before Paris had completed its rejoicings the tricolour had ceased to fly over Mulhouse. The German general ordered a counter-attack which drove the French back to Altkirch, about ten miles from the frontier, a position which they held on August 12.

Still ambitious to win an early success in this region, an army of Alsace was formed under General Pau which was in position to advance on August 14. In anticipation of French attacks farther north in Lorraine the Germans had weakened their front in Alsace and, meeting with slight opposition, Pau re-occupied Mulhouse and reached Colmar; but it was not long before this success was rendered futile and the French were back on their Belfort line.

With the idea of penetrating north-eastwards and striking at the German communications, possibly also of compelling the enemy to withdraw troops from their armies in Belgium, an attack was launched through Lorraine. Of the two armies employed it was planned that the first should advance in the direction of Sarrebourg, the second towards Saarbrucken, while a further corps should make a diversion through the Vosges. Had the Germans carried out the Schlieffen plan to the letter these assaults would have met with little resistance. Actually, the German chief of staff, General von Moltke, had placed far stronger forces on this flank of his line than the plan warranted, and the French armies faced those of equal strength. Moreover, the orders to fall back and lead on the French were very half-heartedly given, and it was left to the army commanders on the spot to decide on offensive action if they favoured it.

This is precisely what happened. At first the French made some advance. On August 14 two French corps entered Cirey and Blamont and the Germans retired on Sarrebourg. Four days later Sarrebourg was occupied, and the corps operating in the Vosges had reached Walscheid. By the 20th the 1st and 2nd French armies, having crossed the frontier, were in front of Lunéville and Nancy, from near Sarrebourg to Delme, about 36 miles north-west of Sarrebourg, but the Germans had already taken counter-offensive action. The French official report ran: "The 1st and 2nd armies, tired by several days marching and fighting, came up against strongly organized positions armed with powerful artillery whose fire was admirably prepared and corrected by aeroplanes."

This contained but half the truth, for the 2nd French army had been attacked in front and on the left flank, and had been forced into a retirement with which the 1st army was obliged to conform. There can be no question, however, that the positions which they had come up against were "strongly fortified," for it was a battle line specially prepared, entrenched and wired, running south-east from Metz through Morhange, Benestroff and north of Sarrebourg to the Vosges. By the morning of the 17th the French had reached Morhange, and it was here on the 20th that Castlenau's army suffered severe losses. Dubail farther south was checked and a general retirement was ordered.

These early actions in Lorraine are interesting rather from their strategical results than from any military action which characterized them, though it has been said that they taught the French the folly of attacking fortified positions without effective artillery preparation. They could count to the Germans as victories and to the French

as defeats, but as will be seen the results ultimately turned in favour of France.

The third sphere of operations into which Joffre entered during August involved an attack in the Ardennes. He was still convinced that the main German drive would be made south of the Meuse, and he determined upon an attempt against the German flank and rear which he supposed to be unprotected. This task he entrusted to three corps of the 3rd army under Ruffey and six corps of the 4th army under Langle de Cary.

The attacking French force crossed the frontier on August 21, making an advance of from ten to fifteen miles through a blind and difficult country covered by forests and traversed by roads little more than narrow defiles. General orders were to attack the enemy wherever met, and a thick mist on the morning of August 22 added to the unexpectedness of these meetings. Aerial reconnaissance was of little use, and the general order appears to have been to advance with the utmost possible speed with the idea of seeking a quick contact with the enemy.

Shell fire was often the first intimation the French had of the proximity of the enemy and little attempt could be made to counter this. Almost a complete débâcle occurred in the 5th corps of the 3rd army, so devastating were the losses which were suffered from shell fire. Elsewhere battalions in column of route were exposed to the German guns, and everywhere the story was the same of columns surprised and shattered before they could offer action. The German forces had been grossly underestimated, the French cavalry had been so disposed as to offer no adequate protection, and French columns ran blindly at right angles into German columns marching across their front. These German troops belonged to the armies of the Crown Prince and Albert duke of Württemberg and were actually superior to the French in strength of numbers. Two topographical features, the town of Virton and the river Semoy, gave their names to these disastrous battles. Losses are known to have been extremely heavy.

The French had now failed in their attempt to break the German centre before the German encircling movement could be felt on the French flank, for after the disasters of the Ardennes the sole interest in the war shifted northwards where Kluck's march on Paris was in progress. The situation on August 21 has been summed up as follows: The French 1st and 2nd armies were retiring after the battles of

SALUTE TO ADVENTURERS

The Emden, a German raider under the command of Captain von Müller, sank many allied merchant vessels in the autumn of 1914 before she was caught off North Keeling Island, one of the Cocos group, by the Australian cruiser Sydney and was driven ashore and destroyed. The photograph shows the battered hulk lying aground

JOURNEY'S END

The best traditions of sea warfare were observed by Captain von Müller during his remarkable exploits, for he provided for the safety of the crews of the ships he sank. The survivors of his own crew are here being taken off the Emden



'HEAVY CASUALTIES'

A row of German casualties removed from a hospital train lie on stretchers on a railway platform awaiting transport to the base hospital. Medical officers and ambulance men turn to the photographer

Photos: Sport and General

Sarrebourg and Morhange; while the 3rd and 4th had failed, were retiring to the Meuse," and the reverse seemed serious." What was happening farther north will be seen in the following chapter.

Military opinion varies in apportioning blame to the French war direction for these early and very serious reverses. It has been argued that the decision to attack widely and immediately was based on certain fundamental misconceptions. The disciples of Napoleon were too much governed by his brave saying that "the moral is to the physical as three to one." They launched the attack from their own fortified line against one still more strongly fortified, and this without adequate offensive weapons or any preparation. No moral, however high, could overcome such obstacles. Their intelligence was extremely faulty, particularly in disclosing the number of troops massed against them, which they seem to have underestimated by at least one half. Also, the true nature of the German attack through Belgium was far too long ignored.

And yet the Germans themselves, though they inflicted disastrous losses in these early battles, cannot be said to have gained great advantage from them. That they employed too many troops in resisting them is certain. That by warding them off they failed to draw the French into the trap which had been set for them has also been shown, and ultimately the French benefited by being driven back to their eastern line of defence which over long stretches they held intact for four years.

At the moment, however, matters looked extremely grave for France. Repulsed in attack their armies were now to meet the full weight of the German onslaught which was directed against Paris and involved their very existence as a nation.

Unfortunately the French high command still nourished regrettable illusions concerning the German forces opposed to them, illusions which were soon to be rudely shattered.

SILENCE AND SYMPATHY

A hospital train has just arrived at Charing Cross Station, and the ambulance cars carry the wounded through a crowd of silent and sympathetic spectators to Charing Cross Hospital. The London hospitals accommodated large numbers of wounded

CHAPTER X

MONS AND CHARLEROI

The battles of Mons and Charleroi were fought by the British and French respectively to hold up the advance of the Germans who, having swept through Belgium, were prepared to push on to Paris

THE transportation of the British Expeditionary Force to France was carried out secretly and expeditiously between August 6 and August 16. The general public knew little of these movements and the soldiers themselves were, when they embarked, ignorant of their precise destination. All through the nights of these eventful days troop trains followed one another along the main southern railway lines, an unusual activity misinterpreted by a wakeful and anxious people as the movement of a phantom Russian host hurrying to the aid of France.

The ports of embarkation were busy with the going and coming of improvised transports whose captains sailed under sealed orders towards the French coast. So quietly was the whole undertaking carried out that not a rumour reached the Germans of the exact movements of this small British force. The actual port of disembarkation for the bulk of the British army was Boulogne, though Havre was also largely used. At this stage Boulogne was best adapted for the purpose. It had in the Bassin Loubet a dock which could accommodate five transports at a time and its mechanism could deal efficiently with the unloading of vast quantities of military stores.

On the outlying heights camps were rapidly constructed for the reception of the troops and a base hospital prepared for the use of British wounded. Day after day continuous streams of British regiments, cavalry and infantry, of guns, and of transport crowded the narrow streets of the seaport town and were greeted with enthusiasm by the inhabitants. In those days excitement ran high and nothing could have exceeded the spontaneous welcome given by the French to their new allies. The houses were decorated with flags and chattering crowds filled the pavements waving greetings and pressing small presents on the British soldiers. Amongst the first to arrive were the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, and the French had their first glimpse of a kilted regiment, a sight which never failed to arouse their delighted enthusiasm. About this time, too, a battalion disembarked and marched off to their camp in column of fours, singing the music-hall song which had lately captured their fancy: "It's a long way to Tipperary." An astute journalist who heard them wired the news to his paper in London and within the space of a few hours this sentimental ditty became almost a national anthem, retaining the affections of troops and civilians throughout the long whole four years of war.

The line regiments did not stay long in their temporary encampments, but were hurried one by one towards their concentration area. Cavalry and infantry were followed by the artillery, by the engineers and finally by the men of the Royal Flying Corps. Thirty-six service aeroplanes flew the English Channel, but their transport and impedimenta came by water. This force numbered 105 officers, 755 other ranks and 63 aeroplanes. The transport was of such an improvised character that it is said to have provided the strangest spectacle of all, ranging as it did from the delivery vans of drapery firms to the familiar London omnibus or taxicab, or the roughly equipped chassis of racing cars. The first park was established at Amiens.



Map showing the area over which the French fought their opening battle against the invaders of Belgium just before the British made their stand at Mons. The two battles were part of the same defensive operation

The mystery which surrounded the movements of the British regular army was dispelled by a famous message from Lord Kitchener, secretary of state for war, when disembarkation was complete and the troops were already moving to their battle positions. It ran as follows:

> The Expeditionary Force as detailed for foreign service has been safely landed on French soil. The embarkation, transportation, and disembarkation of men and stores were alike carried through with the greatest precision and without a single casualty.

The news of this notable achievement aroused much patriotic enthusiasm, as did the publication of two further messages addressed to the troops themselves. The first was from the King, who bade farewell to his armies in these terms:

> You are leaving home to fight for the safety and honour of my Empire. Belgium,

END OF THE SEASON

The summer season of the Belgian watering-places came to a sudden close in the first days of August, 1914. Bathing cabins and casinos gave place to barbed wire entanglements and gun emplacements, and the sea fronts were littered with debris

Photo: Topical Press

DEAD ON THE MARK

A Russian field gun firing in the open is being directed against woods in which Germans are known to be lurking. There can be no question of the accuracy of the Russian fire, the result of which can be seen in the column of smoke rising from the trees

which country we are pledged to defend, has been attacked, and France is about to be invaded by the same powerful foe. I have implicit confidence in you, my soldiers. Duty is your watchword, and I know your duty will be nobly done. I shall follow your every movement with the deepest interest, and mark with eager satisfaction your daily progress. Indeed, your welfare will never be absent from my thoughts. I pray God to bless you and guard you, and bring you back victorious.

GEORGE R. AND I.

August 9, 1914.

Lord Kitchener wrote in a more admonitory manner:

You are ordered abroad as a soldier of the King to help our French comrades against the invasion of a common enemy. You have to perform a task which will need your courage, your energy, your patience. Remember that the honour of the British Empire depends on your individual conduct. It will be your duty not only to set an example of discipline and perfect steadiness under fire, but also to maintain the most friendly relations with those whom you are helping in this struggle.

Lord Kitchener concluded:

Your duty cannot be done unless your health is sound, so be constantly on your guard against any excesses. In this new experience you may find temptations both in wine and women. You must entirely resist both temptations, and, while treating all women with perfect courtesy, you should avoid any intimacy Do your duty bravely. Fear God. Honour the King.

British general headquarters had reached Havre on August 14, and proceeded to Le Cateau two days later. Sir John French, commander in chief, with a small personal staff also left on August 14, and was in Amiens on the same evening. He spent the next three days gaining touch with the ministry of war in Paris, with General Joffre at French headquarters and with General Lanrezac, commanding the French 5th army with whom the British were to co-operate. It was unfortunate that relations between this harassed and impetuous Frenchman and the British commander in chief should have become immediately strained, and it says little for the military education of the time that neither had a conversational command of each other's language. Lanrezac at least understood the menace from the north-east, and it is said that his irritability was largely due to his failure to impress Joffre with the magnitude of the threatened German sweep through Belgium.

Lanrezac's army, the only one directly facing this movement, was at this time getting into position south of Charleroi, the first corps stationed between Namur and Givet. The first position allotted to the British was on Lanrezac's left, covering a front of about 25 miles between Maubeuge and Le Cateau which, being in the form

ROUGH BUT READY

Belgians holding the line of the Yser canal erected a number of these bridges, which, hastily constructed by their engineers, could be even more easily destroyed if need arose

Photo Topical Press

DEAD BESIDE HIS GUN

The Carpathians were the scene of heavy fighting between the Austrians and Russians in 1915. The roads were indifferent and both armies had constantly to abandon guns and munitions and leave the dead where they fell. Here is a scene after the Austrian retreat

of a salient, was at most ten miles in width. Between the infantry and the French were the British cavalry. The 1st British corps, under Sir Douglas Haig, was at the right of the line; the 2nd British corps, under Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, on the left. This corps had been sent to France under the command of Sir James Grierson, whose sudden death, which took place on the way to the front, was a severe blow. No one knew more than Grierson of the German military machine or would have been more valuable acting in liaison with the French. Sir John French asked that he might be replaced by Sir Herbert Plumer, but the appointment was given to Smith-Dorrien.

Each of the two British army corps was about 32,000 strong. They were supported by a cavalry division and artillery with 250 guns. Two divisions of three brigades each constituted a corps. In the 1st corps were the 1st division under Major-general S. H. Lomax, and the 2nd division under Major-general C. C. Monro. In the 2nd corps were the 3rd division under Major-general Hubert Hamilton and the 5th division under Major-general Sir Charles Fergusson. The 4th division, Major-general T. D'O. Snow, did not land in France until the evening of August 23–24. The cavalry division, consisting of five cavalry brigades, two brigades of Royal Horse Artillery, and other details, was commanded by Major-general E. H. H. Allenby. The 12 infantry brigades which made up the two army corps contained six battalions of Guards and regular battalions from the British line regiments.

Each brigade consisted of four battalions, and it will help the narrative if the constitution of the several divisions and brigades is given in tabular form:

DIVISION I

1ST BRIGADE:
- 1 Coldstream Guards
- 1 Scots Guards
- 1 Black Watch
- 1 R. Munster Fusiliers

2ND BRIGADE:
- 2 Royal Sussex
- 1 North Lancashire
- 1 Northamptonshire
- 2 King's Royal Rifle Corps

3RD BRIGADE:
- 1 Royal West Surrey (Queen's)
- 1 South Wales Borderers
- 1 Gloucestershire
- 2 Welch

DIVISION II

4TH BRIGADE:
- 2 Grenadier Guards
- 2 Coldstream Guards
- 3 Coldstream Guards
- 1 Irish Guards

THE VEIL OF YPRES

Throughout the three battles of Ypres the city suffered constant bombardment, but the greatest destruction was done during three days in April, 1915, when the Germans began a furious bombardment. High explosive and gas shells were rained upon the buildings. This photograph shows the scene at the height of the storm

Photo: Topical Press



UNDER SUSPICION

No risks could be taken in leaving at large any stranger who could not give a good account of himself. This man has been arrested at a railway station and is being taken before the interrogating officer. His cheerful bearing seems to give preliminary evidence of his innocence

Photo: Sport and General

5TH BRIGADE:
- 2 Worcestershire
- 2 Oxford and Bucks L. I.
- 2 Highland Light Infantry
- 2 Connaught Rangers

6TH BRIGADE:
- 1 The King's (Liverpool)
- 2 South Staffordshire
- 1 Royal Berkshire
- 1 King's Royal Rifle Corps

DIVISION III

7TH BRIGADE:
- 3 Worcestershire
- 2 South Lancashire
- 1 Wiltshire
- 2 Royal Irish Rifles

8TH BRIGADE:
- 2 Royal Scots
- 2 Royal Irish
- 4 Middlesex
- 1 Gordon Highlanders

9TH BRIGADE:
- 1 Northumberland Fusiliers
- 4 Royal Fusiliers
- 1 Lincolnshire
- 1 Royal Scots Fusiliers

DIVISION V

13TH BRIGADE:
- 2 King's Own Scottish Borderers
- 2 West Riding
- 1 Royal West Kent
- 2 Yorkshire Light Infantry

14TH BRIGADE:
- 2 Suffolk
- 1 East Surrey
- 1 D. C. L. I.
- 2 Manchester

15TH BRIGADE:
- 1 Norfolk
- 1 Bedfordshire
- 1 Cheshire
- 1 Dorsetshire

Particulars may also be given here of the 3rd corps, although it was not yet at the front. Its two divisions, the 4th and the 6th, were made up as follows:

DIVISION IV

10TH BRIGADE:
- 1 Royal Warwickshire
- 2 Seaforth Highlanders
- 1 Royal Irish Fusiliers
- 2 Royal Dublin Fusiliers

11TH BRIGADE:
- 1 Somerset Light Infantry
- 1 East Lancashire
- 1 Hampshire
- 1 Rifle Brigade

12TH BRIGADE:
- 1 Royal Lancaster
- 2 Lancashire Fusiliers
- 2 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers
- 2 Essex

DIVISION VI

16TH BRIGADE:
- 1 The Buffs (E. Kent)
- 1 Leicestershire
- 1 Shropshire Light Infantry
- 2 York and Lancaster

17TH BRIGADE:
- 1 Royal Fusiliers
- 1 North Staffordshire
- 2 Leinster
- 3 Rifle Brigade

18TH BRIGADE:
- 1 West Yorkshire
- 1 East Yorkshire
- 2 Sherwood Foresters
- 2 Durham Light Infantry

A plan of the dispositions of the contending armies when the fighting began would show how small this force was in comparison with the great conscript armies which were now ranged against each other for a hundred miles or more. Although he is now acquitted of the insult the Kaiser in the pride of his own great levies might well have regarded it as "contemptible." But it is generally admitted to have been as highly trained, as highly disciplined, and as efficient as any force in the field.

When the final positions were reached the British line stretched from Condé on the left to Mons, and from Mons along a line opposite Binche and Thuin to a position in front of Maubeuge. The left of the line, from Condé to Mons, was held by the second corps under Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien. In it were the fifth division on the left led by Sir Charles Fergusson and the third by General Hubert Hamilton. The right of the line, Mons to near Maubeuge, was held by the first corps under Sir Douglas Haig. Its first division was commanded by General S. H. Lomax, the second by General C. C. Monro. The gap between the British and French armies was for the moment filled by the French cavalry under General Sordet. British general headquarters were at this time at Le Cateau.

Joffre's plan for an immediate advance at this point included a movement by the British north-eastward through Soignies towards Nivelles, with the ultimate idea of striking at the German flank. This was to support a general move forward on the part of Lanrezac's 5th French army across the

Photo: Topical Press

ON LEAVE IN LILLE

Most of Lille's public buildings were left untouched throughout the War. German troops on leave visited the city and their pleasures included performances at the theatre here shown. This, after the Armistice, became a famous rendezvous of entertainment for British Soldiers

Sambre river. The attack never took place for the Germans had the initiative and were advancing to force the battle themselves.

Cavalry patrols on the morning of August 21 sighted German patrols east of Mons, but did not actually join issue with them. Elsewhere news filtered through from the French peasants of large concentrations of German troops ten miles north-east of Mons. Mist prevented any aerial reconnaissance until the afternoon, when a mixed body of German arms was reported south-east of Nivelles. The Allies had a fairly clear idea of the number of German corps which were massing against them, but as yet could not anticipate in exactly what direction they were advancing.

On the next morning, August 22, the first shots were fired by the British. A patrol of the 4th Dragoon Guards surprised a German piquet north of Obourg on the Mons canal and dispersed it. Later skirmishes occurred with enemy cavalry patrols and with a mixed German force about the bridges over the Somme at Binche and Péronnes. Here two squadrons of the Scots Greys inflicted heavy casualties, as did later a troop of the 16th Lancers which overran a party of Jäger west of Péronnes. But it was becoming increasingly clear that the Germans were advancing in great force, a fact confirmed by the airmen's reports of burning villages and massed columns on the march. Two of these airmen, Lieutenant Waterfall and Lieutenant Bayley who were shot down that morning, are believed to be the first British soldiers killed in the war.

The British force was still moving and both corps had long and trying marches before they reached the positions in which they were to accept battle on the following day. An important move was made by the cavalry division to the left of the British line. Leaving the 5th cavalry brigade to guard the right, units of the 1st corps pushed out eastward towards the villages of Villers St. Ghislain and St. Symphorien. When the line became stationary it was roughly in the shape of a triangle, one side of which, facing due north along the Mons canal, was dead straight. Mons was at the apex and as the canal here wound round the small town it formed a pronounced salient. From Mons the first British corps was deployed south-eastward, ostensibly to reach the left flank of the French 5th army which, in effect, it never did.

During this day, August 22, the Germans had attacked this army in force, and the disquieting news reached Sir John French that it had been driven back from the line of the Sambre and that his own dispositions were now at least nine miles ahead of the main French line. Though not for some time despairing of taking offensive action, his thoughts gradually turned to the possible necessity of retreat, and when, late in the evening, Lanrezac implored him to attack the flank of the German columns which were pressing forward, Sir John felt bound to refuse.

The danger that such action might lead to his own envelopment was too great in view of the vastly superior forces ranged against him. He did offer, however, to stand his ground for twenty-four hours, and so relieve the pressure on the retreating French.

Such was the situation on the night of August 22, with battle inevitable on the following morning. The British troops were ready and eager to meet any onslaught which might be made against them, but the ground on which they found themselves deployed presented the utmost difficulties. Large sections of it were blind, that is to say, it afforded no prolonged view of the enemy's movements, or any adequate field of fire. Along the north of the canal woods disguised the enemy's approach to within two miles. Much of the remaining terrain had artificial disadvantages which prevented observation and restricted manoeuvre. Mons itself was in the centre of a coalfield, and such a district has only to be pictured for it to be realized how unsuitable it must be for open wartare. Coal shafts, great slag heaps, the tangle of miners' cottages with their fenced gardens, covered the scene. Networks of small roads led to isolated settlements. It was thought at first that the slag heaps might be of some use for observation, but they were generally too hot for any human being

THE FOUNTAIN OF HONOUR

Towards the end of 1914, King George V paid his first visit to the troops in France and Flanders. He inspected many of the units, and other duties performed by him included the bestowal of decorations earned by conspicuous gallantry in the field

to stand on. Besides imposing grave handicaps on the infantry, the ground was equally unsuitable for the British artillery, whose officers had great difficulty in finding suitable gun positions or observation posts. It is only fair to add that the Germans faced many of the same disabilities and were hampered in deploying their great numbers of troops.

The first order given, in the dawn of August 23, was to prepare the canal bridges for demolition, an order which showed that both the imminence of the attack and its strength were fully realized. Further to this precautionary measure barges lying in the canal were sunk. The Royal Engineers were fully alive to their rôle in the event of a retirement. The earliest activity was with the cavalry and several brisk encounters with the enemy took place at points ahead of the British line.

The main German attack was by now developing, and it was certain that this would fall on the Mons salient, defended on its north-eastern side by the 4th Middlesex, the 2nd Royal Irish, and the 4th Royal Fusiliers. The Germans began to shell heavily and their infantry to advance to the attack in mass formation. Here they began to experience the deadly effect of rapid fire, that particular accomplishment of the British infantryman to acquire which he had spent hours of practice in peace time barrack life. A small addition of pay could be earned for proficiency, and this inducement and the spirit of emulation had led many a British private to acquire a speed and accuracy in fire unknown to any other army.

The Germans frankly acknowledged that they imagined themselves to be facing nests of machine-guns, although, in fact, the British battalions each possessed only two of these weapons. The execution was at first enormous, and the Germans soon realized that a more widely separated method of attack was necessary. For the moment, however, they could not break down at this point of ground the resistance of the Middlesex and Royal Fusiliers.

Farther westwards, along that straight line of the Mons canal held by troops of the British 2nd corps, the attack had also developed. In front of Jemappes, two miles west of Mons, there was a bridgehead held by the Royal Scots Fusiliers who, when the area behind them was heavily shelled, withdrew to the south bank, there to meet the enemy onslaught and throw it back by the strength of their fire. A mile and a half farther on at Mariette the Northumberland Fusiliers put up an admirable resistance, and though forced by gun fire to withdraw an advance party from the north bank of the canal successfully withstood any passage of the bridge.

Continuing westward, in the neighbourhood of St. Ghislain, a company of the Royal West Kents fought a stout rearguard action, losing half their numbers while resisting the attack of three German battalions with supporting artillery, upon whom they inflicted severe losses. The remaining companies of the Kentish battalion, with assistance from the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry and the King's Own Scottish Borderers, effectually stopped the attack for the time being in this quarter. But the Germans were feeling their way steadily towards the west, seldom meeting with any initial success and particularly at Les Herbières, seven miles distant from Mons, suffering very heavy losses at the hands of the East Surreys and Suffolks.

On the right of the British line the 1st corps had remained unmolested until 2 p.m., with the 3rd and 6th infantry brigades holding its front, but about this time the German artillery became active and shelled the 3rd brigade line extremely heavily. The main brunt of the attack was still against the Mons salient where the Middlesex, Royal Fusiliers, and Royal Irish Fusiliers were meeting with increasing pressure, and in the face of

overwhelming numbers were forced to make some retirement. This was not disastrous as they were able to re-form and continue to harass the enemy.

On the west side of this salient the Scots Fusiliers who had so gallantly defended the bridge of Jemappes were forced to fall back on the village of Frameries, being closely pursued by the advancing Germans. Retirement orders were also given to the Northumberland Fusiliers who, though they delayed their retreat to cover an unsuccessful attempt to blow up the bridge at Mariette, finally fell back on Frameries. Farther left minor retirements were carried out from the north to the south bank of the canal, but on the whole the line was holding extremely well and the Germans were receiving severe punishment. Moreover, one or two of the key bridges were successfully destroyed before the retirements took place.

Round Mons itself the situation was more serious. The Germans appeared to be advancing in considerable numbers, and a good deal of sharp fighting was taking place. But as the evening closed the menaced units of the 8th brigade were gradually withdrawn without serious interference. So favourable did the situation seem and so slight were the withdrawals that had been necessary that Sir John French towards 9 p.m. informed the 2nd Corps commander, Sir H. Smith-Dorrien, that he would accept battle the next day on the line then occupied, only giving orders that this should be strengthened as far as possible during the night.

His message dispatched at 8.40 a.m. ran, "I will stand the attack on the ground now occupied by the troops. You will therefore strengthen your position by every possible means in your power." But this decision was quickly revised as it became clear that no good strategic purpose could be served by holding the line, and that safety lay alone in retirement. With this view General Joffre heartily agreed, and confirmation of its wisdom came later from the Germans who recognized that the British commander in ordering a retreat took the only course which could save him from the danger of envelopment. For the moment, however, the enemy forces were feeling all the disappointment of a repulse. German troops in the field realized that they had made little or no progress, that their casualties had been very severe, and they suffered the chagrin of knowing that they had been inflicted by an enemy that they despised.

The day indeed closed with the British in a justifiable, if unjustified, mood of optimism. In the face of the terrible casualties they had inflicted and the heavy assaults which they had repulsed, the men had more the sense of victory than of defeat, and recognizing the minor character of their retirements were at a loss to understand the necessity for any further retreat. Out of an army of roughly 70,000 men they had lost 1,600 killed, wounded and missing, which was a fraction of the losses which their well-directed fire had inflicted on the enemy.

SEWING SHIRTS FOR SOLDIERS

This typical war-time scene in a London mansion shows one of the many sewing parties of voluntary workers engaged in making shirts and other garments for the troops. Such guilds sprang up all over England and did valuable work

One of the most vivid accounts of the battle was written by a German officer, Captain Walter Bloem of the 12th Brandenburg Grenadiers, whose battalion was in action about Tertre and facing the West Kents and Scottish Borderers, holding the Mons canal. Bloem describes how in advancing to the assault his men were mown down until only a remnant of the battalion was left and nearly all officers were killed. He recalls the humiliation of the order to retire and reorganize at night what was left of the shattered companies. This, he says,

> was no easy matter in this pitch darkness, in the indescribable confusion and the men all chilled to the bone, almost too exhausted to move and with the depressing consequences of defeat weighing upon them. A bad defeat; there could be no gainsaying it. In our first battle we had been badly beaten, and by the English—by the English we had so laughed at a few hours before.

But the unexpected was to happen and no British soldier could have been more surprised at the general order to retreat which was to follow, than was this gallant German officer contemplating his "disorganized little rabble" when he heard:

> Suddenly a tremendous burst like an explosion, not far away either; a terrifying noise. A few moments later, another. Everyone jumped to their feet. What on earth was it? Certainly not a gun of any kind. A rumour ran round that it was the bridges, that the English had blown up the canal bridges. Surely impossible! The English blow up bridges! Nonsense; it must have been something else, but what? In trying to answer the question for myself,



Map showing the general disposition of the opposing armies at Mons

Photo. E.N.A.

SEALED LIPS

The village in which this church stands has been occupied by the Germans, and the few inhabitants who have not been otherwise accounted for are herded together in the aisle. They were thus segregated to prevent them communicating information which might be of service to the enemies of Germany

I must have dozed off again, for when another loud report woke me the first light of dawn had arrived. This time it was the artillery, our own artillery, our own artillery near Tertre station, close by.

Not long after Captain Bloem learnt the truth; the victorious British had evacuated their positions along the canal and he received orders to continue the advance.

It was about 9 o'clock when Sir John French had decided to stay on his present line and there receive the next attacks of the Germans; before midnight he learnt that the French general Lanrezac had ordered a general retreat of his 5th army. The British commander had no alternative but to conform to this movement. He dared not leave his flanks exposed, with no possible support from the French, and face the possibility of encirclement. He decided upon a gradual retreat towards the line Maubeuge-Valenciennes. Between 4 a.m. and 5 a.m. on August 24, the 1st and 2nd divisions were on the move.

It is now necessary to trace the events on the French front which directly led to this decision. After the failure of the attacks in Alsace-Lorraine and in the Ardennes the French 5th army was left in an exceedingly perilous position. It had been intended that it should attack, pivoting on Namur and the Meuse, meeting the German armies advancing from the north.

But owing to changes made by Joffre at the last moment this army had not completed its concentration before it was attacked. It was composed of the 1st, 10th, 3rd and 18th corps in order from right to left, though the last did not arrive from Alsace till August 21. It was disposed from Dinant on the Meuse to the line of the Sambre near Charleroi with its extreme left north of the Sambre near Anderlues. In numbers it amounted to about 300,000 men. Further there was the garrison of Namur of about 30,000 men, for that fortress had not yet fallen, and at Maubeuge another 30,000 badly-equipped reservists who could not be regarded as available as field forces.

Three German armies were closing round the French and British forces: the 1st (Kluck) engaged on the enveloping movement, the 2nd (Bulow) moving directly against the French front and the 3rd (Hausen) against its flank and rear. The imminent approach of this last army does not appear to have been fully realized by the French. An eminent German authority estimated the total German force involved at a strength which would place it in a superiority of about two to one, 600,000 to 300,000 men.

Lanrezac alone appears to have realized the extreme danger of his situation, but made vain representations to Joffre, who ordered him to take the offensive on August 20 in combination with the 4th army (de Langle de Cary) and with the 3rd army (Ruffey). This he was unable to do for his troops had not yet all arrived and the British Expeditionary Force had not yet reached their battle positions. He was then told that he might wait until the 24th before launching the attack.

On August 21, however, the Germans began the reduction of Namur, and two corps appeared on the Sambre, and with detachments forced the passage of that river between Tamines and Jemappes, driving back detachments of the French 10th and 3rd corps. Tactically it was to Lanrezac's interests to allow these detachments to cross the Sambre and then fall on them in full strength, but the impetuosity of his corps commanders led them to make immediate counter-attacks, by which this advantage was lost. Meanwhile, on the left, the French cavalry under General Sordet was

PART OF THE PRICE

Fighting in wooded country where the undergrowth is thick exposed the troops mercilessly to the fire of hidden machine-gun nests. These French soldiers lie dead on the verge of a Flanders wood

pushed back a considerable distance, thus leaving a dangerous gap between the French and British armies.

Hausen's 3rd army entered the field on the evening of August 21 and attempted to force the passage of the Meuse at three points, a manoeuvre which would have seriously threatened Lanrezac's communications. The 1st French corps successfully defended the river line. Bülow was anxious to bring the battle to a decision, and this he might have done more effectually if he had better coordinated his movements with those of Hausen. Actually he opened a strong attack with four corps against the line of the Sambre on August 22, before Hausen was ready to move, a miscalculation most fortunate to the Allies. He succeeded in driving the French in, capturing Charleroi, inflicting very heavy casualties and forcing Lanrezac back to a line between Thuin and Mettet, a retirement which exposed the right flank of the British army. The situation for the Allies was serious enough but not calamitous as it might have been had Hausen moved simultaneously. Nor was the retirement made without some very effective counter-attacks on the German Guards.

During the night of the 22nd Hausen brought 340 guns into position on the left bank of the Meuse between Yvoir and Blaimont to cover the crossing of the river by an attacking force designed to take Lanrezac's army in the flank and rear. On the next day, August 23, while the British were fighting the battle of Mons, the 1st French corps was hurried to meet this new menace, and succeeded in checking the German attack. But it could not remove the necessity for a continued retreat. About the same time on this fateful day the Germans had entered Namur and the Belgian field troops with three French battalions were retiring at full speed, attempting to find safety in the French lines.

Lanrezac held his line along the Meuse until nightfall to the extent of preventing any strong German force crossing, but at 9 p.m. he was obliged to order a general retreat. This was carried out during the night, and the next day until his army reached a line Avesnes-Regniowez. The best that could be said was that through the faulty cooperation of Bülow and Hausen, and through his own stout resistance, he was able to reach a position in which the danger of envelopment had for the time disappeared. Lanrezac suffered the fate of the unsuccessful general, and was not long afterwards superseded by Franchet D'Esperey. It was not long also before Hausen was retired on " the grounds of ill-health."

Lanrezac naturally came under the criticism of an alarmed and disappointed higher command. Yet it is difficult to see how he could have bettered the situation. His warnings had been left unheeded, and he was forced into a most difficult strategic position with inferior forces. Had he stayed to defend the line of the Sambre in force, Hausen's movement would have succeeded and the French 5th army might have met with complete disaster, which would have been a far more severe blow than was implied in a precipitate retreat. General de Langle de Cary, commanding the 4th French army, had also ordered a general retirement to take place on the 24th to the line Montmédy-Sedan-Mezières. His failure to break through had left Lanrezac's right flank and rear exposed, and was one of the chief factors in forcing that general to his decision to retire.

The Germans had no illusions in the matter and, while regarding the battle as a superficial victory, recognized it as a strategic failure. The immediate advantages which they might have gained by their advance through Belgium were seriously diminished when the French 5th army was allowed to escape in fair fighting condition from a situation which might have led to its envelopment and destruction.

One criticism, however, must be recorded, and that is the complaint of Sir John French that Lanrezac " left him in the air." The British general certainly had cause to feel that he had not been kept sufficiently informed of the French movements. As has been said, he had been informed at long intervals

of the repulses of the French on his right and of their decisions to retire, but these had not reached him until the movements were in progress and his small force had been left a good many miles ahead of the nearest French line. Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, in his book, "A History of the World War," thus describes the strained situation :

The trouble began when Lanrezac, irritated by Joffre's blindness to the close-looming danger, vented on his newly arrived neighbour the indignation he could not show to his superior. This feeling is illustrated in the greeting which Lanrezac's Chief of Staff gave to Huguet, who came with French to visit Lanrezac : "At last you're here ; it's not a moment too soon. If we are beaten we shall owe it all to you !" And when French, on being excitedly told that the Germans had reached the Meuse at Huy, inquired what they were likely to do, Lanrezac irascibly replied, "Why have they come there ? Oh, to fish in the river !" The sarcasm was modified in translation. But even French's ignorance of the French language could not prevent him understanding the impatience and rudeness which Lanrezac showed in their discussion. Quick to resent this his resentment changed to alarmed disgust when he found that the French had retired and left him isolated. Henceforward his mind was obsessed with the idea that they had left him in the lurch, and he thought of leaving them The experience of the next few days hardened his thought of retiring independently to Havre, there to fortify himself in the peninsula with a modern version of the "Lines of Torres Vedras." From this disastrous intention he was dissuaded by Wilson's playful cajolery, as well as by Kitchener's urgent and less tactful intervention, but still more by the turn of events

The British commander also complained that he was uninformed of the strength of the forces marching against him. Writing of August 23, in his first dispatch, he says that he received at 5 p.m. "a most unexpected message" from General Joffre which informed him that at least three German corps were moving on his position in front, and that another was engaged in a turning movement from the direction of Tournai.

But if French and British intelligence was faulty, the Germans were in not much better case. It is remarkable that their espionage was so defective that they had not even any certain knowledge of the ports at which the expeditionary force had landed. Kluck was under the impression that these had been Ostend, Dunkirk, and Calais. He had no information whatever as to the line of advance. A message from the supreme command, dated August 20, informed him that the disembarkation of the English at Boulogne and their employment from the direction of Lille must be reckoned with, and added the unhelpful opinion that no large disembarkation had yet taken place.

Not until August 22 was an English cavalry squadron heard of, at Casteau, 6 miles north-east of Mons, an English aeroplane from Maubeuge shot down and the presence of the British Expeditionary Force established. Even so, nothing was yet known of its strength. Kluck's uncertainty led him to halt his army for two hours in expectation of a considerable detrainment of British troops at Tournai and the surprise at finding the British army in position round the Mons salient was naturally shared by the troops in the field who first came in contact with them.

Captain Bloem, the German officer above quoted, had a vision of the British army in red coats with helmets or bearskins. His astonishment when he first met face to face "a man in a grey-brown uniform, no, in a grey-brown golfing suit with a flat-topped cloth cap" was immense. "Could this," he asks, "be a soldier ? Certainly not a French soldier, nor a Belgian, then he must be an English one." As has been seen, Captain Bloem was soon to find out that soldiers in golfing suits could be very deadly opponents.

But miscalculating the strength and whereabouts of their enemy was not the only cardinal mistake which the Germans made. A certain vacillation in both the higher and subordinate commands delayed their programme and baulked them of the decisive victory. From the Allies' point of view, it is disquieting to contemplate what might have happened if they had relentlessly carried out their original plan. It is doubtful whether even the delay at Liége, or the one day's hold-up forced on them by the British at Mons, could have availed to prevent them inflicting a crushing defeat on the French and British armies. But as they had muddled their strategy in Alsace-Lorraine, so they muddled their tactics in the north-west, and Kluck lost precious hours in decisions made only to be cancelled.

The battle of Mons was an historic battle fought on historic ground. Near by were the fields of Waterloo, of Malplaquet and of Oudenarde. For the first time for a hundred years, except for the war in the Crimea, a British army was fighting in Europe. It must always be gratifying to the men that when the test of strength came their small army, standing its ground, was more than a match for the most highly trained military force in the world. The battle of Mons can never count as anything but a victory to British arms, and it was won purely by the superiority of British rifle fire and by the inherited discipline of British troops. It must be remembered that half of the expeditionary force were reservists, called back to the colours at a moment's notice, and at the time perfectly unused to the rigours of route marches and sleepless nights. Nothing but the recollection of the old discipline could have made this veteran army a formidable opponent to one as efficient as itself and charged equally with enthusiasm for battle.

In the heat of war rumour spreads rapidly and nothing can be too bad to say of one's enemy. At this time both the Germans and the British accused each other of driving civilians in front of them to avoid defensive fire. We know now that on the morning of Sunday, August 23, the church bells were ringing in Mons, that excursion trains were running in and out of the station, and that many of the unfortunate population were caught between two fires.

On one occasion British troops sprang to their rifles at the word that the Germans were advancing against them along an adjacent road. They rushed to defend themselves, only to find that they were confronted by a party of Belgian school children. The sufferings of civilians were severe. Families were in an agony of doubt as to whether it were best to stay where they were and let the battle sweep over them, or gathering a few possessions, desert all else that was precious to them, and make the long trek to unknown destinations where they might find safety. No more pitiable sight can be imagined than a civilian population in flight, and nothing can be more hampering to an army in movement than to find its roads choked with farm wagons followed by old and young, enfeebled by fatigue and proceeding only at a snail's pace.

This chapter may well end with a quotation from the official historian of the Great War, Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds. In his introduction to Captain Bloem's book, "The Advance from Mons," he describes how he was sent to the headquarters of the British 2nd corps. He says :

On my arrival I saw that General Smith-Dorrien was obviously perturbed. He said to me at once : "Jimmy Grierson having died, I am sent out here without time to collect even a kit, still less to make myself fully acquainted with the situation, and I have had to make two great decisions. When I arrived before Mons, the C.-in-C. told me to give battle on the line of the Condé canal, and when I asked whether this meant the offensive or defensive, he told me to obey orders. That fellow . . . said to me this morning : 'If you stand to fight there will be another Sedan'."

How magnificently Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was justified in his determination to fight, and how by that action he rescued his corps from a most disastrous defeat will presently be seen. There was no Sedan.

LIGHTER'S WELCOME FREIGHT

These Australian troops at Anzac Cove look on while a field gun is being landed. The water inshore was not deep enough to permit of transports coming in close, and all munitions and stores had to be transhipped to lighters which could be beached

FOOD FOR THE GUN

The plains of the Gallipoli peninsula were pleasant and well wooded. This French gun near Seddul-Bahr has found the range and can keep up a rapid fire. The question of transport made the task of feeding the guns one of great difficulty

COLLIER'S HOUR OF GLORIOUS LIFE

The River Clyde, a 4,000-ton transport that before the War had been employed as a collier, played a memorable part in the landing at C
her sides were opened, and the troops poured out on to a steam hopper which had been grounded between the transport and the

V BEACH HAS BEEN WON

ril 25, 1915. Loaded with 2,000 troops she was run ashore at V beach. As soon as she grounded steel doors which had been cut in n a gangway. Their landing was covered by fire from 12 machine-guns in steel casemates built on the bridge and bows of the ship

'ANNIE' IN ACTION

The work of the artillery in Gallipoli was particularly difficult as the absence of roads and the hilly nature of the battlefields made the task of moving the guns into position a strenuous one. The heavy guns which could reply to the Turkish artillery were regarded with affection by the gunners, and the pet name of 'Annie' has been chalked on the barrel of the one in the foreground

CHAPTER 11

RUSSIA IN PRUSSIA

This chapter deals with the campaigns in East Prussia in which Russia met with some early successes but in the end was disastrously defeated at Tannenberg and amid the Masurian Lakes

THREE main factors went to make up the driving force of the Russians in the War. The first was the belief in the supremacy of the Slavonic race which dominated every class from the Tsar to the humblest mujik; the second was a religious fervour which made every war a holy war, and the third was a traditional hatred of Germany.

The first factor was due to Russia's belief that as the greatest of all the Slav nations, she held the destinies of all her blood brothers in her keeping. That she had not always been loyal to her trust is not to be denied. A century and a half of injustice to Poland called for expiation. The memory of her failure to thwart the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina six years previously had to be wiped out. Action was especially necessary as regards the Poles, with the Prussians as their western neighbours and the Austrians on their southern frontier.

On August 15, five days after the Austrians invaded Russian Poland, the Tsar issued a proclamation to the Poles.

The hour has sounded when the sacred dream of your fathers and your grandfathers may be realized. A century and a half has passed since the living body of Poland was torn in pieces, but the soul of the country is not dead. It continues to live, inspired by the hope that there will come for the Polish people an hour of resurrection and of fraternal reconciliation with Great Russia. The Russian army brings you the news of this reconciliation, which obliterates the frontiers dividing the Polish peoples, which it unites conjointly under the sceptre of the Russian Tsar. Under this sceptre Poland will be born again, free in her religion and her language. Russian autonomy only expects from you the same respect for the rights of those nationalities to which history has bound you. With open heart and brotherly hand Great Russia advances to meet you. From the shores of the Pacific to the North Sea the Russian armies are marching. The dawn of a new life is beginning for you, and in this glorious dawn is seen the Sign of the Cross, the symbol of suffering and of the resurrection of peoples.

The second factor was that Russia was the most religious nation in Europe. The nature of the Orthodox religion, with its symbolism and its ikons, brought it home to the humblest of the people. To the simple peasantry the Tsar was their little father and the church their mother. To them the War became a religious war: and from this peasantry, inspired by religious fervour, came the man power of Russia.

The third factor was the peaceful penetration of Russia by the Germans. German business men had found in the dominions of the Tsar a happy hunting-ground in which they could grow rich quickly at the expense of a simple and even gullible people who in the end, however, realized that they had been exploited. To these Germans the Russians gave the name of *nemetz*.

In Russia, as in the case of the other allies, internal dissensions existed at the outbreak of war, but the trouble was confined to labour disputes and strikes, fomented, as some maintain, by the German secret service. The position had certainly become serious, for the strikers from armament factories, mills and railways numbered many thousands, and conflicts took place between them and the Cossacks. But the hopes based by the Central Empires on this state of affairs proved as abortive as they did in the case of Britain and France. When the war clouds gathered the danger disappeared.

As in London popular enthusiasm showed itself in demonstrations of loyalty towards the King, so in St. Petersburg, soon to be known as Petrograd, crowds paraded the streets cheering portraits of the Tsar or knelt in cathedrals and churches offering up public prayers for the victory of Russia's arms. On August 8 the Tsar received the two houses of the Duma at the Winter Palace and was given assurances by every party leader of loyal and enthusiastic support. It is important to note that in his simple speech the Tsar stressed the racial and religious aspects of the war which meant so much to Russia.

It is not only the dignity and honour of our country that we are defending, but we are fighting for our brother Slavs, co-religionists and blood brethren. In this moment I see also with joy that the union of the Slavs with Russia progresses strongly and indissolubly.

The problems which arose out of the general mobilization were similar to those which called for solution in the more complex civilizations of the West, but they were handled with far less efficiency, though with perfect good humour. Two questions, however, were solved without serious difficulty. One was the harvest. The civil and military authorities acted in unison: the old men, women, boys and even the criminal classes were pressed into service. In spite of the enormous area of the grain fields of Russia the entire harvest was gathered and the winter's supply of food was assured. The second was the consumption of alcohol. At the instigation of General Sukhomlinov, the war minister, who has been called the Russian Kitchener, an imperial ukase forbade the sale of alcohol in all districts likely to be affected by mobilization. Vodka, the fiery national spirit, became a thing of the past.

There was some grumbling, but not a great deal. "Men who had tramped fifty versts or so to serve the little father," says Marr Murray, in "The



Map of East Prussia showing the terrain over which the Russians advanced in August, 1914, and the district of the Masurian Lakes in which they were so disastrously defeated

RING UP THE GUNS

Direction and range were given to the heavy artillery far behind the lines by telephone. This photograph shows the men in charge of a Japanese siege gun during the attack on Tsingtau waiting for telephonic orders to open fire

Russian Advance," "thought that they were at least entitled to drink his health and damnation to the *nemetz*. But generally the order of things was accepted with the unquestioning stolidness of the Russian peasant. The little father had said no vodka, therefore *nitchevo*, why complain ? "

The Russian mobilization began on July 29 and was not completed until August 24. All the belligerents expected that it would be mismanaged, and they were not disappointed. The disorganization of the railways was deplorable ; a new system was in course of being imposed on the army, and the mobilization bases were situated a considerable distance from the frontier. But in their loyalty to their Allies the Russians began offensive operations against Austria and Germany before their mobilization was complete, and the Germans found that in leaving the defence of the East Prussian frontier to Landwehr and Landsturm forces they had made a grave mistake.

In the Russian campaigns of 1914 Russia possessed one great advantage over Prussia and Austria. The populations of East Prussia and Galicia are mostly of Slav descent, and, like the Jews, the Slavs have never been absorbed by their conquerors. Not only that, but the ramshackle empire of the Hapsburgs consisted of a heterogeneous collection of 53,000,000 people of different races of whom a large proportion were wholly or partially Slav.

The trouble was not so serious in East Prussia as it was in some of the Austrian provinces, for as Sir W. E Ironside in his book on Tannenberg points out, East Prussia had developed steadily during the century of peace preceding the Great War under the hard but just rule of the German upper class. The country had, in fact, become so Germanized that, in spite of the existence of a large peasantry using one form or other of the Slavonic tongue, its people had come to be regarded as the backbone of Germany.

The Russian campaigns in 1914 divide themselves somewhat disjointedly into three parts. On Saturday, August 1, Germany declared war on Russia,

ORIENTAL BREAKFAST

An attack on the fortress of Tsingtau has been delivered during the night and some of the men who have taken part therein are enjoying their frugal but customary breakfast of rice balls



CONFERENCE BEFORE RETREAT

Fierce fighting occurred at the beginning of 1915 in the neighbourhood of Soissons on the Aisne. The French who came near to victory were obliged to retire owing to the flooding of the river. French staff officers are here seen anxiously surveying the position

and on the following Friday the Russians carried out the first raid into East Prussia. On the 10th the Austrians invaded Russian Poland, a step which evoked the Tsar's proclamation to the Poles five days later, and which was followed by the swift advance of the Russians into Galicia.

Here, however, we are only concerned with the invasion of East Prussia. In the early days of August both the Russians and the Germans carried out raids into the enemy's country, but neither obtained a foothold therein. Conditions in both the east and the west induced each belligerent to adopt a contrasting plan. The Germans, with their forces heavily engaged in the west, hoped and waited for a quick success there before they struck at Russia. Hence, for the time being at least, their strategy was defensive. The Russians, on the other hand, urged on by France, had every inducement for prompt action.

The forces assembled by Russia for the invasion of East Prussia consisted of two armies, the first and the second, the whole being directed by Jilinsky, then chief of general staff. The first army, under Paul Rennenkampf, consisted of three army corps; altogether 86 battalions of infantry and 120 squadrons of cavalry. These were drawn from the Vilna district. The second army, directed by Alexander Samsonoff, consisted of five army corps; altogether 164 battalions of infantry and 110 squadrons of cavalry drawn from the Warsaw region. All were regular soldiers, as the reserve corps were not yet fully mobilized; but many of the units were not at full strength, and there were serious deficiencies in transport and other auxiliary services. The total force may have numbered 400,000 men.

Instructions were given for the concentration of each army corps at an appointed place, and then for the advance of the two armies, each keeping in touch with the other. The general objective of the two armies was to advance into East Prussia with the object of cutting off the Germans from

KNOWN BY NUMBERS

All military maps mark contours, and it became a convenient practice to refer to particular heights by the number which indicated their elevation. Below is Hill 132, which figured in the fighting round Soissons in early 1915

DEATH BY THE CROSS

Fierce battles raged in Southern Poland in November, 1914, when the Russians succeeded in repulsing the Austrian and German invaders and inflicting heavy casualties on their rearguard. Dead victims of one of these actions are left lying beside a wayside cross while the pursuit continues

the Vistula. In pursuit of this aim the first army was to begin the crossing of the frontier on the 17th and to advance westward to Insterburg and so threaten Königsberg. The second army was to begin the crossing on the 19th and advance to the line Rustenburg-Seeburg.

To defend their frontier the Germans had three corps of regular troops and one of reservists, in all 144 battalions of infantry and 84 squadrons of cavalry. These numbered about 200,000 men, and so were inferior in strength to the Russians. Called the 8th army, it was under the direction of General Max von Prittwitz, with General von François commanding the 1st corps as his most energetic lieutenant. They were superior to the Russians in artillery and in knowledge of, and preparedness for, war.

The difficulties in the way of the Russian commanders were considerable, and consisted mainly in the nature of the territory to be invaded. East Prussia formed a long and comparatively narrow salient, being thus exposed to invasion from both east and south, and affording an excellent opportunity for a concentric Russian advance, yet the movements of the Russian troops were hampered by a complicated system of lakes, swamps and forests which greatly assisted defensive operations. The East Prussian front from north to south can be divided into three sections :

(1) The Königsberg area, bounded on the north by the Baltic Sea, from which access was available to the fortress of Königsberg.

(2) The Insterburg gap, a flat country, down the centre of which ran the Insterburg-Allenstein railway. Although generally favourable for the movement of troops, the country contains a number of forest areas.

(3) The Masurian Lakes, stretching along the frontier from Angerburg and Lyck in the south-east to a little beyond Neidenburg in the south-west. General von Hindenburg had long seen the strategic value of this lake system, and for that reason had consistently opposed the drainage and cultivation of the area during the years immediately preceding the War. On the Russian side this was a country of sandy forest, intersected with marshy streams, deliberately left waste as a military obstacle against German invasion. On the German side the roads were good, and in the Johannisburg area a line of blockhouses had been constructed. To the west of this front were numerous sunken lakes, running north and south, and thus rendering lateral communications difficult to the advancing Russians. On the other side the Germans had the advantage of excellent roads and a perfect network of strategic railways, both of which had little value for the Russians, as they were deficient in motor transport and their own railways were of different gauge from those of the enemy.

The first Russian army began to cross the frontier on the 17th, and almost as soon as it was on German soil one of its corps, the third, was confronted with a German force near Stallupönen. A second German force, hearing that this engagement had started, attacked the Russians in the rear and soon put them to flight, taking 3,000 prisoners. This untoward incident disorganized one section of the advance, but elsewhere it continued without interruption.

There was little or no fighting on the 18th, but on the 19th there were cavalry skirmishes and encounters between advanced guards. The Russians were advancing without sufficient precautions and their services were not working very well. On the other hand, the mere fact that they were advancing was causing many Germans to leave their homes and impede the army in their flight to a safer area. There appears to have been some difference of opinion between the two German commanders as to where a stand could be made ; but eventually François, who had wished to fight nearer the frontier, received orders to take up a position

near Gumbinnen, and in response to his urgent appeal the rest of the army was moved into line on his right.

The battle of Gumbinnen, as it was called, which took place on August 20, began at 3.30 in the morning with the German artillery firing upon the Russians, who were taken completely by surprise. This was followed by an infantry attack, made by the corps under François, which resulted in the rout of one of the Russian divisions and the retreat of the other, the first losing 5,000 men. But the issue was very different to the south of the first corps, where the German forces consisted of the 17th corps under August von Mackensen and a reserve corps.

The 17th corps crossed the river Angerapp, but its advance was delayed by fugitives and livestock that were met with on the roads. The men, therefore, were tired and somewhat disordered when they were attacked by three Russian divisions, and soon they showed signs of wavering. About six o'clock in the evening General von Prittwitz, having just heard that the second Russian army was menacing his forces, gave the order for the troops under his command to fall back behind the Vistula. Before this had been done, however, a telegram arrived superseding Prittwitz, and a new phase of the campaign opened. The Russians were justified in claiming Gumbinnen as a victory for their arms, although they lost over 17,000 officers and men.

While the first Russian army was following, in somewhat leisurely fashion, the retreat of the Germans, the second army, having crossed the frontier, seized several Prussian towns and was in a position, as already stated, to cause considerable anxiety to Prittwitz. Its only fighting in these early days was a cavalry skirmish at Soldau on August 21, but the advance was making heavy demands upon the men, and with the transport and other services in disorder they became, as the commander-in-chief realized, temporarily unfit for action. In some units there was a considerable shortage of food, and one general stated that little had come through and that little only by chance. Villages were deserted and the local resources scanty. In eleven days his corps had covered 132 miles over heavy sandy roads. There were many stragglers, and all were asking for a halt. A staff officer stated that "the infantry and artillery are miserably provided for," and another staff officer said "Everything is at loggerheads," and describes some of the corps commanders as "certainly most incompetent." Not only was there no direct communication with the commander-in-chief nor with the commander of the first army, but the communications within the second army itself were deplorable.

It was at this time that General Samsonoff, the commander of this army, for reasons which he gave, decided to advance on a line more to the south than the one given in his original instructions. General Jilinsky first censured him for this deviation from plans, but later agreed that he should advance on the line Sensburg–Allenstein, which he should reach not later than the 26th. Delay and uncertainty arose because some of the staff officers confused Sensburg with Seeburg. Moreover, owing to units having been detached and other causes, Samsonoff's army was much below its original strength, and, worst of all, it was being allowed to march on a very wide front,

Photos: Sport and General

HAIL AND FAREWELL

Employed as scouts in Russian Poland, these German soldiers are sufficiently near their own homes across the frontier to pay them a flying visit. Friends and relatives, being near the battle area, feel relief or apprehension at the news which they bring

BETWEEN THE SHOTS

These German artillerymen are busily employed in loading one of their heavy guns preparatory to firing it again. In the campaign in Poland the Germans made good use of the heavy guns manufactured at the Skoda works for the Austrian army



Photo: Sport and General

INSCRUTABLE STILL

The men seen here are part of the first Australian expeditionary force that landed in Egypt early in 1915. Altogether they numbered some 20,000 from all the six states of the Commonwealth and few of them would fail to visit the Sphinx

'FORTY CENTURIES LOOK DOWN'

Napoleon's phrase uttered when his army encamped under the Pyramids in 1798 is applicable, with the addition of another century, to the men of the Australian expeditionary force who pitched their camp on almost the same ground early in 1915

AFRICANS ON THE ALERT

France obtained valuable assistance in defending her frontiers from the troops of her African possessions. Forming an outpost, these men of a Senegalese regiment, who are serving in France, are keeping a sharp look-out for the advancing toe

something like 60 miles, the knowledge of which caused Jilinsky to telegraph to Samsonoff on August 24, "Close your corps to more narrow frontages so that they do not have to fight isolated and are not out of liaison with one another."

Samsonoff's first serious engagement with the Germans took place on August 24, and is known as the battle of Frankenau. Between that town and Orlau the Germans occupied an excellent position which controlled the surrounding country, where there was little cover. The Russians, in this case two divisions of the 15th corps, advanced without preparation against the enemy positions, and were soon beaten back, suffering over 2,500 casualties.

After the engagement at Frankenau there was another difference of opinion between Jilinsky and Samsonoff as to the direction which the second army should take. In the end Jilinsky agreed that troops should march in the direction of the line Allenstein-Osterode, provided that a corps and a cavalry division were here detached to watch the enemy movements from Seeburg. This was done, and on August 25 the rest of the army had taken up its positions when news arrived that the Germans were concentrating in the direction of Lautenburg.

To succeed General von Prittwitz, who, as already stated, had been superseded, Paul von Hindenburg was appointed, and with him, as chief of the staff, was a younger man, Erich von Ludendorff. The two met for the first time on the railway station at Hanover on August 22, and just as Roberts and Kitchener went together to South Africa in 1899 these two travelled together to Marienburg, which they reached on the 23rd. Just before they started Ludendorff had telegraphed to the corps commanders that each was to act independently until he arrived. The gloom that prevailed at headquarters at Marienburg struck the newcomer very forcibly.

The battle of Gumbinnen had been a strategical success for the Russians, inasmuch as the Germans in the north of East Prussia had fallen back on Königsberg without any further attempt to risk a decisive action, and it is quite clear that German headquarters was rudely upset by the Russian victory. In the letter which Moltke, chief of the general staff, wrote to Ludendorff, notifying him of his appointment as chief of staff of the 8th army in East Prussia, the following passages occur:

> You have before you a new and difficult task, perhaps even more difficult than that of storming Liége. . . . You may yet be able to save the situation in the East . . . Of course, you will not be made responsible for what has already happened, but with your energy you can prevent the worst from happening.

Before leaving for the Eastern front Ludendorff reported to the Kaiser. "His Majesty, who was very calm," he says, "spoke seriously of the eastern situation, and deeply regretted that part of the German fatherland should suffer invasion by the enemy. He was mindful of the sufferings of his people."

The belief that on their railway journey to Marienburg, Hindenburg and Ludendorff concerted the plan which was to bring disaster upon the Russian armies appears to be wrong, although it cannot be imagined that they refrained from discussing the position as they sat in the train. As a matter of fact they took over a plan which had been prepared by a junior staff officer, Max von Hoffmann, who had been in Manchuria, and therefore knew something about Russian mentality.

The dispositions accepted by Hindenburg and Ludendorff for an attack were assisted by the slowness of Rennenkampf's advance, and it was this fact which decided them first of all to attack Samsonoff's army in spite of the numerical inferiority of the Germans. During the four days' battle of Tannenberg, which began on August 26, Rennenkampf's formidable host hung like a threatening thundercloud to the north-east. But it did no more. "He need only have closed with us and we should have been beaten," says Ludendorff. "But Rennenkampf brought his main body hardly beyond the Allenburg-Gerdauen-Neidenburg line, and we had time to win a brilliant victory. Few

SCENE IN LORRAINE

War swept through the frontier towns and villages of Lorraine, and though the invader was swept back again he left his mark in ruin and desolation. The little town of Baccarat suffered as heavily as any, and it is here seen in the early days of 1915

Photo: Sport and General

INTERLUDE OF WAR

In the ruins of what was once the village church a cheerful crowd of French women, some with their children, are enjoying a concert given by soldiers who are billeted in the neighbouring barns

Photo: Central News

BOMB THAT MISSED ITS MARK

Ostend was one of the first objectives of German air raids. This photograph shows the eager curiosity of the inhabitants, old and young, after a bomb intended for the harbour works had fallen harmlessly on the dunes

knew the anxiety with which I watched the Niemen army during those long days."

In the concentration of their troops for an attack upon Samsonoff's army Hindenburg and Ludendorff had the enormous advantage of the network of strategic railways on Germany's eastern frontier. Forces to the number of 150,000 men were concentrated within a few days, while the German command of the Baltic enabled the German generals to tranship the troops who had been driven into Königsberg to reinforce their field army.

The forces under Samsonoff numbered over 150,000 men, but in Sir Alfred Knox's view Samsonoff, like his colleague, was quite unfitted to deal with the situation.

Rennenkampf and Samsonoff had made their reputation as commanders of cavalry divisions in the war against Japan. Their experience, however, as cavalry leaders in the Far East was of no value as a preparation for the control of large armies in an essentially different theatre under totally dissimilar conditions. They had to contend with men who had made a life-long study of war in this theatre and under the existing conditions.

Samsonoff's prevailing idea was to see the battle with his own eyes. In the early hours of August 28 he decided to cut himself off from his base and to ride forward as he had done in Manchuria in 1904-05.

Intercepted wireless messages gave the Germans valuable information about the Russian dispositions. Samsonoff's army was advancing on Bischofsburg and Allenstein. On the 26th one section was near Waplitz, and farther south the 1st corps, covered by several cavalry divisions, was advancing through Mlava and Soldau against Lautenburg and Strasburg. The German armies were hampered by the refugees, of whom thousands blocked the roads and hung on to the troops.

Ludendorff's object was to fight where he could extend his line by taking into it some of the lakes whose strategic value had become known to him by frequent manoeuvres. Owing to the nature of the ground behind him he could rapidly reinforce a flank during battle, whereas the ground in front was cut up by tracts of soft, marshy land and swamps, with numerous small lakes that would seriously hamper the retreat of a large army in that direction and render practically impossible the hurried retreat of artillery and transport.

The front chosen reached from Osterode on the north to a point near Soldau on the south. His inferiority in numbers at the beginning of the battle was made good during the three days of its duration by the arrival of reinforcements by railway, and he was greatly superior to the Russians in artillery. The Vistula fortresses had furnished heavy guns in great numbers and batteries of field artillery had been borrowed from the army corps on the Posen frontier. At the commencement of hostilities the German supreme command offered to transfer three corps from the western theatre. They arrived too late to take part in the battle, but, as Sir Alfred Knox points out in his book on the campaign, it was solely owing to the Russian raid into East Prussia that they were absent from the battle of the Marne. To this extent, at least, the move was of benefit to the Allies who were then hard pressed in the west.

During the prolonged battle the Russians obtained some temporary successes, several villages along the front being stormed at the point of the bayonet, but they immediately became exposed to the intense artillery fire of the enemy and were rendered untenable. On August 26 Hindenburg retook Soldau, and Samsonoff's attempt to recapture it on the following day resulted in a severe defeat which swept his forces eastwards to Neidenburg, turning his left flank and cutting his main lines of supply and retreat by the Soldau-Mlava railway. Some thirty miles to the north-east the Russians evacuated Allenstein and retired on

HEAVY ARTILLERY

The British Expeditionary Force had heavy batteries which, though no match for the Germans in point of numbers, were yet most useful in the early days of the fighting. This 60 pounder was of a calibre which excited the admiration of the French

Hohenstein, where they made a stand from August 26 to August 29, but in the end they found themselves unable to hold the position. Neidenburg was lost to the enemy, but early on the 29th a Russian army corps marched on the town and threatened the rear of the German 1st army corps, which, fronting to the north, was engaging Russian troops in retreat.

German reinforcements were rushed to Neidenburg, but it was found that General von François was successfully holding his own against the Russians, who were showing signs of demoralization. On the same day the German 3rd reserve division broke through the Russian lines and reached Muschaken, east of Neidenburg, where heavy but indeterminate fighting took place. The Russian right was turned, and Hindenburg's long study of the difficult terrain through which the Russians had to retreat enabled him to hamper them in every possible way.

The unhappy General Samsonoff shot himself. Sir Alfred Knox states that Samsonoff was repeatedly heard to declare that the disgrace of such a defeat was more than he could bear. "The emperor trusted me. How can I face him after such a disaster?" He went aside and his staff heard a shot. They searched for the body but without success. This is explained by Ludendorff, who says: "General Samsonoff shot himself and was buried near Willenberg without being recognized. His widow was able to trace his grave by a locket which had been taken for identification purposes from the body of the fallen general when he was buried."

Ludendorff describes the battle as one of the most brilliant in the history of the world; and at his suggestion the complicated engagement was named Tannenberg, in memory of that earlier battle in 1410 in which the Teutonic Knights succumbed to the Lithuanian and Polish hosts under their king Calislas.

Yet, decisive as the victory was, it might, according to Captain Liddell Hart, have been still more so. If the corps under August von Mackensen and Fritz von Bülow had joined up with the forces of François, the ring round the Russians would have been complete and none of them would have escaped. As it was, a good part of the 13th corps of the Russian army succeeded in getting away. This failure, in the opinion of the historian ("A History of the World War") was due to faulty co-operation

BATTLESHIP'S BROADSIDE

The British Super-Dreadnought Orion is here seen firing a broadside from her ten enormously powerful 13·5 guns. The weight of metal hurled through the air by a single discharge of these formidable weapons is over six tons



LAND MINE

For blowing up barbed wire entanglements or wreaking destruction on enemy entrenchments the land mine was always a useful expedient. The engineers became expert in laying these subterranean charges, the full effect of which is illustrated above

between Mackensen and Bülow and lack of clear guidance from above.

The losses of the Russians in this terrible disaster amounted to almost the whole army of something like 160,000 men. The Germans claimed to have taken 95,000 unwounded prisoners and 30,000 wounded, together with 500 guns. Sir Alfred Knox in his book on Tannenberg comments on the battle :

The disaster of Tannenberg was the greatest defeat suffered by any of the combatants during the War. The suddenness and unexpectedness with which it was achieved heightened the strategical effect of the battle upon the War as a whole. Confidence in Russia amongst her Allies was completely shaken. The German nation was raised to such heights of enthusiasm by the exploits of Hindenburg and Ludendorff that the defeat on the Marne, which came about a fortnight after Tannenberg, passed without much comment amongst the people.

Jilinsky had hurried the second army into an advance before it was ready. Samsonoff made no protest when given an impossible time-table of marches, and exhausted his army before he had gained contact with the enemy. He had persistently disobeyed his orders in extending his advance to the westward, and had thereby upset the timing of the campaign. Jilinsky had weakly acquiesced in the disobedience of his subordinate, and took no steps to adjust the situation by directing the first army to close in to the second. Reconnaissance, both strategical and tactical, had been utterly neglected during the advance, and the Russian forces had been gradually dissipated upon subsidiary objectives until only half the original army remained as a striking force.

Nothing had been done by General Rennenkampf and his army to avert this crushing defeat. After his success at Gumbinnen he had moved his men forward in a somewhat desultory fashion, making, apparently, no attempt to keep in touch either with the enemy in front or with the second army to the south. Part of the responsibility for failure, however, must fall on Jilinsky, who, on the 26th, after a period of silence, ordered his subordinate to employ two corps in blockading Königsberg and to use the rest of his troops in pursuing the Germans, who were believed to be retreating to the Vistula. During the next three days Rennenkampf's army got a little nearer to its objectives, but nothing serious had taken place when, on the 30th, he was informed by Jilinsky that Samsonoff's army had been routed "and the enemy has now complete liberty to turn against you."

Under these conditions Rennenkampf decided to take up a defensive position, and orders for this were issued on Sept. 2. A tolerably strong one, it stretched from Labiau across what was

VETERAN IN ACTION

H.M.S. Canopus, which on Dec. 8, 1914, fired the first shot at Von Spee's squadron, from Port Stanley in the Falkland Islands, went early in 1915 to the Dardanelles, where with her 12-in. guns she took part in the attempt to force the Straits



ON LOAN FROM AUSTRIA

In the reduction of the frontier fortresses the Germans found the greatest assistance from the Austrian Skoda mortars—which when fired with accuracy played havoc with old fortifications. A specimen of these cannon is seen in a barrack square in Brussels

called the Insterburg gap to Angerburg at the north-eastern end of the Masurian Lakes, and it was helped by the presence of three rivers, Deime, Alle and Omet. The right flank was protected by the sea and the difficult country north of the river Pregel, but the southern flank was less secure. Jilinsky approved this action, and instructed Rennenkampf to maintain it at all costs, while he made arrangements to strengthen his army. By this time the remnants of the second army had been, to some slight extent, reorganized, and three corps were arriving from Siberia and Turkestan.

Such being the position, on Sept., 4, Jilinsky decided that a fresh offensive should be undertaken. The good news from Galicia was one inducement, and he had heard also that the Germans were advancing against Mlava. He therefore put the three new army corps under Rennenkampf's orders and drew up a plan for the proposed offensive.

The Germans were by no means inactive during these days, and Ludendorff, having destroyed one army, was eager to repeat the operation on the other. He had received two fresh army corps and reinforcements for the others, and, moreover, owing to their reckless use of wireless was, as before, well aware of the Russian dispositions. He divided his available troops into six groups and each received orders for the anticipated enveloping movement.

The fighting began when Mlava was taken by the Germans on the 4th, and three days later Bialla was captured after a short bombardment. This enabled an advance to be made on Arys, which was approached from the south and west at dawn on September 8. By 10 o'clock the town had been captured, together with a thousand prisoners. General von François, whose corps had done most of this preliminary work, made Lyck his next objective, where Russian troops were in process of concentration. This town was captured in an attack on the early morning of September 10, heavy casualties being incurred on both sides. The advance then continued until the Russian line broke and retreated in disorder, leaving over 5,000 prisoners and 60 guns with the enemy.

These preliminary successes reflected great credit on General von François and his men, who in four days had marched 77 miles with fighting on two of them. The main Russian army was now exposed to a general advance. Directed against the Insterburg gap, this was carried out with eight divisions against seven Russian ones and began on September 9. The Russians were strongly entrenched ; the Germans made very little progress, while the corps on the right was thrown back with considerable loss, followed by a Russian counter-attack between Angerburg and Hardenburg which inflicted further casualties.

In spite of these successes, however, the Russian army, owing to the success of the turning movement, was in a perilous position, and Rennenkampf ordered a general retirement, which began at nightfall on the 9th. This was not unduly disorderly, but it became more so as time went on, and it was during this retreat that the Russians lost most of their men, chiefly as prisoners. By the 12th some of the corps had marched 60 miles or more in extremely hot weather over roads blocked with their transport.

About 11 a.m. on September 12 the Germans came into action with some Russian columns that were trying to break into the forest of Rominten near the frontier, and there the Russians lost 1,000 prisoners. The retreat had now become really disorderly, but Jilinsky made a last effort to save the remnant of the first army, hoping to do this by calling upon the assistance of the second and tenth armies. This, however, was prevented by the action of the supreme commander, the grand duke Nicholas, and there was nothing to do but to continue the retreat.

On the night of the 14th Rennenkampf wired to the grand duke : " All corps have now broken off the battle." By the 15th the remnants of the Russian force was safely across the

THE LUCKY ONES

Through a communication trench a column of German prisoners, captured by the French, is being marched towards the cages. Their smart appearance suggests that they had not been long in the trenches, and so their experiences of actual warfare was brief

frontier. "The Russian army has been a heavy burden on East Prussia," says Ludendorff, "but we have rescued our soil." The losses among Rennenkampf's troops during the twenty-eight days of his occupation of German territory were given officially by the Russians as 145,000 and 150 guns. The moral effect of the disaster was considerable, and the loss of Russian prestige and of irreplaceable material was never made good. On the other hand, for the Germans the victories of Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes, and the evacuation of East Prussia by the Russians, overshadowed the defeat on the Marne.

At this time Ludendorff was called away for more important duties elsewhere, and on the evening of September 14 he took his leave of Hindenburg, although the two were soon to be together again. In his book, "My War Memories," he paid tribute to the exemplary behaviour of the Russian troops in East Prussia. He mentions the strict discipline maintained by Rennenkampf at Insterburg, where wine cellars and provision stores were well guarded, but he excludes the Cossacks from his eulogy, charging them with cruelty towards the inhabitants.

The war was now transferred to the tract of land between the undefended frontier of East Prussia and the river Niemen. Having received reinforcements Hindenburg sent his men into Russia in pursuit of the retreating foe, but he himself did not go with them as on the 17th he was ordered to join Ludendorff in Breslau. During the advance there were desultory engagements near two Russian towns, Augustovo and Suwalki, but the resistance offered by the Russians was not sufficiently strong to prevent the Germans from pushing on to the line of the Niemen, which was protected to the north and south respectively by the fortresses of Kovno and Grodno.

But having been reinforced the Russians were able to prevent the Germans from crossing the river and also to foil their efforts to capture the fortress of Ossowiec. Faced by these reverses the Germans decided to retreat, and on the 27th this movement began. The tables were now turned. It was the Russians who pursued, and near Augustovo a second battle took place in which the Germans are said to have lost 60 000 men. The Russian cavalry again crossed into East Prussia where, as before, their raids caused considerable consternation.

WEB OF WIRE

This network around the ruins of the church of Lampernisse shows clearly the system on which wire entanglements were constructed. From post to post ran lines of barbed wire about waist high, and the very absence of system in the construction of the web made it more difficult to penetrate

Photo: Topical

Photo: Sport and General

THE CROSS OF MERCY

In Galicia, whither the Germans went to help their Austrian allies the arrangements for treating the wounded were somewhat more primitive than on the western front. Here, two stretcher cases are receiving brief attention before being conveyed to hospital

PRIESTLY BRAVERY

An heroic part in the War was played by the village priests of France and Belgium. In the quiet countryside two German soldiers lie on the stricken field. In the hope that there may be a spark of life in them two French priests hurry towards them

Daily Mirror

CHAPTER 12

RALLY OF THE EMPIRE

Before the War had gone far on its course assistance from the Overseas parts of the British Empire began to arrive in Europe. This chapter tells of the eagerness shown by all its peoples to share the common burden

IF a considerable section of the population of Great Britain were startled by the sudden outbreak of a world conflagration, they were equally surprised by the loyalty and enthusiasm of the people of the British Dominions and dependencies overseas, who acting on their own initiative rallied round the Mother Country without a moment's hesitation. Greater still must have been the astonishment of the Germans, who found their calculations entirely at fault. A few hours of unprecedented crisis sufficed to show them that the democracies of the British Empire stood firm and united in this fateful hour.

German statesmen had assumed that at the first breath of danger the British Empire would crumble to pieces. Canada had nothing to gain by fighting for the Empire: on the contrary, by sending her forces overseas she would expose herself to assault from the United States. Australia would expose herself to the Japanese menace. The English colonies in Africa would be compelled in self-defence to sever their connexion with the Empire, in order to avert the danger of attack.

The secret of the two political principles on which the stability of the British Empire rested—the rule of law and the consent of the governed—eluded the Germans. The German ideal was the propagation of Teutonic *kultur*, that of Great Britain the peaceful union of states within the ambit of the Empire. Neither the spirit of adventure nor the desire for private gain moved the young nations of three continents and the ancient peoples of India and Africa to rally round the Mother Country. The spirit of adventure was not absent, but the mainspring of their action was the sober conviction that in the Empire lay the guarantee of their national existence and their future prosperity.

The great Dominions did not wait for the declaration of war to declare their faith. Immediately the danger became apparent Sir Joseph Cook, the Australian prime minister, declared:

> All Australian resources are for the Empire's preservation and security . . . . we must sit tight now and see the thing through at whatever cost. We must be steadfast in our determination. Our resources are great and the British spirit is not dead. We owe it to those who have gone before to preserve the great fabric of British freedom and hand it on to our children. Our duty is quite clear. Remember we are Britons.

Mr. Andrew Fisher, the Labour prime minister, who succeeded Sir Joseph Cook was equally emphatic: "Should honour demand the Mother Country to take part in hostilities, Australians will stand behind her to the last man and last shilling."

The message sent by Canada through the governor-general, the Duke of Connaught, was: "If unhappily war should ensue the Canadian people will be united in the common resolve to put forth every effort and make every sacrifice necessary to ensure the integrity and maintenance of the honour of the Empire."

Sir Richard McBride, the premier of British Columbia, the province farthest away from Britain, declared:

> The time is opportune for some consideration to be given by the people of British Columbia to the expediency of organizing volunteer forces to be placed at the service of the Motherland. Should it unfortunately develop that Great Britain is compelled to engage in hostilities, Canada would automatically be at war also.

The Germans complained during the war that they were faced with a motley crowd of coloured troops. Before, therefore, embarking on the history of the expeditionary forces placed in the field by the Dominions, some of the messages received from the dependencies may well be quoted as showing the nature of the forces Great Britain might have employed if she had deemed it expedient; and it is of interest to note that the people of many of these dependencies professed the Moslem faith.

The hakim of Jubaland memorialized the governor of the Somaliland Protectorate as follows:

> Salaams, yea, many salaams, with God's mercy, blessing and peace. In former days the Somali have fought against the Government. Now we have heard that the German Government has declared war on the English Government. Behold our 'fitna' against the English Government is finished. As the monsoon wind drives the sandhills of our coast into new forms, so does the news of German evil doing drive our hearts and spears into the service of the English Government. Daily in our mosques we pray for the success of the English armies. We have heard that Indian askaris have been sent to fight for us in Europe. Humbly we ask, why should not the Somali fight for England also.

The native treasurer of the Buganda kingdom, Uganda Protectorate, made the following appeal:

> We will ask the governor to allow us to go to England and join the English army with our 500 men. We are quite ready and most anxious to fight for the British flag . . . which we should never suffer to see trampled down by any other nation in Europe.

Lewanika, chief of the Barotse tribe, Northern Rhodesia, declared:

> The indunas (chiefs) and myself want to call in all our people and then when they

NEUTRAL AID FROM U.S.A.

These French soldiers, with minor wounds, have had the good fortune to reach the American hospital in Paris where they will receive all the kindly attention which genuine hospitality, fortified by ample resources, can afford

Photo: Topical

MEN WITH LOADS OF MISCHIEF

These German machine-gunners in Poland during the advance of 1915 have just left the trenches. The German army was far better equipped in this weapon than the British army, which originally had only two machine-guns to a battalion while the Germans had six. The deficiency was only repaired after many months



Photo: Imperial War Museum

TOWARDS THE GUNS

These British cavalrymen are obeying a major maxim of war, one approved by Napoleon, that of moving in the direction of the sound of the gun fire. If the infantry make a break through they will be needed to exploit the success

are here, we shall tell them to make ready for the war to help the Government. We shall stand always to be under the English flag.

Griffith, the paramount chief of the Basutos, cabled:

With regard to this war, which I hear exists between His Majesty the King, George V, and the Germans, I ask whether as my King is engaged in fighting his enemies, I, his servant, will be doing well to keep aloof watching him being attacked by enemies. As I am unable to be with my King in person I beg to know whether I may show my loyalty and the loyalty of the Basutos to H.M. the King by giving monetary assistance.

The Moslem population of Trinidad and Tobago passed the following resolution:

This meeting of the leading Moslems residing in the colony of Trinidad and Tobago have read with intense regret the declaration of war by Great Britain against Turkey, and as loyal British subjects resident in this colony desire to offer to his Most Gracious Majesty the King and Emperor our sincere devotion and loyalty and to state publicly that no Moslems here are in sympathy with the sultan of Turkey. We are always ready to shed our blood for the honour and prestige of the British flag, under which we are enjoying free liberty, peace and contentment

The Moslem Society itself made the following declaration on August 30th, 1914:

All his Majesty's subjects of the Islamic faith are fully prepared and burning with a desire to shed their blood side by side with the sons of Islam, natives of Algeria, who are already fighting for France.

The sultan of Perak, Federated Malay States, picturesquely announced: "As long as the sun and the stars shine in the heavens, I will look to no other country, but adhere to England."

Of the Dominions, Canada was the nearest to the Motherland. She had never interested herself greatly in military matters, but the nucleus of a military organization existed in the militia. The Canadian contingent for Europe, which in a few weeks reached the substantial figure of 33,000 men, possessed a very distinctive character. Lord Strathcona's Horse and the Royal Canadian Dragoons were largely composed of veterans who had seen service in South Africa, while the Highland regiments came of the same stock as the Seaforths, Gordons and Camerons. The adventurous and self-reliant scouts, pioneers, cowboys, trappers and hunters came of the French and English stock of the original settlers, and found military discipline an irksome business.

No expense was spared in equipping the contingent, and by the end of September, 1914, the Canadian expeditionary force

SPICK AND SPAN

Not for long will these 'Old Contemptibles,' who have just reached the front, present an almost parade ground appearance. They have been buying the wares of a Belgian hawker, whose dog also expresses the spirit of the Entente Cordiale

Photo: Sport and General

NEW USE FOR SAPLINGS

The marshy nature of the ground in the Argonne made the movement of even light artillery an arduous task. This photograph shows how the difficulties were overcome to enable the French 75 mm. guns to be moved into position. Saplings were cut down and laid to form a rough track over which they were drawn

which set sail across the Atlantic, was complete with machine-guns, artillery, motor transport, intelligence, medical, chaplains' and other departments.

A veil of silence fell over the voyage, and nothing further was heard of the force until October 14, when it landed at Plymouth and moved into camp on Salisbury Plain. The four months which followed proved a time of trial to the Canadians, but when they arrived in France early in the new year they were a formidable unit. There they joined Princess Patricia's Light Infantry a Canadian regiment largely composed of veteran British soldiers, which had preceded them to France in December, 1914.

Apart from the military effort of Canada, reference must be made to the very substantial aid the Dominion provided in money and in kind. Her granaries provided munificent gifts of cereals ; substantial sums were provided for hospital services, both in France and in England, for ordnance of all kinds, and for contributions to the Patriotic fund. The capitalist and the worker vied with each other in generosity, and even American Indians offered their services and their possessions. The cruisers Niobe and Rainbow had, on the outbreak of war, been placed at the disposal of the Admiralty.

As in other parts of the Empire, political differences were obliterated in Canada. Sir Wilfred Laurier, formerly premier and now leader of the opposition, called his chief adherents together and, after consulting them, publicly announced that his party would lend its support without reserve to all measures deemed necessary by the Government. "There should be a truce to party strife," said he, and he saw that the truce was observed. The statesmen of the several provinces echoed the same sentiment. The Duke of Connaught summarised the national position—"Canada stands united from the Pacific to the Atlantic in her determination to uphold the honour and traditions of the Empire."

Both Australia and New Zealand possessed trained armies, and Australia had a navy. For this fact their geographical position was responsible. The trend of world politics had, during the past ten years, brought Australia, in particular, within the danger zone. The formidable empire of Japan, equipped with a magnificent navy, had begun to cast covetous eyes on Australia, and the Commonwealth was determined to stand by the policy of a white Australia and to oppose Japanese immigration at all costs. Therefore, an Australian navy had come into existence and a system of universal military training had been established.

This training was designed to start early under a cadet system, and in June, 1914, the Australian forces consisted of about 50,000 citizen soldiers. Over 80,000 youths were enrolled as senior cadets and 48,231 men were registered in rifle clubs, a feature of the scheme which ensured that, after the period of general training, proficiency in shooting should be kept up by regular practice. The former militia and volunteer units were being gradually merged into a new citizen army and with the cadres already in existence, and the impetus of recruiting, the minister for defence, Mr. G. F. Pearce, was able to announce, in November, that Australia had a total of 104,630 men under arms.

Towards the end of 1914 the Royal Australian Navy consisted of one battle cruiser, five light cruisers, two gunboats, six destroyers and two submarines. These ships were soon to give a good account of themselves.

As in the case of Canada, material aid on a large scale was rendered both

ONE OF THE HEAVIES

When the Belgians were driven across the Yser into the small area of their country that they retained until the end of the War, they succeeded in taking with them some of their heaviest guns, one of which is here seen firing across the inundated country



GO AS YOU PLEASE—BUT GO!

In some respects the discipline of the French troops was less rigid than that of the British. In moving forward to the trenches and returning to rest British battalions kept military formation, but French troops went much as factory workers go to their daily toil

officially and privately. That the German invasion of Belgium stirred Australian public opinion to its depths was shown by the fact that the Commonwealth Government gave £100,000 to the Belgian Relief Fund, while Sydney alone contributed £20,000.

There was no question as to what Australia should do. "Our duty is quite clear," said the federal premier, Sir Joseph Cook. On the Monday preceding the declaration of war the governor-general of Australia sent on behalf of the Commonwealth Government the following offer to Great Britain.

In the event of war the Commonwealth of Australia is prepared to place the vessels of the Australian navy under the control of the British Admiralty, if desired. It is further prepared o dispatch an expeditionary force of twenty thousand men of any suggested composition to any destination desired by the Home government, the force to be at the complete disposal of the Home government. The cost of the dispatch and maintenance would be borne by this Government. The Australian press has been notified accordingly.

Mr. Harcourt, the British secretary for the colonies, replied: "His Majesty's Government greatly appreciate the prompt readiness of your government to place their naval forces at the disposal of the Admiralty and their generous offer to equip and maintain an expeditionary force."

Shortly after the outbreak of war there was a general election in Australia. The ministry of Sir Joseph Cook was overthrown and a Labour government, under Mr. Andrew Fisher, succeeded it. Apprehension was entertained in some quarters in Australia lest the Labour government should be less keen on giving assistance in the War than its predecessor. This fear was wholly groundless. The Labour leaders during the election pledged themselves in the most complete fashion. Mr. Andrew Fisher declared at the beginning of the War that Australia should support Great Britain to her last man and her last shilling, and when he became prime-minister he acted faithfully on the declaration.

The Australian Expeditionary Force was purely a volunteer one, as overseas service was optional for the Commonwealth troops. The first contingent consisted of 20,338 men, and like the Canadian troops they were extremely well paid. Embarkation began on October 17, and lasted five days, when the flotilla left Melbourne for Albany, Western Australia, where the New Zealanders also arrived.

New Zealand had realized the position clearly, and at once. She was ready for war by land and sea, and some days before war was declared, the prime-minister, Mr. W. F. Massey, announced that the Government were prepared to offer an expeditionary force to the Imperial Government. Three days after the declaration of war the New Zealand Government cabled an offer to London, and on August 12 the offer was accepted.

As in the case of other parts of the widespread Empire, the Government and people of New Zealand contributed generously to the various relief funds, and the Imperial Government, which had already decided to draw on the Indian army for assistance, found it desirable to accept the offer of the Maori people to supply a contingent of fighting men for service overseas. The New Zealand Expeditionary Force numbered 8,000, and everything was in readiness on September 24, when the troops boarded the transports that were to carry them to Albany and then by stages to Europe. There was, however, a delay in sailing owing to uneasiness caused by the presence of German cruisers, especially the Emden, in the Pacific Ocean

At Albany they found H.M.A.S. Melbourne, H.M.A.S. Sydney, and 28 Australian troopships waiting for them, and the combined forces set sail for Europe. In the early morning of Monday, November 9, the transports with their convoys were passing the Cocos islands on the western side at a distance of about 30 miles, when the Sydney suddenly turned away and made rapidly for the island. Captain Glossop of the Sydney had received a wireless call from the Cocos, ordering him to steam ahead at full speed to attack the Emden, an operation fully described in a later chapter.

The combined forces arrived at Colombo on November 14 and found the harbour full of ships sheltering from the Emden, which, however, had just been destroyed. Aden was reached on

'AND THERE WAS MUCH GLORY'

With drums beating, a French battalion is returning to its billets in a village behind the lines. Its men have distinguished themselves in a fight near Souchez and the regiment has been mentioned for gallantry in the orders of the day issued by the general

Photo: Topical

WRACK OF WAR

The village of Souchez, which after the War was adopted by the royal borough of Kensington, was laid in ruins during the course of the struggle. This photograph gives an idea of its appearance in the early months of 1915

November 25. The Anzacs, as they were later to be called, believed that they were going to Europe. But meanwhile the news came that the Allies had declared war on Turkey, and when, after passing up the Suez Canal, the Anzac troops reached Alexandria at 5 a.m. on December 3, they were disembarked there to complete their training in Egypt and to help to guard that unsettled country against the coming attack by the Turkish army that even then was crossing the desert.

At the outbreak of war Newfoundland, Britain's oldest colony, was engrossed in her peaceful occupations. The government, however, lost no time. On August 8 the governor cabled for authority to enlist special men for service abroad by land and sea, undertaking to raise by October 31 a force of naval reservists of 1,000 efficient men, and about 1,200 for land service. The offer was accepted on the following day. The first contingent of the land force set out for England in H.M.S. Florizel on October 4. More than ten months were spent at Salisbury Plain and other places, and finally at Aldershot, in intensive military training, and on August 18, 1915, the Newfoundland Regiment sailed for Alexandria for service in Gallipoli with the famous 29th division. Of the Newfoundland population altogether 11,922 men joined the various services, and, in addition, 3,000 Newfoundlanders enlisted in the Canadian and other forces. In February, 1918, the regiment received the title of "Royal."

The part which the Union of South Africa played in the War is dealt with in detail elsewhere. The problems which confronted the Union differed fundamentally from those which the other Dominions had to face. Not only had initial difficulties to be overcome in the shape of disaffection at home, but South Africa further had the enemy actually at her gates in the shape of the colony of German South West Africa. Nevertheless, she was able to despatch to the Western Front the famous South African brigade which on June 15, 1916, achieved the victory of Delville Wood, a victory which was commemorated in 1920 by the purchase of that battleground by the South African Government to serve as a national memorial.

The enemies and the allies alike were astonished at the flame of enthusiasm which Great Britain's declaration of war evoked in India. According to Sir Ernest Trevelyan, of the peoples of India 69 per cent. are Hindus, 21 per cent. Mohammedans, and 3 per cent. Buddhists. The remaining 7 per cent. include nearly 4,000,000 Christians, some 1,250,000 Jains, over 3,000,000 Sikhs, 100,000 Parsees, and 10,250,000 Animists, a sect united rather by religion than by race.

Yet it is hardly too much to say that in this heterogeneous collection of communities hardly a dissentient voice made itself heard. Distinctions of race disappeared at the first suggestion of danger to the Empire, and all religions and races united. The Indian effort was made simply because the peoples of India recognized that their interests were bound up with the interests of the British Empire, that Great Britain had given them peace, prosperity and justice. From the terse message of the Maharajah of Rewar: "What orders from his Majesty for me and my troops?" to the manifesto of the Indian agitator: "The present is not the time to press for reform. We must sink all differences. The presence of our rulers is desirable even from the point of view of self-interest," the same spirit showed itself everywhere.

Even the Calcutta lawyers, most of whom were Bengalis, a race to which the Government had not so far looked for an army, undertook to raise a company of volunteers. More surprising still, Indian women parted with their personal jewellery and ornaments, things which, as a prominent Indian wrote to "The Times," constitute the women's insurance fund, as they did in bygone times, when religion or honour was in danger. The ruling princes made magnificent contributions in money, and placed their forces at the disposal of the authorities. The King-Emperor was moved to issue a proclamation from which the following passage may be quoted:

> Among the many incidents that have marked the unanimous uprising of the populations of my Empire in defence of its unity and integrity, nothing has moved me more than the passionate devotion to my throne, expressed both by my Indian subjects, and by the feudatory princes and the ruling chiefs of India and their prodigal offers of their lives and their resources in the cause of the realm. Their one-voiced demand to be foremost in the conflict has touched my heart and has inspired to the highest issues the love and devotion which, as I

FIRST GAS MASKS

After the first serious gas attacks by the Germans in April, 1915, the British troops were equipped as soon as possible with gas masks. These men are wearing some of the earliest masks issued. They consisted of a pair of goggles to protect the eyes and a linen respirator, chemically treated

well know, have ever linked my Indian subjects and myself. I recall to mind India's gracious messages of goodwill and fellowship which greeted my return in February, 1912, after the solemn ceremony of my coronation durbar at Delhi.

The military assistance rendered by the Indian Empire during the War was greater than is, perhaps, generally realized. Of the regular garrison of 75,000 seasoned British troops the British Government were able to detach a considerable number for service in the various theatres of war, replacing them by Territorials. The regular Indian army itself consisted of 160,000 men, including some 3,000 British officers, with a reserve of 40,000. The Indian Expeditionary Force dispatched to Europe in September, 1914, consisted of no less than 70,000 men. The troops were safely conveyed to Marseilles by ships of the allied fleets, and met with an enthusiastic reception on their arrival at that port.

During October the Indian troops found themselves in the fighting line on the Western Front and gained their first experience of trench warfare. The character of the fighting and the climatic conditions were altogether against their training and traditions, and in spite of the stoical bravery with which they endeavoured to adapt themselves to the circumstances, their casualties were very heavy. In November Lord Roberts rendered his last service to his country by paying a visit to his old comrades of the Indian army on the western front. He arrived at Boulogne on November 11 and visited the Indian troops in hospital. From there he proceeded to the headquarters of the Indian corps and found himself once more in touch with officers and men who had been his companions-in-arms during his Indian career. Unhappily the tour of inspection which he had mapped out for himself was cut short by a sudden illness which had a fatal termination. A medallion affixed by the Imperial War Graves Commission marks the house in St. Omer in which he actually died.

There remain to be mentioned the two regiments provided by the West Indies: the historic West India Regiment which, as the South Carolina Corps, had been raised in 1778 as a volunteer force of mingled whites and negroes for the purpose of fighting the French in the West Indies, and the British West India regiment which was formed during the War from contingents of the inhabitants of the West India islands. The former regiment served in Egypt and Palestine and took part in the conquest of the German colony of Cameroons; the latter also performed distinguished service in Palestine.

Assistance also came from the Channel Islands, although it was not until a later stage of the War that the Guernsey Light Infantry reached the front. In 1917-18 they did good service when, as part of the famous 29th division, they fought in France and Flanders.

PORTENT OF EVIL

Just before the Germans began systematically to employ poison gas, British troops in Flanders had suffered from the fumes of bursting shells. Against this their only protection was wet handkerchiefs, the forerunners of the gas masks

CHAPTER 13

FIGHTING RETREAT

The battle of Mons was followed by the retreat of the British to a prepared line in the rear. The chief event of this movement was the battle of Le Cateau, fought by the 2nd corps under Sir H. Smith-Dorrien on August 26, 1914

THE battle of Mons died down with the oncoming darkness and little occurred during the night of August 23–24 to disturb the British front line. The Germans showed signs of nervousness and constantly illuminated the battlefield with those white flares which were to become such a familiar feature of night warfare on the western front.

Shortly before midnight Sir John French sent for the senior staff officers of both corps and at this meeting his chief of staff, Sir A. J. Murray, communicated to them plans for an immediate retreat of about 8 miles in depth. This would bring the British force to a line running from La Longueville, 5 miles west of Maubeuge, westward through Bavai to the village of La Boiserette. A rearguard under Brigadier-General H. S. Horne was formed to cover the retreating corps, but so little disturbed were the first two divisions that there was no need for its services. The 1st division marched off at 4 a.m., and the 2nd followed shortly afterwards without incurring any real pressure from the enemy. They did, however, suffer very considerably from heat and fatigue.

The Germans were still attempting to replace the frontal attack with a turning movement from the west, and early in the day news was brought by aeroplane of a mass of German troops moving west of Condé and beyond the extreme western flanks of the British. Independently of this movement they began at dawn to shell heavily the line of the 2nd corps, more with the idea of holding the defenders to the ground than of driving them out of it. Serious fighting developed during the morning, particularly about Frameries. A company of the Bedfords was involved in hand-to-hand fighting at Paturages. At St. Ghislain the Germans, after a two hours' bombardment, crossed the canal by a footbridge, but were eventually held up by the Dorsets supported by artillery.

Map showing the routes followed by the two corps of the British Army during the retreat from Mons to the line of the river Marne, including Le Cateau, where Sir H. Smith-Dorrien made his memorable stand with the 2nd corps

Rearguard actions were fought elsewhere by both cavalry and infantry, and the general movement of retreat was gradually put into operation. A major difficulty at this time was to extricate the 5th division, under Sir Charles Fergusson, to which these battalions belonged. In its position facing the Mons canal it was threatened on its left flank by strong German forces advancing between Thulin and Condé. The divisional commander appealed for renewed cavalry support to relieve this pressure. An action developed in an area between the Mons-Valenciennes road and the Élouges-Audregnies road. Sir Charles Fergusson called also upon reserves from divisional headquarters consisting of battalions of the Norfolk and Cheshire regiments and the 119th battery. This force he placed under the command of Lt.-Colonel C. R. Ballard of the Norfolk regiment, with orders to advance and counter-attack. Meantime, in answer to his appeal, the cavalry returned.

About 12.30 p.m. the battle opened with heavy fire from German guns and rifles. The attack looked serious and Brigadier-General De Lisle, commanding the 2nd cavalry brigade, grasped the opportunity for a cavalry charge on the German flank. This was carried out, but was unfortunately checked by gun fire and wire entanglements. Nevertheless, the charge delayed the German attack sufficiently to allow Colonel Ballard to attempt some consolidation of his line. The German threat began to develop dangerously, and there was the obvious risk that it might become an enveloping movement of the most disastrous character. Fortunately both the British batteries and Colonel Ballard's infantry had an excellent field of fire and wrought tremendous execution on the German columns advancing against them. Indeed, in their action at Élouges the British were entirely victorious in countering and throwing back Kluck's intended envelopment.

At 2.30 p.m., two hours after the action had started, the colonel was able to give the order to retire. The rescue of the guns at this point presented great difficulties and was carried out successfully largely through the heroic action of two officers. Major Alexander of the Royal Artillery received the V.C. for "handling his battery against overwhelming odds with such conspicuous success that all his guns were saved, notwithstanding that they had to be withdrawn by hand by himself and three other men," and Captain Francis Grenfell of 9th Lancers also received

the same decoration for his gallantry in assisting to save the guns of the 119th battery of the R.F.A.

An unhappy feature of the retirement was the impossibility of getting orders to some of the forward companies, who, ignorant of the retreat of their companions, held on to their positions with hopeless gallantry until they had exhausted all their ammunition, had lost most of their numbers and had been then forced to surrender. This fate overtook the gallant Cheshire.

Losses were heavy on this second day of fighting. The Cheshire, out of a full battalion of 1,000 officers and men lost all but two officers and two hundred men. The total casualties for the day amounted to 2,590 officers and other ranks, of which 1,650 occurred in the 5th division. German accounts of this second day's fighting made it clear that their losses, too, were very heavy. One regimental officer of the 24th Brandenburg regiment records that in the attack on Frameries his battalion "lost three company commanders and besides, every second officer and every third man." He refers to the hail of gun and howitzer shell which burst on the edge of the village: "No human beings could possibly live there." He adds: "Tommy seems to have waited for the moment of assault. He had carefully studied our training manuals, and suddenly, when we were well in the open, he turned on his machine-guns." The Germans were still deceived by the rapid fire of the British infantry.

The resistance had served to break down Kluck's enveloping movement, and had inflicted so many checks on his general plan of campaign that he had been obliged during the afternoon to pause, and content himself by the evening with an advance of only 3½ miles. Sir John French thus described his situation at nightfall. His force was disposed—the 2nd corps to the west of Bavai, the 1st corps to the right. "The right was protected by the fortress of Maubeuge, the left by the 19th brigade in position between Jenlain and Bry, and the cavalry on the outer flank."

The 19th brigade referred to was formed from four battalions that had been guarding the lines of communication. These were the 2nd Royal Welch Fusiliers, the 1st Cameronians (Scottish Rifles), the 1st Duke of Cambridge's Own (Middlesex Regiment) and the 2nd Princess Louise's (Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders). Major-General L. G. Drummond was given command of this brigade, which was brought up by rail from Valenciennes on the 22nd and 23rd. On the morning of the 24th the men were moved out to a position south of Quarouble to support the left flank of the 2nd corps. In detail the British line on the night of the 24th was as follows: the 5th cavalry brigade was at Feignies, the 1st corps between Feignies and Bavai, the 2nd corps around Bavai, St. Waast and Bermeries the cavalry division about St. Waast, and Wargnies, and the 19th brigade about Jenlain.

During the afternoon Sir John French had received information of the further retreats of the French 3rd, 4th and 5th armies, and was in some difficulty as to his next dispositions. He had entertained the idea of falling back behind the fortifications of Maubeuge, but this he judged was precisely what Kluck was anxious that he should do. The fate of Bazaine at Metz in 1870 might very likely be his if he succumbed to the temptation of the shelter of an old fortress. On his right flank the French were ten miles to his rear, and Kluck was evidently still determined, if he could, to envelop his left. The British commander-in-chief decided therefore, to retire a further fifteen miles in the direction of Le Cateau.

The country was extremely difficult. Behind him lay the forest of Mormal, through which ran no road north to south capable of taking a column of troops in retreat. There was no alternative, therefore, but to divide the British force and evacuate the two corps on either side of the forest. Sir Douglas Haig, with the 1st corps, took a course along roads near the Sambre river; Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien marched along a Roman road west of the forest. It was impossible, for two reasons, for the whole force to pass by the same route, for had it been on the east there would have been confusion with the French; if on the west a flank march across the enemy's front would have been involved, endangering the entire British army.

But if topographical difficulties were causing anxiety so was the condition of the retiring troops, most of whom had made long marches to the battle front of Mons, had been in action for two days and were now called upon for a long, dispiriting retirement which must be executed with the greatest possible speed. They were hungry and suffering badly from lack of sleep, footsore and forced to plod on through close country in intolerable heat. One private of the Berkshire records in his diary for this day, August 25, that he had had no food since Sunday, August 23. Those who suffered most were the reservists, older men not yet in training to endure such conditions.

Both corps, during their long marches on August 25, were, in fact, hampered by the movements of the French, who were retiring along the same roads or across their front. Fortunately for the troops of the 1st corps, they were little disturbed by the enemy, except for occasional shots from patrols, and they were able to reach their appointed stations at Landrecies and Maroilles between 4 and 6 p.m. The 2nd corps, retiring south-west of Bavai to the Le Cateau position, were also for a time held up by the movement of General Sordet's cavalry passing directly over its line of retreat. The march, in any case, was exceedingly trying, along the straight and airless Roman road, running by the side of a dense forest, and it was complicated by brushes with the enemy, by the necessity of fighting rearguard actions and by the fact that the route was everywhere choked with the slow-moving and ramshackle transport of civilians in flight.

The 1st corps were not long to be left undisturbed by the enemy. At Maroilles, about 6 p.m., two detachments of the 15th Hussars guarding a bridge over the Sambre were engaged by the Germans and forced to retire. An attempt on the part of the Berkshire to recover the bridge was met by gun fire and beaten back. Rather earlier the report had reached Landrecies that the Germans were approaching, and though at first discredited, this proved to be true, for at 7.30 p.m. a party of Germans neared a piquet of the 3rd Coldstream, answered their challenge in French and attempted a surprise assault. They were effectively countered and reinforcements were hurried forward. A brisk engagement followed which lasted until after midnight, and was for a time fought by the light of burning haystacks. A German repulse was assured when their guns were silenced by a British howitzer. Casualties were equal (about 120) on either side.

To the commanders on the spot the immediate threat appeared more serious than in reality it was, and an appeal for help was made to general headquarters and passed on to the 2nd corps. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was unable to comply, having, as he said, no troops which he could send to Landrecies "in a useful condition." Sir John French thereupon altered the direction of the retreat of the 1st corps to a more southerly course. The 2nd corps throughout the evening were retiring through Solesmes harassed by the enemy who were close on their heels.

British headquarters were by this time established at St. Quentin and Sir John French had issued orders for the retreat to be continued on the next day a further ten miles or more to a line Busigny-Le Catelet. Sir Douglas Haig,

IN ITALIA IRREDENTA

An outpost in Austria on the river Eisack is held by one of the Bersaglieri regiments, whose distinctive mark is a plume of black cocks' feathers. When Italy entered the War her army thrust forward into territory ruled by Austria, but inhabited largely by Italians. This she recovered in 1918

FRONT LINE ON THE SNOW LINE

Italian troops are preparing defences 10,000 ft. above sea level. The glacier on the left of the photograph is nature's defence against the invader. To the right, where there is a steep slope downwards towards a valley, a trench is being hastily dug. Behind the trench dugouts, protected by sandbags, have been constructed

EYRIE AND EAGLETS

Every vantage point on the mountainous frontier between Italy and Austria which overlooked a possible line of enemy advance was utilized by the Italians. Here a group of soldiers have made themselves a nest in the broken stone wall of a barn

although his troops had had practically no rest, arranged to begin this retirement at 2 a.m. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien had also planned a further movement towards La Sablière–Beaurevoir to be carried out as from 4 a.m.

But the events of the night made it necessary for him to alter his decision. The Germans had taken possession of the high ground north of Solesmes which brought them dangerously close to the battalions forming for retirement. It seemed unlikely that this could be made successfully unless it was carried out before daylight. General Allenby impressed this view upon the corps commander, who then proceeded to enquire from General Hamilton, commanding the 3rd division, whether his troops could be on the move whilst it was still dark. This commander replied (it was then 2 a.m.) that some of his battalions were only just finishing their march of the day before and that it would be impossible to assemble them for further retirement before at least 9 o'clock in the morning. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, now fully aware that he could not retire his corps in darkness, and conscious of the extreme danger of conducting the operation in daylight, came to his ever memorable decision to stand and give battle.

Before doing so he readily obtained the consent of General Allenby to act, with his cavalry division, under his orders and also that of General T. D'O. Snow, commanding the 4th division. Mention has already been made of the composition of this division which had landed in France on the night of August 22-23, and had been sent by train on the 24th to the neighbourhood of Le Cateau. From there it was moved forward to Solesmes to protect the retirement of the 2nd corps, that place being of extreme importance as the converging point of several roads. It had subsequently marched to take up a position on the left of the 2nd corps line between Fontaine-au-Pire and Wambaix. It had scarcely completed this movement, which had been attended with the utmost difficulty and some disturbance from the enemy, before it was due to move again.

But about this time General Snow received the request to stand, which he agreed to do. Subsequently he wrote to Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien as follows: "When you sent to me the morning of the 24th to ask whether I would stand and fight, I ought to have answered: 'I have no other choice, as my troops are already engaged in a battle of encounter, and it must be some hours before I can extricate them.'" His division suffered from the supreme disadvantage of its hasty formation. It had no divisional cavalry, divisional cyclists, field ambulances, field companies R.E., main and divisional ammunition columns, or heavy artillery. As Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien said later describing these conditions: "He had no troops to give warning, neither rapidly moving orderlies nor cables for communication, no means of getting away wounded, no engineers, who are the handy men of an army, no reserve ammunition and no long-range heavy shell fire." He added: "And yet the division was handled and fought magnificently, but at the expense of losses far greater than if it had been fully mobilized."

General Smith-Dorrien's decision to stand and fight caused some consternation at general headquarters. He was told on the telephone that if he did so there would be another Sedan but he received an equivocal approval from Sir John French in a message which concluded:

> If you can hold your ground the situation appears likely to improve. Fourth division must co-operate. French troops are taking offensive on right of 1st corps. Although you are given a free hand as to method, this telegram is not intended to convey the impression that I am not as anxious for you to carry out the retirement, and you must make every endeavour to do so.

Then came the difficulty of getting the order to the troops in time, which chiefly fell upon the divisional and brigade staffs, and was complicated by the fact that the exact positions of some of the battalions was not yet known. Some units never did receive these orders but conformed to the movements of those that did.

The disposition of the 2nd corps at dawn on August 26 was as follows. From right to left the main body of cavalry was between Le Cateau and the Sambre, later moved to the left flank to join forces with the French cavalry under General Sordet; the 5th division was holding a front from the southern outskirts of Le Cateau to Troisvilles with the 19th brigade in support. In the centre was the 3rd division extending as far as Caudry, and on the left the 4th division with its left flank on Esnes. The gap to Cambrai was filled by the 4th cavalry brigade, and later by Sordet's cavalry corps. The German force advancing in pursuit was the 1st army, commanded by General von Kluck with which the 2nd corps had already joined issue at Mons.

August 26 was the anniversary of Crécy, and the date was again to be memorable for deeds of arms. Le Cateau lies in the valley of the Selle in open cultivated country not unsuited to defensive warfare. The town itself is situated at the right corner of the battlefield over which the 2nd corps fought with varying fortunes during the whole of the day.

It was in the streets of Le Cateau that the battle began. German scouts succeeded in occupying some of the houses and fired on a battalion of the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry and two companies of the East Surrey then leaving the town. They made a fighting retirement to the rear of their brigade. Shortly afterwards the German batteries opened fire upon troops immediately to the west. The situation at once became serious, for the Germans appeared on the flank of the 2nd corps with a distinct chance of pouring through the gap which existed between the 1st and 2nd corps. They did, indeed, advance up the valley of the Selle for about a mile when they were caught by a counter-attack on their western flank, which arrested their progress and foiled their first turning movement.

About 10 a.m. the batteries and battalions of the 5th division to the west of Le Cateau found themselves under heavy enfilading fire which destroyed guns and inflicted many casualties, but about this time the German battalions began to advance in close formation offering targets which were taken advantage of with great effect by artillery and infantry. The Germans quickly filled their gaps and continued to advance, but in the main they were checked by stubborn fire from the batteries and by the marksmanship of the British infantry. On the right centre of the line attacks developed somewhat later, but early in the morning the village of Caudry was bombarded, and German troops advanced against it. In this section, however, they were at first held by the 7th infantry brigade.

Indeed, between Le Cateau and Caudry the whole line was still holding remarkably well six hours after the attack had started. The situation of the 2nd corps on this section is thus summed up in the Official History.

> The German infantry was steadily increasing in numbers on their front and, despite all efforts, was steadily drawing nearer; their right flank was open; they were searched with fire from front and right and left; strong columns betokening the approach of the German III Corps were closing in upon the right front. It mattered not; they had been ordered to stand. The I Corps, for whose coming they waited, might be late, as Blücher had been at Waterloo; but, until it should come, there must be no giving way. Nor did they yield the ground until the divisional orders for retirement reached them some hours later.

It is significant that support from the 1st corps was still expected though in fact that corps was conducting an independent retreat.

On the left wing the day began less auspiciously for the British. As has

Photo: Central News

THEY FELL AMONG FRIENDS

A British medical officer is here seen attending to a wounded Turkish soldier, and other enemy wounded are patiently waiting for similar treatment. The incident took place soon after the landing on the beaches of Gallipoli in April, 1915

been said, the 4th division had no proper means of reconnaissance, and had to rely on the reports of French cavalry which they could not check. French patrols had reported the front clear, and certain units, notably a battalion of the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, were caught unawares in close formation by intensive machine gun fire. This battalion lost half its strength before it could be extricated. Large bodies of German troops made their appearance between Wambaix and Cattenières on the 12th infantry brigade front, but despite enfilading fire and a vast superiority in machine guns and numbers, their attack was resisted for an hour and a half. A single brigade was holding a German cavalry division, two Jäger battalions and a mass of machine guns and artillery.

But a retirement for a short distance at last became necessary, and the 12th brigade was withdrawn to a line Ligny–Esnes. Once re-established, the 14th brigade R.F.A. and the 12th infantry brigade stood fast, and in a sense repulsed a heavy German attack. Thus the way was left open for a further retirement of the 4th division.

Meanwhile, the 11th infantry brigade to the west of Caudry was holding its positions, but the Germans offered little or no target, counting probably on the early retirement of the brigade or the possibility of surrounding it. Certain minor retirements were made, but on the whole front the general line was well maintained. Despite this the position gave cause for the gravest anxiety, and the developments of the afternoon were to prove that this was well founded.

To return to the right of the line, the 5th division was under the fire, direct and enfilade, of at least three German divisions. The question of immediate retirement was discussed between Sir Charles Fergusson, the 5th divisional commander, who could see that the right of his division was seriously threatened, and the corps commander. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, who sent him two battalions, Cameronians and the Royal Welch Fusiliers, to assist him, asked him to hold on until the first stages of the retirement.

A start was made at about 1.20 p.m. to evacuate the guns, a task of great difficulty owing to their position in the firing line. By the most heroic conduct of the gun teams many were got away under heavy fire, but in some cases they had to be abandoned after being rendered useless to the enemy.

General orders for retirement were given about 2 p.m., to begin with the 5th division. West of Le Cateau German pressure and machine-gun fire were becoming intolerable, and the enemy battalions were rapidly gaining ground. The end was inevitable, and after nine hours' persistent fighting this part of the line was overwhelmed. It is said that the Germans in the final attack kept sounding the British "cease fire," and at the same time signalled to the British battalions to surrender, which they steadfastly refused to do.

Orders for retirement filtered through to brigades, but in places it was impossible to get in touch with the battalions, and a regrettable feature of the general retreat was that numbers of scattered units were perforce left behind. How thus by accident rather than design these marooned units formed an effective rearguard to the main body will be seen later. One of the battalions which received no order to retire was the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, who held their position until overwhelmed. This dogged defence was of great value to the retiring troops to their left, for it effectively delayed the German advance at a most critical point. By the end of the battle this battalion numbered only eight officers and 320 other ranks.

Fortunately, too, the outflanking movement to the east of Le Cateau was also checked, leaving time for the corps commander's general scheme of retreat to be put into operation. The retirement from the right of the line started about 3.30 in the afternoon, and on the whole was effected without excessive losses. The Germans made little use of their cavalry to harass the retirement.

The situation was not so strained on the left of the 5th division, where the 15th brigade had the opportunity of firing at a distance on advancing bodies of Germans, and when the orders to retire came the battalions carried out the movement with precision. This naturally was not possible elsewhere on the field where units had become mixed and orders had miscarried. At 4 p.m. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien rode over to watch the 5th division pass along the road south of Maurois. "I likened it at the time," he says, "to a crowd coming away from a race meeting. . . . It was a wonderful sight—men smoking their pipes, apparently quite unconcerned, and walking steadily down the road—no formation of any sort, and men of all units mixed together." He was astounded, he added, that the Germans made no attempt to follow.

Returning to the fronts of the 3rd and 4th divisions where retirements were to be made later, the 9th brigade opposite Beaumont–Inchy encountered little opposition and was able to withdraw without serious loss.

Fighting was more severe in the neighbourhood of Caudry, which was

Photo: Central News

REPAIRING THE SHORTAG

The shortage of bombs and other offensive weapons, so marked in the early part of 1915, led to the practice of making these formidable missiles by the men themselves. Empty tins were filled with explosive that was mixed with fragments of shell and bits of barbed wire. This photograph was taken in Gallipoli

GOOD-BYE TO GALLIPOLI

Wounded men from the Gallipoli beaches were sometimes transferred to the neighbouring islands of Lemnos and Mudros for a brief spell before being loaded into the hospital ships for home. These men, each bearing a label describing the nature of his wounds, are making the slow but welcome journey down the quayside

Photo: Central News

ARMOURED CARS TAKE COVER

Deep and wide trenches were dug in Gallipoli to make garages for the armoured cars of the Royal Naval Air Service. Fine work was done by these cars and they even anticipated the later feat of the tanks in tearing their way through barbed wire entanglements

WE THEREFORE COMMIT——

Behind the battle line common graves held many of the fallen. Here in Gallipoli four men are being buried. Three army chaplains, Church of England, Roman Catholic and Presbyterian, each say prayers, while the burial party form the only mourners *Photo: Central*

captured by the Germans from the troops of the 7th infantry brigade at about 2 p.m. At the same time a flanking attack developed against the left wing at Esnes, which was checked. A counter-attack on Caudry by the 3rd Worcesters succeeded in recapturing the southern part of the village. Later in the afternoon troops from this area were withdrawn towards Ligny, and met with considerable opposition, but on the whole the retirements of the 7th and 8th infantry brigades were carried out in a satisfactory manner.

By 5 o'clock the 2nd corps had everywhere started its retirement, and in general may be said to have extricated itself with remarkable success. The turn to move had now come for the 4th division, the commander of which, General Snow, received his orders about this time. Stationed between Caudry and Esnes he had been meeting increased pressure on his left flank during the afternoon and the Inniskillings holding the line before the village of Esnes had been pressed back to its western borders.

Photos: Sport & General

SHORT RATION

British soldiers in a German prison camp are taking their midday meal. The diet was not generous, and a slice of black bread and two bowls of soup a day was the staple ration. Later on, parcels of food arrived from home

Happily Sordet's cavalry was in position to cover the west flank of the retirement and the supporting artillery under General Milne, which had started withdrawing earlier, was in a good position to protect the movements of the infantry. Moreoever a French force under General d'Amade was in and around Cambrai and it appeared that this covering would be sufficient to secure the British left flank, as indeed it was. In what precise order the various units retired has never been exactly ascertained. It appears that they made their movements as opportunity offered. Great efforts were made to save the guns and very few were abandoned. Scattered detachments, as elsewhere on the battlefield, were left fighting until a late hour. Of these Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien says: "We have to thank them largely for holding off the enemy, thus preventing him being aware that a general retirement had taken place . . . . a wonderful illustration of how a few resolute men can hold up an enemy."

MORT POUR LA PATRIE

In every French village the graves of those who fell in battle were the pious care of the villagers. This homely group stands round the grave of a soldier of France, the wooden cross draped and crowned with flowers

Whether or not the Germans were deceived as to the general nature or direction of the retirement, they made no concerted effort to harass the 4th division, and they were seen to bombard the evacuated positions for some hours afterwards. The Official Historian's comment on the day's fighting reads:

> In fact, Smith-Dorrien's troops had done what G.H.Q. feared was impossible. With both flanks more or less in the air, they had turned upon an enemy of at least twice their strength, had struck him hard and had withdrawn, except on the right front of the 5th division, practically without interference, with neither flank enveloped, having suffered losses certainly severe, but, considering the circumstances, by no means extravagant. The men, after their magnificent rifle shooting, looked upon themselves as victors; some, indeed, doubted whether they had been in a serious action; yet they had inflicted upon the enemy casualties which are believed to have been out of all proportion to their own, and they had completely foiled the plan of the German commander.

The British casualties at the battle of Le Cateau amounted to 7,812 of all ranks killed, wounded and missing, and 38 guns were lost. But, as in the instances already recorded, most of the latter were rendered useless before they were abandoned.

One word more may be said of those detached troops who stood their ground in the absence of orders to retire. General orders may not, without the gravest risk, be revised by the regimental

THE KING IS COMING

In October 1915 King George V paid his second visit to the British troops in France and Flanders. In this photograph the royal car is seen passing along a tree-lined avenue. There has been a parade of troops and the men who have just marched past the King have lined up along the road to give him a parting cheer

officer on the spot. Though he may see an immediate advantage in retiring his troops the necessities of war may require him literally to obey the command to stay where he is " at all costs." In other words, the sacrifice of certain battalions and certain batteries may be absolutely essential to the safety of the main body, and, for all the officer in the field knows, this rôle of self-immolation may be allotted to him, not only in the case of a general retirement, but also during a stand when time is needed to bring up reinforcements.

So naturally enough when orders for retreat failed to reach units on the scattered battlefield of Le Cateau those units remained where they were, prepared to fight to the last man or until a complete encirclement forced them to surrender. In this instance, however, as has been said, it was no part of Smith-Dorrien's scheme to sacrifice a single man who could be retired, and it is interesting to record the corps commander's note in his diary when he made his decision to stand:

> Consciousness that I was acting entirely without G.H.Q. approval would not have lightened my burden, especially as I had another master to consider, namely, Field Service Regulations, which direct (sub-para. III. of para 13 of Section 12 of Part I): " If a subordinate, in the absence of a superior, neglects to depart from the letter of his order when such departure is clearly demanded by circumstances and failure ensues he will be held responsible for such failure."

This would seem to indicate that the subordinate commander is in any case between the devil and the deep sea, but it does not affect the general principle that to retire without superior orders is a course which any subordinate seldom cares to take. Those who have held their ground to the point of annihilation or surrender have generally served the best interests of the main body.

Every later judgement has tended to vindicate Smith-Dorrien's action in giving battle. Had he attempted a daylight retirement he would have been pursued by an alert enemy aware of his movements. As it was he left the Germans disorganized after battle, uncertain as to the strength of the scattered detachments that were still holding out, and in the dark as to the precise movements of the retreating force. Almost inevitably a daylight retirement would have entailed the destruction of the 4th division.

A severe thunderstorm with a heavy downpour of rain soaked the retiring troops to the skin and added to their intense discomfort. They were overcome with weariness, and nearly all had been without sufficient food for many hours. To organize them again into the units to which they belonged was a task of intense difficulty, but it was finally accomplished by the staff officers stationed along the route of march. Regimental officers, themselves worn out, had the greatest difficulty in keeping their columns moving. Infantrymen slept as they marched and cavalrymen could scarcely be roused to feed and water the horses. Corporal John Donmore of the Berkshires, who was with the 1st corps, which had on the whole an easier time, thus describes the scene:

> The roads were in a terrible state; the heat was terrific. There seemed to be very little order about anything, and mixed up with us and wandering all over the road were refugees, with all sorts of conveyances —prams, trucks, wheelbarrows and tiny little carts drawn by dogs. They were piled up with what looked like beds and bedding, and all of them asked us for food, which we could not give them as we had none ourselves. . . We marched . . . staggering about the roads like a crowd of gipsies. Some of the fellows had puttees wrapped round their feet instead

DINNER AT NOON

Field kitchens following battalions on the march had the midday meal ready almost as soon as the troops were halted. Although no more than the familiar stew and hot strong tea it was tremendously comforting to tired men

Photo: Alfieri

THE HIGH COMMAN

Sir John French and General Joffre, who between them commanded the allied forces on the western front, met at Calais for a conference, which was also attended by statesmen and their civilian advisers from both countries

of boots; others had soft shoes they had picked up somewhere; others walked in their socks with their feet all bleeding. My own boots would have disgraced a tramp, but I was too frightened to take them off and look at my feet. Yet they marched until they dropped, and then, somehow, got up and marched again.

It says much for the discipline of the British regular army that the retreat was everywhere continued, and much for the resilience of the men and their degree of physical fitness that they recovered so rapidly after short spells of rest and adequate food. On the morning of August 27 troops were pouring into St. Quentin, where they had a breathing interval before continuing their march. So far the Germans had left them unmolested, though the 4th division was for a time pursued fairly closely by the German cavalry.

Between August 23 and August 28 the 2nd corps had fought two general actions and had marched 75 miles. At this stage of the retreat the 5th division went into billets at Pontoise. The 3rd division halted at Crissolles and Genvry, not far from Noyon. The halting places of the 4th division were at Bussy, Freniches and Campagne. By this time Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien may be said to have shaken off Kluck's pursuit and to have been relieved of the gravest of his anxieties.

On August 27 General Joffre telegraphed his congratulations to Sir John French. He paid tribute to the gallantry of the British army in engaging superior forces, and acknowledged the help afforded in protecting the left flank of his armies. "The French," he said, "will not forget the services rendered."

Sir John at the time was profuse in his congratulations to the commander of the 2nd corps. In his dispatch he wrote: "I say without hesitation that the saving of the left wing of the army under my command, on the morning of August 26, could never have been accomplished unless a commander of rare and unusual coolness, intrepidity and determination had been present personally to conduct the operation."

It is still not easy to understand Kluck's failure to engage in a vigorous

IN THE FRONT LINE

A front line trench in Champagne is thinly held by the French, for though the German trenches are but a few yards away, there are no signs of an immediate attack. Nevertheless in each embrasure there is a sentry whose duty it is to watch for any movement

Photo: Topical

BRAMBLES OF BARBED WIRE

By the lavish use of barbed wire this forest in the Vosges has been rendered impassable to troops. The tangled strands are drawn, without any order, from tree to tree, and only a complete obliteration of the forest by shell fire would make an advance possible

pursuit which would have undoubtedly resulted in disaster to the small British force. That disaster, which for the moment must have been irreparable, might have changed the whole course of the War. But whatever reasons actuated him or whatever lack of information hampered him, the German army commander turned his troops south-west instead of south, leaving the retirement practically unmolested, and missing an opportunity such as is seldom offered to a commander in war. It is significant that German accounts of this battle, in which Kluck suffered very heavy casualties and lost at least one day on his forward march, are extremely meagre.

The narrative of these days, August 26–27, has so far been exclusively concerned with the deeds of the 2nd corps. While Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was fighting the battle of Le Cateau, Sir Douglas Haig, commanding the 1st corps, was carrying out Sir John French's orders to continue an uninterrupted retirement. The enemy, though they had gained the advantage at Landrecies of keeping the British alert when they might have been resting, made the feeblest attempt to delay the retirement. The Connaught Rangers were surprised by the Germans in the village of Le Grand Fayt and were fired on from the houses, suffering heavy losses. On the morning of August 27 the Munsters were in action by Étreux for about twelve hours, holding back the enemy for at least six hours until they were surrounded and over-powered. Again an order to retire had failed to reach the outlying troops.

On the 28th the retreat of the 1st corps was continued to La Fère along roads congested with troops, transport and refugees. A certain amount of cavalry pursuit was encountered but successfully checked, notably at La Guinguette, half a mile east of Cérizy, where a very spirited action took place. The Scots Greys on outpost duty supported by the 20th Hussars and the 12th Lancers, repulsed a German cavalry attack with heavy loss and discouraged further activity in this direction. There was still a gap of 11 miles between the 1st corps, south of the Oise and of La Fère, and the 2nd corps with the 4th division, north and east of Noyon. This gap was partly covered by cavalry, but to bring the two wings close together was the chief object in view during the next days of retreat.

Sir John French had intended to make the following day, August 29, a day of rest. Orders were given to this effect, and except for the cavalry the troops in general had a short breathing space to recover from fatigue. But any prolonged rest was yet impossible. There was a good deal of activity on the 2nd corps front, and it became clear later in the day that the French 5th army had failed to stem the German advance. Orders were therefore given for further retreat to a line Soissons–Compiègne.

Joffre was anxious that the British should join in a counter-stroke, but Sir John French was of opinion that his army was not in a condition to take the offensive until the men had had time to recuperate and units were in a position to refit. On August 30 the retreat continued, but the troops were still so tired that the full distance could not be attained. Meanwhile, Joffre had ordered a widespread retirement of the French forces.

During this day certain correspondence passed between General Joffre and Sir John French. Joffre said that he had in view the general retirement of the forces, avoiding any decisive action

QUARRIES AS QUARTERS

Good use was made of the famous quarries of Soissons by the Germans when they were fighting in that neighbourhood. With the help of blocks of stone the caves made in the course of the quarrying operations were turned into safe billets

Photo: Topical

BETWEEN TWO FIRES

Almost all through the War the French town of Albert was the scene of fierce fighting. And the artillery of the two armies at last reduced most of it to a shattered mass of brick and stone. The photograph shows a devastated street in the town

MOMENT OF BURSTING

A shrapnel shell has burst upon the Belgian trenches and the smoke hangs in a cloud. The time fuse is usually set so that it bursts in the air, and the bullets scatter over a wide area. Shrapnel is more effective against troops in the open than against trenches

ESCORT OF LANCERS

In this photograph an Italian general with his staff following is passing through a village on his way to headquarters. The escort is armed with lances, which though of little value as weapons, were carried by some cavalry regiments of both the Italian and German armies

Photo: Sport and General

so as to hold out as long as possible. But in the course of these movements it would be of the greatest importance that the British army should keep in constant liaison with the French 5th army so as to be able to profit by favourable opportunities. Sir John French could not see eye to eye with this plan. He telegraphed in reply:

> The new plan of retreat having been explained to me, I consider it absolutely necessary to inform you that the British army will not be in a state to take its place in the line for at least ten days. I am short of men and guns to replace losses which I have not been able to ascertain exactly owing to the uninterrupted retreat under the protection of fighting rearguards. You will understand in these circumstances I cannot comply with your request to fill the gap between the fifth and sixth armies; that is to say, on the line Soissons–Compiègne.

The British Official History, quoting this message, adds a footnote, withering in its lack of comment. It runs:

> Neither the field marshal nor any of his chief advisers had been near the fighting troops since the 27th, and he seems to have been unaware of the complete recovery of the 3rd, 4th and 5th Divisions from the hard day of Le Cateau. Only the 5th Division had suffered any loss of guns; the 1st Corps had hardly been engaged, and Sir Douglas Haig had indicated its state by his readiness to cooperate with the French at Guise.

Amended orders were then issued for a southerly retirement; the 1st corps, and 5th cavalry brigade were to move to an area about Villers Cottérêts, the 2nd corps to a line Feigneux–Béthisy St. Martin–Crépy en Valois, the 3rd corps to an area St. Sauveur-Verberie with the cavalry division on the line of the Oise beyond Verberie. This 3rd corps, of which we begin to hear for the first time, consisted of the 4th division, later joined by the 6th division, and was under the command of Major-General W. P. Pulteney.

Much the same circumstances continued to attend the retreat: little activity on the part of the Germans, but great hardships to the retiring army through heat, dust and thirst. The 1st corps halted on the northern side of the forest of Villers Cottérêts, the 2nd corps in the region of Crépy-en-Valois. But there was to be no rest yet. It became increasingly clear that the German 1st army was approaching in great force, and it was necessary for Sir John French to avoid contact with it until General Joffre should be ready to counter-attack. Orders for further retreat were therefore given, although Joffre had made a further appeal to the British army to stand its ground, or "at least to leave rearguards, so as not to give the enemy the clear impression of a retreat and of a gap between 5th and 6th armies."

The retirements of September 1 were marked by actions which, though not of first importance, clearly showed that the British army had still plenty of fighting spirit when called upon to resist a sudden attack. At Néry, where the 1st cavalry brigade and a battery of the R.H.A. had billeted for the night, a patrol of Hussars encountered suddenly, in the early morning mist, a column of German cavalry. The encounter was followed by a rain of shells on the village. The Germans mustered six regiments of cavalry and two batteries, and had the advantage of ground. The single battery of the R.H.A. was man-handled into position, one gun being disabled at once by a direct hit; another was put out of action almost immediately, and the task of silencing the German batteries was soon left to a single gun.

This battle of odds was carried on; officer after officer fell, but still the gun spoke, and of the survivors two earned the Victoria Cross, and amongst those who died on the field one officer (Captain Bradbury) was awarded the decoration posthumously. This minor action of Néry or Compiègne was, however, finished off by the cavalry with infantry support, and so hot did they make it for the Germans that they were obliged to retire precipitately leaving eight guns behind them. The Hussars captured 78 prisoners.

Rearguard actions were also fought this day at Crépy-en-Valois and Villers Cottérêts. Mounted and other troops of the German 4th corps attacked the outpost line of the British 5th division at Crépy, but when checked did not pursue. At Villers Cottérêts the shock



Photo: Daily Mirror

HANGING VIRGIN OF ALBERT

To the many thousands of soldiers who passed through Albert during the War the statue of the Virgin hanging at a precarious angle from the church tower as a result of an early bombardment was a familiar sight. It was said among the troops that when the virgin of Albert fell the War would end, but it fell in March 1918

Photo Sport and General

AT CLOSE QUARTERS

Along this hillside on the Italian front the Italian and Austrian trenches are so close together that hand grenades can be thrown from one to the other. The missile thrown by this Italian soldier is known as a stick grenade and can be hurled about 50 yards

was first felt by the 3rd cavalry brigade, but the main attack was delivered against the 4th Guards brigade, who were covering the 2nd division during a rest interval. The British contested every foot of ground and fell back only by very gradual steps. The fighting continued until 6 p.m. and ultimately the rearguard action was broken off, having achieved its object. Casualties were not light, but considerable losses were inflicted on the enemy, losses which were increased by their firing on their own troops which had lost direction.

Meanwhile, the main body trudged on with no final destination yet in sight, for the close proximity of the enemy—some of his cavalry being at this time behind the British line—determined Sir John French on continued and immediate retirement. In the past twenty-four hours he had had an interview with Lord Kitchener, who had travelled from England to investigate the situation, when it was agreed that the British commander-in-chief should conform to the movements of the French army, while acting with caution, to avoid being unsupported on his flanks.

This interview between the commander-in-chief and the secretary of state for war was decided as necessary by the British Cabinet, who were still in a considerable fog as to the course events were taking on the battlefield, and who were apprehensive of a rupture of understanding between the British and French commands. That such a rupture had taken place between French and Lanrezac was known and it was feared that it might also exist between British and French headquarters. Mr. Winston Churchill, writing later, said:

> We were concerned, with the apparent intention of the British army to retire and refit behind the French left. Their losses so far reported to us did not exceed 10,000 men. We could not measure the exhaustion of the troops, nor the extent of the disorganization inseparable from the continued fighting and retreating. We accordingly decided to send Lord Kitchener at once to see the British and French commanders-in-chief, and make sure that nothing that Britain could do should be left undone.

But by a curious error in tact Lord Kitchener appears only to have inflamed the already injured British commander, although he left behind him orders which were categorical. Mr. Winston Churchill continues: "If Lord Kitchener had gone in plain clothes no difficulty would have arisen, but his appearance in Paris in the uniform of a field marshal, senior to the commander-in-chief at that dark hour and critical moment, wounded and disconcerted Sir John French deeply."

Sir John, it must be added, protested very strongly in a letter addressed to Mr. Winston Churchill, and since published, that he and Joffre had been on the best of terms and that the French commander had spoken most kindly of the help he had received. Moreover, he added, Lord Kitchener had dragged him from the field of battle during a most critical time, a complaint scarcely justified seeing that he himself had fixed the place of meeting at the British embassy in Paris.

The result of this historic interview may be best seen in the terms of the telegram which Lord Kitchener dispatched to the Cabinet. It read:

> French's troops are now engaged in the fighting line, where he will remain conforming to the movements of the French army, though at the same time acting with caution to avoid being in any way unsupported on his flanks.

To Sir John French he repeated this and added:

> I feel sure that you will agree that the above represents the conclusions we came to; but, in any case, until I can communicate with you further in answer to anything you may wish to tell me, please consider it as an instruction. By being "in the fighting line," you, of course, understand I mean dispositions of your troops in contact with, though possibly behind, the French as they were today. Of course, you will judge as regards their position in this respect.

Sir John French replied that he fully understood these instructions and that he was in full accord with Joffre and the French.

The last stages of the British retreat took place between September 2 and 5. The troops fell in to an early call on the 2nd, starting on their march in many cases at 1 a.m. Sir Douglas Haig took the very responsible decision of sending half his ammunition by the railway, which left many wagons free

for the conveyance of kits, baggage and footsore men. No actions of importance occurred during these last days and the retiring troops were little harassed.

On the night of September 2 the line of the British army extended from Meaux north-west to Dammartin. Sir John French gave orders that the Marne should be crossed next day, and between 3 a.m. and 4 a.m. the 1st division had crossed the Marne at Trilport, the 2nd and 3rd at Meaux, the 5th at Isles les Villenoy, the 4th at Lagny, and the cavalry division at Gournay. By nightfall they were in line between Jouarre eastward to Nogent, having blown up the bridges behind them. At this stage Sir John French had hoped to give his men a day's rest, for he had learnt that Kluck was moving his army eastward, and would not seek battle immediately. But to conform to Joffre's plan, which included a retirement over the Seine if necessary, he was obliged to order further movements for the next day.

The next stage of the retreat was to the Grand Morin, the 1st corps marching southward upon Coulommiers, and at dawn of September 5 the last stage was begun, which ended at nightfall with the British troops S.S.E. of Paris on a line from west of Rozoy to Brie Comte Robert, which was on the verge of the Paris defences. Strategically now the French armies, with the B.E.F., were in the position for which General Joffre had been manoeuvring, and General von Kluck was at last at a disadvantage. He was to pay for his mistakes and hesitations when the Allies took the offensive at the battle of the Marne.

From first to last the retreat from Mons occupied thirteen days, while the marches involved amounted to at least 200 miles. During this time the British troops endured hardships and discomforts of the most exacting nature from which they were never for many hours relieved. Their pursuers complained bitterly of the severity of their marches, but they enjoyed advantages unknown to the pursued. Although often out of touch with their ration columns the Germans were able to live on the country, to appropriate the stock of deserted farmyards and pastures and to steal a night's rest, now and again, in the soft beds of abandoned châteaux.

Throughout forced marches often under a scorching sun the British army suffered the pains of hunger and thirst, laceration of the feet, extreme fatigue, never free from the danger of surprise attack or from enfilade fire from ambush. The force was highly disciplined, but it had been hastily mobilized. Many of the reservists were unfamiliar with their officers, a severe drawback to the success of an operation which depended on keeping personal contact. An immense strain was placed on the staff officers, particularly of the junior grades. Losses had been heavy: 16,000 killed, wounded and missing, with 42 guns and a great quantity of material, but in view of the important service which had been done to the allied cause, of the numbers engaged, and the nature of the operations, they cannot be regarded as excessive.

As a feat of arms the retreat from Mons can never be accounted as anything but an honourable chapter in British military history. As has been seen it was marked by many successful

Photo. Sport and General

RESOURCEFUL RED CROSS

This Italian soldier is being placed in an ambulance, after treatment in a base hospital. His destination is a hospital far from the fighting line. The Italian casualties were so heavy that such antiquated vehicles as the one shown were pressed into service

SEARCHING A SUSPECT

The problem of detecting spies on the Italian front was a particularly difficult one. On both sides of the frontier were people whose loyalty was doubtful, and such a humble peasant as the one here shown might have to undergo a searching examination before he was held guiltless of espionage

AGAINST AN UNSEEN FOE

The mountainous character of the frontier between Italy and Austria necessitated a highly specialized form of warfare. While this infantry battalion is marching along the mountain road the howitzer in the foreground is being unlimbered. It will be drawn by men to a position on the mountain side

Photo: Sport and General

FOLLOW THE FLAG

In wars of the past when regimental colours were carried into action valuable lives were lost in defending them on the field of battle. In modern warfare colours are left behind, but this Italian infantry battalion in the early days of 1915 marches proudly behind its flag

actions and heroic deeds. The expeditionary force had early had the opportunity of learning that man for man they were the equal in soldierly courage and skill of the most highly trained army in the world. Throughout the retreat they could never be brought to understand the necessity for the continued retirements. Indeed, as the official historian has said, "They were never demoralized for they rightly judged that they had never been beaten."

No record of these first weeks of the war would be complete without some account of an arm of the service, now being employed in battle for the first time. This was the Royal Flying Corps, which, without delay, took upon itself the duties of aerial reconnaissance. On arrival under the command of Brigadier-General Sir David Henderson, it established an advance base at Amiens and later at Maubeuge. The honour of making the first reconnoitring flights on August 19 appears to have been shared by Captain P. B. Joubert de la Ferté, of No. 3 squadron, and Lieutenant G. W. Mapplebeck, of No. 4 squadron. Constant reconnaissances were made during the following days, and during the retreat, which were invaluable in detecting mass movements of the enemy. One of the most important was made on August 22 and reported the long columns of Kluck's 2nd corps engaged in an attempt at an enveloping movement.

During the retreat the R.F.C. found it necessary to retire its headquarters every day and, with its machines and personnel, a great bulk of material. Mostly during the short halts landing grounds had to be improvised, for no regular aerodrome was available, and all the time reconnaissance work had to be continued. This did not concern only enemy movement. During the confusion the R.F.C. observers rendered great help in tracing the movements and identifying the exact positions of the British troops, thus reassuring corps commanders as to the condition of their distant units. Their greatest service, however, was rendered through the vigilant eye which they were able to keep on Kluck's enveloping manoeuvres.

Their equipment was crude in the extreme: they possessed no bomb-throwing gear, but carried small grenades and had large bombs tied to their bodies. The officers were armed with service rifles and revolvers and yet they managed to achieve some fighting success in the air. In Sir John French's first dispatch, issued September 7, and addressed to Earl Kitchener as secretary of state for war, he said:

> I wish particularly to bring to your lordship's notice the admirable work done by the Royal Flying Corps, under Sir David Henderson. Their skill, energy and perseverance have been beyond all praise. They have furnished me with the most complete and accurate information which has been of incalculable value in the conduct of operations. Fired at constantly, both by friend and foe, and not hesitating to fly in every kind of weather, they have remained undaunted throughout. Further, by actually fighting in the air, they have succeeded in destroying five of the enemy machines.

In the early days the machines had no identification marks, and though these were quickly improvized it was some time before mistakes of identity could be entirely avoided.

During this very difficult period it was decided to move the British base from its stations at Boulogne and Havre to St. Nazaire. The possibility of a further retirement made it necessary to safeguard the landing of reinforcements, supplies and ammunition. During the four days (Aug. 30–Sept. 3) 20,000 officers and men, 7,000 horses and 60,000 tons of stores were moved to the port on the Loire, a measure fortunately not justified by subsequent events

ARMADA OFF SALONIKA

On the morning of October 5, 1915, the first Allied troops landed at Salonika. The fleet of transports which carried the first 20,000 men is seen lying in the roads with its escort of British and French destroyers. In the foreground Greek soldiers are evidently indifferent to the landing of foreign soldiers on their soil

Photo: Central News

CHAPTER 14

PARIS IN PERIL

The retreat of the French after their reverse at Charleroi went far enough back to endanger the safety of their capital. Its story, which includes the battle of Guise and the capture of Maubeuge, is described in this chapter

DURING the British retreat from Mons the northern forces of the French were in rapid retirement. Lanrezac's 5th army was in a particularly difficult position. The Germans had forced the passage of the Sambre on its right, and its situation became even more precarious when the French 4th army failed to hold Givet, close to the point where the Meuse flows from France into Belgium.

The armies of Bülow and Hausen were operating against Lanrezac, the latter threatening the French right wing, while bodies of Germans were advancing against Rocroi, a point on the distant path of retreat. For the moment the flank defence was conducted by General Sordet's cavalry division, which later came so usefully to the relief of the British 2nd corps at the battle of Le Cateau. The French 4th army operating from the Meuse, if not in such an immediately hazardous position, were also heavily pressed and at Dinant, where they were outnumbered and defeated, they fell back fighting artillery duels and rearguard actions.

After crossing the Meuse at Givet and advancing to Rocroi, one body of the German army proceeded to Rethel; another ascended the Meuse against considerable French resistance. On Monday, August 24, the town of Charleville was evacuated of its civil population and left to the protection of machine-gun teams, which were overpowered when the Germans entered the town.

The main invading army advanced along the valley of the Meuse under fire of the French artillery mounted on the neighbouring heights. This, however, did not stop the Germans from throwing pontoon bridges over the river and continuing their victorious march. They were successful in a rearguard action fought between Charleville and Rethel. Between Charleville and Verdun the retirement continued, and in the Semois region Duke Albert of Württemberg, commanding the German 4th army, threw the French farther back, as did the German 5th army, under the Crown Prince, at Longwy, an ancient fortress town near Verdun. This force advanced towards the forest of Argonne on August 27. Everywhere along the front from Verdun to Le Cateau the allies were in retreat, and the situation at this time looked despairing enough.

But in the meantime General Joffre was reorganizing his armies. Under his direction General d'Amade, on the left of the British force, organized a new 6th army out of four reserve army divisions, a regular army corps and General Sordet's cavalry. General Foch was appointed commander of a 9th army formed by three corps from the south. Moreover, the French commander-in-chief had a strong general reserve near Paris which could be used to reinforce his line at any appropriate point.

By August 25 their victories in Lorraine, the Ardennes and on the Sambre had encouraged the Germans to withdraw at least two army corps for service on the eastern front. Moltke took the view that the great general action had

AN ISLE OF GREECE

Allied operations at Salonika and in Gallipoli made it necessary to occupy most of the Aegean islands in order that they should not be used as submarine bases by the enemy. These British marines are keeping guard above the harbour of one of the islands

ANZACS' PEACEFUL HOUR

Australian and New Zealand troops first landed at Anzac Cove in Gallipoli in April, 1915. The heights were taken and a base established. Along the water's edge, the scene of fierce fighting at the landing, the troops, when the Turks had been pushed back, took their ease in comparative safety

Photo: Imperial War Museum

been fought in the west and had resulted in a decisive victory. But when he proposed to withdraw troops he found that his generals on the spot were not agreed as to who should spare them. Eventually it was decided to withdraw them from the left of the German line. On August 26 the German 11th corps from Hausen's 3rd army and the Guard reserve corps from Bülow's 2nd army received orders for East Prussia.

This was the day on which Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien had decided to stand at Le Cateau, and even if the fact had been known the British could not have found much grounds for optimism in the withdrawal of these German forces. General Joffre had, on the night before, issued orders that "further operations would be carried out with a view to forming a mass of manoeuvre on the left flank to carry out an offensive," and the plan was that this mass of manoeuvre was to be provided by the French 4th and 5th armies and the British, plus the new French 6th army. But the rapid sequence of events led to a decision that the general French and British retreat should be continued by gradual stages, and Sir John French, as has been told, took the strong view that his army should not be plunged into any general offensive. He was in a bad temper, and not without some justification, at "the very sudden change of plan and headlong retirement of the French 5th army." He refused point blank to co-operate in any immediate offensive.

On the morning of the 27th the French 5th army was still retiring over the Oise above Guise, and was prepared for further retirement to the line Montcornet–Marles–Ribemont. In the early afternoon, however, General Lanrezac received verbal orders to make a vigorous attack immediately towards St. Quentin. The movement of the army into its battle positions necessarily took time, for on the evening of the 27th the 5th army was behind the Oise with its left below Guise and its right above Rumigny. It was necessary to transfer the bulk of the army below Guise and establish it opposite St. Quentin, facing west. This and other factors made it impossible to open the offensive before the 29th.

Lanrezac's difficulties, which included the exposure of his right flank, do not seem to have been understood by Joffre, and an interview between them was marked by exasperation on the part of the commander-in-chief, who ordered Lanrezac to attack without delay and threatened to supersede him if he hesitated. On the 28th, therefore, Lanrezac ordered his army to face north-west and be in position to attack any enemy columns which crossed the Oise. No sooner had this instruction been issued than Lanrezac received orders from Joffre to send his left the next day between the Oise and St. Quentin to attack any enemy force marching against the British army. Joffre's actual written order, issued at 9 a.m. on August 28, was as follows:

> The 5th army will attack as soon as possible the enemy forces which advanced yesterday against the British army It will cover its right with the minimum of forces, sending reconnaisances to a great distance on that front.

On August 29 Lanrezac began his battle protected on his left flank only by two reserve divisions. The French 10th corps was the covering force and early in the morning got contact with the advanced columns of two German corps marching from the Oise towards the high ground above the river. The clash was unexpected to the Germans, who were considerably disconcerted. The French made a slight advance and the German 1st Guard division withdrew behind the Oise. On the left the French 3rd and 18th corps and the reserve divisions surprised the right wing of Bülow's army. The Germans were checked and driven back with considerable loss at Guise, but no advantage could be taken of this temporary success as trouble had developed on the French right wing.

Here the Germans were again advancing. In view of the complete surprise—it is said that the Germans mistook the French camp fires for those of their own left wing—it is unfortunate that no assistance on the flank was available. The grave suggestion has been made that had Sir John French given permission to Sir Douglas Haig's 1st corps, not then engaged, to take part in the battle, if only by firing into the German front while the French continued to attack on the flank, the 2nd German army might have been very severely defeated.

Lanrezac had no choice but to break off the engagement on August 30, and resume his retreat, as his right was in the air and Kluck's advance continued. The German loss was stated by Bülow at 6,000 killed and wounded. The French casualties were estimated by the Germans at a considerably higher figure, and in addition about 2,000 prisoners were taken.

Lanrezac's decision was backed up by an order from general headquarters to retire on the evening of the 30th and he issued orders to his army to gain the high ground north of the Lower Serre and Souche. By the 31st his dispositions lay in a semicircle around Laon. The Germans had received a sufficiently heavy blow to make them disinclined for any active pursuit and Lanrezac's army was practically unmolested in this stage of his retirement.

Writing later of this action Sir John French said:

> On the 29th a very brilliant and successful attack by the French 5th army at Guise heavily defeated three German corps and threw them back with severe loss. This had a great effect in assisting the retreat, for it not only enabled the 5th army to hold its own for some time on the Oise between Guise and La Fère, but it considerably relieved hostile pressure on the British and on the French troops on our left.

But it could not save Lanrezac, who was very shortly afterwards relieved of his command and superseded by General Franchet D'Espèrey, who up to that time had commanded the French 1st corps.

The defeat of the French 4th and 3rd armies during their attempted offensives of August 20–24 has already been described. At this point the French 4th army (de Langle de Cary) was ordered to hold the left flank of the Meuse, a task which proved beyond its strength. Its front ran from Mézières to Sassey, south of Stenay. At Sassey it was in contact with the 3rd army (Ruffey), but west of Mézières there was an alarming gap between it and the retreating 5th army.

On August 25 the German 4th army (Duke of Württemberg) crossed the river Meuse at Remilly and during the following night forced a passage at Donchery below Sedan. During the next day there was severe fighting at both points and the German guns drove the French back at Torcy, south-west of Sedan, where it had been found impossible to blow up the bridge. The Germans had been successful in piercing the centre of the French line, but they were for the time being checked at their bridge-head.

The French then formed a new front from Sassey and Luzy on the Meuse, along the high ground south of the river near Sedan, with their left unprotected west of Mézières near Signy l'Abbaye. On this line de Langle de Cary decided to fight The Germans bridged the river at several points between Cesse and Luzy threatening the right of the French They constructed bridges also at Mouzon and began to advance along the whole of the Meuse front, pushing south from Remilly and Sedan. The French were able to administer a severe repulse at Noyers which was sufficiently disconcerting to the Germans for the duke of Württemberg to appeal for help from his fellow army commander Hausen

LONG HEROIC LINES

The advance against the Turkish positions at Anafarta from Suvla Bay involved the crossing of the dry bed of the Salt Lake where the nature of the ground made it essential that the troops should advance in extended line. An eye witness declared that the soldiers moved forward as if on peace time manoeuvres

This was not forthcoming, as Hausen had superior orders to continue his march south-west, which, directed towards Signy l'Abbaye, brought him on the flank of the French 4th army.

On the evening of August 27 de Langle de Cary issued orders to his army to resume battle next day and drive the Germans back across the Meuse. The Germans were attacking on the French right, where their advance from the Meuse became most threatening, and on the French left, where they were held in check with severe fighting in the direction of Signy l'Abbaye. In the centre, the French troops gained ground towards Sedan, and German troops recrossed the Meuse. In the early morning, and again in the early afternoon, appeals for help were addressed by the German 4th army commander to Hausen, with the warning that the 4th army had been compelled to withdraw its left towards Olizy. Hausen, therefore, ordered his 12th and 10th corps to move south-east on the 28th.

The French had won a distinct success, handling the German 4th army very severely, and had their reserves been thrown in, it is possible that they might have gained a great victory, as the German 5th army was paralyzed by orders from Moltke to be ready to send troops to Russia. The situation was generally good on the French front, but de Langle de Cary, in view of Joffre's orders for a retreat, was obliged to fall back on the Aisne. Considering himself victorious, he had asked permission to continue the battle. The answer from general headquarters had been:

> We see no objection to your keeping your positions tomorrow (August 28) in order to assist our success and to prove that our falling back is merely strategic; but on August 29 everybody must be in retreat.

He retired rapidly, abandoning a wide extent of country including the Argonne, where there were many opportunities of fighting delaying actions. His conduct of the battle has been severely criticized by French authorities, who blame him for failing to make use of manifest opportunities to deliver the counter-attacks which Joffre had ordered to be made whenever possible, and for the disconnected and muddled fighting. His retirement was hampered by reproachful columns of civilian refugees. In his own justification he claimed that he acted under orders, and in his army order of August 28 he announced that:

> The army inflicted heavy losses upon the enemy, yesterday and today. It returns to the Aisne line in accordance with orders received, to prepare for the offensive in a new direction.

During this period the 3rd French army (Ruffey) was practically unmolested, but on the left of the 4th army, General Dubois, commanding the 9th corps of the 2nd army (de Castlenau) was fighting at Signy l'Abbaye against overwhelming German forces.

General Dubois' corps contained a division of Moroccan troops. In the

Photo: Alinari

early morning of August 28 the Zouave regiment was attacked, and after three hours' fighting was obliged to retire to avoid envelopment. This left the road to Signy l'Abbaye open to the enemy, who occupied the village. The German advance towards the south directly threatened the communications between the 9th corps and the rear and between the French 4th and 5th armies. General Dubois determined to recapture the village. Fierce fighting took place midway at Dommery, a village which was taken, lost and recaptured. The battle was still undecided in the evening, but the German advance had been checked. On the morning of the 29th the 9th corps was under orders to cover the left of the 4th army and keep in touch with the 5th army. It fought gallantly to fulfil this task, but was soon in the general retreat.

The fall of Maubeuge was the last disaster which the French suffered before the battle of the Marne. This fortress stands at one of the most important junctions in northern France, a meeting point of five railways connecting the French and Belgian coalfields. Its fortifications had not been modernized and were as little adapted to resist the German siege artillery as those of Liége and Namur. They had been constructed between 1878 and 1896, and consisted of fifteen detached forts and batteries placed about two miles from the town. Of the 435 guns which they mounted only 48 were of the 6·3-in. type having a range of 10,000 yards. The rôle of Maubeuge in the plan of frontier defence was to engage any German army attacking the flank of the Lorraine-Meuse line.

At the outbreak of war, however, Maubeuge had been left on one side in the scheme of mobilization and its exact functions left undetermined. Though not entirely disregarded as of no military importance, any hope that it could withstand a regular siege had been abandoned. Joffre, indeed, had entertained the idea of employing the Maubeuge garrison in a siege of Metz. This garrison, normally of 30,000 men, had been increased during the retreat by stragglers and numbered about 40,000 The governor was General Fournier, who in the first days of the War had sent such alarming reports to Paris that the French minister of war (M. Messimy) had sent General Pau to Maubeuge to dismiss him and shoot him. Pau investigated matters on the spot, acquitted Fournier of negligence, and continued him in his command. In this unenviable position he was left to defend an obsolete fortress against the strength of Germany.

For a time the Germans hesitated as to the moment for assault. Two considerations weighed with them. One was that rapid advance might lead to the encirclement of Maubeuge and its reduction as a matter of course. The other was the hallucination that vast

GRAVE OF HIGH HOPES

In August, 1915, an attempt was made to retrieve the position in Gallipoli by landing a force at Suvla Bay and gaining control of the heights in the centre of the peninsula. Owing to lack of co-operation and faulty staff work the attack was checked and only the scene of the landing, here shown, was held until December of that year

forces were being landed against them on the Belgian coast, which would so threaten their flank that they might at any moment be forced to abandon the siege. This bugbear arose from the famous "Russian rumour" already referred to, which was believed in as confidently by the German high command as it was by masses of people in Great Britain. No one has ever been able to tell precisely how the rumour arose, but one of the most plausible explanations is that an English porter mistook the origin of some Scottish troops who said they came from Ross-shire. In any case, the rumour spread, supported by a mass of second-hand evidence and was wisely left uncontradicted by the British Government.

So for the moment Maubeuge was left in false security. A plan for its reduction by bombardment and a gradual advance by the infantry was held up for a time by a scarcity of shells, but between August 28–31 batteries were placed in position and the infantry assembled. General von Zwehl, who commanded this force, had borrowed a brigade from the 2nd army, and so uncertain was the German mind at this time that it seemed likely that this force would be withdrawn for service elsewhere. Anxious to force a decision before this happened, Zwehl launched the attack on September 4. On the next day the Bersillies and Salemagne works were carried by the German infantry, and on September 6 further defences were stormed. On September 7 General Fournier surrendered.

Part of the garrison escaped to Lille, but 32,692 unwounded and 1,489 wounded and sick were made prisoners. The weak defence against a German force of half the garrison's strength has been severely criticized, the more so as the Germans were short of ammunition; but after the War Fournier's conduct was justified by court-martial. On the German side the siege was covered by the weak 7th reserve corps under General Zwehl, which was thus prevented from taking part in the battle of the Marne. Had the command at Maubeuge shown the tenacity displayed by the French at Verdun, the German difficulties during and after the Marne would have been enormously increased.

By the time Maubeuge had fallen, General Joffre's armies were in the positions for which he had been manoeuvring, not necessarily from choice, but as a last resort to enable him again to take the offensive. The French retreat was marked on a greater scale by the same hardships and losses as were endured by the British in their retreat from Mons, but the French commander-in-chief in the early days of September was at last able to congratulate himself that he had saved his armies as an effective fighting force.

With the safe retreat of the Allied armies the first great German stroke had failed. Although the French plan, known as Plan 17, had collapsed, their armies were given time in which to recuperate and prepare a new plan, as a result of the mistakes committed by the German command. The opportunities offered to the Germans by the unexpected facility of their initial advance through Belgium were lost owing to Moltke's wavering between the original plan of Schlieffen, which, as will be recalled, included a rapid envelopment of the French left flank by a strong concentration of German troops on the right wing, and another of closing round Verdun with his right wing facing Paris as a shield to this operation. As Captain Liddell Hart has remarked: "The idea of a Sedan was an obsession with the Germans, and led them to pluck the fruit before it was ripe. This premature wheel before Paris had been reached was an abandonment of the Schlieffen plan, and exposed the German right to a counter-envelopment." Moreover, the Germans had advanced more rapidly than was perhaps, wise, their commissariat being unable to keep pace with the movement of the troops.

Photo Imperial War Museum

CHAPTER 15

AUSTRIA INVADED

While one group of Russian armies was invading East Prussia another was preparing to enter the Austrian province of Galicia. This enterprise met with considerable success

IT has been said that one of the reasons that led Jilinsky, the Russian commander-in-chief, to renew the offensive in East Prussia early in September, was the good news he had received from Galicia. The largest and most easterly of the provinces of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, this was a level stretch of land bounded on the north and east by Russian territory, its natural defences being the Vistula, San, and other rivers on the north and the Carpathians on the south. Its capital was Lemberg, also called Lwow, and it included Cracow. Its area was some 30,000 square miles, and its population, just over 8,000,000.

Poland was to Russia what Galicia was to Austria, a province or group of provinces partly surrounded by foreign territory, but protected by no great natural barriers. It lay between East Prussia and Galicia, and its greatest river was the Vistula which flowed right across it. Its area was about 40,000 square miles, rather larger than Galicia, and its population nearly 14,000,000. Warsaw was the capital.

In the north the Germans and the Russians had contrasting plans; one was for haste, the other for delay. To the south it was otherwise. The plans of Austria and Russia on the Galicia-Poland frontier were practically the same. Each wished to invade the territory of the other as quickly as possible and each, having prepared a plan for this purpose, was busy mobilizing its forces.

To take the Austrians first. Their four armies were strung out right across the province, the two strongest being commanded by Generals Dankl and Auffenberg, and drawing their supplies from Przemysl and Lemberg. They were under the supreme control of Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, who was then nearly 62 years of age. He had been appointed to the position in November, 1906, and owed his choice to the insistence of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, with whom he was closely associated during the next eight years. He was forced to resign in November, 1911, but in the following year the Archduke secured his return.

In the fateful month that preceded the outbreak of war Conrad was very prominent, his influence being directed towards pressing upon the Austrian foreign minister, Count Berchtold, the desirability of taking strong action against Serbia. The head of the militarist party in Vienna, after the assassination of the archduke in June, 1914, he urged an immediate mobilization, remarking: "the monarchy had been seized by the throat and had to choose between allowing itself to be strangled and making a last effort to prevent its destruction." He did not, however, obtain what he wanted until nearly a month later. He had already made his plans for the war against Serbia and on the same day, July 31, he was in communication with Moltke in Berlin about the threatened war with Russia.

On the other side of the frontier the Russians had a group of armies under the general direction of Ivanoff, his two most competent subordinates being Generals Russky and Brusiloff. The commander-in-chief, Nicholas Ivanoff, had taken a less prominent share in the events that preceded the war than had his Austrian opponent Slightly older than Conrad, he had served against the Turks and later against the Japanese and had been appointed to the position he now held on the strength of his services in the campaign in Manchuria.

Compared with the standards that prevailed in the West, these armies were deficient in arms and equipment, the Austrians probably more so than the Russians. The transport, medical, telephone and other services were very inadequate, while the intelligence

department hardly deserved the name. As in East Prussia no code was used in the wireless services.

The Austrians were the first to move and on August 15 two Austrian armies began to cross the frontier into the southern part of Poland. In front of them went a great many squadrons of cavalry, said to total 100,000 men; but this is certainly an exaggeration. These horsemen soon came in touch with the enemy and suffered heavily in a sharp engagement about which the Austrian official history says: "the results of a distant cavalry reconnaissance were not worth the cost."

One of the two Austrian armies pushed on towards Lublin and came up against the 4th Russian army near Krasnik, where took place, on August 23, one of the early battles of the war. It ended in a victory for the Austrians, who pressed into enemy country for about 50 miles. Three days later, on August 26, the other Austrian army met the Russians in battle at Komarow and the struggle lasted for some days. As at Krasnik the Austrians were successful. They broke the Russian army and forced its severed wings to retreat in different directions, but events in Galicia prevented them from following up this success.

Like the Russian successes in East Prussia the Austrian victories in Poland were far from being the opening of a campaign of conquest. The 5th Russian army, having narrowly escaped disaster at Komarow on the 26th, made a good recovery and was soon ready to give further trouble to the enemy. Meanwhile, the third of the Austrian armies advancing into Poland met a strong Russian force on the line of the river Ztota Lipa, and on the 26th was thrown back in some disorder. It made a second stand on the Gnita Lipa on the 29th and 30th, but was again defeated, retreating to within 25 miles of Lemberg. It was in this retreat that the Cossacks did a good deal of damage and the mere report that they were coming was responsible for much disorder.

As far as the Russians were concerned, however, these battles were merely skirmishes in which victory or defeat was of no great moment. Their main offensive was directed against Lemberg and for it they had collected two great armies, the 3rd and the 8th. To defend the city the Austrians had two armies, but one of them had been somewhat shaken by the defeat just mentioned. However, they were quickly reinforced and numbered altogether something like 300,000 men.

Of the two main Russian armies the 8th, commanded by Brusiloff and sometimes called the army of the Sereth, had the greater distance to march, in order to take up its position before Lemberg On or about August 27 he captured Tarnopol, an important Galician town on the River Sereth, 70 miles from Lemberg, after fighting which lasted for nearly three days. The attack began with an artillery bombardment which prepared the way for the storming of the Austrian entrenchments. The final struggle took place in the town itself, where there was a good deal of fighting in the streets, which were barricaded and swept by machine guns. From Tarnopol Brusiloff advanced on Halicz, an ancient town on the Dniester, and the one from which Galicia obtained its name. Defended by an Austrian army the city was occupied after fighting which had lasted for about two days, during which the Russian troops had succeeded in crossing the river. Brusiloff's army was then in a position to turn north and join up with the army commanded by Russky.

Brusiloff had accomplished the first part of his advance with almost complete secrecy, and although the Austrians had a host of spies, a fine force of cavalry, including some of the Hungarian guard, regarded as the best horsemen in the country, and a number of aeroplanes, they appear to have been quite unaware of this movement—which occupied about a fortnight—until it was well on the road to success.

The reason for the Austrian ignorance was due, possibly, to the fact that the eastern part of Galicia was the Alsace-Lorraine of the Slav empire. It was peopled by a Slav race having the same language, religion and customs as the men of Brusiloff's army. At the villages priests and people came out with banners to meet their "little brothers." In the cities and towns, flowers were thrown from windows into the streets through which the troops passed. All that the peasants could do by silence or pretended ignorance, to mislead the Austrians and Hungarians, was done.

General Brusiloff made the most of his opportunities. He moved over the tributaries of the Dneister and pushed back the Austrian cavalry without revealing the strength of his army. His vanguard of Cossacks did what was required of them without infantry support or any considerable amount of artillery power. For this work the Cossacks were pre-eminently suited. In advance of the tramping soldiers and the labouring big-gun teams moving at the rate of some 8 miles a day, they kept up continual skirmishes with cavalry, scouts, infantrymen, gunners and even armoured trains, helped only by their own light artillery; they charged with the lance, dismounted and took positions with the bayonet, entrenched, if need demanded, and proved themselves excellent marksmen.

In Galicia, when they were hard pressed, they pretended to fall down dead and their horses had been trained to do the same. As the enemy came to search their bodies the "dead" men used their carbines with surprising effect. Another ruse was for a herd of little Cossack horses to stampede, the riderless animals sweeping forward towards some guarded blockhouse or bridged stream. Just before the animals were caught by the Austrian soldiers, who could sell them at a good price to the farmers of Galicia, grey figures swung from beneath them and charged, lance in hand.

It was not only, however, the Russians who practised the tricks of war. On occasions the Austrians showed themselves fairly clever at these. For instance, in a frontier fight near Tarnopol, a Russian division, having pierced the enemy's front line, swept onwards to meet the main body of their foes. They passed an Austrian officer who was sitting on the earth bandaging his leg. When they rushed forward with their bayonets to get possession of the hostile trenches the apparently wounded officer turned a devastating fire upon them. Soon a Russian officer noticed a wire running along the road. He found it led to a field telephone and the Austrian was sitting by this concealed instrument, through which he gave warning of the Russian movements. He was captured and when the bandage round his leg was removed it was found that his limb was quite sound.

On September 1 the two Russian armies, now about 40 miles E. of Lemberg, opened the attack. General Russky secured possession of a hill which dominated the city, while General Brusiloff's troops were round its southern portion. The Austrians attempted to check this latter movement, but the Russians were too strong for them and they lost heavily in an attack directed by Radko Dmitrieff, a Bulgarian who had entered the Russian service. On September 2 air reconnaissances established the fact that the Austrians were beginning to evacuate the city, and a cavalry patrol having entered it without opposition, it was soon in possession of the Russians. The official communique from the general commanding in this area announced that Lemberg had been captured by General Russky. Brusiloff, however, claimed with considerable justice that it was largely due to the rapid advance of his army. He says,

LAST OF THE ROMANOFFS

In the autumn of 1915 the Tsar took supreme command of the Russian armies in the field. He is seen here with his eleven year old son in the uniform of a Caucasian Cossack regiment. The Tsarevitch was given the historic office of Hetman of the Cossacks, held in former times by the hero Mazeppa, and he also wears a Cossack uniform

O GOD OF BATTLES!

The Tsar was head of the Russian Orthodox church in the same sense as King George is the head of the Church of England. Strict in his religious observances, Nicholas II is here seen with the Tsarevitch attending a service in the field

OTHER FURROWS THAN THE PLOUGH'S

The photograph shows a company of Russian infantry in Galicia. They have advanced across a field of stubble, and have entrenched against a possible counter-attack. The trenches are fully manned, the men standing shoulder to shoulder to meet the coming onslaught

however, in his book: "I made no protest, for I did not seek glory but only desired the success of our armies."

For a time the Austrian retreat, covered by the entrenched camp at Gródek, was orderly, but gradually, as pressure grew more intense, it developed into a rout. The road was choked with transport and crowded with civilian fugitives. The number of prisoners taken is stated to have been as high as 70,000, in addition to a vast quantity of guns.

To save themselves and their own countrymen, the Austrian and Hungarian officers ranged on their rear the Slav regiments—Little Russians of Galicia, Poles, Serbs of Bosnia, and Bohemians. This rearguard screen was thrown out on the road to Gródek, and to prevent the Slavs from going over to the Russians, a line of Hungarians stood behind them, with orders to shoot them in the back the moment they showed any hesitation.

Happily, this became known to the Russian commander. At the critical moment he ordered a devastating artillery fire, with the guns at a high angle, to be opened on the rearguard. The shells and shrapnel were so aimed that they passed high over the heads of the Slav regiments and fell on the retreating Austrians and Hungarians. It was this hail of shell and shrapnel that changed the retreat from Lemberg into a panic. The columns broke and scattered along all the western paths, abandoning guns, ammunition and supplies, and fleeing in terror towards the fortress of Gródek.

The Austrian official account gives a terrible picture of this retreat:

> The artillery, sinking in up to their axles in the morass of the roads, worked their way forward; the cavalry regiments, like horsemen of the Apocalypse, in molten confusion, made their way on, their presence often betrayed from afar by the penetrating smell given off by the festering galls of hundreds of led horses.

The struggle was now transferred to Poland, into which two of the Austrian armies, under Generals Dankl and Auffenberg respectively, had advanced. Partly to divert the attention of the Russians from Lemberg, Dankl, commanding the 1st army, sent a force to assail the fortress of Ivangorod, which commanded one of the few bridges over the Vistula, but this was beaten back. As soon as these men rejoined his army, which was near Krasnik, he made an effort to reach the railway at Lublin, but here again he was foiled.

These Austrian reverses were by no means decisive, and at times the Russians were very hard pressed. The two Austrian armies almost succeeded in surrounding one of the Russian ones, but owing to false reports of reinforcements something like the ruse practised so successfully by Bruce at Bannockburn, the Austrians were induced to draw back instead of moving forward.

Both sides prepared now for a great effort, the terrain of which was the region between the great rivers Vistula and Bug. The two Austrian armies however, were reinforced by German troops, four corps, numbering perhaps 150,000 men, with a great accession of heavy guns. A new army was formed, some of its units being the reorganized remains of those that had suffered severely at Halicz and around Lemberg. The Russian armies were augmented by the two led by Russky and Brusiloff that had operated successfully against Lemberg.

The position on which the Germans and Austrians then posted themselves was a strong line to hold. Indeed, it might have been regarded as excellent, if it were not for the marshes behind it and its distance from the frontier railways. The troops were ranged between the Vistula and the Bug, on a line running from Opole to Zamosc and Tomaszów. In one place they were still within gunshot of the railway to Lublin. Rolling and wooded, the country afforded good cover for infantry and admirable positions for batteries. No outflanking movement by the Russian army seemed possible. The first Austrian force above Krasnik was protected by the wide, deep, unbridged waters of the Vistula. Moreover, Austrian boats, with quick-firing guns, joined in the battle from the river. The Russians proposed to carry the position by a frontal attack instead of an outflanking movement, and for this purpose collected a general reserve which could be shifted to any part of the Austrian line.

Operations began with a thrust made at a point far removed from the spot



Map of Galicia and Poland, two areas in which there was a good deal of fighting with alternating advances and retreats, during 1914 and 1915

Photo: Imperial War Museum

ALL QUIET ON THE ANZAC FRONT

After the Australian and New Zealand troops had driven the Turks back at Anzac the Cove became a supply depot and a hospital base. In this photograph of the North Beach the 1st Australian hospital camp is seen in the foreground. There cases that were too serious for transhipment to the hospital ships were treated

LIGHTER'S TRAGIC LOAD

Owing to the slowly shelving coast round Gallipoli all transport between ship and shore had to be carried by shallow draught lighters. The photograph shows a tug and two lighters loaded with wounded, stretcher cases and others, being transported to hospital ships

chosen for the real piercing attack. It was on the left wing of the Austrian forces that the real frontal attack was to be made. So, against all expectations, General Dankl, in his apparently impregnable position on the Vistula, was the first to feel the full weight of Russia's power. For some days the long battle continued in a close-pressed Russian offensive all along the line. The Austrians suffered most at Tomaszów, where Russky was co-operating. When this delusive operation had taken effect, the hammer-stroke fell on Dankl's army, which occupied a position some 40 miles away to the north.

The decisive tactics of the Russians had a characteristic subtlety about them. They massed a strong force with many guns on the opposite side of the Vistula. It was composed of tried troops and could easily destroy the single German division that was holding the left bank of the river. This they did about September 8. Meanwhile, Dankl was invited to advance from his strong, entrenched position farther east. The pressure upon his front was entirely relaxed now that the general reserve had been massed behind the troops that had been holding him He resolved to take advantage of this state of things, and also to relieve the pressure at Tomaszów, by another offensive movement towards his customary objective—Lublin and the railway line. The road was now left clear for him to within some eight miles of the railway running from that town to Warsaw.

At this stage, however, his men were hurled back with great violence. The Austrians were barely back in their trenches when a great frontal attack was delivered. There was the preliminary artillery duel, in which the superior Russian guns were pushed forward to overpower the hostile batteries. This result was largely achieved. Some Austrian river gunboats tried to get an enfilading fire against the Russians, only to be smitten from the side themselves. For by this time the Russian force on the farther bank of the Vistula had routed the German division and had brought up their guns to take part in the battle. The hostile gunboats were sunk or forced to retire, and the riverside Russian batteries then began in turn to enfilade the Austrian position.

As this side conflict was proceeding, with important consequences for General Dankl's troops in their hour of retreat, the decisive infantry attack on the centre of the Austrian front opened. In grey lines the Russians moved onward from cover to cover, making quick rushes, and then lying prone and firing steadily at any heads that might appear in the enemy trenches, while their supports were running into position behind them.

At the village of Wysoky, eastward of Krasnik, the lines of Dankl's army were pierced on September 9. There the Russian bayonets came over the Austrian trenches, stabbing as they passed. Behind, the machine-guns were pushed through the first broken defence, to help in the decisive work of shattering the enemy's second line. As the foremost troops were fighting in the twilight of daybreak against the reforming Austrians, another mass of grey, tall figures crashed into the conflict. The Austrian line was completely broken. Dankl abandoned his position with great speed, and in doing so exposed the German army situated on his right to a flank attack.

This Austro-German left wing could have been completely routed, and even annihilated, by the attacking army and its powerful supports on the opposite bank of the Vistula. But Ivanoff, who had taken command in Poland, was aiming at larger results than the immediate destruction of Dankl's forces. In pursuit of these results he detached only

Photo: G.P.A.

WAR IN WINTRY WEATHER

Three times the flood of war passed through Poland. When the Germans were forced to retreat they laid the land waste and every village through which they passed was burned. Here is a scene in the snow-bound countryside, Russian soldiers standing helpless before the vengeance of a retreating army

sufficient troops to keep the beaten wing on the move along the shore of the Vistula, and to thrust it back if it tried to turn eastward and grope for a connection with its centre.

The weary Russian soldiers were then sent against the western flank and rear of the central Austrian armies. For the flight of the Germans from the heights of Turobin had naturally exposed their neighbours on their left to a turning movement similar to that which had made them retire. But the Grand Duke Nicholas did not intend the Austrian centre to escape by a retreat. All through the evening and night of September 9 the Russian troops marched, some corps covering a remarkable distance by a splendid display of endurance. The result was that Auffenberg's army on September 10 was beaten and almost encircled at the battle of Rawa Ruska. General Russky held it on the south-west near Tomaszow. Round Zamosc and along the northern front it was retained by its old opponents; on the east and south, part of the Russian left wing effectively barred all the roads.

North and east and west the Russians drove in upon the Austrians, and though the southernmost attacking force drew off, leaving an apparent path of retreat, this movement was as deadly in effect as an attack would have been. For the only line of retirement thus allowed to the broken Austrians led to the swamp lands of the river San. Into this trap the Austrian centre army was forced by blow after blow on flanks and rear.

At the same time Dankl's army, now separated by a two days' march from its broken centre, was more vigorously handled by the Russian commander. As soon as the Austrian centre forces were scattered and bogged in the southern river swamps some of the Russian troops were again moved towards the Vistula to co-operate in drawing Dankl's army in disorder into another stretch of marshland between the Vistula and its tributary the San. The water draining from the Carpathian Mountains into Galicia turns both rivers into streams that ooze and trickle for miles into the country on either side, and turn the land, even in the month of September, into a green, untraversable morass.

It was bad strategy on the part of the Austrian commander to place his armies with their backs to a wide, long stretch of swamp. But he had been so confident at least of holding the Russian attack that he did not trouble to arrange for the possibility of a sudden retreat. In the end this cost him half his army, almost all his war stores, and a large number of his guns—some captured in the fight, but more bogged during the murderous rout through the river swamps. For two or three days after the victory over the enemy's left wing and centre, the two immense bodies of defeated troops were shepherded into difficulties rather than continually cut down. For most of the victors were as fatigued as the vanquished, though the Cossacks seemed to be indefatigable. By constant attacks they kept the routed forces moving, and allowed them no chance to reform.

The Russian commander meanwhile was again drawing off troops from the centre for more battle work. For the Austrian right wing in Galicia, between Rawa Ruska and Grodek, close to Lemberg, was putting up a magnificent fight. This stand was unexpected, for many of the troops had been thoroughly defeated in the first battles around Lemberg. The conflict appears to have begun soon after the capture of Lemberg, when Dmitrieff advanced with some 40,000 men with the object of driving in the still retiring wing and thus exposing the retreating centre army to a rear attack.

Great reinforcements, however, were suddenly poured into this part of the battlefield. The Austro-Germans took the offensive and made continual attacks. The brunt of these assaults fell upon the 40,000 men under the Bulgarian general. In this place the

Austrians and Germans outnumbered the Russians by four—or even five—to one. The Russians fought in a splendidly stubborn and enduring manner. For three days and nights the conflict raged unceasingly, and Dmitrieff had to use his troops to the uttermost. It was General Brusiloff who came to the help of his former companion in victory at Halicz. But even when their forces were united they were still outnumbered by the opposing army. The Austro-German forces here were directed by the Archduke Frederick.

Austrians and Germans in considerable force assailed the Russian advance guard, with a view to shattering it and then breaking through the centre. The Russian infantry and guns were strongly entrenched. In reserve there were several Cossack detachments. At first the Austrian foot soldiers attacked under cover of a bombardment. But they encountered so heavy a gun fire and rifle fire that they wavered and fell back. Then an attempt was made to carry the trenches by a cavalry charge. The flower of the Austro-Hungarian army, officered by the Magyar nobility, was hurled against the Russian front. The Hungarians, in their bright jackets, galloped furiously forward in close order. Massed shrapnel fire made great gaps in their ranks; a rain of bullets from the machine-guns swept away their leading squadrons; at last the magazine rifles of the Russian infantry volleyed at them.

The Hungarians never hesitated. Those who survived only urged their horses to cover the ground more quickly, and prepared to strike. The Russian infantry rose with their bayonets in a hopeless attempt to repel an overwhelming charge. In less than a minute, it seemed, the trenches would be taken. But behind them the infantry heard a thud of hoofs and clatter of steel, and the Hungarians were countered by a whirlwind of Cossacks. For two hours the Austrian and Russian infantry watched with excited eyes the scene of carnage, each party cheering on its own men, and getting in a quick, helping shot on occasion. One cavalry division was almost annihilated and its leader, it was reported, could not bear the disgrace of the defeat and shot himself on the battlefield.

The Austro-German right wing with desperate valour tried to maintain its position between Rawa Ruska and Grodek. When its centre and left wing gave way the need for holding out against the southern Russian army became still more urgent. For it then had to cover the retreat of Dankl's and Auffenberg's forces, and prevent General Brusiloff and General Dmitrieff sweeping down also upon the broken fugitives. But on September 12 General Russky joined again with General Brusiloff and General Dmitrieff. The archduke's force was turned in the north, and it, too, fled westward. More fortunate than the other two Austro-German armies, it was able to fall back towards the famous fortress of Przemysl, 50 miles due west of Lemberg, which required a long siege even with modern artillery to reduce it. Nor was this the end of the retreat, for on September 16 Conrad ordered his armies to fall back to the Dunajec, 80 miles westward.

In the first three months an Austrian invasion of Poland was swept back and turned into a Russian invasion of Galicia; a Russian invasion of East Prussia, which was hurled back and turned into a German invasion of Russia, which was first blocked on the Niemen, and then pressed back again into East Prussia; a German rush upon Poland, with Warsaw as its objective, which, quite close to Warsaw, was arrested, and hurled back again almost to the Prussian border. Finally, the Russian successes in Galicia brought practically the whole of that province into Russian occupation.

Conrad von Hotzendorf an optimist to the last, declared in his Memoirs that his armies had not been beaten. They had "withdrawn" in order to avert possible defeat. He was unwilling to accept as defeat the loss of 350,000 men out of 900,000, a retreat of 150 miles, and the abandonment of the province of Galicia, with its capital, Lemberg. Its recovery by a combined force of Germans and Austrians led by August von Mackensen formed one of the outstanding campaigns of 1915.

THE GRAND DUKE REPORTS

The Grand Duke Nicholas of Russia, cousin of the Tsar, who commanded the Russian armies in 1914 and 1915, was a general who with a well-equipped army might have achieved great victories. He is here seen on the field in 1915 discussing the situation with his master who is paying a visit to the troops

FOOT SLOGGING IN SALONIKA

In the Salonika campaign both British and French troops were engaged on the outskirts of the port that was the centre of a great entrenched camp. British troops taking a midday rest watch French troops march past on their way to the front

CHAPTER 16

BATTLE OF THE BIGHT

The first naval encounter during the World War that can be called a battle took place in the Bight of Heligoland on Aug. 28, 1914. A British force penetrated into German waters and the resulting fight was well called "fortunate and fruitful"

FROM the very beginning of the War a close watch on the German coast was kept by British submarines, and towards the end of August these vessels reported that a considerable force of German light cruisers and destroyers was under the protection of the defences of Heligoland. Some of these ships put to sea every evening, returning at dawn, and the British Admiralty determined to strike a blow at them.

After careful consideration a plan was drawn up. It was mainly the work of Commodore R. J. Keyes, in charge of the submarine service, who carried it out in conjunction with Commodore R. Y. Tyrwhitt, in command of the force stationed at Harwich. It was designed, as a secondary purpose, to attract the attention of the Germans while companies of marines were landed at, and then withdrawn from, Ostend.

Three submarines were to proceed on the surface towards the rock of Heligoland in order to induce the enemy to chase them westwards. Two flotillas of destroyers, the 1st and the 3rd, each containing 16 vessels, grouped into four divisions, with the light cruisers Arethusa and Fearless as their leaders, were to get behind any German vessels that might come out. Behind them was to be a squadron of six light cruisers under Commodore Goodenough, to render help if necessary, while the ships of the battle cruiser squadron were ordered to be at a stated rendezvous for the same purpose. Three other submarines lay submerged nearer the fortress, ready to attack the German ships as they came out; two others watched the mouth of the Ems, while a number more were with the attacking force.

The battle divides itself into three parts. The first was the fighting between the destroyers which lasted from about 7 a.m. to about 10 a.m. The second was the renewed engagement between these ships, with the light cruisers on both sides taking part. The third and last was the end of the battle due to the arrival of the British battle cruisers.

At midnight on August 27, Commodore R. Y. Tyrwhitt in the Arethusa, with the two flotillas of destroyers, moved towards Heligoland, with instructions to be 12 miles from that island at 8 a.m. on the 28th, in order to begin operations. Eight miles behind him were the light cruisers, moving quickly over the waters 2 miles apart from each other. A mist added to the difficulties of the underwater craft, as it enabled enemy vessels to approach unseen and rendered it almost impossible to distinguish friend from foe. Cautiously the two flotillas searched the waters for German submarines, and finding none steamed slowly towards the land with their own submarines, the decoys, in front. As this group of vessels neared the island the mist thickened till the limit of visibility was reduced to 5,000 or 6,000 yards.

As it happened, the Germans were aware that something of the kind was contemplated, and they had prepared a counterstroke to draw the British destroyers on towards Heligoland, where German light cruisers could cut in behind them. Just before 7 o'clock in the morning, therefore, when he was some way from his rendezvous, the mist having cleared off somewhat, Commodore Tyrwhitt saw a German destroyer about 3½ miles away. It was chased by the British vessels, but the range was too great for firing to be effective. Other German destroyers came out and both British flotillas moved forward to meet them. The result was that for about half an hour there was a general action, while the forces on both sides steamed rapidly into the Bight. The thickening mist, however, prevented accurate shooting, and there is no record of damage.

Just before 8 a.m. two German cruisers were sighted off the Arethusa's port bow. They were the Frauenlob, a light cruiser of 2,650 tons with a speed of 21 knots and ten 4-in. guns, and the Stettin, of 3,500 tons with a speed of 24 knots and ten 4-in. guns. They immediately opened a heavy fire on the Arethusa and the attendant destroyers, which, until the Fearless and her destroyers came to her aid, suffered considerably. When the Stettin turned away with the Fearless in chase, the Arethusa concentrated her attentions on the Frauenlob. At 8.30 only one 6-in. gun in the Arethusa remained in action; but it was enough. A shell shattered the forebridge of the Frauenlob, and she turned away towards Heligoland, which now came into sight on the Arethusa's bow through the mist, and later reached Wilhelmshaven.

The Arethusa had suffered severely. Shells in her hull had damaged her machinery; her four torpedo tubes had been disabled, and her deck was on fire amidships. Moreover, she was now under the guns of Heligoland and the lifting

HEROES OF LOOS

During the battle of Loos, one of the major operations of 1915, the British army of 250,000 men sustained 40,000 casualties. These British soldiers have been passed through a casualty clearing station and are awaiting the departure of the ambulance train, which in this case is made up of ordinary railway coaches

fog gave a sight of that fortress. The signal was thereupon made from the Arethusa to turn westwards, and with her destroyers she proceeded on the new course. Some minutes later it was found that her speed had fallen to 10 knots as the result of the injuries she had received, and all hands were engaged in getting her once more into fighting trim. The Stettin had meanwhile got away from her pursuers and the first stage of the battle ended.

Commodore Tyrwhitt now received a report from his destroyers of the first flotilla. While he had been hotly engaged, the leading ship of the German flotilla, V 187, a vessel of 650 tons and 12½ knots, armed with two 20-pounders and four machine guns, had been caught and cut off. She fought with great gallantry, but the British destroyers poured in a storm of shells which caused smoke and flame to rise from the enemy vessel. She sank lower in the water, still firing from a single gun until she sank The British destroyers launched their boats in order to save the German sailors who were struggling in the water. But this had scarcely been done when a large German cruiser, probably the Stettin, approached and opened fire. To this attack the British destroyers could make no adequate reply, so they retired, leaving two of the boats of the destroyer Defender full of wounded men.

These two crowded boats were saved by something like a miracle. Just after they had been left, Submarine E.4 suddenly appeared and attacked the German cruiser which, having failed in an attempt to ram the British vessel, made off at full speed. The wounded German sailors in the boats were then taken on board the submarine, which had risen to the surface, while the unwounded ones were given water and biscuits and told to make for Heligoland.

Neither the battle cruisers nor the light cruisers had yet taken any part in the fighting, but the latter vessels had not been inactive. At 8.10 a.m Commodore Goodenough had sent two of the cruisers, Nottingham and Lowestoft, to the assistance of Commodore Tyrwhitt, and this gave rise to a certain amount of confusion which might have had serious results. Commodore Keyes, in the Lurcher, was not told that these ships were coming to the scene of action, and when suddenly they loomed up before him he thought that they were German vessels and acquainted the Invincible with this fact.

Meanwhile, Goodenough, having sent off two of his ships, followed with the other four, and when these arrived within sight of the Lurcher, Commodore Keyes made a mistake similar to the earlier one, signalling that he was being chased by four cruisers. At ten o'clock, however, visibility became greater, and it was possible to distinguish friend from foe, and so to clarify the situation. The light cruisers then completed their circular run and joined the battle cruisers.



Meanwhile the Arethusa, Fearless and their attendant destroyers had reformed and made preparations for renewing the battle, bringing up fresh ammunition and, in the case of those that had been damaged, plugging up the shot holes and getting out collision mats. By this time (10.30) Commodore Tyrwhitt again found that he was getting too near to Heligoland, so he gave the signal for the flotillas to take a westerly course, and as his own ship, the Arethusa, was badly damaged, he ordered the Fearless to keep close.

The position at this moment was critical and signals were promptly made by wireless to Sir David Beatty stating



BOUND FOR THE BLUE

All armies made extensive use of captive balloons. This photograph shows how the German balloons differed from those used by the British and French. The skirt-like ballonet, open at one end to catch the wind, steadied the balloon, but made it an easier target

that the Arethusa and her destroyers were hard pressed and calling for aid. Similar signals were sent out by the Fearless, leading the other flotilla of destroyers. Sir David thereupon ordered the light cruiser squadron to proceed at full speed to the aid of the flotillas, and four of its ships, Southampton, Birmingham, Falmouth and Liverpool, did so without delay. The other two light cruisers, Nottingham and Lowestoft, had not yet rejoined.

Beatty had now to decide whether or not he would take his battle cruisers to the fight. He had been marking time some 50 miles from the scene of action and had been kept acquainted with the course of events. He had received three urgent messages from Commodore Tyrwhitt in the Arethusa, and at 11.30 he decided that the time had come for his ships to go to the assistance of the smaller ones. At high speed, therefore, five battle cruisers, with the Lion leading, followed the light cruisers toward the sound of the thundering guns.

While this powerful succour was on its way the crisis of the battle had arrived. The German light cruisers had come out and were attacking the British destroyers. Commodore Tyrwhitt, in the crippled Arethusa, directed the Fearless to concentrate her fire on the Stralsund, and the first flotilla to attack her with torpedoes. They closed her, but she eluded the torpedoes and vanished in the haze. It was not for long, however. Ten minutes later she reappeared and took up a position on the Arethusa's starboard quarter. The Arethusa and Fearless attacked her with gunfire, while the destroyers

Photo: Sport and General

COVETED FORTRESS REGAINED

The fall of Przemysl during the Russian advance into Galicia was hailed by the Allies as a resounding victory. But they held the city only for a few months, and in May, 1915, it was recovered by the Austrians and retained by them until the end of the struggle. The Austrian troops are here seen entering the recovered city

again tried to use their torpedoes. The German ship concentrated her fire on the Arethusa, but the destroyers maintained a steady fire on her and she evidently suffered a good deal of damage. After a quarter of an hour of this pounding she turned away and vanished in the mist towards Heligoland. The British vessels did not attempt to pursue her; they had expended too much ammunition and too many torpedoes to make this possible.

At this juncture another vessel was seen coming up through the mist. She was the German light cruiser Mainz, running south from the fire of the British light cruisers. The Arethusa with the attendant destroyers met her onslaught in a determined manner, but as they came down she poured a very heavy fire upon them. One well directed salvo detonated the ready rack of ammunition in the Laurel and put the after-gun out of action. The next astern, the Liberty, was hit forward, her mast brought down and her captain killed. Every shot of the next salvo hit the Laertes.

It was a fine piece of German gunnery, but it was not to save the Mainz. Slowly, as the British shells swept her, her rapid broadsides died down; fires burst out on board; splinters could be seen flying from her upper works. One funnel fell with a tremendous crash. A torpedo struck her amidships, and when the cloud of smoke and foam which rose had vanished it was seen that one of her boilers had been flung on deck

Out of the mist came four British light cruisers, and seeing them the commodore ordered his destroyers to cease fire and re-form. The 6-in. guns of the cruisers opened a crushing fire on the wrecked Mainz. A second funnel fell with one of the masts. The rain of shells reduced the hull to a piteous mass, wreathed in black fumes, from which flared out angry bursts of fire, like Vesuvius in eruption. Her resistance ceased. Then Commodore Keyes, in the destroyer Lurcher, ran in alongside to take off survivors—in all 224 men were rescued. The Mainz was sinking fast, and the Lurcher had just shoved astern when she listed over to port, and those who were left slid down the side into the water. The Fearless and her destroyers were now recalled by signal from the Arethusa and ordered to cease fire and proceed westwards, leaving the light cruiser squadron and the Lurcher to attend to the Mainz.

Chart illustrating position of the warships in the Bight of Heligoland during the battle that took place on August 28, 1914

At 12.15 the ships of the battle cruiser squadron arrived on the scene, and proceeded north-eastward towards Heligoland. They came in sight of the Arethusa, engaged with yet another German light cruiser—the Köln—a sister ship of the Mainz, and like her of 4,300 tons, armed with twelve 4-in. guns and steaming 26 knots. She had come up through the mist and opened a long-range fire on the Arethusa, which the British cruiser returned.

Admiral Beatty with his battle cruisers steered at full speed to cut her off from Heligoland, and his ships chased her at 27 knots. At 12.37 he

opened fire, and, though the range was extreme, his guns inflicted great damage and set her on fire. A few minutes later, while the British battle cruisers were moving at 28 knots, another German ship, the light cruiser Ariadne, came into sight. She was steaming fast on a course at right angles to that of the Lion, which led the line of British battle cruisers. The Lion sent two salvos from her eight 13·5 guns, which took effect, and the enemy cruiser disappeared into the mist in a sinking condition.

There being no other German ships in sight, the battle cruisers circled northward to complete the destruction of the Köln. The Lion trained four of her big guns upon the German vessel. Two salvos were fired, each of four 1,250 lb. shells, and as the smoke of their explosion rose from the Köln it was seen that she was sinking. She went down as a stone sinks, and the four destroyers attached to the battle cruiser squadron, on proceeding to rescue survivors, found no one alive. The crew of 379 officers and men had perished. The German Admiralty paid a tribute to the heroism of the British in seeking to assist the wounded and drowning Germans while under fire. "It must be admitted that the British, without stopping to consider their own danger, sent out lifeboats in order to save our men."

No British ship was lost in the battle, but the Arethusa was badly damaged. She had about 30 holes in her sides, half her bridge had been carried away, and one of her torpedo tubes had been smashed. The total casualties of the entire British attacking force were 35 killed and 56 wounded. The Germans, on the other hand, had suffered heavily. Three of their modern cruisers —the Mainz, the Köln, and the Ariadne —had been sent to the bottom. Their losses amounted to over 1,000 men, and included the flotilla admiral and the destroyer commodore. Well might the Admiralty describe the action as "fortunate and fruitful."

This engagement was intended, although perhaps as an afterthought, to cover the operations at Ostend, where brigades of British and Belgian marines had been landed. The rapid advance of the Germans through Belgium was endangering the British bases at Boulogne and Havre, and the possibility of moving back to Cherbourg was considered. With this contingency in sight the authorities in London became anxious for the safety of Ostend. On August 24, 3,000 marines, from Devonport, Portsmouth and Chatham, were ordered to the Belgian seaport, and on the 27 and 28, although hampered by very heavy weather, the operation was completed under the command of Sir George Aston.

Soon, however, it was decided that S. Nazaire, in Brittany, must be the new British base, and this reduced the importance of Ostend, where Belgian troops were arriving by sea. This and other considerations led to an order to withdraw the marines, and on the night of August 31, they were carried back safely to England. In both cases the navy gave adequate protection to the transports. British ships also did good work in conveying men, animals and stores from Dunkirk to Cherbourg and Rochelle, but the check which the Germans received on the Marne made the move to S. Nazaire unnecessary and so released the British navy from a further arduous task.

MORTAR FROM SKODA

The Austrian army was for long superior to all others in its heavy guns made at the famous Skoda works. This photograph shows an Austrian mortar in action in the Carpathians. Such guns could only be used where a concrete setting was possible

Photo: Sport and General



CHAPTER 17

FIGHTING IN POLAND

The Russian invasions of East Prussia and Galicia were answered by a German and Austrian offensive into Poland. This was arranged by Ludendorff and Hindenburg, and as here related neither side gained any overwhelming success

BY the end of September, as described in a previous chapter, the Austrians had been driven out of Poland and the Russians had overrun the greater part of Galicia, only the western area of that province remaining in Austrian possession. The Russian advance may be said to have reached as far as the line of the river San, whereon stood the fortress of Przemysl, which was in danger of capture. On the other side of the San were the Austrian armies, somewhat broken and dispirited, and it was necessary for Germany to come to the help of her ally in much greater strength than she had hitherto done if she did not want her to be crushed. Conrad von Hötzendorf was bitter in his complaints about the lack of German support and even hinted at broken faith.

Under these conditions Ludendorff and then Hindenburg were ordered from East Prussia to the theatre of war where the danger was more pressing. Having reached Breslau on September 17, Ludendorff prepared a plan of campaign and then went on to the Austrian headquarters at Neu Sandec, where he saw the Archduke Frederick, one of the army commanders and, more important, had conversations with Hötzendorf.

Ludendorff's plan was that a great Austro-German force should invade Russian Poland, making Warsaw its objective, the idea being that this city would be a pleasing Christmas present for the Kaiser. To form a striking force the 8th German army was withdrawn from East Prussia and, strengthened with other troops, was made into a new army known as the 9th. The scheme provided that this new German army should link up with the Austrians and protect their northern flank from a possible envelopment. Ludendorff adds that his conferences with Hötzendorf ended in complete harmony, but a single command was not established as he and Hindenburg preferred to remain independent.

About the time that Ludendorff was preparing the Austro-German plan for the invasion of Poland the Russian commander-in-chief, the Grand Duke Nicholas, was having important discussion with the French authorities. The French suggested that the Russian armies should assemble on the left bank of the Vistula as the starting point for the invasion of Germany by way of Silesia. The grand duke would have liked nothing better, but it must be in his own time and in his own way. Finally, it was settled that the Russian armies should be assembled for the invasion very much as requested. From the capital southwards to Ivangorod, and still farther south to the junction of the San and the Vistula, the Russian armies numbering over a million men stood ready, either for an invasion of Silesia or to repel a German invasion of Poland.

It was the Germans who made the first move. Having secured strong reinforcements Ludendorff divided his forces into four groups. On September 28th the German 9th army, in touch with the Austrian left, headed through Czesstochowa along the Pilica river towards the Ivangorod region. A week later great progress had been made by the other three groups: the first working its way from Thorn by the left bank of the Vistula; the second from Kalisz, moving eastward through Lodz. These two armies concentrated against Warsaw. The third Austro-German group based on Cracow moved towards Kielce. Other Austrian forces were still more to the south-east, ready to defend Przemysl and if possible to recover Lemberg.

Considering the forces arrayed against the Germans it was a bold advance, and they can hardly be blamed for the elaborate precautions they took to keep the way of retreat widely open. They had succeeded in bringing the shaken Austrian army into play and, a strange reversal of custom, actually applied to them for assistance in the matter of transport. Hötzendorf complied and

FIRST TIN HATS

The French army was the first to use steel helmets, and they were issued to some of the front line troops in the spring of 1915. The photograph shows two infantrymen in a trench north of Arras wearing the earliest type of defensive headgear

lent them some of the light horse-drawn carts driven by peasants which were nicknamed Panje, from the habit the drivers had of addressing each other as Panje, meaning Sir. These handy vehicles were found more suitable for the Polish roads than the heavy transport supplied to the German army for their columns.

The Austrian army was beginning to recover slowly from the shattering blows of the previous campaign in Galicia and took the field early in October. At first the general Austro-German advance met with little resistance, easily brushing aside all opposition. The men suffered far more from that horrible factor of the Great War—mud—than from the missiles of the enemy. They marched knee-deep in it, even on the main road from Cracow to Warsaw, but the Germans began to restore the roads and soon had their lines of communication in first-class order. The trail was thoroughly blazed for a possible return journey.

The Germans had early knowledge of what they had to face. Reports came in of strong Siberian forces equipped with Japanese guns which the Grand Duke Nicholas was pushing along the right bank of the Vistula north of its confluence with the San. The entrance of Japan into the war on the side of the Allies was a bitter disappointment to Germany. She put it down to her action in 1895 in preventing Japan from seizing Port Arthur. Ludendorff remarks rather ruefully that the Japanese ultimatum handed to Germany on August 15, 1914, is said to have corresponded, word for word, with their own ultimatum of 1895:

> We spoke at that time of the restoration of Port Arthur; now Japan spoke of the restoration of Kiaohchau. The Japanese knows how to take his revenge!

The formidable plan drawn up by the grand duke projected a strong encircling movement from the north against the German 9th army, combined with a simultaneous frontal attack against it and the Austrians. The Russians had four armies along the Vistula between the confluence of the San and Warsaw. Their plan was to hold the Germans to the Vistula and tempt them to an attack upon Warsaw which would spell disaster to them. Hindenburg pays a generous tribute to this plan:

> It was unquestionably a great plan of the Grand Duke Nicholas; indeed, the greatest I had known, and in my view it remained his greatest until he was transferred to the Caucasus.

Hindenburg's attack upon Warsaw opened on Sunday, October 11, but it did not follow the course anticipated by the grand duke. He managed to avoid the trap laid for him, but he was continually in danger, and the farther he advanced the greater grew the masses opposed to him. The pressure was strongest on his left, where Mackensen commanded the XVIIth German corps. The Russian commander, with his right based upon the formidable fortress of Novo Georgievsk, 20 miles north-west of Warsaw, dominated the situation in that region with the constant menace of enveloping Mackensen's army.

The Germans continued to advance and the Russians to retire, and only when within a few miles of Warsaw did the Russian commander call a halt and order the troops to entrench. He had chosen his distance from the capital with great care. It was just sufficient to keep Warsaw out of range of bombardment by heavy field guns. The defence of the Russians now took the form of a continual series of attacks.

The main Russian attack opened on Saturday, October 17, and was continued all that day and the next. In the face of shrapnel, rifle fire and fierce bayonet attacks, the Germans had to give way but two days later reinforcements were hurried up and their position was bettered. At the same time, southwards, the struggle on the Vistula between the four Russian armies and the weaker Germans grew more intense. At Góra-Kalwarja, about half-way between Warsaw and the Pilica river, a strong Russian column succeeded in crossing the Vistula on pontoon bridges on October 20, and attacked the weakened wing of the German army marching north.

But two days earlier Hindenburg had given the order to break off the attack

OUTSIDE PASSENGERS

The French made great use of carrier pigeons, and the photograph shows how they were housed in the field, where a motor omnibus fitted with a pigeon loft was used. During the War the liberation of carrier pigeons from private lofts was forbidden

IMPROVISED OPERATING THEATRE

In a deep dug-out behind the lines in Gallipoli an operating theatre where minor operations can be performed has been set up under the protection of mother earth and the Red Cross Flag. In this case the surgeon is removing a bullet from a man's arm

Photo: Central News

upon Warsaw. The danger to the German left army had become a crisis; only their carefully planned way of retreat could save them. Mackensen retired from the environs of the Polish capital on the night of October 18 He got his armies away in good order, and it was not until October 25 that he was violently attacked by the Russians north of Nowemiasto.

The Austrians, meanwhile, who had tried to keep the Russians in check on the Vistula, were themselves pushed back from Ivangorod to Radom. They blamed the German 9th army, and the 9th army blamed them. But, without settling the rights of this squabble, it is sufficient to record that, while the German northern armies were forced to retire, the main body held fast and made a determined attack upon the fortress of Ivangorod.

Here the Russian troops were commanded by General Russky, who shared with Brusiloff the victory of Lemberg. His army held more than 150 miles of the winding course of the Vistula, from the point where the Pilica falls into it to the point where the Kamienna flows into the great river near Jozefow. These geographical details are of vital importance, for the distance from Russky's left wing to the battlefield of Warsaw was equal to seven days' hard marching. That is to say, Hindenburg had a week's grace in his operations round Ivangorod, in which he could attempt to force the Vistula with no fear of any attack on his rear by part of the conquering Russian force from the Warsaw section. If Hindenburg won, the retreat of his northern wing would be an affair of no importance. He would still be master of the whole of Russian Poland, with both Warsaw and the Russians on the lower reaches of the San and Vistula at his mercy As a matter of fact, a strong Russian column had set out from Warsaw to reinforce Russky's army, and by forced marches in bad weather over bad roads managed to surprise the enemy.

In the stern struggle on the central Vistula the fiercest fighting took place on the plain of Kozienice, ten miles north of Ivangorod. The German design was to clear the plain of Kozienice and then to force the passage of the Vistula. This would pave the way for two big enveloping movements round Ivangorod; one from the north, the other from Radom in the south.

The struggle at Kozienice was among the most bitter in this campaign. Heavy rains had turned the bend of the Vistula at Kozienice into a swamp. At this point a Caucasian corps succeeded in crossing the Vistula and in spite of the efforts of the Germans to dislodge them managed to build a bridge. For fourteen days they held out, unable to advance but refusing to retire across the river

This corps, containing many Armenians, fought with the utmost bravery, with their gun trails as Max Hoffmann, the German military historian, says, "literally in the Vistula." Ludendorff, too, dealing with this bitter little fight, manages to call up a shudder in the reader over the sufferings of the troops

WAY FOR THE WOUNDED

Through one of the narrow British trenches in Gallipoli a stretcher case is being borne to a dressing station. The lack of roads and the precipitous nature of the country made the use of mechanical transport difficult, and the wounded had often to be carried considerable distances by the ambulance men

KITCHENER TAKES STOCK

In August, 1915, when the Gallipoli campaign had reached a deadlock, Lord Kitchener went to the peninsula to examine the situation. He was opposed to abandoning the campaign, but was overruled. He is here seen in consultation with General Birdwood

on both sides. "All who participated in these engagements look back on them with horror."

On paper the German plan of securing the line of the Vistula had succeeded Except for this "uncomfortable crossing" they had pinned the Russians to the right bank of the Vistula, but Warsaw and Ivangorod remained in the hands of the enemy and the end of the German advance into Poland was at hand. Hindenburg gave the order for the general retreat on October 27. Thanks to the dispositions they had made on the advance the retreat in a westerly direction was carried out "according to plan," and the country was spared.. But the Austrians on the right wing were badly mauled by the Russians, who delivered a series of frontal attacks and they retired on both sides of the Vistula to the region of Cracow.

The Russians kept in close pursuit between the rivers Prosna and Warta and it was only the wholesale destruction by the Germans of the railways they had built that brought the pursuing Russians to a standstill. By the end of October the Austro-German armies had fallen back almost to their starting point. The first round had gone in favour of Russia.

But there was little breathing time for the combatants. Early in November Hindenburg had prepared his counter-offensive. He gathered armies estimated at 2,000,000 men, but almost certainly fewer, predominantly German, on the frontier around Thorn. From this base, on November 10, Mackensen set out for the second invasion of Russian Poland, by way of the Vistula.

The Russians, meanwhile, were advancing towards Silesia and their right wing naturally came into contact with the German armies, operating from Thorn. This right wing was thrown back and 12,000 men were taken prisoners and the beaten army fell back upon Lodz. On November 18 began that complicated struggle known as the battle of Lodz, the "Neapolitan Ice" as it has been christened with its layers of troops back to back or face to face. At one time the right wing of the second Russian Army was completely enveloped and the Germans were in possession of ground to the south-west of Lodz. Then Russky appeared upon the scene with 3½ divisions to relieve pressure upon this harassed Second Army, and the situation underwent a complete change. The German divisions surrounding the Russian 2nd army were themselves surrounded and cut off.

On November 22 it was quite clear that the attempt to repeat the victory of Tannenberg on the plains of Lodz was a complete failure. General Scheffer and his three divisions, forced to fight on fronts in every direction, had to escape as best he could. This escape, by a narrow gap from the net enveloping him, was as brilliant a piece of manoeuvring as many a victory. Moreover, on his way out Scheffer destroyed a Silesian division and captured 10,000 prisoners and many guns.

The Russians hung on to Lodz until December 6, when they retired to a position south of Warsaw, behind the river Miashga, and the Germans entered Lodz without further opposition.

The Russian advance into Silesia had been effectually checked. South of Cracow the Austro-Hungarian troops had been driven back into the Carpathians with severe losses both to themselves and to the enemy. The Magyars fought desperately in defence of passages to the Hungarian Plain, some of the fiercest engagements being at Mezolaboncz.

The German armies in the north were gradually driving back the Russian forces, and on December 7 the second battle for Warsaw began and continued until December 24. Against the German onslaught the retreating Russians gradually entrenched themselves in a line from the Lower Vistula along the east bank of the Bzura to Tarnów. The Germans were within 35 miles of Warsaw, but the Polish winter was making itself felt. The movement of

troops became increasingly difficult, and in the east, as had already happened in the west, there was a deadlock between the armies. The Kaiser did not receive Warsaw as a Christmas present. On Christmas Day the German troops were in trenches some 35 miles from the Polish capital.

Attacking Galicia and defending Poland, it was also necessary for Russia to guard other portions of her western frontier. From Russian Poland it extended south, touching Bohemia and, nearer the Black Sea, Rumania. The Bohemian frontier had to be held while Brusiloff was marching on Lemberg from Kieff; if Rumania joined the Allies it was important that her communications with Russia should be kept open. The Russian frontier to Galicia and Rumania extended to the northern shores of the Black Sea. On the eastern shores of the Black Sea was the Caucasus, bounded on the south by Turkey in Europe, on the east by the Caspian Sea, while to the north of the Caspian Sea the Russian frontier met Persia.

Marching southward from Kieff towards Lemberg, Brusiloff detached a part of his force to move southwards into the Bukovina His army occupied Czernowitz on September 15, having five days before seized Kolomea on the railway running through the Bukovina to Jassy, the key to the Bukovina in the west. His cavalry then crossed the Pruth from Czernowitz and overran the Bukovina to the foothills of the Carpathians. Brusilov refers to the difficulties of manœuvring in this region owing to the proximity of the Rumanian frontier. In no circumstances would either of the belligerents violate a foot of the country then neutral, which each was trying to win to its side. In October the Austrian resistance stiffened, and the Russians withdrew from the Bukovina before superior Austrian forces advancing from the Kirlibaba Pass. Later in the autumn, after their victories in Galicia the Austrians reoccupied Czernowitz and most of the Bukovina.

Besides Austria, Russia had Turkey to deal with. In October, 1914, without declaring war on Russia, Turkish warships had destroyed Russian ships in the Black Sea and bombarded Odessa. Turkey's neutrality was only half-hearted. German war material and German gold had been poured into the country. A German general, Liman von Sanders, became military adviser to the Sultan, and the army was mobilized.

Another theatre of war was the mountainous region of the Caucasus, where Young Turkey under the ambitious Enver Pasha was thirsting for military glory. Strategically the frontier could be turned through Persia by either combatant. Militarily Persia was negligible, and in Azerbaijan, her north-west province, both had small forces before hostilities began—the Russians at Tabriz and the Turks in the Lake Urmia (Urumiah) district. Several roads led across the mountains, that from Erzerum through Sarikamish to Kars being the only good one. From Sarikamish a railway ran through Kars to Tiflis, where it connected with the Batum-Baku line; the rest of the route was an old caravan road, which passed west to Erzingan and Sivas, and from Erzingan north to Trebizond.

There was another area in which Russia could be attacked, and this did not escape the attention of the Germans. Called Caucasia, the district between the Black and the Caspian Seas, with the Asiatic possessions of the sultan on its south-western frontier had become a Russian dependency in the 19th century, and as soon as Turkey had joined her forces to those of the Central Powers it became vulnerable.

A mountainous country, Caucasia consisted of two parts which were

Photo: Topical

THE TENSEST MOMEN

Men of the King's Liverpool Regiment are holding an advance front line against a German attack. Their trenches are only deep enough to cover the men lying prone, but fixed bayonets are ready should hand-to-hand fighting occur

ROAD TO LOOS

The great British offensive which began on September 25, 1915, in front of Loos, was the first battle in which the efforts of the Allies to increase their supply of munitions became effective. The havoc wrought in the German lines is here seen, but the enemy defences were strong enough to prevent a complete break through

divided by the Caucasus Mountains, the highest point of which was Mt. Elbruz, 18,500 feet high. They were known as Ciscaucasia, which was in Europe, and Transcaucasia, in Asia. The area of the former was 85,000 square miles and of the latter 95,000 the total population being about 14,000,000. Transcaucasia, the capital of which was Tiflis, was the nearer to Turkey. There was an extraordinary mixture of races, which included Tartars, Georgians, Armenians and Cossacks.

Influenced thus by Germany the Turks immediately prepared to advance into the Caucasus, though the difficulties confronting them in a winter campaign were great. The Turks, with Enver Pasha in command managed to mobilize between Erzerum and Trebizond on the Black Sea an army consisting of three corps from Armenia, a division from Bagdad and a corps brought by sea from Constantinople. The mobilization was incomplete owing to the difficulties of transport and communication and to the disinclination of 50 per cent of the men to answer the summons to arms. The exact numbers mustered are not known, but it is probable that 150,000 is pretty near the mark.

Eventually three armies were formed. The plan of the campaign was to advance simultaneously upon the Russian frontier in two parallel columns, the 1st Corps from Trebizond with Ardahan as an objective; farther south the 3rd Army under Enver advancing upon Sarikamish. Russia, owing to her commitments in Galicia could only muster an army of 100,000.

The two Turkish columns had been timed to advance simultaneously over an exceedingly difficult country where already, in November, the snow lay thick on the uplands. Struggling painfully through snow drifts and fierce blizzards the Turks advanced towards Sarikamish, north of which lay Kars, their objective. Their 11th army corps drove the Russians back from Kopri Koi to Khorosan, and held them there, while their 9th and 10th army corps tried to take their opponents in flank and rear and envelop them from Olti, north-west of Sarikamish.

Season and terrain were both decidedly unfavourable to this bold strategical plan. It was the depth of winter, and passes across the mountains, which rise to a height of 10,000 feet, had to be negotiated, yet the Turks succeeded in taking both Ardahan and Sarikamish. They had, however, been unable to move their heavy artillery, and their slow progress gave time for reinforcements and guns to be brought up by the Russians.

The battle began at Sarikamish on December 25, 1914, and lasted till January 3, 1915. In its first stages the Turks took the town and a small part of the railway, the Russians falling back until they were reinforced, when they counter-attacked, compelled the 9th corps to surrender, and forced the 10th corps to retreat with heavy losses. The 11th corps, to cover this retreat, advanced from Khorosan to Kara Urgan, but was heavily defeated by January 17. In the north the Russians recaptured Ardahan on January 2, and the whole Turkish offensive collapsed. The frozen bodies of 30,000 soldiers lying in the mountains told the tale of this terrible Turkish defeat. Meanwhile, a subsidiary Turkish column, disregarding international rights, had invaded north-western Persia and entered Tabriz. When the general Turkish retreat set in, a Russian cavalry force marched on Tabriz and, with very little difficulty, drove the Turkish invaders before them, being assisted thereto by the Persian mountain robbers of the vicinity, who joined in the pillage of the convoys and transports which the Turks were obliged to abandon in their retreat.

CHAPTER 18

TWO AFRICAN CAMPAIGNS

Early in the War measures were concerted by the British and the French to gain possession of the German colonies in Africa. In 1914 Togoland and Cameroons, both on the west coast, were secured by the troops of the Allies

ON the west coast of Africa Germany had two colonies, Cameroons, or Kamerun, and Togoland. The German flag was raised in Cameroons in 1884 and in the same year Dr. Gustav Nachtigal, acting on behalf of the German government, signed a treaty with M'lapa, king of Togo, and hoisted the German flag at Bagida. From that date the colony was administered by German governors.

Cameroons and Togoland were not as fortunate in their administrators as was German East Africa. Prussian methods were adopted in both colonies, and the natives were ruthlessly exploited. One notorious person, W. Horn, who was governor from 1902 to 1905 was guilty of such callous indifference to the welfare of the natives that the Imperial Government dismissed him from his post. Horn was succeeded by governors who, though they took energetic steps to develop the material resources of the country, took none whatever to win the confidence of the natives. Thus, when war broke out the German governors of Cameroons and Togoland, unlike the governors of German East Africa, could not depend upon the loyalty of the people whom they ruled. The difficulty of raising native troops was great, and those who were enlisted might at any moment be guilty of treachery or desertion. This being the case the position of the Germans in these two colonies was thus hopeless from the beginning.

Togoland was a country of about 33,000 square miles, lying between Dahomey, a French colony and the Gold Coast, a British colony. The population consisted of about 1,000,000 natives, among whom were only a few hundred whites, mostly officials and traders.

The capital of the colony was Lome, on the coast. Other stations were Bagida, also on the coast; Togo on Lake Togo, Misahöhe about 100 miles inland, Bismarckburg on the high lands in the centre of the country, and Sansane Mangu and Jendi in the north. A railway ran along the coast from Little Popo to Lome and thence inland to Misahöhe, another from Lome to Atakpame, and there were about 800 miles of good roads. At Kamina, near Atakpame, the Germans had built a high-power wireless station which maintained direct communication with Berlin. The importance of this station, by means of which news of the situation in Africa could be quickly received by the Imperial government, was considerable, and its possession was very valuable to Germany.

At the time of the outbreak of hostilities the governor of Togoland was a member of the reigning family of Mecklenburg. He had led a trans-African expedition, and was therefore believed to have an understanding of native ways and to be more likely to win their loyalty than his immediate predecessors. But the seed which he had sown had not, at the outbreak of hostilities, borne fruit. Moreover, he was on leave and such confidence as he had inspired in the natives was not transferred to his deputy, Major von Döring. Before Germany had realized that Britain would come into the War Major von Döring had been instructed to make an attack upon Dahomey.

SUCCESS FOR THE SAPPERS

British troops are taking possession of a German position mined during the battle of Loos, and the dead and wounded still lie in the crater which was made in the following way. From the foremost British sap a tunnel was driven forward beneath the enemy lines, the end being filled with high explosives and fired by electrical contact just before the infantry attack

Photo: Imperial War Museum

LOOS LAID LOW

One of the tragedies of the War was the fact that when the Allies advanced against the towns and villages held by the enemy they had to wreak a destruction no less terrible than that which enemy guns might have inflicted. Here is the village of Loos after the Germans had been driven from it

When it became known that Britain would range herself with France against Germany, Döring was ordered to make neutrality proposals to the governors of Dahomey and the Gold Coast. They were rejected, and the German government, realizing that the continued defence of the whole colony, sandwiched between two hostile powers, was impossible, decided that Döring should concentrate upon the defence of their wireless station at Kamina.

It is true that in this campaign the attacking force had an advantage in the fact that the enemy could not depend on the loyalty of the natives, but that must not detract from the achievements of the British and the French who by a plan, well conceived and capably carried out, conquered, in the course of a month, a territory admirably adapted to defence.

Two days after the outbreak of war a British cruiser was dispatched to Lome to demand the surrender of the colony. A reply was to be given within twenty-four hours. On the next day a German official informed the captain of the cruiser that he had instructions to surrender the colony as far as a line 75 miles north of Lome. Döring had already retreated with his small army of 60 Europeans and 400 natives towards Atakpame, and a combined movement by the British and the French against him was at once planned.

An attack was to be made from three directions. British troops were to invade the colony from the Gold Coast and French troops from Dahomey, while a combined force under the command of Colonel F. C. Bryant was to advance along the railway from Lome to Atakpame. On August 12, Colonel Bryant's force, consisting of 57 Europeans and over 500 natives, landed at Lome and at once began its march northwards. A few days later they were joined by a French contingent, consisting of three European officers and 150 natives under the command of Captain Castaing.

Major von Döring had chosen a strong position at which to make his stand. Some miles to the south of Atakpame the railway crosses the river Chra, and Döring blew up the bridge behind him and took up a position on the north bank of the river. With the bridge gone an enemy advance would be very difficult, for both banks were covered with dense scrub through which it would be necessary to cut a path

EACH IN HIS NARROW CELL

From being a mere scraping of the earth, hurriedly dug with entrenching tools, trenches developed into the elaborate earthworks which sheltered the opposing armies almost throughout the War. Here are seen the first trenches intended to be vigorously held when the German advance had been checked

HIGH EXPLOSIVES 'MAKE GOOD'

The remains of a German position in Sabot Wood, Champagne, after a heavy bombardment, are here shown. By the autumn of 1915 the Allies were occasionally able to break up the most elaborate trench system with high explosives, the advance of the infantry in some cases being a walk over

yard by yard. Upon the only practicable approaches Döring trained his three machine-guns. When the Franco-British force came on the German position the men made a gallant attempt to take it by a frontal attack, but time and again they were driven back by a withering fire from the German machine-guns and were at last obliged to abandon the attempt as hopeless.

An unpleasant surprise, however, awaited Döring. On August 22 he learned that British and French forces were operating in his rear, the French advancing from Dahomey and the British from the Gold Coast with Kamina as their objective. Immediately he received this news Döring abandoned his position on the Chra and fell back on Kamina, with Colonel Bryant and his force in pursuit. The British reached Kamina two days after the German force, but Döring, knowing that in a few days he would be greatly outnumbered, blew up the wireless station and sent an envoy to negotiate terms. The British commander insisted on unconditional surrender and Döring had no alternative but to submit. The fighting on the banks of the Chra had been the only engagement of importance, but there the British losses were heavy. The rest of the country had been rapidly conquered and before the end of August all resistance was at an end.

The story of Togoland for the rest of the War is a happy one. It was administrated jointly by French and English officials, each looking after the part nearer to his own colony. Trade was resumed and the natives settled down contentedly under their new rulers.

The German colony of Cameroons, or Kamerun, was also taken possession of by Dr. G. Nachtigal in 1884, and by 1911 had been expanded to close upon 191,000 square miles. It was augmented further as a result of the Agadir crisis, for in the settlement which followed that dispute Germany was granted two large slices of French Equatorial Africa in return for relinquishing all her claims in Morocco. By this transaction the area of the colony was increased to 292,000 square miles.

Cameroons was roughly a triangle, standing on a base stretching from the

valley of the Sanaga river in the east to the Muni river estuary in the west. The eastern boundary was an arbitrary line running from Bonga at the confluence of the Sanaga and Congo rivers to Lake Chad. On the west the territory had a coastline of some 200 miles on the Bight of Biafra as far as the mouth of the Cross river in Nigeria. From there the boundary, that was settled by an Anglo-German agreement of 1913, ran in a fairly straight line north-east to Lake Chad again. By the Franco-German treaty, Germany had secured a valuable port on the Congo river, and farther north, another on the Ubangi. The most curious result was the total inclusion within the boundaries of German Cameroons of the small territory of Spanish Guinea. Elsewhere the country adjoined French and British territories.

The colony had great possibilities, for the products included rubber, cotton, coffee, maize and rice ; there were great forests of ebony ; ivory and copra were exported, while cattle raising was a prosperous industry. There were good harbours and many rivers.

When war broke out Germany had not had time fully to develop her vast territory. Only in the southern and western portions had roads been built, and there were only two lines of railway, one running north and one south-east from Duala. Neither was a hundred miles in length. In Cameroons, as in Togoland, the administration in the early days was conducted with little consideration for the natives, but during the early years of the 20th century Germany realized the folly of alienating native feeling. Governors were appointed who were believed to be capable of conciliation, but when war broke out they had not gained the complete confidence of the subject people. There was no strong feeling in favour of Germany, neither was there any overt disloyalty. The Germans enlisted a number of natives as askaris ; but their attempts to start a jihad, or holy war, in the north were unsuccessful.

At the outbreak of war the German military force numbered about 3,100, including the police, but only 240 were Europeans. The commander of this force was Colonel Zimmermann, a

capable officer. For the invasion of the Cameroons the British had the West African regiment, stationed in Sierra Leone, and the West African Frontier Force, consisting of several battalions of Northern Nigerian and Southern Nigerian troops. The French forces in Equatorial Africa were composed of native levies with white officers.

On August 6 General Aymerich, the French commander-in-chief, initiated an offensive intended to forestall the Germans. This movement was made by two columns, one having Lomie as its objective and the other having Singa, both places being in the centre of Cameroons.

The British attacked farther south. The first attempts were not conspicuously successful, partly because they were undertaken in the rainy season. On August 25 mounted infantry of the West African Frontier Force left Yola, in Nigeria, crossed the frontier and, after a fight in which two British officers were killed, seized Tepe, a German post on the Benue river. Lieutenant Colonel P. R. Maclear commanded the detachment, and on the 29th he led it against the bigger station of Garua. One fort was captured, but on the 30th the Germans brought up reserves and totally defeated the British. Lieutenant Colonel Maclear, four other white officers, and many men were killed. The remainder of the Frontier Force retreated to Nigeria. Another column entered Cameroons farther south, but was driven back by reinforcements rushed up from Duala.

By the end of August the British and French authorities had realized that such disconnected operations would never be successful, and they agreed to a concerted offensive. The major part of the German forces were concentrated on the coastal area, and against them the attack was to be directed. Major-General Sir Charles Dobell was appointed to the supreme command of the British troops, the force under him consisting of just over 2,000 native levies. The French force under Colonel Mayer was slightly larger.

The British and French embarked at different ports, the British at Freetown and the French at Dakbar. Two British ships were watching the entrance to the harbour of Duala, the cruiser Cumberland and the gunboat Dwarf. The Germans made every effort to drive off or destroy the two ships whose presence was such a formidable menace to the safety of the port. On the night of September 14 a small German steamboat tried to blow up the British gunboat by running on it with a spar-torpedo in the bows. The sharp look-out kept on the Dwarf gave the alarm in time, and the steamboat was captured.

Two nights later a German merchant ship, Nachtigal, got up full steam in the river, and swung up in the darkness against the small British craft. But it was the big steamer that was wrecked, with a loss of 14 men killed and 22 missing; these were probably drowned in the darkness. The British cruiser Cumberland, under Captain Cyril Fuller, came up the Cameroons river to assist the gunboat.



Map of the German colony of Togoland that was conquered by small British and French forces in August 1914

The Germans apparently then turned their attention to the more important ship. Two more steam launches were prepared for a spar-torpedo attack. One carried the explosive machines and the other assisted in the operation, but both were destroyed, and when the Anglo-French force approached Duala, the Cumberland and the Dwarf were still there to support the attack. The Germans had sunk ten or twelve merchant ships in the entrance to the harbour, but when the six British troopships, escorted by the Challenger, arrived off Duala on September 26, a bombardment of the town was begun by the warships, and on September 27 the Germans intimated their wish to surrender the town.

On September 30 Dobell took possession both of Duala and Bonaberi on the other side of the river, the surrender of both places being unconditional. The Germans, under Colonel Zimmermann, had withdrawn from Duala, and before doing so had destroyed the wireless station. But some 30,000 tons of shipping fell into the hands of the Allies, including ships of the Hamburg-Amerika line and the Woermann line, which had been in the port at the outbreak of war.

With Duala and the whole coastal line in their possession, the Allies could rest assured that the first stage of the campaign was over. Yet the second stage, the rounding up of scattered enemy forces in a country with few roads or railways, mountainous and thickly wooded, having, moreover, a climate exceedingly unhealthy for white men, presented great difficulties.

Colonel Zimmermann had withdrawn his main force to Edea before the fall of Duala, but a large part of the German troops was scattered over a wide area. Sir Charles Dobell therefore divided his force into three columns. One moved along the railway running north from Duala, a second east along the valley of the Wuri river, while the third advanced along the railway running south-east towards Edea. Colonel Zimmermann had followed the same plan as Döring had done in Togoland. He had destroyed the railway bridge at Japoma and taken up a position covering the crossing.

On October 6 a small force of French infantry, assisted by some light draught gunboats, forced the passage of the river, but the advance proved difficult as it had to be made through dense forest in which German snipers were concealed. Eventually the column was reinforced and the Germans were gradually driven back. They evacuated Edea, which was occupied by the French on October 26, and took up a new position at Jaunde, 100 miles from the railhead. The commander of the

PUTNIK'S SEDAN

When the remnant of the Serbian army driven from their country fled into Albania and even transport for the headquarters staff was lacking, the heroic Putnik, an old and sick man, was carried in a sedan chair while his officers trudged behind

AFTER THE DEBACLE

King Peter of Serbia is here shown during the retreat of the Serbian army leaving his car to ride on horseback over roads impassable to wheeled traffic. Though he had made his son, the Crown Prince Alexander, regent he remained with his troops

TRAGIC JOURNEY: KING PETER DEPARTS

On the last stage of his flight into Greece King Peter sometimes went afoot, and sometimes rode on any vehicle available. Here he sits, a pathetic figure of defeat, on the limber of a gun dragged over the mountain roads by a team of oxen

NATURE'S RAMPARTS

The Bulgarian advance into Serbia was made through mountainous country. Troops are here advancing against Serbians entrenched on the hillside, but despite the advantages which the formation of the land gave to the defenders, the Serbians were outnumbered, and after some hard fighting were overwhelmed

advance forces, Colonel Mayer, was not strong enough to dislodge the Germans from the formidable position they now occupied, and Sir Charles Dobell therefore resolved to concentrate his energies on clearing the more northern portion of the territory. After one unsuccessful attempt to dislodge the Germans from the entrenched position at Jabassi on the Wuri river, the Allies returned to the attack on October 14.

The force, under the command of Colonel E. H. Gorges, D.S.O., had been strengthened and it was supported by lighters carrying 6-inch guns, which soon silenced the German guns. After a sharp engagement Jabassi was occupied. The work of this column was greatly assisted by that of another column which was advancing along the northern railway under the command of Lieutenant Colonel A. H. W. Haywood, R.A. Pushing steadily forward it dislodged the Germans from Susa and about ten days later gained a further success by taking Mujuka, a station about 50 miles along the railway from Duala.

Thence Colonel Haywood gradually forced his way another twenty miles up the railway to Lum, and on December 10 he occupied the railhead at Nkongsamba and took 60 prisoners, besides making a useful capture of rolling stock. Beyond the railhead, however, the country was very difficult, and Colonel Haywood was only able to push forward to Bare, six miles distant.

In other parts of the country, too, Sir Charles Dobell's forces had carried out some successful operations. Aided by the French cruiser, Bruix, and the Nigerian government's yacht, Ivy, the German capital Buea and its seaport Victoria had been taken. In the hinterland the French had also won some successes. With the help of an armed steamer lent by the government of the Belgian Congo the Germans were cleared out of nearly the whole of the territory which had been ceded to them in 1911.

In the most northerly portion of the colony German raids still gave trouble, and in order to check them a small force was organized in Nigeria. It left Lagos on November 22 and sailed up the Cross river to Ikom, marched thence to Okuri on the border between Cameroons and Nigeria, and then made its way towards Ossidinge or Mamfe, a German post. The march was a difficult one, no fewer than 23 rivers having to be crossed. On reaching its objective the British force found that the place had been evacuated, and the only fighting that took place were skirmishes with small bodies of Germans.

On October 26 the Germans made a determined attack on the French at Edea, and there was some hot fighting before they were repulsed. In other parts of the colony there was desultory fighting, but it could now only be a question of time before all German activities ceased. The position as a whole at the end of 1914 was very satisfactory to the Allies.

The Germans had been driven into the inhospitable regions of the north and east, and gave so little trouble that it was possible to reopen Duala for trade with those parts of the colony which were occupied by the Allies.

Although Cameroons had not been completely conquered by the end of the year, the Allies had every reason to congratulate themselves upon the success of their arms there and elsewhere in Africa. Togoland had been completely subdued. In the south the rebellion in the Union had delayed the operations against German South-West Africa, which are described in a later chapter, but it had been dealt with in masterly fashion and suppressed with commendable speed and efficiency under the direction of two Boer leaders, Louis Botha and Jan C. Smuts. Lüderitz Bay, on the west coast of the German colony, had been captured by the navy as early as September 18, and the situation augured well for the future.

In German East Africa the position, although not so satisfactory as in other places, was promising. It is true that the British attacks had been repulsed and that German troops still occupied two corners of British territory, but they had been unable to make any serious incursions and the position in which the German commander, Von Lettow-Vorbeck, found himself was far from enviable. The British blockade on this coast was almost complete, and he was faced with the serious difficulty of obtaining the necessary supplies to meet the needs of his army.

His force lacked modern rifles and though possessing a fair number of machine-guns he had insufficient ammunition for prolonged fighting. His only real advantage lay in the nature of the country which he had to defend, covered as it was by almost impenetrable bush. How this gallant German commander overcame his difficulties and evaded capture during the whole course of the War will presently be related. The whole record of his experiences provides one of the most thrilling chapters in military history.



SERBIA'S PRINCE REGENT

The regent of Serbia, Alexander, who twenty years later when King of Yugo-Slavia met a tragic death at Marseilles, is here seen questioning a prisoner



CHAPTER 19

DECISION ON THE MARNE

The first decisive battle in the West was fought in September along the banks of the river Marne. By it Paris was saved and the Allies were able to move forward to the Aisne

WITH Joffre still in the mood for retirement and Sir John French of the same mind, it was left to the vigorous governor of Paris, General Galliéni, to realize that the moment had now come to inflict a decisive blow on the German armies. Kluck, by his wheel south-east, was now marching with his flank abreast of the defences of Paris, and it was Galliéni's idea that Maunoury's 6th army, acting in conjunction with the British force, should, with all possible speed, be thrown against this flank. But Joffre's mind worked slowly, and it was some days before Galliéni could gain his point.

Meantime, the serious decision had been taken by the French cabinet to move the seat of government to Bordeaux. It had been decided, in any event, to defend the capital to the last, and all possible preparations in the way of storing provisions for a siege and strengthening the fortifications were made. The temper of the citizens was naturally depressed ; they were starved of news, but they were aware that their armies were in full retreat, and rumour magnified this disaster. Poincairé's message of September 3, although couched in reassuring terms, could not but strike further dismay in their hearts :

> On the demand of the military authority the government is temporarily removing its residence to a place where it can remain in constant relations with the whole of the country . . . The government is quitting Paris only after having assured the defence of the city and the entrenched camp by every means in its power. Frenchmen! Be worthy of these tragic circumstances. We will obtain victory in the end.

Fortunately for their cause the scare which hurried southward the French ministers and their staffs, to be followed by the ambassadors of foreign powers, was premature.

The Germans, it might be thought, were indulging the rosiest hopes and congratulating themselves on the near prospect of victory. This, however, was not the case, for later evidence has shown that they were in considerable doubt and confusion as to the progress of the battle. They were beginning to suspect that their plan was miscarrying. Their lines of communication were very long and they dreaded some swift stroke on their flank and rear. Their imperfect intelligence service magnified the force of 3,000 British marines which had been landed at Ostend into one of 40,000, and they believed that 80,000 Russians were disembarking somewhere on the Belgian coast. Moreover, Antwerp with its large garrison remained a menace, and a sortie carried out at this critical juncture increased the nervousness of the commanders in the field.

When Galliéni succeeded in moving Joffre to action, the British army was still in retreat, and the message announcing the forthcoming attack, which reached Sir John French in the early morning of September 5, was too late to stop the day's movement of retirement which had already begun.

Joffre's plan, as outlined to the British commander, was as follows :

The two central French armies, the 4th and 9th, were to hold their line while the three armies of the left, the British expeditionary force and the French 5th and 6th armies, were to attack the 1st German army. On the right were three other French armies, 1st 2nd and 3rd, but to them only a subsidiary part is allotted.

In response to Joffre's most earnest personal plea, Sir John French agreed to take up this offensive with all his strength and, in Joffre's words, " to profit by the adventurous position of the 1st German army " by concentrating the allied armies against it.

The British commander allowed his troops to finish their retreating march and then vouchsafed them some rest before bringing them forward again. His operation orders were actually



Photo: Imperial War Museum

SERBIA'S PARTING SHOTS

While the Serbian army was retreating to the south through mountainous country the pursuing Austrians were not allowed to advance unscathed. This battery of Serbian field artillery, with but scant protection for the men, must eventually yield its ground

issued at 5.15 p.m. on September 5 and directed that the first operation, a movement designed to bring his army into a position facing north-west, should be completed by 10 a.m. He recorded later that " When the day dawned . . . some ray of the great hopes in which I had indulged during the first two or three days at my headquarters at Le Cateau seemed to revive," and his special order for September 6 was framed in these terms :

After a most trying series of operations, mostly in retirement which has been rendered necessary by the general strategic plan of the Allied armies, the British forces stand to-day formed in line with their French comrades, ready to attack the enemy. Foiled in their attempt to invest Paris, the Germans have been driven to move in an easterly and south-easterly direction, with the apparent intention of falling in strength on the 5th French army. In this operation they are exposing their right flank and their line of communication to an attack from the combined 6th French army and the British forces. I call upon the British army in France to now show the enemy its power and to push on vigorously to the attack beside the 6th French army. I am sure I shall not call upon them in vain, but that, on the contrary, by another manifestation of the magnificent spirit which they have shown in the past fortnight, they will fall on the enemy's flank with all their strength and with their Allies drive them back.

Joffre showed something of the same spirit in his manifesto. He said :

At the moment when a battle on which the welfare of the country depends is about to begin, I feel it my duty to remind you that it is no longer the time to look behind. We have but one business on hand—to attack and repel the enemy. An army which can no longer advance will, at all costs, hold the ground it has won and allow itself to be slain where it stands rather than give way. This is no time for faltering, and it will not be suffered.

The German command, still hoping to achieve the decision before it was too late, told the troops that " everything depends on the result of to-morrow."

On that morning, September 6, British cavalry patrols gained touch with the enemy who, at certain points engaged them. The infantry, too, met with some opposition, but it was mostly of a minor character, and by the night of the 6th the whole force occupied a line with the cavalry division at Jouy le Chatel, the 1st corps between Vaudoy–Touquin–Pezarches, Gough's cavalry brigades (3rd and 5th) between Pezarches–Lumigny, the 2nd corps from Lumigny to La Celle sur Morin and the 3rd corps from Villiers sur Morin to Villeneuve le Comte. The character of the country over which the advance was taking place was interesting, being an open cultivated plateau intersected by deep valleys through which run the rivers of the Grand Morin, the Petit Morin, the Marne, the Ourcq, the Vesle, the Aisne, and the Ailette.

The French were pushing cautiously forward during September 6 and although General Foch (9th army) received some setback in the marches of St. Gond, the eastern wing held well, General Dubail (1st army) and General de Castlenau (2nd army) completely repulsing German attacks, so much so that Moltke raised the battle in this quarter. Sarrail (3rd army) and de Langle de Cary (4th army) also maintained their lines.

The British army was ordered to be ready to move at 8 a.m. on the following day and again the early hours were marked by cavalry activity, the squadrons driving patrols and rearguard units before them and inflicting a number of casualties upon the enemy. Informed that the ground in front of him was being cleared by the enemy, Sir John French ordered a further advance north-eastward. This was carried out during the day, although the average penetration did not amount to more than seven or eight miles, bringing the British to a position beyond and by the side of the Grand Morin.

The 18th corps, part of Franchet d'Esperey's 5th army, reached and crossed the Grand Morin during the evening, but the 6th army (Manoury) was checked by the arrival of fresh German forces. It was at this point that Galliéni made his famous lightning reinforcement of Manoury by commandeering the taxicabs of Paris. A fresh division had just arrived in the capital and transport by train was only available for half its numbers. Had the remainder marched they would have been too late, so Galliéni conceived the brilliant idea of collecting every available taxi-cab. He ordered the police to

RETREAT OF A NATION

Not only the Serbian army but the whole Serbian nation retreated before the advance of the Austrians, Germans and Bulgarians. Along this rough road a motley army of soldiers and civilians is in flight. With it is one of the British Hospital units which did fine service

Photo: Central News

WITH ALL THEIR WORLDLY GOODS

The Serbian people suffered very severely during the invasion of their country. By every road they streamed south and west, their personal property piled on wagons, their pigs and cattle driven before them, while the women carried their babies on their backs

turn out their occupants and having amassed 600 of them, contrived by a double journey to transport 6,000 troops to the battle front. The drivers, it is said, left their fares in some confusion and it took some time to sort them out on the morning of September 8.

On the evening of September 7 the British received orders to continue their advance next day in the direction of the Marne, between Nogent L'Artaud and La Ferté-sous-Jouarre. This involved the crossing of the Petit Morin, a difficult little stream with few bridges. The cavalry covering the 1st and 2nd corps moved off early on September 8 in the direction of the valley of the Petit Morin. They made more than one attempt to carry the bridge over the stream, but the German rearguard was too strong for them and they were checked by rifle and machine-gun fire. As the infantry advanced they could see from the heights above the valley that the line of the Marne was strongly held and might prove a difficult obstacle when it was reached. But the Petit Morin had first to be crossed and this was gradually effected by the infantry, with artillery support. The task of crossing this little river took practically the whole day.

One of the first actions was on the right, where near Bellot the Black Watch crossed the river and took cover in some woods on the north bank. They then turned west towards the village of Sablonnaires, which place with its crossing they took with the Cameron Highlanders, in spite of scattered but determined opposition. Troops of the 2nd division operating on a front of a mile and a half to the west of Sablonnaires were held back by enemy shrapnel and machine-gun fire. After this was silenced the passage of the river was forced by the Guards and by the 2nd Worcesters, who captured the bridge near Bécherelle. The most eastern crossings having been secured the cavalry advanced from the north bank, taking a toll of the retreating Germans, who, in addition to casualties on the field, lost some of their men as prisoners.

Still farther to the west, about a hamlet with the unlikely name of Gibraltar, the enemy was holding up the advance much more effectively by machine-gun fire from concealed positions. The British guns failed to silence this and as a frontal attack was impossible, a deployment became necessary. The first troops concerned were battalions of the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry and the East Surreys who, working their way through the open under shrapnel fire and through wooded country, crossed the river by a footbridge. The Surreys attacked the enemy in flank and forced a retreat.

The Cornishmen took the village of St. Cyr, to the west of Orly, which village troops of the 5th brigade were approaching from the east, rendering the position of the Germans, who still held the place, highly precarious. They retreated from their positions under heavy fire, sustaining casualties. The village itself with 150 prisoners was captured at 4 p.m., and by the end of the day's fighting in this sector advanced troops of the 2nd corps were not a mile distant from the next obstacle to the advance, the river Marne.

At the right of the British line the 4th division were in position about Jouarre, which stands at the junction of the Petit Morin and the Marne, with the 5th division on their right and the 19th brigade on their left. Some effective battery fire silenced the German guns on this front during the course of the morning and in the early afternoon the 11th and 19th brigades advanced towards La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, which stands actually on the banks of the Marne. The 12th brigade in the meantime took Courcelles about a mile and a half to the east, and the southern half of La Ferté, after some resistance from the houses, also fell, but with the bridges over the river destroyed. The day, which ended in a violent thunderstorm, had witnessed the passage of the Petit Morin at all points against admirably directed delaying actions on the

Photo: Imperial War Museum

MAILED FIST AND IRON CROSS

During the Great War iron crosses were distributed very lavishly by the kaiser, who lost no opportunity of handing them to the recipients in person. The Order of the Iron Cross was founded by the king of Prussia, Frederick William III, in 1813, during the struggle against Napoleon

TRANSPORT BY TRAMCAR

While the Germans held Ostend they made full use of the electric train system for the transport of troops to the front. Here two railway trucks are attached to the tramcars to carry the machine-gun company of the 5th regiment of marines to the front

Photo. Imperial War Museum

part of the Germans. The British had taken 500 prisoners and some machine-guns and had inflicted casualties equal to their own, which amounted to about 600 killed and wounded, not a high price for the ground gained.

On September 8 the French 5th army also made progress, the 18th corps crossing the Petit Morin to the west, the 3rd and 1st to the east of Montmirail. Maunoury's 6th army on the Ourcq attacking Kluck's flank, however, met with very determined resistance and far from advancing was at points forced to fall back. Foch with his 9th army facing the marshes of St. Gond met with no success whatever. His right wing was driven back before his main attack could develop, the gap which existed between the 4th and 9th armies was increased and his centre was obliged to fall back from the south of the St. Gond marshes.

At this time the excellent story gained currency that Foch had wired to Joffre: "My centre is giving ground; my right retiring; situation excellent; I am attacking." He did, in fact, send some such message and held the view that his offensive had played its part in thwarting the true design of the enemy to retreat rapidly and without loss. He further argued that he had been able to keep a close watch on the movements of the German right wing.

At 9 p.m. in the evening he ordered the 9th and 11th corps to attack towards Champaubert and to entrench on the heights beyond this place. He begged assistance from Franchet D'Espèrey which, rightly or wrongly to the main plan of the battle, this general afforded him by putting the 10th corps under his orders. It has been argued that he might have served Foch better by continuing his own attack with determination.

Sir John French also issued orders for the advance to be continued on the next day. The hour of attack was fixed at 5 a.m. and instructions were given that rearguards of the enemy should be attacked wherever met. The cavalry division was ordered to act in close association with the 1st corps and gain touch with the 5th French army on the right, while General Gough with the 3rd and 5th cavalry brigades was to keep contact with Maunoury's 6th army on the left.

This day, September 9, was really the decisive day of the battle and the decisive feature of it was the advance of the British. But in the morning there was every prospect of the Germans holding the line of the Marne with the utmost tenacity. Everything was in favour of their maintaining a successful rearguard action. They commanded the infrequent bridges of a wide stream and they had plenty of cover for the defending batteries, machine guns and troops. But movements of retreat were early detected and when the British cavalry made reconnaissances on the right of the line they found the important bridges at Charly, Nogent and Azy, three miles from Château-Thierry, undefended. The cavalry then proceeded to cover the advance of the infantry.

The advance parties of the 3rd brigade, 1st division, crossed at Nogent, the 6th brigade, 2nd division, at Charly, and both succeeded without material opposition in reaching the high ground north of the river. It was reported, however, by the Flying Corps that the French were increasing the gap between the 5th army and the British and that the Germans had considerable forces massed behind Château-Thierry. On receiving these reports, which were exaggerated, Sir Douglas Haig called an unfortunate if temporary halt, but later his divisions crossed the river and made an advance towards Château-Thierry. But the advance was unsupported and Sir John French ordered a cessation of the attack of the 1st corps.

On the 2nd corps front the 3rd and 5th divisions crossed the Marne at Nanteuil and Saacy over bridges which they found undamaged and though not without opposition continued this advance for some distance. Then

came a severe check from the left, in which direction it had been hoped that it would be possible to attack the rear of the Germans defending La Ferté. Confusion caused by the nature of the wooded country and the accuracy of the German gun fire prevented much further advance, although here and there they were able to punish the Germans severely.

The front of the 3rd corps presented much greater difficulties, for all but one bridge had been destroyed and the Germans had an excellent field of enfilade fire on any troops who might attempt to cross at La Ferté and were also strongly posted in the houses on the south bank. A crossing was, however, effected in a manner which Sir John French afterwards described as "a very fine piece of work." When the 11th infantry brigade approached the river, they found that the broken bridges were covered by German snipers and machine-guns occupying the houses on the farther side.

Attacks by infantry were difficult, and a reduction of the improvised fortresses by artillery was rendered difficult also by the impossibility of reconnaissance. Two battalions of infantry did, however, succeed in crossing the river by a weir, and protracted shell fire finally drove the Germans from the bridgeheads. Further battalions crossed by the weir, and others were ferried across in boats, but it was the work of the Royal Engineers in constructing a floating bridge under these awkward conditions that made the movement possible and earned the commander-in-chief's special commendation. This, however, was not completed until the evening and at nightfall a considerable body of the troops of the 4th division were still on the south side of the river.

This delay and Sir Douglas Haig's unnecessary halt on the right prevented a decisive blow being delivered on Kluck's left flank and rear, as had been asked for by Manoury; for, although the extent of the German movements were not known until later in the day, the German 1st and 2nd armies were in full retreat. "Held on his flanks," proclaimed General Franchet D'Espèrey that evening, "his centre broken; the enemy is now retreating towards the east and north by forced marches."

Franchet D'Espèrey's first order was for a vigorous pursuit to take place next day. Later, Joffre instructed him to cover the right flank of the British army by directing a strong attack on Château-Thierry–Azy, supported by General Conneau's cavalry corps. Franchet D'Espèrey then became more volubly belligerent, ordering that the German rearguards "should be crushed by violent artillery fire, turned by infantry and pursued by cavalry": but actually little was done to fulfil either these aims or Joffre's instructions about affording aid to the British.

At this time Foch was being hardly pressed and, as has been said, appealed for assistance. Three corps of the 5th army, which might have been better employed making the frontal attack, were swung eastward. Much valuable time was lost by this manoeuvre, which became unnecessary almost as soon as it was completed, and when these corps were re-aligned there was no "vigorous pursuit," but merely an advance in some places of five or six miles over ground already evacuated. The divisions in the centre appear also merely to have advanced in a leisurely fashion over ground deserted by the enemy, and to have neglected completely to take advantage of the gap which the Germans had left before them. Foch, too, on this day made no progress, nor was he able to do so until the German retreat became general.

The reasons which impelled the German commanders in the field to order an immediate retirement were for long after the war a matter of some obscurity, but their actions can now be judged in the light of considered official explanations. The relations of German headquarters with the army commanders on the western front was hampered by the fact that these headquarters were over 100 miles away from the battle front. There is no doubt that the supreme command, preoccupied by affairs in the east, had in these early days of September a comfortable

Photo: Imperial War Museum

HIDDEN HOWITZER

A German 21 cm. howitzer is here seen in action on the Russian front. From the high ground above the positions of the enemy are signalled to the gunners in charge of this heavy piece of ordnance



DRUM OF DEATH

A German trench in Champagne has been taken by a French battalion which advanced to the beat of a drum. The attackers have gone forward, leaving behind them the drum which has performed its heartening work

assurance that all was well in the west. News reached them slowly, and it appears that they first learnt of the seriousness of the situation when it was too late to do much to correct it. They had no adequate reserve with which to counteract the success of the French and British or snatch from them a hard-earned victory.

At this juncture a liaison officer (Lieutenant Colonel Hentsch) was sent from the supreme command to undertake a motor-car journey of some 400 miles, interview the army commanders on the spot, and, having judged the situation, if necessary to give orders in the name of the chief of the imperial staff. This delegation of summary powers to an emissary was a peculiar feature of the German military system. Colonel Hentsch, therefore, must be considered as the mouthpiece of the supreme command, armed as he was with power of giving verbal orders.

His journey was accompanied by all the difficulties of driving along roads choked by transport, but he succeeded in interviewing the commanders of the 5th, 4th and 3rd armies on September 8, and spent the night at the headquarters of the 2nd army with General von Bülow. On the morning of the 9th, Bülow, alarmed at the passage of the Marne by the British army, realized that Kluck would be obliged to retire, and that his own 2nd army must follow suit.

On consideration, Colonel Hentsch agreed to the decision, and at once motored to the headquarters of the 1st army at Mareuil. He did not succeed in finding Kluck, but interviewed his chief of staff, General von Kuhl, who was divided between the view that a possibility of defeating the French on the Ourcq still existed, and a realization of the immediate dangers threatening the 1st army. In the face of the plenary powers of Colonel Hentsch, however, he had no reason for deliberation and accepted the orders for retreat. Meanwhile, Bülow had notified the 3rd army (Hausen), on his left, of his retirement, and that army had no choice but to conform to the movement.

No ready means were apparently available of informing the supreme command of the fact that the whole right and right centre of the German army was now falling back, and on September 9 Moltke, the chief of the general staff, was preparing plans for the continuance of the offensive. But the retirement, once it set in, soon became general, and Moltke had to accept it as inevitable.

Whether it could have been avoided is still a matter of conjecture, but there can be no doubt that two of the chief factors which contributed towards it were the ignorance of the higher staff of events in the field and the absence of any general reserve. At least, it must be added Colonel Hentsch received no reprimand and continued to serve on the staff until his death in Rumania in 1917. Kluck, on the other hand, received his dismissal in an army order which ran, "First army until further orders is placed under commander of 2nd army." This was Bülow, who not long after had a stroke and retired from the active scene. Kluck was continued in less important military commands.

Sir John French held that the battle of the Marne came to an end properly on the following day, September 10, although the pursuit to the Aisne actually continued until the 12th. It is necessary to describe briefly the incidents of these three days. During the 10th the British reached the line La Ferté-Neuilly–St. Front-Rocourt. Sir John French describes the general situation as follows:

> The French 6th army had been wheeling up their right into line with us, and the French 5th army was nearly in line on our right. The enemy were in full retreat to the north and north-east. During the day the cavalry, the 1st army corps and the 2nd army corps had fought numerous engagements with the enemy's rearguard and had made large captures. Allenby, as usual, had handled his cavalry with great vigour and skill.

In his dispatch he described how the advance was resumed at daybreak up to the line of the Ourcq, opposed by strong rearguards of all arms. Thirteen guns, seven machine-guns, about 2,000 prisoners and quantities of transport fell into British hands, and the enemy left many dead on the field. Sir John French added, "As the 1st and 2nd German armies were now in full retreat this evening marks the end of the battle which practically commenced on the morning of the 6th instant." He then



NEW USE FOR TURNTABLE

German ingenuity adapted the idea of the railway turntable to their Zeppelin sheds to enable airships to be launched into the wind. The shed shown is situated at Nordholz and is over 220 yards long

Photo: Imperial War Museum

referred to the casualties in his own army in these terms:

> Although I deeply regret to have had to report heavy losses in killed and wounded throughout these operations, I do not think they have been excessive in view of the magnitude of the great fight . . . . and the demoralization and loss in killed and wounded which are known to have been caused to the enemy by the vigour and severity of the pursuit.

The actual casualties suffered between September 6–10 amounted to 1,701.

Some of the small actions of this day deserve to be mentioned. The advance guard of the 2nd division observed a German convoy retiring from the valley of the Clignon uphill towards Chézy. An artillery duel followed during which the British guns silenced those of the Germans. The 1st K.R.R.C. then advanced over the open and held the Germans to their position while the 1st Berkshire and 2nd S. Staffordshire attacked them on their flanks and captured the little force of about 500, of whom 150 were made casualties. In other parts of the field the 12th Lancers captured 300 and the 6th brigade 600 prisoners. The 1st Lincolnshire distinguished themselves by capturing a German battery. The French armies during the day advanced with little or no opposition, although owing to the nature of the ground their progress was, in some cases, considerably slower.

"To confirm and exploit this success, the advance must be pursued energetically leaving the enemy no respite; victory is now in the legs of the infantry." Thus wrote General Joffre in his instruction of September 10, and the more than weary legs of the British infantry were therefore turned north-eastward. The march on September 11, though undisturbed, was not a pleasant one: the front was narrow, there were insufficient roads, and progress was slow. No interference occurred from the enemy, whose cavalry divisions were reported by themselves (a wireless message was intercepted) to be "in a terrible state of fatigue, without food for several days, and not being able to move owing to the roads being blocked." The British force during September 11 maintained an average advance of about ten miles, an excellent performance.

The French 5th army on its right also met with no opposition and at the end of the day were slightly in advance, on its left wing, of the British. The French 6th army, marching prudently, engaged in nothing but a few skirmishes, and advanced between seven and nine miles. The weather during these last stages of the retreat was both wet and misty, entirely unfavourable to aerial reconnaissance and exceedingly trying to troops and transport moving along waterlogged roads. Moreover, generalship at this point could not discover to what extent the Allied armies were following a routed enemy. There was clear indication that, though they were for the moment exhausted, the Germans had suffered no serious disaster to their armies and might at any point turn and give battle to their attackers.

Of the 12th, Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, commanding the 2nd corps, wrote:

> The operation this day was an advance to the river Aisne, the commander-in-chief's intention being, if possible, to cross it and occupy the high ground on the north side. It was a terribly wet day with a good deal of wind and the roads were in an awful state, delaying all wheeled vehicles to a very serious extent.

Aerial reconnaissance was impossible, but even in this confused condition it was realized that the Germans might stand on the line of the Aisne and that the commander-in-chief's ambition to cross it might not be fulfilled. But the still advancing armies of the Allies were given orders to attempt the crossing and seize the high ground on the northern side.

Their first obstacle was the river Vesle, where at the village of Braisne three dismounted regiments of British cavalry successfully attacked the Germans holding the bridgehead. The infantry followed and succeeded in this and other corners of the field in breaking down the resistance of German rearguards. But the day's fighting left the Germans on the strongest possible defensive line with admirable artillery positions. "The river is at least sixty yards broad," wrote Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien that evening, "and very deep. Night fell—one of the worst I have ever known; blowing hard and pouring in torrents, finding us unable to establish ourselves on the river. The men drenched to the skin were mostly got under cover in some of the villages

during the night; but I am afraid they suffered a good deal."

Thus, as far as the British were concerned, ended the so-called battle of the Marne, which, though it turned the tide of war against Germany, was, in reality, no battle at all but a series of minor engagements following up a strategic retreat. The action had, however, the most decisive results. The Germans were forced to abandon all hope of the enveloping movement upon which their whole strategy was based. The element of surprise had now completely disappeared, and they were pinned down to a defensive line which they were to hold while the stalemate of trench warfare developed. There occurred afterwards, it is true, the conflict on the Aisne and the race to the Channel ports, both of which are dealt with in later chapters. During these struggles there remained still the hope on both sides of turning a flank, but in truth deadlock had already been reached.

Grave faults of generalship occurred on both sides, and it is tantalizing to conjecture what might have been the issue if Galliéni's plan had been carried out more urgently. Joffre's intransigent attitude undoubtedly cheated that brilliant genius of the full fruits of his daring scheme. The British commander-in-chief, too, cannot be acquitted of a certain hesitation in pursuit which was not dictated by any reasonable caution. Such dilatoriness may well have cost the price of a far more decisive victory, while Galliéni was denied the two army corps he had asked for, which, if flung against the German rear, might have induced a calamitous retreat, so a further and speedy reinforcement of the British force might have led to the same result. The rapid landing of reserve troops from England on the Belgian coast would have been bound to lead to a more precipitous retreat of the Germans.

One of the most pertinacious of the criticisms has been put forward by several French and English writers, which is that greater resolution on the part of the high command would have brought the British forces to the Marne by the night of the 8th. They could, it is said, have started earlier than they did on the 7th, have pushed more resolutely through the defences of the Grand Morin, which were very weak, the more so because air reports showed that by 7 a.m. the ground to the north was almost clear for several miles. In "The First Seven Divisions," Lord Ernest Hamilton says: "The advance was slow and cautious, which was perhaps excusable in a tired army to whom anything but retreat was a new experience." This opinion is backed by Mr. C. R. M. F. Cruttwell, in his "History of the Great War," who says in a footnote:

> The British cavalry showed no enterprise comparable to that of the French 5th division, which almost captured Kluck in his headquarters at La Ferté-Milon on the evening of the 8th. The German cavalry by the 10th was absolutely exhausted. Foch criticized the inaction of his cavalry on the same day most severely, declaring that they could not believe that the enemy was really beaten. This is doubtless the true explanation of the ineffectiveness of the whole pursuit.

In the British Official History there occurs the following epitaph on the dying battle: "The gigantic struggle . . . in which, between Verdun and Paris, so far as can be ascertained, 40 allied divisions, with eight cavalry divisions, contended against 46 German divisions with seven cavalry divisions, was over, and with it all hopes of the rapid knock-out blow on which Germany had counted for winning the war against her unprepared opponents. Tactically it was not fought to a finish, but strategically its results were far reaching, so that it must be regarded as one of the decisive battles of the world."

LONG VACATION ENFORCED

Two of London's inns of court, Gray's and Lincoln's, were hit by bombs during air raids. In Gray's Inn, associated with the great name of Francis Bacon, a bomb fell on October 13, 1915, wrecking many sets of chambers at the back of Gray's Inn Square

CHAPTER 20

PRICE OF ADMIRALTY

The British command of the seas, although not seriously challenged by the German fleet, was only maintained at the price of constant losses in men and material. The story is here told down to the end of the year 1914

IN spite of the British success in the battle in the Bight of Heligoland the first months of the war at sea were very disappointing to the British public. Unaware of, or indifferent to, the immense changes brought about by science and invention in arms and armour, they looked for some great spectacular stroke against the enemy; the forts of Heligoland blown to bits, a squadron of Dreadnoughts sunk, a victorious dash up the Elbe or a landing on the German coast. But none of these things happened or could happen. Instead came the news of events which proved that, although the British fleet could keep the seas, it could not avoid attack or escape injury.

The Germans got in the first blow delivered by a submarine, and on September 1 sank the British light cruiser Pathfinder. This happened when this ship, the flotilla leader of a destroyer patrol, was lost with nearly all hands off St. Abb's Head. She went down in four minutes, and it was at first believed she had struck a mine, but it was afterwards learned that the attack on her was made by the German submarine U21. The Pathfinder's commander, Captain Martin Teake, was wounded but saved. Just after this disaster the battle fleet, which had just put into Loch Ewe to coal, swept the North Sea, advancing to within 100 miles of Heligoland. But the coast was trailed in vain; the Germans ignored the challenge to fight.

At the time British underwater craft were blockading the Elbe, and on September 13 the old German cruiser Hela, steaming between Heligoland and the Elbe, was sunk by the British submarine E9, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Max Horton.

Horton was then sent to a station off Emden, a centre of German torpedo craft. Towards the end of the first week in October he submerged in the enemy's harbour, and kept his crew amused by a gramophone concert. Then, taking his first peep through the periscope, he saw a destroyer, but too near to loose a torpedo at her. He let her steam away for 600 yards, and then fired his two forward tubes, with an interval of five seconds between the shots. The first shot missed, but the second, travelling near the surface of the water, caught the destroyer amidships. The explosion lifted her in the air and tore her in two. It was the S126, a vessel of 480 tons and 27 knots speed, launched at Danzig in 1904. She had a crew of 60.

Again the British submarine submerged, while a flotilla of German destroyers cruised above him but found nothing to shoot at, and by October 7 E9 and her daring crew were safely back once more at Harwich. E9 was one of the newest and most powerful submarines then existing. She was over 800 tons, with accommodation for a crew of 28 men, and an air-supply enabling them to stay under the sea for 24 hours.

On September 14 a sea fight occurred in the South Atlantic between a Cunard liner, the Carmania, and the new German liner, the Cap Trafalgar. They met off Trinidada Island—not the West Indian island of a similar name, but a rock, about four miles by two, lying in the South Atlantic some seven hundred miles east of Brazil. The Carmania, equipped as an auxiliary cruiser, had been sent to reconnoitre the little island. Her look-out spied three steamers westward of the rock. They all fled when the British ship was sighted; but when it was seen that the Carmania was alone,

BLOW AT THE HEART

In the Zeppelin raid of September 8, 1915, severe damage was done in the heart of London. Bartholomew Close, a busy quarter near the church of St. Bartholomew the Great, was left in the condition here shown and destruction was wrought elsewhere

AN ENGLISHMAN'S HOME

In the earlier Zeppelin raids the eastern and south-eastern suburbs of London suffered severely. A bomb has fallen between two small houses. One house was unroofed, a mother and child were blown into the street and a boy buried beneath the wreckage

the largest of the three German ships turned round and steamed to attack. Then Captain Noel Grant, commanding the Cunarder, saw that the curious liner, which suddenly hoisted the German ensign, was a foe worthy of his guns.

The two armed liners were about equal in size, speed and fighting power, and they were both manned mainly by naval reservists. They had no armour, and their triple tier of decks offered such targets as made a miss by a trained gun-layer at fighting range almost an impossibility. Each had a speed of 18 knots. The Carmania had a tonnage of 19,524 tons, and mounted eight 4·7 guns. The Cap Trafalgar had a tonnage of 18,710 tons, and mounted eight 4·1 guns and six pom-poms. In spite of their somewhat smaller calibre the German guns, being of more modern make, had a low trajectory and were more effective at long distances. Fire was opened about midday and action took place at a range between 8,000 and 4,000 yards from start to finish.

Each ship aimed at letting water into the other as quickly as possible and the guns were laid on the waterline. Of the first few shells that hit the Carmania on the port side three made holes, big and small, at and above the waterline; one tore through the stewards' pantry and embedded itself in the sandbagged engine-room; another cut the fire main —a casualty that might have had a decisive effect on the action. As the range shortened the effectiveness of the Carmania's fire was to be seen in the slight list to starboard of the Cap Trafalgar. Both ships were on fire; the Carmania's bridge so badly that it had to be abandoned. Soon the Cap Trafalgar turned away, and by 1.30 she was out of range of her foe. But her increasing list showed she was vitally injured, and soon after she capsized and sank bows first. Her survivors were picked up by one of her colliers. The Carmania's loss in men amounted to only nine killed and 26 wounded.

Just after this incident there was a lively little duel in African waters. H.M.S. Pegasus was a light cruiser, a little over 2,000 tons, carrying eight 4-in. guns of an old pattern. Stationed at Zanzibar, she made a successful expedition to the German East African port of Dar-es-Salaam, where she sank a German gunboat and a floating dock, and crippled the enemy commerce raiders by destroying the wireless station. After striking this blow she returned to Zanzibar harbour, as defects in her engine-room made a complete overhaul necessary. At five o'clock in the morning of September 20, the German cruiser Königsberg was seen by the guardship Helmuth coming slowly up the south channel that led to the harbour.

The Königsberg was armed with ten 4-in. guns, with a longer range and greater power than the weapons of the British vessel. She began shooting at 9,000 yards distance, and though the broadside of the Pegasus tried to reply, her old guns were put out of action in 15 minutes. Shell after shell struck the British cruiser, tearing down the upper works and smashing the guns. When the decks were strewn with dead and dying men the Germans ceased firing for five minutes. Thinking that the action was over, all the men who had been able to find shelter came on deck to succour their wounded comrades.

RAIDER LIMPS HOME

Photo: Imperial War Museum

This Zeppelin has been hit by British anti-aircraft guns on her way home after a raid on England. Loss of gas has brought her down within sight of the Belgian coast and she is shown being towed into the harbour at Ostend which until the end of the struggle was in possession of the Germans

END OF ONE ZEPPELIN

On the night of Sept. 23, 1915, twelve Zeppelins raided England. L33, here shown, was injured by anti-aircraft guns. She made for home, but was soon compelled to return and landed in Essex, where her crew set her on fire, leaving only the skeleton as a memento

But this was the moment chosen by the Königsberg for another bombardment. She battered the Pegasus almost beyond recognition, and caused her to list heavily. Out of the crew of 234 men there were 24 killed and 55 wounded.

During the fight the British ensign was shot from the mast and fell on the deck. At once it was seized and held aloft by two marines in the most exposed position in their ship. It drooped for a moment when one had been killed by a shell. Immediately another marine took the place of the dead man, and the flag was still flying from the broken Pegasus when the German cruiser fired a last shot and steamed away.

The next event of importance was a serious blow to the British fleet. A small German submarine, commanded by Lieutenant Otto von Weddigen, received orders to cruise along the coast of the Netherlands and Belgium and attack the vessels that the Admiralty were sending to defend the Belgian seaports. Weddigen arrived at dawn on Tuesday, September 22, some 16 miles north-west of the Hook of Holland. Here he spied, about six o'clock in the morning, the three old British armoured cruisers, the Aboukir, Hogue and Cressy, cruising in a single line 20 miles from the Dutch coast, without any destroyers to scout for them. Vessels of 12,000 tons, and 14 or 15 years old, each had a complement of 800 officers and men.

Selecting a good firing point, Weddigen loosed a torpedo at the middle ship. He was about 12 feet under water at the time, and he got the shot true on the mark. Round the Aboukir rose a fountain of water, a burst of smoke, a flash of fire—and part of the cruiser rose in the air. The victor felt the shock of the explosion. Through his periscope he could see the crew, with their ship sinking beneath them, standing at their posts, ready to handle their guns if an enemy were visible. Weddigen then saw through his periscope the Hogue and Cressy coming to the aid of their sister ship. As in the case of the Pathfinder, it was at first thought that the ship had struck a mine.

As the Hogue and the Cressy steamed up, Weddigen got his firing depth and trained his torpedo on the Hogue, the nearer of the approaching vessels. The torpedo got home, and for 20 minutes the ship lay helpless on the surface. Then came a second explosion, caused probably by another torpedo hitting near the magazine, and the great vessel heaved, half turned over and sank. The captain of the Cressy at once began to steam a zigzag course past the scene of the double disaster, in the hope of being able to rescue the sailors struggling in the water, and at the same time to get an opportunity of sighting and attacking the enemy. But the Cressy shared the fate of her sister ships and was sunk by torpedo shortly afterwards. In all, 62 officers and 1,400 men were lost with the three British cruisers. The saved numbered 60 officers and 777 men—837 in all.

The loss of the three old cruisers was of no importance, but the loss of good men was an irretrievable blow. The discipline of the men provoked the admiration of Weddigen, who, peeping at them through his periscope, bore witness to their steadiness and fearlessness.

ZOUAVES' LAST SLEEP

Gas has swept over the French lines and four men, unprovided with gas masks, lie dead in the trench which they held to the last. They are Zouaves, a crack French corps—originally recruited from the natives of North Africa

"All the while," he said, "the men stayed by their guns, looking for their invisible foe. They were brave, true to their country's sea traditions." Dutch and British vessels in the neighbourhood tended the survivors, many of whom were conveyed in the boats of the cruisers to the rescue ships.

In Mediterranean waters the main French naval force, combined with the British fleet, under the command of Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère, held the Austrian warships in the Adriatic. To assist the land operations of the Montenegrins the Austrian fortress of Cattaro was bombarded by the Allied fleets on September 10. Then the 40 warships steamed to the island of Lissa, where the Austrian navy had won in bygone days a great victory over an Italian fleet. The signal station on this island was shelled, as were those on Pelegosa and Lesina. All the southern coast of Dalmatia was searched, and mines, lighthouses, signal stations and wireless stations were destroyed. This was done to impede the Austrian fleet in any sortie from its base at Pola, and British and French flags were hoisted over the conquered island, which was made the base of the Franco-British operations.

Early in October the British blockade of the North Sea became even more effective than the Franco-British blockade of the Austrian shores of the Adriatic. On October 2, moved by the disaster to the Aboukir, Hogue and Cressy, and by the increasing activities of the enemy's submarines, the British Admiralty closed the lower area of the North Sea. A system of minefields was laid between the Goodwins and Ostend, and between Foulness, in Essex, and the opposite coast. The work was done at night by the Iphigenia and the Andromache under the protection of destroyers. The result was that the mouth of the Thames and the northern entrance to the Channel were sealed to hostile warships. German submarines could creep underneath the mines at considerable peril, but some time passed before they had a conveniently near base at Bruges for such operations.

The minefields, however, did not deter Otto von Weddigen. In his submarine he was tracking two old armoured cruisers, the Hawke and the Theseus, in the northern waters of the North Sea, and on October 15 the sister ships were attacked by U9. Weddigen released his first torpedo at the Theseus, but missed the mark. Then he turned on the Hawke, and struck her amidships near a magazine. The detonation was followed by a second terrific explosion in which a large number of the crew were killed, and in five minutes the Hawke sank with the loss of nearly 500 lives. Only one boat got safely away, and after rowing about for three hours the exhausted members of the crew, three officers and 46 men, were picked up by a Norwegian steamer. Attacks were made on other ships and four destroyers narrowly escaped.

Made bolder by these successes, the German submarines aimed at the bigger ships and on October 16 it was reported that one of them was actually inside Scapa Flow. The Dreadnoughts therein at once put to sea, and, having realized that the base was vulnerable, the commander-in-chief asked that it should be protected, repeating the request when it was stated that a second submarine had entered the Flow. It is probable, however, that both reports were incorrect. Meanwhile the headquarters of the Grand Fleet were moved to harbours in Skye and Mull, with a further one in Lough Swilly on the north coast of Ireland.

At this time four German destroyers, S115, S117, S118 and S119, left Emden and turned south with the intention of operating off Belgium in association with the submarines. Acting on



BEHIND THE GAS CLOUDS

Clouds of poison gas discharged by the Germans are seen rolling towards the Russian lines during an attack on the Eastern front. On the right, waves of troops are waiting to move forward as soon as the gas has done its deadly work, the supporting lines being in somewhat closer formation than those in front

COVER IN A CHURCH

Few village churches in the war zone were uninjured by hostile gunfire although their medieval masonry could stand a tremendous bombardment. Here in the Argonne French sharpshooters use the ruins of a church as a point of vantage

information received, Captain C. H. Fox in the light cruiser Undaunted, accompanied by the new destroyers the Lance, the Lennox, the Legion and the Loyal, steamed out of Harwich at the same hour. At four o'clock on the afternoon of Saturday, October 17, the German destroyers were descried off the mouth of the Scheldt. They tried to escape, but by good seamanship Captain Fox cut them off, using the superior speed of his flotilla to the best advantage, and then opened the action at a range of five miles. To prevent any from escaping, Captain Fox ordered the four British destroyers to concentrate against two of the German vessels.

The Undaunted brought her two 6-in. guns and 4-in. guns against the two remaining destroyers, and in less than a minute the leading German ship was in distress. Clouds of smoke arose from her as the lyddite shells struck home and exploded, rending the thin steel armour plate of the hull as if it were wood and hurling the metal splinters all about. A shell smashed the machinery and brought the boat to a standstill, and a few minutes after the action opened she was sunk. Soon afterwards, the second enemy destroyer was ablaze from end to end, with her funnels, bridge and deck fittings torn from their holdings. As she went down the sea seemed to engulf a length of leaping flame. The British destroyers were equally successful, and at the end of an hour and a half the German navy had lost four useful destroyers and some 250 officers and men, including 32 survivors picked up after the action.

The first exploit in commerce destruction by submarine attack occurred on Tuesday, October 20, when the British steamer Glitra, with a cargo of oil and coal, was steaming towards Stavanger in Norway. About ten miles from this destination her captain sighted a submarine, which forced him to heave-to under threat of a torpedo. Two officers and a couple of men then boarded the Glitra from a canvas boat. They had revolvers in their hands, and they ordered the crew to leave the ship within ten minutes. As the crew rowed to the shore the submarine officers entered the engine room and opened the Kingston valves. Then, returning to the submarine, they fired on the steamer, which took nearly three hours to sink. U17 was the submarine that carried out this work.

About a week later, on Monday, October 26, the first historic act of veritable piracy was committed. On that day the French liner Amiral Gauteaume was steaming from Calais to Havre in a heavy sea with 2,500 refugees aboard. She was torpedoed without warning, and about 30 lives were lost, but she got back to port.

Next day the traffic along the chief Atlantic trade routes was interrupted. A British steamer, the Manchester Commerce, struck a mine off the Irish coast by Tory Island, the captain and 13 men perishing. A minefield had been laid off the island by a vessel showing neutral flags on one of the new trade routes fixed by the British Admiralty and communicated by secret instructions to skippers, shipowners and cargo-owners concerned in the carrying of commerce across the North Atlantic.

The speed and facility with which the new route had been mined proved that German secret service agents were able to discover the Admiralty's secret instructions and arrange for a neutral vessel to slip out with a cargo of mines.

A statement issued by the secretary of the Admiralty on October 23 showed that this form of warfare had not as yet met with any conspicuous success. At that date only 39 out of 4,000 British ships engaged in foreign trade had been sunk by the enemy. Nearly 9,000 foreign voyages had been undertaken to and from the ports of the United Kingdom, and in 45 cases only had these ships been interfered with. On the routes where Admiralty instructions were followed, little damage was done to merchant shipping.

The overseas trade of Germany, however, had practically ceased to exist. Among the comparatively few German ships which had put out to sea, 133 had been captured, which was nearly four times the number of those lost by the vast and active British mercantile marine. The government rate of insurance for cargoes, fixed at the outbreak of war at five guineas per cent, was reduced to two guineas, a reduction which in no way imperilled the solvency of the insurance fund.

On October 27 the British navy suffered a severe loss. A German minelayer had got out of harbour with a

cargo of mines which she laid on the routes taken by the Atlantic liners along the north coast of Ireland. On that day the ships of the 2nd battle squadron were engaged in gunnery practice near Tory Island when at 5 o'clock one of them, the super-Dreadnought Audacious, struck one of these mines. Ships, including the White Star liner Olympic, came to the rescue and the battleship was taken in tow. For four hours there were hopes of saving her, but about 9 o'clock she blew up suddenly and sank. No lives were lost. The news of the disaster was concealed from the public partly because of the delicate state of the negotiations with Turkey, and partly at the request of Sir John Jellicoe. This loss was probably due to mines laid by the liner Berlin, which left Wilhelmshaven at the end of September and put into Trondhjem on November 16, there to be interned by the Norwegians.

It is now time to return to the Königsberg, for which British ships were still searching. On October 30 she was discovered by H.M.S. Chatham, a light cruiser displacing 5400 tons, hiding in shoal-water about six miles up the Rufiji river in German East Africa. The British ship, being of greater draught, could not be worked up the river. The Königsberg's crew had landed and dug entrenchments on the banks of the stream, and though the Chatham bombarded the enemy's ship and trenches the effect could not be observed owing to the thick groves of palm trees screening the German ship. The British captain blocked the river by sinking colliers in the navigable channel, but the destruction of the German cruiser was not accomplished until July, 1915.

As the German warships made no attempt to patrol their North Sea coasts, Britain's submarine commanders had little opportunity of displaying their skill. Her light and armoured cruisers, with destroyer flotillas, were spread over the North Sea and down the English Channel, reconnoitring and searching merchant ships for contraband, and guarding both the British and Belgian coasts from a naval raid. The battle cruisers and light cruisers swept up to the Skaggerrak, and three submarines made their way into the Baltic Sea.

The task of patrolling the narrow seas, carried out by the British navy, became more difficult when the Germans were able to make fuller use of the stretch of Belgian coast which they had seized. Zeebrugge, owing to its proximity to England, was selected as a suitable base for submarines and there, as elsewhere along the coast, strong fortifications were erected. The plan was to send the submarines in parts by railway to Bruges, where they were put together. They then passed along the ship canal that connects Bruges with Zeebrugge, whence they put to sea. Mines were laid in the Scheldt, and both destroyers and submarines were ordered to proceed from Emden to the new Belgian bases.

The activity of the German submarines and the successes that attended their efforts caused serious concern to the British Admiralty and it was decided to close the North Sea entirely. The reason for this step may be stated in the words of the Admiralty notice which was issued on Nov. 2:

> During the last week the Germans have scattered mines indiscriminately in the open sea on the main trade route from America to Liverpool via the north of Ireland. Peaceful merchant ships have already been blown up with loss of life by this agency. The White Star liner Olympic escaped disaster by pure good luck. But for the warnings given by British cruisers, other British and neutral merchant and passenger vessels would have been destroyed. These mines cannot have been laid by any German ship of war. They have been laid by some merchant vessel flying a neutral flag which has come along the trade route as if for the purpose

NEW USE FOR OLD GUN

French artillerymen improvised a novel missile. An 80 mm. mountain gun was used to fire a mammoth bomb weighing from 100 to 200 lb., which, on exploding, made a crater some 26 ft. in diameter and 8 ft. in depth. Its extreme range was 550 yds

SIX HUNDRED STRONG

In the mountainous country in which Italy fought against Austria, the task of moving heavy guns into position presented extraordinary difficulties Neither tractors nor horses could drag the artillery up the precipitous roads, and in this case six hundred men were needed to haul a field piece to a position nearly 7000 feet above sea level

of peaceful commerce and, while profiting to the full by the immunity enjoyed by neutral merchant ships, has wantonly and recklessly endangered the lives of all who travel on the sea, regardless of whether they are friend or foe, civilian or military in character.

Their lordships added that :

They therefore give notice that the whole of the North Sea must be considered a military area. Within this area merchant shipping of all kinds, traders of all countries, fishing craft, and all other vessels will be exposed to the gravest dangers from mines which it has been necessary to lay, and from warships searching vigilantly by night and day for suspicious craft. All merchant and fishing vessels of every description are hereby warned of the dangers they encounter by entering this area except in strict accordance with Admiralty directions. Every effort will be made to convey this warning to neutral countries and to vessels on the sea, but from November 5 onwards the Admiralty announce that all ships passing a line drawn from the northern point of the Hebrides through the Faeroe Islands to Iceland do so at their own peril.

Ships of all countries wishing to trade to and from Norway, the Baltic, Denmark and Holland are advised to come, if inward bound, by the English Channel and the Strait of Dover. There they will be given sailing directions which will pass them safely, so far as Great Britain is concerned, up the east coast of England to Farne Island, whence a safe route will, if possible, be given to Lindesnaes Lighthouse. From this point they should turn north or south according to their destination, keeping as near the coast as possible. The converse applies to vessels outward bound. By strict adherence to these routes the commerce of all countries will be able to reach its destination in safety, so far as Great Britain is concerned, but any straying, even for a few miles from the course thus indicated, may be followed by fatal consequences.

On the very day of this notice, November 2, 1914, the German Admiralty received news of the victory of their China squadron over the Good Hope and Monmouth in the action off Coronel. It was then decided to send a squadron of cruisers across the North Sea in order to bombard the east coast of England. A new minefield was laid between Heligoland and Jahde Bay, where Wilhelmshaven is situated. The idea was to draw the counter-attacking British ships into the minefield, where a large flotilla of German submarines was waiting.

So as evening fell on Monday, November 2, a German squadron of three battle cruisers and four smaller cruisers, one being the Blücher, came out of Wilhelmshaven, threaded the minefield around Jahde Bay, and then made at high speed for the East Anglian coast. At dawn on Tuesday, November 3 they arrived off Yarmouth, Gorleston and Lowestoft. The only British warship in view of the Germans was the old gunboat Halcyon, lying ten miles off the coast at Lowestoft on fishing patrol duties. The German ships rained shells upon the gunboat, which had only two 4·7-in. and four 6-pounder guns. She could scarcely do 18 knots, but her captain, running her on a zigzag course, only had his ship hit eight times. Then two British destroyers, the Leopard and the Lively, arrived and sent up a screen of thick smoke, behind which the battered Halcyon got safely away.

FRIENDS IN COUNCIL

The leaders of the Allies visited one another from time to time in order to exchange ideas on the conduct of the War and discuss plans of campaign. Joffre visiting the Italian front is here seen in earnest conversation with Cadorna, the Italian generalissimo

The bombardment of Gorleston began at 7 o'clock in the morning, but at so great a range that the damage done was negligible. German destroyers, scattered northward and southward, had got into touch with the outer guard of the British battle cruiser squadron racing to the scene of action. A wireless message came to the German admiral, and, learning that a superior force was closing down upon him he turned for home at top speed and the vessels escaped into a thick mist, dropping mines as soon as they left Yarmouth Roads. As the result several trawlers and a British submarine of the D class were sunk. On the return the Germans lost the armoured cruiser Yorck. Built just before the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, she was sister-ship to the Roon, having an armament of four 8·2-in. guns and ten 6-in. guns. Losing her way in the mist while returning to Wilhelmshaven, she took the wrong path through the minefield, exploded a mine, and sank just in the entrance to Jahde Bay, thereby blocking it. Owing to the fog, rescue work was impeded, and only 177 men out of 629 were saved.

The next raid came about six weeks later. About five o'clock in the evening of Tuesday, December 15, the German battle cruiser fleet steamed out of Wilhelmshaven, and for 14 hours made at a speed of 25 knots for part of the Durham and Yorkshire coast. The British Admiralty had received news of this movement on the afternoon of the previous day, Monday. On the afternoon of the Tuesday, further messages having been decoded, the Admiralty stated "There is good probability of German battle cruisers, cruisers and destroyers being off our coast to-morrow, about daybreak." The information proved correct.

Scarborough was selected for attack, and there the German bombardment began a little after eight o'clock in the

2.22 P.M., MAY 7, 1915

On this date, ever memorable in the history of the War, the 31,500 ton Cunard liner Lusitania, sister ship of the Mauretania, was torpedoed off the Irish coast by a German submarine. She carried over 1900 passengers and crew, including many Americans



THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, SATURDAY MAY 8, 1915.

LUSITANIA TORPEDOED: 1,400 LIVES LOST

DESTRUCTION OF THE LUSITANIA.

SUNK OFF IRISH COAST BY GERMAN PIRATES.

NO WARNING.

1,978 PEOPLE ON BOARD.

FEARED LOSS OF OVER 1,400 LIVES.

SURVIVORS AT QUEENSTOWN

Yesterday afternoon the German submarine pirates committed the most ... famous outrage of which they have yet been guilty by torpedoing and sinking the famous Cunard liner Lusitania, at a point eight miles south by west of the Old Head of Kinsale, near Queenstown.

This fresh crime was perpetrated without the least warning of the submarine's intentions and without any opportunity being given to remove the 2,000 persons aboard the steamer, who included upwards of 1,900 passengers, among them many women and children.

It was not until one o'clock this morning that the first news was received of the loss of life and sufferings. From the ... had sent out a wireless message, "Come at once, big list."

At 8.30 p.m. the following message from the Admiralty was issued from the offices of the Cunard Company, for the information of the Cunard Company's steamer.

Galley Head, 4.45 p.m.—Several boats apparently survivors, E.E. side ... Cruiser steamer proceeding to assist."

During the news of the disaster to the Lusitania spread in Cockaigne the Cunard Company's offices were crowded by anxious friends and relatives.

PERIOD OF UNCERTAINTY

The American Ambassador, prior to the ... inquiries as to the latest ... received in reply to the telephone message stating ...

The first officer, it was announced, ... would be equipped with photographs of the passengers ... from New York.

One message says the ship went down in eight minutes, but another gives the time as four minutes. Probably the truth lies somewhere between the two estimates.

SURVIVORS COMING IN.

The following message was issued from the Cockspur-street offices of the Cunard Company about 9.15 p.m.:

Old Head Kinsale wires 8.15 p.m.

Motor fishing boat is towing two boats; probable number of passengers ... Tug Storm-cock is ... passengers and ...

As the evening advanced the ... grew ... Cockspur-street, ... Mr. Leslie Burgin, ... Mr. Ashley, ... Mr. Bonar Law ... Mr. Churchill ... Mr. Lloyd George ... Mr. Asquith ... Mr. Balfour



CAUGHT IN THE OPEN

As a rule supplies and ammunition were taken up to the front line at night to avoid enemy shell fire. On occasions roads some distance behind the lines were shelled when the range was found. Here in broad daylight a shell is bursting over a British convoy

Photo: Daily Mirror

morning of Wednesday, December 16. The Moltke, with her 11-in. shells, and an armoured cruiser firing 6-in. shells, came up in the mist and opened fire at close range. The first shell tore up the promenade and foreshore. Then the Grand Hotel and other prominent buildings were struck. The walls of the castle, ten feet thick, were shattered in places, and the keep damaged. In all, four children, eight women and five men were killed and over a hundred were wounded. A similar bombardment took place at Whitby, where a coastguard and a vanman were killed and two boys wounded.

At the Hartlepools the bombardment began at the same time as at Scarborough. The weather was very hazy, and the three battle cruisers got within a range of about 4,000 yards, but little military damage was done. However, no fewer than 127 men, women and children were killed, and 567 wounded.

As the German cruiser squadron steamed away from Whitby about 9.30 o'clock on Wednesday morning, December 16, the Grand Fleet was on the alert. Sent by the commander-in-chief from Scapa, Cromarty and Rosyth, the battle cruiser squadron, the six super Dreadnoughts of the 2nd battle squadron, the 3rd cruiser squadron and their attendant light cruisers and destroyers, reached the Dogger Bank at 5.30 a.m. There they caught sight of the Roon and some smaller German warships, the advance guard of the High Seas Fleet; shots were exchanged, but the British pursuit ceased on hearing that Hartlepool was being bombarded. The squadrons steamed towards the English coast to cut off the raiders, while another battle squadron was ordered out from the Forth and the Harwich force put to sea. There was almost constant fog during the day and, although the fleets came into contact and shots were exchanged between the light cruisers, this prevented any general action. The German ships succeeded in evading the clutch of their foes and their only casualty was when the battle cruiser Von der Tann accidentally rammed the light cruiser Frauenlob.

As a reply a raid by British seaplanes was directed at Cuxhaven with the Harwich force and some submarines in support. When the planes set off from their parent ships visibility was perfect; but over the land a dense frost fog made accurate bombing difficult. By the time the seaplanes had located their targets and dropped their bombs fuel was running short. Zeppelins and hostile seaplanes were out after them, and five British planes had to come down in the sea. One was rescued by the Fearless and another by a Dutch trawler. The other three came down close to the island of Norderney and their pilots were rescued by submarine E11, which dived just in time to escape two bombs dropped by a Zeppelin.

A disaster to the British ship Formidable, which was carrying out manoeuvres off the Isle of Wight, ended the year. On December 31, the last of the line, she was steaming at only ten knots and unprotected by destroyers. Without warning she was struck amidships by a torpedo, which, exploding on the starboard side abreast the foremost funnel, gave her a list of 20 degrees. Soon after she was again struck, on the port side. Only four boats could be launched and all hands were set to breaking up woodwork for life-saving purposes. Two and a half hours after she had been hit she went down with a loss of 512 men and 35 officers of a complement of 780. An extraordinarily gallant rescue of the ship's launch with 70 men was made by the Brixham trawler Provident, manned by a crew of only four men. In a full gale and a high sea the skipper gybed his vessel and brought her up alongside the sinking and overloaded boat.

CHAPTER 21

ACTION ALONG THE AISNE

The battle of the Marne was followed by the German retreat as far as the Aisne. Along the line of that river they dug their trenches which were attacked by the British and French, but without decisive result

THE events now to be described concern the adventures of the British Expeditionary Force between September 13 and the end of the month. Although during this period the line became stabilized and the troops suffered their first experience of trench warfare, it was preceded by stiffly fought actions on September 13, 14 and 15 which came to be known as the battle of the Aisne. As early as the afternoon of the 12th, Sir John French had formed the opinion that the enemy had for the moment arrested their retreat. The 6th French army had encountered considerable opposition west of Soissons, as had also the British 3rd and 2nd corps in their positions south-east of that place and south of Missy and Vailly. Describing the nature of the ground, Sir John French said :

The Aisne valley runs generally east and west, and consists of a flat-bottomed depression of width varying from half a mile to two miles, down which the river flows a winding course to the west at some points near the southern slopes of the valley, and at others near the northern. The high ground, both on the north and south of the river is, approximately, about 400 feet above the bottom of the valley, and is very similar in character, as are both slopes of the valley itself, which are broken into numerous rounded spurs and re-entrants. The most prominent of the former are the Chivre spur on the right bank and Sermoise spur on the left. Near the latter place the general plateau on the south is divided by a subsidiary valley of much the same character, down which the small river Vesle flows to the main stream near Sermoise. The slopes of the plateau overlooking the Aisne on the north and south are of varying steepness, and are covered with numerous patches of wood, which also stretch upwards and backwards over the edge on to the top of the high ground.

Several small villages and towns, of which the biggest is Soissons, are scattered along the valley and on the slopes. The Aisne itself is normally sluggish, about 170 feet wide, and in the centre 15 feet deep. It is nowhere fordable in this region.

From a defensive point of view, the Germans had taken up an extremely strong position on a high plateau above the north bank. This could not be overlooked from the south, and commanded a free view of the attackers' movements, and also of the bridges over the Aisne which they would have to cross. The Germans had made some effort to entrench and fortify this position on their march south, and now hurried forward these preparations. It was said that they had made a particular study of this area before the War, and had agents engaged in the neighbourhood. In any case, they were greatly helped by the amount of natural cover which the country afforded in the way of quarries, caves, woods and sunken roads.

At this point the German plan appears to have been to hold this admirable line, to tempt the British and French forces across the Aisne and, when opportunity offered, to deliver the counter-stroke. The release of a number of heavy howitzers from the siege of Maubeuge swelled the amount of this class of artillery which could be brought against the attacking columns. It was superior in range and power to anything which the Allies possessed, and could continue its deadly work in complete immunity from counter-attack. But when the general attack of the Allies was ordered for the morning of September 13, there was still much obscurity as to the German intention.

Their armies had been in rapid retreat since September 6, and, despite Sir John French's inkling that they were about to make a determined stand, he could not accurately gauge their strength or be certain of much more than that strong rearguards of at least three army corps were opposing his advance. The French had no more certain information. Foch, on September 13, occupied Reims, and de Langle de Cary fought his way to the upper Suippe. Maunoury continued to press the Germans west of Soissons and, supported by the British 3rd corps, his 6th army forced the Germans back over the river at Soissons, and on September 13 crossed the Aisne at Attichy and Vic.

On that morning Sir John French gave orders that his force was to advance and make good the Aisne. Actually the general battle did not begin until the next day, although a very skilful and daring crossing was effected by the 11th brigade, under Brigadier-General Hunter-Weston, during the night. This commander was ordered at 9 p.m. on September 12 to lead his brigade to the bridge at



CEASELESS VIGIL

The destroyer flotillas were constantly at sea. In the heaviest weather they patrolled the English Channel and the North Sea, protecting commerce, hunting submarines, and often saving the crews of ships that had been mined or torpedoed by the enemy

OUT TO KILL

Below are shown the officers of a German submarine which has come to the surface during its hunt for enemy ships. U boats were often submerged for long periods and great endurance was called for from their crews

SINKING OF THE HOSPITAL SHIP ANGLIA

On November 18, 1915, the British hospital ship Anglia, which a short time before had brought King George home after
The first vessel to come to the rescue was also mined, but destroyers, one of which is here seen,

ent in France, struck a mine in the English Channel.
ered the Anglia's S O S

DOWN BY THE HEAD

The officers, crew, nurses and wounded on board the Anglia numbered 385, of whom 300 were saved by the patrolling destroyers. The photograph shows the ship, her bows submerged, a few minutes before she sank, with the rescuing destroyers

HER LAST PLUNGE

Just before the Anglia sank the rescuing destroyer and boats were forced to sheer off. Those who went down with her, including some of the nurses who had worked heroically to save the wounded, are seen clustered in the stern

Venizel, a few miles east of Soissons. He sent forward reconnoitring officers, and himself reached the position at 1 a.m., when it was reported to him that the bridge was all but impassable, but that there was a precarious possibility of getting the troops over in single file.

The brigadier made a personal examination, and decided to take the risk of transporting his troops over a section of concrete roadway from under which the girders had been blown away. Ammunition was manhandled, and the operation was completely successful by 3 a.m. on the 13th. The Germans were surprised and hurriedly retreated, while Hunter-Weston's brigade occupied a position on the edge of the plateau from the spur north of Ste. Marguerite to a point two miles north-east of Soissons. This was a fine performance, following as it did a march of 30 miles in drenching rain by troops who had had no proper food for twenty-four hours.

On the right of the British line the cavalry was early on the move, reconnoitring the crossings of the Aisne at Villers and Bourg. Bridges were found to be destroyed, and the dragoons came under some sharp fire from the houses on the south bank. Later a crossing was effected by the cavalry over a partially destroyed aqueduct, and the infantry of the 1st division, who were able to make some progress on the north bank. Meanwhile, the 5th brigade of the 2nd division crossed at Pont Arcy, where the bridge had not been sufficiently destroyed to debar a foot passage, and were thus able to cover the engineers in the construction of a pontoon bridge.

On the left the 2nd corps met with severe checks, their leading troops having reached the river at 9 a.m. At Condé the Germans had left the bridge intact, but obviously as a ruse to lure the British into the field of fire of their machine guns, a trap wisely avoided. The 5th infantry brigade found another safer, if more difficult, crossing over the broken girders of a bridge which was not entirely submerged. At Vailly and other places improvised rafts were used. The British engineers worked with the greatest energy. During the first two days of the battle they constructed eight pontoon bridges and one foot bridge, while five of the damaged bridges had been repaired sufficiently to carry traffic. All this work was carried out in heavy rain under severe fire from the German artillery. East of the British Franchet D'Espérey crossed above Bourg late on the 13th, keeping contact with the British right.

Everywhere during this day detachments of British troops were crossing the river as and when it became practicable. The 12th brigade was able to defile gradually over the damaged bridge at Venizel which had been earlier crossed by Hunter-Weston's brigade. The French 6th army was able to make continuous headway at Soissons, although the advance was considerably harassed by the German batteries which outranged their guns.

By about midday the Aisne had been crossed on both flanks of the British army, and these passages secured. The centre remained closed. Sir Douglas Haig believed that the gap between the German 1st and 2nd armies, which had been caused during their retreat from the Marne, still existed, and that the opportunity for a break through was very promising. Certainly, by nightfall the situation was by no means discouraging, and the Germans had lost any chance, had they desired it, of driving the 1st corps back over the Aisne. Farther to the left on the 2nd corps front General Hubert Hamilton (3rd division) ordered the advance of the 8th infantry brigade at Vailly. The bridges had been destroyed, but over one the Germans had left a single plank spanning the breach which they had made. About 3 p.m. the 2nd Royal Scots and 2nd Royal Irish began to cross under shell fire, in single file over this narrow passage, and established themselves on the high ground north-west of Vailly. The rest of the 8th brigade and the 9th brigade followed, and during the night occupied their positions on the north bank.

The crossing at Missy (by the 13th infantry brigade) was effected at nightfall by means of rafts manufactured from materials collected on the ground. The 1st Royal West Kents, negotiating the river by this means, had the good fortune to surprise a German patrol which might otherwise have carried news to the rear and brought disaster in the way of artillery and machine-gun fire on the troops who were propelling themselves by this cumbrous form of transport. A raft big enough to carry sixty men was also used at Moulin des Roches above Venizel, where two battalions of the 14th infantry brigade crossed the river by this means, and were beginning their advance by 3 p.m. towards Chivres, a forward movement which was brought to a standstill by heavy artillery fire. Their raft was used later by the 15th brigade.

On the German side an advantage was gained by the fact that divisions were becoming available to fill their gaps. Their 15th corps and 7th cavalry division had been ordered westward from Alsace, and the 7th reserve corps arrived on September 13 to take up a position north of the Aisne. So narrow was the margin of time that it was only two hours ahead of the attack of the British 1st corps. The German 15th corps was able to stop the French advance on the right and both corps had forced marches, the 7th corps having been released only shortly before by the fall of Maubeuge.

Here occurred an instance of disobedience of orders which was entirely justified, and completely altered the course of events. General von Zwehl, commanding the 7th corps, was instructed by General von Bülow to march to a position 15 miles east of Chavonne to protect his (Bülow's) right. Had he done so the Chemin des Dames would have been left clear for Sir Douglas Haig's advance. Zwehl, however, considered that the immediate danger was too great to justify such a manoeuvre, and prudently kept his corps in a position to resist the British. The German 7th corps was, in fact, ready when the British 1st corps made its passage of the Aisne. Despite their forced marches, these troops were comparatively fresh, and had not suffered the hardships of the German retreat to the Aisne.

Before dawn on September 14 the British cavalry division, the 1st division and the 5th brigade were on the north bank of the Aisne, between Paissy and Verneuil, with a gap of five miles between them and the 8th and 9th brigades at Vauxelles. A further gap of three miles separated them from troops of the 13th, 14th and 15th brigades on a line Missy–Ste. Marguerite–Crouy. On the south bank, not yet across the river, were the 3rd and 5th cavalry brigades, the 6th and 7th infantry brigades, with the 19th brigade in reserve.

At this stage of the battle, when deadlock was so very near at hand, there still existed a reasonable hope that a more decisive blow might be inflicted on the enemy. There was a moment on September 13 when, as it is said in the British Official History, "the prospects of a break through were never brighter," but the opportunity was lost through too tentative an advance and "the failure of the High Command to appreciate the situation." It is added that "in the G.H.Q. orders there was no hint whatever of the importance of time."

Sir John French, however, considered that he was justified in attempting a further energetic pursuit on the next day. General Joffre also issued a "Special Instruction," ordering the

'SOMEWHERE IN FRANCE'

Concert parties to entertain the troops during their periods of rest behind the lines came into being when trench warfare was established. This open-air theatre in its beautiful surroundings is many miles behind the line. British and French troops, nurses and a few civilians form the audience listening to songs in English and French

pursuit to be continued "energetically" in a northerly direction. Accordingly, Sir Douglas Haig, making the Chemin des Dames his first objective, ordered the 1st division to advance to this section from Cerny westward to Courtecon and the 2nd division from Courtecon to the tunnel of the Oise by Pargny. The 2nd and 3rd corps were also ordered to push northward.

Early in the morning troops of the 1st corps were close to Troyon and a sugar factory near the Chemin des Dames, in contact with the German main line of entrenchments. About noon the factory was stormed after a fierce resistance, and a little later a general advance was ordered. If there had been sufficient force on the spot the German line might have been broken with shattering results. As it was, not more than 15,000 tired men were available, and these encountered a violent fire and were too few to reap the full harvest of their success. Yet they obtained a firm footing on the upland, captured 12 guns and 600 prisoners, and inflicted heavy loss upon the Germans. At the critical moment German reinforcements came up, counter-attacked, and stopped all progress. The line which the British had gained was held for over three years without any marked change, and the German line confronting it was never again heavily attacked until 1917. At this stage of the battle, it is said, the Germans hesitated to press their attacks a l'outrance as the spirited British assault led them to suspect the presence of large reserves.

The day was full of incident. Early in the morning the 2nd Royal Sussex were taking prisoners, as many as were spared from the rifle shots of their own comrades. Others surrendered to the 2nd King's Royal Rifles and in that act were, many of them, shot in the back by their supporting companies. A heavy fog lay on the ground and it is quite possible that this slaughter may have been accidental. In one instance, the 1st Coldstream Guards took the Germans around them for British troops and the Germans mistook the Coldstream for their own. Fortunately for the Coldstreamers they were the first to discover the mistake and were able to inflict severe punishment on their enemies. The Germans had an advantage in having their batteries already in position on the fogbound battlefield. The British guns, following up the advance, had to restrain their fire until they were certain of the exact battle line of the infantry.

As the fog cleared the German counter-attacks became more determined, and though the 1st corps as a whole held its ground, small distances had to be given up here and there. The fierce character of the fighting in which Sir Douglas Haig's troops had been engaged may be judged from the fact that on this day their casualties amounted to 3,500 men. But at such a cost they had made a very appreciable advance, which was, unfortunately, not the case with the 2nd and 3rd corps who had remained practically stationary.

Gaps existed in the British line which could not be regarded as anything but serious. A mile and a half distance lay between the 2nd and 3rd divisions and the 5th and 4th divisions were cut off from the rest of the army by the promontory of Chivres. Moreover, every available man had been thrown into this all too lengthy line and Sir John French had literally no reserves to call upon. Had the Germans been aware of this state of affairs they might have made a very determined effort to crush the British force once and for all. As it was, however, they were still contemplating the possible necessity of a further retirement.

Difficulties were increased by the fact that there was as yet no satisfactory bridge over the Aisne, which had become a swollen torrent after the incessant rain, so much so that the temporary pontoons were in some danger of being swept away. Only over these improvised bridges could ammunition and rations be sent to the fighting line or the wounded evacuated. Despite all these disabilities, Sir John French hoped to continue his advance on the next day.

He was in this respect disappointed and on September 15 was obliged to

ICH DIEN

Throughout the War the Prince of Wales lived up to his motto Ich Dien (I serve). He is here shown in a French village in the autumn of 1915 when his rank was only that of lieutenant. Many times during the War he went among the troops in the front line with a disregard of danger that caused anxiety to the authorities

FROM STRICKEN FIELD

In the autumn of 1915 there was heavy fighting in Champagne, but on this section of the front the destruction behind the lines was much less evident than was the case in Flanders. Here an untouched farmyard is being used as a clearing station

Photo: Topical

give orders to his troops to entrench and attempt by counter-fire to reduce the heavy German batteries. General Joffre also had to relinquish any idea of pressing rapidly forward and ordered a " methodical " attack. This, however, resulted in the end in methodical defence on the part of the Allies, for the Germans made a very determined effort at this stage to throw back the French and British from the north bank.

Moroccan infantry, to the east of the British, entrenched under a violent fire, but Franchet d'Espérey's advance was generally checked by the forces gathering in his front and the strength of the German fortified position. Without heavy long-range artillery the attack on the German entrenchments was difficult, and the French had no advantage in numbers.

Next day, the 16th, Maunoury's 6th army, which was clinging to the edge of the plateau north-west of Soissons, was counter-attacked by the Germans under a tremendous fire from their heavy artillery, and in a series of desperate encounters was slowly forced back from Autrèches and Nouvron, both of which places thenceforth remained in German hands. Soissons was bombarded by the German 8-in. and 11-in. howitzers, and great damage was done to it ; the French bridges were kept under heavy and constant fire.

Eager to make contact with the German right flank, Maunoury succeeded in advancing some distance up the Oise valley. The British 3rd corps south of Vregny held on with difficulty. Its remaining division, the 6th, commanded by Major-General J. L. Keir, arrived from England on this day and was kept in reserve south of the Aisne. On the night of the 3rd, the 2nd corps was obliged by heavy losses to retire on Missy, though one of its divisions advanced north of Vailly after fierce fighting. The 1st corps near the Chemin des Dames was not seriously molested, although they suffered a good many casualties from gun fire. Farther east Franchet d'Espérey made a spirited attack on the Craonne plateau, hoping to pierce the Germans' centre, but they were sufficiently strong to repulse him.

Fighting of a more or less open character occurred during the next few days, but actually from this time we may date the beginning of that trench warfare which was to lock both armies to the ground for four years. As the months passed by preparations for holding these hundreds of miles of ditches became more and more elaborate, but at the outset neither side had had any training in this form of warfare. The possibility that the first battles might lead to such a stalemate seems to have been little appreciated. Everything in German and French strategy was based on the quick and decisive blow.

When they stood on the Aisne the Germans must have known that they were gazing on the ruin of their best hopes and were now committed to a contest of endurance sometimes called " siege warfare in the field." In its early stages they had one great advantage. The German soldier had no more skill in building and fortifying entrenchments than the French or British, but he had been supplied with the apparatus necessary to reduce the French frontier fortresses—quantities of heavy guns, trench mortars, hand grenades, flares, etc.—and these were adaptable for use in defending an entrenched line. As the war progressed, it must be agreed, the Germans became far more skilful and more

Photo Alfieri

REARGUARD STANDS FAST

One of the hardest duties that falls to the soldier in wartime is to hold an outpost in face of a strong enemy advance. Here a small detachment of French soldiers, with no other protection save a wooden palisade, stands fast, but at heavy cost

ALL PRESENT AND CORRECT

An Indian infantry battalion has disembarked at Basra to join the Mesopotamian expedition, and before marching off the roll call is taken. During the war India sent over 600,000 men to fight the Turks in Mesopotamia

thorough than the Allies in strengthening their defensive line, but it is doubtful whether the vastly superior protection which they secured for their troops was in the highest emergency of real value to them. The palatial galleries of the Hindenburg line, with dug-outs so deep that no shell could damage them, must have been extremely comfortable to live in but every soldier knows how difficult they must have been to leave.

On September 17, Maunoury continued his efforts to work round the German right, and was informed that Joffre was reinforcing him to strike at that flank. The British did not attempt any further important advance, but on the afternoon of that day the 1st Northamptons in the 1st corps by their effective fire compelled a German detachment to put up their hands and come into the British line. When the Germans saw how few the British were, they turned on their assailants treacherously and killed or wounded 152 men, but were themselves shot down to a man. That at least is the version of an unpleasant incident which is still generally believed. It was not an isolated occurrence, as the 2nd King's Royal Rifles had a similar experience which they were also able to avenge. It is possible, of course, that they may have been signs of surrender made as incitements to troops on the other side to lay down their arms or they may have been unofficial and individual surrenders immediately punished by commanders in the field. The German General von Zwehl made the same accusation against the British.

The Allied advance had by now completely petered out and the French on the British right had to fall back as the result of the failure of the attack of the 5th army on the Craonne plateau. Sir John French did not press his offensive, in view of the fact that Joffre had decided to try to dislodge the Germans by turning their right flank. The German position had become too strong to be stormed by frontal attack as the forces on each side were about equal, and the Germans had the advantage of ground and a great superiority in heavy guns and machine guns. They now endeavoured to disturb a readjustment of the Allied armies which was about to take place. They attacked the 5th French army on the British right, and after a sharp struggle succeeded in re-capturing Fort Brimont, a height near Reims, from which they had retreated after the Marne. From it they proceeded to shell the city.

Maunoury was expecting reinforcement on his flank from the 7th army (de Castlenau) and attempted to move on Noyon on the 18th. They captured a small amount of ground north-east of Crouy. The British on his right were attacked near the Chemin des Dames, and without yielding ground anywhere beat off the Germans. Indeed the 1st Gloucesters made a successful rally and captured four machine guns. The 19th was a comparatively quiet day on the British front but on the 20th a more serious attack appeared about to develop. The Moroccan troops who held the line immediately to the right of the British were driven in. They made an excellent recovery but repeated attacks forced them back, and in endeavouring to fill the gap thus caused and cover their own flanks the 1st West Yorkshire met with severe disaster, being practically wiped out by the strength of the German enfilade fire. The right of the British line being thus left in the air, every possible expedient was taken to secure it. A counter-attack was attempted by the 1st East Yorkshire, who however found it impossible to make headway. The 2nd cavalry brigade was hurried forward with further supporting battalions, the 2nd Royal Sussex and 2nd Sherwood Foresters, and by 4.30 p.m. the lost trenches were regained in a counter-attack by the Sherwood Foresters. Casualties during the whole of this action was very heavy, amounting

WASTE NOT WANT NO

In Mesopotamia, as in other theatres of war, the expenditure of ammunition was great. Thousands of shell cases with which the battlefields were strewn were collected and returned to the base, eventually to be melted down and used over again

to 400 killed and wounded of all ranks and 500 missing.

Determined attacks were made elsewhere along the British line. East of the Oise and Aisne canal the 1st King's (Liverpool) were mainly responsible for throwing back an extremely heavy onslaught which they did with few casualties to themselves. Another threatening attempt was made against the line held by the 7th brigade but was finally repulsed by the Wiltshires, Irish Rifles, South Lancashires and Worcesters. This brigade sustained 400 casualties but inflicted tremendous punishment on the enemy.

In fact, this day, September 20, resulted in the Germans being everywhere repulsed, the French having met with much the same attacks and also being successful in repelling them. But the Germans had a longer end in view than attempting to break the allied line at stated points. They were particularly anxious to prevent a simultaneous movement with their own towards the west and the only way this could be done was by engaging their enemies in the field, thus making it impossible for them to release any considerable body of troops. For by this time the Germans had realized that they would be obliged to extend their line towards the channel ports.

The closing phases of the battle were not marked by any major action, though isolated attacks were made notably on the 25th, when the 1st South Wales Borderers distinguished themselves by holding on to their positions at Mont Faucon despite all the efforts of a strong German force to oust them. By October 1 offensive action had ceased and was succeeded by normal trench warfare, with its irritating accompaniments of raids, patrols, fatigue parties and spasmodic shell fire.

The battle of the Aisne ending as it did in deadlock was something of a failure on both sides. The Allies did not succeed in delivering the decisive blow and the Germans, though they had manoeuvered for the best position and were now firmly entrenched in the heart of France, had lost any hope of a quick decision.

The casualties on both sides were very heavy. The British loss was 561 officers and 12,980 men, or more than one fifth of the British force engaged, and it is quite certain that the German casualties were on the same scale. They may even have been greater, for the German official account refers to September 26 as "the bloodiest battle day of the whole of this period of the War," and of the battle as a whole it is said: "A great part of the German armies suffered irreparable loss of officers and men." There is added the further comment, "Nowhere had the armies won any ground worth mention, far less beaten the enemy in these battles; but what was more serious was the disappearance of the hitherto unshaken faith in the irresistible might of the German attacks."

As a military operation the battle of the Aisne has a special interest in so far that the passage of the river was made frontally without possibility of manoeuvre. The Germans say that their whole theory of war demanded that they should retire to secure a long field of fire, leaving only a thin line to protect their front, but they have still to account for their failure to destroy the aqueduct at Bourg, without which passage it is unlikely that the British would have been able to maintain their positions on the north bank. Certainly if the guns had not been able to use this passage Sir Douglas Haig would have been far more hampered in his attack on the Chemin des Dames. Much military experience was gained from the battles by all ranks. The allied generals learnt that heavy artillery must be provided on a far more plentiful scale and plans to fulfil this need were hurried forward, though naturally it took many months before anything approaching equality with the Germans was reached.

CHAPTER 22

HOW ANTWERP FELL

Likened by Napoleon to "a pistol pointed at the heart of England" this Belgian fortress was captured by the Germans after a short siege. The British Naval Division helped the Belgian garrison in its heroic but unavailing defence

ANTWERP was the final fortress of Belgium and the last refuge of its army. When Brussels had fallen, the king and government made the city their headquarters and the field army retired to its defences. This force was fairly intact and was not content to play a purely passive rôle while the French and British were retreating or engaged in the struggle of the Marne. Three valuable sorties were made which caused the Germans much anxiety and which occupied large bodies of their troops. The first of these sorties began on August 24; Malines was re-captured, as was also Alost, whilst the left wing of the attack menaced Cortenburg between Brussels and Louvain.

To suppress this counter-attack, which was gravely threatening their communications, the Germans had to divert at least three divisions which might have played a decisive part elsewhere on the battlefield. The action was broken off on the 25th, but the annoyance which the Germans felt at the interruption to their main plan is said to have excited the fury of vengeance which they wreaked on cities such as Louvain, Malines and Termonde.

The second sortie from Antwerp took place on September 9 at the height of the battle of the Marne. The direction of the attack was towards Aerschot and Louvain. Termonde, Aerschot and Kessel were recaptured, but on the 11th German reinforcements became available and on the 13th the Belgian army was forced to retire to the Nethe, the river which winds round Antwerp towards the south-west. The third and last sortie was made on September 26, but the Germans were now so strongly determined on the capture of Antwerp that only minor fighting occurred before the Belgians retired again on their fortress.

After the battle of the Aisne, both sides stretched out westward to the coast, still bent on outflanking each other. It became clear to the allied command that unless their line could be so extended as to rest on Antwerp that city must eventually be doomed. Brialmont's obsolete fortifications could have no more chance against the German siege artillery than they had had at Liège and Namur. The only hope the Belgians had was to keep those deadly pieces out of range. This quickly proved to be impossible.

For the moment they had no other thought than to hold their city to the last while preserving a safe egress for their army through which, in the event of abandonment, they could rejoin the main allied forces. The Belgian engineers had worked ceaselessly to make the defensive line more secure and the nature of the country suggested the obvious expedient of inundation. Large areas were flooded, obstacles to the field of fire removed, and shallow entrenchments dug. But the floods proved in the end a disadvantage, for, in the picturesque words of the British official historian, "The clearing of the foreground had unfortunately the effect of making the forts clearly visible to the enemy; they stood up like islands in the midst of a calm green sea: mere targets for a hidden foe."

The kaiser had given orders for the reduction of Antwerp as early as September 9, but it was not until September 28 that the intensive bombardment of the outer forts began.

General von Beseler, an engineer officer, was placed in charge of the siege and ordered to expedite the capture of the city as the troops he would employ were urgently needed for operations elsewhere. He had at his disposal a

DUST OF DESTRUCTION

The huge areas of country over which fighting took place in the African campaigns and the absence of good roads made the possession or destruction of the railway tracks a matter of supreme importance. Here a railway in South-West Africa has been effectively put out of action

Photo: Topical

FOR THE LAST CAMP FIRE

Much military material that was still serviceable was successfully carried away when Gallipoli was evacuated in December, 1915. Other stores were piled in huge dumps ready to be set on fire when the last men left. The photograph shows the scene at W Beach two days before the evacuation

Photo: Central News

battery of siege artillery, including four 16·2 in. naval guns and four 12 in. Austrian Skoda mortars, released by the fall of Maubeuge. Compared with these the guns of the Antwerp forts were mere toys. In the matter of troops conditions were more equal, Beseler having four to four and a half divisions under his command, amounting to approximately 120,000 men, while the garrison of Antwerp consisted of some 80,000 soldiers, the field army in support numbering 65,000.

With regard to artillery the Belgians were in a very inferior position. They had no guns with a maximum range of more than 5 or 6 miles while those of the Germans could be directed with perfect precision up to 7½ miles. But with their field army in a position to manoeuvre, they were not despairing of making a stout defence could they but receive assistance from their allies.

From a strategic point of view the city was highly important. After the fall of Namur the shortest line of allied defence ran from Antwerp south-west to Mons and thence south-west to Longwy. With the fall of Brussels the Germans were already across this line and had separated the Belgian army from the French. A circuitous contact could be established through Courtrai and Ghent, but once the German host was liberated by the fall of Antwerp that area of country and more would be speedily overrun. The French and English divisions on the Aisne could spare not a single soldier, and the difficulty of finding reinforcements for the defence of the city was considerable.

But so long as the city of Antwerp held out it was a constant menace to the German right wing. So soon as the easing of the pressure in the south should enable the Allies to transfer troops northwards, a blow might be struck at the German rear which might well prove decisive. With the fall of Antwerp, apart from the enormous loss of prestige and morale which would be sustained, any further hope of a crushing offensive on the German flank and rear would have to be abandoned.

The defences of Antwerp were in three lines; first the walls and ramparts of the city which could afford useful protection for the infantry but were useless against artillery. Secondly a close ring of forts a mile and a half outside the city boundary defending the southern and eastern approaches. Third, an outer ring of forts from seven to nine miles from the city, while across the whole southern and south-eastern front ran the river Nethe.

Having moved his troops and heavy guns across the marshy ground the first barrier which the German commander met was the ring of outer forts south of the Nethe with the intervals between the forts held by the entrenched Belgian infantry. It was against this position that the bombardment of the 28th was directed. It was now clear that the most urgent measures must be taken if Antwerp was to be saved or even enabled to hold out for a useful period.

The situation was being watched with the gravest anxiety in London where the strategic mind of the first lord of the admiralty, Mr. Winston Churchill, had first realized the peril that would arise if Antwerp and the Channel ports were allowed to fall into the hands of the Germans. It will be remembered that he had already dispatched a brigade of marines to Ostend and these troops had served a useful purpose in keeping the Germans alert to, and nervous of, a

FINAL FIRES AT SUVLA

This photograph was taken from the deck of H.M.S. Cornwallis, the last warship to leave the waters of Suvla Bay. On shore war material is burning and long after the last man had left the Turks continued to bombard the flames in ignorance of what the fires indicated

DECEIVING THE TURK

A steam pinnace is towing a raft laden with guns and men from Suvla bay to a transport during the evacuation. So completely were the Turks deceived as to the Allies' intentions that they took the movement of troops and material between the ships and the shore to be only part of the routine work of reinforcement and replacement

British demonstration on the coast. The headquarters of this brigade were afterwards moved to Cassel, an isolated hill 18 miles south of Ypres, whence they were able to range the country and employ their armoured cars against German patrols. They were now to become available for the defence of Antwerp.

On September 29 the Germans made a serious breach in the fortress line by virtually demolishing the important fort of Wavre Ste. Catherine and badly damaging that of Waelhem. This result, achieved after a day's bombardment, showed what little chance the forts would have against systematic reduction. The Germans could range them with the greatest exactitude and destroy by sheer weight of metal (their heaviest shells weighed over a ton) all their defensive apparatus.

At this time therefore the Belgians began to prepare for evacuation, making Ostend their new base and transporting thither such materials and men as could be spared from the defence. Lord Kitchener was as much alive as Mr. Winston Churchill to the dangers which must accrue from the loss of Antwerp, and when the serious bombardment began he sent a staff officer, Colonel Dallas, to the city to make him a personal report on the situation.

This observer found the Belgian minister of war profoundly pessimistic of the chances of preserving the city unless an operation could be launched on the German flank, preferably from the neighbourhood of Ghent. Lord Kitchener than proposed to the French government that if they would detach a sufficient number of regular troops for the relief of Antwerp, he would also throw in such regular reserves as he could spare. Territorial troops, such as the French had offered, were, he considered, useless for such an operation and he firmly refused to send his own regular troops to cooperate with them.

Mr. Winston Churchill has said that up to this time he was sanguine that something would occur to bring relief to Antwerp, and indeed on the evening of October 2 he set out for Dunkirk on business connected with the marine brigade which had been sent there at General Joffre's request. When about 20 miles out of London his train was stopped, the engine reversed, and the first lord hurried back to Victoria.

On his arrival Churchill received an urgent summons to Lord Kitchener's house in Carlton Gardens where, in anxious conference with the secretary of state for war, he found Sir Edward Grey, the first sea lord, Prince Louis of Battenberg and Sir William Tyrrell. They had in front of them a telegraphed communiqué from the British minister in Antwerp, Sir Francis Villiers, which had been received at ten o'clock that night. It contained the information



Forts erected by Brialmont, the famous engineer, to protect Antwerp. They were bombarded and taken by the Germans in October, 1914

WAR IN A WASTE OF WATERS

The fighting in Mesopotamia, the land between the historic rivers, Tigris and Euphrates, was hindered during mid-winter by floods. As soon as the floods receded columns of mules carried the food and munitions of the advancing army across the watery plain

Photo: Daily Mirror

that the Belgian government had decided to move on the following day to Ostend and that the king with the advance guard of the field army would withdraw in the direction of Ghent to protect the coast line, eventually, it was hoped to co-operate with the allied armies. The Belgians believed that the city would hold out for five or six days, but the British minister was of opinion that, with the court and government gone, this was unlikely. He added that in view of the critical situation the most responsible Belgian opinion was that no other course was possible if the field army was to avoid the risk of capture.

Such was the gist of the message which came as a thunderbolt to those who were considering it under Lord Kitchener's roof. But almost simultaneously advices were received from Colonel Dallas to the effect that the situation had not materially changed for the worse and that the Belgians were contemplating a strong counter-attack in the neighbourhood of the last fort Wavre Ste. Catherine. There seemed, therefore, to be no sinister turn of events to justify the disastrous decision.

The council in London took immediate steps to harden the resolution of the Belgians. They sent a telegram urging a further effort till the course of the main battle in France was determined. They expressed the hope that help might be sent from the main army and promised the immediate dispatch of the marine brigade to assist in the defence. It is only just to add that the Belgian official account of this period states that "Contrary to what the British government and Mr. Churchill in particular believed, there had been no question on October 2 of evacuating the fortified position of Antwerp next day. The council of national defence only contemplated the departure of the members of the government for the new base in preparation at Ostend." Otherwise the move only embraced materials and stores and "No decision had yet been taken with regard to the departure of the field army."

It was decided that Mr. Winston Churchill should travel at once to Antwerp to examine the situation on the spot, and a telegram was sent by Sir Edward Grey to the Belgian government announcing his arrival and begging that he might have an audience with King Albert on the following day before any final decision as to the departure of the government was taken. While Churchill was on his momentous journey Lord Kitchener was again in telegraphic communication with the French enquiring what measure of assistance they could afford, what form it would take, and when it would be available. The reply was that a territorial division and a brigade of Fusiliers Marins would be sent to Dunkirk on the 7th.

The situation, as it was explained to the first lord on his arrival on the 3rd, was that while the outer forts were falling the inner forts were also being attacked and that nothing could prevent their gradual demolition. Monsieur de Broqueville, the Belgian prime minister, told Mr. Churchill:

> The army was tired and dispirited through having been left so long entirely upon its own resources without ever a sign of the allies for whom they had risked so much. Material of every kind—guns, ammunition, searchlights, telephones, entrenching materials—was scanty. The water supply of the city had been cut off. There were many rumours of German sympathisers in its large population of 400,000. At any moment the front might be broken in under the heavy artillery attack which was then in progress. But this was only half the danger. The life and honour of the Belgian nation did not depend on Antwerp, but on its army. To lose Antwerp was disastrous; to lose the army as well was fatal. The Scheldt was barred by a severe interpretation of neutrality. The only line of retreat was by a dangerous flank march parallel to the Dutch frontier and the sea coast. Two Belgian divisions and the cavalry division were staving off the Germans from the only remaining line of retreat. But the pressure was increasing, and the line of the Dendre was no longer intact. If Ghent fell before the Belgian army made good its retreat, nothing would be saved from the ruin.

Mr. Churchill revived Belgian hopes by again detailing possible measures of assistance and was able in the evening to wire Lord Kitchener that he had obtained the assurance that every effort would be made to hold out for another ten days. He himself remained in Antwerp personally inspecting the front

and awaiting the arrival of the two naval brigades from England which he had asked to be immediately dispatched. Lord Kitchener proposed to supplement this force which, with the Marine brigade already in Flanders, constituted the infantry of the Naval division, by the newly formed 7th division under Major-General Sir Thompson Capper.

On the next day, October 4, the Royal Marine brigade, under the command of Major-General Paris, arrived at Antwerp and took up a position in the line opposite Lierre. The Germans made every preparation to break the Belgian line on the Nethe between Lierre and Duffel. At one point they forced the Belgians to retreat, but in the main the line held well, and Mr. Winston Churchill was able to send cheerful telegrams to Lord Kitchener during the day. He was highly satisfied with his own Marine brigade, which had received a dusting from the Germans and had stood well. It is interesting to note that on this day the first lord, feeling himself so deeply involved in his present task, and conscious that it was wrong to leave his urgent Admiralty duties for so long unattended, offered to resign his office and take formal charge of the British forces. But this offer was not accepted, and it was decided to send Sir Henry Rawlinson to take up the position of G.O.C. the operations.

On October 5 two German reserve battalions, with the aid of a roughly constructed trestle bridge, were able to cross the Nethe below Lierre and could not be thrown back before they were reinforced. Some further advance was also made through the outskirts of Lierre, but there having been no effective crossing of the Nethe, it was still possible to consider the city and the inner forts secure from heavy bombardment. During the early hours of the 6th, however, a badly supported Belgian counter-attack was driven back and a retirement became necessary to a position midway between the Nethe and the inner forts. This loss of ground, when the Germans could exploit it, meant that they could range their guns on Antwerp and force its surrender.

On these days also the Belgians faced a serious threat in the neighbourhood of Termonde and Schoonaerde on the Schelde which might gravely threaten their lines of escape. During the 5th and 6th energetic attempts were made to force the passage of the Schelde, and so cut off the retreat of the Belgian army. Both at Termonde and at Schoonaerde the Belgians were compelled to fight desperately to prevent the crossing, and only the lack of adequate artillery support prevented the Germans from achieving their aim. Although the attacks were unsuccessful, such warnings could not be disregarded. Moreover, the expected reinforcements had failed to materialize, and with every day the invaders were creeping slowly farther westwards. The fall of Antwerp was a matter of a few days at best, and if the Belgian army was to escape through the narrow corridor still open on the west it was time for it to move. Accordingly on the 6th and 7th the Belgian field army was moved to the west bank of the Schelde and the defence of the city was left to the garrison and the small British force.

During the day the two expected naval brigades had arrived at Antwerp, and as their sponsor, Mr. Winston Churchill, admits, they were "partially trained and ill equipped." It was, indeed, said that their accoutrements were tied together with string. But he was himself on the spot to decide into what part of the line they should be thrown. The battle was at this time a moving action and he realized that "ardent and determined" as they were, it would be unwise to submit them to immediate manoeuvre. He, therefore, with the agreement of General Deguise, the Belgian commander, chose for them a position entrenched between the inner forts in the hope that if the front line held until evening they could go forward in support. This eventuality did not arise, for the Belgian divisions were forced to retire, and the best that could

Photo: Central News

HEAD DOWN, HELMET UP

The Gallipoli peninsula was evacuated by the British in December, 1915. The idea of deceiving the Turks was maintained until the very end, and snipers are here invited to waste their cartridges on an elevated sun helmet

LINK WITH THE PAST

Rafts made of inflated skins have been used on the Tigris from time immemorial, and when the British went to Mesopotamia they employed a modern adaptation of that age-old device for pontoon bridges. Here infantry are seen crossing a river by a bridge supported during rainy periods on inflated cylinders of canvas

be said for the newly arrived naval troops is that they were not seriously attacked during that night. Assured of the effectiveness of their guns to achieve their military object, the Germans launched no infantry attack in this quarter.

On the morning of the 7th, helped by a fog, two battalions of German infantry crossed the Schelde at Schoonaerde in boats. A bridge was built before evening, when two further battalions of the same brigade were able to follow. This success itself was menacing enough, leaving as it did an avenue of only twelve miles between Schoonaerde and the Dutch frontier available for the escape of the Belgian army. A further step was therefore taken to secure its safety by a withdrawal over the Terneuzen canal, running northwards from Ghent towards the Dutch frontier. Of the forts, those of Broechem and Kessel were found to be evacuated when the Germans entered them, but the most important work which they did during the day was to begin to bring their heavy artillery over the Nethe.

This was an engineering feat of no mean accomplishment considering the immense bridging difficulties to be overcome. It is due to German correctitude to acknowledge that warning was given of the impending bombardment, and shortly before midnight 6-inch howitzer shells began to fall in the residential quarters of the city. The British Royal Naval Division with the Belgian 2nd division were still holding the line of the inner forts. Elsewhere on the field the Belgian field army was steadily on the move between the coast and Ghent, the French Fusiliers Marins were on their way to that city, the British 7th division were concentrating at Bruges, and of the main British Expeditionary Force the 2nd corps had reached a position near Abbeville.

On October 8 the decision was taken to evacuate Antwerp. In the morning the German attack near Schoonaerde was heavily reinforced and pushed forward sufficiently to menace the Belgian railway at Lokeren, which was on one of the only two lines which could be used for evacuation. This was now proceeded with as rapidly as possible and a flank guard assembled round Ghent consisting of two Belgian brigades, eight squadrons of Belgian cavalry and the French marines who were never able to reach Antwerp. The British 7th division, in answer to a German threat from Lille, moved from Bruges to Ostend. On the night of the 8th the Belgian field army might congratulate itself that it had virtually escaped any danger of envelopment.

There remained, however, in a far more precarious position the Belgian garrison and the Royal Naval Division still holding on in front of the city. The chief danger to their eventual escape was the very close approach of the Germans to the railway line at Lokeren, while the chief danger to their immediate safety in the line was the reduction of the forts on their flanks. The day passed with reports, some true and some untrue, that this and that fort had fallen, but the general situation grew gradually worse. The state of the Belgian troops, General Paris afterwards reported, was lamentable, and as for his own, they were " for the most part untrained and ill equipped." Neither were they in a position to withstand the grand assault, and General Paris came to the definite conclusion that he must withdraw his troops that night. He communicated his decision to General Rawlinson, to Lord Kitchener, to the Admiralty and also to General Deguise commanding the Belgians, who, when he learnt this fateful resolution, remarked with tears in his eyes, " Then it is finished, my men are done for."

It was not, however, till dusk that the retirement began, and about this time the Germans obligingly launched an attack on the line of the inner forts which drew a considerable fire from the defending troops, thus removing from the German mind any suspicion that they were contemplating an immediate withdrawal. The Belgian troops, the 2nd division and many of the garrison were evacuated successfully and were able to join up with the field army during the next day. About the same time two brigades of the Royal Naval Division



DEFENCE AND DEFIANCE

Unlike the tank, the armoured train was not a product of the Great War, as it was used by the British in South Africa in 1899–1902, and there are earlier instances. They carried 4-in. or 6-in. guns in their turrets and also machine-guns

began their retirement across the Schelde. These were the Marine brigade and the 2nd naval brigade. All three brigades should have received orders at the same time, but owing to an error on the part of an officer detailed to deliver the message to the 1st naval brigade, the order in this case only reached the commander of the Drake battalion. Having insisted that this single battalion should move off at once, the officer in question seems to have been inanely confident that his mission was completed, so much so that it was reported to General Paris that orders had been given to the whole brigade. Actually, Commodore Henderson commanding this brigade, and the two remaining battalion commanders knew nothing of these orders, and had not a high staff officer made a tour of inspection to see that the withdrawal was complete, it is doubtful whether they would have ever received them. As it was, it was impossible for them to begin their withdrawal until 10 p.m.

It is necessary, at this point, to revert to the unhappy plight of the civilian inhabitants of Antwerp. On Wednesday the 7th the Belgian government had left the city, and all that day and the next over 250,000 terrified townspeople sought to reach safety. Then began the immense, tragic flight of the civil population. Only three avenues of escape remained open—westward by road to Ghent, Bruges and Ostend; north-eastward by road into Holland, and down the Schelde by water to Flushing. Anything that could float was crowded with the fugitives—merchant steamers, dredgers, barges and canal-boats, ferry-boats, tugs, fishing-smacks, yachts and rowing-boats. There was no possibility of maintaining order and discipline. The terrorized people at times crowded aboard until there was not even standing room on the decks. Very few of them had brought food and warm clothing with them, or had space in which to lie down. For two nights and two days they huddled together, chilled and famishing on the open deck, while the German guns bombarded the city from which they had fled. On the roads leading towards Ghent and the Dutch frontier the scenes of anguish and misery, hunger and fatigue were even more appalling. In many places civilians and soldiers were mingled in inextricable confusion.

The highway from Antwerp to Ghent was jammed from ditch to ditch. Every footpath and lane leading away from the invading army was so closely packed with fugitives that they impeded each other's movement. Wheelbarrows were often seen packed with children too young to walk. There were monks carrying wounded men on stretchers, nuns shepherding along groups of war-orphaned infants.

It will never be known how many people perished from hunger, exposure and exhaustion in the flight from Antwerp. The fields and ditches along the westward road were strewn with the prostrate bodies of worn-out women, children and old men. For miles around the countryside was bare of food. There was not merely a scarcity of provisions—there was absolutely nothing to eat. The fugitives stopped at farmhouses and offered all they possessed for a loaf, but the farmers' wives, weeping at the misery of their own people, could only shake their heads. Near one small town on the Dutch frontier twenty children were born on Wednesday night in the open fields. The mothers were without beds, without shelter and without medical aid. This occurred at a spot where an American observer chanced to be. At hundreds of other places along the lines of flight there were similar piteous scenes.

In Antwerp itself, as the last of the defending troops were beginning to leave the scene was of an appalling nature. Heavy shells were exploding in the open streets causing huge craters and bringing down great buildings in masses of débris. The pavements were piled with broken glass. The roadways were littered with tangled telephone wires, shattered poles, twisted lamp-posts and splintered trees. More than 2,000 houses were struck by shells, and more than 300 of these were destroyed.

Flames roared from many of the smitten dwellings. A hundred and fifty could be seen blazing away at the same time, and as the water supply had been

PLEASE CROSS HERE

Photo: Central News

A French communication trench in Champagne has been cut through chalky soil. A certain safety was ensured for men crossing the ground between the support and front lines by making use of trenches cut in the form of zig-zags which afforded protection from enfilade fire. The arrival of reinforcements is being watched with interest by French soldiers

cut off by the enemy early in the siege there was no means of fighting these fires. Had there been a wind everything in Antwerp would have been consumed, and nothing but the charred wreckage of one of the most beautiful and busiest centres of industry would have remained in the hands of the victorious enemy.

By night the scene was one of infernal splendour. The oil-tanks by the river had been fired by the retreating Belgians to prevent the Germans making use of the large stores of petrol. The glare of the burning of thousands of tons of oil, producing a thick pall of smoke which rolled over the river, was a truly terrifying spectacle. It is a striking tribute to the steadfastness of the Belgians and their patriotism that the civil authorities willingly submitted to this fearful punishment. On October 7 the Communal Council informed General Deguise that "they were ready unanimously to accept all the consequences of a defence maintained to the last moment, and that they would never seek to influence the decision of the military authorities responsible for the defence."

BRIDGE OF WAGON

Rivers and streams abounded in the parts of France and Belgium where fighting took place, and it was often necessary to construct bridges at short notice out of scanty and unsuitable materials. The one here seen is made of farm carts lashed together

To return to the evacuation of the naval brigades. The rallying point across the Schelde was the village of Zwyndrecht, where the bulk of the Royal Naval Division had gathered by about 11.30 p.m. Here again the false information was given to General Paris that all his force had got away safely, but even had this report been true, his difficulties were immense. Confusion existed as to when railway transport was available, and marches and countermarches had to be undertaken before this could be discovered. These had to be conducted in darkness over roads blocked by civilian refugees and their transport. In this press troops could not be kept together, communications between one body and another were almost impossible, and the rate of progress seldom exceeded one mile an hour. In the circumstances, it is remarkable that so many escaped, and it was no mean achievement that by 9 a.m. eight battalions had been sent off by train from St. Gilles Waes in the direction of Ostend.

DIED WHERE THEY STOOD

A French attack has resulted in the capture of a long German communication trench, which is here shown before the dead have been removed for burial. The men standing at the end are French officers inspecting the captured works

The fate of those who had been left behind without orders was unhappy in the extreme. They were three battalions of the 1st naval brigade with the engineers and the Portsmouth battalion of the R.M.L.I. When eventually they did receive the orders to withdraw there was no divisional guidance to tell them where to go or what route to take. One battalion, the Hawke, managed to cross the upper bridge over the Schelde. Others that followed found the Belgians already destroying the bridge, and were obliged to make what crossing they could by ferry steamers and barges. They reached the Zwyndrecht rendezvous in the early morning, where no instructions were awaiting them.

The brigade commander, Commodore Henderson, however, discovered that St. Gilles Waes was the appointed rail head, but before they could reach this place information was received that the Germans were already attacking Moerbeke, more than ten miles farther down the line. The brigade commander had a difficult decision to make. His men were exhausted, untrained and without ammunition. Had he attempted any field operation they would have been either annihilated or forced to surrender.

He took the only other course open to him and marched them across the Dutch frontier. Here they were disarmed and interned. This was bad enough, but not so disastrous as the fate which met the Portsmouth battalion of the R.M.L.I. which was acting as rear-

Photo: G.P.A.

FOLLOW UP!

French infantry are advancing against a German position after a preparatory artillery bombardment. Over the rough ground between the opposing lines the men who have leapt together from the advance trenches have lost all military formation, but the leader presses on, sure that his comrades will follow

guard. Apparently unaware of the presence of the Germans farther down the line, they boarded a train at the station of Kemseke, already crowded with refugees At Moerbeke the German guns blew the engine off the line. The troops detrained and fought an action against light German forces. The Colonel with about half his battalion managed to fight his way clear and reach a station ten miles distant, but of the remainder, mostly stragglers from the 1st naval brigade, nearly 1,000 were forced to surrender.

In Antwerp itself the end was drawing very near. Indeed there was no valid reason why General von Beseler should not have entered the city, had he wished to do so on the evening of October 8. He actually gave the order for the bombardment to be stopped on the morning of the 9th when he found that some of the inner forts had been abandoned. He then demanded the surrender of the city, and a formal capitulation was signed in the evening. An attempt on the part of the chief of staff of the Belgian military governor on the morning of the 10th to discuss terms of surrender was met merely with the threat of a renewed bombardment, and on that day the Germans made their formal entry into the city. They had their "pistol pointing at the heart of England," but, like Napoleon, were to learn that without command of the sea that pistol could never be fired.

For long after the War the operations round Antwerp, and particularly the part played by a small British force in protracting the defence, were the subject of much criticism. Mr. Winston Churchill was freely condemned for the dynamic rôle which he personally assumed and for his action in throwing into the breach raw troops, many of them untrained and without adequate equipment. For himself he says: "I cannot feel that I deserve the reproaches and foolish fictions which have been so long and freely heaped upon me . . . . at each stage the action which I took seemed right, natural and even inevitable." He adds: "But, after all, it is by results and as a whole that the episode will be judged."

After twenty years it is easier to adopt that long view and impartiality of judgement, and there can now be no question that the defence of Antwerp, and not least the British share in it, had, from the point of view of the Allies, a most valuable influence on the general course of events. Captain Liddell Hart, in his book "A History of the World War, 1914–1918," published in 1934, thus sums up what is now the accepted opinion.

Yet, viewed in the perspective of history, this first and last effort in the west to make use of Britain's amphibious power applied a brake to the German advance down the coast, which just stopped their second attempt to gain a decision in the west. It gained time for the arrival of the main British force transferred from the Aisne to the new left of the allied line, and if their heroic defence at Ypres, aided by the French and Belgians along the Yser to the sea, was the human barrier to the Germans, it succeeded by so narrow a margin that the Antwerp expedition must be adjudged the saving factor.

Looked at from the Belgian point of view, they indeed might claim to have been deluded by false promises of help far in excess of anything which actually reached them. The French divisions never came within striking distance of Antwerp until too late to be of the least use. Major-General Capper, on his arrival in France with the British 7th division, had strict injunctions not to advance towards Antwerp in any way which might expose his division to a German movement of envelopment. All the practical help which the defenders of Antwerp ever received from their allies were a few pieces of artillery, an armoured train and the troops of the Royal Naval Division.

As to these it must be said that under the circumstances they played their

Photo: G.P.A.

ACROSS NO MAN'S LAND

This photograph shows French troops advancing in the open through partially destroyed barbed wire entanglements and against a withering fire from machine-guns, while shells from heavier guns are still falling on the trenches they have left

part very successfully. The promise of their assistance and their performance in the line did much to reinforce the Belgian spirit of resistance and their determination to hold on to the last—thereby gaining those three or four days which were of such inestimable value. Troops who had reached France earlier as part of the highly organized regular British army, and those who were to join later as members of the best equipped civilian army that ever took the field, can have no idea of the makeshift to which this brave handful of volunteers were put. For lack of leather or webbing equipment much of their impedimenta had to be carried by hand, humped or tied on to their clothes. Much that was essential to their comfort or efficiency was missing. In the British official history the following fine tribute is paid to them.

The three infantry brigades, without divisional troops, which first bore the name of the Royal Naval Division, were highly tried. The Royal Marine Brigade did well in the hottest part of the line at Lierre and the enemy sought a passage of the Nethe elsewhere. The men of the 1st and 2nd Naval Brigades showed most creditable firmness under heavy artillery fire; without any training in field fortification they entrenched themselves; without training in musketry they used their rifles with effect; without any supply service or regimental transport they lived on such food as could be procured locally from time to time and one day it was only turnips from the fields. Cheerfully accepting the lack of valises, mess tins, water bottles, ammunition pouches and other normal equipment, they contented themselves with the allowance of one great coat to every two men and carried their bayonets, for want of other means, in their gaiters or their pockets. The wonder is, not that they failed to accomplish what was hoped, but that they fought so well. Had it not been for the unfortunate mistake of the delivery of the message for the 1st brigade to one of its battalions, and the report that it had been duly acted upon, the whole division would no doubt have got clear, for the 2nd Belgian division easily did so.

The unhappy few spent the next four years in internment in Holland or in captivity in Germany, but many who took part in the expedition were with the Naval division during its next great adventure, the landing on Gallipoli, and survived to fight the sanguinary battles in which it later became engaged in France and Flanders.

As for the Belgian army, after their truly heroic defence, they escaped with remarkably few losses. Indeed, it is said that when the capitulation was signed the German "bag" amounted to little more than the Belgian military commander and his chief of staff and a few troops who had been left stranded in the inner forts. The Germans complained rather bitterly of the paucity of their capture although they cannot but have congratulated themselves on the acquisition of yet another valuable base and the practical conquest of Belgium. Bells rang throughout Germany.

After its heroic defence of Antwerp the Belgian army, as we have seen, managed to slip from the clutches of its powerful adversary, but now, after prolonged and discouraging fighting, it was badly in need of rest and reorganization. It was, therefore, proposed that it should fall back to a line St. Omer–Calais. Such a course, however, would have meant the surrender of the last corner of Belgian territory. In view of this the plans were changed and the army retired during the 10th and 11th to the Dixmude–Nieuport–Furnes area, with Dunkirk as headquarters.

On October 14 the Belgian soldiers set to work to prepare the defences on the river Yser, and from that time until the end of the war the Germans were never able to wrest that tiny but precious piece of territory from them. They therefore obeyed the order made by King Albert: "The line of the Yser constitutes our last line of defence in Belgium and its preservation is necessary for the development of the plan of operations. This line is therefore to be held at all costs."

ROUGH ROAD OF RETREAT

The mountainous country which enabled the Serbians to hold their foes so long at bay made their retreat into Albania difficult and, at times, perilous. Here a motor wagon has come to grief at a hairpin bend during the retreat to the Adriatic coast. To the right of the photograph is seen one of the British nurses who played a heroic part in rendering assistance both to wounded soldiers and civilian refugees

CHAPTER 23

JAPAN KEEPS HER WORD

In accordance with her treaty obligations Japan declared war on Germany in August, 1914. The following chapter describes the activities of her army on the Shantung peninsula and of her navy there and in the South Seas

THE declaration of war by Great Britain on Germany found Japan, Britain's ally in the Far East, anxious to fulfil her treaty obligations. Just before the treaty of Portsmouth, which ended the Russo-Japanese war, had been signed (September, 1905), Japan had entered into a new alliance with Great Britain. This bound the contracting parties to come to each other's assistance if, by reason of an unprovoked attack, either party should be involved in a war for the defence of its territorial rights or other interests.

Japan had long regarded with uneasiness the growing strength of Kiao-chau, Germany's protectorate in China. In 1898 Germany made the murder of two missionaries the excuse for occupying the port pending the payment of an indemnity, and in the end obtained a 99-years lease of the port and an adjacent territory, altogether 193 square miles, in satisfaction of her claims.

With characteristic thoroughness the new masters of Kiao-chau at once set about developing it. The important feature of the territory was a fine harbour, with an entrance two miles broad. The high hills by which it was surrounded made fortification easy, while commercially it was of great importance as the port of Shantung, one of the richest provinces of China, which was henceforth to be considered as a German sphere of influence. The harbour was placed under the control of the German navy and developed into an important naval base. The old Chinese town of Kiao-chau was relegated to a secondary position, and a new city—Tsingtau—was built on modern European lines. Fine buildings sprang up; almost every amenity that a western city could desire was made available; it was at once a commercial centre and a pleasure resort. The trading possibilities were thoroughly exploited. Dry docks and repairing yards were built, and every facility for expeditiously loading and unloading merchant ships was provided.

But besides creating a fine commercial port, the Germans made Kiao-chau a great fortress. It was under the command of a naval governor, and, in addition to two powerful forts, named after the Kaiser and Bismarck, there were numerous batteries and entrenchments which would make any attempt to take the place extremely difficult.

Such a strong base, so close to her own shores, was regarded by Japan as a menace. It was therefore with peculiar satisfaction that on August 15, 1914, in fulfilment of her treaty obligations, she sent an ultimatum to Berlin requiring Germany's immediate withdrawal from the Far East. All German warships were to leave Eastern waters and Kiao-chau was to be handed over to Japan and ultimately to be restored to China. After her victorious war with China in 1894–95, Japan considered that she had been robbed of the full fruits of her victory by the intervention of Russia, France and Germany, who together advised her to restore the captured territory and to evacuate Port Arthur. This, the note of the three Powers declared, would be "advisable in the interests of peace."

There was a threat of war behind this plea for peace, and Japan, being then in no position to risk war with European powers, was obliged to relinquish her spoils. Now had come her opportunity to wipe out the old score, and she imparted a touch of irony to her ultimatum by couching it in phraseology similar to that which had been employed by the three Powers twenty years previously. The text of Japan's ultimatum to Germany was as follows:

We consider it highly important and necessary in the present situation to take measures to remove the causes of all dis-

BALKAN INTRIGUE

King Ferdinand of Bulgaria was an inveterate intriguer, and before he threw in his lot with the Central Powers in October, 1915, and invaded Serbia, he had conducted tentative negotiations with the Allies. Here he is seen in consultation with General Ivanoff

SOME FELL BY THE WAYSIDE

The rigours of winter added the last touch of tragedy to the Serbian retreat. Weakened by exposure and hunger, soldiers, as here seen, fell by the wayside and were left to die, for it was quite impossible to give them succour whilst rescuing the main body

Photo: Topical

Photo: Topical

IN THE ALBANIAN ALPS

The only road open to the Serbian army in its retreat into Albania ran across the Albanian Alps. Serbian artillery is here seen crossing the mountains over a rough track above the snow-line. The retirement was not effected without severe losses

turbance of peace in the Far East, and to safeguard general interests as contemplated in the agreement of alliance between Japan and Great Britain. In order to secure firm and enduring peace in Eastern Asia, the establishment of which is the aim of the agreement, the Japanese Government sincerely believes it to be its duty to give advice to the German Government to carry out the following two propositions :

1. To withdraw immediately from Japanese and Chinese waters the German warships and armed vessels of all kinds, and to disarm at once those which cannot be withdrawn.

2. To deliver on a date not later than September 15 to the Japanese authorities, without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiao-chau, with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China.

The Japanese Government announces at the same time that in the event of its not receiving by noon on August 23 an answer from the German Government signifying unconditional acceptance of the above advice offered by the Japanese Government, Japan will be compelled to take such action as it may deem necessary to meet the situation.

AUTOBUS ANGLAIS

The London General Omnibus Company, the great concern that was afterwards absorbed by the London Passenger Transport Board, rendered material help in transport not only to British troops but to the French army. Here L.G.O.C. buses, interspersed with transport wagons, are rushing troops to a sector of the line where help is needed

No reply having been received by Japan on August 23, she declared war against Germany.

Japan's eagerness to fulfil her treaty obligations was not without its embarrassments for the Allies, and particularly for Great Britain. In the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand there was some distrust of Japan's motives and, in order to allay that feeling, a formal statement was issued by the British Government. This declared that, with a view to protecting the general interests of the Far East, and particularly the integrity of China, Japanese action would not extend beyond the China Seas, except in so far as the safety of her shipping made it necessary, and that her land operations would be confined to territory in German occupation ; that is to say, when she had taken Kiao-chau and had driven the German warships from Eastern waters, her obligations would be fulfilled.

On August 27 a blockade of Kiao-chau bay was declared and immediately put into operation. The Japanese had chosen Lungkow, 150 miles north of Tsingtau, as the point at which they would make their first landing. This point was outside Germany's zone of influence and a landing could not, therefore, be made there without the consent of the Chinese government. The Japanese government had begun negotiations with the Chinese before the expiration of her ultimatum to Germany, in order to establish a war zone which should include Lungkow, and by the beginning of September an agreement on these lines had been reached.

On September 2 a Japanese division under the command of Lieutenant-General Kamio landed at Lungkow. Its progress towards Kiao-chau was, however, exceedingly slow, for it encountered heavy floods—heavier, it was said, than any that had been known for 60 years. But despite the difficulties which they encountered, the Japanese troops advanced to the town of Weihsien, and from there spread through a large part of the province, even taking possession of the town of Tsinan-fu.

In spite of formal protests on the part of China they seized the Shantung railway, and dealt with a large part of the Chinese province as though it were conquered territory. The Japanese advance guard at times scarcely succeeded in marching eight miles a day. Streams were swollen to torrents impossible to cross ; fields were turned into seas of mud ; there was nothing to do but to wait for a few days. By September 13, however, the Japanese scouts reached and attacked the railway station of the little town of Kiao-chau itself, 22 miles from Tsingtau.

On September 18 a second Japanese contingent landed at Laoshan bay within the German zone and quickly established contact with the force which had landed at Lungkow.

The naval governor of Tsingtau, Captain Meyer-Waldeck, had at the first sign of war ordered all the German reservists in the Far East to report at Tsingtau. Women and children were, as far as possible, sent to places of safety, and Meyer-Waldeck was apparently preparing to put up a prolonged resistance. But with all the reservists who had joined the garrison and the crews of the warships in the harbour, the force under his command numbered no more than between 5,000 and 6,000 men. He had left nothing to chance. Every tall structure which might have afforded a mark for the enemy's gunners was destroyed ; everything within the German zone that could possibly afford cover to advancing troops was razed to the ground, while thousands of Chinese coolies were pressed into service to create a triple line of defence works. Barbed wire entanglements were erected and connected with the local electricity works so that they could be charged with current.

Meyer-Waldeck had made a defiant reply to a Japanese call to him to surrender. " Never," he said, " shall we surrender the smallest bit of ground over which the German flag is flying. From this place we shall not retreat. If the enemy want Tsingtau he must come and fetch it."

For diplomatic reasons it was considered advisable that the operations against Kiao-chau should be carried out by a combined British and Japanese force, and two British ships, the battleship Triumph and the destroyer Usk, co-operated with the Japanese in the sea operations.

The earlier naval operations were greatly hampered because the Germans had heavily mined the approaches to Kiao-chau. A destroyer, a torpedo boat, and one cruiser were sunk before mine-sweeping operations enabled the

attacking ships to get within range of the forts and begin the bombardment.

When the Japanese forces, which landed at Lungkow and Laoshan, had united, the expeditionary force numbered 22,890 officers and men and 142 guns, and the supreme command was given to General Kamio, with Major-General Yamanashi as chief of staff. The force was mainly composed of the 18th division, the 29th brigade of infantry, the siege artillery corps, marine artillery and a flying corps. In the British force under Brigadier-General Nathaniel W. Barnardiston were the 2nd South Wales Borderers and 450 men of the 36th Sikhs. The blockading fleet took up position on August 25, and a blockade of the coast was declared as from August 27. It was hoped to bottle up the German fleet, but some of the ships slipped out. Several, however, were left behind, including five gunboats, a destroyer and a minelayer.

Though previously there had been some skirmishing, and Japanese aeroplanes had dropped bombs on the German positions, the battle for Tsingtau did not begin until September 26. On that date the Japanese heavy artillery began to bombard the town, and from the sea three Japanese warships—the Suwo, the Iwami and the Tango, assisted by the Triumph—opened fire on the forts. The object of this Japanese advance was to clear the outer works of Tsingtau. As they moved forward they were subjected to fire from the German gunboat Jaguar and the Austrian warship Kaiserin Elisabeth in the harbour, and at some points nests of machine-guns enfiladed them. But despite this the Japanese advanced steadily, and by the morning of September 28 they had driven the Germans into the inner lines of Tsingtau.

On September 30 the Germans made a strong counter-attack, but it was repulsed with heavy loss, and it was now clear that they could only hope to hold the inner lines. A pause then ensued. The Japanese were waiting for their heavy guns and siege artillery—the advance of which had been delayed by the sodden state of the country—to be brought into position. The Germans, instead of withholding their fire until the Japanese advance recommenced, opened a heavy artillery attack on the Japanese positions, expending vast quantities of ammunition, but inflicting only very slight losses. Early in October the forts fired over 2,000 shells in 24 hours, a useless expenditure of ammunition which the German commander was not in a position to afford.

By the second week in October the fire of the German guns was intermittent, and, the Japanese heavy guns having come up, the assault began in earnest. A position on Prinz Heinrich Hill from which the Japanese guns would command the Tsingtau forts was taken with comparative ease, and throughout October the bombardment continued with increasing severity.

The British contingent, which had left Tientsin on September 19, landed in Shantung on the 21st. The weather was unfavourable, a strong southerly gale blowing, heavy rain falling, and a very heavy sea running. The men set out on a 40-mile march, and came up behind the Japanese as they were driving in the German advanced positions. It was intended that they should participate in this attack, but the German resistance at this point was so slight that their help was not wanted. On October 30 the entire British force moved up to the front, and now occupied part of the line extending to about five miles. There they helped the Japanese troops in the work of digging an approach by sapping right up to the German redoubts.

On October 31 the Japanese brought their heavy siege guns into operation, and they scored an early success, for one shell set fire to the oil tanks in the naval docks, causing a huge conflagration. Before the incessant rain of shells the German defences crumbled away, and the barbed wire entanglements were completely destroyed.

For seven days the bombardment continued, the artillery being supported by the guns of the British and Japanese warships, while the infantry continued to push forward their saps. The difficulties of the Germans were increased by the hostile aeroplanes which kept up a rain of bombs on the defences. The intense but ineffective fire with which the Germans had met the first appearance of the Japanese had depleted their supply of ammunition so greatly that they were now unable to make an effective reply to the attackers.

By the end of October it was obvious that the fall of Tsingtau could not be long delayed. At the beginning of November Bismarck fort, one of the main defences, was destroyed, and the other forts were almost silenced. On the night of November 6 some troops advanced to attack a redoubt and met with so little opposition that a general assault was ordered. Point after point was taken by the British and Japanese, and by daybreak the Japanese were in possession of several forts dominating the city, including such great mountain positions as Fort Bismarck. Everything was prepared for a final grand assault, but just before it began white flags appeared at several points on the German line. This speedy surrender came as a surprise to the Japanese and British, who had expected a prolonged siege. When the town was entered it was found that food supplies were ample, but the lack of ammunition had made a prolonged defence impossible. The losses of the attacking forces were not heavy. The Japanese had 236 men killed and 1,282 wounded, and the British 12 killed and 61 wounded. On November 10 the fortress was formally handed over to General Kamio.

The capture of Tsingtau was Japan's only operation on land, but immediately after the declaration of war she turned her attention to the islands which Germany had acquired in the southern Pacific. These lay, roughly speaking, between Japan and Australia, and in the hands of a strong empire, such as Germany, could be given a high strategic significance. As Germany had also occupied the northern portion of New Guinea, as well as the Bismarck Archipelago, farther south, she had substantial interests in this quarter of the globe.

For the most part, the islands, which were grouped and comprised under the general title of Micronesia—Marianas (or Ladrones) Islands, Marshall Islands, and Caroline Islands—were small coral atolls, slightly raised above high water, and none of them was large. Of them the most easterly were the Marshalls, totalling some 23 in all, and Jaluit, the best, though not the most populous of them, had become the headquarters of the Germans, with a commissioner in command.

A squadron of the Japanese navy in these waters looking for enemy ships visited Jaluit on October 6, 1914, and the Germans gave up the island without resistance. Japanese marines destroyed all the German military establishments and seized their munitions and supplies. Japan also occupied Yap, the seat of the German government in the Carolines, and before the end of October, 1914, all Micronesia was in her hands. In these operations Japan was able to display sufficient naval strength to make resistance useless.

Right through the war the Japanese navy continued to give valuable assistance to the Allies. All the trade routes in Eastern seas were patrolled by her ships and she provided escorts for the Australian and New Zealand transports in the Indian Ocean, and later a squadron, commanded by Rear-Admiral Sato and consisting of the cruiser Akashi as flagship and three destroyer divisions, was sent to the Mediterranean to deal with enemy submarines. Voyages totalling over 250,000 miles were convoyed by the Japanese destroyers.

REGAL SIMPLICITY

King Victor Emmanuel of Italy, like the king of the Belgians, took the field with his armies and shared with them many of the hardships of war. He is here seen entertaining Joffre during the French commander-in-chief's visit to the Italian lines in the autumn of 1915

HONOURS OF WAR

The rest period of a French battalion behind the lines has been broken for an hour or two for the presentation of decorations to men who have distinguished themselves in action. British troops did not take their colours to France, but for ceremonial purposes those of the French troops were often paraded on occasions such as the one here depicted

FAR FROM THEIR AIN FOLK

Marseilles, since ancient times a clearing house for the nations, saw Allied troops of many nationalities land on its quays and march through its streets. Early in 1916 battalions of Scots were landed there on their way from India and other parts of the East to the Western Front

CHAPTER 24

IN FLANDERS FIELDS

In the autumn of 1914 the Germans turned their attention to the ports on the English Channel. In what is sometimes called "the race to the sea" they secured Ostend, but their effort to progress in the direction of Calais came to nought

NOT long after the battle of the Aisne had come to an end and the opposing armies had settled down opposite to each other in permanent entrenchments, there began that movement westward, conducted by both sides, which came to be known as the "race to the Channel ports." The period when this extension was taking place was marked by many bloody conflicts in which the British played their part alongside their French allies General Joffre realized that the defensive line in his centre might be more lightly held and quantities of his best troops released to take part in one final effort to turn the German flank.

On September 17 General Maunoury's 6th army, reinforced by the 13th corps, opened an offensive which, however, came to a standstill on the next day on a line south-east and north-west through Carlepont. Better fortune attended the efforts of the newly constructed 2nd army, under General de Castelnau, which on September 22 made an appreciable advance, and on the 23rd was threatening the German communications at Ham and St. Quentin. Despite counter-attacks in force, de Castelnau reached Péronne, which town was, however, the limit of his advance. The Germans, heavily reinforced, made a strong counter-stroke, and on the 26th de Castelnau retired to a line running north from Lassigny through Roye

The French commander found himself involved in heavy fighting even to retain his position. His front covered a distance of 20 to 25 miles, and advance northwards would simply have left a dangerous gap between his own and Maunoury's army. The resulting battles raged until the end of September, one side and then the other making advances and then being forced back. In the south the lines were becoming more clearly defined, as each side discovered its strongest line of defence and began to entrench itself with all possible speed. In the north the lines remained fluid.

So far it may be said that the Germans had secured the advantage of position. From Compiègne to Lassigny they defended the eastern bank of the Oise; from Lassigny north to Péronne the country is intersected by undulating plains unfavourable to defence, but the Germans had secured a natural barrier in the Somme river.

They were profiting already from their admirable surveys of the whole terrain made during peace-time, and were revealing a skill in the selection of military positions which left the French at a decided disadvantage. Péronne itself is hidden in a hollow and possesses no military advantage. The point at which the French should have aimed was the heights of the Somme north of the town. The Germans had seized at once upon the strategic value of this line of hills, commanding as it does an extensive view across the plain, and, since it faces eastward, presenting an efficient barrier to advance across their line of communication. Before the end of the month they had occupied the heights and begun the construction of a line of fortifications in the Corbie salient which for two years was an insuperable obstacle to the Allied advance.

In driving back de Castelnau over a large front the Germans had the advantage of reinforcement by Prince Rupert of Bavaria's 6th army, which had been brought up from Lorraine. De Castelnau, who was short of ammunition, was again attacked on the line Lassigny–Roye–Lihons–Chaulnes–Bray to the high ground east of Albert. Thiepval was occupied and Albert shelled. The French left flank was in danger of being turned. Moreover, although after a desperate struggle de Castelnau held his position at Lihons to the west of Chaulnes, and inflicted heavy losses on the Germans, a dangerous salient was formed in his front farther south at Roye, which threatened to give under the German pressure. Had the Germans succeeded in breaking through, de Castelnau would have been isolated and Maunoury would have found his position untenable. But the French hung on tenaciously and the German forces were held. Joffre, realizing the gravity of the situation, hastened the movements of Maud'huy's 10th army, until by the 30th it was in position on de Castelnau's threatened left.

The race to the sea continued, and the wings of the opposing armies have been likened at this time to two doors on the same hinge, slowly swinging together and closing on a line running northwards. An early incident of the battle was the struggle for Arras, which stands only 50 miles from the English Channel and faces the direct line of march of any force moving from Belgium south-west to the Channel ports. It is the junction of five railway systems, and its value to an attacking force was therefore very great.

The Germans, realizing its strategical importance, occupied it with cavalry on Sept. 1 and afterwards brought infantry into the town. On the 18th, however, French cavalry recaptured it, succeeding in throwing out the Germans after a stiff fight and penetrating with their patrols as far as Douai. But the Germans did not relinquish the struggle, for they saw in the possession of Arras a useful pivot on which to turn the flank of de Castelnau's army, and that it might in any event be a valuable point on the line of defence from the Aisne to the sea. Therefore, when the French captured the town, a further effort was made to regain it.

The French cavalry in possession had been reinforced by the advance troops of Maud'huy's 10th army, which was moving up from Amiens. Despite the fact that de Castelnau was being severely pressed, it was decided not to reinforce his line but to attempt to outflank the German right, which was thought to be in the neighbourhood of Bapaume, south-east of Arras. The exact positions of the enemy were a matter of some obscurity, and the existence of the powerful reinforcements collecting on the line Péronne–Cambrai–Valenciennes was unknown. The troops of the 10th army, which had not yet arrived, were directed to Lens and ordered to make a sweep south-east, covering Douai and cutting the German flank further in the rear. Meanwhile, the available troops were moved out from Arras towards Bapaume. On the morning of October 2 they began to concentrate on a line south-east of the town, but before all the positions were occupied unsuspected forces of the enemy were flung upon the left flank, and the line became disorganized.

In swinging his position round from south-east to north-east Maud'huy lost much ground. The Germans seized Douai, pushed north of Arras and drove a wedge between Maud'huy's forces. The French general was forced to abandon Lens and bring his left back towards Arras.

General Foch was now appointed to command the armies operating in the north-west with the idea of co-ordinating the Albert-Arras front. He made his headquarters at Doullens, whence he could observe the repeated attempts of the Germans to take the town of Arras.

PERISCOPE IN POSITION

The periscope proved indirectly a valuable protection, for with its aid a soldier could obtain a view of no man's land and enemy activity from the trench without exposing himself. Another more immediate protection was the steel helmet, first used by British troops early in 1916

They captured the commanding heights of Vimy ridge from which they could shell the town, which hereafter was subjected to continuous bombardment. But the French succeeded in holding it despite two further attacks in strength. General von Bülow, who superseded Prince Rupert, launched all his available forces against the French line on October 21. By breaking through at this point he hoped to roll back the French armies to the south and drive the British into the sea. The French line sagged dangerously to the north, but south of the town it still held, and the Germans were eventually repulsed. They had, however, secured valuable ground which commanded the French position, and three days later, on the 24th, began an intensive bombardment of the French trenches which was followed by a second and heavier attack.

In spite of all their efforts the Germans were unable to take Arras. They were, however, rapidly in process of enveloping it; they had secured Vimy ridge and their line ran in a close semicircle round the town. Only a recovery of lost ground could make the defenders' position tenable, and in consequence the French counter-attacked. The movement took place at a time when the fighting round Ypres was at its height, and the Germans were steadily drawing troops from farther south to reinforce their attacks on the Ypres salient Maud'huy was therefore able to make some progress and to straighten his front considerably. By the end of the month, when the fighting in front of Arras died down, the French held a line running from west of Ablain through a point east of Arras, to the west of Hébuterne.

Meanwhile the movement of the British force towards the north had been taking place. Early in October a study of the general situation had impressed Sir John French with the necessity of bringing his greatest possible force to bear in support of the northern flank of the Allies in order effectively to outflank the enemy and compel him to evacuate his positions. The position on the Aisne appeared to justify the withdrawal of the British force, and with this view General Joffre fully agreed. Other considerations were that the natural position of the British was obviously in the west, near their bases and home ports from which they could be most quickly reinforced and supplied. Also it was their clear duty to defend the ports of Calais, Dunkirk, and Boulogne, the loss of which would have been a profound embarrassment to their armies in the field and a menace to the home coast line.

The movement, which occupied about a fortnight, was carried out very successfully without revealing to the Germans the precise destination of the various corps. This lack of knowledge certainly made them more hesitant than they would otherwise have been in pressing their own attacks. Actually the 2nd corps detrained at Abbeville on October 8–9, the cavalry corps at St. Pol on October 9, the 3rd corps at St. Omer and Hazebrouck for Bailleul on October 11, while the 1st corps, which was the last to leave the Aisne, began its concentration at Hazebrouck on October 19.

Immediately the British found themselves engaged, for on October 11 the 2nd cavalry division under General Gough came into contact with the enemy's cavalry holding woods to the north of the Bethune-Aire canal. After clearing the woods of Germans this division of cavalry joined up with the 2nd corps, which was moving in a north-easterly direction after crossing the canal. On October 11 Sir H. Smith-Dorrien had reached a line of the canal between Aire and Bethune, and received orders to continue his advance to bring his left in the direction of Merville, with the idea eventually of reaching a position on the left of the French army, threatening the German flank.

On the 12th came the depressing intelligence that the Germans had captured Vermelles, upon which village the left of the French 10th army had rested. Sir H. Smith-Dorrien thereupon decided to march eastward, as the best

'PACK UP YOUR TROUBLES'

The gallantry of the original British Expeditionary Force, the "Old Contemptibles," was proverbial. Later recruits, many of them little more than boys, suffered little by comparison. Here men of different ranks and ages give vent, while in reserve, to their high spirits, though soon they may be facing death

expedient for rendering aid to General Maud'huy. The nature of the ground upon which the 2nd corps first deployed made a quick advance impossible, for the district was covered with workmen's cottages, mine shafts and slag heaps, and was indeed of much the same character as the district through which the British had first fought at Mons. It is said that men of the 2nd corps felt their hearts sink when they found themselves again in country which reminded them so closely of their earlier desperate adventures.

Their difficulties did not diminish as they advanced: the country was flat, intersected with hedges, and so marshy as often to be impenetrable except by roads. These were of the most primitive description and unsuitable to the movements of an army. Those of most importance were lined on both sides with granite sets the width of a pair of wheels apart, but on the sides and in the centre they were loosely made, and in wet weather rapidly became ankle deep in mud. The side roads were scarcely made at all, and were most difficult to manœuvre when they had become mud tracks. Entrenching to any depth was impossible, and the throwing up of breastworks caused channels of water where excavations were made. From point of observation, the ground still contained useful features in the way of slag heaps, factory chimneys and church towers, all of which were made use of; but the marching infantry had endless difficulties to contend with, not the least of which was the rough and cumbersome transport of the farmers still trying desperately to market their crops and blocking the roads in their endeavours.

The Germans contested the ground wherever possible, but in general progress was made along an eight-mile front, most of the objectives being reached, including the village of Givenchy. By evening the 2nd corps was entrenched along a line Noyelles-Givenchy—Rue des Chavattes towards Fosse, having during the day incurred about 200 casualties. On the following day, the 13th, the advance was ordered to be continued, but little progress was made and the Germans opened a most determined attack on Givenchy. They bombarded the village and set it alight, driving back the Bedfordshire in the village itself and the Dorsets, who had advanced on the right. The British guns fired until the last moment, but the troops eventually were forced to abandon the village and take up a position 500 yards behind. Elsewhere on the 2nd corps front no appreciable success was gained, despite the 1,000 casualties incurred on this day. These continued to be of some severity during the two succeeding days, when fighting continued along the La Bassée canal marked by nightly attacks on the part of the Germans and some progress on both flanks of the 2nd corps.

On the 14th the British army suffered a severe loss when Major-General Hubert Hamilton, commanding the 3rd division, was killed. General Hamilton had been military secretary to Lord Kitchener in South Africa and India, and had proved himself in every way a most able divisional commander. He was succeeded, first, by Major-General C. J. Mackenzie, secondly by Major-General F. D. V. Wing, and in November by Major-General J A. L. Haldane. His division, as if inspired to avenge his death, did remarkably well on the following day. The infantry, closely supported by the guns, drove the Germans away from the La Bassée–Estaires road and occupied a line Richebourg St. Vaast–Croix Barbée–Pont du Hem. As Sir John French reported, they "fought splendidly, crossing the dykes, with which this country is intersected, with planks and driving the enemy from one entrenched position to another in loopholed villages."

The movement was continued on the 16th, until the left flank of the 2nd

Photo: Daily Mirror

THEIR DAILY BREAD

At a base camp in France bread was baked for the troops both there and in the front line. This photograph shows a row of rough-and-ready ovens where each day many tons were made



Area over which the Allies and the Germans fought in the autumn of 1914. The object of the Allies was to prevent the enemy from capturing the ports on the English Channel. The inset shows the area between Ypres and La Bassée in which the fighting was most severe

corps was in front of the strongly defended village of Aubers. Further progress on this day included the retaking of Givenchy by the 15th brigade, an advance to Canteleux between Givenchy and La Bassée being carried out by the Norfolks, and the capture of Violaines, a mile north-west of La Bassée being effected by the Cheshire. On the 17th the village of Aubers was carried by the 9th infantry brigade, as was also the village of Herlies, which was taken by a bayonet charge of the 1st Lincolnshire, who particularly distinguished themselves. Sir John French also gives credit to the Royal Fusiliers for their part in this dashing little action. On the left of the line the French cavalry, with the 2nd Royal Irish, captured Fromelles, but did not get into alignment with the 2nd corps.

The British, after the capture of Herlies, held a position north and east of La Bassée and threatened an envelopment of the German position. The losses, however, had been extremely heavy, and the troops were worn out by a week of continuous fighting. On the right they still made contact with the French position near Vermelles, on the left they were in touch through Conneau's and de Mitry's cavalry with General Pulteney and the 3rd corps, which had moved up from St. Omer. Up to this point, moreover, although the Germans had had the advantage of defending strong positions, they had been definitely outnumbered. Now, however, the reserve divisions pouring into the area were to redress the balance, and the Germans were able to launch a counter-offensive.

On October 19, on the extreme left, the 2nd Royal Irish, again in conjunction with the French cavalry,



ASKARIS IN EAST AFRICA

The campaign in East Africa proved extremely trying to white troops, but the native levies stood the heat much better. Much of the fighting on both sides was done by regiments of askaris, as they were called. Here is a detachment in the British service

had carried the hamlet of Le Pilly north of Herlies, and retained their position throughout the night. Sir John French, meanwhile, had realized that the high-water mark of the British advance had been reached, and ordered a withdrawal to a stronger and more defensible position which was in course of preparation in the rear. Unfortunately, however, before the orders to retire reached the Royal Irish, the Germans found out they were isolated, and after a heavy bombardment surrounded Le Pilly. Until 3 p.m. the Irish resisted with amazing heroism, but by that time the 300 survivors, nearly all wounded, had exhausted their ammunition and were compelled to surrender. The total loss to the battalion in the two days' fighting in killed and prisoners was 578, only 30 men managing to rejoin the British lines.

The 2nd corps may now be said to have reached a turning point in their attempt on La Bassée, and British troops were on October 20 nearer that town than they were to be for the next four years. The turning movement had failed here, as it had failed at every point from Soissons northwards, and Sir John French issued orders that the 1st corps under Sir Douglas Haig, which had arrived from the Aisne on the 19th, should seek to achieve north of Ypres the success which the 2nd corps had failed to win at La Bassée. In the meantime, the 2nd corps was to hold its position and link up strongly with the 3rd corps to the north-west. While the 2nd corps halted a particularly fierce attack was launched on the 3rd division. A gap was made in their line, but they fought very sturdily to maintain their positions, doggedly realizing that there was no possibility of calling on reserves.

At least one counter-attack was successful in regaining ground, but towards evening, when the retirement of the 19th brigade became known, Major-General Mackenzie, commanding the 3rd division, gave orders that Herlies should be abandoned and that a retirement of about a mile should be carried out to a line Lorgies–Ligny, to south of Fromelles. The 14th brigade conformed to this movement. In view, however, of increasing pressure and the exhaustion of his troops, Sir H. Smith-Dorrien decided to withdraw his corps to the line already prepared from the eastern side of Givenchy, east of Neuve Chapelle to Fauquissart.

This had been dug by the engineers with the help of civilian labour, and, though much water-logged, was a better defensive position than any that the fighting troops had been able to dig for themselves. The withdrawal was actually carried out on the night of October 22–23, and involved a retirement on the left of the line of about two miles. On the 24th the 2nd corps was reinforced by the Lahore division of the Indian army corps, which had recently arrived in France.

It is now necessary to revert to the doings of the 3rd corps, which, it will be remembered, had detrained at St. Omer on October 11, preparatory to moving to Hazebrouck, which town, owing to various delays, they were not able to reach till late on the 12th, nor were in a position to leave until the morning of 13th. On this date the advanced guard formed of the 19th infantry brigade and a brigade of field artillery occupied a line Strazeele station–Caestre–St. Sylvestre. General orders were that the corps, as a whole, should advance towards a line stretching from Armentières to Wytschaete.

On the left of this line of advance lay a ridge extending from Mont des Cats to Kemmel. These hills, although only 400 feet high, offered a commanding position to any force defending them, and represented a perpetual threat to any force operating below them. General Allenby's cavalry were in consequence ordered to clear them of the enemy, it having been ascertained that only one German cavalry corps was in the neighbourhood. This task was accomplished after some very stiff fighting by the evening of the same day, the Germans losing a considerable number in prisoners, amongst whom was Prince Max of Hesse, who subsequently died of his wounds.

The infantry divisions of the 3rd corps, the 6th and 4th had, meanwhile, advanced eastward from Hazebrouck, and on the evening of the 13th drove the Germans out of Meteren. Mont Noir was occupied by British cavalry. On this day, the 13th, it was learnt that Lille had fallen the day before. The importance of this town, both strategically and commercially, is considerable. It is a large and populous manufacturing centre, and its possession gave to the Germans not only a splendid

ACROSS THE DESERT

Some trouble was caused to the Egyptian authorities by rebellious Arab chieftains across the frontier. Men of a Camel Corps are here shown on their way to deal with the forces of Ali Dinar, the rebellious sultan of Darfur

Photo: L.N.A.

VISIBILITY GOOD

In the clear and dry atmosphere of Egypt visibility was generally good, as was also the going for mounted men. An outpost such as this, by making use of a slight elevation, can watch enemy movements over many miles of desert

A MAN'S JOB

On the British front in the neighbourhood of Maricourt in the region of the Somme, where some of the fiercest fighting of the War took place, a British heavy gun is being hauled by a willing team along the path of a Decauville track to its new position

Photo: L.N.A.

WILLING HANDS

When the battalion bearers were not at hand it was often necessary to improvise stretchers for men too badly wounded to walk back to the dressing station Usually, however, the journey was a short one as motor ambulances were close to the firing line

base and rest-centre for their troops in Flanders, but, more important, a large warehouse of valuable commodities, particularly woollen goods, and a busy factory for the production of more. For as the War wore on the French were less and less inclined to submit to the destruction by shell fire of one of their chief industrial towns.

The fall of Lille, like the fall of Antwerp, was a hard blow to the Allied cause. In the retreat to the Marne every soldier who could be collected was flung in front of Paris. Towns like Lille, even though they bordered upon the German line of march, were left with but a small garrison. In this case the garrison consisted of a territorial brigade of 4,000 soldiers equipped with some light guns. The town had no fortifications of value against anything more than raiding parties, and such a garrison was powerless to resist a determined attack in force. One surprise raid by a German armoured train and a force of cavalry was in fact carried out on October 4, but was beaten off with great determination.

Later attacks by raiding troops and columns of cavalry met a similar fate, but on the evening of the 11th the German 19th corps arrived outside the town. This corps had been detached from the 3rd army in the Reims area to aid the operations in the west, and had covered 147 miles by a forced march in the astonishing time of seven days. There was no chance to counter the blow, and although the garrison made what resistance was possible the Germans entered the town on the 13th after a sharp bombardment, and took prisoner most of the defenders.

Lille had resisted, however, sufficiently to give time for the British 2nd corps to consolidate its position in front of Armentières. Had energetic measures of defence been taken by the Allied command, the line of defence in Flanders might have included the town and have been carried, therefore, some 12 miles farther to the east. But not only would its defence have required a large body of well-equipped troops, which at that time were not available, but, moreover, the fate of Liége, Namur, Antwerp and Maubeuge did not encourage a belief in the strength of a town, even when defended by a field army, to resist the advance of the enemy. Finally, with the capture of Lens, the Germans had already crossed the direct line from Arras to Lille, and its attempted defence would have involved the creation of a huge salient which would have been a perpetual point of weakness. In the result, taking into account the fact that Lille was saved from the horrors of intensive bombardment, it can be concluded that although its fall was a grave blow to prestige, it represented a tactical advantage.

October 14 saw the establishment of some sort of line of the Allies right to the sea. On a day quite unfavourable to aerial reconnaissance it was some time before it was discovered that the Germans had evacuated Bailleul and were retiring beyond the Lys. The movement forward of the 3rd corps was also further delayed by an appeal from Sir H. Smith-Dorrien for help for the 2nd corps. Before pushing on, a course which General Pulteney thought would best serve the interests of the hardly pressed 2nd corps he had to obtain the sanction of the commander-in-chief and it was early afternoon before the two divisions, the 4th and the 6th, advanced towards the line Steenwerck—Dranoutre.

As they passed through Bailleul they found some German wounded abandoned to their fate but the German retreat was not so precipitate that they could not find time to harass the advance by determined rearguard actions. On that evening, however, the British line extended from Pont Fixe on the La Bassée canal to the town of Ypres, whereabouts was General

FLIGHT FROM THE ARK

To facilitate the rising and landing of their early Zeppelins, the Germans built floating hangars on Lake Constance. Later, when the experimental stage was over, these hangars, one of which is here shown, became the homes of raiding Zeppelins

Capper's 7th division. Two French territorial divisions extended westward from Ypres, a French naval brigade was at Dixmude, and the Belgian army held the line of the Yser from Dixmude to the sea.

On the 15th the 3rd corps was ordered to make good the line of the Lys from Armentières to Sailly, secure the bridges over the river and, where they had been destroyed, to repair them. This order was successfully carried out, Sailly was found to be abandoned and was occupied with the village of Bac St. Maur by the 6th division. The 4th division secured the bridges at Erquinghem and Nieppe. In leaving this area the Germans were, in fact, taking up a new defensive line from La Bassée to the Comines canal preparatory to further attacks farther north.

At the moment, however, Sir John French sought to exploit his advantage by a further advance eastward, and on the morning of October 16 the cavalry corps moved out with orders to cross the Lys between Armentières and Menin. The dawn broke in fog, and when the horsemen attempted to cross what had appeared to them as green fields they found themselves in marshy land heavily intersected by dykes and impassable streams. The only possible avenues of approach were the roads, and in view of the difficulties which they presented and the fact that no supporting artillery could be brought up, little progress was made. The 4th Hussars did in fact enter the village of Warneton but could not make good their capture and were later ordered to withdraw.

As far as the infantry were concerned they appear to have spent the day largely in strengthening the positions which they had taken the day before though one or two minor advances were made. The Somerset Light Infantry crossed at Erquinghem and occupied the village ; the 1st Hampshire of the same brigade seized the bridge and crossed the river at Pont de Nieppe. Plooegsteert was occupied by the 12th brigade and Neuve Eglise by mounted troops of the 4th division. Of Sir Henry Rawlinson's troops the 7th division took up a position five miles east of Ypres from Zandvoorde through Gheluvelt to Zonnebeke. Mention may be made, at this time, of a strong German attack on the French naval brigade at Dixmude which was repulsed.

October 17 was notable for the capture of Armentières. The cavalry entrenched along the Lys and the 6th division fulfilled its operation orders by advancing to a line Bois Grenier–Chapelle d'Armentières. The 10th brigade of the 4th division crossed the Lys at Erquinghem and entered Armentières, meeting only with opposition from a few Germans left in the houses of this small industrial town. The advanced guard of the 10th brigade then penetrated as far as Houplines. On the same day the 2nd corps made a small advance towards Herlies near La Bassée, while General de Mitry's French cavalry also made some progress beyond Ypres.

By the 18th the Germans were holding a line from Radinghem on the south, through Perenchies and Frelinghien on the north, from which point the German troops, which were opposing the cavalry corps, occupied the east bank of the river as far as Wervicq. On this day Sir John French ordered the 3rd corps to move down the valley of the Lys and attempt to assist the cavalry corps to make good its position on the right bank. To do this it was first necessary to drive the enemy eastward towards Lille. A determined offensive was launched in this direction but the enemy, by this time heavily reinforced, met the attack with equal determination. By the evening of the 18th the Germans had been pushed back on a line from Frelinghien on the Lys to Verlinghem and thence south-west to Premesques.

The 3rd division began to entrench on this line, its left joining up with Allenby's cavalry at Ploegsteert Wood, its right meeting the French cavalry filling the gap between it and the 2nd corps at Zunetières. The weakness of this position was that the British front extended on a salient with its left flank exposed to enfilade fire and attack from the German line between Frelinghien to Verlinghem. Had the cavalry corps been able to force a crossing of the river north of Frelinghien, the Germans defending that village would have been compelled to retire, and the British line could have been straightened. As it was, during the whole of the 18th the cavalry corps could make no progress, and although they made a spirited attack on Deulemont the German position was too well defended to permit of capture without adequate artillery support.

On the 4th corps front beyond Ypres results on this day were equally disappointing, for owing to a misunderstanding of G.H.Q. orders the advance was not pushed with any vigour until midday. The mistake was then rectified, and the 4th corps prepared to strike strenuously at Menin. Information as to enemy concentrations was, however, received, and it was decided to postpone the attack until next day.

Yet this failure to advance was to prove an advantage, for October 18 was the final day of concentration behind the German lines before they launched their attack, which was to herald the battle of Ypres, and had the 7th division pushed on too far it is probable that the next day it would have been cut off and surrounded. As it was, it was enabled to fall back steadily into line with the other forces on the Ypres salient.

On October 18 the Germans for the first time seriously showed their hand and launched an attack on the Belgian position, which was continued uninterruptedly for the next eight days in the battle of the Yser. Further description of that battle will be found elsewhere, but for the moment it is sufficient to point out that here if anywhere was the real objective of the German attack, and although they exerted enormous pressure along the whole front from the sea to the south of Arras, it was undoubtedly upon the Nieuport–Dixmude line that they based their hopes. And it is easy to see that had that line been broken, what the Germans had failed to achieve on the Marne might well have been gained by a late attack in Flanders. Boulogne, Calais and the control of the Channel ports would have fallen into their hands. The British, cut off from their base and supplies, would have been paralysed; the French line from Soissons to Arras would have been taken in the rear, and Paris would have been at the Germans' mercy.

To sum up once again the position of the Allied armies in Flanders: The 2nd corps held the line from the La Bassée canal bridge, through Herlies, Aubers and Fromelles to Le Maisnil. Of the 3rd corps the 6th division was in the line Radinghem to Epinette, and the 4th on the road one mile north-east of Epinette–Pont Rouge. Two divisions of the cavalry corps were in position between Deulemont and Tenbrielen, with the third about Passchendaele. The two French territorial divisions were disposed between Passchendaele and Ypres. The Belgian army was spread

Photo: L.N.A.

GERMAN LIGHT ARTILLERY

A light German gun is in position on a hill in Champagne, carefully chosen to give the widest possible field of fire. The light artillery of the Germans was less effective than the famous French 75 mm. guns that won a high reputation in the War

IN A GUN PIT

When trench warfare became stabilized the artillery had greater opportunity of safety for the guns and their teams than heretofore. Rough shelters in which their work could be done under less precarious conditions were constructed. Here is seen a British field piece firing from the shelter of a prepared position

CHANCE SHOT GETS HOME

The roads over which the transport wagons passed were subjected to constant shelling, but it was only very occasionally that a shell found its mark, as most of the journeys were made in the darkness. In the scene here photographed a convoy has been hit

Photo: L.N.A.

out between Boesinghe and Nieuport. The length of the front held by the British was approximately thirty-five miles.

Thus ended the race to the sea, though there were to follow immediately two long and critical actions in which the Allied forces were to be most severely tried and during which the safety of the channel ports was to be constantly in the hazard. The actions between October 9 and October 18 were a prelude to the more important battles of the Yser and of Ypres. During this period British losses amounted to about 4,500, of which total 2,600 occurred in the 2nd corps, 1,550 in the 3rd, and the remainder in the 7th division and the cavalry corps.

It has been pointed out that one great advantage accrued from these battles, and that was that a better understanding sprang up between the French and British armies. This was due to the fact that they were fighting far more closely together than they had done before. During their earlier misadventures at Mons—and even in the advance to the Marne and the Aisne—the British could never escape the impression that they were to some extent deserted by their more powerful allies or, to say the least, were not being properly supported. But in these battles they had a closer opportunity of watching the French in action, of witnessing their dash in attack and their resolution in defence. Also frequent opportunities arose for one side to support the other. Difficulties occurred in which British troops rendered valuable assistance to the French, and the French to the British.

On one occasion General Maistre, commanding the 21st French corps visited Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien to thank him for assistance rendered by the heavy battery of the 5th division. He expressed his admiration for the accuracy of the shooting and informed the corps commander that, according to reports given by his own staff officers, the British artillery fire had been distinctly more effective than his own. The British had, in fact, kept up a barrage in front of the advancing troops, a method of firing not yet adopted by the French.

Though they had no conception of it at the time the British had taken over a section of Flemish territory which for four years they were to make distinctively their own. The then unfamiliar names of the towns and villages were to become household words of grim association and to find a place, many of them, in the battle honours of most British regiments. For the first time the British public became familiar with the names of Ypres and Passchendaele, of Gheluvelt and Dickebusch, of "Plug Street" and Messines.

We may now turn for a moment to consider what was passing through the mind of the German high command during these fateful days. After the fall of Antwerp on October 9, when it became plain to the Germans that the Belgians had escaped, their 3rd reserve corps was ordered to pursue the retiring forces in the direction of Ghent and Bruges and finally to make the coast between Blankenberghe and Ostend. But more important was the decision to form in Belgium a new 4th army under Duke Albrecht of Württemberg, which was to obtain the decisive victory by breaking through the left flank of the allies and gaining Calais. A light is thrown on the tactics of the German forces opposing the British advance from La Bassée by the order to the 6th army operating on this front to

remain entirely on the defensive, while this new 4th army was being formed and until it had begun its attack. It was detrained west and south-west of Brussels on October 13, and on the 14th began its advance westward.

Meantime, the German effort was being contested not only by land but also by sea. At one moment it had appeared that it might be necessary to evacuate Sir Henry Rawlinson's 7th division, and one of the first tasks of the Admiralty was to keep transports ready to meet this emergency. Fortunately, the divisional commander succeeded in keeping his force intact and by a series of successful movements escaping the menace of envelopment. But as the German armies became packed more closely towards the sea border it became clear that the navy could play a valuable part by bombarding their areas of concentration.

General Joffre telegraphed to Lord Kitchener on October 16 in these terms: "Now that operations extend up to the coast of the North Sea between Ostend and the advanced defences of Dunkirk, it would be important for the two Allied navies to participate in these operations by supporting our left wing and acting with long range guns on the German right wing." "This duty," says Mr. Winston Churchill, "we instantly accepted." The Admiralty had available for this service three monitors which had been built for the Brazilian government and had been commandeered at the outbreak of war.

On October 18, these ships, whose activities are more fully related in a succeeding chapter, left for Dunkirk and began naval operations on the Belgian coast. They were supported later by a number of old craft which could be speculated on this hazardous enterprise.

As the first lord said:

We had to pick ships primarily for the class of ammunition which they fired; ships that could use up old ammunition and ships whose value was so small that we could afford to spend all their ammunition. As October wore on we scoured the dockyards for every little vessel that carried a gun of any kind. Even the smallest gunnery tenders, 250-ton gunboats, forty years old, were pressed into service and in one way and another the fire was continuously maintained.

This little fleet was always under the menace of submarine attack and the possibility of a raid in force from German harbours. Actually, on October 17 the Germans, as Mr. Winston Churchill said, "torn between the will to wound and the fear to strike," sent a weak flotilla of four destroyers to attempt to relieve their armies in the field in Belgium. These destroyers were themselves destroyed very quickly by the British navy, while the German hosts were made excessively uncomfortable as they occupied first Zeebrugge and then Ostend. At this last seaside resort the German army of occupation found their tenancy of the fashionable hotels considerably disturbed by shell fire from the naval guns, a fact recorded by Dr. Sven Hedin who was with them at the time and who saw the hungry officers deprived of their dinner. Their armies in the field were shortly to face a far more serious menace to their advance along the coast. The battle of the Yser, as will be seen, was mainly won by the opening of the sluice gates at Nieuport.

Photos: Australian Government

TROOPS FROM 'DOWN UNDER'

Not only in Gallipoli, but also in France did the Australians demonstrate their worth as soldiers. Here they are holding a shallow front-line trench, in the Ypres sector, one of the most hotly contested in the whole line

SHARING THE TASK

Two members of an Australian gun team carry the shells with which their companions load this 18-pounder gun. In position a little way behind the front line, and having an effective range of about 3,000 yards, it is sighted directly on the target

'Canadian Records'

HEAVY HORSES FOR HEAVY GUNS

Moving the heavy guns forward was a slow and laborious process. A team of eight heavy draught horses is needed to draw this Canadian gun over the good roads that existed in France. Larger teams were required on soft ground, where even such broad wheels as those here shown could not always prevent the guns from becoming bogged

CHAPTER 25

HOLDING THE YSER

In the autumn of 1914 the Belgian army, aided by their British and French allies, fought desperately to prevent the oncoming Germans from seizing the last corner of their little land. This battle took place along the canalized river Yser

AFTER the fall of Antwerp King Albert, it will be remembered, had issued an order to his army to hold the line of the Yser and the last fragment of his country " at all costs." The army was therefore concentrated in the area Dixmude–Nieuport–Furnes, with a base in Dunkirk.

But they were not allowed to settle down to anything like peaceful trench warfare until they had withstood the most severe shocks from the attacking German forces. It is generally recognized that along the whole battle front the most deadly thrusts were made on the line of the Yser and around Ypres. The exact position held by the Belgians extended from Nieuport and the sea to Dixmude. Here they joined up with the French Marine brigade. Mixed French and Belgian cavalry and the 89th French territorial division continued the line between the Yser and Houthulst Forest, where they touched the 3rd cavalry division and the 7th division of the British 4th corps that held a position running from Langemarck through Zonnebeke to Gheluvelt and Zandvoord, where General Allenby's cavalry corps continued the line to Frelinghien. From there the British 3rd corps stretched as far as Fromelles, where Conneau's cavalry filled the space between the 3rd and the 2nd corps, the latter making contact with the left wing of Maud'huy's 10th army near Cuinchy.

There were three points at which the Germans could attack the Allied line. One was at Arras, where a victory would not only have opened the way to the Channel ports, but would also have turned the Allied flank from Soissons northward, cutting off the British, French and Belgian troops north of that town from their bases, compelling their surrender. An attack on La Bassée would have achieved the same end.

The third course, and the one finally chosen, was an attack on the Belgian positions on the Yser. The decision to advance in this region was due to two considerations. If it were successful the way would be open to the Channel ports equally as much as if La Bassée or Arras had been taken, and moreover, the last remnants of the Belgian army would be driven from Belgian soil.

The attack upon the Belgian army on the Yser was entrusted to Duke Albert of Württemberg. The army under his command was the 4th, consisting of four recently organized reserve corps. The country in which the battle took place is flat and marshy, and the sea is only kept back from it by embankments. Across the plain runs the canalized river Yser, making a semicircle, bulging towards the east. Behind the river ran a single line of railway connecting Dixmude with Nieuport. This was carried across the dunes on an embankment about six feet high. The Yser was spanned by bridges at intervals of two or three miles. These were situated at Steenstraat, Drie Grachten, Dixmude, Tervaete, Schoorbakke, S. Georges and Nieuport.

The stretch of country bordering the Yser canal was a difficult one for military operations. On the banks of the canalized river it consisted of marshland and the rest of it was sand dunes. Only on the sand dunes was there any ground for gun emplacements. The Belgian army, which was to make its final stand here, numbered by this time only about 40,000 effectives, and in support of them were 7,000 Breton Marines under Admiral Ronarc'h.

On October 16 a reconnaissance in force on the position on the Yser was

'Canadian Records'

FROM SHIP TO SHORE

The example of the Boer War, when naval guns were used in the defence of Ladysmith, was followed during the Great War. Huge guns from the fleet, such as those here shown, were used on the front held by the Canadians and in other parts of the line

PIPING TIMES OF WAR

With a large proportion of its population of Scottish descent, it is not surprising that Canada raised battalions of Highlanders for service in the Great War. A platoon is seen returning from a route march

'Canadian Records'

made by two German army corps. It was found that the Belgian army was still holding the villages north of the canalized river, while French Marines occupied Dixmude.

The Germans at once brought up their artillery and began a bombardment. The next day strong infantry forces were launched against all the outlying villages. Overwhelmed by numbers and lacking ammunition for their field-guns, the Belgian 1st division was driven out of the village of Mannekensvere, and the 4th division was forced out of Keyem. They both retired across the Yser. But in the night the 4th division returned over the river, and by a furious bayonet attack in the darkness recaptured all its positions at Keyem.

The German attack, which began on Monday, October 19, was directed at the village of Lombartzyde, on the coast, two miles north of Nieuport. It was held by a single Belgian division, the 2nd, and against it were launched masses of German troops backed by light and heavy artillery. Under a heavy bombardment the Belgians were forced to give ground, but when the shell fire ceased and the Germans attempted to advance, the men of King Albert's army proved more than a match for them in hand-to-hand fighting. But battles cannot always be won by the rifle and bayonet, and the overwhelming superiority of the German artillery would have overcome the Belgian resistance if help had not been at hand.



District on both sides of the canalized river Yser which the Germans struggled hard to cross in the winter of 1914–15

At this moment there appeared off the Belgian coast a new type of warship which subsequently played an important part in all the coastal warfare. British monitors came into action for the first time. At the outbreak of the war Messrs. Vickers had just completed three river warships for use on the Amazon, to the orders of the Brazilian government. The ships were flat-bottomed, with a draught of only 4½ feet, but they carried armoured turrets with two 6 in. guns forward and two 4·7 in. howitzers aft. The Admiralty at once bought these monitors. Their value as off-shore batteries in land operations was obvious, and the course

'Canadian Records'

BROTHERS OF MERCY

The photograph shows a Canadian field ambulance during an advance. Under improvised shelters stretcher cases are waiting their turn for places in ambulances which will take them to the base. German prisoners lend the Red Cross men a willing hand

of events in the early days of the War pointed quite clearly to a campaign along the coast at no very distant date. As the battle-front extended near to the coast, the monitors — renamed Severn, Humber and Mersey—anchored at Dover under the command of Admiral Hood, ready for action. On Sunday, October 18, they were ordered to Belgium, and by that night were steaming, lights out, with an escort of destroyers, towards the Belgian coast.

A few hours later, to the great surprise of the Germans, who were well aware of the Belgian deficiency in artillery, half a dozen 6-in. shells exploded among their batteries. Then the 4·7-in. howitzers came into action, and found their mark.

This unexpected bombardment seriously interfered with the German plans, and the enemy replied to it by bringing up their heaviest guns and howitzers. The land batteries, however, were at a serious disadvantage in comparison with the naval guns. Once in position the shore guns could only be moved with much labour, and once the range was found the naval guns could pitch shell after shell upon them. The ships, on the other hand, were swiftly moving targets, which it was extremely difficult for the shore gunners to hit. To meet this menace from the sea the Germans were forced to bring 11-in. and 12-in. howitzers from other parts of the line. On October 27 the naval support for the Belgian army was increased by the arrival of H.M.S. Venerable, whose armament consisted of four 12-in. guns and twelve 6 in. guns. The 12-in. guns could reach practically the whole of the German line, for they had a range of between eight and twelve miles and in flood tide the Venerable could come in close to the shore.

In this dilemma Duke Albert called the German navy to his help, and a flotilla of submarines was dispatched from Emden to attack the monitors. They were of very little use, however, as the monitors drew only $4\frac{1}{2}$ feet of water, and at that depth torpedoes were ineffective. The presence of the submarines had, too, very much the effect of stirring up a wasps' nest, for a strong force of British destroyers were sent to deal with them, and when the destroyers were not engaged in submarine chasing they shelled the German positions.

The arrival of the British monitors, besides upsetting this German plan, made it essential that the sea coast should be heavily fortified, and guns, war material and labour were brought up to fortify the seaport of Bruges and for the building of the battery at Knocke. The large number of men mobilized in trenches on the coast as a protection against the possible landing

MY FRIEND THE ENEMY

A fine humanity distinguished the work of the ambulance men of all the belligerents. In this advanced aid post the wounds of Canadians and their prisoners are being dressed, "worst wounded first served" being the rule

'Canadian Records'

Photo: Imperial War Museum

SOLDIER AND SAILOR TOO

After the flooding of the Yser the eight miles of the German line which ran from Dixmude to the coast was in part held by German marines under the command of Admiral von Schröder He is seen here with his staff and some of his men

of a British raiding force was another anxiety. British ships shelled Zeebrugge, attacked Ostend, drove the Germans out of Middelkerke, and with long-range fire swept the country for six miles inland. The only effective means of defence was to attack the monitors and destroyers with light and armoured cruisers. But the German fleet, hemmed in its ports by the British navy, was powerless to help.

Though the Germans had a great superiority in artillery on shore they were not able to make full use of it on account of the difficult nature of the ground. The flat fenland country intersected by the banks of the dykes and lines of willows and osiers made it extremely difficult to site the guns. The range of vision was not more than half a mile and it was often impossible to see where the enemy was or what damage was being inflicted upon him, while the autumn mists which spread over the whole battlefield made aerial reconnaissance difficult.

The gunners were therefore obliged to depend largely on information received from the men in the firing line to obtain their positions, and the guns had constantly to be fired at short range.

On account of the menace of the naval guns, Duke Albert chose a point farther east for his next attack, and on Monday, October 19, a terrific bombardment was opened on the little village of Beerst, just north of Dixmude. The Belgian 4th division, which was entrenched among the ruins, was driven back by a massed attack of infantry. The neighbouring village of Keyem, which the 4th division had recovered by a splendid bayonet charge, was also assailed, and many of the Belgian troops were in danger of being cut off.

But the Belgian bayonet again won all that the heavy German field howitzers had partly conquered. When night fell and the mist thickened the Belgian division crept northwards out of Dixmude with some thousands of Breton fishermen forming the French Marine division. There was not much rifle fire, but with the bayonet the Belgians and Frenchmen thrust their way into Vladsloo and got again into Beerst. But as it was discovered that fresh strong columns of the enemy were pouring out from Roulers and striking westward, the defending force retired on the Yser, evacuating all the villages up to Keyem.

Duke Albert had been expecting reinforcements on the following day, but they were not forthcoming, for on October 20 Sir John French began his advance against the German force between Roulers and Thourout, and no troops could be spared for the German line farther west.

The Germans could therefore do no more than keep up a furious bombardment of the Belgian line. On the coast a farm was taken from the 2nd division, then recovered by the Belgians and again lost. But this only brought the fire of naval guns on the captured farm, wrecking it completely and killing and wounding most of the troops which held it.

All through the night the plain was lit up by bursting shells and burning villages, and in this strange light the German infantry concentrated for an attack upon Dixmude. Four times, the last just as dawn was breaking, the massed battalions of Germans surged forward upon the enemy positions, but each time the attack was stopped by rifle and machine-gun fire. The success of the sorely tried 4th division in holding up an attacking force vastly superior

in numbers was, after the supreme courage of the men, due to the excellent machine-gun with which the Belgian army was equipped. It was a small, light and very handy machine-gun of American invention with a simple air-cooling device that did away with the use of the cumbersome water-jacket. As the Germans advanced through the mist over the marshy ground these guns were used by the Belgians with effect.

The attacks on both flanks of the Belgian line having failed, the Germans decided to make an attempt to break through the head of the salient formed by the Yser canal. Half-way between Nieuport and Dixmude the Yser bulges northward, forming a salient loop between the village of Schoorbakke and the village of Tervaete. The Belgian trenches, following the loop of the river, constituted a bastion of earthworks that could be shelled from three directions by the hostile batteries. The head of the Yser salient was unquestionably the weakest point in the defence, but the Germans were slow to realize this, and only after their attacks on the flanks had failed did they concentrate on a frontal attack.

The Belgians had foreseen the possibility of such an attack and, realizing that it might be successful, had prepared a line on which to fall back. It lay some two miles in the rear, by the railway from Nieuport to Dixmude, and the cobbled, tree-lined highway running between the two towns, with the red roofs of Pervyse rising at the cross-roads. Pervyse was the centre of the Belgian operations, for through it a cross-road led to Furnes, the last town in Flanders and the Belgian headquarters. Furnes was only five miles from Pervyse, so the loss of the latter town would involve the complete conquest of Belgian territory by the invaders For even though the British held on to Ypres, which would have been doubtful if Furnes had fallen, the Germans would have been able to claim that they had driven the Belgian army out of Belgium

Patriotism, even more than military considerations, therefore, led the Belgians to hold on to this position as long as possible. The first German attack was delivered on the afternoon of Wednesday, October 21. The first drive was directed to the left of the village of Schoorbakke, where the bridge across the canalized stream had been blown up by the Belgians. During the night the Germans concentrated many heavy guns on the Yser salient, and for hours it was subjected to a devastating fire. To this concentrated fire the Belgians were unable to make any effective reply, for they had only a few light field-guns, the ammunition for which had been heavily depleted during the retirement from Antwerp. The best that they could do was to withhold their fire until the enemy's mass attack began.

On October 22 Duke Albert succeeded in making a crossing of the Yser at the village of Tervaete, which was held by the 1st Belgian division. Overwhelmed by superior numbers and machine-gun fire, the Belgians lost the village, but, making an heroic counter-attack, recovered it for a time. The Germans were continually receiving reinforcements, but the Belgian 1st division still clung to the head of the Yser salient, while the 4th division and the

ALL ABOARD FOR BLIGHTY

The Braemar Castle was among the many passenger liners that became floating hospitals. She is here seen alongside the quay at Salonika ready to take a load of wounded back to England. The Braemar Castle was sunk by a mine or torpedo in the Aegean Sea in December, 1916

SUNK WITHOUT WARNING

International law permitted the destruction of merchant shipping only if the crew could be saved, but German submarines often sank ships without possibility of rescuing the crews. This photograph was taken from the deck of a U boat just as the torpedo she has fired strikes a tramp steamer

Photo: Cribb, Southsea

SEASCAPE AT SCAPA

From 1914 to 1918 the Grand Fleet was based at Scapa Flow, a sea basin in the Orkneys, 15 miles long and from 8 to 12 miles broad. In the foreground is the Royal Oak, and on the right is one of the drifters which were employed as patrols, in netting channels against submarines and as errand boys of the fleet

French Marines held their trenches round Dixmude. Between Friday, October 23, and Saturday, October 24, the Germans crossed the Yser seven times, only to be driven back each time. Describing the action afterwards, a German said : " At last our dead formed bridges over which we again tried to pass, only to be repulsed once more."

For seven days the Belgians had held off more than four times their number of Germans, but their losses were terribly heavy. One-fourth of the remnant of the Belgian army had fallen, while the rest were exhausted. The Belgians had not only to face a numerical superiority both in men and artillery, but such guns as they had were ill supplied with ammunition. When the German attack began the Belgians had about 350 field-pieces. After a week they were reduced to 180, with fewer than 200 rounds of ammunition apiece.

At this point the French, realizing the critical situation on the Belgian coast, sent reinforcements both of artillery and infantry to the support of their allies. The artillery included howitzers which had quite as long a range as the German pieces, while the infantry consisted of a whole division, the 42nd, under the command of General Grossetti.

By the capture of Tervaete the Germans had at last secured a crossing of the Yser, but to get any useful force across in face of the reinforced enemy artillery was an extremely difficult task. Concentrated cross fire swept away the head of any column that endeavoured to penetrate beyond the village, and the pontoon bridges which the Germans attempted to build at various points were destroyed by the new French artillery.

But by superior weight of numbers the Germans at last effected a crossing, and the Belgian and French forces fell back to a fortified position along the railway embankment. It was in many ways more favourable to defence than that which they had occupied along the river. There it had been impossible to dig a three-foot trench without getting 18 inches of liquid mud to stand in, and all that the Germans had won was a stretch of marsh and ditches, than which no ground more unhealthy for troops could be imagined. The new position enabled the Allies to bring a new weapon to bear upon the enemy.

The armoured train is one of the devices that was greatly improved by the inventive skill of Lord Fisher, who used it in the campaign against Arabi Pasha in 1882. British naval men had subsequently specialized in this instrument of warfare. It was used with great effect in the South African war, and now a British armoured train appeared on the track between Dixmude and Nieuport. The successful use of the armoured train depended largely on the factor of surprise. When the struggle was at its fiercest and all the enemy batteries were disclosed and all his forces deployed, the armoured train, in answer to a telephone call, appeared on the scene. Some of the earliest attempts at camouflage were made with armoured trains, which were painted in colours that blended with the background. This, and the high speed at which they moved, made them difficult targets for the enemy guns.

The British armoured train, commanded by naval officers, played a valuable part in resisting the German assault upon the last stand of the Belgian army. More than once its guns, opening unexpectedly at short range, silenced a hostile battery, and its shrapnel shells brought down five of the captive balloons used by the Germans for observation purposes. At the end of a month's campaign only one engine had been damaged, without being put out of action, and of the crew

IF IT COMES TO THE WORST

The Channel steamer Sussex was torpedoed by a German submarine on March 24, 1916, while crossing from Folkestone to Dieppe. She had on board 386 passengers, of whom 270 were women and children. The loss of life was heavy, including American citizens. The photograph shows passengers waiting with their life-belts on

BROKEN BUT BEACHED

The torpedo struck the Sussex in the bows with what result is here shown. The watertight bulkhead held and the ship was towed into Boulogne harbour where she is seen beached, subsequently to be refloated and taken to dry dock

GERMANY'S BIG THREE

At the German headquarters Hindenburg (left) and Ludendorff (right) are explaining their plans to the Kaiser. In the earlier years of the War, William II insisted on taking an active part in the direction of the campaigns, but later his counsels were tactfully ignored

Photo: G.P.A.

one Belgian rifleman only was wounded. But with all the help that their allies were able to give them, the Belgians could not hope to resist for long the overwhelming German hosts which were being launched against them. There was no possibility that Belgium's allies could send further reinforcements to this part of the field, and the Germans were constantly pouring fresh battalions into the line. In this crisis the Belgian command resolved to make the last sacrifice to save their country from complete conquest.

It was one that, as readers of Motley's Rise of the Dutch Republic will remember, had been employed against the Spaniards in the 16th century. In one instance a mere threat succeeded. In September, 1573, the town of Alkmaar was invested by a Spanish force, and to save it the Prince of Orange gave instructions to flood the country by opening the sluices and piercing the dykes to let in the sea. On hearing that this was proposed, the Spanish general withdrew his troops, and the town was saved.

The second occasion, nearly a year later, was more serious. In June, 1574, the town of Leiden was besieged and its defenders, with provisions and stores exhausted, were in despair. Again proposals for inundation were made, and, having obtained the consent of the states general, who believed "better a drowned land than a lost land," the Prince of Orange ordered that the dykes should be pierced and the great sluices at Rotterdam, Schiedam and Delftshaven opened. This was done, and after some delays and disappointments the advancing waters carried a relieving fleet to the walls of the besieged city, which is some five miles from the sea. The attacking force, therefore, made a speedy retreat and the relief of Leiden became one of the historic episodes in Dutch history.

The sluices by means of which this could be done were at Nieuport, which the Belgians still held. King Albert was loth to resort to inundation as a last means of holding back the Germans, but when it became clear that another attack was imminent he consented, and orders were given for the sluices to be opened with the object of flooding the whole of the country lying east of the Dixmude–Nieuport railway, to such a depth as to be quite impassable.

At first the water rose but slowly, and the Germans failed to realize what had happened, attributing the rise of the water to the recent heavy rains. They therefore pressed on with the attack, and on Monday, October 26, made another determined effort to hew their way along the coast. They concentrated a large body of troops on the Mannekensvere road and, under cover of a rain of high explosive shell and shrapnel, threw three pontoon bridges across the river and canal by which the infantry passed to an assault upon Nieuport.

In front of Nieuport a French brigade was in danger of being surrounded, but with the help of Belgian supports they were able to retire to an entrenched position. The enemy was, however, making steady progress to the south towards the villages of Ramscappelle and Pervyse. The progress he made could be marked by the way the bursting shells fell nearer and nearer to Furnes. Between ten and eleven o'clock in the morning the situation became critical. Orders were given for Furnes to be evacuated. The wounded were carried to the station, and a large number of the townspeople began to leave. Belgian soldiers, shelled out of their trenches, made their way to the rear, but fresh columns of their comrades who had been resting in the villages between the lines pushed along to the front.

It was essential that the Belgians and French should hold the railway line until the rising floods made any further German advance impossible. It was anticipated that by October 31

successive high tides would complete the inundation of the country, but as the Allies had been forced back to the railway embankment on October 28, the weary and war-worn Belgian and French troops must hold out for three more days. At terrible cost the Germans had won their way across the Yser. At terrible cost they had thrust the Belgians from their strongest defences. One more effort should carry them over the railway embankment and Furnes would be in their grasp. Once that was lost Belgium was doomed and with it the Channel ports.

It seemed to the German command that a victory which would eventually put Calais in their hands was now within their grasp. In spite of the difficult country, the unexpected appearance of the British monitors, and the fact that the German 4th army was largely composed of untried troops, they had steadily advanced, and when once the railway embankment had been carried no further opposition of any importance need be expected. Success would mean the fall of Ypres and Arras, and the Allied line, even if it were not broken irretrievably, would be forced to fall back on Paris.

Since the beginning of August the Belgian army had been pitted without rest against overwhelmingly superior forces, and the last stand on the Yser, when they were weary to death, had been the hardest task of all. Once more the Allied cause on the Western front depended largely on King Albert's heroic troops. They did not fail, and the knowledge that within a day or two the sea would prove their irresistible ally, spurred them to heroic efforts.

By this time Duke Albert was beginning to realize that rain alone was not responsible for the gradual rise of the water. He learned through spies that the Belgians had been examining the plans of Vauban, Louis XIV's great engineer, who had built these canals with an eye to the defence of northern France. But the prize was so nearly within his grasp that he resolved to make one more desperate throw, spurred on to do so by the fact that the kaiser had arrived on the field to witness the final triumph.

A great new German offensive was therefore planned. The floods were not as yet serious, the water being only a few inches deep, and men could splash through it, and guns could be dragged through the mud. The 3rd and 22nd reserve corps were ordered forward and more guns were brought across the river. The front towards Nieuport was almost denuded of troops, only enough men being left to hold the ground already won, for the key position to the Belgian line was Ramscappelle, against which the main assault was to be launched. By October 29 everything was ready for the attack, and the kaiser addressed the troops, calling for volunteers to lead the assault. Two Württemberg brigades were eventually selected. On October 30 at 6.30 a.m. a terrific bombardment was opened on Ramscappelle. A few hours later the Württemberg brigades raced across the fields towards the village.

Nothing could stand against the impetus of the charge. The Belgian 2nd division swayed, bent and broke, and the Germans were through. Ramscappelle and Pervyse fell into their hands and a huge gap was torn in the Belgian line. Behind the German lines the kaiser, watching the scene through field-glasses, smiled. The whole of Belgium and Calais were, he thought, in his power.

But the Belgians and the French knew that they were fighting a winning battle if only they could hold on until the rising tide came to their help. The fighting was terrific, continuing all day and into the night. German reserves were pouring up; the Belgian line was reeling. But now the French

Photos: Imperial War Museum

ARMIES MUST EAT

Organization of the commissariat was a major problem of the War. A line of German field kitchens is here seen moving up to the front to ensure that the courage of the German troops should not fail them by reason of empty stomachs

HOME OF A HOWITZER

During the congested fighting of trench warfare the heavy batteries of the contending armies found shelter in the woods of France and Flanders. Their great missiles were often destined to wreak destruction on peaceful towns and villages behind the lines

42nd division swept up from Furnes, the Belgian 2nd and 3rd divisions rallied and, abandoning the desperate defence, rushed into more desperate attack.

Every inch of ground which the Germans had gained was hotly contested by the Belgian and French soldiers. Through the streets of Pervyse and Ramscappelle, now reduced to ruins, fierce fighting continued all through the day. The Allies were holding their own, but no more than their own. They had succeeded in checking the German advance, and now a mightier force than bayonet and rifle was rushing to their aid. From the direction of the sea was heard a dull sound that rose monotonously above the noise of the bombardment. The North Sea at flood tide was spreading across the country. The flood was no longer ankle-deep—it was waist-deep.

The German troops which had faced the fire of the Belgian and French troops with unflinching courage, broke and fled before this new menace. Panic-stricken they ran, casting away rifles and accoutrement, their only thought to escape the water which by now was lapping coldly round their waists. Hundreds were drowned, hundreds were shot down as they huddled defenceless on the spurs of higher ground which formed little islands in the surrounding inundation, hundreds rushed to safety and captivity behind the Belgian lines. That night, full of the bitter knowledge that the coast road was barred and that the last corner of Belgium was safely immersed under several feet of water, the emperor left the field. It was round Ypres that he would have to look for the success which had just slipped from his grasp.

Two miles of muddy water stretched between the Germans and the Belgians, and while the Germans were safe from Belgian attack it was equally clear that the Germans could not reach the Belgians. Only along the coast, still protected by British and French warships, and at Dixmude, was there a dry route. Already the Germans had been driven from the west bank of the river, the few dry spots where guns and troops could still maintain themselves being useless. For all real purposes the battle of the Yser was over, but intermittent fighting still continued.

In the first days of November the Belgians made a surprise attack on the Westende–Middelkerke line, taking Lombartzyde and pushing northwards. Forces of the enemy were hurried up, and in spite of the help given by the ships off the shore, managed to check the Belgian advance, retook Lombartzyde on the 7th, and drove the Belgians back on their strongly fortified positions at Nieuport.

While the Belgians were desperately defending the Yser position, Dixmude had been of the utmost importance. If it could have been taken the Belgian position would have been turned. From October 16 to November 1 Ronarc'h realized that he was holding a key position, and he knew that he and his Marines could expect no help from the Belgian army on his left.

In the defence of Dixmude he made good use of the meagre forces at his disposal. To the west of the town a slight ridge gave him admirable gun sites and here he placed his batteries. Not only did they command all the approaches, but they could bombard the town itself in the event of the Germans gaining a footing. And he was also lucky in the possession of a huge flour mill which towered above the surrounding houses and made an excellent observation post. His men he could rely on. Recruited from the hardy Breton fishermen, they could endure the worst rigour of the waterlogged trenches without flinching.

The Breton brigades in the Franco-Prussian war had won renown for courage and endurance ; their descendants were to become the talk of every bivouac in northern France for their defence of Dixmude. It is said that they first evolved the method of concentrated machine-gun fire. Four guns were grouped together and their united fire was directed on one point. Certain it is that the heads of the German columns which swept forward to the attack withered away under the terrible cross fire that was brought to bear.

The ordeal of Dixmude and its brave defenders was a terrible one. On October 19 the Germans delivered a particularly severe attack upon it, but though they drove the Marines back into the town they themselves were unable to penetrate into it. Dixmude was a scene of desolation and terror. The German commander ordered that every house should be levelled to the ground. On the first days of the struggle the field guns and howitzers of an army corps were massed against it. Then some of the 12-in. Austrian mortars were brought up by railway. The artillery general tried to obtain also two of the 16½-in. Krupp howitzers, but, much to his disappointment, they were needed on the coast to reply to the British warships. Even without these gigantic instruments of destruction the town was quickly battered into mounds of rubble.

On the night of October 23–24 the Germans delivered their fiercest attack upon the town. No fewer than fourteen attempts were made to carry it by assault, but the Marines, reinforced by a part of the Belgian 5th division, which temporarily came to their aid, repulsed each one. The advancing Germans were met by a steady fire from the batteries on the hills and the massed machine-guns. But the ranks of the Frenchmen were becoming terribly thinner and their supply of ammunition was running low, when they gained a temporary respite. While the Germans made their desperate thrust at Ramscappelle, the pressure on Dixmude was relaxed, though the position continued to be shelled.

After the flooding of the Yser the value of Dixmude was much diminished, but the Germans, anxious to avenge their defeat in the major operation, again turned their attention to the sorely stricken town. On the morning of November 10 they began a bombardment more severe than any the town had yet endured. By this time the power of resistance of Admiral Ronarc'h and his Marines was almost exhausted. The first advance of the German infantry was again met with heavy fire from artillery and machine-guns, but as wave after wave of packed battalions advanced it became clear that they could not be checked, and at nightfall Admiral Ronarc'h and his Marines abandoned the town, and took up a position on the opposite bank of the river.

The defenders of Dixmude had done all that was asked of them. The town was no longer of any great importance, for nearly half a mile of deep water lay between the Germans and the Belgian right flank. From their new position on the farther bank of the river the Marines held the German advance with ease, and as the fighting in this area settled down to desultory trench warfare they evolved a new weapon—a boat armed with a quick-firing gun—which they used with remarkable effect over the flooded marshes of the Yser front.

After the fall of Dixmude there was for many months a complete deadlock along the whole front from the North Sea to Switzerland. Here as elsewhere the trench system was developed, and hand grenades and trench mortars took the place of rifles and artillery. The sacrifices of the Belgian army had not been in vain. The Channel ports were safe from attack from this quarter, and King Albert's army still stood fast on Belgian soil. The British monitors remained off the coast some time longer, but after the inundation they could render no effective service. They had, however, during the time they were employed been of great use.

LLOYD GEORGE LISTENS

Both as Minister of Munitions and Secretary for War Mr. Lloyd George paid many visits to the front. He is here seen in conference with Sir Douglas Haig and General Joffre, while M. Albert Thomas, the French Minister of Munitions, stands ready to take part if required

GENERALS' ON PARADE

Many of the buses of the London General Omnibus Company were sent to France and converted to transport uses. Some of them were still majority were painted a neutral tint all over and carried only signs showing to which branch of the service they were attached. Many of them were

ir original red and bore advertisements on their sides, but the
he men who formerly piloted them through the streets of London

PRAYER BEFORE ACTION

The village churches of France and Flanders, battle-scarred and wrecked though they often were, remained to the end places of prayer. In this photograph, British troops on the eve of battle kneel before a broken altar and the village priest joins in their prayers

CHAPTER 26

SEA RAIDERS' EXPLOITS

The German warships that were out on the high seas at the outbreak of hostilities were for a few months a menace to the shipping of the Allies. The careers of the two most successful, Emden and Karlsruhe are described in this chapter

IT is a pity that so many stories of the war at sea never reached the general public. Every tramp steamer that zigzagged across the ocean must have had a budget of them. But though the tramp steamers are for the most part silent, their most famous chaser created so much havoc that her log has passed into sea history. The Emden is the princess of modern privateers and her maid of honour, hardly less enterprising, is the Karlsruhe. The steamship Alabama in the American Civil War did a lot of damage before she was sunk off Cherbourg by the Kearsarge on June 19, 1864. But her exploits pale before those of the Emden, just as the battles of former wars shrink into skirmishes when ranged against the mighty conflicts of the Great War.

The story opens at Tsingtau, the Chinese seaport fortified by the Germans, captured by British and Japanese troops on Nov. 7, 1914, and in 1922 handed back to China. The light cruiser Emden belonged to the Pacific squadron under the command of Vice-Admiral Count von Spee. With a subsidiary base at Rabaul on the island of New Britain—now the seat of government for the mandated territory of New Guinea—and bases in the German Pacific Islands, the German admiral was favourably placed to attack the sea-borne trade of Britain and her allies.

On August 6 the Emden came into port at Tsingtau with a prize. Captain von Müller, having heard by wireless that war had been declared against Russia, had immediately got to work. The captured ship was a Russian vessel, the Riasan. On the same day the Emden left Tsingtau to join Admiral von Spee at Pagan Island in the Ladrones, a chain of islands in the North Pacific exactly half-way between Japan and New Guinea. Later, Müller was to range the seas for plunder with a freedom few sea captains can have enjoyed since the adventurous days of Drake and Frobisher.

An amusing light is thrown upon German boarding methods in a book called "Lauterbach of the China Sea" by Lowell Thomas. Lauterbach a very Falstaff among sea-dogs, had been the skipper of a liner plying east in pre-war days, and when war broke out had promptly volunteered for the Emden. As her navigation officer his duties, despite his bulk, included those of boarding officer. The first story deals with this very Russian vessel Riasan. Lauterbach is speaking.

> The skipper of the Riasan was my very good friend, Captain Austin. Many a time we had gone ashore in ports where we had met. But this was war; he awaited me in his cabin.
>
> "I am awfully sorry, captain," I said, "but it is my duty to make your ship a prisoner of war."
>
> I spoke in German. My friend was very stiff and dignified. The war affected a lot of people in that way.
>
> "I don't know what you are saying," he replied. "I do not speak German."
>
> *Was!* What had come over him?
>
> "Well," I said, shrugging my shoulders, "you have forgotten a lot. You knew German well enough fourteen days ago, when we were drinking beer together in the club at Tsingtao!"
>
> That broke the ice. My friend laughed, and then he became amiable again.

Having joined Admiral von Spee, under whose orders she still remained, the Emden, attended by the collier Markomannia with 6,000 tons of coal on board, was detached from the squadron for special duty in the Indian Ocean. The fog of war then descended upon her and it was some time before the British Admiralty were aware of this mission. It was unpleasant news when it arrived, for the routes through the Indian Ocean were perhaps the most vulnerable sector of Britain's sea-borne trade.

With her 22 knots, her cruising range of over 5,000 miles and a captain ideal in every respect for his lone and dangerous job, the Emden was a wolf indeed among the shipping lambs. On his journey through the Malay archipelago by the unfrequented Molucca Pass and Bali Strait Müller spurned temptation. Rather than risk his chance of arriving safely in the great open sea spaces, he let the trading ships slip by him. Secrecy was of more value to him at the moment than a prize in the shape of a rich cargo of sugar from the Dutch East Indies.

Müller's forbearance brought him luck. Had he delayed to make captures he would probably have been caught by the squadron under Admiral Jerram, who was keeping a look-out in the Java seas. The Emden just managed to dodge the Hampshire off Simalur or Hog Island, the most northerly of the Sumatra chain, and at last emerged into the rich criss-cross of sea-borne traffic in the Bay of Bengal near the great junction of Colombo.

There was another point in Müller's favour. When he arrived the coast was practically clear of his enemies. The British cruisers had gone into other waters, Admiral Peirse into the Arabian Sea and Admiral Jerram into the Malay archipelago. Moreover, Indian trade had begun to recover from the first attack of nerves engendered by the outbreak of hostilities. The merchants too were becoming accustomed to strange conditions—to Admiralty instructions regarding the scattering of ships, the dimming of lights and similar matters.

Captain von Müller quickly got busy. On the track between Calcutta and Colombo on September 10, 11 and 12, he seized the Greek steamer Pontoporos with 6,000 tons of coal, the Indus, the Lovat and the Kabinga. Three prizes and a collier in three days. The next day he captured the Killin with 5,000 tons of coal, and the Diplomat. All were sunk except the Kabinga, whose cargo was found to be neutral property. The Diplomat, a new steamer with 7,000 tons of general cargo bound for London, including 30,000 chests of the finest Indian tea, was the richest prize.

With his next ship, the Italian Loredano, Captain von Müller made an error of judgement. Her captain demurred to taking aboard any prisoners and was allowed to proceed on his way to Calcutta. In the Hugli he gave warning of the Emden's activities to the first ship he met equipped with wireless, with the result that all sailings were stopped. This was a strong counter-blow to the Emden, and but for it she would certainly have obtained a bigger bag than the solitary Trabboch. Müller transferred his prisoners to the Kabinga with the traditional courtesy ascribed to Claude Duval.

We are still no further than September 14, and though the air waves were rippling with Emden messages her captain just before midnight captured the Clan Matheson, bound for Calcutta with nearly 3,000 tons of general merchandise on board. Müller next headed across the Bay to the Burmese coast. The total British loss up to date was 29,477 tons of shipping.

The wireless had speeded up both British and Japanese pursuers, and now the Hampshire, Yarmouth and Chikuma joined in the chase of the Emden. Captain Grant of the Hampshire was in command, but he was far from the scene

LAST FLIGHT OF ALL

Photo: Central News

In February, 1916, a Zeppelin was brought down by the French near Revigny. The crew perished in the flames, except the commander, who lies dead where he fell from the burning airship. This ghastly fate overtook many such gallant airmen

when the Emden suddenly appeared off Madras, on September 22, and shelled the tanks of the Burmah Oil Company. Nearly half a million gallons of oil in two of the tanks caught fire and burnt out. The steamer Chupra was struck during the bombardment, and the casualty list on the steamer and ashore was five killed and a dozen wounded. A quick run out of the Bay when the shore batteries opened on her, a lucky escape from Captain Grant, and once more the Emden disappeared into the void.

The moral damage inflicted by the Emden, apart from the material, now began to declare itself. Once more nerves began to agitate the mercantile world. Stocks of jute, tea, hides, leather, all vital imports for Britain, began to pile up in Indian warehouses. Once more the moneylenders took to the hills with their bags to the great dislocation of local trade. Ships continued to sail outward bound from Britain, but the homeward bound stayed in Indian waters.

Having dealt this blow at India, Captain von Müller sailed off to Ceylon, accompanied only by his collier, Markomannia. At Point de Galle, on September 25, he snapped up the King Lud bound to Calcutta from Alexandria. Later in the day the Tymeric was sunk. Four more ships, Gryfevale, Buresk, Ribera and Foyle, brought the loss of tonnage up to 19,000-odd for the three days.

Trade routes were being closed up, with consequent breaches of contract. Australia was so aggrieved by the failure to deliver gunny bags for the harvest

A LONE HAND

The use of aircraft in war created the need for a special type of gun to deal with them, and as the struggle proceeded these were produced, improving steadily in quality and quantity. Here a lone German gunner, lying back in an emplacement, is watching for British raiding or reconnaissance planes

BALLOON OVER ARRAS

Owing to their ability to remain almost stationary, kite balloons were often more useful than aeroplanes for observing enemy activity. The service was a dangerous one, for the balloons were an easy mark for enemy airmen and anti-aircraft guns

that an appeal was made by the Indian Government to extend the contract dates. At Rangoon, as at Madras, there was congestion, orders and counter-orders, a glut of shipping at all ports, particularly Colombo, the focal point of the radiating trade routes, but east of Singapore there was far less agitation in mercantile circles. With the China Squadron on constant patrol, and Australian and Japanese warships operating in the Pacific Ocean, Japanese tramp steamships could do business in the China seas with little fear of destruction.

But in the Indian Ocean the lull before the storm lasted less than three weeks. On October 16 the Emden, almost within reach of Minikoy, came up with the liner Clan Grant with 4,000 tons of general cargo for Calcutta. Barely had she been dealt with before the raider was off again in chase of the Ponrabble, a steam dredger outward bound to Tasmania. Shortly after the crews of the two prizes had been transferred to the consort Buresk, the Emden at 8 p.m. caught the lights of another vessel, the Benmohr, on her way to Yokohama. The same programme was gone through. A boarding crew was sent to extinguish the lights and carry on with electric torches, and prisoners were transferred.

Two more ships unable to deviate in time, the Troilus and St. Egbert, were captured on the 18th. Both were just out of Colombo, the former being a Blue Funnel liner homeward bound. They were added to the Emden's fleet. The next day the Exford and the Chilkana with a general cargo of nearly 7,000 tons brought the total of ships

BAGGED A ZEPPELIN

Early in 1916 this gun, one of the famous French 75's, scored a remarkable success. It had been converted into a mobile anti-aircraft gun and Zeppelin L.77, caught by searchlights, was hit by a shot from this gun and brought down in flames

EXTRA WHEELS FOR MOBILITY

Powerful motor tractors were used to draw heavy guns into position over rough ground. Here the gunners are removing an extra pair of wheels which have been attached to bear the weight of the trail of this French 120-mm. gun

BEFORE THE BARRAGE

The same gun is now almost ready to fire, and, with the two guns beyond, which are already in position, is prepared to lay down a barrage on the German lines. Thick undergrowth makes an effective screen against enemy aircraft

NO SHORTAGE HERE

This photograph shows a shed in a French munition works early in January, 1916, when the Allies were making strenuous efforts to overcome the ammunition shortage. An inspector and his assistants are measuring the amount of powder in the nose of each shell, a task requiring great care

captured to twenty-one. Captain von Müller now felt that the environs of Colombo were growing rather too hot for him. He put the crews on the St. Egbert with orders for them to be landed anywhere between Cape Comorin, the southernmost point of India, and Calicut on the west coast. He then made off south, having argued correctly enough that the Hampshire and Empress of Asia, the latter an armoured liner, from Colombo would soon be on his tracks.

These two British warships, warned by the St. Egbert, patrolled the Maldives, one on each side, without a sight of the raider. Müller's latest captures were prizes indeed. The Troilus was the most valuable up to date, a fine new ship of 7,562 tons, with a cargo worth nearly £756,000.

A dispute then arose between the Bengal chamber of commerce and the Admiralty in London. The former put in a strong plea for convoys; the latter, pointing out the utter impracticability of such a scheme, owing to commitments in Europe for military convoys, suggested a closer attention by vessels to instructions—deviation, dimmed lights, etc. These official views were incorporated in a statement published by the Admiralty on October 24. The statistics were reassuring. Less than one per cent. of the 4,000 British ships employed in foreign trade had been destroyed. This could not but be regarded as satisfactory.

After this statement the Oriental market recovered somewhat, and the stocks of tea, jute, cotton, wheat, oilseeds and leather began to dwindle in the warehouses. Tin and rubber were going forward satisfactorily from the Malay Peninsula, owing to the Admiralty's ability to keep open the Singapore-Colombo track.

Now comes one of the most dramatic chapters in the story of the Emden. The naval net was drawing closer. Müller's freedom to sail across the trading tracks was gradually being curtailed. The idea that flashed upon the privateer was worthy of a master dramatist. Many times the ruse has been practised with success by military forces upon land, but not often upon the seas. Why should not the wolf disguise herself as one of the guardians of the folds and so steal upon the unsuspecting flock? Quickly a dummy funnel was rigged up, and the Emden appeared to anxious look-outs in the cross-trees as a British cruiser of the Yarmouth class.

The masquerader, dispatching her convoys, the Buresk to the coast of Sumatra, and the Exford to the Cocos Islands, proceeded herself to Penang. Painted dark grey and flying a property white ensign, she boldly entered the harbour on October 28. French destroyers were therein, but before they could get under way to attack her she had sunk the Zhemchug with a torpedo followed by gunfire.

Running out after this exploit, she came upon the Glen liner Glenturret, bound for Yokohama with ammunition and flying the explosives flag. The Emden had lowered her boats when a cruiser suddenly appeared. But it was only the little French destroyer Mousquet, and in ten minutes, after a gallant fight with gun and torpedo, she went under. The Emden, in spite of the risk of reprisals from the other destroyers, stopped to pick up survivors from the Mousquet, and then made off.

The last scene is laid in the lonely Cocos-Keeling group, far south in the Indian Ocean. This island of Cocos must not be confused with the magnetic island in the Pacific 500 miles off Panama, which has drawn so many treasure hunters. There is yet a third Cocos Island off Sumatra. The Cocos-Keeling group contained the wireless station and submarine cable connecting Singapore, Australia and South Africa. Into this area the Emden was lured, and all the escape holes were blocked.

DOES DEATH AWAIT THEM?

Photo: G.P.A.

The hell into which attacking troops had to advance is vividly illustrated by this photograph of an attempt by the French to storm a position near Verdun. Shells capable of destroying whole platoons are bursting between them and their objective

Admiral Jerram carefully prepared his plans for the passage of a rich Australian convoy under the escort of the Melbourne, Sydney and Ibuki. At Cocos cable station the British admiral had instructed the officials how to give warning in case of an attack. At the same time he provided them with the call signals of the ships in those waters.

The calculation was exact. At that very time the Emden was foregathering with her two colliers, Buresk and Exford, at a point north of Cocos. Ignorant of the dangers on all sides of her, the Emden supposed all clear and sailed in at daybreak on November 9 with dummy funnel rigged and a landing party all ready. But one little slip on the part of the masquerader brought about a catastrophe. The dummy was so ill-rigged that the cable officials smelt a rat. A message was sent out in clear, that a strange ship had entered the harbour.

This message was picked up by the Minotaur and passed on to Captain Silver of the Melbourne, in command of the escort to the convoy which had reached a point 55 miles north of Cocos. A ticklish point arose. Captain Silver could not leave the convoy himself. Which of his other cruisers should he detach to attack the raider, the Sydney or the more powerful Japanese cruiser Ibuki? Wisely, Captain Silver decided that Captain Glossop of the Sydney was the man for the job.

Meanwhile, a landing-party from the Emden was engaged in destroying the wireless installation. But the Müller touch was seen once again in his orders against wanton destruction. The wireless mast and all means of communication were wrecked, but no other property. In the midst of the cable cutting, smoke was seen on the horizon. The Emden sounded the recall and steamed out to attack what she took to be a light cruiser of the East Indies squadron. But she had met more than her match—5,400 tons against 3,592; 25·7 knots against 24·12; eight 6-in. guns against ten 4-in. Only with their two torpedo tubes was there parity between them.

Sir Julian Corbett in "Naval Operations" has written so graphic an account of the Emden's end that we may quote a few extracts:

As the Emden crossed the Sydney's bows at less than 10,000 yards, Captain Glossop turned to the northward on a parallel course, and so at 9.40 the unequal action began by the Emden opening fire at 9,500 yards. It was a calm, clear morning, and her shooting was brilliant from the first. She straddled the Sydney at once, while the Sydney, having over-estimated the range by 1,000 yards, began by sending everything far over. It was not till the twelfth round, so the Germans say, that she secured a hit. . . . so terrible was the effect of the British lyddite that whole gun crews were swept away together . . . still, in spite of losses and constant fires, she continued the hopeless action gamely. . . . .

The action had now lasted about 40 minutes, and both the Emden's fire-control positions and her two remaining funnels were gone. She was holed all over and was burning fiercely fore and aft. Indeed, so smothered was she in smoke that at one time it was believed she had gone down. . . with her flag still flying, she ran hard on the reef on the south shore. For an hour and 40 minutes she had made a gallant fight against superior force, but it was clear she was helpless. . . .

It was not till after the second salvo had torn the helpless ship that she showed white flags and sent a man aloft to haul down her colours. Why this was not done before was never explained. . . . . Her decks were a shambles, and the work of rescue was extremely difficult, for she had beached herself on the weather side of the island and the scud of the sea was very heavy. . . . Captain von Müller himself was saved, and he stated that the dead numbered seven officers and 108 men. . . .

So ended the episode of the Emden which recalls the most famous exploits of the old French raiders. Not only had Captain von Müller obtained a high measure of success in the actual damage he had done, and the strategical and economic disturbance he had caused, but he had won the admiration of his enemy for the skill, resource and boldness with which he had maintained his position so long, and for the chivalry and humanity with which his duty had been discharged.

The Karlsruhe was the fastest and most modern cruiser among the German commerce raiders. Her sea speed was 24·8 knots, and to it she owed a narrow escape from the Suffolk and the Bristol off

the Bahamas before she arrived in company with the Hamburg-Amerika liner Patagonia in South American waters. Off Pernambuco in Brazil is a great focal point. The narrow trade tracks from Cape Horn and Buenos Aires running to Western Europe past Las Palmas and the Canary Islands are here cut into by the tracks running from New York through the Bermudas, and from the West Indies.

The Karlsruhe picked up her first prize before she had arrived in the avenues of sea traffic. She was on her way from Curaçao in the Dutch West Indies and was proceeding on August 18 along the Venezuelan coast some 70 miles north of the trade tracks, when she caught sight of her first prey. The unfortunate Bowes Castle, a new ship laden with nitrate, silver ore, and copper ore, from Antofagasta in Chile to New York, had deviated not into safety but to destruction. Captain Köhler of the Karlsruhe sank the English vessel and transferred her crew to the Patagonia. Later they were transferred to the steamer Stadt Schleswig and were landed at Maranham on September 2.

The Karlsruhe then proceeded to her station upon the cross roads of seaborne traffic off Rocas Reef, commanding the radiating lines of traffic as a spider in its web. The first victim to blunder into the web was the tramp Strathroy bound from Norfolk, Virginia, to Rio with 5,600 tons of coal. She was 85 miles north of the usual track, but the moment she touched the fatal area between Rocas and Fernando Noronha she set up the vibration which brought the lurking Karlsruhe to the spot. The tramp ran for it, but not for long. She was taken back to the reef and, as the sea was too rough for coaling, she was sent off under the escort of the Patagonia to a secret harbour on the lone Brazilian coast. This improvised coaling station was three days' journey from the look-out station; but it was better to risk this occasional run than the danger of coaling at sea.

This completed, the Karlsruhe went scouting up the trade route from Pernambuco to St. Vincent. The time was well chosen by the German captain, for the British warships were engaged upon other business. The main British naval force in those waters had gone southwards in pursuit of the Dresden after her capture of the Hyades and Holmwood on August 15, 180 miles east of Pernambuco; while Admiral Stoddart's was off the Canaries.

The general method of the Karlsruhe was akin to that of the Emden, but the former had one great advantage over her sister raider: she had more tenders, which could act either as scouts or prison ships. On September 3 a rich prize fell to the raiding fleet. This was the Maple Branch from Liverpool with 2,000 tons of general cargo of such a character as to make the hungry raiders lick their lips. For here were not only stores, tools and yarn, but prize cattle, sheep, pigs and poultry.

The next excitement of the raider was provided by a wireless call from her sister cruiser the Kronprinz Wilhelm. But Captain Köhler prudently turned a deaf ear to the caller, for he had also picked up voices on the air from British cruisers. Admiral Sir R. Cradock in the Good Hope was on his way to Pernambuco to take up his new command So the two German raiders never met: each ran an independent course.

A few days interval to coal at the

THY SERVANT A DOG

Dogs in the War were trained to make effective sentries, and they were also used as bearers of messages, and to search for the wounded and carry bandages and other first-aid appliances. For these French dogs comfortable billets were provided

WOODLAND HOSPITAL

Though, as the presence of the hospital nurse shows, this French temporary dressing station is some way behind the front lines, it is still within range of the German heavy artillery, and is accordingly hidden in a wood and camouflaged against observation

MARK OVER

The menace of an enemy aeroplane causes the men of this Italian machine-gun post to train their gun upon the sky. The water-cooled barrel is connected by tubes to the can of water seen in the foreground

secret base and the Karlsruhe, accompanied by the Crefeld and the Rio Negro, was once more upon a sea foray. Nothing came in sight until September 14, when the Nelson liner Highland Hope, slipping along without lights, was warned by the usual blank shot across her bows. The warning being disregarded, a shell came hurtling across her bridge and then she heave to.

Here a little incident occurred in which a Spanish sea captain, not quite persuaded that he had bumped into a British convoy, drew his own conclusion and later got into touch with the British warship Canopus on her way to join Admiral Cradock.

These seas were becoming too dangerous for Captain Köhler, so he made for a new area round the point of Brazil some 300 miles westward of his old cruising ground. His enterprise on the New York-South American track was soon rewarded by the capture of the collier Indrani, bound from Norfolk, Virginia, to Rio, as had been the tramp Strathroy. The Indrani, a new ship with 7,000 tons of coal in her hold, was too good to sink, so she was added to the fleet as collier and scout. Taking stock of the Karlsruhe's activities up to date, since her escape from Admiral Cradock she had really been as busy escaping capture as capturing. Five ships and four narrow escapes in four weeks—so stood the account.

But better days were in store. Returning to the old lurking-place off Rocas Reef she picked up on September 21 and 22 three more prizes of 3,000 to 4,000 tons each: the Maria, Portland, Oregon, to Ireland with wheat; the Cornish City, a collier with Welsh coal to Rio Janeiro; and the Rio Iguassu from the Tyne to Rio with coal.

The prison-ships Crefeld and Rio Negro were now filling up, the former having a passenger list numbering 170. Köhler then made the same slip as Müller of the Emden had done. An Italian ship, the Ascaro, was stopped but allowed to proceed, and she promptly gave first news at St. Vincent of the Karlsruhe's whereabouts. At this period Admiral Cradock was sweeping south in chase of Admiral von Spee. The Cornwall, Bristol and Macedonia were left to guard the northern area, but the limit of their patrol was Cape San Roque. On his way to the secret base to coal, Captain Köhler met the Asuncion and coaled from her. Returning to his area with grimy decks, he was joined later by the Asuncion, who brought news that Admiral Cradock with the Good Hope, Monmouth and Glasgow had gone south. With relief Köhler proceeded to a point east of the tracks about 100 miles from St. Paul's rocks to look for other ships.

Sent out to scout, the Crefeld sighted and captured the Farn, from Barry to Montevideo laden with coal. It was the best coal—Welsh—but Captain Köhler would have none of it. Already he had enough, so he proposed to make a present of the coal to Admiral von Spee. So the Farn was dispatched to a rendezvous with the Asuncion for this purpose. All around were British voices calling so Köhler fled eastwards, and only just in time, to escape a search of his old areas by the Bristol, Cornwall and Macedonia.

Luck was not with the British these days. Not only did the Karlsruhe escape, but she was actually headed off into the richest hunting ground to date. Counting the Farn taken on October 5, the bag was five ships in five consecutive days. The Niceto de Larrinaga (Buenos Aires to London), Lynrowan and Cervantes (Buenos Aires

OVER THE MOUNTAIN TOP

A mountain summit separates this Italian 280 mm. gun from its target, an Austrian fort. Its elevation has to be checked by map and compass measurements, and its hits are registered by observation officers on the slopes



MEN, MACHINE AND MOUNTAINS

By a complicated arrangement of rope ladders and pulleys this Italian 75 cm. gun is hoisted to a position from which it can dominate the surrounding heights. The treacherous snows complicate a task made necessary by the great strength of the Austrian Alpine defences

CAFÉ AU LAIT

Madame dispenses hospitality to the troops on the verandah of her farmhouse near Armentières. Though the town was right in the war zone this old lady, like many of her countrywomen, refused to leave her home, which was fortunate for these soldiers

to Liverpool), and Pruth (Chile to St. Vincent) were captured with valuable cargoes and much foodstuff. The aggregate loss to British shipping within a week was 17,445 tons.

In England the Karlsruhe's sphere of operations was unknown and Admiral Stoddart's suggestion for a second squadron for South America had been approved by the Admiralty His orders now were to proceed to Pernambuco and then to continue along the trade route to Montevideo, where he would take under his orders the Cornwall, Bristol, Macedonia and Orama. The Defence from the Mediterranean was also to join him, and with this force he was to concentrate " in case the German squadron from the Pacific escapes past Admiral Cradock."

While these counter-offensives were preparing, the Karlsruhe continued her raiding operations. On October 18 she captured the Glanton, laden with coal from Barry to Montevideo. Luck was again with the raider, for two days later Admiral Stoddart out from St. Vincent to Pernambuco passed within 10 miles of the spot where the Glanton had been captured. At Pernambuco Stoddart got news of the Karlsruhe about 70 miles west of Cape San Roque, and sent the Bristol and Edinburgh Castle in pursuit. With a general feeling of uneasiness at this stir among his enemies, Captain Köhler decided to leave his old scene of operations and go on a raiding expedition to the West Indies. But as a parting shot on October 23 he captured the Hurstdale, bound with maize from Rosario to Bristol, and sank her. Two days later, after detaching the Rio Negro, Asuncion and Indrani, Köhler, with the Farn alone as a tender, set out for the West Indies.

The day after leaving his old quarter he was approaching the track from Trinidad to Brazil when he sighted a large passenger ship. She was the Vandyck, with a rich general cargo, the most valuable prize the Karlsruhe had yet secured. Meanwhile, another ship appeared on the scene. She was the Royal Sceptre of London, but her cargo of coffee was neutral, and she was allowed to go on her way unmolested. Captain Köhler in high spirits headed for Barbados. It was sunset on November 4 and the ship was slipping through a quiet sea. The captain was on the bridge, and the officers and crew on deck listening to the band. Then came one awful shattering roar and a column of flames and smoke. Slowly it drifted clear and the survivors saw that the whole forepart of the ship had been blown away, and this terrible blast had brought death to the captain, a lieutenant, and 259 petty officers and men. The after-part floated for 20 minutes—just long enough for the survivors, 17 officers and 129 petty officers and men, to be taken off by the tenders.

The Emden captured 24 steamers with a gross tonnage of 105,413; the Karlsruhe 16 steamers, gross tonnage 72,805. Between them they caused losses of ships and cargoes amounting to a million pounds.

So much for the two star raiders. Of the other performers the merchant cruiser Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse comes first with four British ships sunk south-west of the Canaries. They were the Galician from South Africa, Kaipara Montevideo to Bristol with frozen meat, Arlanza from Buenos Aires, and Nyanga with cargo originally consigned to Hamburg. The Galician and Arlanza having passengers were allowed to proceed after the wireless had been removed. The other ships were sunk and their crews taken aboard the cruiser.

CHAPTER 27

FIRST BATTLE OF YPRES (I)

The first battle of Ypres, the climax of the fighting in the West during 1914, is here dealt with in two chapters. It began on October 19 and died away towards the end of December with the salient still in possession of the British

THE last attempt of the British, French and Belgian armies to turn the flank of the German army before the line in Flanders was finally consolidated, was made round Ypres, but it resulted only in the establishing of the famous salient which was held throughout the War at such a heavy cost.

While the Belgians were holding up the German attempt to advance along the coast of Flanders, Sir John French and General Foch, who was then in command of the French northern armies, planned a great offensive. At this time the Belgian armies held the line between Dixmude and the North Sea, and the right of the line at Dixmude was held by Admiral Ronarc'h and his Breton marines. South of Dixmude came two French territorial divisions and the 2nd French cavalry corps, while at Ypres were the British 7th division and the British cavalry corps. In order to carry out the attack planned by Foch and French, the British Expeditionary Force, as has been stated in a previous chapter, was moved from the Aisne to Flanders; and on October 19 Sir Douglas Haig, with the British 1st corps, detrained at Abbeville and moved up on the left of the 7th division.

The French troops on the left of the British about Ypres had also been reinforced, and the British and French generals were convinced that they had a numerical superiority over the Germans. They also looked for some support from the Belgians. They knew that two or three divisions, released from Antwerp, were operating on the Belgian coast, and the only other forces opposed to them appeared to be the German 19th corps opposite the British 3rd and 2nd corps, south of Ypres. The German centre they believed to be almost denuded of troops.

According to the plan of campaign Sir Douglas Haig, with the British 1st corps, was to strike at Roulers with the idea of eventually pushing on to Ghistelles and cutting off the German troops under Beseler. While Sir Douglas was advancing in the north with the 1st corps, Sir Henry Rawlinson was to strike at Menin on the east of the salient with the 4th corps, thus falling upon the unprotected flank of the enemy south of Ypres. It was hoped that these operations would start a movement of the same character as that which had driven the Germans from the Marne and across the Aisne. The German 19th corps and cavalry corps would be thrown back, and the British cavalry corps and the 2nd and 3rd infantry corps, which had the line to Cuinchy, would be free to advance on the flank of Prince Rupert's army, which was opposing the French in front of Arras.

If the strength of the German army had been no greater than the Allied command believed it to be, this plan might have had a good chance of success. Actually the German force on this part of the line was merely a screen for two armies, the 4th and the 6th, which were marching in their full strength. As has been shown in the chapter on the battle of the Yser, this overwhelming force was first exerted against the Belgians between Dixmude and the sea, and so hard pressed were the latter that, instead of being able to assist the British and French by striking at the Germans, it had been necessary to send French troops to their aid. General Foch, though he was at this time "commandant le group des Armées du Nord," had no real control of the British and Belgian armies. All he could do was to communicate his plans and send copies of his orders to King Albert and Sir John French, suggesting what they might do by way of co-operation. It is to the credit of all concerned that the three commands worked in complete harmony and Foch's suggestions were, whenever practicable, carried out.

When the struggle began, the French and British troops numbered about 100,000. At no time did the number exceed 200,000. Opposing them were two armies at full strength, which totalled over 500,000 men. In one respect the Allies had the advantage; most of their divisions were first line troops, excellently disciplined and experienced, while a large part of the German 4th army and many of their reserve troops were men of peace-time training only, either under or over military age. The powers of disciplined recovery which the Allied troops showed whenever the line was temporarily broken were as remarkable as the lack of finishing power in the German troops.

As it became clear that the Germans vastly outnumbered the Allies, it was necessary that the latter should at once throw into the fighting line all the reserves which were being sent to them, instead of holding them for a general advance. The great plan which was to have resulted in rolling up the German armies was therefore practically stillborn. Bruges was not captured, Beseler was not pinned on the coast, the German

DINING UNDER DIFFICULTIES

There is little luxury about the setting for this meal, eaten within easy range of the German bullets. These soldiers, however, appear to be killing two birds with one stone, for their cooking stove gives them much needed warmth as well as eatables

Photopress

AFTER OFFICE HOURS

Men too old or unfit for service in the army volunteered for work in munition factories. They were trained in engineering schools and many of those who could not give their whole time to munitions put in long spells of work after office hours

flank was not turned. Instead, the British troops found themselves thrust into the defence of a weak salient on a front many miles too long, and pitted against forces which were enormous. Yet the men stood firm; the leaders never lost courage. Time after time the Germans were thrust back until, after four weeks of terrible fighting, they sullenly withdrew. "I venture to predict," said Sir John French in his despatch, "that the deeds during these days of stress and trial will furnish some of the most brilliant chapters which will be found in the military history of our time."

After the first attack, the British troops in the salient were entirely on the defensive, and the Germans might have held them there while they concentrated their men and guns on some other part of the Allied line. All and more than all that was to be gained at Ypres might have been gained elsewhere. If the enemy had broken through on the Yser, the Channel ports would have been at their mercy; if they had taken Arras the British and Belgian armies would have been cut off from the French.

The Germans apparently believed that with their vastly superior numbers they could smash the left wing of their opponents absolutely, and they were particularly anxious to destroy the British army. A German order of the day ran: "We must and therefore will conquer . . end the war and strike the decisive blow against our most detested enemy. We will finish with the British, Indians, Canadians, Moroccans and other trash, feeble adversaries who surrender in mass if they are attacked with vigour" If the object is to exterminate an opposing army a salient affords an admirable opportunity for bringing to bear upon it an overwhelming force, for it usually permits the enemy to mass outside it a far greater number of men and guns than can be accommodated inside. In this case the Germans had an additional advantage in the formation of the country, for Ypres is overlooked on the south and east by lines of hills.

The long-drawn-out battle sometimes known as "First Ypres," began on October 19, 1914. On that day the German 24th, 25th, and 26th divisions moved into line, with units of the 6th army to the south. In that area the British 3rd corps had begun to entrench on a line that stretched from Frelinghien on the river Lys, east of Armentières through Premesques to Ennetières and Radinghem. Conneau's cavalry continued the line to a point opposite Fromelles in close contact with the flank of the 2nd corps. North of the 3rd corps General Allenby and the 1st and 2nd cavalry divisions were holding a long line extending from just north of Frelinghien to the little village

THE WEAKER SEX?

Throughout the War the shipbuilding yards were never for a moment idle. In them, as in munition factories, women increasingly took the place of men. This picture shows how women proved themselves equal to heavy manual tasks

of America. For two days the cavalry had been endeavouring to force a passage of the Lys, which ran north and south, but without success, and their inability to advance had held up the progress of the 3rd corps to the south.

On the opening day of the battle the 7th division under Major-General T. Capper was ordered to advance on Menin, a place of some importance on the river Lys, but any anticipation that such an operation could be easily carried out was quickly dispelled. Before the day had started two German reserve divisions made a determined attack on the Belgian positions east of the Yser. Although a counter-attack was made, the Belgians were obliged to retire to the west bank of the Yser, and General de Mitry's cavalry divisions on their right were also forced to withdraw.

Little better fortune met the effort of the 7th division to reach Menin. An initial advance was made, but the increasing pressure of the enemy forced a wheel-back before evening to a position some distance in rear of their line of the morning. This reverse was the only important incident of the day. Farther south no progress was made, but no loss of ground was recorded. A new feature of the disposition of the British was the ordering of Sir Douglas Haig, whose 1st corps had now completed its detrainment, to a position north of Ypres where the Belgian flank was heavily threatened. As yet, however, Sir John French did not realize the strength of the movement against him, and the day ended with repeated orders for advance.

Photopress

WOMEN TAKE OVER

After the introduction of conscription early in 1916 the need for women to take over many arduous jobs at home grew increasingly urgent. The underground railways of London employed women as ticket collectors, porters, and in other capacities

HURRY ON, PLEASE

This girl has also donned uniform and is doing her bit. As bus-conductresses, munition and hospital workers, and in countless other positions women rose to the occasion with a cheerfulness and ability that aroused widespread admiration

On the following morning, October 20, however, it became evident that the Germans intended to attack in force, and that their offensive would take place along the whole front. Heavy artillery and machine-gun fire everywhere preceded the attempt to advance. Particularly severe was the attack made on the 18th brigade front about La Vallée—Ennetières, where the 2nd Sherwood Foresters, after two days' heavy fighting, met with disaster, facing overwhelming odds. Despite the most heroic resistance on this day of other battalions of the 18th brigade, the villages of Ennetières and Prémesque were lost and no successful counter-attack could be contemplated. The 6th division retired on its right and in its centre a distance of approximately two miles, having lost about 2,000 men.

Elsewhere on the battlefield attacks were made, without any great degree of success, by the 10th brigade in the direction of Frelinghien and the 12th brigade in front of Ploegsteert Wood. General Allenby's cavalry were forced to make a retirement, the Germans crossing the Lys in considerable force. On the left the 7th division was ordered to make a reconnaissance in the direction of Menin on the morning of October 20. This made some progress until the approach of strong German columns made imperative the withdrawal of the reconnoitring battalions. Houthulst forest was evacuated by the French cavalry. Apart from such withdrawals, the line, as a whole, was well held.

The projected offensive of October 21 was entrusted to Sir Douglas Haig, whose 2nd division had now reached a line behind the 3rd cavalry division behind Zonnebeke–St. Julien–Langemarck, and whose 1st division was still further to the rear between Elverdinghe–Poperinghe. The general instructions to these two divisions of the 1st corps were to attack towards Thourout, and to roll up the Germans in one direction or another. What happened to this ambitious project will be later seen.

The rest of the line was ordered to be held, and this proved to be a task of the

ON THE QUI VIVE

On the ability of this French scout in what was once a wood near Verdun to detect the approach of enemy forces may depend the lives of many men. The task of the scout, mingling great responsibility with extreme danger, was most exacting

CAUSE AND EFFECT

At the entrance to Fort St. Michel, near Verdun, here obscured by German shells, was engraved " Fall amidst the ruins rather than surrender," and the losses sustained in gallant obedience to this order are witnessed by the military cemetery in the foreground

Photo: G.P.A.

greatest difficulty when feeble trenches were separated by dangerous gaps, where units were perforce split up to lend aid at critical points, and when German shell and machine-gun fire were deadly and continuous. The 12th infantry brigade between Frelinghien and Le Gheer was subjected to one of the earliest and fiercest attacks. The village of Le Gheer was taken with a certain number of prisoners and the whole of the 12th brigade became subjected to enfilade fire. It was determined to recapture it, and the brigade commander, Colonel Anley, with a mixed force, including the Somerset Light Infantry, directed the operation with the greatest success. Not only were the Germans driven out of the village, but the British prisoners were rescued, and over 100 German prisoners taken. Meantime, heavy attacks were being made on the cavalry corps about Messines, and the 19th brigade about Le Maisnil, where some loss of ground was recorded.

The 4th corps, of which the 7th division held what was practically the centre of the line, was during this day often in a most critical situation, but, despite temporary losses of ground, it was in the main able to hold its own. This was largely due to the advance of the 1st corps, which was steadily coming up on its left.

As related, the rôle assigned to this corps was an advance on Thourout, with the eventual idea of capturing Bruges or rolling the Germans back to the sea. Sir John French ordered this plan to be put into operation with little appreciation of the strength of the forces opposed to him. It is said that he even discredited his own intelligence service and information from commanders on the spot, so obsessed was he by what Mr. Lloyd George has called "planomania." In the circumstances, it was creditable that the 1st corps made such progress as they did. The advance was in the direction of Passchendaele—Poelcapelle, and in some cases achieved a total depth of more than 2,000 yards.

The action was marked by stiff fighting, notably by the 1st South Wales Borderers and 1st Queens, of the 1st division, but the resistance was too determined, and by 3 o'clock in the afternoon Haig had issued an order to the corps as a whole to halt and entrench. By evening Sir Douglas held a line from Zonnebeke station, about a mile east of Langemarck, through Koekuit to the canal at Steenstraat. The 1st corps had suffered altogether on this day casualties amounting to nearly 1,000. In view of the fact that further attacks were hazardous without reinforcements, General Joffre decided to send the French 9th corps to Ypres and the British to hasten the arrival of the Lahore division of the Indian corps, which was in billets around Hazebrouck.

Photo: G.P.A.

RUINED RAMPART

Fort de Vaux, to the east of Verdun, was captured, largely owing to lack of water for the garrison, in June, 1916. The effect of high explosives, as is shown in this picture, was often to wreak great havoc on the object hit, while leaving neighbouring objects standing comparatively untouched by the shell fire

In the meantime, Sir John French's order for the evening of October 21 was framed in the following terms: "Action against enemy will continue tomorrow on general line now held, which will be strongly entrenched." This amounted to the abandonment of offensive action, although the British commander, still self-nourished by his own optimism, wired to Lord Kitchener at midnight: "In my opinion, the enemy are vigorously playing their last card, and I am confident that they will fail." The British official history, adds briefly: "This was far from being the view of the subordinate commanders in contact with the enemy."

The subordinates on the left of the line around Ypres had early reason to know that the enemy had many more cards to play, when on the morning of the 22nd they continued their attack along the whole line, but more particularly from Messines to Bixschoote. This line, it must be remembered, was held very lightly, with gaps sometimes of several hundred yards between shallow trenches without any barbed wire protection. Particularly heavy were the bombardments on the 4th corps ranged about the line Zandvoorde–Becelaere–Zonnebeke and against the 1st corps which was disposed about Langemarck.

In the meantime, the French made an abortive counter-attack between the Yser canal and the Houthulst forest. The German attacks on the British line were, on the whole, well repulsed, despite the heavy shell fire which preceded them. The 1st division did indeed give ground in its centre, where at Kortekeer cabaret the 1st Cameron

Photo: G.P.A.

A GREAT TRADITION

For his defence of Verdun alone Marshal Pétain would rank high among French commanders of all time. Later he became chief of the staff, and in 1917 succeeded Nivelle in command of the armies of the East and North-East. He became commander-in-chief and Marshal of France in 1918

Highlanders were partially surrounded and only with difficulty withdrawn and re-formed about a quarter of a mile to the rear. The extent of the gap thus caused was serious, and instructions were at once given for the lost ground to be retaken, the operations being placed in charge of Brigadier-General Bulfin, who was ordered to advance at dawn on the next day.

Meanwhile the French were hurrying to the assistance of the threatened line. A division, the 42nd under General Grossetti, had arrived at Nieuport in support of the Belgians, while General Dubois with the French 9th corps was in the neighbourhood of Ypres. Foch ordered an offensive for the following morning, beseeching the co-operation of the British 1st corps, but this could not be afforded owing to the late hour at which the request was received at British headquarters.

The first important operation of the following day, October 23, was the counter-attack under General Bulfin against the Germans holding the captured line about Kortekeer cabaret. Some of the battalions engaged in this successful movement were of the North Lancs, Queen's, the King's Royal Rifle Corps and the Camerons. The cabaret was recaptured, a number of British prisoners released and some hundreds of German prisoners taken. The element of surprise was secured by starting the attack in the dark, and General Bulfin was to be congratulated on a successful attack, even though, as the line had later to be again revised, it proved more a success of morale than one of material gain.

A German attempt to capture Langemarck, launched about the same time, failed completely, the attacking battalions being first mown down by accurate rifle shooting and afterwards further weakened by artillery fire. Elsewhere during the day the 2nd division between Langemarck and Zonnebeke beat off all attacks, and to the right of the division the 4th corps with some difficulty held its own, being constantly attacked in force. Special mention was made, during this and following days, of the work of the 2nd Green Howards, a divisional diary stating: "they fought steadily on. When blown out of one trench, they moved to the next and never wavered." Indeed, October 23 stands out as a day generally successful to the Allied armies, and the Germans fully admitted their lack of success in failing "to gain a decisive victory between Bixschoote and Langemarck."

On October 24 General D'Urbal, the senior French officer at the front, felt that he was at last in the position to launch a powerful offensive. His order of the day to General Dubois of the French 9th corps is quoted in the British Official History in these terms:

> As we stand now the tiniest rupture of equilibrium at any point may incline the balance definitely in our favour. The enemy troops which you have on your front and on your left appear to belong for the most part to newly-raised corps without great value.
>
> Take advantage of this to press your offensive on Roulers with the greatest vigour, without troubling whether this carries you faster than the rest of the Allied line or not. Secure your flanks by flank guards on both sides and push on, whatever your neighbours right and left may do, without troubling about them except to ascertain what they are about. Try to make a gap. Attack to-morrow as soon as it is possible.

General Foch, with all his characteristic optimism, wired that the action should receive "a new impulse." He added: "There must be decision and activity." The rôle of the British 1st corps, which was at this time about to be relieved was to support the French.

There was to be an advance along the whole front. The 17th division, of the French 9th corps, was to thrust at Roulers, the forces defending

Dixmude were to push in the direction of Thourout, and the French 42nd division in the direction of Ghistelles. The Belgians on the extreme left were asked to co-operate, while Sir John French, with his massed 1st and 4th corps, was to be prepared to support the attack, if it was successful, along the east front of the salient. As it happened, the only force that met with any success was that of General Dubois.

General Grossetti was desperately engaged in the defence of the Yser as soon as he was in position. Far from being able to advance he was hard put to it to maintain his line. A fierce attack on the Allied line from Dixmude to Bixschoote prevented any forward move by the French troops defending it, and on the right the British had their own troubles. But General Dubois and the 17th division, later in the day supported by the newly arrived 18th, made considerable progress. After an initial check the whole line advanced some thousands of yards, recapturing Zonnebeke and pushing almost as far as Poelcapelle. There the advance halted. In view of the serious attacks on their right and left, further movement was dangerous, and the troops proceeded to dig themselves in.

On the French right were the 2nd and 7th British divisions, the latter of which was much harassed during the night by rifle fire and subjected in the early morning to a heavy bombardment which practically obliterated the feeble trench system which was being held. Early attacks of the Germans, however, were repulsed, although bodies of Germans penetrated into Polygon Wood. It then became necessary to make desperate attempts to clear the wood and restore the line. The Northumberland Hussars and a battalion of the Warwickshire were launched against the German 27th reserve corps, which began to push rapidly through the wood towards Hooge. The Northumberland Hussars thus became the first territorial regiment to engage in any serious fighting in the British line, and they performed their task efficiently. Admirably supporting the Warwickshire they helped to hold up the German advance and to recapture the southern part of the wood. The Warwickshire lost heavily, Lieut.-Col. Loring being killed and over 300 other casualties sustained.

Troops of the 2nd division were hurried forward in an attempt to retake the wood. The 5th brigade reached the corner of the wood about 11 o'clock, and the 2nd Highland Light Infantry and the 2nd Worcestershire were ordered to advance. Polygon Wood was covered with thick undergrowth, which made it difficult to keep contact, and the troops were ordered to use only the bayonet, as rifle fire might have endangered British troops to the north.

A desperate hand-to-hand struggle ensued, but the coolness of the British regular soldiers prevailed, and the wood was at last cleared of the enemy. The left of the 7th division was now secure, and later in the day the 2nd division moved into the line, and by a surprise attack on the Zonnebeke-Broodseinde road succeeded in carrying the British line half a mile forward. But the 7th division was not in any happy state; its casualties had been very severe, close on a third of its effective strength having been lost, and on its right it had further to sustain very heavy attacks near Gheluvelt.

The operations thus recounted and known officially as the battle of Langemarck, which occupied the days October 21–24, left both sides in a considerable state of exhaustion. Both had attacked and been attacked consistently by night and day. The German reserve divisions, though showing the utmost

Photo: Topical

BEFORE THE ASSAULT

The continuous German attacks on Verdun made heavy demands on the man-power of the attacking armies. The photograph shows a small detachment of Germans, one of hundreds, ready to take their part in what proved to be a vain effort

TRANSFORMATION SCENE

Like most of the public buildings at Verdun, this theatre suffered heavily from the intensive German bombardment. The successful defence by the French of the fortress, the pivotal point of the whole French line, saved France from almost certain disaster

Photo: G.P.A.

Photo: G.P.A

SHELL SHOCKED LANDSCAPE

The ferocity of the bombardment of Verdun and its outer defences is well illustrated by this view of what was once the fertile country round Douaumont, which lies to the north of the fortress. Lakes have formed in shell-hole craters and the landscape has been battered and broken up beyond recognition

courage, had been badly hammered A number of British battalions had been cut to pieces, but despite these losses and the strenuous efforts which had preceded them, the line had been little altered. The prospect of any Allied advance of real importance was diminishing to vanishing point, not the least serious aspect of the situation being the depletion of ammunition reserves.

But before continuing the narrative of these abortive struggles round Ypres, it is necessary to revert to the fortunes of the 2nd and 3rd corps operating round La Bassée. In an earlier chapter events taking place in this sector of the front were recounted up to the date October 23, and the reinforcement of the 2nd corps by the Lahore division of the India army corps on the 24th. The 2nd corps, it may be remembered, had withdrawn on the night of October 22–23 to a position which had been previously sited on a line—La Bassée Canal, Givenchy, La Quinque Rue—Fauquissart. The Jullundur brigade and 34th Pioneers extended from Fauquissart to Rouges Bancs, and the 19th brigade from this point past La Boutillerie to the west of Bridoux.

On October 24 the Germans, after making several attempts during the day, launched a serious night attack which fell mainly on the 8th brigade and the Jullundur brigade. The defending battalions were under grave disadvantages. They had been fighting for many days, had suffered severe losses and their ranks had been filled up by young and untried troops. Their defences were of the most meagre kind, shallow trenches which rapidly filled with water, and they had no proper material with which to construct breastworks. Moreover, like their comrades round Ypres, they were running short of heavy ammunition. It says a great deal for their determination that they were able to throw back this night attack, which was made in considerable force. The Gordon Highlanders and the 15th Sikhs suffered particularly heavily, but where trenches were lost they were quickly retaken.

The enemy had little spirit to press the attack next day, contenting himself

ON DEAD MAN'S HILL

Of the troops, French or German, who fought on the slopes of the famous ridge, known as Mort Homme, at Verdun, very few survived. On one occasion the German bombardment covered the ridge with a smoke and gas cloud 2,500 feet high

FIRST-AID AMID THE RUINS

In the ruined village of Herbécourt, in the Somme area, the French have hastily improvised a first-aid post. Here a wounded man is being lifted on to a wheeled stretcher, a primitive form of field ambulance. Herbécourt was captured on the second day of the great Somme offensive, July 2, 1916

with pushing out patrols and shelling the trench line, but on the night of October 26-27 a more serious assault began to develop. Despite reinforcements from the French, the British line was obliged to give way, particularly at Neuve Chapelle, which village was lost. There followed the most intense fighting during which the village was recaptured and lost again. Along the attacked line hand to hand fighting was general, and both British and Indian battalions, fighting to the extremity of their strength, suffered very heavily indeed.

On October 28 a further counter-attack by the 3rd division was ordered with the object of retaking Neuve Chapelle. Bodies of mixed troops, including some French cyclists, were ordered to support the assault, but co-ordination was faulty and the main share in the attack fell on four companies, two of the 47th Sikhs, with the 20th and 21st companies of Sappers and Miners. The Indian troops, with the greatest determination, did succeed in penetrating the village, but the resistance was too strong for them and, lacking support, they were obliged to fall back, a mere remnant of the body which had been thrown into the assault. Along the whole line the Germans this day delivered the fiercest attacks, which were magnificently withstood. The British official history marks the day with the following fine tribute: "Once more the British troops had shown a superiority over the enemy in fortitude and endurance, through all the varying phases of a battle, and once more their fine discipline had, in his eyes, multiplied the small force opposing him into immense superiority of numbers." A few more attempts on the part of the Germans to break the British line were made on October 28-29, but the force of their attacks was spent, and about this time what is known as the battle of La Bassée came to an end.

Before returning to the Ypres front proper, it is necessary to recount the adventures of the 3rd corps and the progress of the battles known as Armentières and Messines, 1914. The corps held a line about twelve miles long from Rouges Bancs, 5 miles S.S.W. of

EN AVANT, MES BRAVES!

Through a lane previously cut in their own barbed wire defences, these French troops dash to attack the German defences. The pill-box, a concrete casemate, seen in the middle distance, is manned by machine-gunners, who may make a shambles of no-man's-land

Photo: G.P.A.

Photo Imperial War Museum

SALUTE FROM THE KAISER

The presence of the kaiser behind the lines did much to stimulate the valour of his troops, and he lost few opportunities of thus encouraging them. The cyclist corps here under review was used sometimes as a form of supplementary cavalry, at other times as infantry in the trenches

Armentières, to the Douve. Conneau's French cavalry filled the gap between the 2nd and 3rd corps. While the Germans were launching the more serious attacks, described above, on the La Bassée and Ypres fronts, the 3rd corps was subjected to incessant shell fire and assaults on their line, which in general were satisfactorily driven off. At times the Germans succeeded in getting a foothold in the British trenches and sometimes even penetrating beyond them, but despite heavy losses the 3rd corps managed to bring the so-called battle of Armentières to a close without any serious loss of ground.

About Messines the cavalry corps was entrenched with orders to hold the line at all costs. With some support from the Lahore division and two British battalions they carried out this order. They were incessantly attacked, but the Germans made little or no impression on the line, although they inflicted many casualties. They were at this time themselves beginning to complain of lack of gun ammunition, and heartily cursed the accuracy of the British rifle fire, which everywhere prevented them from attaining their objectives.

It is now necessary to revert to the fighting round Ypres itself, where the morning of October 25 found the Allied command in high feather and encouraging that spirit of optimism which was so constantly belied by the true situation. It is difficult to understand from what disordered source sprang the false hopes that were reflected in such vain messages as that sent by Sir John French to Lord Kitchener on the evening of the 24th that his battle was "practically won." It is true that up to that date the Allies had been valiantly successful in defence, and might even congratulate themselves that they were now in a better position to attack than their enemy, but nothing could excuse the inane confidence that that enemy was really beaten and had no reserves to fling into the defensive line. Far from marking the end of the battle the next few days were, apart from one or two isolated incidents, a mere prelude to the flaring up of the main German attack at Gheluvelt on October 29.

However, on October 25 General D'Urbal, commanding the French 9th corps, prepared to advance via Passchendaele towards Roulers. After a certain progress had been made, the British corps on his left were to follow on and press the advantage The French did make some slight progress, but not sufficient to bring them into line with the British in time for any useful co-operation to take place. An attack launched by the 4th brigade was too late in starting to achieve any material result. A certain amount of ground was gained and some prisoners taken. In the action as a whole the Royal Berkshires particularly distinguished themselves. A less consolatory feature of the day was the attack on the 20th brigade at Kruiseecke and the Gheluvelt crossroads. At the former the British line was in the form of a small salient with no proper entrenchments or wire.

The Germans decided to attack by night, and about 8 p.m. they carried a trench held by the 2nd Scots Guards and pushed on into the small village. As soon as the brigade commander, Brigadier-General Ruggles-Brise, realized that a gap had been made in his line, he ordered a counter-attacking force of two companies of Scots Guards to make this good by recapturing the lost trenches. After much hand-to-hand fighting the lost line was recovered about midnight. Thus on this day, on the evening of which Sir John French again telegraphed to Lord Kitchener that the situation was growing "more favourable every hour," nothing whatever had been gained save the very minor advance of the French 9th corps.

No further progress was made on the following day, October 26. The French here and there advanced a few hundred yards, but not sufficiently to justify any general assault. On the contrary, news early came of an intended German attack in force on the 2nd division. This was not strictly true, but any attempt to advance on the part of that division was quickly frustrated. Meanwhile, the 20th brigade was again the subject of unwelcome attentions, the

POINTED ARGUMENTS

To dispute the passage of no man's land the Germans did not depend only on rifle fire and barbed wire. This ground in front of the German front line trench has been dug with small pits and sown with deadly pointed spikes. A similar device was used by the Scots at the battle of Bannockburn

Photo: Imperial War Museum

EFENDING THE DUNES

The vulnerability of the long stretch of Belgian coast occupied by the Germans to attack from the sea led to its being strongly fortified. The sand dunes, resembling those of Lincolnshire, gave good points of vantage for the siting of heavy batteries

Germans having determined to have the last word in the matter of the possession of Kruiseecke. A heavy bombardment of the place began early in the morning, and this increased to a pitch which could not be reached by the answering British guns. The troops in the line, the 2nd Scots Guards and 1st Grenadiers, had a terrible gruelling, and the advance of small parties of Germans through gaps between trenches should have passed unnoticed.

As the morning wore on the German troops made their serious assault, breaking through the southern line of the salient. Individual units held on with great heroism, notably the Guards battalions and the Borders, but many were gradually surrounded and forced to surrender. The village was lost and a further advance made beyond it, but the situation was saved by the formation of a new line, which eventually took on the shape of a re-entrant, the 20th brigade facing east from Zandvoorde to the north and the 22nd facing south near Gheluvelt. A further adjustment of the line was made during the night. The casualties of the 20th brigade during these sanguinary battles of the 25th-26th were a little over one thousand.

On the evening of this day, when the British had lost Kruiseecke and the French had advanced about 100 yards, Sir John French's lullaby contained the words that the Germans were, in his belief, "quite incapable of making any strong and sustained attack."

Any advance of the British on October 27-28 still depended on the progress made by the French 9th corps. This was negligible on October 27, but the British 6th brigade, including the 2nd South Staffordshire and the 1st King's Royal Rifle Corps, made an advance of 1,000 yards between the Passchendaele ridge and the Keiberg spur. It was during this action that Prince Maurice of Battenberg, serving with the K.R.R.C., lost his life.

During this day and the following night a redistribution was effected on the British front. The 7th division was placed under Sir Douglas Haig and was appointed to hold the line from a point east of Zandvoorde to the Menin road. The 1st division, on the left of the 7th, extended to a point immediately west of Reutel village, and the 2nd division from the left of the 1st to the vicinity

MARINES IN FLANDERS

In the fighting in Flanders and near the Belgian coast both the Allies and the Germans employed Marines. This machine gun, its menace half concealed by a skilfully chosen hollow in the ground, is manned by a team of German Marines

OSTEND'S GAIETY GONE

Ostend was occupied by the Germans during the War, and, like Zeebrugge, formed a valuable submarine base. The cheerfulness of these German soldiers contrasts with the grim emptiness of the promenade, filled in peace time with crowds of holiday-makers

of the Zonnebeke–Roulers road, where it joined up with the French.

The events of October 28 were a repetition of the day before. Attempts to advance were made both by the French and the British, but were stopped by shell fire, and only the smallest progress was made. But towards the afternoon Sir John French received information, by means of a tapped wireless message, which might have been thought likely to have checked the flow of his optimistic messages. On the night before he had expressed the opinion that it was "only necessary to press the enemy hard to ensure complete success and victory." Unfortunately the enemy were of the same opinion, with greater reserves to justify their hopes. The news which was intercepted was of the preparation for the next day of a further attack on Kruiseecke and Gheluvelt. Every possible means were taken to ensure a successful resistance to this movement, but the British command had little idea of the strength which the Germans were prepared to employ.

The 1st battle of Ypres was now about to enter its middle stage. Fighting, as has been seen, had been costly and continuous, represented by a series of what are known as "battles of encounter"—that is to say, battles in which both sides are striving for advantage, as opposed to battles in which one side is attacking, while the other is purely on the defensive. The British army had shown an unconquerable spirit, and if it had gained nothing, had surrendered little of importance. Its trials, however, were only half over and were to continue in one bloody conflict after another almost to the end of the next month.

Meanwhile, on the Belgian sector along the Yser the situation during October 28 and 29 remained relatively calm, apart from intermittent shelling of the Belgian lines and a continuous bombardment of the town of Dixmude. An operation of major tactical importance was carried out on October 28, when the Belgian engineers, after having failed the day before, finally succeeded in opening the gates of the Furnes lock at Nieuport and letting in the sea between the Yser and the high embankment of the railway running between Nieuport and Dixmude, thus repeating the exploit of Vendôme during the war in the Netherlands in 1708.

Before commencing the narrative of that phase of the first battle of Ypres officially referred to as the battle of Gheluvelt, something may be said of the German point of view at this time. As there appeared to be but little likelihood of Duke Albrecht of Württemberg being able to break through the British line near Ypres with the forces at his disposal, it was incumbent upon the German general staff to consider some other plan of attack. Accordingly, General von Falkenhayn, the chief of the general staff, decided that it would be advisable to place an additional army group in the line between the German 4th and 6th armies, and with this augmented force to attempt a breakthrough from a position south-east of Ypres in the direction of the Franco-British sector comprised between Messines and Zandvoorde. On October 27 General von Falkenhayn arrived at the headquarters of the German 6th army, where he formulated his new plan of attack. He gave instructions for a new army group to be formed, the command of which he entrusted to General von Fabeck.

The formation of this new army group, composed of troops taken from various other parts of the line, meant an increase of six divisions on the Ypres front between the Lys and Bixschoote. General von Fabeck was also given the German 1st cavalry corps, the 11th brigade and six other battalions from various sources. More important still, his army group was allotted over 250 heavy guns, a highly formidable armament with which to oppose the puny artillery resources at Sir John French's command.

CHAPTER 28

FIRST BATTLE OF YPRES (II)

The story of the tremendous struggle for the possession of the Belgian town of Ypres that was begun in the previous chapter is here continued. Oct. 29 is taken as the dividing line between the two parts of the narrative

THE second stage of the first battle of Ypres opened on October 29, when there began that series of operations, lasting three days, officially known as the battle of Gheluvelt. The day opened with the British commander still in the mood to attack, in conjunction with the French. Some defensive precautions had been taken, however, as it was known that the Germans meditated an assault that morning.

This opened at 5.30 a.m., and was first directed against a company of the Black Watch and two companies of the Coldstream, north of the Menin road. Under the weight of the attack, and in the absence of artillery support, the line was broken. Efforts were hastily made to restore it, and the 1st Gloucestershire were sent forward to assist the companies in the line to hold their own. Later in the morning, at 7 30 a.m., the Grenadier Guards, a stage farther north, were attacked, after a heavy bombardment, and they, too, were forced to give way. By the time they had occupied a position south of the Menin road, east of Gheluvelt, they had been cut to pieces, with eleven officers killed and eight wounded, and total casualties amounting to 470.

Gradually the enemy began to take advantage of his initial successes, developing the attack against the whole of the front of the 7th and 1st divisions. The two remaining companies of the Coldstream and one of the Black Watch, whose comrades had been so roughly handled earlier, were the next to feel the brunt of the assault, which fell so heavily upon them that they were practically destroyed. The 1st Scots Guards on the left of the Coldstream also gave up portions of their line to the enemy, but managed later to recover them and consolidate their position.

Later in the day every available battalion was mustered for a counter-attack, which succeeded in regaining some of the lost ground but was called off towards evening. The situation at this time was far from satisfactory. Apart from the severity of the casualties, the sorely tried troops were called upon to suffer all the additional fatigue and hardship of entrenching by night, and rest was further denied them by the necessity of sorting out units which had become much mixed up during the day's fighting. An agreement, which remained in force during the rest of the battle, was reached that evening between the commanders of the 1st and 2nd divisions, that in the event of the 1st being too hardly pressed the 2nd would afford relief by a counter-attack towards Polygon Wood on the German right flank. This arrangement was approved by the corps commander, Sir Douglas Haig.



To sum up the situation on the evening of October 29–30, the Germans, although they had made only small progress, had captured ground round Gheluvelt which would enable them to conceal their artillery in support of a further attack on the village. The French, on the left, met with little success, General D'Urbal confessing that he could make small impression on an enemy so numerically strong, so well entrenched and possessing such a superiority of heavy artillery. Some success, however, was gained farther north by the French cavalry, under De Mitry, which captured Bixschoote and Kortekeer cabaret, a feat which led Sir John French to announce that "slow but decided success is being made everywhere." Two events of this period may be recorded. On the evening of October 28–29 the bombardment of Ypres began, and on the evening of the 29th the London Scottish, who had been for a month in France acting as line of communication troops, arrived behind the firing line, shortly to become the first battalion of Territorial infantry to go into action.

With formal instructions to continue operations "in accordance with previous

KINGS IN KHAKI

Deprived by German armies of all but 200 square miles of his European territory, Albert King of the Belgians, still undaunted established his headquarters in the village of La Panne, where he was visited by his cousin and ally King George. Their greeting typifies the mutual loyalty and admiration of their respective countries

ETURN JOURNEY

On their way from the front-line dressing station to comparative security, these English wounded with their German prisoner have just been passed by ot
Weary, mud-bespattered and in pain, they can hardly help hoping that theirs are ' Blighty ' wounds which will take them for a while away from the

eir comrades going up in their turn to 'face the music.'
battle to a hospital at the base and then to England

TOMMY HAS HIS JOKE!

The cares of state sit lightly upon the occupants of this improvised No. 10 Downing Street just behind the lines. The unconquerable good humour of the British troops would hardly be better illustrated than by the conversion of this battered hansom-cab into a travesty of the prime minister's residence

orders," the British on October 30 faced a day of heavy fighting on the defensive, and the loss of more ground. Still the higher command seemed quite ignorant of the strength of the German forces massing against the most vulnerable sector near Ypres. Nothing was yet known of the five fresh German divisions under General von Fabeck which were already in the line, supported by as many as 250 heavy guns and preparing to attack the weakened British 7th division and the three cavalry divisions which held the line from the Menin road to Messines.

Farther north the opposing forces were numerically fairly equal, but here there were long stretches when the numerical superiority of the Germans was as three to one. Indeed, they were making a strong bid for an immediate decision against the British force. It was at this time that the order already quoted was issued, in which they exhorted themselves to "conquer and settle for ever with the centuries-long struggle, end the war and strike the decisive blow against our most detested enemy." Their hope was that their attack would penetrate to the Kemmel heights and drive all the Allied troops in and north of Ypres on to the coast or into Dutch territory.

The first German attempt on the morning of October 30 was not brilliantly successful. This was against the 2nd division near Zonnebeke, where a very heavy bombardment was followed by an infantry attack which was repulsed. A little later a great mass of artillery opened on the weakened 7th and cavalry divisions in the neighbourhood of Zandvoorde. The chief sufferers were the 1st and 2nd Life Guards, who held exposed trenches in front of the village and withstood the merciless gun-fire and the full strength of an infantry assault to the point of annihilation. The Germans claim that they were in the village of Zandvoorde by 10.0 a.m.

Immediate arrangements were made to re-establish the line and recover Zandvoorde by counter-attack, but so strong was the German resistance that this was not possible. Much severe fighting occurred, and though the battalions engaged were heavily battered, they managed to return a highly effective fire. North of Zandvoorde the 2nd Green Howards, receiving no order to retire to a new position, fought steadily on, although greatly reduced in numbers. When they did eventually fall back they were able to break off the action in their own time and retire with practically no losses, so completely had they subdued the enemy's fire. To the south of Zandvoorde a squadron of the 1st Royals was attacked at Hollebeke château, and the 3rd cavalry brigade near Hollebeke village lost so heavily that it was obliged to retire, leaving the village behind it. This left the château position exposed on its flank, and the squadron of the Royal Dragoons were forced to abandon it. At this time all three brigades of the 2nd cavalry division and a battalion and a half of Indian troops were withdrawn to a line which ran in front of Wytschaete, between Messines and Hollebeke. On the other part of the British front the German attacks were well resisted.

Towards the close of the day, which had seen the loss of Zandvoorde and Hollebeke, Sir Douglas Haig, apprehensive of further attacks on his weakened line, appealed for help to the French. This was readily afforded by General Dubois, who sent three battalions to Zillebeke which were, however, not immediately needed. The night was, in fact, spent in consolidating, as far as possible with the limited material available, the new positions which had been taken up, although it was not entirely peaceful, for about 10 p.m. a heavy attack appeared to be developing against Messines. In spite of this, orders for the following day included the launching of a counter-attack on the lost positions at Hollebeke and Zandvoorde.

From the point of view of the Germans, October 30 could not count as a successful day. They had failed at Gheluvelt and Messines if they had succeeded at Zandvoorde and Hollebeke, and their diffidence in pressing their attack appears to have been due to their fear that the British were being strongly reinforced from the Territorial army, and their refusal to believe, it has been suggested, that their enemy could be so impudent as to deny them the coast with the light forces which were actually holding the line. Divisional commanders protested against the continuation of "the most dreadful sacrifices in blood" which achieved so little, but the higher commands insisted on achieving the breakthrough which the crown prince Rupert ordered "in very hard words." On October 31, a much more notable day in the history of the battle, the Germans had the encouragement of the presence of the kaiser at army headquarters.

The British official historian, Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds, opens his chapter on this day's fighting with these measured words: "Saturday, the 31st October, 1914, was to prove one of the most critical days in the history of the British Expeditionary Force, if not of the British Empire." He concludes his first paragraph: "The line that stood between the British Empire and ruin was composed of tired, haggard and unshaven men, unwashed, plastered with mud, many in little more than rags." Everything, indeed, seemed in favour of the Germans, with their numerical superiority and preponderance of gun-fire. There was no valid reason why this day should not bring them the decisive victory which they sought. Sheer fighting ability, coupled with an obstinate refusal to admit defeat, denied the enemy this issue to their determined efforts.

Two main actions characterized the day, and of these the first to be described is the attack on Messines, which had as its first object the capture of the Messines–Wytschaete ridge. The village of Messines was held as a salient by the 1st cavalry brigade, the 9th Lancers from the 2nd cavalry brigade, and two companies of the 57th Rifles from the Ferozepore brigade who were about to be relieved by the 2nd Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers. Before dawn the enemy attack developed, on the village and to north and south of it. Despite the fact that a relief was taking place, this first assault was beaten off with heavy casualties to the enemy.

But these early attempts on various parts of the line were merely the prelude to a more serious attack which developed about 8 a.m. At this time a very heavy bombardment fell on the village. Assaults were delivered against it on both flanks, and it became necessary to abandon the forward half of the village, making a continuous line through its centre with the Queen's Bays on the left and the 2nd Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers on the right.

But the Germans had by no means spent their strength, seeing that their attacking force outnumbered the defenders by at least six to one. After a short pause they renewed their efforts, demolishing the houses by shell fire and dynamite and gradually forcing back the defenders until they occupied a position in the western half of the village. In the meantime, reinforcements, including the 2nd King's Own Scottish Borderers and the 2nd King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, were sent up to Messines. They advanced to the counter-attack in excellent order, but German machine-gun fire prevented them from regaining many of the lost houses.

At the same time the London Scottish made their first appearance in the field. They were, after certain counter-orders, offered to Major-General de Lisle (1st

Photopress

WINTER AT 'WIPERS'

The ruined Cloth Hall at Ypres—known to Tommies as Wipers—was one of the most familiar landmarks in the War. The snow through which these transports are passing to the depôt will soon turn to mud, making even worse the conditions in the trenches

NOTED AND RETURNED

In a quiet sector of the support line the adjutant of a Fusilier battalion is at work outside his dug-out 'somewhere in France.' The ceaseless filling in of forms was the bane of the regimental officer

Photopress

cavalry division), who, rather than send them up to Messines purely as supports, contemplated using them in a strong counter-attack. They were directed first to Wytschaete and a windmill half a mile north of Messines, whence they were to attack south-eastward. This avenue of advance proved impossible owing to gun-fire. They were then ordered to go to the support of the cavalry holding the ridge east of the main road between Messines and Wytschaete. The London Scottish, who at this time appear to have been confused as to their precise orders and the nature of the action in which they were to be employed, proceeded to attack when they had been asked merely to reinforce.

They at once came under heavy shell fire, but succeeded in reaching the 4th cavalry brigade trenches, and on their left forcing some kind of battle on a reluctant enemy. During the day they suffered 321 casualties, but they proved at least to the tired men in the line that there was an abundance of fighting spirit behind, anxious only to undergo the experiences of which they themselves were more than a little weary. Later they were deployed to deal once more with the German menace in the direction of Wytschaete, but, unsupported by any general attack, they naturally could make no further progress. They had, however, with the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry and King's Own Scottish Borderers, enabled General de Lisle's 1st cavalry division to hold its line and recover part of the ground which had been lost. On the left the 2nd cavalry division also held its own, so that all that was lost on this section of the line was that part of the village of Messines which formed a salient.

Far more spectacular on this day were the events round Gheluvelt, where troops of the 1st division were holding the line in front of and on the flanks of the village. Here an infantry attack developed about 6 a.m. and was repulsed, except at one point, where the Germans penetrated and captured an orchard from which they were able to enfilade the British line. The attack was made by thirteen German battalions, whereas the British front at this point was defended by only five—the 2nd King's Royal Rifle Corps, the 1st Queens (the Royal West Surreys), the 2nd Welch, the 1st South Wales Borderers, and the 1st Scots Guards. Ultimately this disparity of numbers made itself felt and, although individual battalions fought with the utmost tenacity, they were eventually worn down and were either, as in the case of the Queens, almost annihilated, or in some cases forced to retire.

The Germans entered Gheluvelt according to their own account at 2 p.m. An attempt to counter-attack was foiled by heavy fire from the German batteries, and the situation began to look extremely serious. An effort was made to form a line in front of Veldhoek, but in the meantime the Germans, having taken Gheluvelt, proceeded to make a violent attack to the south on scattered posts held by detachments of the 1st Loyal North Lancashires and the 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers whose strength amounted only to six officers and 175 men.

These units had the unhappy experience of being surrounded and shot at by machine-guns from the rear. Nevertheless, obeying orders not in any circumstances to retire, they stood their ground, and few remained to be cap-

MODERN CAVE MEN

Behind the front line these British soldiers are snatching a short rest in temporary shelters, sometimes called funk-holes. Exhaustion causes them to be grateful even for such cramped quarters, where at least they can shed their equipment

Photopress

ASSPORT TO PRISON

As in peacetime a traveller must produce his passport, so in wartime the commander of this surrendered German submarine must show his papers to his captors. Like a passport, they admit him and his crew into England, but only at the price of liberty

tured by the Germans when they made their final onslaught.

Yet in front of Gheluvelt the little band, comprising a shattered company of the 2nd Welch, the 1st South Wales Borderers, and what remained of the 1st Scots Guards, held on. A thick copse protected some part of the line from artillery observation, but this did not prevent a merciless rain of shells falling on the improvised trenches The Welch were overrun. the South Wales Borderers were partially forced back, but there remained enough of them to justify a counter-attack, which was launched in the most spirited manner and succeeded in inflicting heavy punishment on the Germans. An order to retire to Polderhoek Wood was given to the Scots Guards and the South Wales Borderers, but shortly afterwards cancelled to the Scots Guards, whereupon Colonel Leach of the South Wales Borderers decided also to remain where he was.

At this time the situation was extremely dangerous. Gheluvelt had fallen and the most vital part of the British line was in imminent peril. It was impossible to arrange for any effective reinforcement of the broken line, and it was therefore decided to revert to the plan already decided upon and launch a counter-attack on the German flank. All the force that was available was the reserve of the 2nd division, which was composed of the 1st Kings, three companies of the 2nd Worcestershire and two of the 1st Royal Berkshire. The 1st Kings were directed to defend the south-east corner of Polygon Wood, the Berkshires were held in reserve, and the main duties of the counter-attack devolved on the 2nd Worcestershire.

Thus began one of the most splendid actions of the whole war. The Worcestershire were only 350 strong, with seven officers. Their attack necessitated an advance over the open under the most violent high explosive and shrapnel fire. Although almost immediately they lost a hundred of their strength this fine county battalion charged on, although warned by wounded stragglers that they were facing certain death. Persevering, they reached the line of the South Wales Borderers and the Scots Guards, by this time nearly surrounded. They had recaptured the greater part of Gheluvelt.

By sending out patrols themselves they were able to drive off German patrols and make their line moderately secure. In doing so they had saved a most critical situation for the whole British army, and the news of their gallant and successful attack came at a moment when the high command had indeed cause for profound depression. Sir John French in his dispatch announced that he regarded this "as the most critical moment in the whole battle. The rally of the 1st division and the recapture of the village of Gheluvelt at such a time was fraught with momentous consequences. If any one unit can be singled out for especial praise, it is the Worcesters."

During the very course of this action a major calamity fell on the 1st corps. Both the 1st and 2nd division staffs were quartered in Hooge château. Early in the afternoon, when the two generals with their staff officers were in conference, the Germans started to shell the château with deadly accuracy. Indeed, at the very second attempt their aim found the room where the staffs were assembled. Major-General Lomax, commanding the 1st division, received wounds of which he later died. Major-General Monro of the 2nd was badly stunned, but recovered sufficiently to continue in command. A number of the staff officers surrounding these generals were killed outright and others mortally wounded. At no period of the battle could such a catastrophe have been felt more severely.

Now the higher commands were suffering the gravest anxiety as to how they might best rescue the shattered line, and plans were under discussion for immediate retirement. Sir John French, with no reinforcements to call upon, was at his wits' end to know how to avert disaster. Only one hope remained and that was to seek help from the French, and it was at this dark hour, as the British commander was stepping into his car to make for General Foch's headquarters, that the news came of the successful charge of the Worcestershire, the recapture of Gheluvelt, the discomfiture of the Germans and the re-establishment of the British line.

It is now necessary to look for a moment at the situation north of Gheluvelt and south of Veldhoek. The loss of the village had turned the flank of the 2nd division, which had to swing its right round precipitately to resist German attacks. On the right of the 2nd, Bulfin's 2nd and 4th brigades and what remained of the 7th division had been heavily engaged all day. By 3 p.m. the situation was critical, as the troops had been driven to their last line of prepared defences; but the appearance on the scene of about 80 men of the 2nd Gordon Highlanders encouraged Bulfin to order a counter-attack. After one "mad minute" of rapid fire the whole line, led by the Highlanders, rushed on the advancing Germans. Only a few of them stood: the rest broke and fled, pursued by the British. Over half a mile was gained before this wild charge ended, and by the end of the day most of the lost ground had been won back.

To the south near Hollebeke General Moussy and the French had been desperately pressed. In the nick of time they had arrived to support the exhausted 3rd cavalry division, but although they managed to hold the line they were unable to do more. In fact, at one critical moment, only by organizing his own escort and collecting every man he could lay his hands on, and



Photos: Cribb, Southsea

SWEEPING THE SEAS

Ready at any moment to engage an unseen enemy, the 25,000 tons super-dreadnought, H.M.S. Benbow, preceded by a companion dreadnought, patrols the North Sea. The Benbow, one of the most powerful ships in the British fleet, could attain a speed of 22 knots

NO SMOKE WITHOUT FIRE

Sea-battles in the Great War were not won at close range. With this salvo the big guns of H.M.S. Queen Mary could send their message of death across more than eleven miles of sea. The Queen Mary herself was sunk by gunfire at Jutland, May 31, 1916

USSIA PRESENTS ARMS

Russia sent a quota of troops to Salonika as well as to the Western Front. Here, at the end of their long sea journey from Siberia, a Russian force is being reviewed by General Sarrail, who became the commander-in-chief of the Salonika expedition

Photo: Central News

leading his 250 men in a bayonet charge, did Moussy drive back the attackers.

The day had gone more quietly in the north round Polygon Wood. Brigadier-General Fanshawe, commanding troops of the 2nd division, had been ordered—after the loss of Gheluvelt—to withdraw every man he could into divisional reserve. This had been done, only a thin screen of troops being left in the trenches. But the recapture of Gheluvelt by the Worcesters avoided the necessity of employing Fanshawe's men

Thus on the night of October 31 the British line scarcely varied from that of the previous day. It was, however, decided, in view of the dangerous nature of the salient, to evacuate Gheluvelt and retire to prepared positions to the west. French had conferred with Foch during the night of October 31–November 1, and it had been arranged that while the British line should be held the French would move up reinforcements and attack to the north and south of the British position. The situation of the cavalry at Messines was giving rise to grave anxiety, and Foch promised to send the 32nd division to its relief.

Messines and Wytschaete continued to be shelled during the night, and at 1 a.m. a heavy German attack was launched. Before the French division had arrived, Messines had fallen, and the London Scottish had been enfiladed and driven back, badly cut up. Farther north the Germans had also penetrated through Wytschaete, and all efforts to dislodge them had failed. But with the arrival of the advance companies of the French the village was recaptured, although the Allies were unable to press far beyond it. By the evening the line was solidly held by the French 32nd division. Several fresh attacks had been launched on Wytschaete by the Germans, but all had been beaten off.

The battle of Ypres during the next four days declined into an artillery duel. Skirmishes occurred from time to time, but, except for the loss or gain of a few yards of trench here or there, the line remained stable from Bixschoote to Le Gheer. The French offensive was continued, but no marked success was gained. The British troops were therefore able to enjoy a well-earned rest, and some reinforcements which arrived also improved the position. The losses of the 1st and 4th corps had been very severe, and the cavalry had suffered as badly. The 4th corps had been reduced from a fighting strength of 12,000 men to under 3,000. The Germans, it appeared, had abandoned their effort to break through. Their exhaustion probably exceeded that of the Allies, but they had still other cards to play, and the fighting of November 6–15 was to prove by no means a small affair.

The night of November 5–6 was employed in carrying out a series of reliefs, and the section held by the remnants of the 7th division was taken over by ten battalions of the 2nd corps, which had been resting since coming out of the line at La Bassé, on October 31. Colonel Lovett's 3rd brigade was relieved by the 6th cavalry brigade, of which the 3rd Dragoon Guards and 10th Hussars held the front line, with the 1st Royal Dragoons in support.

At this time the Allied commanders, being under the impression that the German effort had expended itself, proposed to withdraw troops from General Dubois' 8th army for service elsewhere. Fortunately, however, the Germans gave warning of further activity before this project could be carried out.

On November 6 a strong enemy attack developed along both sides of the Ypres-Comines canal, and the Germans succeeded in driving the French troops out of the woods to the west of Hollebeke. Near St. Eloi they gained much ground owing to the retreat of two chasseur battalions, and it was not until

General Olleris had rallied his troops and led them back in person that the abandoned territory was recovered. The Irish Guards and the 2nd Grenadier Guards also lost many men from shell fire, but until 2.30 p.m. the front line remained intact. Then, however, a particularly violent assault was successful in piercing the French front in three places, forcing the defending troops backwards upon Zillebeke, and leaving a wide gap in the Allied line.

Into the gap thus formed the German troops advanced, forcing back the flank company of the Irish Guards, and falling upon the 2nd Grenadier Guards, of whom hardly a man came through unscathed. Two companies of the Royal Sussex and one of the Oxfordshire and Bucks L.I. were rushed up to secure the British right flank, but although they managed to prevent the Germans from enfilading the British trenches, the gap still remained, and through this the Germans continued to advance until they reached Zwarteleen and almost gained Verbrandenmolen, within a mile and a half of Ypres.

To save the situation, Lord Cavan flung the 7th cavalry brigade across the path of the German advance. The cavalry commander, Brigadier-General Kavanagh, covering his right by a squadron of the Royal Horse Guards, dismounted the 1st and 2nd Life Guards and advanced on Zwarteleen, now occupied by the Germans, the remainder of the Royal Horse Guards acting as support. On the way they were joined by General Moussy's small reserves—two companies of infantry and detachments of cavalry. Zwarteleen was successfully carried, the cavalry made contact with Lord Cavan's other troops and the French pushed on towards their old trenches Met by concentrated fire by the Germans entrenched across their path, they were forced back, carrying with them in their retreat part of the British cavalry brigade which was endeavouring to enfilade the German advance. The retreating force finally rallied in front of Zwarteleen. In this action Lieut.-Colonel Wilson, of the Royal Horse Guards, and Major Hugh Dawnay, of the 2nd Life Guards, were killed, the 7th cavalry brigade having lost altogether 17 officers and 78 men.

Sir Douglas Haig, alarmed at the critical situation on his right flank, concentrated his artillery upon the area which the Germans were traversing, and with the French rally before Zwarteleen the situation became easier. Shortly afterwards the line was strengthened by a battalion of Munster Fusiliers. Nevertheless, the situation was by no means reassuring. The wedge driven into the Allied line along the Comines canal menaced the safety of the whole line.

Next morning, November 7, a cold and misty day, two British counter-attacks took place. Although General Foch had promised co-operation from General Moussy's troops, Lord Cavan realized that the position needed an immediate remedy, and before dawn he sent Brigadier-General Lawford's 22nd brigade to join the 3rd brigade in an assault on the German lines north-east of Zwarteleen. Lawford's troops made a brilliant onslaught which succeeded in capturing the first enemy trench and three machine-guns. Unfortunately, since no French support was forthcoming and the flanks of the 22nd brigade were in the air, to avoid envelopment in the dark they were compelled to withdraw to their original line. However, in spite of the failure of the French to reinforce General Moussy on the canal bank, they did good work in advancing their line between Wytschaete and Messines.

During the day isolated attacks were made by the Germans at five different points, all of which proved unsuccessful. Similar disconnected attacks took place on November 8, 9 and 10, but none resulted in any gain of ground for the Germans. The enemy bombardment continued without respite, with the object of wearing down the defenders of the salient. The night of November 10–11 was quiet, with no hint of anything unusual for the morrow or of the preparations that were in progress for a great assault upon the right wing of the British 1st corps. With remarkable

VANTAGE POINT

In the plains on the Russo-German border this Russian officer is, from his perch, registering the hits of the guns firing beneath him

A LONG, LONG TRAIL

Russian troops, although not by way of Britain, did reach the Western Front, travelling by way of Siberia, the China Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean. They are here seen being welcomed at Marseilles

Photo: Sport and General



CITY OF CONTENTION

The only town of importance in Belgium that did not fall into German hands, Ypres was finally defended by the Allies. The Germans were repulsed in three of the costliest battles of the War. The horror wrought by the heavy and continuous German bombardments can be well seen in this photograph. *Photopress*

kill the Germans, all unsuspected by he Allies, had brought up considerable einforcements to the Ypres sector, mong which were the 1st and 4th rigades of the famous Prussian Guards, assed behind Gheluvelt.

According to the German plan, their ffensive was to have been made on November 10, but owing to the fact that og had greatly interfered with preminary reconnaissances, it was postoned until the following day. On the orning of November 11, shortly after alf-past six, the British trenches were wept by a hurricane of fire more devasating than any bombardment hitherto xperienced, a fire against which the ront-line troops had little protection. But although shelling was heavy all long the nine-mile front involved, the fantry attack which followed lacked etermination, and at few points was the ssault pressed home with any vigour.

Around Messines strong artillery fire om Mount Kemmel combined with nfilade fire from Ploegsteert Wood ept the enemy in check, and in this ctor the line remained unaltered. ather north, however, the old danger pot on the banks of the Comines canal as threatened. Once more the Germans drove back the weak centre of oussy's detachment, now commanded y General Vidal.

Forced back to Hill 60 and almost o Verbrandenmolen, Vidal, having no eserves, appealed both to the French ommand and to Sir Douglas Haig for elp. Only General Dubois could spare ny reserves, and they consisted of but ne cavalry regiment, which, however, roved sufficient to stem the tide. A ounter-attack re-established the French ne, but it was within less than 3,000 ards from Ypres itself. On Vidal's eft Lord Cavan's troops, though heavily helled, resisted all attacks and never ost a trench. Although the numerical uperiority of the enemy in this sector as, according to authoritative acounts, as high as five to one, the German ttack here was a complete failure.

In spite of the fierce attack launched gainst them the centre and right wings f the 3rd division, under Count Gleichen nd Brigadier-General McCracken repectively, broke down every enemy onlaught by the excellence of their rifle re, and in their sector the Germans ever reached a single British trench. t was north of the Menin road, against he left wing of the 3rd division and the djoining right wing of the 1st division, overing the sector Herenthage Wood–Ionne Boschen, that the enemy assault net with more success.

Here the British line had suffered more rom shell fire than at any other point, for the German gunners had an excellent observation post on Reutel spur which enabled them to range with extreme accuracy upon the British front-line trenches, from which, to avoid undue loss, as many troops as possible had been withdrawn. Although Brigadier-General Shaw's forces on the left wing of the third division managed to repulse the first attacks, a number of the German 2nd Guard Grenadier Regiment advancing into the pocket where the British line made a re-entrant just north of the Menin road, succeeded in enfilading the left flank of the 4th Royal Fusiliers and gained a foothold in Herenthage Wood. The Fusiliers were depleted by the fighting in the wood, but the German casualties were equally severe and they failed to exploit this small success.

Farther north, the German 2nd Guard Grenadier regiment managed to advance about a quarter of a mile into Veldhoek Woods, but were stopped upon reaching Veldhoek château, held by a company of Zouaves. Unable to receive the help of reinforcements, which were held up by the well-directed fire of the 1st divisional artillery, unable either to advance or retire, the German regiment soon lost all its effectives, the few survivors being driven out of the woods by a reserve company of the Duke of Wellington's.

Farther north still, between Veldhoek and Polygon Wood, lay the 1st (Guards) Brigade, led by Brigadier-General Fitz-Clarence. Towards nine o'clock in the morning, hidden by the mist until almost on top of the British trenches, the German 1st Guard Brigade advanced right across the first line, but were met with such resistance by the Scots Guards, the Camerons and the Black Watch that their formation was soon thrown into confusion. Then the British divisional artillery came into play and, ranging superbly, kept up such a barrage that German reinforcements found it quite impossible to reach their first line.

The German assaulting troops had been ordered to attack in divergent directions. The 4th Guard Brigade, which had attacked Shaw's forces near the Menin Road, was instructed to proceed due west. The 1st Guard Brigade, who marched against Fitz-Clarence's men, were to head north-west. Into the gap thus formed when the two brigades diverged, the German commander intended to push a reserve battalion. This plan was effectively frustrated by the British barrage.

Nevertheless, although the Germans thus left a gap in their line, they had also made one in the British line by the sheer force of their initial attack. Through this breach the leading Germans rushed, but as they advanced the British threw back their wings with admirable coolness, to avoid their flanks

DIED WHERE THEY STOOD

The battle has swept on, leaving its toll of human dead amongst the wreckage of the trenches. The slender protection of a sandbagged dug-out was of no avail to these members of a trench garrison who have become the victims of a direct hit



ROPE TO THE RESCUE

Skilled mountaineers were needed for the armies on the Austro-Italian frontier. The risk of a missed foothold is as acute for these Austrians pulling a wounded comrade up the mountain-side to safety as is the danger from an enemy bullet

being enfiladed, and, faced with the stubborn resistance of the Scots Guards' strong point at Northampton Farm, the German assault broke down. Against the 1st King's, which was holding a mile of front along the southern edge of Polygon Wood without either supports or reserve, the German 3rd Foot Guard Regiment could make no impression. The men were mown down until their dead and wounded formed a continuous line, still some distance from the edge of the wood

To the west of Polygon Wood lay Nonne Bosschen, or Nun's Copse. Here the German 1st Foot Guard Regiment succeeded in crossing the British front and support trenches and penetrated into Nonne Boschen, but failed to capture the strong point of Veerbeek Farm, held by the 1st Black Watch and the 1st Cameron Highlanders. Nevertheless, the Prussian Guard now lay on the right of the 1st King's, and the latter were likely to be strongly enfiladed. Immediately on being informed of the situation, Colonel Westmacott, who was at 5th brigade headquarters, sent troops to defend the flanks of the 1st King's, whilst General Monro, commanding the 2nd division, sent up additional reinforcements.

Meanwhile the German attack against General Fitz-Clarence's force was striving to maintain its progress. Veerbeek Farm still held out strongly, and the enemy found themselves obliged to pass to its right through Nonne Boschen, and, meeting with no resistance, pressed on through the wood. Fortunately the barrage which was skilfully put up behind them paralysed the columns of infantry which should have supported them, and the steady advance was halted. Well for the Allies that it was, for by then the German Guards had thrust through all lines of defence and were actually in sight of the 2nd divisional artillery. There were no reserves available, and if they had won through those extra yards nothing lay between them and Ypres.

Met by the point-blank fire of the guns, and by the rifle fire of hastily collected stragglers of the Black Watch and Camerons, the Prussian Guard, or what was left of them, retreated hastily into the wood, never realizing that they had all but penetrated the ultimate British defences. The tragedy of the situation from the German point of view was graphically portrayed by a wounded officer who was taken prisoner. He asked where the British reserves were, and, disbelieving the answer, which had been a wave of the hand towards the guns, inquired what was behind them. He was told " divisional headquarters." Sinking his head on his knees he murmured simply, " God almighty ! "

Thus the great German offensive, upon the success of which the enemy command had based great hopes, had been beaten off, and counter-attacks were organized to recover what small ground had been lost during the day. In the afternoon the 2nd Oxfordshire Light Infantry were detailed to clear Nonne Boschen, while the 2nd Highland Light Infantry received orders to recapture the Black Watch trenches near the south-west corner of Polygon Wood.

While this operation was being prepared a message was despatched to the officer commanding the 1st King's that his men must hold on and on no account leave their trenches. No better testimony of the calm and self-possession of the British troops on that day of crisis can be imagined than that afforded by the following laconic reply: " No intention of quitting our trenches, but what about our rations ? " At the same time other counter-attacks were launched by troops of the 1st division, and though darkness and a heavy storm of rain prevented the British attacks from being driven home at every point, most of the ground was recovered, and, resting content with what they had re-won, the tired British troops dug

themselves in where they stood. Unfortunately General Fitz-Clarence was mortally wounded whilst reconnoitring.

With the repulse of the famous Prussian Guard the Germans appeared both discouraged and exhausted. Although spasmodic attacks were delivered until November 22, the battle proper was at an end, and "First Ypres," of immortal memory, was definitely an Allied success.

From November 12 to November 15 the Germans transferred their attention to the northern part of the salient, and for four days Bixschoote was the centre round which the fighting raged most fiercely. General Dubois was assailed time and again, but his Zouaves, with magnificent courage, defended Bixschoote in the face of overwhelming numbers. After November 15 the fighting slackened, and the advent of winter conditions made any further offensive impossible. During the days that followed the British line was reorganized and the battle-weary 1st corps relieved. The French 9th and 16th corps took over the British sector north of the Menin Road, and on November 21 the 3rd division and Lord Cavan's group, on the sector Menin Road–Comines Canal, were relieved by other French troops. The British front was thereby transferred to a line extending from Wytschaete to Givenchy, on the La Bassée canal.

With the first battle of Ypres the epoch of open fighting came to an end, and with the coming of trench warfare all chances of a rapid decision in favour of either side came to an end also. Germany had lost her final chance of exploiting the Schlieffen plan. Of even greater importance, she had now lost her confidence. It is almost unquestionable that the Germans lost the battle of Ypres through bad generalship and bad staff work. Successes were never exploited, and when by the superiority of their numbers they succeeded in penetrating the Allied lines, they hesitated—a hesitation which proved fatal in the face of accurate artillery and rifle fire.

In its character the battle was one of continuous encounter, with each side striving to break through and failing to do so. Its material result was negligible, although its moral effect was of considerable importance to the Allies. The Ypres salient, always expensive to defend and becoming, as the years went on, an almost impassable morass, had a sentimental value to the Allied cause which justified its retention at all costs. The shattered town of Ypres itself came to stand as a symbol of British resistance and though it may well be argued that there were other lines which could have been held more cheaply and with less chance of ultimate disaster, the loss of Ypres would have had an overwhelmingly depressing effect on the Allies. It would have meant to the Belgians the surrender of the last shreds of their country, and might have led to the complete annihilation of their armies.

As often happens in war, it became necessary to hold a piece of country which military strategy might argue had far better be abandoned, and it is significant that the Germans, despite powerful efforts, never did succeed in rolling back the Allied line beyond Ypres. Rather from the end of 1914 did they realize the importance of strengthening their own line of defence until in 1917 it had become a fortress.

Photos: G.P.A.

MOUNTAIN MARKSMEN

Less efficient in general than the other contending armies, the soldiers of Austria-Hungary yet showed remarkable skill and gallantry in fighting in the mountainous country that lay between their land and Italy. Here every soldier was also a cragsman

LAST SURVIVOR

This young Austrian lieutenant holds out gallantly, the last of his machine-gun post, against the advancing Italians. The rocky nature of the Alpine districts in which the Austro-Italian fighting took place led to a higher percentage of facial wounds than on any other front, this being due to ricochetting bullets

CHAPTER 29

CORONEL AND FALKLANDS

The British defeat in the sea fight off Coronel was quickly avenged by a crushing victory off the Falkland Islands which practically put an end to the raiding activities of the German cruisers in the seven seas

THE exploits of the Emden and the other German cruisers, which, on the outbreak of war, formed part of the squadron commanded by Count von Spee, have been told in previous chapters, and the story of the naval operations now reaches the point at which some of the ships were collected for a larger enterprise. On October 12 Count von Spee, with his two armoured cruisers Gneisenau and Scharnhorst, and the light cruiser Nürnberg, reached Easter Island, where he was joined by the Dresden. Two days later the Leipzig arrived, and on the 27th the force was completed by the armed merchantman Prinz Eitel Friedrich. The two armoured cruisers were each 11,420 tons with a speed of 23 knots. They each mounted eight 8·2-in. and six 6-in. guns. Of the three light cruisers the Dresden of 3,600 tons mounted twelve 4·1-in. guns; the Nürnberg of 3,400 tons and the Leipzig of 3,200 tons each mounted ten 4·1-in.

Under Sir Christopher Cradock the British squadron consisted of the armoured cruiser Good Hope of 14,100 tons, completed in 1902, carrying one 9·2-in. gun forward and a similar 9·2-in. gun aft, together with sixteen 6-in. guns of an old pattern; the cruiser Monmouth of 9,800 tons, completed in 1903, whose main armament was fourteen 6-in. guns of an old pattern; and a light cruiser, the Glasgow, launched in 1909 and armed with two 6-in. and six 4-in. guns of a new type. Their speed varied from 23 to 25 knots. The auxiliary vessel Otranto, a liner of the Orient Company, did not count as a fighting unit. Attached to his force was the old battleship Canopus, dating from 1897, and though her four 12-in. guns were impressive, her speed—at best 15 knots—made her useless in an action against ships of 22 knots.

Ordered by telegram on October 5 to search for the enemy squadron, which had now reached South American waters, Cradock replied by pointing out the need for a stronger force in that area, and later he said that, owing to the low speed of the Canopus, it would be "impossible to find and destroy enemy squadron." The Admiralty then ordered the Defiance to join him, but the battle was over, although England did not yet know of it, before this order could be executed.

Cruising round Cape Horn, Cradock received news of the German ships. The Glasgow went on ahead to Coronel on the Chilean coast, scouted there for the enemy's cruisers, and left about nine o'clock on the morning of Sunday, November 1, to rejoin the Monmouth and the Otranto. The order was then given for the squadron to spread out fanwise to a distance of about 15 miles, and to search for the enemy. At 20 minutes past four in the afternoon the Glasgow sighted smoke, and made out four cruisers steaming in line ahead, two big armoured cruisers leading and two three-funnelled cruisers following. The third cruiser, the Nürnberg, having been sent away on special duties, joined the squadron later. The British light cruiser was chased, and informed her flagship of the presence of the enemy.

The Good Hope came up with the Monmouth and Otranto, an hour or so afterwards, the Glasgow joined them, and the squadron formed in line ahead. At a quarter to six the German squadron, possessing the advantage in

DAVID AND GOLIATH

Light aeroplanes played as prominent a part as anti-aircraft guns in the defence of Paris against the raids of Zeppelins. Here, high above the city, a French plane is bearing down swiftly to do battle with its giant but slow-moving enemy

Photo: Mondiale

speed as well as in guns, came up along the coast at a distance of twelve miles from the British ships. The Scharnhorst led, followed by the Gneisenau, Leipzig, and Dresden. At 6.18 p.m. Cradock informed the Canopus, which he had left some 250 miles away: "I am going to attack the enemy now."

It was a summer evening in the southern hemisphere but the weather was stormy. The German ships were steaming near the coast. Farther to the west the British ships were silhouetted upon the skyline, and as Cradock moved nearer the enemy about 6 to 6.40 p.m., the sun sank, leaving the German ships in shadow against the coast, whilst the British were still more clearly outlined upon the western afterglow. Then at a range of about seven miles the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau opened fire.

Their first salvo fell over the leading British ships, and with rapid and deadly shooting the Germans got home on the Good Hope and Monmouth while the Leipzig and the Dresden engaged the Glasgow. Little reply was possible. In fact, the Monmouth with her 6-in. guns could not get close enough to the enemy to do any damage. At the third rapid salvo of the light 8·2-in. German guns, both the Monmouth and the Good Hope were on fire forward, and the forward 9·2-in. gun of the Good Hope was disabled.

Ten minutes after the action opened the Monmouth steered out of the line to westward, still being hit heavily. Her foremost casemate was in flames and she had a decided list. She came back again into line and swerved out again eastward, with her gunners still working at their outranged guns. The fires were soon got under, but both she and the Good Hope were quickly flaming again. After the Good Hope caught fire a second time, she was seen trying to steer towards the enemy by means of her propellers, so as to use her torpedoes. She fell more and more out of line to eastward, burning brightly forward, and thus making a clear target in the growing darkness. At 7.50 p.m. an explosion occurred amidships. Her funnels went up in the air, and the flames rose to a height of 200 feet. So near was she to the enemy that some men in the Glasgow thought it was the German flagship that had been blown up. Sir Christopher Cradock and his crew were instantly killed.

In the meantime the Monmouth was badly down by the bow and reeling under the German salvos. She became unmanageable at the same time as the Good Hope, and at eight o'clock the Glasgow was the only ship left fighting in the British line, with the armoured cruisers and light cruisers directing their fire at her at a range of less than 5,000 yards in some cases. Over 600 shells were fired by the Germans at the light cruiser, but by a miracle she escaped. Out of this number only five struck her at the water line.

No longer firing, the Monmouth steamed off to the north-west, but then fell off to the north-east. The Glasgow asked her if she could not steer north-west, but she replied, "I want to get stern to sea as I am making water badly forward." At 8.30 p.m. the enemy's ships were seen, sweeping the horizon with their searchlights. They soon discerned the Monmouth astern of the Glasgow, and opened fire. For 15 minutes the Glasgow stood by with the enemy closing round at a distance of 6,000 yards, after which, seeing that nothing could be done, she steamed away to join the Canopus followed by the Otranto.

About 8.50 the Glasgow lost sight of the German vessels, but half an hour afterwards her look-out observed the play of a searchlight and flashes of gun fire. This was the final attack on the Monmouth. The Nürnberg, which hitherto had taken no part in the fight, came upon the helpless ship in the dark. The Monmouth had a list of ten degrees

PATRIOT AND POET

Gabriele D'Annunzio, Italy's leading poet, proved himself also as an aviation officer a courageous man of action. In a series of daring flights, including one over Trieste, for which—the smaller, helmeted figure—he is here seen prepared, he dropped messages for Italians who were then living on Austrian soil

Photo Mondiale

BOLTS FROM THE BLUE

The damage that a single bombing aeroplane could inflict is shown by this picture of the Galician plain. The German bombers were at times markedly superior to those of the Allies, a superiority gained by their greater capacity for making long-distance flights at high altitudes

and so could not reply to the Nürnberg's withering fire. The Nürnberg actually ceased firing for three minutes to allow her to surrender, but the flags were still flying as she sank under the next salvos. No attempt was made by the Germans to pick up survivors.

The battle of Coronel was lost owing to a misunderstanding between the Admiralty in London and the admiral at sea. The Admiralty, then directed by Mr. Winston Churchill, relied on the superior gun power of the Canopus, which, in the words of the first lord, was "a citadel round which all cruisers in those waters could find absolute security." Moreover, a Japanese battleship and cruiser were moving towards South America, and on the east side of that continent was the squadron under Admiral Stoddart. The authorities in London never imagined that Cradock would fight without the Canopus, and their telegrams assumed that he would keep his ships together. As a matter of fact the admiral left his most powerful vessel behind him, but even then he possessed, in the opinion of the Admiralty, sufficient speed to avoid an engagement until he was strong enough to annihilate. Cradock, however, regarded it as his duty to engage the enemy.

When it was known that the British ships had been destroyed the Admiralty was faced with a new problem, or rather series of problems. Admiral von Spee could take any direction he liked, traversing seas wherein were the regular routes of British merchantmen. Seven possible courses were visualized and arrangements were made to deal with each one. The strength of the British naval forces, with which the French and the Japanese were co-operating, was examined and 21 armoured vessels, several unarmoured ones, a Japanese squadron and other units were warned to be ready to fight five German warships.

One decisive move was decided upon. This was the sending of the new and powerful battle cruisers, Invincible and Inflexible, to South American waters and to put the whole force under the command of the chief of the staff, Sir Frederick D. Sturdee. Detached from the Grand Fleet the two ships were sent to Devonport to refit, and an urgent order was telephoned instructing them to sail on Wednesday, November 11. Meanwhile orders were sent to other ships in South American waters instructing them to concentrate, but the voyage of the battle cruisers was kept a profound secret.

The Admiralty orders were carried out except as regards the Canopus. Like other warships, this battleship was ordered to proceed to Monte Video, and there to join the squadron under Admiral Stoddart, but boiler troubles made it impossible for her to complete the voyage, and she was instructed to put in at the Falkland Islands and there to make preparations to defend herself and to await further orders. The vessel steamed into the inner harbour, really a lagoon, at Port Stanley, where she laid mines and in other ways prepared a defensive position.

The Invincible and the Inflexible were ordered to make for the Abrohlos Rocks, islets off the coast of Brazil which had been prepared as a coaling base. The Rocks were reached on November 26, just over a fortnight from leaving Plymouth, and there the Carnarvon, Cornwall, Kent, Glasgow, Bristol, Macedonia and Orama joined the battle cruisers. The Glasgow by now having been thoroughly repaired. The squadron then proceeded to Port Stanley, which was reached on the night of December 7

The Falkland Islands are inhabited by a couple of thousand British settlers, mainly Scotsmen, who rear sheep on the chill, windy pastures, and keep a store of coal for steamers plying round Cape Horn and through the Straits of

Photo: G.P.A.

FALL OF A TITAN

Points in the Zeppelin's favour were its ability to rise quickly to great heights, its bomb carrying capacity, and its usefulness as scout and pilot for German ships. Its vulnerability, however, is illustrated by this smoking wreckage in a field in France

MASTER AND PUPIL

When Count Zeppelin died in 1917, the comparative failure in warfare of his invention had been established. Dr. Hugo Eckener, his friend and disciple, here seated next to him in uniform, established later the value of the Zeppelin in commercial aviation

TOP HATS TO TIN HATS

Throughout the War the Officers' Training Corps provided a constant supply of subalterns to the army. After a further period of intensive training many of these young Etonians will exchange their "toppers" for tin helmets and their belts for "Sam Brownes"

STITCH IN TIME

The sewing machine took its place among the more dangerous instruments of war, and balloon factories were filled with women war-workers, employed on the responsible task of stitching balloon fabrics. On their stitches may depend the lives of the observers

Photopress

Magellan. The Falklands are the southernmost outpost of the Empire, and its wireless station forms an important link. Its destruction would make it easier for the German admiral to prey upon British shipping, while the coal would enable him to replenish his colliers and extend their fighting range.

The meeting of the British and German squadrons off the Falkland Islands was long attributed to the foresight of the Admiralty officials, especially the first sea lord, Lord Fisher, but in 1934 evidence was produced showing that this was not quite the case. It seems that German code books were found on a German steamer at Melbourne, and by their aid many German wireless messages were intercepted and decoded. One of these contained instructions to the German ships to make for the Falklands and as soon as it reached the Admiralty in London the British battle cruisers were sent to meet them. The statement was also made that, by the aid of the code, the British Admiralty sent out a counterfeit message to the German battle cruisers, but, if the earlier statement is correct, this was unnecessary.

Early in December the German squadron rounded Cape Horn, and on the morning of Tuesday, December 8, the hills of the Falklands were sighted on the skyline. Admiral von Spee detached two cruisers, the Gneisenau and the Nürnberg, to explore the islands and discover if any British warships were sheltering there. The cruisers steamed towards Port William and Port Stanley, in the great landlocked bay on East Island, and discerned only the Canopus on guard, with a cruiser—the Kent—coming out.

Photo: Imperial War Museum

WALKING WOUNDED

The less severe casualties, known as "walking wounded," made their own way back to the dressing stations from the front line first-aid posts. The exhaustion of battle affects these men more severely at the moment than their wounds

The two ships were seen by the Canopus and their presence was signalled to the other vessels in the harbour, which at once prepared feverishly to put to sea. It was then 7.50 in the morning and a little later, at a range of 11,000 yards, the battleship opened fire and hit the funnel of the Gneisenau. Unperturbed, however, the German battlecruiser and her consort came steadily on until her captain, to his intense surprise, caught sight of masts which told him that inside the harbour were vessels more powerful than any he had expected to meet. Realizing that it was a sentence of death he turned about to rejoin the rest of the squadron, which was some 12 miles behind.

At 10 a.m., having sent out the Glasgow and the Kent to follow the retiring enemy, the two battle cruisers, Inflexible and Invincible, with the Cornwall and Carnarvon in attendance, put to sea. Not being ready, the Bristol was left behind. Once out of the harbour and through the minefield, the order "general chase" was signalled from the flagship and the four vessels went ahead at full speed. In a short time, however, it was seen that the light cruisers could not keep up with the larger ones and the speed of the squadron was reduced to 20 knots. Meanwhile, the Bristol came out and with the armed merchantman Macedonia was ordered to attack three strange vessels that seemed to be carrying German reservists or perhaps coal.

At 11.30 a.m. Sir F. Sturdee ordered his men to take a meal and this over he prepared for decisive action. Leaving the light cruisers behind, the battle cruisers increased their speed to 25 knots and rapidly overhauled the enemy. At 12.51 fire was opened upon the Leipzig, the last of the German ships. Seeing how impossible it was to escape, Admiral von Spee decided to fight, and ordering his three light cruisers to make for a South American port he turned the two larger ships to face the oncoming foe.

The main action began at 1.20 p.m. with the Invincible engaging the

SAY IT WITH FLOWERS

A crowd has gathered in the approach to Charing Cross Station to pay their floral tribute to the returning wounded as they are borne to hospital; and the old flower girls from whom the flowers are bought are the first to make their offering

Photopress

MACEDONIAN PICNIC

The British Expeditionary force that arrived at Salonika in October, 1915 found itself faced with the exceptionally difficult task of conducting operations in the neighbouring mountains of Macedonia. Men and beasts are equally glad of this temporary rest

Mondiale

Gneisenau and the Inflexible the Scharnhorst. At first the range was 14,000 yards, and when it had been reduced to 13,000 the Inflexible was hit. The opposing ships were steaming parallel to each other, the British vessels keeping the parallel wide apart and veering away when the enemy tried to reduce the distance. Sir Frederick Sturdee aimed at using his superior speed and gunfire against Count von Spee as the latter had used his similar advantages against Sir Christopher Cradock. The range was only 13,500 yards at 1.30 p.m., but in half an hour it increased once more to 16,450 yards. The Germans tried one manoeuvre. A wind was getting up, and they steered their ships so as to get their line of fire clear, while the smoke was blown in the way of the British gunners. Sturdee wheeled his flagship and consort round, and at a little loss of time came up on the other side of the enemy. The firing of the two British ships was hampered, not only by the smoke clouds sent up by the enemy, but by those of each other. Nevertheless, their more powerful guns succeeded in hitting the enemy ships, and at 3.10 the Gneisenau had taken a list and at 3.15 the Scharnhorst was on fire.



Chart illustrating the course of the opposing squadrons in the battle of the Falkland Islands. Inset the islands showing their relation to the mainland of South America

About this time Sir Frederick Sturdee signalled Count von Spee, asking him if he would surrender, but there was no answer. At 4.17 p.m., after a running fight of three hours, the Scharnhorst went down by the stern, with the admiral's flag at the maintruck and the crew in the bows. The Invincible went at once to the help of the Inflexible, and the 12-in. guns of the two battle cruisers were thus massed against the Gneisenau, which was also now attacked by the Carnarvon. The weather had now become thickish with a rainy mist, and a quick result was needed. The Gneisenau fought on gallantly in a hopeless condition till she was battered into a wreck. It took two hours, however, to sink her, and it was not until 6 o'clock that she suddenly listed to port and went down. It was afterwards learned that

when there was no longer any hope of escape the sea cocks of the warship had been opened and all hands ordered on deck.

The British ships Inflexible, Invincible and Carnarvon went full-speed towards the patch of discoloured water marking where the enemy had disappeared. On coming up close the crews saw the floating wreckage with men clinging to it. The boats were lowered as quickly as possible and, with the searchlights blazing round, they picked up the swimmers. Sailors were also lowered down their ships' sides on bowlines to haul up the survivors as they drifted past. Of the 115 men picked up by the Invincible, 14 were already dead and all were numb. The Inflexible saved about 70 and the Carnarvon a few more, although the ship was hit about twenty times. The British casualties were very slight. In the Invincible, only the commander was slightly wounded. In the Inflexible one man was killed and three wounded. The Germans lost the whole crew of the Gneisenau, and about 600 officers and men of the Scharnhorst.

Photo: Mondiale

SHOULDER TO SHOULDER

In the trenches near Salonika the British troops stand next to their gallant Serbian Allies. A Serbian is helping a British comrade with a morning shave. Men of the two nations can be told apart by the difference in their headgear

When Admiral von Spee broke his line of battle, the Kent, Cornwall and Glasgow pursued the Dresden, Nürnberg and Leipzig. The duel between the Kent and the Nürnberg was long and exciting, for the German ship had at least one knot more speed than the older and more heavily armed British cruiser. The chase began at noon, and the action did not open until five o'clock in the afternoon. Captain Allen, of the Kent, appealed to his engineers and stokers, asking them to achieve the apparently impossible. But their 6-in. guns could not come into play unless the slower Kent overhauled the lighter ship. By forcing her fires with everything inflammable, they actually made the Kent for a time go a knot faster than she had ever done in the days of her prime.

In five hours the Nürnberg came within reach of the Kent's 6-in. guns. A few salvos of common shell set her on fire, and then the lyddite shells began to fall thick and fast on her. In broad daylight the Kent, having guns of a longer range, would have been able to sink the Nürnberg without herself being struck, for the Nürnberg had only 4·1-in. guns. But when the action opened darkness was setting in, and to get a quick finish the Kent closed with her opponent, shooting at the gun flashes showing through the rain, mist and obscurity. The result was that the British ship was hit in 21 places. One shot set a casemate on fire, and the flames went down into an ammunition passage where there was a heap of charges. But a Marine rushed through the flames, flung out a charge of cordite and, turning a hose on, put out the fire. If he had not at once flooded the charges the Kent would have been blown up.

SECOND OF RECOIL

This photograph shows a British 18 pounder near Salonika at the moment of firing. The force with which he has pulled the lanyard which causes the detonation throws the firer forward. The team keeps contact with the observer by field telephone

The Nürnberg ceased firing at about half-past six. Flames were bursting out in the region of her conning-tower, but as the Kent came up quite close, thinking the action was over and preparing to send a boat, it was seen that the German flag was still flying. A salvo from the Kent's starboard guns very quickly brought it down. The whole of the conning tower and forebridge was flaming, with a strong wind fanning the roaring fire. Many of the crew jumped and swam towards the British ship, and at 27 minutes past seven the fiery wreck turned over and sank. The boats that remained on the Kent were badly holed and splintered, and by the time they were patched and got into the water most of the Germans had become numbed and

NIGHTLIGHTS OF BATTLE

Illuminating flares, first seen by the British troops in the Great War after the battle of Mons, were far more extensively used by the Germans than by the Allies. The war-scarred landscape of Champagne is here seen weirdly lit up in apprehension of a night raid

unconscious. To add to the horror, a flock of albatrosses swooped down and attacked the men clinging to the wreckage. Only 12 men were picked up, and of these five died from exhaustion.

At Coronel the light cruiser Glasgow was seriously damaged by the Leipzig. At the battle off the Falklands she singled out this ship, and so worked her superior armament that at the end of a two hours' running fight she had given her rival the death-blow; then the slower Cornwall came up and joined in. The two ships raked the Leipzig fore and aft, till the upper deck was a shambles. After she had burst into flame and stopped firing, the two British ships steamed round her and poured in a destructive fire. Then, at 9.23 at night, the stricken ship gave three slight heaves to port and turned completely upside down, sinking with a hiss of steam. Only five officers and 13 men were picked up out of the 368 men who had begun the action. Thus, of the German warships engaged, the Dresden alone escaped.

While the main action was being fought the Bristol had taken and sunk two German colliers, the Baden and the Santa Isabel, but a third escaped. Although the captured ships contained coal and other stores, the Bristol's captain considered that his orders made it necessary for him to sink them. Having, therefore, taken the crews aboard his own ship, he did so.

With the battle cruisers recalled to home waters, the search for the Dresden was left to the smaller ships. On Dec. 13 it was learned that the German cruiser was at Punta Arenas where, in violation of international law, she obtained coal from the Chilean authorities. She got away from there, however, and eluded her pursuers completely until March, when she was chased by the Kent, but the pursuit failed for lack of coal in the latter's bunkers.

Information came to hand that the Dresden was at Mas a Tierra, one of the Juan Fernandez group, and thither the Kent and the Glasgow with the armed liner Orama, hastened. On March 14 they found the foe and their guns began to batter her. The German captain at once sent out a flag of truce and his envoy stated that the Dresden was interned; but Captain Luce, in command of the Glasgow, replied that he could discuss nothing but unconditional surrender. The German captain then ordered the Dresden to be abandoned and blown up. This was done, twenty men being killed during the operation.

The issue of the battle of the Falkland Islands was satisfactory and its results, the seas practically cleared of German warships, were of tremendous value to the cause of the Allies. Yet some of its lessons aroused, or should have aroused, anxiety in the minds of the authorities in London. The shooting of the British ships was clearly far from accurate, for it took an hour and a half for the two battle cruisers to sink the Gneisenau, even after she had been seriously crippled in the earlier stages of the action. But the fault was not perhaps entirely due to defective shooting, for the British shells were evidently much inferior in armour-piercing power to the German ones. They burst practically on impact, instead of piercing the armour and then bursting. In so doing they inflicted considerable casualties on the opposing personnel, but at the expense of their main object, that of sinking the enemy ship.

Photo: G.P.A.

PILLAR OF SMOK

The smoke rocket was used by the Germans to give warning to their artillery of an impending attack. There is a poignant contrast between the gaiety usually associated with fireworks and the grim purpose to which they were put in wartime

CHAPTER 30

FRANCE'S WINTER BATTLE

During the winter of 1915 both the French and the Germans made attacks on the line that now stretched from the North Sea to Switzerland. The main French attack was delivered near Reims in the Champagne country

AT the beginning of 1915 it seemed evident to the French command that General von Falkenhayn had no large reserves on the Western front, for he had been obliged to refuse any further consignments of first-line troops to Hindenburg in the east. The German staff hesitated between two plans. Falkenhayn believed that a decision ought to be reached on the Western front. Hindenburg, his reputation enhanced by his victory at Tannenberg, was convinced, on the contrary, that the quickest way to end the War was to beat Russia to her knees, a clash more fully discussed in the succeeding chapter.

Owing to the German commitments on the Russian front, the number of divisions available in the west was 98 in January, 1915, as opposed to 106 during the previous November, and the Kaiser, aware that the situation was serious, hurried to Laon, the headquarters of General von Heeringen, to hold a council of war. The force holding the heights of the Aisne, a natural fortress, had been depleted to send troops urgently needed to the north and south, and the defence relied almost entirely upon their superiority in artillery power to ward off any attack. But now the French army lying east of Soissons (which had replaced the British force transferred to Ypres), supplied with a new armament of heavy howitzers, menaced the heights where the Germans had established their line in a semicircle of dominant points: the Mont de Pasly, the Mont de Cuffies, Hill 132, north-west of Crouy and the plateau of Vregny.

Photo: Antony D'ypres

PRISONERS EARN THEIR KEEP

After an action in which prisoners were taken they were disarmed and pressed into service as stretcher bearers to their captors. These Germans are taking a wounded Belgian soldier back to the casualty clearing station

On January 7, 1915, General Berthelot launched an attack across the Aisne with Hill 132 as his objective. After a violent bombardment, which inflicted severe losses upon the Germans, the French 45th division assaulted the heights against which the British 3rd army corps had failed the previous September. They managed to gain a footing on the hills and took four lines of trenches in succession. On January 9, 10 and 11 the fighting was furious, and by the morning of January 12 the increasing force of the counter-attacks showed plainly that General von Kluck was receiving reinforcements. At 11 a.m. a powerful German assault was launched against the French position east of Hill 132, and by 1 p.m. the struggle was general from that point to Missy, five miles farther east. The French were thrown back from the position they had won on the slopes of the hill, on to a line from Crouy to Montagne-Neuve farm. Reinforcements were hastily dispatched to the aid of General Berthelot.

At 7 p.m. on January 12, General Berthelot acquainted General Faëz, commanding the 14th division, with his decision to attack the next morning. "Your division must assault vigorously, as if in open country, taking no notice of trenches and barbed-wire entanglements, which must have been flattened out by our artillery. It must overthrow everything in its path."

That Berthelot was not over-confident that this programme would be carried out is shown by an operations order he issued that evening, which ran:

i.—In order to constitute a solid bridgehead on the right bank of the Aisne, should our troops be forced to abandon Hill 132, the 14th division should immediately push forward a battalion to Saint-Paul and one to the Distillery to occupy the line of withdrawal prepared on that bank.

ii.—Troops of the 55th division will hold solidly on to the positions they still occupy at Crouy, 138 and on the Terny road.

Troops obliged to fall back will be immediately withdrawn to the left bank of the Aisne and assembled around Belleu.

On the night of January 12 the French front line north of Soissons ran through Vauxrot, the middle of Crouy, the southern slopes of Hill 132, Montagne-Neuve farm and across the plateau south of Vregny. A night attack, begun at 2 a.m. on January 13, made a slight advance east of the Terny–Soissons road, but otherwise the result was negligible, and at 6 a.m. Berthelot ordered the offensive to stop.

Nevertheless, under instructions from General Maunoury, the attack was reopened at 3 o'clock the same afternoon, and appeared to be progressing favourably when suddenly the right wing of the division found itself in danger. On the previous evening the river Aisne, swollen as the result of a thaw, had swept away the bridges thrown across it at Venizel and at Missy, the only ones linking the two banks east of Soissons. Thus the French right now found itself in a predicament, unable to receive aid

Photo. G.P.A.

DEATH'S ROLL CALL

The familiar war-time communiqué "All quiet on the Western Front," might be applied with a different and more terrible meaning to this field in Artois. The scene of dead bodies laid out awaiting burial could easily be paralleled on any sector of the Western Front

HACKING THROUGH

Though battered by a preliminary bombardment, these German barbed wire defences still provide a most formidable obstacle to this French advance. They were constructed often to a depth of 100 yards or more, and made a surprise attack almost impossible

against the growing strength of the counter-attacks, and unable to retire over the river. The enemy, perceiving the situation, was not slow to profit by it, and instead of attacking in the direction of Montagne–Neuve farm, as was expected, concentrated on driving the French troops off the plateau of Vregny down to the river-bank, where their retreat was cut off. After fighting with the utmost bravery to hold the enemy in check while a bridge was reconstructed, the French troops were finally forced to retire, taking up a position in the curve of the Aisne, covering Soissons. In this action, in addition to their killed and wounded, the French lost 5,000 men, captured 35 guns, a quantity of machine-guns and much material and munitions. On January 21 Berthelot was replaced by General de Grandmaison.

At the beginning of January, 1915, the French 4th army, under General de Langle de Cary, held the sector in Champagne running from the Marquises farm on the old Roman road north of Prunay as far as a point between Boureuilles and La Chalade in the Argonne. In the centre of this section, where the heaviest fighting took place, the French line ran through the town of Souain, south of Perthes, and south of the farm of Beauséjour, situated on the road between Le Mesnil and Massiges.

The vast plateau of Champagne, measuring some 35 miles from west to east and about 45 miles from north to south, consists mainly of a chalk subsoil covered with calcareous sand, forming one of the most arid stretches of the department of the Marne. Hardly ever water-logged, even in unfavourable weather, it was at all times suitable for the movement of troops. For this reason the high command considered the region eminently favourable for winter operations.

During the month of January, 1915, small advances were made at various points, and throughout the month there was a monotonous repetition of attacks and counter-attacks on the sector Perthes–Beauséjour farm. Some territory was won north of Beauséjour and in the direction of Massiges, but blinding rain and continual mist hindered the artillery to such an extent that progress became slow and difficult. This situation did not satisfy General de Langle de Cary, who wished to see a rapid development of the offensive, but lack of material prevented an immediate major attack.

In spite of various small gains, the results of the French offensives since the end of 1914 were far from commensurate with the efforts expended, and, like de Langle de Cary, General Joffre was most anxious to secure a large success, "partly to hasten to a decision Italy and Rumania, partly to placate public opinion and the French Chambers." Moreover, the Germans had just won the winter battle of the Masurian lakes, and in view of Hindenburg's success the French high command considered it necessary to begin operations to pin the enemy troops to the Western Front on an impressively large scale in order to give the Russians a sufficient breathing space for recuperation.

During the second week of February, General Joffre concentrated a French army of 250,000 men near Perthes, in the Champagne sector. Feigning a decisive attack against the weakest part of the German line, at St. Mihiel, he compelled the Germans to bring up reinforcements, until, to cope with the pressure exercised by the French commander, General de Langle de Cary, they had massed 220,000 troops round Perthes. The engaged front extended from the village of Souain to Ville-sur-Toube, in the Argonne.

On February 16, 1915, at 10 o'clock in the morning, the grand attack by the French 4th army was launched. An artillery bombardment on a hitherto unprecedented scale was the prelude to a vigorous assault by the infantry. But in spite of the vast volume of the French fire, in spite of the magnificent bravery of the French soldier, so strong was the German position on the ridge north of Beauséjour, and so indecisive the French command, that although the French succeeded in gaining a footing at several points in the enemy line, it was soon apparent that the prospect of a general break-through was as far removed as ever.

Instead of using the 4th corps as an entity, General de Langle de Cary, acting against the advice of General Boelle, insisted upon splitting it up and using it in driblets as an adjunct to the 17th corps, with the result that certain



The Champagne district, famous for its vineyards, was, during the War, the scene of repeated attempts to break through the German lines. In the sectors around Perthes and Soissons (insets) very heavy fighting occurred during the spring and autumn of 1915

INHUMANE KILLER

British preparations for the great battle of the Somme included a far greater concentration of heavy artillery than at any previous period of the War. The first attack on July 1, 1916, was preluded by the heaviest bombardment yet attempted by British batteries which included 12- and 15- inch guns

'WEARY FROM THE TOILS OF WAR'

Battalions of nearly all the English county regiments were engaged in the battle of the Somme. In this photograph men of the Warwickshire regiment have 'fallen out' during a long day's march in summer heat. Their attitudes tell clearly of their exhaustion

HOT WORK

Field guns formed the first line of artillery support for the infantry and their mobility enabled them to move up quickly behind advancing troops. The rapidity with which this 18-pounder gun can be fired may be seen from the pile of empty shell-cases.

REST AFTER BATTLE

The tide of battle has swept on ahead of these weary British troops, who, replaced by fresher comrades, are now resting in the dug-outs of what had once been the front-line trench near Bazentin-le-Petit, a village on the Somme front

officers of the latter corps found themselves in charge of troops to whom they were absolute strangers. The 4th corps did not even know anything of the lie of the land on the sector in which they had to fight. At the end of the day the French had won about two miles of German front line trenches, and the 43rd division had penetrated into the enemy stronghold at Beauséjour. Unfortunately, during the night they were forced out with heavy losses by a strong German counter-attack

The following day the 60th division gained a footing in the enemy trenches on the southern edge of Bois Sabot, whilst the 34th division took possession of Rectangular Wood, and advanced towards the Bois des Trois Sapins. By the evening of February 18 the front line of the 18th corps lay north of the Souain–Perthes road, across the top of Rectangular Wood and along the southern edge of the Bois des Trois Sapins.

In spite of the limited advance that had been made, the offensive was renewed on the morning of February 19 with attacks upon Hill 196, north of Le Mesnil, the Bois Jaune Brûlé, the southern Mamelle, and Trou Bricot. A division of the 1st corps was successful in entering the eastern portion of the Bois Allongé, south-east of Hill 196, and captured several trenches on the east and west sides of the Bois des Trois Coupures, whilst small advances were made at other points of the line. On February 21 the French finally captured Wood 3, as well as part of the Grande Poche.

On February 22 the 1st corps, reinforced by the 3rd division, received orders to continue the offensive and to break completely the enemy's front line. The hopes of those in command were not realized, and two attacks upon Wood 4 were repulsed. On the 23rd a further effort was made to capture the German stronghold at Beauséjour. Here the enemy had constructed a veritable fortress. It consisted of a series of trenches echelonned in depth, situated on a saddle of land between two ravines. The approach to the saddle from the German side was a network of communicating trenches, well protected, which served as an assembly point. Preceded by a heavy bombardment, a battalion of the 22nd colonial division made a rapid assault upon the fort and took it by storm. But the following night the last of seven counter-attacks by the enemy succeeded in dislodging them.

By this time the French troops were beginning to feel the effect of the prolonged struggle, their morale affected by the constant succession of fruitless attacks in which the advance could be counted in yards and the dead in hundreds. Nevertheless, on February 24 the 4th Army received orders to make an ensemble attack upon the German positions, but again the hoped-for results were not forthcoming, the assault failing all along the line.

On February 25 General Deligny, whose relations with General de Langle de Cary were not altogether harmonious, was relieved of the command of the 1st corps, ostensibly on the grounds of ill-health. General Gérard, in charge of the 2nd corps, was called upon to lead both 1st and 2nd corps, with orders to concentrate his attacks upon the north and south Mamelles on his left and the stronghold of Beauséjour on his right. During the night of February 25–26 two companies gained a footing on the south Mamelle. On February 27 two colonial battalions made a further attempt upon Beauséjour fort, and, in spite of severe losses, managed to reach the second line of trenches; and though the battle raged throughout the night, though repeated counter-attacks threatened to drive them back, they held firm and consolidated their position. Beauséjour was won. The following day the 1st corps advanced past Hill 196 and entrenched themselves strongly round the little town which is 32 miles from Reims.

By the end of February, 1915, after a fortnight's continuous battle, the French advance was barely noticeable on the map. Ten days had been spent

COMMANDER OF THE GRAND FLEET

It is still debated whether Admiral Jellicoe made the most of his opportunities at the battle of Jutland. It is not, however, denied that his tactics as commander-in-chief of the Grand Fleet until December, 1916, enabled Britain to maintain control of the seas

Mondiale

DESTROYERS ON DUTY

This photograph shows part of the German fleet proceeding towards the English coast with the intention of bombarding Sunderland before unexpectedly meeting Beatty's battle cruiser squadron at Jutland. The destroyers act as a protective screen

GALLANT FINALE

In the running fight which preceded the arrival of the main body of the Grand Fleet at Jutland, the battle cruiser Invincible was engaged by the Derfflinger and the König, ships of superior equipment and gun power, and blew up, all but six of her crew perishing

Photo: Imperial War Museum

in taking the two small woods, 3 and 4, and over a week was spent in reducing the small German redoubt west of Perthes, and then only at the cost of hundreds of lives. Nevertheless, still optimistic about the result, the French command continued its offensive on the same sector.

On March 1, 1915, the Germans launched a series of attacks in the neighbourhood of Prunay, but without success. Two days later the French made further slight progress to the north of Souain, Le Mesnil and Beauséjour, and the official communiqué announced that since the beginning of the Champagne offensive the French gains represented an advance to a depth of a thousand yards on a frontage of nearly four miles.

March 4 was spent in consolidating the positions won to the north-west of Perthes and Le Mesnil, and the following day the offensive was renewed by the 1st and 17th corps. The former took several trenches in the ravines north-west of Beauséjour, and the latter about three hundred yards of trenches in the neighbourhood of Bois Carré. The assault on March 7 was directed against the Bois Sabot, the south-eastern edge of a long strip of wooded land lying between Perthes and Souain.

Two battalions of the 64th brigade, attacking from different points, entered the wood on a half-mile front. One attack was repulsed with heavy losses by machine-gun fire; the other was more successful. It captured the first and second lines of German trenches, and took up a position on the northern edge of the wood, from which repeated counter-attacks failed to dislodge it. March 8, 9 and 10 saw the continuation of the interminable offensive, with resulting gains that could only be measured in yards.

BRITAIN'S FIGHTING ADMIRAL

By November, 1918, when he received the surrender of the German High Seas Fleet at Rosyth, Sir David Beatty had had a greater experience of sea warfare than any other admiral on either side. He became commander-in-chief in November, 1916

On March 10 the German high command issued a statement, the gist of which was that the French offensive was virtually at an end, seeing that their troops could make no further progress. On March 12 the French general headquarters issued a notice to the troops headed "Victory is certain," assuring the *poilus* that the German guns were worn out, that many of their shells failed to explode, and that the new German recruits had only one rifle between three men.

In a further effort to save its face, the French high command published on March 12 a memorandum on "The aim and achievements of our operations in Champagne," in which it was stated that the offensive had completely attained its objective, both local and general; that progress had been made on a five-mile front to a depth of from one-and-a-half to two miles; that the enemy losses had been very severe, and that, on the contrary, the French losses had been comparatively few. No mention was made, however, of the complete failure of the French attempt to break through the German line and seize the enemy lines of communication, and though it was true enough that the French line could now show some advance in that smaller sector, Souain–Beauséjour, its value was out of all proportion to the number of troops sacrificed. Nevertheless orders were given for a continuation of the offensive.

The Germans still held a fortified position on the northern edge of the Bois Sabot, and further attempts on March 12 and 13 failed to dislodge them. A fresh attack was launched at dawn on March 15, which was at first partially successful, until the Germans retired into a block-house from which they harassed the French with machine-gun fire. At half-past four in the afternoon another attack took place, and this time the French were determined at all costs to capture the block-house. When darkness fell the French troops, closing round their objective, heedless of the bullets, attacked the masonry with pick and spade. By two o'clock in the morning a breach had been made, the soldiers rushed in, and the stronghold was won. With the capture of the German block-house, the French were definitely in possession of the Bois Sabot.

The offensive was directed the following day, March 16, by the 16th and

Photo: Cribb, Southsea

BEFORE THE FATAL VOYAGE

Lord Kitchener is here leaving a destroyer before boarding H.M.S. Iron Duke to say what proved a final farewell to Admiral Jellicoe. Immediately afterwards he left for Russia on the Hampshire, which struck a mine and sank, Kitchener being drowned, June 5, 1916

17th corps, and succeeded in capturing rising ground on a half-mile front in the vicinity of Hill 196, but no progress was made elsewhere. Further advance of the French forces having been checked by the skilfully organized defences in the Bois Jaune Brûlé, to the west of Hill 196, a strong attempt was made to carry this position on March 18.

The wood, covering an area under a quarter of a square mile, was a warren of trenches honeycombed with dug-outs and machine-gun posts, cunningly concealed from observation. Previous attacks from the southern slopes having failed, it was now decided to assault the eastern edge. A surprise attack with bombs on March 16 was successful in winning for the French an advanced trench some 300 yards long, and this was made the jumping-off position for the general attack two days later.

After fighting all day, the French bombed their way through the enemy trenches and by nightfall had captured most of the wood. In spite of a strong counter-attack on March 19, they managed to retain and consolidate their positions, and with this success, at long last, the winter offensive in Champagne came to an end. Although the battle had raged furiously for a whole month, the French army had at no point seriously threatened the main German line of communication in that area—the railway running from Grand Pré to Bazancourt.

The partial successes made on the right wing by the 1st and 2nd corps, such as the capture of Bois Sabot and the stronghold at Beauséjour, were paid for in casualties far exceeding those warranted by the slight advance made. The extent of the French losses —69,000 killed or taken prisoners, and 164,000 wounded—coupled with the insignificance of the total advance made, led to heated discussions in the Chamber and orders were issued to stop the offensive on March 19.

The relative failure of this winter battle in Champagne was largely due to lack of adequate preparation. According to the French deputy, M Abel Ferry, "behind the firing-line nothing had been organized for the last six months." Lines of communication were insufficient, the state of the roads was lamentable, and the insufficiency of communication trenches made the transport of the wounded, as well as the bringing up of supplies and reinforcements, a slow and difficult business, while the German shells played havoc in the congested areas. The only railway-line in proximity to the field of operations was the local line from Châlons to Verdun through Saint-Hilaire.

Incredible as it may seem, in spite of the importance of this month-long battle in the eyes of the French high command, the commander-in-chief of the French forces did not consider it necessary to move his G.H.Q. from Chantilly, a hundred miles away, to a spot nearer the zone of operations.

The only satisfactory result of the Champagne battles was the fact that General von Einem, the German commander, had been compelled to call upon reserves which otherwise would have gone either to the Russian front or to Flanders. Moreover, as the Crown Prince had been obliged to send one of his army corps to the assistance of Einem, the German attack in the Argonne necessarily diminished in intensity. Thus, although the optimistic plans of the French general staff failed miserably to attain the ambitious objectives for which they were originally intended, the winter battle in Champagne played its part in the war of attrition. How large that part might have been had the execution of those plans been better conceived can only be conjectured.

COST OF DECEPTION

British "Q" ships, disguised as dilapidated tramp vessels, and with guns carefully concealed, wreaked considerable havoc among enemy submarines. When their true purpose was revealed, as in this photograph, no quarter was given to them

Photo: Imperial War Museum

TIGER AT JUTLAND

Next in the line to the Queen Mary when the latter sank in Beatty's opening battle-cruiser action, the Tiger, though hit four times, survived. She was one of the largest ships in the British navy, her tonnage being 28,000

MAJOR DISASTER

Struck simultaneously by salvoes from the Seydlitz and Derfflinger, the Queen Mary blew up and sank within 30 seconds. The battle-cruiser action at Jutland proved the superior accuracy of the German gunners, and the greater resistance of the German armour-plating

Mondiale

DAMAGED BUT DEFIANT

The Seydlitz, a battle cruiser of 25,000 tons, was one of the most heavily damaged of the German ships at Jutland. The manner in which her crew fought the flames and returned the British fire typifies the gallantry shown by both sides in the battle

Photos: Imperial War Museum

SAVED BY HER ARMOUR

The survival of the Seydlitz at Jutland was proof of the amazing power of resistance possessed by the armour-plating of the German battleships. Surrendered to the British under the terms of the armistice, she was sunk by her own crew at Scapa Flow in June, 1919

CHAPTER 31

RUSSIA'S WINTER BATTLE

While the French were fighting in Champagne the Russians and Germans were engaged in what Ludendorff called "the winter battle in Masuria." This ended in a defeat for the Russians, although they managed to avoid a second Tannenberg

THE opening days of January, 1915, found Russia and the Central Powers, after a short breathing space, busy with their plans of campaign and preparations to take the field. Grave difficulties were revealed at this time at the meetings of the German staff officers. Two schools of thought, henceforth so bitterly at variance, ranged themselves under their eastern or western banners according to which front they looked for a final decision. The most confirmed westerner was General von Falkenhayn. Hindenburg and Ludendorff, it is hardly surprising to learn, were easterners. The spell of Tannenberg was still strong upon them.

Complaining of stalemate in the west, these two generals were anxious to beat Russia to her knees, to help Austria to her feet and, with the co-operation of Turkey, to make a sweep through the Balkans. Such a move would, so they believed, have a decisive effect on neutral opinion, turning it in favour of Germany, and to bring it about they asked for four army corps from the Western front. Conrad von Hötzendorff, the Austrian commander, was a hearty supporter of this programme. To display his talents as a tactician he must have a strong and efficient army, and he was only too pleased that his reinforcements should be German.

Falkenhayn refused. He strenuously denied the stalemate in the west and maintained that Russia was too large to be smashed. On the Eastern front only local successes could be won. A decision must be forced in the west and the war won on that front. The withdrawal of four army corps might have disastrous results and, in any case, would create a dangerous precedent. In those circumstances there was only one thing to be done, to refer the issue to the highest court. The kaiser must deliver judgement. After a few days his championship of the eastern adventure became known, and the four army corps went east. Hindenburg, Ludendorff and Hötzendorff had triumphed.



East Prussia and the adjoining portions of Russia and Poland, over which the Germans and the Russians fought in the winter of 1914–15

In the early days of 1915 the Allies still centred extravagant hopes upon Russia. The optimists even thought that with her powerful assistance they would win the war within that year. To these aspirations Russia responded with a gigantic plan. This included a strong offensive in the Carpathians, an advance in force between the river Niemen and the road between Gumbinnen and Insterburg in order to throw back the Germans upon the Vistula, and a break through between Mlawa and the Vistula as the prelude to an invasion of West Prussia. East Prussia was to be overrun and the German forces east of the Vistula to be annihilated.

The German scheme, however, was the one that decided the strategy of the campaign and the fighting is best viewed from that side. It may be briefly described as follows. All the German and Austrian armies on the Eastern front were to unite in an enveloping movement against the Russian armies. They were to operate on a front of about 370 miles; those in the north were to reach forward in two lines and destroy all the Russians that came within their grasp, whilst to the south the armies under the Austrian commander, Conrad von Hötzendorff, were to strike out in a like manner in the direction of Lemberg, which had been occupied by the Russians in the previous September.

Mr. Winston Churchill in "The World Crisis" uses an analogy that puts the plan into a nutshell. He says: "The Russian armies were to be seized, as it were, by a crab of monstrous size and gripped simultaneously with each of its two widely-spread claws." General von Falkenhayn strenuously opposed this plan, maintaining that two such widely separated flanking attacks could not be directed and co-ordinated with any success, and his objections, as we shall see, were only too well justified.

To form the northern nipper of the crab two armies were prepared in East Prussia, the 8th and the 10th, under Generals Otto von Below and Eichhorn respectively. The 10th army was composed of three of the four army corps that had come from the Western front, while the other one joined the 8th army. The plan was for the 10th army, having concentrated in front of Insterburg, to move through Gumbinnen and then in a south-easterly direction. To its south the 8th army was directed to march through Johannisburg to Lyck. In this way, while the front of the Russian force was held, the flanks would be surrounded and the victory

Canadian Records

DANGER STILL NEAR

This Canadian advanced dressing-station on the Somme front is the first link in the chain connecting the first-aid posts, just behind the trenches, to the hospital bases. Staffed by men of the Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps it is still well within range of the enemy's heavy guns

of Tannenberg would, it was hoped, be repeated. To protect the German flank, one corps, the 20th, was moved from the 9th army, which was in trenches about 40 miles from Warsaw. It marched to Ortelsburg, where it joined up with the 8th army.

In discussing this plan Ludendorff, in "My War Memories," says:

> Both our opponent's wings were weak. We could hope to gain a lot of ground before the enemy's main force could get away from our frontal attack. Both our thrusting wings were to surround the enemy line—the sooner the better; but if we succeeded in annihilating the enemy it might be possible, while guarding our flanks against any move from the Kovno-Grodno direction, to attack the Osowiec-Grodno line and take the Bobr crossing near Osowiec from the rear.

To these forces the Russians opposed only a single army, the 10th, which, commanded by Baron Sievers, consisted of four corps. It was strung out along the frontier from Pillkallen in the north to some distance beyond Lyck in the south, a distance of about 100 miles. It was astride the important railway line running to Kovno and had the forest of Augustów behind its centre. Still farther behind was the line of the river Niemen. To its south was the army of the Narew, but this was not very strong.

To mask their dispositions the German 9th army was ordered to make an attack on the Russian lines at Bolimów, about 35 m. S.W. of Warsaw. In the ensuing battle the Germans used "divisions of death," the precursors of the storm troops that figured so largely in the later battles on the Western front. There was fierce fighting for about a week, and, though the Germans claimed a strategical success, their divisions of death lost very heavily and made no real headway.

But Bolimów, lost in the Great War amidst a hundred battles, has a unique claim to remembrance. It was here that poison gas was first used in warfare. In "My War Memories" Ludendorff remarks in his curt military fashion that 18,000 rounds of gas shells were served out, but that the weather was too cold for an effective gas attack, adding that in the East they were never short of munitions. The German staff was naturally anxious to watch the effect of the gas shells. Lieutenant-Colonel Hoffmann, afterwards a military historian of the War, who observed the fire of the guns from a church steeple, sums up the results as disappointing. It appears that the officers looked upon the new weapon with coldness, as it kept the men in the trenches when they were due to go over the top.

While this fighting was proceeding the 8th and the 10th armies were making ready for the great attack which developed into what is known as the winter battle of Masuria. It opened in terrible weather; an exceptionally fierce snowstorm had been raging for some days and the roads and railways were completely hidden under a white blanket. In parts the snow drifts exceeded six feet in depth, whilst the severe cold made the clear ground hard and slippery. So cold was the weather that even the runners fixed to the transport were of no avail owing to the nature of the ground, and it was sometimes necessary to harness 10 or 12 horses to a gun or ammunition wagon. The weather, however, did not seriously interfere with the German scheme, and the advancing troops pushed their way

'Canadian Records'

THE ROAD BACK

The appalling conditions of winter warfare on the Western front are shown by mud and desolation seen in this photograph. The task of these Canadians in bearing their wounded comrade along a road that is little more than a quagmire is no easy one

KAMERAD!

The expressions of these German prisoners leaves little doubt as to the completeness of their submission. It takes only one Canadian soldier to shepherd this flock down the communication trench to the first "cage," a compound surrounded by barbed wire, which was usually established some distance behind the lines

'Canadian Records'

ALL HANDS TO THE GUN

The loading of this Canadian howitzer is shown in detail in this photograph. A shell has been fired and another is being placed in a clamp, on the gun's trail, ready to be swung into position in the opened breach

through the obstacles obstructing their progress.

The first move was made on February 7 by a section of the 8th army under the command of General von Litzmann. Pressing steadily forward he reached Johannisburg on the same day, and on the following day succeeded in capturing that town. Farther south his troops had made a successful crossing of the river Pisa, after which they pressed forward as far as Rajgród, where they met with opposition from the Russians and repulsed a strong attack from the direction of Osowiec. Meanwhile, the centre of this 8th army hotly pursued the Russian forces which were retreating in the direction of Lyck. Here a splendid defence was put up by the 3rd Siberian corps, and it was not until the morning of the 14th that the town eventually fell, the Siberian corps escaping annihilation by withdrawing through Augustów behind the marshes of the Bobr.

After Lyck's fall the German advance was speeded up, and by the night of the 16th General Litzmann entered Augustów after heavy fighting. Ludendorff now issued orders for the 8th army to push forward its right wing from Rajgród to the river Bobr, so as to bring it up on the flank of the retreating Siberian corps, but this was impossible owing to the state of the roads.

Success, too, attended the movements of the 10th army, which began to move on the 8th. Under its pressure the right of the Russian army, fearing envelopment, was forced to retreat, and by the night of the 10th, after some extraordinarily long marches, the centre of this German army had reached the road running from Insterburg to Kovno, had cut the railway line running to Kovno, and on the 14th its infantry columns were due north of the forest of Augustów. The retreating Russian army was vigorously attacked and forced southwards into the forest. Its leaders were apparently taken by surprise, and Ludendorff mentions that at this time his intelligence service did good work by spreading false rumours and preventing the enemy from obtaining information.

On the evening of the 11th, following the narrative of Ludendorff in his book "My War Memories," it seemed as though it would be possible to complete the circle round the enemy due east of Augustów, and General von Eichhorn diverted his left wing in that direction. On the 15th and 16th the advance guard of the 21st army corps, under General Fritz von Below, advanced far into the forest; but here they were overrun by Russian columns pouring back eastwards and part of the force was captured. Meanwhile, other sections of the German 10th army pushed on along the northern edge of the forest to the vicinity of Grodno, where they took up a position facing west, their rear being quite close to the fortifications, a bold movement which cut off the enemy's retreat. Other German troops penetrated the forest on the north and after the capture of Augustów reached the river Bobr, fighting all the way.

The position of the German troops before Grodno, however, was exceedingly hazardous. On the 20th and 21st violent attacks were made from the fortress where Russian reinforcements had gathered. The Russians also made repeated attacks from the forest of Augustów, into which they had poured in their retreat.

But the ring was not quite complete. A good part of the Russian army made

WASH AND BRUSH UP

This rain-filled shell crater is being used by Canadians for the purposes of shaving and removing trench mud. Later, however, this custom was strictly prohibited, mainly on the ground that diseases resulted from the poisons often found in the water

'Canadian Records'

Photo: G.P.A.

COMPULSORY PICKPOCKETS

Two British prisoners are forced to search German dead for valuables, while a German makes an inventory. The Germans made their prisoners do this so that they themselves should not be accused of pilfering from their dead comrades

good its escape, although not without heavy losses. One corps, the 20th, was caught and its units found themselves struggling against a great superiority of Germans, perhaps as many as six corps. In a different terrain they might have been annihilated in twenty-four hours, but the ground favoured them. It was a wilderness of lakes, swamps, and dense brushwood, above which rose the gaunt boughs of great forest trees. In this spot a force of Cossacks had destroyed a section of the former German army of invasion in the autumn of 1914. The commander of the 20th corps, General Bulgaroff, had the services of the Russian woodsmen, who had acted as guides in the former victory, and this gave him a notable advantage in the use of the difficult and intricate system of paths across the swamp lands. There were no dominating heights from which the enemy could bring to bear his overwhelming number of field-guns.

The 20th corps, however, was clearly doomed, but this fact did not disturb the Russian commander. To Bulgaroff had fallen the same task as that which the Russian commander of the two army corps at Kutno had carried out in the same circumstances of peril. He had to put up a fierce, stubborn, and long resistance until the victorious enemy could be checked by the arrival of stronger Russian forces. He had to fight for time, to enable the Russian commander-in-chief to alter his dispositions, and bring up an army to defend the Warsaw–Petrograd railway. In obedience to these orders Bulgaroff carried on, and as late as February 24 battalions of the 20th corps were cutting their way through the German ring and rejoining the main Russian forces. Detachments continued to fight their way out of the forest, after a struggle lasting three weeks. Most of the corps fought on until their ammunition was exhausted, and then surrendered.

Ludendorff states that in the winter battle the Germans captured 110,000 prisoners and many hundred guns, but this figure is probably an exaggeration. The losses fell mainly upon a single corps, the 20th, which could not possibly have consisted of more than 40,000 men in all and was more probably considerably below that figure. The total Russian losses in dead, wounded or prisoners may have been as high as 80,000 men. Similarly, Mr. Churchill's statement that the Russian army was 350,000 strong is very wide of the mark. The correct figure was certainly nearer 200,000. But, whatever the losses, the battle ended disastrously for the Russians, the 10th army being virtually destroyed.

It is not often that a soldier gives way to his emotions, but Hindenburg allowed them to master him when he wrote this passage :

> The name of the winter battle in Masuria charms like an icy wind or the silence of death. As men look back on the course of this battle they will only stand and ask themselves : Have earthly beings really done these things, or is it all but a fable or a phantom ? Are not these marches in the winter nights, that camp in the icy snowstorm, and that last phase of the battle in the forest of Augustów, so terrible for the enemy, but the creation of an inspired human fancy ?

About the beginning of March General von Eichhorn was directed to withdraw his right flank to a defensive line and his left to the north of the Augustów forest near Sejny. This was due to the fact that the Russians were strongly counter-attacking against the long German flanks on the southern frontier of East Prussia. It was Eichhorn's intention to fall once more on to the pursuing Russians and again defeat them by enveloping their right wing, but the German troops were tired and the idea of any further attacks was

Photo: Imperial War Museum

'HAPPY MARRIAGE'

Thus Hindenburg described his wartime association with Ludendorff. As chief of general staff and quartermaster general from August, 1916, they showed an ability to collaborate successfully almost unique amongst the generals on either side

abandoned. Moreover, it became necessary to withdraw troops from the 10th army to reinforce the 8th and 9th armies farther south. The 10th army therefore contented itself with consolidating its position south of Kalwarja, and although the Russians repeatedly assaulted this position they met with little success, and gradually a period of quiet descended upon this sector.

Meanwhile, 30 miles south on the river Bobr the German 8th army received a severe check. It had moved from Lyck to attack Osowiec, but the fortress put up a determined defence against continual bombardment and attacks. The Russian counter-attacks became gradually more and more severe, and from February 21 heavy fighting developed in the neighbourhood of the fortresses of Osowiec and Lomza. The German troops offered a stiff resistance, but the situation was grave. The Germans besieging Osowiec were in a precarious condition, until the arrival of reinforcements early in March eased the situation in this vicinity.

Meanwhile the German attack in the direction of the river Orzyc, a tributary of the Narew, was slowly progressing, but the Russians, on being reinforced, made repeated attacks from the direction of Nowogród. Here the Siberian corps, which had distinguished itself in the defence of Lyck, was again in the front. The severity of these Russian attacks necessitated further reinforcements for the Germans from the 10th army and even from the troops under the command of General von Gallwitz. This fighting dragged on into April, but when it came to an end the German armies were still on enemy soil.

Towards the end of February fighting began to develop to the west of the river Orzyc. Here General von Gallwitz, in command of the 9th army, after strengthening his front on the west of Mlawa, pushed forward up the Vistula and reached Plock. Meanwhile German reinforcements took up a position on Gallwitz's left between Neidenburg and Willenberg. The situation now augured well for an attack on Przasnysz. On February 22 Gallwitz attacked, and two days later General von Morgen, in command of the first reserve corps, made a determined onslaught on this fortified town, which, after a stubborn resistance, fell into their hands. Russian reinforcements, however, were quickly brought up, and on February 27 the German forces were obliged to withdraw to a line Janówo–Chorzele after suffering severe losses.

Until March 7 the Russians attacked vigorously on the ground between Chorzele and Mlawa, but the Germans stood firm and inflicted considerable losses upon their attackers. By this time their 10th army in the north had completed its withdrawal and consolidated its position. North of the Augustów forest it began to make counter-attacks. Near Lomza the Germans had the situation well in hand, but they were still hard pressed between the river Pisa and Mlawa. The commanders in the south were now constantly appealing to Eichhorn for reinforcements, as the Germans were not sufficiently powerful to counter the Russian thrusts. Gallwitz, therefore, had to content himself with purely defensive tactics until March 8, when, reinforcements having by this time arrived, he was in a position to make a further attempt for Przasnysz.

The advance, which began on the 8th and continued until the 12th, was halted north of the town by Russian counter-attacks. The Russians were considerably assisted by their knowledge of the land, and many of their attacks through the swamps took the enemy completely by surprise. By the end of March the fighting to the west of the Orzyc had died down, and the tired German armies were able to settle down along the whole southern front and enjoy the rest they so badly needed.

The southern claw of the German crab, to return to Mr Churchill's simile, composed chiefly of Austro-Hungarian troops supported by the German southern army under Linsingen had thrown itself against the successful Brusiloff, but the failure to break through was complete, and resulted in the fall of Przemysl. The operations, therefore, of these forces will be considered in conjunction with the capture of the fortress in a future chapter.

While the actions already described were taking place, fighting was in progress in the northern part of East Prussia, where the Russians north-west and north-east of Tilsit were still in possession of a small part of German territory. In order to wrest this little corner from the enemy, General von Pappritz, governor of Königsberg, was put in command of a small force consisting of artillery and Landsturm troops and instructed to drive the Russians across the border. Pressing forward to Taurogen, Pappritz captured that town on February 18, and for nearly a month the front north of the Pregel remained comparatively quiet. On March 17, however, a Russian force made an attack in the direction of Taurogen and Memel and, taking the Germans by surprise, captured these places.

Pressing on, the Russian army advanced in the direction of Tilsit, but fresh troops arrived to reinforce the German line and the tide of battle turned again. On March 21 Memel was retaken and once again in the hands of its rightful owners, and by the 29th Taurogen was likewise delivered. Consequently East Prussia was once more free, and during the rest of the War did not suffer from the encroachment of the enemy.

CHAPTER 32

THE DOGGER BANK

The fight on Jan. 24, 1915, between the British and German battle-cruisers and cruisers resulted in a defeat, although not an annihilating one, for the Germans. Their fleet did not again challenge the British until Jutland

RAIDS upon the British coast had now become one of the main factors of German strategy. They were in contemplation by airship, by aeroplane, by submarine, by mine-layer, by light cruiser, by battle-cruiser, but not by battleship. This was the kaiser's order. The battleships of the High Seas Fleet were to remain in harbour, secure behind the defences of the Heligoland Bight.

But this embargo upon the employment of battleships was not religiously observed. In the raid upon Scarborough and the Hartlepools on December 16, already described, Admiral Ingenohl supported the raid by taking his battleships out to the Dogger Bank "in the hope of meeting with an inferior force." This nearly happened, for he came within 50 miles of Admiral Beatty's battle-cruiser squadron. But, afraid of torpedo attack, the German admiral started on the return journey. Afterwards he bitterly declaimed against the "restrictions" which had lost him the grand opportunity of an action against a weaker British force.

These raids against "fortified" towns created a great deal of indignation in Britain. Strategically, however, they were perfectly sound, as they helped to keep up the invasion scare which remained the bogey of British strategy until nearly the end of the War. "This obstinate retention," writes Captain Frothingham, the American naval historian, "of a pre-war theory was not merely a delusion of the public, but it was a fixed idea of the British military and naval leaders . . . this dread of a German invasion of Great Britain remained a harmful influence upon British strategy until 1918." British authorities are also agreed upon this point. Lord Sydenham refers to the moral effect of the raids as being valuable to the Germans because it assisted the invasion-mongers. The shifting of Admiral Beatty's base from Cromarty down to Rosyth was intended to counter a potential invasion.

The Germans, undeterred by the small material results which they had gained by their attacks on Scarborough and the Hartlepools, planned another raid. The date fixed was January 23, 1915. On this date Vice-Admiral Hipper was ordered to reconnoitre off the Dogger Bank, and then to destroy any of the enemy's light forces to be met with. Unfortunately for him, the British Admiralty got wind of the raid. Mr. Winston Churchill, with one of those intimate touches that characterize his book "World Crisis," describes how Sir Arthur Wilson burst into his room at the Admiralty with the exultant cry: "First Lord, these fellows are coming out again!" Then and there the rendezvous on the Dogger Bank was worked out, and telegrams dispatched to Scapa Flow, Rosyth and Harwich—

MISFORTUNE OF WAR

When visible to the opposing artillery the Red Cross flag secured immunity from gun-fire. This custom was generally observed, but, as in this destruction of a German hospital wagon, shells sometimes struck Red Cross units behind the line in ignorance of their position

Photo: G.P.A.

HELL ON EARTH

German flammenwerfer were first used in 1915, and were for a time widely adopted. By means of a jet of oil, compressed through a length of metal tubing and ignited as it emerged, they spread a mass of flame and smoke over and in the Allied trenches, making them a veritable hell on earth.

Mondiale

ROAD UP!

This photograph of soldiers returning to their billets shows how danger is not confined to the front line. All tracks and roads leading back from the trenches were systematically shelled by the enemy, whose airmen provided the necessary information

the base of the destroyer flotillas under Commodore Tyrwhitt. The time fixed was 7 a.m. but chart and compasses showed that only Beatty from the Forth with his five battle-cruisers and Tyrwhitt from Harwich could intercept the raiders. The Grand Fleet was too far from the scene.

The battle-cruiser Von Der Tann being in dock under repair, Admiral Hipper could muster 3 battle-cruisers: Seydlitz (flag), Derfflinger, and Moltke, the armoured cruiser Blücher, 4 light cruisers, and two flotillas of destroyers.

In regard to tonnage the British and German battle-cruisers were nearly on an equality—the British average for her 5 ships being 23,000 tons; the German average for her four, slightly over 22,000. But the British armament for 3 of her cruisers included 13·5-in. guns; while the Derfflinger alone carried 12-in. guns, the Seydlitz and Moltke 11-in., and the Blücher 8·2-in. guns.

Great interest attaches to the Blücher. In 1906, when Lord Fisher was working out his plan for a fleet of all-big-gun ships, the German Admiralty heard a rumour of the creation of a British ship of a new type—the battle-cruiser. With much trouble and expense their intelligence department obtained a forecast of the plan of the Invincible. On this plan the design of the Blücher was carefully modelled, being given the same displacement (about 15,500 tons) as the British ship would possess. She was armed with what was thought to be an overpowering armament for a cruiser—twelve 8·2-in. guns—and engines were made to give her a speed of a little over 25 knots. But the German intelligence was entirely at fault. The first three battle-cruisers of the Invincible class (completed in 1908) were not cruisers in the old sense of the word, but racing battleships, with two knots more speed than the Blücher, a tonnage of 17,250 and—the grand surprise—eight 12-in. guns apiece.

With a big British force speeding eagerly to the attack, swift contact was inevitable. It was established at the break of dawn, January 24, 1915, between the British and the German light cruisers Aurora and Kolberg. They opened fired at each other and both scored hits. Admiral Scheer relates that the light cruisers Kolberg and Stralsund also sighted thick clouds of smoke. "The conclusion was thus to be drawn that other and more numerous forces were lying off the Dogger Bank." Nelson's practice of attacking a superior force being by this period quite out of date, Admiral Hipper assembled his ships on a south-easterly course and, directly the growing light revealed the number and type of the enemy forces, made off at full speed.

Action had started between the two squadrons under the most favourable conditions for effective gunnery. The ships of both squadrons were "end-on," and so made better targets than ships showing their broadsides. This is a curious paradox, well known to all fighting seamen, but scarcely understood by the general public. When a ship shows only her bow or stern, leaving merely the beam of 90 to 95 feet clear on the sky-line, she is a better mark then a ship that is broadside-on, and therefore shows her long grey side, 600 to 650 feet in length.

The explanation lies in the old problem of raising the gun to its right elevation. When a ship is fighting bows-on or stern-on the entire length of her deck comes under fire. A shell pitched at her bow, but falling short, will strike amidships or aft. In the same way, a shell pitched at her stern, and falling over the mark, will strike amidships or forward. In short, when a ship fights broadside-on, there is only the narrow breadth of her deck as a target. When, however, she fights a running action, showing her bow or stern, the entire length of her deck forms a receptacle for the enemy's shells.

For this reason a fighting admiral will not usually run away when he meets the foe, but will turn and engage in a sound, regular broadside action. In so doing he exposes his ships less to the

DEATH OR GLORY

German troops, with bayonets fixed, pour out of the support lines and across no man's land. The first wave of the attack has already gone forward from the front line trench, leaving its toll of dead and wounded behind it

enemy's fire than if he ran away. However, Admiral Hipper decided upon flight. The destroyers were in the van, while the Blücher and light cruisers fended off the British destroyers to the north. The action then developed into a stern chase on a parallel course, with the British on the starboard side.

Beatty's reply was for speed and yet more speed from his five battle-cruisers Lion (flag), Tiger, Princess Royal, New Zealand and Indomitable. Consequently the heroes of the next hours were the men of the engine-room. Nobly they responded to the great call made upon them. By 8.30 they were doing 26 knots. The call came for 27, and 27 it was. Then came the congratulating signal from the flagship: "Well steamed, Indomitable!" Her trial speed had been 25, but she was keeping up with the Lion at 27. The New Zealand, too, was beating her designed speed of 25. Shortly before 9 a.m. Beatty signalled for 29, which meant that two at least of his ships, New Zealand and Indomitable, must fall out of the chase. But the Lion in the van got within 20,000 yards of the enemy and tried a shot. It fell short; the next fell over. The signal to engage was then given.

Admiral Jellicoe, meanwhile, was speeding to the scene with his three battle squadrons, his cruiser squadrons and four flotillas of destroyers. The hope was to cut off the enemy in his retreat if he should turn northwards. But Jellicoe was 150 miles north-north-west of the opening exchanges of the fight.



Photopress

FOR SERVICES RENDERE

The kaiser is here seen bestowing upon his troops the famous decoration, the Iron Cross. The Order is divided into three classes, of which the Grand Cross takes precedence. Originally a Prussian decoration, it was instituted in 1813 and accompanied, in the case of the rank and file, by a sum of money

This great force under his command never got into action.

When Beatty had given the signal to engage the Lion directed fire on the Blücher and scored hits. A little later the Lion engaged the Derfflinger, leaving the Tiger and Princess Royal to deal with the Blücher, which was out-gunned from the start. Signal was then given to engage opposite numbers; but this signal was not correctly read, with the result that the Moltke remained for a time unattacked. The Seydlitz was then badly hit. The shot not only put her aft guns out of action, but the explosion wrecked both rear turrets.

"However regrettable was the great loss of life on board the Seydlitz," wrote Admiral Scheer, "through the fire spreading to the munition chamber of each turret, a valuable lesson had been learned for the future in dealing with reserve ammunition, and it was applied in subsequent actions."

In order not to obscure the position by smoke, Commodore Tyrwhitt's destroyers fell back from the van to a position on the port quarter. The consequence of this move was that they were unable to regain their position in the van owing to the tremendous speed of the battle-cruisers.

The damage wrought by the tremendous artillery duel now began to declare itself. The Seydlitz was blazing furiously, but she started to register hits upon the Lion. One of these shots pierced the flagship's armour, flooded the engineers' workshop, disabled the fire control and damaged her electric connexions. The wounded ship began to take on a list to port, but for a time her speed, reduced to 24 for firing purposes, was not affected. But further hits upon the Lion followed, and she became more and more crippled. On the German side the Blücher was practically

WATCHING THE EFFECT

A tunnel has been dug under No Man's Land, and a mine laid under the Allied trenches, connected by lengths of cable to a battery in the German trench. One German officer is detonating the mine while another watches eagerly for the explosion

Photo: G.P.A.

BALKAN CAVALCADE

After its gallant defence of its own country the Serbian army was transported to Corfu, where it was re-equipped by the French and Italians. It reappeared at Salonika, and Serbian cavalry are here seen massing to resist a Bulgarian attack at Boreshnitsa

WRACK AND RUIN

The chief house of the village of Gornichevo and the Bulgarian barbed wire defences have been battered by the guns of the Allies during their advance from Salonika. A French heavy gun team is passing through the village, which has been captured by Serbians

BRITISH ATTACK ON BULGARS

The Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry made their Balkan début in August, 1916, when in a hand-to-hand encounter they captured a Bulgarian strong point known as Horseshoe Hill on the Salonika front. They are seen advancing to attack

done for. At 10.48 she sheered off to port, out of control, and the Indomitable was ordered to engage her. The battle between the four British and the three German battle-cruisers continued. Unable to follow in the wake of the enemy for fear of mine-laying, "there was nothing for it," as Sir Julian Corbett tells us, "but to rely on speed to overlap the flying enemy, and so either force them to the northward towards Admiral Jellicoe or compel them to accept close action." So Beatty, perforce, had to keep to his parallel course.

Then, simply and dramatically, the unexpected happened. The pursuit was broken off. The report reached Beatty that there were submarines on the starboard bow and the admiral personally observed the wash of a periscope two points in that quarter. He had to signal "eight points together to the port bow," which movement had the effect of swinging the British battle-cruisers wide of the chase. Realizing that this manoeuvre would entail considerable loss of ground before he could resume the chase, he soon afterwards signalled "Course N.E." This enabled him to converge on the enemy, and at the same time to cut off the Blücher, while if the Germans turned to help her, he could get to grips with them.

But a direct hit upon the Lion put her port engine and her lighting plant out of action, her speed sank to a mere crawl, and finally she fell out of the line. In circumstances of peculiar difficulty Admiral Moore took over command. It is not quite certain when the transference was really operative. Her wireless out of action, the wounded Lion could only flag-signal her commands. One was the famous Nelson signal, his last public word at Trafalgar, "Keep closer to the enemy."

But, blowing end-onwards, the wind-tossed flags could not be deciphered. The fateful consequence was that the rear-admiral totally misunderstood his chief's commands. The Blücher, almost a wreck, was understood to be the main objective. The Tiger and Princess Royal broke off action with the Derfflinger and Moltke and began to circle round the dying Blücher. "The luck," writes Sir Julian Corbett, "which had snatched the Germans from our grasp at the time of the Scarborough raids stood by them, and, for the second time, gave them a means of escape." On that occasion, as we have already related, it was the German commander who claimed that fortune was against him. But remarks upon the vagaries of fortune are apt to differ in the mouths of rival combatants. If only the British fire had finished off the Seydlitz instead of the already disabled Blücher, the Dogger Bank might well have turned out a decisive British victory instead of a chase that failed.

The Blücher fought gamely to the end. Although she could only fire from two of her turrets she continued to spit defiance at her ring of enemies. Twice she had driven off light cruisers which had come up to destroy her. A Zeppelin came to her assistance, but was driven off. The destroyer Meteor got near enough to fire a torpedo, but, manoeuvring for position, was put out of action by a shell. The light cruiser Arethusa then approached to 2,500 yards and put in two torpedoes. The Blücher fired back with a torpedo at the Arethusa and at the battle-cruisers, but the latter were out of range. The salvos poured in on the Blücher, until, a mass of flames and smoke, she gave up the struggle she had waged for three hours against an overwhelming force. "As an example of discipline, courage, and fighting spirit," the British Admiralty's official historian writes, "her last hours have seldom been surpassed."

When they turned at last from the stricken ship, the British squadron took up the chase once more. But the enemy had gained a lead of over 12 miles, and were still doing their 25 knots. In the two hours it would take Moore to catch them he would be brought up against the guns of Heligoland. There was danger, too, that the High Seas Fleet would come out.

And what of the Lion? The unknown fate of the flagship settled the question. Admiral Moore decided to return, leaving the light cruisers to rescue the survivors from the Blücher. At this rescue an extraordinary incident occurred. The 300 odd survivors, crowded on her upper deck, cheered the Arethusa as she came up to the rescue. The British light cruiser was within 100 yards of the doomed ship, which suddenly capsized and turned bottom upwards before she finally disappeared. The Arethusa was busy with the men struggling in the water,

Photo: Central News

'CAME THE DAWN'

The hour before sunrise was a favoured time for launching infantry attacks, and in the succeeding hours the stretcher-bearers were in constant demand. This photograph shows wounded being taken back after an early morning attack during the battle of the Somme

and had picked up 260 of them, when a seaplane suddenly appeared, and began to bomb the rescuers. It was quickly driven off, but not before it had killed several of the Blücher's men. The excuse afterwards given by the Germans was that the seaplane fighters mistook the Blücher for a British ship. But, even if they did, the action was indefensible. After this experience it is no matter for surprise that, on the approach of a Zeppelin, Commodore Tyrwhitt drew off the rescue party.

Sir David Beatty meanwhile, in ignorance of developments, was striving his utmost to get back to the scene of action. He transferred his flag to the destroyer Attack and speeding to rejoin the squadron, found the ships coming back, whereupon he boarded the Princess Royal. His first instinct was to resume the pursuit, and he gave the signal. But second thoughts prevailed. Pursuit was quite hopeless. The next problem facing the admiral was how to bring the wounded Lion home. Her 12 knots suddenly sank to 8, and there was a long way to go. Submarines were hovering round. A crippled battle-cruiser would be a fat prize for the enemy. Orders were sent out and she was taken in tow by the Indomitable.

Admiral Jellicoe was now in visual contact, and ordered the whole of his flotillas to act as a screen, and there was a further cruiser screen to the eastwards. When night fell the Indomitable was towing dead weight. The Lion's engines no longer functioned and the two could make no more than 7 knots. Admiral Beatty, with his three remaining battle-cruisers, proceeded northwards; but first he made sure that all was as well as possible with his crippled flagship and her escort.

When morning broke the Lion was a hundred miles from her base and still within the submarine area. At long last, seamanship of a high order brought the battle-cruiser home to Rosyth, to be welcomed by cheering crowds in the early hours of January 26.

The Lion in this engagement figures in a delightful story told by Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes in his "Naval Memoirs," to exemplify the spirit of youth in the navy. "When the Lion took a heavy list after being hit below the water line, and all lights went out and dynamos ceased whirring, in the silence which ensued a young officer's voice floated up the voice pipe to the conning tower from the control room 80 feet below, Well, I suppose this is Kingdom Come—or three weeks' leave!"

In this engagement the German casualties were far heavier than the British. Four dead and two wounded in the Meteor was the sum total of losses of the destroyers; eleven men wounded in the Lion; Captain Taylor, the squadron engineer officer, and nine men killed, three officers and five men wounded, in the Tiger. Against this the German losses in the Blücher and Seydlitz were 951 killed or drowned, 78 wounded and 189 prisoners. The only other losses were three killed in the Kolberg.

In this action the German admiral carried out the old tactical principle known as concentration on the van. It was a principle far more common in the era of sailing ships, as a disabled leader might very well throw a close-hauled fleet into confusion. As it turned out, the German concentration on the Lion quite justified the plan. The crippling of the Lion, with the consequent removal of the admiral commanding from the action, enabled the Germans to gain their objective, which was to make good their escape from a superior force.

After the action Mr. Winston Churchill made a tremendous effort to move the strategic position of the Fleet from the remote Scapa Flow to Rosyth. He wrote to Sir John Jellicoe advocating in the strongest terms the change of base, and pointing out what he considered the overwhelming advantages of the move. His representations, however, were not successful. It was not until 1917, after Admiral Beatty had become commander-in-chief, that the Grand Fleet was based on Rosyth.

GOOD-BYE TO ALL THA

The fruit of weeks of underground labour is seen here. British sappers have tunnelled under no man's land until the German trench has been undermined. The explosion not only destroys the trench and kills many, but shatters the morale of the survivors

Photos: Imperial War Museum

STRIPPED SADDLES

Near Maricourt, in the Somme area, British cavalrymen are exercising the horses. The fact that the saddles are stripped shows that there is no immediate prospect of fighting, and the mud emphasizes the difficulty of cavalry operations

FRIENDS IN NEED

The stretcher-bearers were in general non-combatant troops. They shared to the full, however, the dangers of fighting, frequently carrying wounded back to the first-aid post through heavy barrages. These Frenchmen are dealing with the aftermath of a Somme attack

CHAPTER 33

NEUVE CHAPELLE

The first attempt of the British to break the German line in 1915 was made in March, at and around the village of Neuve Chapelle. One of the reasons for the failure of this operation was the shortage of munitions

AT the beginning of 1915 both the French and the British high commands considered that, in view of the heavy German commitments on the Eastern front, both in men and material, an attempt should be made to break through the German defences in the West by means of a direct attack. This, it was argued, should be carried out before any success in Russia might relieve the pressure on her Eastern army. Sir John French was sufficiently optimistic to believe in the possibility of success, and Joffre agreed that it was imperative to take action at once, both in an endeavour to relieve the pressure upon Russia and also to strike before the German armies in the West should receive reinforcements.

Unfortunately, in the early part of 1915 the British expeditionary force was not in a position to take part in a large-scale offensive. The new army was as yet insufficiently trained and inadequately equipped to be flung into action against a highly-trained adversary, and the original expeditionary force could no longer be regarded as a regular army.

Moreover, the possibility of breaking through by direct attack was dependent upon a far greater supply of munitions than had hitherto been available, and unfortunately, in spite of reiterated appeals by commanders in the field, artillery and high explosive were still unobtainable in anything like sufficient quantities.

For the time being the advantage lay with the Germans, and all that could be done by the Allies was to consolidate the positions already occupied and to make the most of any success which could be gained in local actions. From this time onward the " raid " was to be a constant feature of the new trench warfare, a feature that often proved, where heavy casualties were incurred in gaining a minor success, as demoralizing to the attacking party as to the defenders. In the absence of a visible target, marksmanship ceased to be of paramount importance, and special courses were instituted for all ranks in machine-gunnery, bombing, and in course of time in protective measures against gas. The need of the moment was to ensure that every man should become adept in the new technique of trench warfare. New weapons—bombs, mortars and rifle-grenades—were hastily evolved, and gradually improved upon in the light of experience.

With the continuance of a period of temporary stalemate, details of organization were attended to, among them being the system, which is said to have been sponsored by General Hunter-Weston, of identifying the features of local topography no easy matter in flat country intersected by a maze of entrenchments identical in appearance, by christening trenches, ways of communication and local headquarters with typically English names. Many of these, among them the notorious Hell Fire Corner near Ypres, were to achieve immortality.

The year began auspiciously enough with a small but brilliantly-planned action at the Alsatian end of the long battle-line. At the beginning of January the Chasseurs Alpins, who were holding the frozen slopes of the Vosges, executed one of the most successful ambushes of the war. Placing light guns in concealed positions on the heights commanding the valley through which they were moving, they attacked on the lower ground, apparently aided by a single battery. The Germans, whose base was at Mulhouse, counter-attacked with 6,000 men. Abandoning their few guns in the valley, the French made a feint retreat, whilst the Germans, flushed with victory, swept into the valley intent upon capturing the deserted battery, whereupon they received the full fire of the concealed guns from the heights. The French lost some 200 men; of the enemy, 2,000 were killed, 2,000 surrendered, and most of their guns were captured when the French once more launched the attack.

The defending forces thus broken, it was not difficult for the French to capture the approaches to Mulhouse. This engagement provided general headquarters with valuable information. Four days elapsed before the German commander could muster sufficient forces to make a further counter-attack. It was obvious that General von Falkenhayn had no large reserves on the Western front, and in view of the serious position he expressed the strongest opposition to Field-Marshal von Hindenburg's request for more first-line troops for the campaign in the East.

In forming their plans for a spring offensive the French general staff aimed at reducing the large German salient which bulged out between Albert and Reims, both on account of the proximity of its apex to Paris and because a further extension in the direction of Amiens would threaten the communications between Paris and the North. The object of the French was to cut the line of supply to this salient, and Joffre concentrated his pressure on the enemy

UNBURIED DEAD

Three German soldiers lie dead in No Man's Land in a crater made by a French shell. Caught by the murderous fire that proceeded from the trenches they were attempting to capture, they lie unburied midway between the opposing armies

lines at three points; Neuve Chapelle, near Lille; Perthes, near Reims; and Eparges, between Metz and Verdun. Between these points of attack lay several places from which railways and roads of the utmost value to German transport could be threatened.

The Crown Prince Rupert of Bavaria, in charge of the German 6th army, opened the first German offensive of the year on January 25, 1915, but the operations were not on a large scale. An attack, unheralded by a preliminary bombardment, was launched against the French at Zonnebeke, near Ypres, but, caught in the wire entanglements, the storming parties were annihilated by the French batteries and were unable to reach their objective. A more serious attempt aimed against the British communications with Boulogne and the French communications with Calais, took place on the same day. An attack was directed against the rail-head at Béthune, a key position, but, in order to mislead Sir John French, the first assault was made against Neuve Chapelle at dawn on January 25, and the main attack followed against the Allied positions on the south of the canal running from La Bassée to Aire.

At 7.30 a.m. the Germans started to bombard Béthune, and half an hour later infantry attacks developed at three places; to the north, a demonstration against Festubert aimed at distracting attention from the main onslaught upon the British position at Givenchy, while a subsidiary attack was made upon Cuinchy. In the centre the impetus of the German attack was successful in driving the British from their trenches.

Givenchy was lost in the morning, but after four hours of hand-to-hand fighting the Germans were driven out, and in spite of five further attempts to recapture the north-east corner of the position they were forced to retire.

The attack upon the south side of the canal continued all day, and the Bavarians, in spite of the havoc wrought in their ranks by British fire, succeeded in capturing part of the trenches in the brickfields near La Bassée. A British counter-attack, aided by a section of the French forces, drove back the enemy for a considerable distance, but was not successful in re-establishing the original line. The Germans, however, soon lost what small gains they had made, for in a night attack on January 27 the British troops advanced up the Béthune road and recaptured some of their trenches. The Germans made a further sortie on February 1, took a small trench near the canal, and were promptly shelled out of their position, while the infantry, attacking in force, captured one of the German posts on the canal embankment.

The supports, passing through, took the second German post at the point of the bayonet. Continuing to fight their way along the German trench, a party, led by Michael O'Leary, of the Irish Guards, succeeded in driving back the enemy with bomb and bayonet, captured two machine guns, and cleared the trench. O'Leary, rushing on ahead, oblivious of the hail of fire, killed the Germans holding the first barricade, and captured single-handed, the second barricade, 60 yards to the rear of the first, after killing three more Germans and taking two prisoners. For these deeds he was awarded the Victoria Cross.

Meanwhile, the French army was facing a strong attack on the Béthune road. Twice the Germans were driven back by the French artillery. A third assault reached the French trenches, but the artillery, which this time had held its fire, opened out at close range, annihilated the first line of attack, caught the supports as they swept forward, and sprayed the reserves with shrapnel. Upon the failure of this German offensive the battle died down.

About the middle of February the Canadian division, which had reached England in October 14, 1914, after a few months' preliminary training on Salisbury Plain, arrived in France and assembled in the neighbourhood of Hazebrouck. It was commanded by General Sir Edwin Alderson, who for some years previous to the outbreak of the war had been in charge of the Poona division in India. Towards the end of February the 46th (North Midland) Division, the first of the Territorial divisions, arrived in France, while other Territorial battalions arrived independently. By the end of the month 48 Territorial battalions were in France, though they still needed further training before they could participate in the actual fighting. But they were on the spot in case of any emergency.

Sir John French was now anxious to take the offensive. The British 1st army was badly situated in the sodden land of the Lys valley, whilst in front of it rose Aubers ridge, extending northwards from La Bassée for some twenty miles. A plateau of relatively dry land, providing good facilities for observation, could not fail to become an obvious objective. The British 2nd army extended from Bois Grenier, just south of Armentières, to a point south-east of Ypres, and here again the Germans had the advantage conferred by the possession of Messines ridge.

The French high command envisaged three lines of attack: one eastward from the Artois plateau in the direction of Douai and Valenciennes, to cut the enemy's communications between Reims and Arras; a second from Reims in the direction of Mezières and Hirson, with the ultimate objective of seizing the main railway line running through Namur and Liége; the third, an advance on the Verdun-Nancy front towards Metz and then into the enemy's own territory. The first two schemes were to be put into operation simultaneously, and in the event of their proving successful the attack from the Verdun-Nancy line was to be delivered so as to cut off the German line of retreat in the direction of the Rhine.

Sir John French's offensive was aimed at Neuve Chapelle, where the Germans had driven an awkward salient into the British lines in October, 1914. On that occasion General Smith-Dorrien had been obliged to withdraw his corps from the Aubers ridge into the Lys valley on account of the exposure of his left flank to a German attack from Lille, due to the failure of Conneau's cavalry corps to cover it. All through the winter the salient thus wedged into the British line enabled the Germans to enfilade the British trenches on either side, and though the enemy position might have been made almost untenable had convergent gun-fire been brought to bear on the salient, lack of ammunition prevented the British from adopting this obvious method of retaliation. During the earlier months of 1915 it became increasingly clear that until this salient should be reduced any advance would be difficult.

In order that his 1st army should be able to carry out the projected offensive with the greatest possible number of men and guns, Sir John French decided that no simultaneous offensive should be undertaken by the 2nd army, whose rôle would be limited to making a demonstration east of Ypres so as to draw off as many German reserves as possible from the Neuve Chapelle sector. For the main attack he placed in general reserve the Cavalry corps, the Indian cavalry corps, and the 46th Territorial division. To recapture the village was an almost indispensable preliminary to gaining a foothold on the Aubers ridge, and apart from the tactical advantages the position afforded, Sir John French cherished the hope that he would be able to make a break through. Had his plans not been affected by local breakdown of communications he might possibly have made a serious gap in the German lines.

The offensive which had been planned as a combined Franco-British attack, had finally to be carried out

TORPEDO PRACTICE

Here are seen British sailors at torpedo drill at the moment of discharge. Torpedos used for practice were fitted with a special collision head consisting of a steel shell fitted with cork. Gas masks were used for protection against the fumes from enemy shells

SMOKE UPON THE WATERS

These destroyers, by emitting dense masses of smoke, can completely block the line of vision between two opposing fleets. This manoeuvre, in the later stage of the Battle of Jutland, by German destroyers, was a vital factor in saving their main fleet

LONG HIDDEN BRITISH CATASTROPHE

In the early weeks of the War people were asking each other with bated breath whether they had heard that the Audacious, one of the most mode
by a mine off the north coast of Ireland. It was not till four years later, after the Armistice, however, that the publication of the official accour
This photograph shows the last moments of the doomed ship, which sank without any los

Dreadnoughts of the British navy, had been sunk
ter, till then forbidden, confirmed their suspicions.

CRAMPED BUT CHEERFUL

These Canadians in a communication trench are compelled to keep their heads well down, since they are well within range of German rifles, hand grenades and trench mortars. They appear, however, oblivious to the discomforts of their resting-place

LEST WE FORGET

There are no materials with which to erect a splendid tombstone for this Canadian who has fallen in battle. But with a simple wooden cross with his helmet resting on it, and white stones laid on his grave, his comrades pay their homage to him

without the co-operation of the French 10th army, owing to the inability of the British to relieve the French 9th corps at Ypres, as had been arranged. General de Maud'huy, commanding the 10th army, had only sufficient troops for the sector he was holding, and General Haig, commanding the British 1st army, told Sir John French, after an interview with Maud'huy, that the proposed offensive action must be considered an entirely independent operation.

Owing to the number of reinforcements sent to the Russian front only three and a half corps of the German 6th army opposed the six corps of the 1st and 2nd British armies, and of these only the 7th corps, consisting of two divisions, faced the six divisions of the British 1st army, which held the front from Givenchy to Bois Grenier. The only German reserve immediately available was a body of Saxons and Bavarians resting at Turcoing after a spell in the trenches near Ypres. No more favourable opportunity for a large-scale offensive could have presented itself to the British command.

Great hopes were entertained that the 7th and 8th divisions, forming the 4th army corps, together with the Indian army corps, composed of the Meerut and Lahore divisions, would advance far enough to recapture Lille.

It was unfortunate that Sir John French could muster no more than 48,000 men for the most important offensive on the Western front since the battle of the Marne. Thousands of men of the volunteer armies at home still awaited rifles and cartridges in order to begin their musketry training. The supply of guns and shells was totally inadequate for the needs of modern warfare, and even after weeks of rigid economy in the use of shells, the quantity available only allowed of a preliminary bombardment of half an hour.

On the night of March 9–10, 1915, the Garhwal Brigade, which was to open the assault on the right flank, moved into position along the Estaires–La Bassée road from the crossroads at Port Arthur to the Rue des Berceaux. On their left the 23rd and 25th infantry brigades manned the trenches and breastworks which ran in front of the Rue Tilleloy as far as the sunken road just south of the Moated Grange.

The attack was thus to develop from two points north-west and south-west of Neuve Chapelle respectively, with the object of enveloping the enemy, driven by artillery fire from their trenches into the houses, and, in point of fact, when the British and Indian troops met in the village, they there killed or captured large numbers of Germans The troops already holding the British front line, the Bareilly brigade and two battalions of the 24th brigade, closed up to the right and left, leaving room for the assaulting battalions to get into position.

As daylight came on the morning of March 10, a heavy mist rendered aerial reconnaissance impossible. The rising sun, however, dissipated the fog about 6.30 a.m., and Sir Douglas Haig gave orders to begin the attack with zero hour at 7.30. After a few preliminary ranging shots, at the appointed hour the concentrated bombardment began. The 18-pounder brigades were detailed to smash a way through the wire entanglements, using shrapnel, which it was found cut the wire more effectively than was possible with high explosive at that time. Simultaneously all available howitzers opened out upon the German front-line trenches. After thirty-five minutes of this preparatory barrage, the first of its kind to be employed before a British attack, the artillery fire lifted on to a line farther east, running through the village of Neuve Chapelle, and the assaulting infantry advanced across no man's land as quickly as the sodden state of the ground would permit.

It was found that the bombardment had been extremely effective over most of the area under fire, with the exception of a quarter-mile stretch on the extreme left. There the failure must be attributed to the fact that the siege batteries deputed to deal with that sector had only arrived from England late on the day before, and had been unable to build up their gun platforms in time. In consequence of their ineffective fire the 23rd brigade was held up by the unbroken wire in front of the first German trench.

The attack opened inauspiciously. The right battalion of the Garhwalis, which should have attacked directly in front of its position on the right face of the Port Arthur salient, mistaking direction, bore to its right and came up against barbed wire entanglements that had not been destroyed. Cutting the wire, the Indians forced their way through, and after fierce fighting took the front trench, though only after suffering heavy casualties.

Meanwhile the assaulting companies of the 25th brigade, the 2nd Lincolnshire and 2nd Royal Berkshire in the van, were advancing according to plan. With bomb and bayonet they cleared the first hostile line, and then held the captured positions in preparation for the next step in the advance. Behind them were the 2nd Rifle Brigade and



Map showing the area around Neuve Chapelle that was attacked by the British army March 10, 1915. Neuve Chapelle itself, which had been lost in the previous November, was recovered, and other gains made, but the results on the whole were disappointing

THE KING OBSERVES *Photopress*

Victor Emmanuel III, King of Italy, a descendant of the warlike counts of Savoy, though he took no active part in the campaigns against Austria, as his grandfather, Victor Emmanuel II, had done over 50 years before, was a frequent visitor to the front

the 1st Royal Irish Rifles, who were to pass through and capture the village. In similar fashion the 2/39th Garhwalis were to remain in the trenches they had captured and allow the 1/39th Garhwalis, in support, to rush through and storm the Bois du Biez, which lay behind Neuve Chapelle.

Unfortunately, the 2nd Middlesex, on the left of the 23rd brigade, were facing the German trenches which had been left undamaged by the ineffective bombardment of the siege batteries before mentioned. Met with heavy rifle and machine-gun fire from the 11th Jägers, they suffered such heavy casualties that they had to retire and beg further artillery support. Before the objective was secured valuable hours had been lost.

At half-past eight, when the artillery lifted its fire from the village, the Rifle Brigade and Royal Irish Rifles, passing through the Berkshire and Lincolnshire battalions, advanced without hesitation upon the village, which the Rifle Brigade entered shortly before nine o'clock.

No further advance was possible for the moment, as the artillery bombardment of the ground between the village and the Bois du Biez was still in progress, but touch was obtained with the Garhwalis on the right. Further delay was inevitable, as contact still had to be made with the 23rd brigade on the left. The 11th Jägers, who were still in the front-line trenches from which the Middlesex had been unable to dislodge them, were harassing the 2nd Scottish Rifles, who had pushed forward on the right of the Middlesex, with sustained enfilading fire.

By 1.0 p.m. both the 23rd and the 25th brigades had reached their objectives and the whole of the village of Neuve Chapelle had been taken. They were then ordered to consolidate, while the supports, the 24th brigade and the Dehra Dun brigade of the Meerut division, were ordered to prepare to advance.

General Haig during the morning asked Sir John French for a cavalry brigade, so that he could use them for reconnaissance in the case of a breakthrough, and accordingly the 5th cavalry brigade was sent to Estaires in readiness. But delay in communications, the impossibility of rapid co-ordination, and one or two minor obstacles which had not yet been removed, made further advance impossible.

Shortly before 3.0 o'clock in the afternoon General Sir Henry Rawlinson, with the approval of Sir Douglas Haig, ordered the 4th corps to advance in the direction of Aubers, while the cavalry came up the Estaire–La Bassée road as far as Rouge Croix. The preliminary artillery bombardment was not very effective. Owing to the cutting of telephone wires by shell fire, communication between batteries and forward observation officers was impossible. Again, concentrations of troops were erratic, brigades being handicapped by incomplete information regarding the readiness of their flanking neighbours.

All this delay gave the Germans time to prepare their second line of defence, which stretched from Mauquissart southwards to Layes Bridge, and then along the western edge of the Bois du Biez, continuing to the Lorgies Road, with strong points constructed at intervals. The only immediately available reserves, two companies of the 11th Jägers resting at Halpegarbe, had been unable to reach Neuve Chapelle before that village fell into British hands, and were set to work upon the second-line defences, which had only been begun in places.

Orders were given for a counter-attack to recapture the village, but the number of troops available was insufficient to carry out such an operation. During the afternoon and evening battalions of various Saxon regiments were entrained at Lille, and the 6th Bavarian reserve division was thrown into the line ready for the counter-offensive.

Meanwhile, on account of the various delays already mentioned, it was nearly 6 p.m. before the next general British advance began, and apart from 500 yards of ground gained by the 1st Sherwood Foresters and the 2nd Northants along the sector between Signpost Lane and the Sunken Road, this renewed advance made little progress. In the gathering dusk units got hopelessly mixed, and the forward movement of the Indian Division was cancelled when it became known that German reinforcements were in the Bois du Biez. By nightfall German troops were being hastily sent from north and south to fill the breach.

At this period of the day's fighting the British gains could be summarized as follows: the capture of the German front-line defences on a front of 4,000

Photopress

TUG OF WAR

The slope up which this Italian field-gun is being man-hauled is, for the Austro-Italian front, a comparatively mild one. The fact that it takes some 20 men to achieve the task goes to prove the immense difficulties of mountain warfare

yards and at its maximum a depth of 1,200 yards; the occupation of the whole of the village of Neuve Chapelle, and the capture of over 700 prisoners. The general reserve had not been utilized. Subsidiary actions had not been productive of any great results.

During the night of March 10–11 the Germans hastily strengthened their new front line, reinforced their strong points and added more machine-gun nests. Under cover of the darkness a fresh line of defence was taken up lying parallel to and about two hundred yards in front of the western side of the Bois du Biez, extending from Brewery Road to Lorgies Road. The original intention of the Germans had been to attack at dawn without a preliminary bombardment, but as the majority of the reinforcing battalions did not arrive before dawn, it was considered inadvisable for them to descend the slopes of Aubers Ridge in daylight. The German counter-offensive was therefore postponed.

British aerial observation, which had duly reported all movements of troops by road, had failed to notice any great concentration by rail, and accordingly Sir Douglas Haig issued orders on the night of March 10 for a continuation of the general attack the following morning. The 7th and 8th divisions of the 4th corps, opening the assault, were to take as their objective a line from Rouges Bancs through Le Plouich to La Cliqueterie farm. The Indian corps was to take the Bois du Biez and push forward until its right flank rested on the hamlet of Ligny le Grand and its left made contact with the 8th division at La Cliqueterie farm. The 1st corps, operating to the south, was to continue its attack on the trenches east of Givenchy, and the 5th cavalry brigade was to be in readiness for any eventuality. The attack was ordered to begin at 7.0 a.m., preceded by an artillery bombardment. "From information received," ran the operation order, "it appears that the enemy before us is in no great strength."

At 6.45 a.m. on the morning of March 11 the artillery opened upon the German strong points situated along the Mauquissart road, but the new German

TITANIC TROPHY

Even with these giant caterpillar wheels this Italian howitzer, here seen after being captured by the Austrians, could ascend no farther than the Alpine foothills. Only by excessively high mounting could the elevation which was necessary for the high angle fire demanded by the country be obtained

Photo: G.P.A.



Photo: G.P.A.

TO WHAT RED HELL?

Austrian storm-troopers, advancing across a scene of desolation, plunge into the lurid smoke-screen of the Italian guns. Their desperate hand-to-hand encounters with the Italian Bersaglieri and Alpini were a feature of the bloody and protracted mountain campaigns in Tirol in 1915 and 1916

front line, to the rear of their strong points of the day before, had not yet been observed, and was therefore not shelled at all. The consequence was that attempts made by the 21st brigade to advance after the barrage met with no success, so terrific was the rifle and machine-gun fire that met them. The 20th brigade was also unfortunate. Almost as soon as it started to move forward on a line between the Moated Grange and the Orchard, it came under heavy fire from the German batteries on the Aubers ridge, and was forced to halt and consolidate the position it had reached. Owing to the destruction of telephone communications by heavy shell fire, orders failed to reach the battalions, and on the 4th corps front the attack definitely failed.

On the right the Dehra Dun brigade were no more successful in their endeavour to capture the Bois du Biez, for as no definite information had been received concerning the new German trenches running 200 yards in front of the wood, the fire of the artillery was concentrated on the western edge of the wood itself, and the Indians were held in place by the enemy fire.

Difficulty of communication delayed any further attack until the morning was well passed. Towards noon the belief gained ground that the Germans were preparing to attack, and it was hoped that such an attack, if favourably repulsed, would afford the best chance of a further advance; but as the day went on it became apparent that the expected German offensive would not immediately take place. Therefore, at a quarter past twelve General Rawlinson ordered a continuation of the attack along the Mauquissart road. Communications were so bad, however, that orders failed to reach many of the companies, and the isolated efforts of those which did receive instructions met with disaster. Though the 1st Worcestershire attempted an advance, their first waves were quickly shot down, and the 1st Sherwood Foresters, though successful in occupying two farm buildings on the Mauquissart road, sustained heavy casualties. The 2nd Northants were repulsed by enfilading machine-gun fire before they had covered more than a few yards, and their colonel refused to order any further advance. The steadily-growing number of British casualties was compensated by no appreciable gain, and by the end of the day it became obvious that no more progress could be hoped for until the new German line had been reduced.

As soon as night fell, the main German reinforcements, consisting of no fewer than six battalions, took up their positions, in readiness for the counter-offensive on the morning of March 12. The enemy had by that time some 16,000 men available for this action.

At 4.30 a.m. on the morning of March 12 the German artillery opened out on the front occupied by the British 4th and Indian corps. The ranging was poor, and the shells dropped behind the British lines, though they caused serious casualties among the troops in reserve. When the Germans advanced to the attack at 5.0 a.m. a heavy mist hid them from view until they were within 60 yards of the British trenches, and, as it covered the plain and ridge, hindered the fire of the British artillery. Observation from the air was likewise rendered difficult, machines having to fly very low over the enemy's positions in order to reconnoitre for the guns.

Nevertheless, the German attack did not prove successful. Divided into



Photo: G.P.A.

DIVISIONS OF DEATH

The Germans early used special storm troops, known as "divisions of death." The Austrians followed their example on the Italian front, and here are seen a picked body of Austrians hurling their stick bombs as they dash to the attack

GAS!

The original gas clouds from cylinders were almost entirely replaced in 1916 by gas shells, such as the one seen exploding here, and projectors. Of lethal shells, those filled with phosgene were the most deadly · later mustard-gas shells proved more effective

Photo: G.P.A.

Photo: G.P.A.

WAR'S WINTER SPORT

The snow, the sledge, and the man on skis bring thoughts of holiday pleasures But as the machine-gun shows, the sport indulged in is the grim one of warfare, and the men are members of an Austrian machine-gun team

separate attacks against four different parts of the British line, it was everywhere repulsed. An attempt to recapture Neuve Chapelle was made at 10.40 a.m., and the Germans massed along the whole front round the village and to the north of it. The attack developed along Brewery Road, where the 2nd Rifle Brigade and the 2/3rd Gurkhas occupied the trenches immediately east of the village and facing the Bois du Biez.

Warned by listening posts, the British were ready to meet the assault, and the troops that tried to debouch from the wood were checked by rifle-fire and by repeated shell-bursts from the British guns, which were now accurately ranged on this point. Unable to make headway, in spite of repeated assaults, the Germans abandoned the attack after an hour's fighting. At other points the German offensive was broken by rapid fire from the breastworks, and in face of the impenetrable defence afforded by the concentrated machine-gun fire they retired with heavy losses. In fact, at one point only, north-east of the village, did the Germans succeed in even reaching the British trenches, and there they were driven out and pursued with the bayonet.

Encouraged by the surrender of large bodies of Germans, particularly the Westphalians, who appeared to be in an exhausted condition, and believing that the 24th brigade had captured the cross-roads at Pietre, when in point of fact the captured sector had been abandoned three hours earlier, Sir Douglas Haig was induced to counter-attack in turn. The 1st Army headquarters wrongly imagined that a complete break-through had occurred along the Mauquissart road, and the British forces were ordered to push forward regardless of loss. At half-past two in the afternoon British gun-fire was concentrated upon Aubers ridge, north of Neuve Chapelle, and the troops pressed forward to storm the heights. For four hours the struggle went on, and it was in this battle that the heaviest British losses occurred. Among the troops that tried to storm the ridge were the 2nd Scots Guards, the 1st Grenadier Guards, the 2nd Gordons and the 2nd Border Regt., together with a territorial battalion, the 6th Gordons

Meanwhile the 2nd cavalry division had been placed at General Haig's disposal. The 5th cavalry brigade, under Sir Philip Chetwode, rode along the Rue du Bacquerot in the direction of Pietre Mill, fronting the Aubers ridge, and the remainder of the 2nd cavalry division moved forward from Estaires in support. The cavalrymen were to charge through the gap made by the infantry, capture the German batteries on the high ground, and open the road for a general advance on Lille.

A continuous bombardment of the German lines was kept up from 4.40 p.m. until dark, but the infantry attack against the heights failed just when it appeared to be within measurable distance of success. The plan by which the 23rd brigade, along the Armentières Road, should advance and carry the 24th brigade along with it to the Pietre–La Russie road, its first objective, was rendered difficult by the darkness, intensified by low clouds and fog, and it was half-past nine before the central battalion had reached its assaulting position. Other battalions lost their way in the darkness, and the confusion was so complete that a postponement of the attack was ordered. At 1.30 a.m. the advance towards the Mauquissart road was renewed, but, on receipt of a

ALPINE CITADEL

Both the Italians and the Austrians had developed before the War an extensive system of barrier fortresses similar to the Italian example shown in this photograph. The Austrian forts, equipped with more modern armour and heavier guns, proved the less vulnerable

Mondiale

PRELUDE TO ADVENTURE

Through an untouched countryside the great body of French colonial troops is marching up to the front lines on the Somme. The moment will soon arrive when, split up into units, they will be led up the communication trenches to face their greatest adventure

message from the 8th division ordering no advance to be made beyond that point, further attempts to proceed were abandoned, and the remainder of the night was spent in reorganizing the mixed-up 23rd and 24th brigades. The 7th division failed likewise in their effort to reach the Mauquissart road, the troops were completely exhausted, and it was clear that there were no hopes of a break-through by the cavalry.

Seeing the impossibility of winning the ridge, and with no further reserves to call upon, Sir John French ordered Sir Douglas Haig on the night of March 12–13 to suspend offensive operations and hold and consolidate the ground won by the 4th and Indian corps. The British casualties during the three days' fighting amounted to 583 officers and 12,309 other ranks: those of the Germans to about 12,000, including 30 officers and 1,657 other ranks taken prisoner.

The battle of Neuve Chapelle demonstrated the possibility of a break-through at that period of the War. The attack was executed generally with remarkable skill and bravery. So rapid was the initial success that it took the British staff by surprise.

The success might, however, have been greater. In the considered opinion of Sir John French, the failure to make the most of the success of the first offensive movement rested with Sir Henry Rawlinson, commanding the 4th army corps. Had he flung his reserves into the battle on the morning of March 10, after the capture of the village, the disorder in the British line, the probable result of tactical errors, might have been immediately remedied while they took on the task of pushing back the enemy.

The Germans had not recovered from the surprise, their reserves were inadequate, and their line might have been completely pierced if it had been attacked at this critical juncture by the whole weight of the 4th corps. Instead, the delay of four and a half hours in restarting the attack was sufficient to nullify the carefully planned scheme of operations. The element of surprise was thenceforth absent, the enemy got their second wind, had strengthened their defences and had been able to bring up reinforcements. The chance of a break-through had gone The first objective was won in three hours, and at the expense of comparatively few lives. It was afterwards that the heaviest casualties occurred, during the two days of repeated attacks and counter-attacks.

Though the result of the battle did not affect the military situation on the Western front, it showed that the German system of defence was not impregnable and it did more than anything to enhance the prestige of the British expeditionary force in the eyes of the French command.

This battle was the first in British military history in which the army went into action provided, thanks to the work of the Royal Flying Corps, with pictures of the hidden secrets of the enemy's defences. In spite of the bad visibility, aerial photography, though still in its infancy, provided sufficient material for maps of the enemy trenches to be drawn and circulated among the attacking army, as well as for directing the preliminary bombardment

There was a further small engagement at St. Eloi, about three miles south of Ypres. on March 14. The British 2nd army, under General Smith-Dorrien, was holding that portion of the line, which encircled the village on the east and included a large mound to the south-east of it After mining the mound, the Germans bombarded the British positions, and after a rapid infantry attack captured the village. The British made their counter-attack the following day, and the 82nd brigade, advancing before dawn, captured part of the enemy's trenches, and shortly afterwards, in conjunction with the 80th brigade, recaptured all the lost ground except the mound.

CHAPTER 34

DEFENDING THE SUEZ

Fresh theatres of war were opened when Turkey ranged herself among the enemies of Great Britain, France and Russia. One of these was Egypt, where Britain took steps to defend the Suez Canal, a vital link in her Overseas communications

RIGHT from the outbreak of the War it was obvious that the maintenance of unhindered communication through the Suez Canal was of vital strategical importance to the British empire. Once control was lost of this gateway to the Mediterranean, a long and perilous journey would be imposed upon the transport of all Indian and Australian forces. In order to guard against any attempts to block the canal, British troops were at once ordered to occupy its banks.

Although such an action was in a sense an infringement of the convention of 1888, which stipulated that the canal should "always be free and open, in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag," it must be remembered that Great Britain, in signing, formulated the reserve that such provisions should apply only in so far as they did not fetter the British Government's liberty of action during its occupation of Egypt.

Before the War, although nominally subject to Turkish sovereignty, a suzerainty recognized by the payment of an annual tribute, and although the administration of the country was carried out by native ministers under the personal authority of the Khedive, Abbâs II, in actual fact the machinery of government was controlled by English departmental advisers, responsible to the acting British agent. With the entry of Turkey into the War in November, 1914, Great Britain declared the Turkish suzerainty at an end. On December 19, Abbas Pasha was deposed from the Khedivate, and that dignity was offered to his uncle, Prince Hussein Kamil Pasha, with the title of sultan.

At the beginning of August, 1914, there seemed no reason to assume that Turkey would have any cause to intervene in the quarrel between the Allies and the Central Powers. As far as was known she was bound by no treaty to any of the belligerents, and not until later did the Allies discover that negotiations for a Turco-German alliance had been in progress long before the War and that a pact between the two nations was signed on August 2, 1914. On that day Turkey mobilized her army, though only, she alleged, as a precautionary measure. Actually it was but the preliminary step to her declaration of war upon the Allies.

Inspired by her German advisers,

SHELL TRANSPORT

These shells for French guns are on the last stage of their journey before they are used to cause havoc to the enemy. Light wagons were frequently used by the French to carry munitions from the railhead. The scene here is the back area of the Somme

BEFORE ASCENT

Behind the lines near Nancy these French captive balloons are being led from their hangars down a sunken path to avoid enemy observation, to their place of ascent. They were used mainly for the purpose of artillery observation

Turkey determined to forestall her troubles, and, applying the axiom that a vigorous offensive is the best defence, she prepared two armies of invasion. One of these, based on Erzerum, was to cross the Caucasus and invade Russian territory; the other, based on Damascus, was to cross the Sinai desert and invade Egypt. Both of these ambitious expeditions were foredoomed to failure.

The German supreme command was fully aware of the difficulties inherent in maintaining a line of communication stretching 1,200 miles from Constantinople to the Suez Canal. The blocking of the canal was to their mind sufficient in itself. But Djemal Pasha, the commander of the Turkish expedition, on whom had been somewhat prematurely bestowed the title of the saviour of Egypt, would be satisfied with nothing less than a triumphal entry into Cairo. Having once decided upon the invasion of Egypt, it must be admitted that the Turco-German staff set about its task in a most efficient manner. All Turkish officers suspected of political intrigue against the Young Turk party were drafted to the army of Syria, while those who were known to have anglophile tendencies were drafted to the army of Caucasus.

During the first weeks following Turkey's entrance into the War, large numbers of men and vast quantities of munitions and stores were sent to Aleppo, the Syrian railhead, but it was not until the end of December that Lieutenant-General Sir John Maxwell, the British commander in Egypt, obtained reliable information as to the strength of the Turkish force advancing upon Egypt. It was then reported to him from Sofia that the strength of the army in Syria amounted to not far short of 40,000 men, together with some thirty batteries of artillery and four companies of machine-guns. By the middle of January, 1915, it was estimated that six infantry divisions were assembled between Cilicia and Palestine. Included among these troops was a large proportion of Arab Bedouins, of whom it is thought at least 50 per cent deserted before the advance even began. Indeed, it would appear that in the end the numbers of the Turkish force, when finally concentrated around the advanced base at Bir Saba (Beersheba) fell considerably short of what Djemal Pasha had expected. According to Oberst Kress von Kressenstein, his chief of staff, it did not exceed 20,000 rifles, nine field batteries and one 15 c.m howitzer battery. The Turkish commander, probably doubting his ability to conquer Egypt with so small a force, demanded reinforcements from Constantinople. Three picked divisions of the Turkish army were despatched in accordance with the request, but it was too late.

In his book, "Egypt and the Army," Lieut.-Colonel P. G. Elgood states:

> Before the reinforcements had started the Allied warships were commanding by their fire long stretches of rail and road between Adana and Toprak Kele, and the troops were forced to march over the Amanus Pass. The task proved to be too great for the capacity of the Turks, and the bulk of the reinforcements got no farther than Adana . . . But, despite this disappointment, Djemal would not postpone his attack.

The British force in Egypt at this time consisted of a Territorial division, the 42nd Lancashire, and a few squadrons of yeomanry, together with a contingent of Australians and New Zealanders. These troops, who were

MIDGET MORTARS

These French trench mortars were detonated, as is shown in this picture, by means of a fuse. Known by the French as crapouillots, or little frogs, they were a variant of the Stokes mortar, being muzzle instead of breech loading

SCIENCE AND SKILL

At a first-aid post in the Somme battlefield a French wounded soldier is about to receive an injection against tetanus. The label on his tunic, affixed by the regimental medical officer, tells briefly the nature of the wound he has received

IN MEMORY OF THE FALLEN

General Cousin presents to children of fallen soldiers the medals their fathers would have received had they lived, while the widowed mothers stand watching. The scene is the courtyard of Les Invalides in Paris, where stands a captured German aeroplane

still undergoing their training, replaced the army of occupation in Egypt which in August, 1914, had been sent to France. The 42nd division, it is said, was chosen for this relief by Lord Kitchener because, in the phrase attributed to him: "Lancashire spins cotton. It will not be a bad thing if Lancashire men see how the raw material is grown." To complete the truly imperial nature of this composite force, the native Egyptian army furnished a quota of its effectives, and Simla sent two divisions of Indian infantry. The headquarters of Sir John Maxwell's forces was established at Ismailia on the canal, equidistant from Port Said and Suez.

To quote further from the authoritative work of Colonel Elgood:

> No sooner had the Indians taken up their positions than it was apparent that two schools of thought existed among the defenders. While one section advocated pushing out the line into the desert to deprive the enemy of opportunity to block the Canal, a second urged that that policy would rob Egypt of her most formidable bulwark, the waterway itself. There was, in fact, uncertainty whether the Indian expeditionary force was in Egypt to protect the Suez Canal, or whether it was occupying that line to defend Egypt.

In the end, the arguments in favour of passive defence prevailed, though the wisdom of this choice may be debated.

Meanwhile, by the end of January, 1915, Djemel Pasha's 20,000 men were on the outskirts of the Sinai Peninsula. Fortune at first appeared to favour the Turkish venture. It was fairly obvious that the Turks would have to advance across the centre of the peninsula, for the northern zone was difficult to cross on account of the sand dunes and the possibility of attack from the sea, while the southern extremity is covered with lofty mountains. Fortunately for the Turks, the wells and watering places of the central zone were very well supplied with water owing to the unusually heavy rains of November, December and January. This comparatively copious supply greatly facilitated the task of the invading army, with its transport column of 10,000 camels.

General von Kressenstein must have felt some doubts as to the wisdom of invading a country defended by 60,000 troops, protected by the waters of the Suez Canal, with a force of one-third of that number. But Djemal Pasha was convinced that the arrival of the saviour of Egypt on the banks of the Canal would cause all Egypt to rise in revolt against the Christians, and that the khalif's invitation to wage a Holy War would meet with immediate response. Fortunately for the British Empire, turcophile sentiment among the Egyptians was less strong than Djemal had imagined.

A FRENCHMAN'S HOME

Paris suffered more severely from air raids than did London. The city was first bombed from the air on August 30, 1914, though raids by Zeppelins did not begin till later. This photograph shows the damage inflicted by a Zeppelin in a Paris street

Skirmishing between outposts of the opposing forces began on January 26, but not until February 3 did the main action begin. On February 2 the first Khamsin, or desert wind, of the new year blew in from east by south. In this wind, the velocity of which often reaches fifty miles an hour, the sand is thrown up until even the brilliant Egyptian sun is obscured. That night the Turkish forces, trusting, no doubt, to the darkness and noise of the sandstorm to hide their approach, determined to test the defences of the Canal. In the early hours of February 3 an attempt was made to bridge the Canal. The Turks had 20 pontoons, brought all the way from Germany, and six improvised rafts. These were launched at a point south of the Canal station of Tussum, and the storming parties proceeded to paddle themselves across. But the defenders were ready for them, and not more than two pontoons managed to reach the western side of the Canal, and the occupants of these were either killed or made prisoners. The rest of the pontoons and rafts were sunk with little difficulty.

The Turkish commander thereupon sent forward the 25th division to attack the British line at Serapeum. Ranging well, the Turkish guns opened a fairly effective fire which reached the southern edge of Ismaila, and caught some of the war vessels lying in Lake Timsah. The Indian marine service vessel Hardinge was struck by several shells. A pilot of the Canal company, Captain Carew, was badly wounded by a shell which burst on the bridge, shattering his leg. With true courage, he shouted to his comrades, "Bring me a chair

Photopress

APPRENTICES OF WAR

The exigencies of war caused even the very young to be brought into contact with some of its grim realities. These schoolboys in their workshop at Ponders End in Middlesex serve an early apprenticeship in the art of making munitions

and I'll take her into port." Though unable to carry out his gallant boast, he happily survived his injuries. Turkish fire was next concentrated on the French cruiser Requin, but her commander soon silenced the hostile guns.

The Turks were unable to dislodge the Indian garrison at Serapeum, and when the Indians counter-attacked the enemy fled. In their retreat they were caught by heavy fire from the Requin and from another French cruiser, the D'Entrecasteaux, lying in the Great Bitter Lake, which cost them many casualties. The sandstorm, which still raged violently, caused the various enemy units to lose touch and direction, and it was not long before a general retirement was ordered. By nightfall the Turks were in full retreat, but Maxwell considered it inadvisable to follow them into the desert. For forty-eight hours the Turks retreated without a pause, until they felt safe from pursuit, but the rate of their retreat proved too much for the camel transport. An eye-witness, Colonel Ali Fuad Bey, estimated that no fewer than 7,000 camels died or were lost during that hurried withdrawal. Von Kressenstein himself acknowledged that the Turkish casualties exceeded 1,200, whereas the British losses were insignificant.

It was a crestfallen and weary army that finally reached Bir Saba. Djemal Pasha, in the proclamation he issued to the inhabitants of Palestine and Syria, showed himself a master at the art of making the best of a bad job. "Our troops," he said, "reached the Canal. They did not cross it or enter Egypt, for Egypt belongs to Mohammedans, and it would be unfair to take that country by force." Then, as though assailed by a desire to be strictly truthful, or possibly thinking this statement too much for even oriental credulity, he naively added: "Also we had not enough men and animals."

Discussion now arose as to whether it would not be advantageous to carry the war into enemy territory and advance into Asia Minor. The advocates of a cautious policy pointed out the risks involved in securing what could scarcely amount to more than a slight tactical advantage, and argued that the ease with which a hostile attack could be repulsed, as had been clearly demonstrated, showed that the security of Egypt was dependent upon the presence of large bodies of troops in the neighbourhood of the Canal. This view prevailed, and by the end of the year there were 100,000 British troops in Egypt.

But although General von Kressenstein was astute enough to pin as many British soldiers as possible to the spot by a series of isolated raids upon the Canal and the lateral railway, the Turks had been discouraged from attempting any other major operations in the Canal zone, and the Gallipoli campaign now engaged all their attention. For the rest of the year the Canal region remained in a state of comparative calm.

Had the sultan of Turkey, when proclaiming a jehad, been able to rally the faithful to his standard, this might have proved a feature of great strength, but Egyptians took little interest in the concentration of the Turkish forces in Palestine. They felt that a Turkish army of occupation might after all be a greater evil than a British one, and, less clever at propaganda than their German allies, the Turks took no steps to rouse the Egyptians from their apathy.

MIND YOUR STEP

From the beginning of the War drastic restrictions were placed on the lighting of London after dark, and during air raids complete darkness was enforced. The kerbs of many London streets were whitewashed so that they should be visible to vehicles and pedestrians

CHAPTER 35

EPIC OF THE DARDANELLES

The British offensive against European Turkey began with a naval attack on the forts of the Dardanelles, the object being to open the seaway to Constantinople. Its failure was followed by the expedition to Gallipoli

ROUND the narrow channel forming part of the boundary that separates Europe from Asia both legend and history have gathered. Called today the Dardanelles, and in former times the Hellespont or Greek Sea, it is 48 miles long and has an average breadth of three or four miles. It connects the Aegean Sea, and therefore the Mediterranean, with the Sea of Marmora, and is thus part of the route past Constantinople, or Istanbul, as it is now called, and the Bosporus to the Black Sea. At its western or European side is the peninsula of Gallipoli, and on its Asiatic or eastern side is the coast of Asia Minor.

For 3,000 years, perhaps more, civilization has made its home on the shores of the Dardanelles. The name bears witness to the belief of the ancients that one of the amours of Zeus resulted in the birth of a son to him by Electra, a daughter of Agamemnon. To this son the name of Dardanus was given, a name later bestowed upon a city which was built on the side of the straits to which it gave its name.

But the associations of the Dardanelles are best described in the stately prose of Gibbon :

> The geographers who, with the most skilful accuracy, have surveyed the form and extent of the Hellespont, assign about 60 miles for the winding course, and about three miles for the ordinary breadth of these celebrated straits. But the narrowest part of the channel is found to the northward of the old Turkish castles between the cities of Sestos and Abydos. It was here that the adventurous Leander braved the passage of the flood for the possession of his mistress. It was here likewise, in a place where the distance between the opposite banks cannot exceed 500 paces, that Xerxes imposed a stupendous bridge of boats, for the purpose of transporting into Europe an hundred and seventy myriads of barbarians.

On its Asiatic shore stood one of the most renowned cities of the ancient world. It was Troy, the "windy Ilium" of Homer's epic, from whose burning portals Aeneas, with his little son, went forward to found Rome, while Ulysses, the greatest of all travellers, left the surrounding plains on that long and adventurous journey that ended in his return to his island home and his patient wife.

In the following words Gibbon describes Troy at the time of the siege, and goes on to tell how some distance away the emperor Constantine selected the site for the new imperial capital.

Ancient Troy, seated on an eminence at the foot of Mount Ida, overlooked the mouth of the Hellespont, which scarcely received an accession of waters from the tribute of those immortal rivulets Simoeis and Scamander. The Grecian camp had stretched twelve miles along the shore from the Sigaean to the Rhoetian promontory; and the flanks of the army were guarded by the bravest chiefs who fought under the banners of Agamemnon. The first of those promontories was occupied by Achilles with his invincible Myrmidons and the dauntless Ajax pitched his tents on the other. After Ajax had fallen a sacrifice to his disappointed pride and to the ingratitude of the Greeks, his sepulchre was erected on the ground where he had defended the navy against the rage of Jove and of Hector; and the citizens of the rising town of Rhoeteum celebrated his memory with divine honours. Before Constantine

WOMEN MUST WORK

This photograph shows the willingness of women to undertake tasks for which previously they had never been considered. It has been computed that in Great Britain during the war period over 1,500,000 women replaced men needed for the front

P

A FEW OF THE 39,000

The number of German prisoners captured by the British in the six months that followed the opening of the Somme offensive exceeded 39,000. A batch of Germans captured at La Boisselle are being shepherded by men of the famous Worcestershire Regiment

Photos: Imperial War Museum

BREAKING THE SILENCE

A British aeroplane flying by day during a quiet period of complete inactivity in the front lines has noticed some unusual movement in the German trenches. This receives the immediate attention of the British gunners, as this well-directed shell burst shows

gave a just preference to the situation of Byzantium, he had conceived the design of erecting the seat of empire on this celebrated spot from whence the Romans derived their fabulous origin. The extensive plain which lies below ancient Troy, towards the Rhoetian promontory, and the tomb of Ajax, was first chosen for his new capital; and, though the undertaking was soon relinquished, the stately remains of unfinished walls and towers attracted the notice of all who sailed through the straits of the Hellespont.

After the emperor Constantine had founded his new city, the Straits remained under the control of the Byzantine emperors for about a thousand years. Following the Eastern Empire's decay, the peninsula of Gallipoli was conquered in 1358 by the Turks, and when, in 1453, the sultan entered the city of Constantine, the whole of the seaway between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea was in their strong hands. For 350 years no hostile vessel passed through them.

With the decay of the Turkish power in the 19th century a new situation arose. In 1807 Sir J. T. Duckworth, with a British fleet, sailed along the channel and reached Constantinople, but before he could force the Turkish fleet to surrender the city, he was compelled to retire by lack of provisions and ammunition. During the Russo-Turkish war of 1877–8 a British squadron again sailed through the channel; but this time it did not proceed beyond the Sea of Marmora. The object of the voyage was to prevent the Russians from occupying Constantinople, and, although the object was attained without any action on the fleet's part, attention was again drawn to the difficulties of the passage.



Dardanelles and the Gallipoli peninsula were the scenes first of naval attacks and later of fierce battles on land. The forts on either side of the Straits were bombarded, but the warships failed to force a passage

The entry of Turkey into the Great War on the side of the Central Powers imposed a hostile barrier between Russia and her allies in the west, and under such conditions the question of forcing a passage through the Dardanelles again came up for serious consideration. The need for establishing communication other than through the frozen waters of the Arctic became more imperative as Russia's supply of munitions began to fail, while the wheat of which she had abundance would be very welcome to the peoples of Britain and France.

The proposed operation was upheld by Lord Kitchener, who, although unwilling to supplement the navy with military aid, considered the naval attack vitally important. If successful, he said, its effect would be equivalent to a successful campaign fought with the new armies, whilst it had the advantage of the fact that, if unsuccessful, it could be broken off. Mr. Balfour stated that such a campaign would "cut the Turkish army in two,

WHILE OTHERS SLEEP

Far more hours in the trenches were spent in waiting than in active attack or defence. During periods of the day one man kept watch in each sector of a trench, his head just below the parapet, while others took an after-dinner nap

Photo: Imperial War Museum

ARE WE DOWNHEARTED?

These troops are lucky enough to have found lorries of the Royal Army Service Corps that were not required at the moment for other purposes. Their faces show how fully appreciative they are of their good fortune

'Canadian Records'

put Constantinople under British control, and would also open the passage to the Danube." Sir Edward Grey maintained that it would influence the attitude of Bulgaria and the Balkans in general, whilst Mr. Winston Churchill was confident that such operations were not only feasible, but likely to be successful.

The proposal that an assault should be made on these historic Straits was first considered at a meeting of a war council as early as November, 1914. Nothing was done however, beyond collecting a few transports, until January, 1915, when Russia made an appeal to her allies for assistance. The proposal before the council envisaged a combined attack by the army and navy, but this scheme was abandoned when Lord Kitchener announced that it would be impossible to find the necessary 150,000 men for the land operations. The idea of a naval attack, however, found favour, its chief advocate being Mr. Winston Churchill.

Before taking any further steps in the matter the Admiralty decided to obtain the opinion of the man on the spot, Vice-Admiral S. H. Carden, who commanded in the Mediterranean, and a communication was addressed to him asking whether he thought the operation of forcing the Dardanelles by ships alone was possible. In reply he stated that he did not think the Straits could be rushed, but they might be forced by extended operations with a large number of ships. The Admiralty agreed with Carden's opinion and asked him to send particulars. These were received in London on January 11.

Four operations, he said, were possible, and he estimated that it would take a month to carry them out. They were (1) the destruction of the defences at the entrance to the Dardanelles; (2) action inside the Straits in order to destroy the defences up to and including Kephez Point battery No. 8; (3) destruction of the defences of the Narrows; (4) sweeping a clear channel through the minefields and advancing through the Narrows, followed by the reduction of the forts farther up and an advance into the Sea of Marmora.

These plans made a great impression, but met only with a qualified approval from Sir Henry Jackson, then chief of staff, who maintained that only the bombardment of the outer forts was feasible and that any attempt to get through the Dardanelles without

ALAS! POOR YORICK!

Two men of the Royal Engineers examine a ghastly relic of the battlefields. If they have read the plays of Shakespeare they can hardly fail to be reminded of Hamlet's famous line when he too picked up a skull, "Alas! poor Yorick!"

'Canadian Records'

Photo: Imperial War Museum

POST OF PERIL

The Seaforth Highlanders fully maintained during the battles of the Somme their great traditions. They are here seen holding a front-line post near Martinpuich. In many parts the front was held in this manner and not by a continuous trench

Photopress
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WAR'S JUGGERNAUT

The first appearance of the Tanks on September 15, 1916, came as a complete surprise to the Germans. It is thought by many that they were used prematurely, for the early types proved unable to manoeuvre on ground broken up by shell fire



Photos: Roberts

THE CAMELS ARE COMING

The Australian camel corps assisted in the successful campaign against the Senussi on the western borders of Egypt early in 1916. They also took part later in 1916 in the campaign that resulted in the expulsion of the Turks from the Sinai peninsula

SHIPS OF THE DESERT

The necessity to get wounded quickly back to hospital was rendered acute in the Egyptian and Palestine campaigns by the extreme heat. Camels, the "ships of the desert," were widely used for this purpose, two stretchers being slung along the back of each beast

military support was a foolhardy and dangerous undertaking. Lord Fisher, too, disliked the idea, not because he considered it impossible, but because he thought the ships could be employed to better advantage elsewhere.

On January 13 the matter was again discussed by the war council, when the following decision was reached. "The Admiralty should prepare for a naval expedition in February to bombard and take the Gallipoli peninsula with Constantinople as its objective." The matter was further discussed on January 28, after which Mr. Churchill made preparations for a naval attack.

It was hoped at the outset that the task would be assisted by a detachment of soldiers from the Greek army, and that these would be reinforced by a small portion of the British forces at the moment in Egypt. France's contribution, a small expeditionary force of Senegalese troops and Zouaves, was actually collected in North Africa under the command of General d'Amade. This part of the scheme, however, fell through when the king of Greece refused to follow the advice of his prime minister, M. Venizelos, who had promised military aid to the Allies. The effect was that practically no military help against the Turkish 5th army, entrenched on the Gallipoli peninsula, could at the time be granted by the British and French authorities, and thus the operations were left in the hands of the navy alone.

As soon as the Admiralty had decided to undertake the operations against the Dardanelles, the necessary ships were got together. First and foremost of these was the super-Dreadnought, Queen Elizabeth, which was detached from the Grand Fleet. She had a speed of about 25 knots, a displacement of 27,500 tons, and was armed with eight 15-in. guns, each capable of throwing a 1,720 lb. projectile a distance of 15 miles. The fact that the Grand Fleet was able to spare so powerful a vessel without impairing its strength to any great extent caused many of the neutral nations to revise their estimates of British naval power, and thus the presence of the great ship, besides contributing materially to the strength of the bombarding expedition, added considerably to the political prestige of the British Empire at this juncture.

The other ships comprising the force were all older and slower vessels, destined for the shipbreaking yard at the end of the war, but they possessed powerful guns and were, in consequence, ideally suited to the task. Moreover, in view of their age they were useless for service either with the Grand or Mediterranean Fleets, and their loss, apart from their personnel, would not be a matter of any real concern. Such were the old battle-cruiser Inflexible and the pre-Dreadnought battleships, the Lord Nelson and the Agamemnon. These

Photos: Roberts

OPEN WIDER, PLEASE

This patient can feel none of the glamour attaching to an honourable wound as compensation for the pain he is suffering. Dentistry while on active service in Palestine was a rough and ready affair, as this photograph clearly shows

DESERT DRESSING STATION

Even the most advanced and hastily constructed dressing stations during the Palestine campaigns had to be well sheltered. This was a precaution less against enemy aeroplanes and artillery than against the almost unbearable heat, to wounded men, of the sun's rays

FOR EVER ENGLAND

Not only the Sinai peninsula, where this photograph was taken, but every battlefield of the Great War in Europe, Asia or Africa has its memorial tombstones to the British dead, its "corner of some foreign field that is for ever England"

vessels were powerfully armed with 12-in. guns, as also were the still older ones Cornwallis, Irresistible, Duncan, Goliath, Ocean, Vengeance, Canopus, Albion, Majestic and Prince George. The Swiftsure and Triumph were more modern ships which had been purchased in 1903 from Chile. They carried four 10-in. guns and fourteen 7·5-in guns. Besides the ships mentioned, a number of cruisers were employed; these included the Euryalus, Sapphire, Amethyst and Dublin, and there was also a seaplane carrier, the Ark Royal. Several flotillas of destoyers and a number of minesweepers completed the British contribution.

The attacking force was further augmented by a number of battleships detached from the French Adriatic fleet. Of these the Suffren, with four 10-in. guns and ten 6·4 guns, was the most powerful. Like the British vessels she was somewhat old, as were also the other French ships, the Bouvet, Gaulois and Charlemagne. The only Russian warship was the old light cruiser Askold, commanded by Captain Ivanov, and armed with twelve 6-in. guns.

The British fleet was placed under the command of Vice-Admiral S. H. Carden, but after the early operations he resigned through illness and was replaced by Vice-Admiral John de Robeck. The French commander was Rear-Admiral Guépratte, who, although opposed to the operations, carried out his part loyally from his flagship, the Suffren. Vice-Admiral Peirse, with some ships from the East India squadron, carried out operations against Smyrna with the dual purpose of distracting the enemy by pretending to land on his Asiatic coast and, at the same time, preventing him from using the Gulf as a base for submarines operating in the neighbourhood and therefore dangerous to the Allied ships.

The opening shot of the campaign was fired by the Cornwallis at 9.51 on the morning of February 19. Her objective was Orkanie, a fort on the northern spur of Turkey-in-Asia, facing the toe of the peninsula of Gallipoli. The bombarding fleet on this, the first attempt, consisted of six battleships, the Inflexible, the Triumph, the Cornwallis and the Albion, and the French vessels Suffren and Bouvet. The Queen Elizabeth, owing to damage done to her turbines just before leaving Gibraltar for the scene of action, was unable to take part, and Admiral Carden therefore made the Inflexible his flagship.

Soon after the Cornwallis opened fire on Orkanie the Triumph engaged the fort at Helles and the Suffren was operating against Kum Kale by indirect fire over Cape Yeni Shehr. For about half an hour the leading ships poured shells on to their objectives, and then, about noon, they withdrew, making way for another squadron of big-gun vessels. The enemy attempted no reply, as the Allied fleet kept beyond the range of their guns. About 4.40 p.m. the Vengeance, Cornwallis and Triumph, with the Suffren, Gaulois and Bouvet, ventured closer inshore in an endeavour to finish off the first forts; but as soon as they came within range of the enemy an intensive fire was opened upon them, thus showing that the enemy guns had sustained little or no damage from the British bombardment. Soon afterwards the "cease fire" sounded and the Allied ships withdrew.

Days of stormy weather followed, and it was not until February 25 that the operations were resumed. Naval airmen discovered that during the interval the enemy had prepared several new gun positions and that any small damage inflicted had been repaired. On the second occasion the Agamemnon fired at fort Helles, the Queen Elizabeth at Sedd-el-Bahr, the Irresistible at Orkanie, and the Gaulois at Kum Kale. This time the fire was more accurate and all the long-range guns defending the mouth of the Straits were disabled or destroyed. In the afternoon the ships

OUTPOST OF EMPIRE

Great Britain declared a protectorate over Egypt just after the outbreak of the war and continued responsible for its defence. The men stationed at this outpost at Daaba, on the country's western borders, came into contact with the Senussi in 1916

Photos: Roberts

Photo: Imperial War Museum

A WORTHY FOE

In command of the Turkish forces in Sinai and Palestine from 1915 to 1917, Djemal Pasha, the figure with his hand on the table, proved an able and courageous leader. But his execution of leading Arabs at Damascus in 1916 precipitated the Arab revolt

came closer in and completely silenced all the forts by sheer weight of metal.

The next phase of the operation was the reduction of the forts between the entrance and the Narrows, known as the Dardanos group and the Messudieh group. Preceded by minesweepers, the Albion, Triumph and Majestic steamed up on February 26, and, although harassed by concealed batteries, obtained most satisfactory results. On this day marine demolition parties were landed to complete the work of the ships, and in spite of heavy resistance they blew up several guns or destroyed breech pieces. It was then that Lt.-Commander E. G. Robinson observed that Fort Orkanie was silent. He therefore approached it single-handed and, finding it deserted, blew up one gun and returned to bring up his party to complete the demolition. For this act he was awarded the Victoria Cross. On February 27 a gale interfered with the landing of the demolition parties, but in the afternoon the mortars at Sedd-el-Bahr were blown up.

By March 2 all the outer defences had been destroyed, and the minesweepers, covered by the guns of the battleships, began their perilous work. Between March 2 and 8 three bombardments were delivered against the Turkish forts constituting the main defences of the Dardanelles. The first of these was made on the 2nd by the Swiftsure, Cornwallis, Albion, Canopus, Prince George and Triumph; they bombarded the various inner forts, but Dardanos (No. 8) received the brunt of the fire. On March 3 another similar attack was made, but as no definite conclusions could be drawn as to the result, the method was changed, and on March 5 the Queen Elizabeth began an indirect bombardment of the forts guarding the Narrows. She took up a position on the outside of the Straits, two miles from Gaba Tepe, and during the day kept up a steady fire. The success of this long-distance bombardment, of course, depended upon accurate spotting, and this was done by three seaplanes and the battleships Canopus, Irresistible and Cornwallis.

Unfortunately, two of the seaplanes were put out of action, one by enemy fire and the other by a broken propeller, and thus, with only one machine in commission, the spotting was unsatisfactory. However, the bombardment was continued on March 6, by which time the enemy had brought up guns on the peninsula, which caused the Queen Elizabeth

HUMAN SEDAN CHAIR

Two Turkish soldiers are here seen, for lack of a stretcher, carrying a wounded comrade to the dressing station. The Turkish armies in Palestine were at an appalling disadvantage as against the British owing to shortage of equipment of all kinds

Photo: Roberts

ULTIMATE HORROR

There has not been even time for defenders or attackers to bury this dead German. The tide of battle has swept over him, and his body lies decaying in the mud of the trench in the same terrible attitude in which he fell

Photo: Imperial War Museum

FOOD FOR FLIES

A single shell is sufficient to produce the havoc and desolation seen in this trench. The War had its glorious moments, but they could not in any measure make up for the ghastliness of such scenes as this, where flies feed on rotting corpses

'Canadian Records'

FAIR FIELDS NO LONGER

War in all its unrelieved horror, typical of the whole Western Front, is shown in this photograph. Death takes pride of place in the foreground, while all around is a scene of utter desolation. Shells continue the work of defacing the fair land of France

to increase her range to 20,000 yards. Mr. Winston Churchill, in "The World Crisis, 1915," gives the results of this bombardment as follows:

Fort 13 was hit eleven times and Fort 17 about seven times. The barracks in the rear of both these forts were destroyed and one magazine was hit. No guns were damaged, but the firing, coming from an unprotected angle, had a disturbing effect on the Turkish gun crews.

On March 7, the indirect bombardment having proved unsatisfactory, direct attacks upon the forts at the Narrows were begun. The Lord Nelson and the Agamemnon, firing at ranges of about 13,000 yards, and assisted by the French squadron, bombarded them. When the firing ceased at the end of the day little had been attained, but on the following morning firing was resumed. On this occasion the Queen Elizabeth entered the Straits. Assisted by the Irresistible, Canopus and Cornwallis, she engaged the forts by direct fire, but visibility was bad, and results disappointing. According to Turkish accounts no damage of military importance was done, and there were no casualties. Operations continued until the 12th, during which time strong efforts were made to clear the Kephez minefield. Trawlers and picket boats, escorted by destroyers, carried out sweeping attempts on the nights of the 9th and 10th, but with small success.

Up to this juncture the operations against the forts leading up to the Narrows had been carried out with considerable caution; very little damage had been sustained in men and material, but the enemy had escaped equally lightly. In consequence the Admiralty War Group dispatched a telegram to Admiral Carden, telling him that a more energetic attack must be attempted, "the results to be gained," it said, "are great enough to justify loss of ships and men if success cannot be obtained without." As a result of this message Carden decided to prepare a mass attack on the Narrows, but owing to ill health he was obliged to return home before this took place and the command passed into the hands of Vice-Admiral de Robeck.

On the morning of March 18 the Allied fleet steamed into the Straits, having as its objective the forts guarding the Narrows. Admiral de Robeck's plan consisted of silencing these, together with the batteries guarding the minefields, and in order to accomplish this he ordered ten battleships to attack them. Four of these, the Queen Elizabeth, Lord Nelson, Inflexible and Agamemnon, were ordered to fire at the forts from a distance of 14,000 yards, whilst the Prince George and the Triumph were to fire at intermediate distances. After the forts had been bombarded and partially subdued, the four French battleships, Suffren, Bouvet, Gaulois and Charlemagne, were to steam up ahead of the British ships and bombard the forts at a range of about 8,000 yards. After four hours these ships would withdraw, and their place would be taken by six British battleships, the Irresistible, Albion, Vengeance, Ocean, Majestic and Swiftsure. When the forts had been sufficiently silenced minesweepers were to proceed to sweep a passage through the Kephez minefield.

At 10.45 on Thursday morning, March 18, the work began. The battleships steamed into their respective positions and began to bombard the forts. Every gun and howitzer on both sides of the Straits returned the fire, when, at about 12.20 p.m., Admiral Guépratte led his squadron up the Dardanelles and engaged the forts at close range. All ten battleships were repeatedly hit, but they silenced every gun at Dardanos and Suan Dere, and put Fort J at Kilid Bahr and Fort U at Chanak out of action. Most of the enemy gunners had been driven out or withdrawn from these forts, the interiors of which were reduced to a mass of débris.

The minesweepers were now ordered to begin their work, and the French vessels, which up till now had borne the brunt of the firing, were ordered to retire and make way for the relieving squadron. Up to this point little damage had been sustained by the British ships and the operations had

proceeded admirably according to plan It is true that the battle-cruiser Inflexible had been badly hit, but the damage was less than had been expected. But just as things were going well the first disaster occurred. At 1.54, as the Bouvet was coming out of the Straits in the wake of her flagship, the Suffren, she struck a mine in Erenkeui Bay. There was a column of vapour, followed by a spurt of dense black smoke, and in less than three minutes the old battleship sank, only 66 out of a crew of 600 being saved.

Operations, however, continued without a pause. At 2 o'clock the forts ceased to fire, but the Queen Elizabeth and Lord Nelson maintained their bombardment. The forts had not been completely destroyed, however, for when the minesweepers, followed by the relieving battleships, approached they opened a rapid but ineffective fire. By 4 p.m. most of the batteries guarding the minefields and also the forts had been silenced. The situation appeared to be favourable for clearing the minefields, but at 4.11 p.m. the second disaster occurred. The Inflexible, which had been lying close to an unknown minefield, struck a mine which killed every man in the foremost submerged flat. Though down by the head and listing badly, her crew were able to get her back to Tenedos.

The disasters which had marred the otherwise successful operations were not yet over; shortly after the mishap to the Inflexible the Irresistible also struck a mine and the Ocean, in going to her aid, suffered likewise. The crews of both these vessels were taken off by destroyers, but during the night both battleships foundered.

The damage so suddenly and unexpectedly caused to the Allied ships, especially in view of the fact that they had been operating in waters presumably swept and cleared of mines, caused Robeck to break off operations.

Thus ended the battle of March 18, and with it the purely naval attempt to force the passage of the Dardanelles. Considering the magnitude of the operations, the losses sustained on both sides were remarkably small; the Turkish casualties amounted to approximately 150 men, whilst only 61 lives were lost on the British ships. The greatest loss of personnel fell upon the French, for when the Bouvet foundered practically the entire crew perished.

The failure of the operation was undoubtedly brought about by enemy mines. It appears that on the night of March 8 a small Turkish ship had laid a line of moored mines in Erenkeui Bay, in waters occupied by British ships during the bombardment of March 5-6. These mines had not been detected by the sweepers, and on them the Bouvet and the three British vessels had come to grief. When night fell on March 18 the Turks set to work to repair the damage done in readiness for another attack, and by the end of the month the peninsula was even more securely guarded against attack than it had been at the start of the operations six weeks previously.

For some time it was thought that further efforts would be made to pass the Narrows; the fleet was reinforced by three more battleships, the Queen, Implacable, and Henri IV. But stormy weather set in, and although the Russian Black Sea fleet attempted to disconcert the enemy on March 29 by bombarding the outside forts and batteries of the Bosporus, the attack on the Dardanelles was not resumed.

In the "Official History of the War, Naval Operations," Sir Julian Corbett says:

> The great attempt to force the Narrows with the fleet had ended in what could only be regarded as a severe defeat. Out of the sixteen capital ships engaged three had gone down and three more, including the only battle cruiser, had been put out of action for an indefinite period. Of the whole Allied battle fleet, therefore, one-third was spent in one day's operation. At such a rate of loss, with results apparently so meagre, it looked extremely doubtful whether the navy unaided could ever force a passage.

The failure of the naval attack was attributed by many to incompetence and mismanagement, and there arose an urgent demand for a full inquiry. In consequence a royal commission, with the earl of Cromer as chairman, was appointed to inquire into the failure of the expedition. The first part of its report, published on March 8, 1917, dealt with the origin and inception of the campaign—i.e. it carried the story until March 23, 1915, and therefore covers the incidents described in the present chapter. In this, certain criticisms were made about Lord Kitchener and Lord Fisher, and the commissioners expressed the view that greater care should have been taken by the prime minister and the first lord of the Admiralty to ensure that the views of their naval advisers were properly put before the war council in London. Their words are as follows:

> We think that there was an obligation first on the first lord, secondly on the prime minister, and thirdly on the other members of the War Council to see that the views of the naval advisers were clearly put before the council; we also think that the naval advisers should have expressed their views to the council, whether asked or not, if they considered that the project which the council was about to adopt was impracticable from a naval point of view.

Dealing particularly with the actions of Mr. Winston Churchill, then first lord of the Admiralty, the report stated that he should not have urged Lord Fisher to give a very reluctant assent to the undertaking, but should have insisted on his expressing his views freely to the council in order that the civilian members might have been placed in full possession of all the arguments for and against the enterprise. Whilst not doubting Mr. Churchill's good faith, the commissioners expressed their opinion that he had been carried away by his sanguine temperament and his firm belief in the success of the undertaking which he advocated.

In "The World Crisis," Mr. Churchill defends his action in the following words:

> I have asked myself in these later years, what would have happened if I had taken Lord Fisher's advice and refused point blank to take any action at the Dardanelles unless or until the War Office produced on their responsibility an adequate army to storm the Gallipoli peninsula? Should we by holding out in this way have secured a sufficient army and a good plan? Should we have had all the advantages of the Dardanelles policy without the mistakes and misfortunes for which we had to pay so dearly? The Dardanelles commissioners, studying the story from an entirely different angle, obviously felt that if there had been no naval plan in the field, there would later on have been a really well-conceived and well-concerted amphibious attack. No one can probe this imaginary situation very far, and it is impossible to pronounce.
>
> But I think myself that nothing less than the ocular demonstration and practical proof of the strategic meaning of the Dardanelles, and the effects of attacking it on every Balkan and Mediterranean power, would have lighted up men's minds sufficiently to make a large abstraction of troops from the main theatre a possibility. I do not believe that anything less than those tremendous hopes, reinforced as they were by dire necessity, would have enabled Lord Kitchener to wrest an army from France and Flanders. In cold blood, it could never have been done. General headquarters and the French general staff would have succeeded in shattering any plan put forward so long as it was a mere theoretical proposal for a large diversion of force to the southern theatre.

But whatever the arguments for or against the expedition, it seems fairly clear that an extremely difficult, if not an impossible, task had been given to the navy. Whether or not an army, acting in conjunction with the fleet, would have turned the tide will never be known, but certainly an attempt by land to silence the batteries would have added to the chances of success. But by the time the army arrived the enemy had had time to make its task more difficult.

QUEENLY HOMAGE

The King and Queen, by countless acts of kindness and thoughtfulness and by their deep concern in all war activities, redoubled their popularity. Here Queen Mary is placing her tribute to the dead on the Roll of Honour in Balcorne Street, South Hackney, London

THE GUNS SPEAK

The smoke, dust and activity surrounding this 39th siege battery of the Royal Garrison Artillery well illustrates the intensity of the bombardment during the battles of the Somme. Used originally for the defence of fortresses, the guns of the R.G.A proved of great value in the War, especially for long-range barrages

WIRING PARTY FORWARD

Fearsome as these weapons look, they are used for the purely defensive purpose of constructing barbed wire entanglements. These men are about to consolidate the positions won from the Germans in the action at Morlay during the British advance in September, 1916

COUNTER-ATTACK EXPECTED

These British troops have taken up their position in the support line on ground recently taken from the Germans near Ginchy in the Somme area in September, 1916. They are on the alert for the expected counter-attack which nearly always followed an advance

CHAPTER 36

PRZEMYSL LOST AND WON

The campaign in Poland early in 1915 centred around the great fortress of Przemysl on the river San. An Austrian stronghold, it was taken by the Russians in March. Further struggles for its possession form the subject of a later chapter

PRZEMYSL, one of the oldest and most important cities in Galicia, had belonged to Austria since 1773. Standing in the centre of the Galician territory, just west of the confluence of the San and the Wiar rivers, it occupied in 1914 a position of considerable strategic importance, for it represented the first barrier, north of the Carpathians, to any Russian invasion of the Hungarian plains. This fact had long been recognized by the military experts of the Dual Monarchy, and as early as 1854 Przemysl had been fortified. Continued modifications and additions to its fortifications had given it at the time of the outbreak of war a reputation as a fortress that it scarcely deserved, for while it had not been neglected until 1900, a period of incompetent administration had permitted it during the next ten years to fall into disrepair.

When the ominous sabre rattling that accompanied the Agadir crisis of 1911 filled Europe with forebodings, the Austrian government awoke to a period of feverish if belated energy and began a systematic reconstruction of the fortress under a famous Swiss engineer, which continued almost until August, 1914. At its conclusion a group of German military engineers had pronounced Przemysl to be as strong as Thorn, admittedly the most powerful fortress in Europe, but it may be doubted whether such a remark was not less accurate than tactful. Much had been done to improve its defences. The whole foreground had been cleared, an enormous task involving the destruction of some 20 villages and several miles of forest, the field works had been strengthened and multiplied, new forts had been built and many modern cannon, electrically operated and well equipped with bomb-proof cupolas, had been installed. But although the fortress possessed some 1,000 pieces of ordnance only a small proportion were modern, and of those only four were large long-range guns.

Nor were the defences, as the bombardment by Mackensen later in the year was to prove, effective against modern howitzers, and as its armaments were quite incapable of keeping such weapons at a distance, its powers of resistance against armies equipped with modern siege artillery were essentially limited. Against armies lacking such artillery, however, its well-sited and mutually defensive forts were impregnable. Two rings of forts, apart from other works, surrounded the town, the outer ring measuring some 36 miles in circumference. Its garrison, under the command of the capable and courageous Kusmanek von Burgneustädten, numbered some 88,000 men in normal conditions, and it was adequately provisioned to withstand a siege of at least eight months.

Przemysl was something more than a great fortress and an object of national pride : it was the advanced supply base and *point d'appui* of Austro-Hungarian armies operating towards the Russian border. After all allowance has been made for such factors, however, it is difficult to see exactly why the Austrian command made so many desperate efforts to relieve it, when their energies could have been better expended elsewhere. The fact that it did not fall into Russian hands during the first siege was of consequence in that the Austrians thereby secured a valuable bridge-head over the river, but the vast loss of life suffered by the Austrian armies in their attempts to relieve it during the second siege was out of all proportion to its significance. Its chief value was that, while still held by Austria, it engaged a large besieging army of Russians which might well have proved a decisive factor had it been available for service in other areas.

From the Russian point of view, however, Przemysl represented a perpetual threat to their rear, and as the main line from Russia passed through the fortress, whence it branched west to Tarnow and south through the Carpathians to Cracow, the control of communications between Russia and her southern armies was seriously interrupted. While this undoubtedly complicated Russian supply difficulties, it was not of vital importance, for alternative lines existed through Rawa Ruska and through Sambor.

It was on September 11, 1914, that Conrad had ordered a general retreat of the Austrian armies following their disastrous defeat at Lemberg and Rawa Ruska, as was related in Chapter 15, and by September 18 the relics of the three broken Austrian armies, after their fearful retreat, were clear of the river San. Conrad realized that to attempt to hold the line of that river with his exhausted troops, while the Russians were so close on his heels, was impossible, and he wisely but reluctantly decided to continue the retreat to the Dunajec ; and there, with his right firmly planted on the Carpathians, he began, on September 26, to reform his battered command. His reluctance arose because by his retreat Przemysl was isolated ; but he had no choice, and, having left there an army corps which brought its garrison strength to some 130,000 men, and given Kusmanek instruction to hold out to the last, he was compelled to leave it to its fate. This acquisition of strength, although welcome from a military point of view, seriously affected Kusmanek's supplies, and when, on September 24, Dmitrieff's army finally encircled the place, only three months' provisions were available.

The Russian commander could afford to waste little time on the siege ; his men were urgently needed elsewhere. But he lacked any effective siege artillery and his heavy ammunition was limited. His task was more than difficult, for his own army numbered scarcely more than the defenders. If he wished closely to invest the place he would be quite unable to mass his troops rapidly, while the defenders, with the overwhelming advantage of interior lines, could attack in crushing strength wherever they wished. Little could be done, however, before the arrival of the heavy howitzers, an event long delayed by the confusion in the Russian lines of communications, and Dmitrieff devoted himself to repelling as best he could the numerous and energetic sorties planned by Kusmanek and to protecting his troops, with whatever few means he could devise, from the hail of shells from the superior armaments of the forts.

When Hindenburg and Ludendorff, desperately solicited by their Austrian allies, were compelled, at the beginning of October, to throw the German 9th army against southern Poland in a final attempt to stem the torrent of Russian invasion and draw off the terrible threat to Cracow which the Russian infiltration into the Carpathian passes represented, the capture of Przemysl became an urgent necessity Dmitrieff's army was urgently required in the west. The Austro-Hungarian forces, rallied by German efficiency and courage, were pushing forward in a long delayed counter-attack against the Russian front, which the success of the German thrust at Ivangorod was denuding of troops. It was clear that the Russians must retreat, and Dmitrieff decided on a desperate attempt to capture Przemysl by a *coup de main* before being compelled to retire. Massing

CHAMPION THROWERS

Hand grenades, first used in the 17th century by troops who became known as grenadiers, were in daily use during the four and a half years of the War. These French soldiers have spotted some German machine-gunners endeavouring to establish a forward position, and picked men are busily engaged in " bombing them out "

what guns he possessed on the south-east of the city, on October 4 he delivered a hurricane bombardment, which shattered two of the forts, and launched his division at the gap.

For three days a horrible struggle raged, the Russians sacrificing themselves in thousands in an effort to drive a wedge into the heart of the fortress. But the motley garrison, cheered by prospect of relief, presented an unbreakable front. The cross-fire from all the neighbouring forts that concentrated on the gap swept the storming parties away, and on October 8 Dmitrieff, having sacrificed some 70,000 men, was compelled to desist. The pressure on his rear and flanks exercised by the gradual advance of the Austrian field armies compelled him to withdraw the remnants of his shattered divisions slowly eastward, and on Oct. 11 Austrian cavalry entered the citadel.

The Russian retreat was no rout; try as they would, the Austrians were unable to cross the San, and Przemysl became the centre of the fighting. With a recklessness that in the circumstances was little short of criminal, the resources and the troops of the fortress were thrown into the struggle. When the German retreat from the Vistula left the Austrians on their right perilously advanced and it was seen that retreat was again urgent, a last-minute effort was made once again to put the fortress in a state of defence. Provisions, guns and munitions were rushed in, and the garrison troops were brought up to strength. In less than a month the Austrians were back on the Dunajec, and by November 6 the Russian bear had once more spread its arms round the doomed fortress.

Photos: Antony D'Ypres

IN FLOODED FLANDERS

Two members of a Belgian Red Cross unit are bringing a wounded man across the Yser floods. The opening of the dykes at the mouth of the Yser in 1914, which stopped the German coastal advance, caused extensive floods which remained throughout the war

Its garrison strength was approximately the same as in the first siege; many scattered divisions, isolated from their units or lost in the chaos of the second Austrian retreat, had sought shelter in the fortress, and Kusmanek found himself possessed of a mass of manoeuvre numbering some 50,000 men, besides his 90,000 garrison troops. Such a force, well supplied as it was with munitions, represented more than a mere defensive group. Properly handled, it might be capable of smashing a way through the Russian besiegers, and if the operation were timed to coincide with an Austrian advance from the Carpathians, would achieve more than the mere relief of the fortress.

As soon as the garrison could make contact with their advancing comrades, a breach would be created in the Russian front; from that, momentous consequences might follow. All the Russian armies in East Galicia and the Bukovina would be outflanked, and might well be annihilated, while to the north a devastating attack might be launched against the rear of the Russian forces in Poland, an attack which, in co-operation with German pressure from Thorn or East Prussia, might nip off the whole of the enemy armies spread out in the Polish salient and open the door to an invasion of Russia itself.

Such considerations undoubtedly occupied the minds of the Austrian high command when once again the enormous masses of Russian man power rolled back the exhausted Austro-Hungarian forces to the Dunajec. Nor was the Stavka (Russian General Headquarters) blind to the consequences of a successful sortie from Przemysl, and as their armies pushed slowly but surely farther into the Carpathian passes the full use of the railway through Przemysl became of vital importance. For the purpose of reducing the fortress, Brusiloff

BRINGING THEM IN

The Belgian soldier in charge of this little group of German prisoners can be told apart by the fact that he is the only one who is carrying arms. A rough plank bridge takes them over the quagmire that the fields of Flanders became



SINISTER SKITTLES

Of the same shape as the skittles knocked down in many alleys, these 220 mm. shells have a more deadly use. It would take only a few from this trainload to blast the peaceful countryside through which they are passing

was ordered to form a composite army consisting largely of reservists, and to place it under the command of General Selivanoff. It numbered at first some 120,000 men, but the pressure exercised by sorties compelled Selivanoff repeatedly to ask for reinforcements, and at the end of the siege he had over 200,000 men.

During the early days no siege artillery was available; all the heavy guns that Russia could command were urgently required for service on the active fronts. Moreover, the Stavka had learnt from previous experience that to attempt to capture the fortress by assault was as hopeless as it was terribly costly. Selivanoff was ordered, therefore, simply to invest the place closely and to rely upon the old-fashioned method of starvation to do his work. Difficult as it was for the Russians to get into Przemysl, it was scarcely less difficult for them to prevent the Austrians from getting out. Selivanoff dug himself in on a vast circle well out of range of the heavy guns. But the farther he was away the larger became the perimeter of his front and the greater the dispersal of his troops.

Again, interior lines gave the besieged an enormous advantage, of which Kusmanek was not slow to avail himself. His able lieutenant, General Tamassy, led one sortie after another, throwing the weight of his forces first against one side and then against another. The Russians had little warning of any impending attack, and time and again only the most desperate fighting prevented a break-through. But the ring of steel which gripped the fortress held, and as the slow days passed into weeks and the weeks merged into months, the position of the defenders became critical. Gradually the initiative had passed from Kusmanek to Selivanoff, and the Russian sappers slowly drove their trenches nearer the forts.

By the beginning of March, 1915, the Russians had captured the advanced field-works, both on the north and south, and were within rifle-shot of the outlying forts. The enormous numbers inside the fortress were becoming daily the best ally of the Russians. In spite of the strictest rationing and the wholesale slaughter of horses, the food supplies were diminishing with appalling rapidity. Nor was the ammunition in much better case. The attempts of the relieving armies to break through to the fortress had all failed, as will be described below, and for Kusmanek surrender grew hourly more certain. On March 13 the Russians had swept down on his northern defences and carried them at the point of the bayonet, and the shells from the Russian guns were falling inch by inch nearer to the heart of the citadel. A systematic bombardment was beginning and the forts were showing terrible signs of wear.

Kusmanek decided upon a last desperate attempt to break out. On March 15 and 16 he directed a tremendous fire from all the guns of the forts upon the Russian trenches to the south. He issued an appeal for volunteers on the 17th, but such was the demoralization of the half-starved garrison that only some 20,000, mainly Hungarians, responded to the call he made.

These troops the courageous General Tamassy led out of the fortress on the morning of Friday, March 19. With desperate heroism they flung themselves on the Russian trenches, and for nine hours strove to force a gap in the encircling defences, but all in vain. As they advanced in rushes over the open ground they were swept away in hundreds by shrapnel and machine-

HELL'S CHIMNEY

The heaviest artillery, including this camouflaged French 400 mm. gun, was transported by rail. Light railways were constructed behind the lines, on which the guns were run into position; and they were fired usually from a platform running on the track



ROYAL REVIEW

The King of the Belgians led his armies in person, while the Queen was indefatigable in hospital work, often working close behind the front line. They are here inspecting French troops, the King walking in the centre of the third row

POILUS AT PRACTICE

These French soldiers, in spite of appearances, are in no danger, for the scene is far behind the battlefields. Both sides staged elaborate rehearsals of battles, the Germans having in this respect the advantage, since they were indifferent to the havoc they caused

Photo: P.A.

NO PEACE FOR THE DEAD

Wartime cemeteries, when laid out behind the battlefields, suffered from stray shells. These German crosses have been shattered, but the fact that the houses and the rest of the cemetery are untouched show that no deliberate bombardment had been attempted.

'MINNIE' FOR SHORT

The Minenwerfer, an example of which is here seen ready to fire on the Isonzo front, was first designed at the Krupp works at Essen. Of two-inch calibre, it fired a spherical bomb weighing 250 lbs. and had a maximum range of 450 yards.

Photo: Mondiale

guns. Having lost 4,000 prisoners and nearly 8,000 killed and wounded, they drew back behind the ring of forts. Przemysl was doomed.

Meanwhile the fortunes of the Austrian field armies had reached their lowest ebb. Although the second retreat to the Dunajec in the beginning of November, 1914, had been accomplished with much less loss and suffering than had attended the terrible withdrawal after Lemberg in September, the Austrian forces, when finally they were lined up in their old defensive positions, were in no case for much more fighting. Most of the troops had been continuously in action against overwhelming forces for weeks on end, and the reckless extravagance with which Conrad had used up his reserves had left him no option but to call on the same men time and time again. Within the ranks of the Austrian command there obtained none of that wealth of supply and service which characterized their German allies. The troops were often worse equipped than their Russian enemies, although they were never so short of ammunition, and they suffered much more severely from the terrible winter conditions than did their more acclimatized opponents.

Conrad was in despair; his appeals for aid to Berlin became frantic. All along his line from the Rumanian border through Bukovina and the Carpathians up to Cracow, great masses of Russian infantry were thrusting against his position with a power that grew steadily. Throughout the whole of November and December a terrible struggle raged in the Carpathians, a struggle for Cracow, a struggle that might decide the fate of the Dual Monarchy. Time and again the Russian masses were beaten back from the passes; time and again fresh bodies of troops hurled themselves at the exhausted Austrians. Little relief was brought to this hard-pressed quarter by the German attacks in Poland. The Grand Duke realized the consequences that would follow if only he could win through the passes and scatter his myriad Cossacks over the Hungarian plains, and not for one moment would he lighten the pressure he was exercising in the passes. Three Russian armies, the 9th, the 8th and the 3rd, battled slowly forward along this front, which was still largely fluid. Gorlice, Tarnow, and the vital railway junction of Mezölaborcz were threatened, and by the end of the year Russia had almost secured an exit from the Dukla Pass.

So desperate had the position become that Hindenburg and Ludendorff, realizing the consequences that would follow if the Grand Duke were able to force his way over the Carpathians, redoubled their demands to German headquarters that the Eastern front should be reinforced. As has been explained in an earlier chapter, eventually they gained their point and the four new corps training in Germany were at last sent to the Eastern command.

With this reinforcement it was possible to form, on January 8, a new army, consisting of units of Austrian troops with a stiffening of Germans, officered and staffed by Germans, and the whole under the command of General von Linsingen. To this new army Ludendorff, in spite of Hindenburg's protests, was appointed chief of staff. But his visit to Neu Sandeg, Austrian headquarters, was only of short duration. In his "War Memoirs" he gives a withering account of the incompetence of the Austrian administration which he found on arrival, but his genius and his energy did much to put new



Photos: Mondiale

BEFORE—

The size of this shell, almost twice the height of a man, is as impressive as the monster which it is about to feed. The calibre of the heavy artillery in the War was far greater than anything that had ever before been known

—AND AFTER

The attitude of the gunners and the smoke from the gun in this photograph tell their own story. The noise of the heavy guns was heard not only in Paris and in the Kent coast towns, but also at times quite clearly from the hills to the south of London

Photos: G.P.A.

WHEN WINTER COMES

Intense cold and the blinding glare of sun on snow add to the trials of these Austrian troops on an Alpine summit more than 10,000 ft. high. Their sun goggles and padded clothing make them look more like robots than men

life into the Austrian command and to straighten out the tangle of confusion he found there.

In particular, he arranged with Conrad the plan already referred to in the chapter on the Winter Battle, which Mr. Winston Churchill has described as the "crab." While Hindenburg and Ludendorff—for the latter returned to Hindenburg's headquarters at Posen in the middle of January—were to operate the left pincer in East Prussia and Northern Poland, Conrad, reinforced by the German Southern Army, was to operate the right pincer in the Carpathians. Falkenhayn's dubiety as to the successful outcome of such a vast operation, spread over a front some 350 miles long, was vindicated in the result. But the Russians were known to be planning a stupendous advance on the two wings, and if the Germans were to anticipate them, time became the chief factor.

Conrad prepared to strike, and for this purpose withdrew all available troops from the Serbian front. The new Southern Army was put into line in the Carpathians, and the 3rd and 4th Austrian armies on its left, under the command of Boroevic and the Archduke Josef Ferdinand respectively, were strengthened. The plan on this sector was an enveloping movement by which, while the two Austrian armies should strike slightly north-eastwards from south of Tarnow and Gorlice, the Southern Army should strike direct at Przemysl; in this way it was hoped not only to relieve the fortress, but also to crack the Russian front. Farther east, in Bukovina, a general pressure should be maintained by Pflanzer-Baltin, and if a break-through should prove possible there, a vast enveloping movement from the right was to be put in train.

The scheme failed. It did not even secure the great local success which rewarded the left pincer of the crab hundreds of miles to the north. Nor was its failure due to the fact that Conrad and Linsingen were not a Hindenburg and a Ludendorff. The Austrian troops fought with magnificent heroism, but the ghastly winter conditions placed them at a great disadvantage when pitted against Russian troops, and, moreover, Brusiloff had fixed his teeth too firmly in the Carpathian passes to permit of his dislodgement by frontal attacks.

The Grand Duke was anxious to secure a speedy break-through into Hungary; the state of the Russian reserves of munitions was giving rise to the gravest alarm in the Stavka, and unless it could fight on an open front, where man power could be made to count much more effectively, it was clear that the Russian steam-roller would shortly become paralysed. In the far south of the line the front was largely fluid, and the Grand Duke looked to this area for the fulfilment of his designs. He had given the able Brusiloff in the Carpathians all the men he could spare him, and as the battle grew in intensity further reinforcements were dispatched. The immense superiority of the lateral railways north of the Carpathians over those on the south gave an advantage to the Russians that proved decisive.

Before, however, the Austrian offensive could open, the Russians had launched a fierce attack all along the line, but particularly in Bukovina, where Webel's Dniester force rapidly pushed back the small units under the command of Pflanzer-Baltin. By January 23, however, the Austrian offensive was ready, and the sudden thrust against the Russian fronts in the Carpathians

HIDE AND SEEK

The darkness which has hidden an Austrian post, the barbed wire defences of which can be seen in the foreground, is dispelled by the rays of two Italian searchlights on the opposite slopes. Their value in mountainous country was considerable

relieved the pressure on the Austrian Bukovina army, which, rapidly reinforced, began at first slowly and then more rapidly to recover the ground it had lost. North and west of Gorlice the front remained comparatively quiet, but south and east of that point a terrible struggle raged continuously until the end of March. On the one hand, the Austro-German forces strove to break through to Przemysl, and, on the other, the Russians endeavoured to secure an exit from the Carpathians. Before the beginning of the offensive Brusiloff's 8th army had won the Uszok and the Dukla passes from Boroevic's 3rd army, and had seriously threatened the Volocz and the Wyszkov passes to the east.

The arrival of the Southern Army, which went into line between Boroevic's 3rd army and the Pflanzer-Baltin group, temporarily checked the Russian advance. Pflanzer-Baltin was able to keep pace with von Linsingen's progress, as the Southern Army drove forward with some rapidity against the right of Webel's Russian troops, and his rapid reconquest of Bukovina by the middle of February began to threaten a serious envelopment of the Russian line. Brusiloff, however, would not yield an inch. His troops still outnumbered Boroevic's force, and in spite of desperate assaults, in spite of the advance of the German southern army on his left flank, he clung to his position and even managed to move forward day by day a little nearer to his goal. Von Linsingen reached the Upper San before the end of the month, but his advance did nothing to stop Brusiloff's drive.

Both sides were rapidly drawing reinforcements from the front farther north, and southern Poland became denuded of troops. In particular, the Austrians were able with the units withdrawn from Poland to form a new 2nd army under Böhm-Ermolli and throw it into line to strengthen Boroevic, in the early days of February. The troops on both sides suffered fearfully from the intense cold—temperatures often falling 13 degrees below freezing point—and the savagery of the fighting added to the horror of this ghastly winter campaign. Back and forward the line swayed, but by the end of February the Russians had consolidated their position in the Dukla Pass and had captured the junction of Mezölaborcz.

The necessity of relieving Przemysl, now in dire straits, spurred the Austrian command to one effort after another. In a frantic attempt to break the Russian line the 2nd army was heavily reinforced and launched in mass attacks at the Russian positions. The troops were swept away in thousands and many Austrian divisions were left no stronger than a battalion. Von Linsingen had been held up by a heroic Russian stand at Zwinin and Ostry, and farther east the left wing of Webel's army, which the Russians, now seriously alarmed, had by this time heavily reinforced with several fresh corps under the command of Lechitski, had just checked and was now driving back Pflanzer-Baltin's exhausted troops.

Although many of the Austrian troops had been fighting continuously for six weeks, the Austrian command refused to give up the struggle. They had already sacrificed many more men than the whole garrison of Przemysl in vain efforts to relieve the fortress, but in March they determined on a final effort. Every available man was brought up to strengthen the decimated 2nd army,

Photo: G.P.A.

ONCE PEACEFUL VALLEY

Villages high up in the mountains, almost cut off from civilization, might have been thought immune from the incidents of war. But not only the Italian soldiers, but also the scene of destruction which this Alpine village presents testifies to the contrary

BACKS TO THE MOUNTAIN

This wooded slope in the Tirolese Alps conceals the menace of an Austrian trench, from which retreat will be almost impossible. The nature of the country made the element of surprise far more prominent on the Austro-Italian than on the Western front

Photo: Sport and General

Photopress

GOING GREAT GUNS

Guns of a calibre of those seen in action here revolutionized the strategy of naval warfare. In contrast to the sea battles of Nelson's day, Beatty, in the battle of Jutland, opened fire at more than 16,000 yards range

and the appalling struggle was renewed with even greater intensity. The only gain that resulted from this gambler's throw was a slight advance by Von Linsingen, but the rapid retreat of Pflanzer-Baltin in Bukovina was seriously exposing the former's right flank, and he was, by March 20, compelled to halt. The imminent fall of Przemysl enabled the Russians to draw reinforcements from the besieging army.

The Austrians had failed. The right pincer of the vast Austro-German crab had grasped nothing, had been, on the contrary, terribly mauled. It had failed to relieve Przemysl, failed to crack the Russian line, failed even to dislodge Brusiloff from the Carpathians. Hundreds of thousands of lives had been sacrificed and the survivors were exhausted. Frost-bite had taken almost as heavy a toll as bullets.

On the Russian side conditions were rather better, for their superior numbers had enabled them to rest one battalion while another was fighting, but the strain upon them had been severe enough and the exhaustion of their ammunition was almost complete. They were in poor case to exploit the retreat of the Austrians to positions west of the mountains, on which they fell back at the end of March, and although the fighting, particularly at the exits of the mountain passes, continued intermittently for something like a further three weeks, it very slowly died down.

SHIP SUNK, CREW SAVED

This small tramp steamer has been torpedoed in home waters and is rapidly sinking, the crew having taken to the boats. Hundreds of ships were so sunk, yet though exposed to the constant danger of submarine attack, no seamen ever refused to sail

Przemysl had already fallen. With the failure of his last sortie and the failure of the final Austrian offensive which became evident on March 20, Kusmanek had no choice but to surrender. His ammunition and his supplies were practically finished and his half-starved troops were growing daily less capable of defending their positions. Moreover, the Russians had ordered Selivanoff to press the siege, as his men were urgently required elsewhere, and he had begun to close in on the fortress. His heavy artillery was slowly mastering the fire of the forts and his sappers, with immense skill, were driving their trenches ever closer to the doomed city. Further resistance was useless, and, having blown up his forts, Kusmanek capitulated on March 23.

CHAPTER 37

YPRES SECOND BATTLE (I)

The main German offensive in the West in 1915 was made near Ypres, but, as in November, 1914, that city was retained by the British after a long and terrible struggle, marked by the use of gas

EARLY in April, 1915, the British took over from the French a further five miles of front which lay between the Menin road and the road from Ypres to Poelcappelle. The total length of the British front, which now stretched from Poelcappelle road on the north to Cuinchy on the south, was thirty miles, and once again the British troops lay around the city of Ypres.

As many of the trenches taken over were in poor condition, considerable time was spent in strengthening and fortifying them, and, as the Germans were employed in a similar manner, for a time the sector remained comparatively quiet. German aeroplane attacks, however, became more frequent in view of the negligible quantity of anti-aircraft guns possessed by the British.

The situation of the Allies in the Ypres salient was far from good. It is true that on the new British front Sir John French had 16 divisions in line against only 11½ German divisions, but they were far inferior in artillery strength. Two of the weakest French divisions were placed between the British and the Belgians; there was considerable divergence of opinion between the commands of the three Allied forces. The positions where the French and British and French and Belgian contingents joined had been badly chosen, the former meeting at a shoulder of the salient, the latter at the canal with their respective forces on opposite sides of the water.

On April 15 information was sent to British G.H.Q. that a prisoner captured by the French on the day before had divulged a German plan for making use of asphyxiating gas in a forthcoming attack, as soon as the wind should be from a favourable direction. Not only did the prisoner declare that he had seen the actual cylinders of gas, but on him was found an impregnated gauze and cotton pad intended to counteract its effects.

General Putz, commanding the French forces in Flanders, was not inclined to attach much faith to the prisoner's story. He considered it as a deliberate German attempt to mislead the Allies' intelligence service, and intimated as much to the British 2nd army. A reconnaissance by the R.F.C. failed to perceive any signs of special apparatus, and although a report was received from Belgian sources that the Germans had manufactured in Ghent a large quantity of respirators, no action was taken by the Allies.

Nor were these the only indications of an impending gas attack, and it is a striking instance of the lack of co-operation among the Allied armies that more importance had not been attached to them. Although the Germans had made a gas attack upon the Russians in February, 1915, at Bolimów, the fact does not seem to have been brought to the notice of the British command. As C. R. M. F. Cruttwell says in his "History of the Great War," possibly the latter did not recognize the experiment and took it for a protective smoke cloud, as German reports state that the extreme cold made the results of the emission unsatisfactory. More probably, with their habitual unbusiness-like carelessness, the Russians failed to report it to their Allies.

Again, at the end of March, 1915, the French 10th army reported in its bulletin that a German prisoner had described gas cylinders which were hidden behind Zillebeke and also the respirators with which the German soldiers had been supplied. This warning also appears to have been ignored, nor apparently were the British forces near Zillebeke informed of the fact.

The French official history reveals another case of unheeded warning, in the fact that on April 16 the Belgian General Staff supplied the French high command with information concerning the equipment of German troops with tulle respirators for protection against the gas which they intended to discharge

Photo: Mondiale

TORPEDO GETS HOME

A torpedo's effect is well illustrated by this final glimpse of a merchant vessel before she disappears. The German submarine campaign was, however, in the main unsuccessful until 1917

Photos: Keystone

SINGLE FILE FOR SAFETY

These Italian troops are moving up to the front along a road camouflaged by means of overhanging brushwood. The use of this device was mainly in eliminating for aerial observers the shadows of troops and transports on the march

against the French. This report also contained the information that the 26th German corps were being instructed in the use of gas cylinders and in their disposition for attack.

Although they may have regarded these reports merely as an enemy ruse calculated to prevent them withdrawing troops from the Ypres salient in preparation for an offensive elsewhere, yet the French and English commanders cannot be held entirely blameless in neglecting rumours and reports and making no provision for protection against gas. When, after the event, thousands of home-made respirators began to reach the front, troops who had suffered in the first attacks must have wondered why some such simple provision could not have been made for them in the first instance. The statement that the allied commands could not believe that the Germans would so transgress the rules of war as to use gas can be no excuse for a lethargy which condemned thousands to injury and death.

Meanwhile the attention of the British G.H.Q. was concentrated upon the capture of Hill 60, an artificial hillock made of the earth excavated in cutting the Comines–Ypres railway. This eminence, which the Germans had taken from the French in December, 1914, was of considerable tactical importance, since from its summit the enemy were able to observe the British movements and, when necessary, to enfilade the British position in the Ypres salient.

An attempt to recapture Hill 60 having been decided upon, during the month of April the site was undermined by experienced miners from the Monmouthshire Regiment working in co-operation with the 1st Northumbrian Field Company of the Royal Engineers, and six mines were run under the hill. Five were exploded at 7.0 p.m. on April 17. At once an artillery barrage was opened upon all approaches to the hill, and the storming parties, which consisted of a company of the 1st Royal West Kent and sappers of the 2nd Home Counties Field Company, R.E., rushed the summit, followed by their supports, which comprised another company of the 1st Royal West Kent, two companies of the K.O.S.B., and a machine-gun detachment of the 9th London Queen Victoria's Rifles. The few survivors of the German garrison were overwhelmed, and within a quarter of an hour the assaulting troops were consolidating the captured ground.

A position of such value was too important to be given up by the Germans without a struggle, so throughout the night of April 17–18 desperate counter-attacks were launched, and at dawn part of the crest was again in German hands. At 6.0 p.m. a British counter-attack once again succeeded in dislodging the enemy, holding the summit despite the intensity of the German gun-fire and the incessant efforts to repulse them during April 19, 20 and 21. By nightfall on April 21 the Germans temporarily ceased their attacks, but Hill 60 had cost the British more than 100 officers and 3,000 men.

A fact of interest in connexion with this operation is that German gas cylinders had actually been dug into position in the enemy trenches on Hill 60,

CABLE TRANSPORT

The commanding position of this natural gun platform is clearly to be seen from this photograph. The Italians have overcome the difficulty of carrying ammunition for the gun up the mountain side by means of an aerial cable, also used for carrying wounded

where they had been for some time. The presence of gas was indeed noticed, but the smell was wrongly supposed to be due to gas-shell. In any case no report of the presence of these cylinders appears to have been considered by officers of the headquarters staff.

The scene of battle was now to become the entire salient of Ypres, and on April 22, 1915, opened that series of actions officially referred to as the battle of Gravenstafel Ridge. The fact that the British had not resumed the offensive after Neuve-Chapelle was construed by the Germans as a confession of weakness and their Supreme Command decided that the time was ripe for attack. The method they resolved to employ differed from the tactics of "First Ypres." Then they had a distinct numerical superiority and endeavoured to reach a rapid decision by sheer weight of attack. By now, however, in the matter of men the odds were no longer against the British 2nd army, and Falkenhayn, who directed the operations, could not rely solely upon infantry power. He did possess, however, an overwhelming superiority in artillery, and profiting by the lesson of "First Ypres," he determined to make full use of it.

The tactics employed by the Germans on April 22 consisted of a short advance to a limited objective, which, captured and immediately consolidated, would serve as a base for a further short advance: a method derived from the advance by "parallel" of earlier siege warfare, and which needed intensive artillery fire to drive back the enemy step by step. In order to be certain of a sufficient preponderance of artillery, Falkenhayn brought up the great Krupp naval guns and the howitzers which had been used along the Belgian coast in repelling Hood's battleships and monitors.



Photos: G.P.A.

MORTAR STAYS PUT

The mountainous nature of the country on the Italian front made mortars and howitzers often of more value than field guns. This Italian mortar has been dismounted from its carriage and placed on a concrete bed well behind the lines

Placed in position against Ypres, this new siege train was provisioned with an extraordinary amount of shells. But even this was not enough to ensure absolute success. So the new weapon of destruction was brought to the front. All along the German lines round Ypres —northward, southward, and eastward — gas-cylinders, it appears, were placed as early as March 30. Each steel cylinder was about fifty-three inches long and was filled with chlorine. The cylinders were stored in bomb-proof casemates, in the proportion of one to every six and a half feet of the front. The officers directing the gas operations then waited until the wind was in an easterly or north-easterly direction. They had a long time to wait.

During this period German troops were instructed in respirator drill, and after three weeks had passed without a sign of the necessary favouring wind, on Thursday, April 22, they made up their minds to take advantage of a north-easterly wind blowing towards the French front north of the salient.

Here a French colonial division of Zouaves and Turcos held the line between the right wing of the Belgian army at Steenstraat and the left wing of the Canadian division on the Poelcappelle–Ypres road, just behind the village of Poelcappelle. To the rear of the Canadians was the village of St. Julien, and on their right was Zonnebeke and the Roulers road, from which the line swerved round south-west to Hill 60. The German general calculated that if the French colonial division were broken north of Ypres, the line of the Canadians could be turned and then Ypres could be captured in a sudden sweep.

The day was exceptionally fine, and apart from some desultory shelling, the morning and the early part of the afternoon passed peacefully enough. At 5.0 p.m. heavy howitzers opened a violent bombardment upon Ypres and the surrounding villages. The German field-guns, however, were quite silent, for

EASTER EGGS

It is hardly likely that the Austrian troops will appreciate these Easter offerings from their Italian foes. With grim humour, emphasizing their bitter racial hatred, they have chalked "buona Pasqua" ("a happy Easter") and other messages on the shells

BROKEN MELODY

Death came unexpectedly to these Italian soldiers in the course of a sudden Austrian attack in the mountains near Cividale. The sweetness of the guitar lying at their side was stilled almost at the moment that the sweetness of life was taken from them

Photo, C.P.A.

the cylinders of gas had been opened, and their fire would have disturbed the clouds of poison gas which drifted like a greenish-yellow blanket in front of the German lines. The strange vapour slowly moved across the ground in the direction of the French line, and soon the Algerians were enveloped in a lethal fog against the devastating effect of which they had no protection. It was more than flesh and blood could stand, and in the growing dusk a terrible sight was witnessed between the Ypres canal and the Pilckem road. Back down the roads through the back areas of the 5th corps ran a stream of French coloured troops, coughing, half-blind and thoroughly panic-stricken, while over the bridges crossing the canal north of Ypres there surged ever-increasing bodies of French colonials, to whom no discredit can be attached for having broken under the insidious and unknown weapon employed against them.

The tactical effect of this first gas attack is well described in a dispatch from Sir John French, which says :

> What follows almost defies description. The effect of these poisonous gases was so virulent as to render the whole of the line held by the French division practically incapable of any action at all. It was at first impossible for anyone to realize what had actually happened. The smoke and fumes hid everything from sight, and hundreds of men were thrown into a comatose or dying condi ion, and within an hour the whole position had to be abandoned, together with about 50 guns.

Against the gas there was no defence. The unprepared Frenchmen and Algerians either died, or fell back towards the Yser canal, half blind, and suffering greatly. Then behind the gas-cloud came the German troops. Their advanced outposts wore gas-proof helmets, while the main force of infantry was provided with respirator masks. The only troops that remained in the front line of the French sector were the 1st Tirailleurs and a supporting company of Zouaves, on the immediate left of the Canadian division. Unaffected by the gas, they remained in position, but between them and the flank of the Belgian army at Steenstraat was a gap four and a half miles in width. Through this gap poured German soldiers until they were checked within a quarter of a mile of Mouse Trap Farm by two platoons of the 13th Canadian battalion and a company of the 14th. The German advance was finally halted by fire from the 10th Canadian battery lying north of St. Julien.

So great was the confusion that it was at first believed that the Canadians were in retreat, but although their flank was in danger of envelopment Brigadier-General Turner was able, at 8.25 p.m., to report that his line still held, and that his left wing had been extended south-westward to St. Julien by two and a half companies of the 3rd Canadian brigade moved up from that village. Between St. Julien and Mouse Trap Farm, a distance of nearly a mile and a half, there were no troops at all. From Mouse Trap Farm to Hampshire Farm there were three companies of the 14th battalion and the 3rd Field Company in line. The former were soon reinforced by the Zouaves who had remained in the French line, and who now fell back on the left wing of the Canadians, and they in turn received two companies of the 7th Zouaves on their left.

It was becoming increasingly obvious at G.H.Q. that a grave situation had arisen, for, in spite of the reserves thrust in, so extensive was the break made by the Germans that the new flank was little more than an outpost line, and the way to Ypres lay open. Luckily for the British, the Germans had made no preparations for exploiting this great success achieved by the element of surprise, and, lacking adequate reserves, showed no inclination to push on farther that evening. Furthermore they had attained their "limited objective," and so contented themselves with consolidating their position and allowed a further respite to the British to bring up reinforcements. This respite was indeed a godsend, for towards nine o'clock in the evening the 5th corps was informed that the French troops had abandoned Pilckem, many of their batteries had been captured,

Photo: G.P.A.

SOLDIER AS STRAPHANGER

Suspended from a wire railway midway between two Alpine peaks, this Italian will, if he loosens his hold, fall to certain death in the valley beneath

SHADOWS ON THE SNOW

This photograph shows a column of Italian Alpini crossing a snowfield in the Tyrolese Alps. To the normal marching kit of other soldiers they added the full equipment of the experienced mountaineer, and rifles and ice-axes were carried side by side

Photo: Topical

DRAWERS OF WATER

When possible, water pipe lines were laid right up to the trenches; on other occasions water butts, such as those seen here, were brought up from the railhead, and were sunk deeply into the ground, as well as being sandbagged for additional protection

ROADS TO MEND

In this destroyed village members of a Highland regiment are carrying off bricks from the shattered ruins for road-mending purposes. The patching up of roads behind the lines was one of the more unspectacular but still vitally necessary tasks during the War

PERTHSHIRE'S PRIDE

From the day of the battle of Fontenoy in 1745, when the Black Watch, known familiarly as the "Heroes of Perthshire," first encountered a foreign foe, the regiment steadily established a magnificent reputation. A battalion is here seen being piped back to rest billets after a period in the front line

and that no French troops, apart from stragglers, were to be found east of the canal except at Steenstraat.

Fortunately the line held by the Belgians was still intact. The sector occupied in April, 1915, by the 6th Belgian division, stretching along the western bank of the Yser–Ypres canal from Drie Grachten to Steenstraat, was considered a particularly well-covered position. By reason of the formation of the ground and the wooded nature of the country troops were effectively hidden from enemy observation. Villages and farms had not at that time suffered greatly from the effects of shell-fire, and the tenacious Flemish peasants persisted in remaining on their land, as though rooted in their native soil, large numbers of them paying with life or limb for their persistent obstinacy. Not until their roofs fell in or fire destroyed their homes would they consent to leave their farms.

The right wing of the Belgian division, at Steenstraat, consisted of a regiment of Grenadiers, two battalions of which were in the trenches and two in reserve. Their flank was protected by artillery near Lizerne and a battery beyond the Kemmelbeek. When the Germans had pierced the French lines after the gas attack this battery found itself in danger and was withdrawn.

As soon as General De Ceuninck was aware that the French troops occupying the bridge-head were in retreat, he sent for Colonel Lotz, in charge of the right-wing forces, and urged him to hold the position at all costs. Being in ignorance of the exact situation of the French forces, De Ceuninck could do no more than open fire with rifle and gun upon the right wing of the attacking Germans, and make the necessary dispositions towards strengthening his exposed flank at Steenstraat.

Towards 7.30 p.m. the Germans attacked the Belgian right wing, as had been expected, in an endeavour to force a passage of the canal. Under a fire of gas-shells the Belgian Grenadiers stood firm while, harassed by machine-gun fire trained on them by the beam of a portable searchlight, the Germans were unable to throw a single bridge across the river.

Meanwhile, being informed that the French 45th division intended to counter-attack that night towards Pilckem, and asked to co-operate, General Alderson, commanding the Canadian division, sent word to his 3rd brigade to counter-attack in the direction of Kitchener's Wood. This counter-attack, which was one of the most dashing features of the action, was launched at midnight.

In front of the Canadian Scottish of the 3rd brigade and the 10th battalion of the 3rd brigade the trees of Kitchener's Wood could be seen in the light of the misty moon about five hundred yards away. The wood was occupied by 7,000 German troops, who had built forts defended by machine-gun parties with sand-bags. No enemy was visible as Colonel Leckie led the Canadian Scottish forward and Colonel Russell Boyle led out his 10th battalion. But when the leading companies were in the hollow, about two hundred yards from the mass of trees, the line of hostile machine-guns directed upon them a continuous sheet of bullets.

But the assault never wavered. Those who survived the hail of fire rushed over the low ridge and through the hedge where the Germans were entrenched, and then entered the shadowy wood. Here it was wild hand-to-hand fighting in clumps and batches amid the brushwood, the Canadians having only their rifles against the machine-gun forts forming the German support line. The two battalions were soon reduced to ten officers and 400 men, and with so light a force they could not possibly hold such an advanced position without support. This was not forthcoming, and, the French offering no assistance, it was decided to withdraw from this advanced position to one south-east of the wood. It had been "a true counter-attack," and had been carried out "with rapidity, decision, and courage." As a feat of arms it redounded greatly to the credit of the Canadian forces.

Although by daybreak on April 23 ten battalions were established throughout the length of the gap they were far from forming a continuous line, nor were they properly entrenched. The German line from in front of Poelcappelle to Steenstraat now ran west of the

Photo: Imperial War Museum

GOD SAVE THE KING

There can be no mistaking the warmth of the welcome which King George is receiving from these British soldiers. The King paid several visits to the troops in France, the first occurring in December, 1914. With him is Major-General Hudson, later General Sir Havelock Hudson

Photo: Imperial War Museum

SEAFORTHS WHO SURVIVED

Their share in the battle over for the moment this group of Seaforth Highlanders, with men attached from other regiments, is marshalled behind the lines for roll call. Enemy action has sadly cancelled the report " all present and correct "

Poelcappelle road as far as St. Julien, through the southern edge of Kitchener's Wood, through Welch Farm, down to Mauser Cottage and up along the eastern side of the Yser canal. A huge dent had been driven into the northern side of the Ypres salient, with a maximum penetration of some two and a half miles. Such was the effect of the first gas attack of the War, during which the enemy liberated some 180 tons of chlorine along a front of $3\frac{3}{4}$ miles.

Primitive protective measures against gas attacks were carried out. Troops were advised to hold wetted cloths or handkerchiefs over the mouth and nose, or, if they could obtain them, to use respirators made of lint and tape, moistened with a solution of bicarbonate of soda; but to units in the most exposed positions neither lint nor tape nor bicarbonate could have been readily available.

INFORMATION BUREAU

These Canadian intelligence officers are interrogating a recently captured German soldier. Information thus gained was sometimes of the greatest value, and raids were made with the object of capturing a prisoner, who might give vital news

'Canadian Records'

Fully aware that gas attacks might henceforth take place whenever the wind was favourable, and aware also that some time must elapse before respirators could be made in England and dispatched to the army, officers were sent to Paris to purchase the necessary material and crude respirators were sewn up by Frenchwomen in the small towns close to the front. Shortly afterwards, also, an appeal was made to the women of England for respirators of gauze and cotton, a request which met with an immediate response. Even so, the bulk of the defending troops lacked adequate protection.

During April 23 British counter-operations took place. Four English battalions, the 2nd Buffs, the 3rd Middlesex, the 5th King's Own and the 1st York and Lancaster, under the command of Colonel Geddes of the Buffs, and for that reason known as the Geddes detachment, were detailed to join the Canadians in front of Kitchener's Wood and to extend westwards until they made contact with the French right.

As soon as he had assembled his scattered force Colonel Geddes moved up from St. Jean. It was now daylight and his troops met with considerable

PERILOUS PATROL

Only in exceptional circumstances did patrols go out into No Man's Land in broad daylight, as this one is doing here. Their objects normally were to bring in wounded, cut enemy wire, or reconnoitre, aims less dangerously effected under cover of darkness

Photo: Imperial War Museum

opposition from the German machine-gun posts, and when near Mauser Ridge came under heavy enfilade fire. Nevertheless they managed to extend the left flank of the Canadians to a point within 1,200 yards of the canal. Colonel Mordacq had three and a half battalions of his Zouaves still on the eastern side of the canal, where they formed the French right wing, and it was hoped that he would be able to deploy these troops until they made contact with the British. They were unable to advance, however, and a gap still remained, but eventually, about 9.30 a.m., the 1st Canadian brigade gained contact with the right of the Zouaves and so the line to the canal was completed.

A " line " is perhaps too flattering a description to apply to this particular section of the front. Nowhere was it properly entrenched, the battalions holding it were depleted, many of them to half their strength, and there were gaps which urgently required filling up. Seventeen and a half British battalions were facing 42 German battalions which were supported by artillery with a superiority of five to one. The position was extremely serious.

Fortunately the German offensive movement had been suspended, and they contented themselves with shelling heavily all along the line. Both Sir John French and General Foch sent up what reinforcements they could to the danger zone. General Putz received two battalions and three batteries from Nieuport. Colonel Geddes' detachment was increased to seven battalions, the infantry of the 50th (Northumbrian) division was allotted to General Smith-Dorrien, the 1st Cavalry division was moved up in support, while the 10th and 11th brigades of the 4th division, together with the Lahore division, were commanded to be in readiness.

At 2.40 p.m. the 5th corps was ordered to make a general attack between the Yser canal and Kitchener's Wood in the direction of Pilckem, supported by a French attack along the canal. A delay in the arrival of the 13th brigade caused a postponement of the attack from 3.0 p.m. until 4.15 p.m.

Owing to the lack of time for sufficient preparation, and on account of the advantageous position of the enemy on the higher ground of Mauser Ridge, the attack was doomed to failure. Advancing in broad daylight, without adequate artillery support, over unreconnoitred ground, the British assaulting lines were mown down. French co-operation was limited to a short-lived attack by about four hundred Zouaves, who only managed to hinder the advance of the 1st Royal West Kent and soon retired again. Towards 7.0 p.m. the attack was broken

TRENCH TEA PARTY

These Canadian troops realize that they may be disturbed by German activity in the midst of their tea-party, and one of their number keeps a watchful eye on the periscope. The duckboard flooring is some protection against French mud

'Canadian Records'



TAKING COVER

The scene of this photograph, taken near Mametz, was known for obvious reasons as Death Valley. The tractors which are drawing these 8-inch howitzers into position serve also to protect the men from the shells that are bursting around them

Photos: Imperial War Museum

off, as no general advance could possibly be made, and the action had gained very little in exchange for the heavy casualties sustained. The tragic irony of the situation, as the official historian points out, is that "actually no ground was gained that could not have been secured, probably without any casualties, by a simple advance after dark, to which the openness of the country lent itself." In fact, this short encounter lost the British over 2,000 men. After dusk the sharp angle formed at the Poelcappelle road where the line had been bent back to the south-west, and which had become quite untenable, was flattened by a slight withdrawal on to another line, which offered less opportunity for enfilade fire. The retirement was effected without a casualty.

During the six days from April 24 to April 30 were fought the series of actions officially known as the battle of St. Julien. On the morning of April 24 the Germans resumed the offensive, and at 3.0 a.m. attacked the flank of the Belgian army, which had lost touch with the French through the capture the day before of the village of Lizerne. The Belgians succeeded not only in beating off the enemy attack, but in again establishing contact with the French.

At 4.0 a.m., heralded by an hour's intensive gun-fire, a gas attack was launched against the apex of the Canadian line south of Poelcappelle. The gas was released on a thousand-yard front against the 8th and 15th battalions of the 2nd and 3rd Canadian brigades respectively, and, forming a wall about fifteen feet high, soon drifted over to the British lines. The Canadians possessed no prophylactic other than moistened handkerchiefs and towels, yet, although many men were overcome by the fumes, they succeeded in holding the enemy, and only at one point on the 15th battalion's front did the Germans manage to break through.

The commander of the 3rd Canadian brigade, Brigadier-General Turner, had no reserves. To cope with the situation he was obliged to withdraw two battalions from Kitchener's Wood, but even so they were unable to arrive in time to alter the situation. Luckily the Germans, checked by the ferocity of an unexpected resistance, and possibly deterred by a fear of penetrating into the gas-affected area, left the pursuit of the attack to the corps reserve of the 26th Reserve Corps, which was ordered to advance towards St. Julien between the Steenbeek and Kitchener's Wood; and by 7 o'clock all the German effort was concentrated upon that sector of the salient facing north-west, lying between the apex and Kitchener's Wood.

Soon it became evident that the 13th battalion, the Royal Highlanders,

AMMUNITION ARRIVING

Shells are here seen arriving in lorries at a dump behind the lines during the Somme offensive. A thick covering of earth and small shrubs is laid on top of them as camouflage to avert the major disaster of their being sighted by enemy aircraft

WAGON WHEELS

This scene on the Gallipoli peninsula shows the wreckage of a transport column. Though parked in a sheltered position, it has been caught, completely immobile, and shattered by enemy shell fire. The horses, however, had previously been unharnessed, and are seen unharmed in the distance

Photo: Imperial War Museum

now menaced from the rear by the enemy penetration of the 15th battalion's line, would have to retire to avoid being surrounded. This retirement was disastrous in two ways. Those who succeeded in making the retreat were so heavily shelled that they lost half their numbers, and a company of the Buffs and two platoons of the Canadian 15th battalion were left standing without having received the order to retire. Fighting until their last cartridge was expended the survivors, most of whom were wounded, were forced to surrender.

An open space of nearly a mile now broke the front line as a result of this forced retreat. General Alderson immediately ordered up whatever reinforcements he could find, and Sir Herbert Plumer, commanding the 5th Corps, promised to send help as soon as it could be summoned.

There was now a slight lull in the action until 11.0 a.m., when a fresh attack opened. This was directed against the new Canadian position between Kitchener's Wood and the apex of the salient. In the absence of reinforcements the battalion commanders had to decide upon a further withdrawal to a position between St. Julien and Fortuin, and accordingly the right half of the 3rd Canadian brigade fell back, closely pursued by the Germans and harassed by an artillery fire to which the British had no effective reply. So short indeed was their artillery of ammunition at this time that, according to the official historian, the allotment averaged only about three rounds a day for each gun.

Photo: G.P.A.

MODERN GOLGOTHA

No Man's Land provided, as this photograph shows, scenes of unbelievable ghastliness. For many of those who died in the open space between the front lines there was no burial, for the rescuing of the wounded was often all that could be attempted

TORTURED EARTH

Fighting in an area which is pockmarked with huge craters made by bursting shells, these members of a forward post have held on to the last. Their heroism is typical of that of many other British soldiers

Photo: G.P.A.

Towards midday the German attack developed against St. Julien and the British front immediately to the east, and three-quarters of an hour later the Germans occupied the trenches in front of the village from which they had driven the survivors of the 14th and 15th Canadian battalions. About half a mile east of the village a company of the 7th battalion clung to their position.

The Canadians were once again obliged to retire, and the 3rd brigade fell back upon the Wieltje–Grafenstafel road. Unfortunately some detachments appear not to have received the order, with the result that two companies of the 3rd battalion were left to fight a hopeless battle with the oncoming Germans. When, finally, they managed to retire, only forty-three men survived, almost all of whom were wounded. At Grafenstafel the left flank of the 8th Canadian battalion was in the air, but Colonel Lipsett stood firm with his men even when an effort by the 1st Monmouthshire to reinforce his left proved unsuccessful.

The situation was undoubtedly serious, and General Plumer ordered up what reinforcements he could muster. He

realized the necessity of holding the position until the French should bring up the men and batteries needed to attempt the recapture of their lost ground, and to strengthen him in his determination a message arrived from Sir John French, which stated that "Every effort must be made at once to restore and hold the line about St. Julien, or situation of the 28th division will be jeopardized."

As soon as he received these instructions General Plumer instructed General Alderson to make a strong counter-attack with fresh troops being dispatched to him. This force consisted of the 10th and 150th infantry brigades and six battalions under the leadership of Brigadier-General Hull. General Alderson ordered the attack to be made at 3.30 a.m. the next day, April 25, in the general direction of St. Julien, with the object of driving back the enemy and securing the exposed left flank of the 28th division. The 149th and 151st brigades of the 50th (Northumbrian) division, then acting as corps reserve, were to be in support.

Hull's attack was commenced under unfavourable conditions. The night was dark and rain fell heavily. No opportunity had been afforded for reconnaissance, and General Hull had to throw his men into a battleground the natural features of which were obscure, without even knowing for certain whether all the attacking units could be found and assembled in time. In addition, he soon found himself unable to keep in touch with the fifteen battalions he commanded, for he was understaffed and telephonic communication had not been established. His men had no means of protection against gas.

On moving up to their battle positions the units were heavily shelled, and they were delayed by the fact that they had to defile through two narrow gaps in the defensive wire of the British support, or, as it was called, the G.H.Q. line. It became obvious that there was not the smallest hope of making the attack at the appointed hour of 3.30 a.m. The French had not progressed, and elsewhere on the British front serious gaps were being reported. The situation was more confused and dangerous than it had been on the morning before. Fortunately an attack by the German 23rd reserve corps against the Franco-Belgian position from Steenstraat to Lizerne was unable to make headway.

General Hull's attack was perforce postponed until 5.30 on the morning of Sunday, April 25, a date coinciding with that of the landing of Sir Ian Hamilton's divisions at Gallipoli. The assault opened with misfortune, for the news of its postponement had not reached the supporting batteries, which, after blazing away between 2.45 and 3.15 a.m., and putting the Germans on their guard, suddenly closed down. The assault was therefore opened with quite inadequate artillery support. To make matters worse, owing to lack of communication and various delays, many of the units destined for the attack did not arrive in time, and when the assault was launched it was with five battalions instead of the fifteen originally detailed for the operation.

The advance was carried out in perfect order, and had almost reached the first houses of St. Julien when it was checked by heavy machine-gun fire from the village and outlying farms and from Kitchener's Wood. For twenty minutes this hail of fire swept along the front of Hull's attack until the survivors were compelled to retreat to cover. The losses of this splendid but fruitless effort amounted to 73 officers and 2,346 other ranks. No attempt was made by the Germans to exploit their success, and the best that could be said of an expensive failure was that it had, at least, prevented the enemy from making further trouble in this sector.

At about the same time part of the German 27th reserve corps fell upon the 85th brigade holding the line from Gravenstafel to Broodseinde. After a bombardment of the British front with shrapnel, high explosive and gas-shell, which lasted the whole morning, the German infantry swarmed across No Man's Land and managed at several places to penetrate the defence of the 2nd East Surrey in the front line trenches. After a fierce hand-to-hand struggle the attackers were repulsed at all points save one, where an enemy lodgement was effected on a sixty-yard front, from which the East Surrey, exhausted, depleted in numbers and short of bombs, were unable to eject them.

In view of minor German successes at other points, the Canadians were once more compelled to retire, thus leaving the left flank of the 85th brigade in the air. At this period the line was very tenuous, held here and there by isolated bodies of troops, but the enemy, apparently unaware of this precarious condition, attempted no further advance that evening.



WHERE DESTRUCTION LURKS

The development of aerial observation in the war rendered essential the camouflaging of heavy gun emplacements in the back areas. Though the camouflaging of this 8-inch howitzer looks insufficient, it will break up the line of the gun when observed from above

HORSE POWER: THE REAL THING!

The phrase "horse power" is usually connected with the motor car. This photograph of a 60-pounder being dragged through the mud, however, shows the real thing. Horse power has been defined as the effort needed to raise 33,000 pounds one foot in one minute

LOYAL LANCASHIRE

Ordered to the front after a period in rest billets, this battalion of the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, whose name was changed after the war to the Loyal Regiment, faces the prospect with its accustomed cheerfulness. Originally the 47th and 81st Foot, this regiment during the Great War had no fewer than 21 battalions

SANDBAGS FOR SAFETY

A typical scene behind the line shows men on "fatigue" duty. Less spectacularly employed than if they were capturing or defending a trench, these builders of a dug-out near Bazentin-le-Petit are yet engaged in a task of vital importance

CAGED CAPTIVES

Caged like wild animals, but in their present condition far less dangerous, these German prisoners have been captured in the Somme offensive. Most of them look too weary to mind that this temporary rest is a prelude probably to years of incarceration

CHAPTER 38

YPRES SECOND BATTLE (II)

Like the first, the second battle for the defence of Ypres was a long and costly struggle. Its second part, the subject of the following chapter, began with the British withdrawal on April 28 and lasted through the greater part of May

THERE is little doubt that during these days of comparatively futile battles Sir John French knew in his own mind that the most sensible course would have been to withdraw his line to one better organized for defence and presenting less dangers than holding a rectangle some five miles by three with awkward corners at Polygon Wood and Gravenstafel. But the French command was still convinced of its ability to recover the lost ground and strenuously opposed any British withdrawal.

On the afternoon of April 28 the British commander-in-chief visited General Foch and expounded his reasons for considering an early withdrawal of his troops advisable. The French commander protested vigorously, holding that such a retirement would be a confession of weakness and would invite a further enemy offensive. Also he had "the honour to observe" that the new line proposed for the British army was badly chosen, being at the foot of the ridges and thus more difficult to defend. He considered that a retirement in the Ypres salient would be the worst possible preparation for the forthcoming offensive in the Arras sector.

To sum up, General Foch urged upon Sir John French on no account to order the proposed retirement, but rather definitely to forbid it, and in conclusion he had "the honour to request the Field-Marshal not to consider any further the retirement from the line on account of the serious consequences which would ensue, but to be good enough to keep to his present intention and to support the French offensive to retake the Langemarck region at all costs beginning at noon on the 29th." To this Sir John French could make but one reply. His postponement of the withdrawal would be contingent upon the French making good their losses, and thus re-establishing the original front.

The following day General Putz ordered a fresh attack to be made, but this order was soon afterwards cancelled, as the artillery, newly arrived, was not ready to support. Sir John French agreed to delay his retirement for a further twenty-four hours, until the results of the French attack should become apparent. By this time the situation was more than ever confused—with the French promising to regain their ground if the British would stay where they were and offer assistance, and, on the other hand, the British generals straining to begin their retirement but consenting to delay it until the French attack was made. Various reasons prevented Generals Foch and Putz from fulfilling their promise, and for the next two days the two armies were for all practical purposes inactive.

On May 1 a note from General Joffre was handed to Sir John French, stating that, in view of the operations planned for the Arras–Neuve Chapelle front, the forces around Ypres might well be reduced in favour of the offensive farther south. As this proposal was in entire agreement with his own views, Sir John French readily acquiesced, and instructions were issued to General Plumer to begin his retirement at 8.0 p.m. that night.

This day, which saw the first stage of the retirement effected without incident, was notable for an enemy gas attack upon Hill 60—an attack which was unsuccessful, though the 1st Dorsetshire suffered heavily in the defence. They were, however, admirably supported by the 1st Devonshire and 1st Bedfordshire, who, undeterred by the gas-cloud, charged towards the front and checked the assault. The official historian notes, "The forbidden weapon had been faced and defeated for the first time."

The morning of the following day, May 2, was so quiet that it was hoped to carry out the remaining stages of the retirement without molestation, but during the afternoon an enemy attack developed. After a heavy bombardment of the 4th division front, lasting for over four hours, cloud gas was released on a three-mile front, followed by a strong infantry assault. This attack was completely repulsed, though certain units—for all lacked adequate protection—suffered heavy losses. From information afterwards available it is evident that the attack was in no way connected with the British withdrawal, but had been carried out to profit by a wind favourable to a gas attack. The failure of the enemy assault was due largely to the British and French artillery, which, as soon as the poisonous cloud was seen, dropped their shells just behind it, right in the path of the advancing infantry. When the action had flickered out, the night being quiet, General Plumer continued his methodical retirement. The Lahore division, most of the artillery, the 2nd cavalry division and a large body of infantry were now back upon the new line, and only the infantry of the 4th, 27th and 28th divisions remained on the old front line.

One day had still to pass before the retirement could be completed, and during this the Germans launched an attack on the 85th and 11th brigades around Gravenstafel and Berlin Wood. Owing to the withdrawal of so many batteries during the previous night the defending troops lacked artillery support and were entirely dependent upon rifle and machine-gun fire to ward off the enemy. In parts of the line the front trenches were only manned by one soldier to every twelve yards of trench, yet so stout was the resistance that although reinforcements had been hurried up, they were not required. Towards 9.0 p.m. the fighting petered out, and under cover of darkness the remaining troops retired on to the new position without any casualty, and completely unknown to the enemy.

Thus the withdrawal of the British troops was carried out as planned, and from Hill 60 the new line formed a rough semicircle by Hooge, through Frezenberg, until it joined up with the right wing of the French at a spot south of Pilckem called Turco Farm. Divisional headquarters were withdrawn to various positions behind Ypres, and on May 4 the operations officially referred to as the battle of St. Julien came to an end. Work was now taken in hand to strengthen the new system of entrenchments and to consolidate the line generally, while arrangements were made to give warning of further gas attacks by gongs, bells and horns.

So unexpected by the enemy was the British retirement, and so skilfully had it been carried out, that on the morning of May 4 the Germans bombarded the abandoned British trenches for some time before they became aware of the withdrawal. That evening the Germans advanced and entrenched themselves at varying distances from the new line. During the movement they found abandoned such famous battle-grounds as Shrewsbury Forest, Nonne Bosschen, Polygon Wood and Zonnebeke.

The following day the scene of activity was once more transferred to Hill 60. After discharging gas against the British position, the Germans managed to

LET THEM COME

In a hastily prepared trench, inadequate for shelter, these German troops are preparing to repel a counter-attack on their new but insecurely held position on the edge of a wood. Stretcher bearers have followed and are already tending a wounded soldier

Photos: G.P

THEIR TURN NOW

The counter-attack has been successfully repulsed, and in the see-saw of battle the Germans are climbing out of their trench, preparing to dash across the open on a further stage of the advance. Once again the stretcher bearers prepare to follow

secure the summit once the fumes were dissipated. In this manner the crest once more passed into their possession, though the British could not be dislodged from the western slope. Hill 60 remained in German hands until June, 1917.

On the evening of May 6 Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was instructed to hand over the command of the 2nd army to Sir Herbert Plumer and return to England, a step for which, according to the official historian, "no reason or explanation was vouchsafed." General Plumer, upon taking over his command that evening, established his headquarters at Oxelaere.

The next battle in the Ypres salient, and one of the fiercest of the whole operations, opened on May 8. It lasted six days and bears the official title of the battle of Frezenberg Ridge. To the German command, the withdrawal of the British troops probably seemed, as General Foch had said it would, a confession of weakness. They were therefore anxious to make another attempt to gain ground while conditions were favourable. With this end in view the Duke of Württemberg planned an offensive against that sector of the British front comprised between Frezenberg and the Menin road.

The British 5th corps was now called upon to hold a new line, which was in no condition to withstand continuous bombardment—and to this it was now subjected day after day. The trenches were shallow, at places no more than three feet deep. It was impossible to dig farther without their becoming waterlogged, and with such flimsy protection the British infantry were called upon to endure the heaviest shelling they had yet experienced, and, according to General Plumer's order of May 8, to hold the line with all possible tenacity. There were few reinforcements available, for the 1st army was about to be engaged in the battle of Aubers Ridge farther south, and the artillery support was completely inadequate. The entire heavy artillery with the 2nd army at this period amounted to 44 old 4·7-inch guns, 8 sixty-pounders, 16 old 5-inch howitzers, 4 old 6-inch howitzers, and 2 9·2-inch howitzers. Of these the 5th corps was allotted 6 sixty-pounders, 12 4·7-inch guns, and 2 5-inch howitzers, with the result that during the ensuing fighting the British were completely out-gunned by their opponents.

The activity of German patrols on the night of May 7–8 gave the British an intimation of a probable attack, and at dawn on May 8 the 5th corps front was heavily shelled, the bombardment being particularly severe on the sector held by the 83rd brigade. With practically every trench destroyed by the devastating fire and the support line equally deluged with shell, it is extraordinary that the line held. But the 3rd Monmouthshire, the 2nd King's Own, the 1st Suffolk, and the 2nd Cheshire of the 83rd and 84th brigades holding the front of the Frezenberg Ridge made a particularly heroic resistance, and only when the defending troops were wiped out to a man did the enemy succeed in obtaining any foothold. The 80th and 83rd brigades on the right were also subjected to very heavy shell fire, but succeeded in resisting the German advance.

Between Frezenberg and Mouse Trap Farm, farther north, where the 84th brigade held the line, the defenders were vigorously attacked, but the troops clung to their position as long as possible, until they were overwhelmed and



Dorien Leigh

BEDSIDE MANNER

A visit from the kaiser often did more than dressings and medicines to stimulate the recovery of wounded German soldiers. Like King George in England, he paid frequent visits to hospitals, sometimes presenting men with the decorations they had won

ALL SET

This German mortar, in its woodland emplacement, is ready for action. The heavy type of trench mortar used by the Germans in the War was of 6·69-inch calibre, and could fire a shell of 100 lb. up to a range of about 1,250 yards

Mondiale

Photo: U.S.A.

TAKE THE STRAIN

The familiar words of the coach of a tug-of-war team might be well applied to the men in this photograph. On the last stage of its journey to its camouflaged emplacement near Montdidier this German heavy gun has to be man-hauled into position over open country

Photo: Imperial War Museum

SHOCK TROOPS IN ACTION

With their task made easier but their coming heralded by the invariable preliminary bombardment, these German shock troops stream across the bullet-swept No Man's Land to the assault. Picked from many regiments, they were the pride of their army

the remnants of battalions were forced back. A gap of nearly two miles was caused in the front, and though a defensive flank had been formed to prevent the Germans from rolling up the line, the necessity for a strong counter-attack was apparent. Accordingly General Bulfin directed the 3rd Middlesex of the 85th brigade and the 1st York and Lancaster of the 83rd to launch an attack on either side of the railway to recapture the lost ground. Shortly afterwards these two battalions were reinforced by the 2nd East Surrey and the 3rd Royal Fusiliers, both battalions of the 85th brigade, together with the remnants of the 2nd East Yorkshire and 2nd and 5th King's Own Although the assault was carried out with the utmost energy until dusk, it was found impossible to dislodge the enemy. But the Germans were by this means prevented from making any further advance, and the way was prepared for another counter-attack carried out that evening by the 10th brigade. This was successful in forcing the German 26th reserve and 27th reserve corps to abandon the ground they had captured, so that by the end of the day the Germans could claim very little gain of territory, though they had inflicted severe losses upon the defenders.

DELIVERED BY HAND

In the course of an attack on an Allied trench two Germans drop behind cover, while a third hurls a hand grenade before following their example. The early hand grenades were of percussion type, but later time-fuse models were employed

Photo: G.P.A

Fortunately for the British the enemy had no great reserves to throw into the action, and from the German point of view these attacks were not regarded as main assaults. Their plan, it appears, was to rely on their immense superiority in artillery, backed up by their command of the air, to break down the resistance of the defending troops. When and where this object was achieved, they looked to their trench garrison to follow up the advantage.

Although during the next three days the French offensive in Artois and the British battle of Aubers Ridge occupied the attention of the Germans farther south, they did not relinquish their attempts to break in towards Ypres. But they abandoned their efforts to recover the ground recaptured by the 10th brigade, and during May 9, 10 and 11 concentrated their attention upon the sector between Zwarteleen and the Ypres–Zonnebeke railway, held by the 27th division. On May 9 they stormed and occupied an advanced trench defended by a platoon of the 2nd Gloucestershire, all of whom were killed;

PREPARED BY THE ENEMY

In a gun position near Mametz, prepared and, as the German wicker shell-cases show, till lately held, by the enemy, a single British gun now stands. In the background a field battery is also moving up to a new position

Photos: Imperial War Museum

but apart from this small and purely local success, all their attempts at penetration failed. Their repeated onslaughts were on each occasion frustrated by the excellence of the British rifle fire. During the next days renewed efforts, though preceded by heavy shell-fire and a release of cloud gas, proved equally ineffective. On May 11 the Germans hurled themselves upon the 27th divisional line south of the Menin road. Here, though part of their assaulting troops, owing to a change in the direction of the wind, were caught in their own gas cloud, they did manage to force the 2nd Cameron Highlanders back to the support line, and though incessant attacks and counter-attacks were fought around the lost position, it remained in the hands of the enemy.

Apart from heavy shelling the British front enjoyed a respite on May 12, and the sorely tried 28th division, which had been in the thick of the fighting since April 22, went into reserve, its trenches being taken over by the 1st and 3rd cavalry divisions.

The respite did not prove of long duration. At dawn on Thursday, May 13, the cavalry front was subjected to a heavy bombardment. The whole of their sector, running from Bellewaarde Lake to just east of Wieltje, was violently shelled, and the effect of the high explosive, coupled with a drenching rain which fell all day, was to turn the British trenches into a veritable morass.

Early in the morning the enemy managed to penetrate the front of the 7th cavalry brigade, but were held up by steady fire from the support trenches. Strong attacks were also made at other parts of the battlefield, particularly around Mouse Trap Farm, which, though captured by the Germans during the day, was retaken during the evening. By nightfall, when the battle of Frezenberg came to an end, the Germans had managed, as the result of six days' fighting, to shell the British off the forward slope of Frezenberg Ridge, and had advanced between Hooge and

TENANTS BY EVICTION

A successful attack brings these Tommies the reward of a welcome and effective shelter in the dug-outs of a captured German trench. Their smiles denote cheerful tenants, who, moreover, have the additional advantage of paying no rent for their lodgings

Photo: Imperial War Museum

CLOUDS THAT CHOKE

A cloud gas attack is here seen in progress on the Western front. Gas clouds were at first of chlorine, which caused immediate choking; later the more fatal phosgene was used in increasing quantities, since it had a more deadly inflammatory effect on the lung tissues

Mouse Trap Farm to a maximum depth of a thousand yards.

One more important action remained to be fought before the 2nd battle of Ypres came to an end. This battle, fought on May 24–25, is known as the battle of Bellewaarde Ridge. During the interval between the close of the battle of Frezenberg Ridge and the beginning of the new battle various changes of organization were made, and advantage was taken of the lull in the fighting to consolidate the trenches and make additional lines of support. Gas helmets, of the flannel-bag type, now began to arrive, though only in small quantities, and Vermorel sprayers, an apparatus similar in appearance to a large disinfectant sprayer, were supplied to neutralize any gas lurking in the trenches. The 27th division was relieved between May 17–19 by the 1st cavalry division. May 15 witnessed a resumption of the offensive by the French.

HARDLY HUMAN

There is something at once farcical and terrifying about these machine-gunners, wearing gas-masks, which, during 1915, became an essential part of every soldier's equipment. The use of gas added a further touch of inhumanity to the whole War

On the British front the period of respite came to an end on the morning of Monday, May 24. At 2.45 a.m., when it was already growing light, signal rockets flared up from behind the German lines, and simultaneously with a concentrated fire from batteries, rifles and machine-guns a great cloud of gas, the largest yet experienced, was released on a total frontage of 4½ miles against the 5th corps position. Luckily, the British were expecting a gas attack owing to the favourable weather conditions, so that the element of surprise was missing, and they were able to repulse the assaulting infantry, who followed the wave, with heavy rifle and machine-gun fire.

Although the gas-cloud rose as high as forty feet and was so strong as to be felt twenty miles behind the line, no repetition of the disaster of April 22 occurred. But Mouse Trap Farm, though now nothing but a heap of ruins and a name on a map, passed into the hands of the enemy, and as the action developed the Germans began to make some headway. For four and a half

photo: Imperial War Museum

AMMUNITION COLUMN

No shells are disturbing the temporary peace of the countryside near Fricourt seen in this photograph, yet the proximity of war is amply evident. An ammunition column on its way to the fighting zone is passing an Australian howitzer battery ready for action

PICK AND SHOVEL

These members of an Australian pioneer battalion are busily engaged in the task of filling sandbags. The magnificent physique of the Commonwealth troops, practically all of whom had been brought up in the open air, is well shown in this photograph

Photos: Imperial War Museum

hours the gas attack continued, and the smoke and dust of the bursting shells, mingling with the chlorine cloud, blotted out the scene of action from the eyes of the commanders. With telephone communications cut by high explosive and runners continually becoming casualties, it was almost impossible to follow the various phases of the battle.

On the front between Verlorenhoek ridge and the Ypres–Roulers railway two companies of the 8th Middlesex and a company of the 2nd East Surrey, despite a brilliant resistance, were overwhelmed and wiped out almost to a man. To their right the 3rd Royal Fusiliers and the 2nd Buffs—or rather what remained of them—after being forced from their position, rallied in the third line trenches to the rear of Railway Wood, and clung there stubbornly all day.

Farther south, in the vicinity of Hooge, the gas-cloud passed northward of the 1st cavalry brigade, which stood firm. On its left flank, however, the 2nd cavalry brigade was less fortunate and suffered severely from gas. But the line held fast, any gaps were quickly filled by supports, and before evening British counter-attacks had restored most of the line save at Mouse Trap Farm. There it was considered expedient to abandon ground to a depth of about a thousand yards, which it was decided was impossible to hold. The necessary withdrawal was successfully accomplished that night, and the French altered their line at Turco Farm so as to connect with the British left.

NEWS FROM HOME

Papers and magazines were sent out to the troops, not only from England but from the Dominions as well, and their arrival was eagerly awaited. This Australian is reading the news from home, while his comrade keeps watch through the periscope

The following day was uneventful, and at this point the second battle of Ypres came to an end. The fight had been waged with little intermission for nearly five weeks and had been fought to a standstill. Both sides were exhausted, and both had suffered enormous casualties. At Hill 60 and during the battles of Ypres the British losses were 2,150 officers and 57,125 other ranks. The German losses were given as 860 officers and 34,073 other ranks, but it must be remembered that the Germans did not include in their casualty lists those who were only slightly wounded. Even so, it is only reasonable to suppose that their losses were much lighter than the British, who suffered throughout from the enemy's superior artillery fire, from gas attacks and from the constant necessity of making counter-attacks without proper artillery support.

But though the military gain lay with Germany, their slight success was

WASHING DAY

It can be seen from this photograph that the Australian troops did not allow the War to interfere with their laundry arrangements. Whenever possible a plentiful supply of dry socks was sent up to the men holding the water-logged trenches

bought at the price of what amounted to a strategical defeat, for their use of gas weighed morally against them in neutral countries and inflamed still further the hatred of their enemies.

To quote Major-General Fuller ("War and Western Civilization"), in using gas "the Germans made two cardinal mistakes: first, they did not use enough to win a decisive battle, and secondly, they used a lethal gas—chlorine — which was unnecessary, because the Hague Convention had not forbidden the use of gases of a non-toxic nature."

It is probable that British casualties would not have been nearly so high if Sir John French had had the strength of his own opinion, and had not repeatedly delayed his retirement. For during these days of hesitancy the British line was most severely attacked and the necessary counter-attacks resulted in whole battalions being wiped out. Indeed, it has been questioned whether those counter-attacks were always as necessary as they seemed to the higher commands. They were made under every possible disadvantage —lack of artillery support, lack of communications, lack of any preliminary reconnaissance by the leaders concerned. But, pledged as he was by daily promises to the French to hold his line, it is difficult to see how they could have been honourably avoided.

It is impossible to find words adequate to praise the splendid devotion of the British troops in the field. Many of them at this time were untrained men, called upon to fight under conditions of great hardship, lacking adequate trench protection, often without rations or supplies, and placed in the unenviable position of receiving shell fire to which their own batteries could not reply. For the ammunition crisis was serious indeed during the 2nd battle of Ypres. A report sent to the War Office on May 9 showed that 4·5-inch howitzer ammunition was practically exhausted, the total amount available for the B.E.F. both at the base and army rail-heads being only 3,600 rounds. There was no reserve stock of machine-guns, and the reserve of rifle ammunition was only ninety-three rounds per rifle. Rifles themselves were at a premium, so much so that one division was delayed in embarking for France, since neither rifles nor ammunition were ready for it.

By the time the 2nd battle of Ypres came to an end the situation had become little short of desperate. Only a small quantity of shrapnel was left, and high explosive was almost exhausted. On May 26 there was to be found nowhere among the B.E.F. stores in France a single round of high explosive for either six- or eight-inch howitzers and but a paltry 10 rounds for the fifteen-inch howitzer. What would have happened if the battle had been protracted for a few days longer cannot be contemplated.

This desperate situation had arisen in spite of repeated warnings and requests from the British commander-in-chief in the field. As long before as December, 1914, Sir John French had written:

> The present supply of artillery ammunition has been found to be so inadequate as to make offensive operations, even on a small scale, quite out of the question. Recent experience has shown that the ammunition available suffices for scarcely one hour's bombardment of a small portion of the enemy's line, and that even this operation leaves no ammunition to repel a counter-attack or to give the assaulting columns sufficient support. Owing to the nature of the operations in which we are.

RUM RATION

These New Zealanders subscribe warmly to the words of the song "Another little drink wouldn't do us any harm" as their rum ration is issued to them. The normal ration was a half gill per man, extra rations being usually issued before an attack

Photo: Imperial War Museum

and shall continue to be, engaged, the supply of artillery ammunition is the governing factor.

As the weeks rolled by a growing uneasiness made itself felt in England concerning the manner in which the war was being conducted. The cogs of the national mechanism were meshing far from smoothly, and from all parts arose a demand for some more effective policy. On March 13, 1915, after the battle of Neuve Chapelle, Sir John French had telegraphed to Lord Kitchener : " cessation of the forward movement is necessitated today by the fatigue of the troops, and, above all, by the want of ammunition." Five days later he wrote :

> I desire to state, with all the weight of my authority as commander-in-chief of the British army in France, that the object of his Majesty's Government cannot be attained unless the supply of artillery ammunition can be increased sufficiently to enable the Army to engage in sustained offensive operations, and I further desire to impress on them the very serious nature of the effort that it is necessary to make to achieve this end.

Yet still the ammunition shortage was acute—not so much on account of any lack of a particular explosive, but because the necessary machinery for providing the munitions of war on a basis commensurate with the scale of operations was non-existent.

Still waiting in vain for the shells which might have prevented the sacrifice of so many lives, Sir John French, in his dispatch of April 5, again referred to the matter.

> An almost unlimited supply of ammunition is necessary, and a most liberal discretionary power as to its use must be given to the artillery commanders. I am confident that this is the only means by which great results can be obtained with a minimum of loss.

Fortunately, under the stimulus of Mr. Lloyd George's energy, more vigorous steps were now taken, and in April was appointed a departmental committee of the War Office. With Lord Kitchener as chairman, its business was " to give assistance in expediting and, if possible, accelerating the supply of munitions of war." In addition a larger committee was appointed to work with this War Office one. This was called the munitions of war committee, and its duties were " to ensure the promptest and most efficient application of all the available productive resources of the country to the manufacture and supply of munitions of war for the army and navy."

Now that matters appeared to be progressing more smoothly, the unfortunate speech of the prime minister, Mr. Asquith, at Newcastle on April 20, came as a bolt from the blue, arousing in the whole British nation a general sense of perplexity that was far from reassuring. He said :

> I saw a statement the other day that the operations of war, not only of our army but of our Allies, were being crippled, or, at any rate, hampered, by our failure to provide the necessary ammunition. There is not a word of truth in that statement.

He declared that it was neither true nor fair to suggest that there had been anything in the nature of general slackness in the armaments industry on the part of either employers or employed, and throughout took an entirely opposite line to that followed by Mr. Lloyd George and, to a less extent, by Kitchener.

A leading article in " The Times " on May 19 brought matters to a head. It stated that " Men died in heaps upon the Aubers Ridge ten days ago because the field guns were short, and gravely short, of high-explosive shells." A yell of anger broke from that section of the press which had consistently opposed all measures for the defence of the country, whether on sea or on land ; but the statements in " The Times " were true, and Mr. Asquith had evidently been misinformed when he spoke on April 20. Less than a week later the conclusion of the 2nd battle of Ypres proved a mournful confirmation of the rumours which had already reached the ears of the British public. Thus was paved the way for the foundation of a Ministry of Munitions under the inspired leadership of Mr. Lloyd George, who mobilized every available industrial resource.

Photo : Imperial War Museum

BEASTS OF BURDEN

Mules proved of great value in the mountainous country in which the Allied forces which had their base at Salonika were called upon to manoeuvre. Here is seen a column of the reorganized Serbian army with pack mules carrying light artillery

CHAPTER 39

GALLIPOLI LANDING

The attack on the Dardanelles forts having been described in a previous chapter, the narrative has now reached the story of the landing on the beaches of the Gallipoli peninsula and the subsequent fighting, one of the epics of the War

ON February 16, 1915, three days before the naval operations against the Dardanelles opened, a meeting of ministers and soldiers was held in London. Among those present were the prime minister, Lord Kitchener and Mr. Winston Churchill, and after long and careful deliberation it was decided to send the 29th Division to Lemnos and to supplement this, if required, with a force from Egypt. These troops, together with the Royal Marine battalions already dispatched, were to be held ready to assist the naval attack on the Dardanelles should it be necessary.

Three days later, February 19, Lord Kitchener announced that after all he could not consent to dispatch the 29th Division to the Near East, as he feared the arrival of strong German reinforcements on the Western front. Preparations for sending the other forces were, however, continued. But on March 10 he again changed his mind, and informed the War Council that he felt that the situation in other theatres of war now justified the release of the 29th Division. Commenting on this in "The World Crisis," Mr. Churchill says:

> The decision of February 16, the execution of which had been suspended on the 20th, again became operative on March 10. In the meanwhile, three weeks of valuable time had been lost. The transports which might have left on February 22 did not get away until March 16 . . . The repeated changes of plan were baffling in the last degree. But even after decision was at last taken to send an army including the 29th Division, the use to which the army was to be put remained a secret of the Sphinx When Lord Kitchener decided in his heart that if the navy failed to force the Dardanelles, he would storm the Gallipoli peninsula, he ought to have declared it to his colleagues

When Sir Ian Hamilton, who was placed in command of this force, arrived at Mudros, his base on the Aegean island of Lemnos, on March 17, he found himself in a most difficult position. He had no definite instructions as to what line of action he should take and, furthermore, the main body of his forces was just starting on its journey, having been held up for three weeks through the indecision of Kitchener.

When Admiral de Robeck came out of action after the battle of the Narrows on March 18 he had every intention of renewing the attack immediately, and he sent Sir Ian a letter in which he said: "we are getting ready for another go and not in the least beaten or downhearted." At a meeting of the naval and military commanders on board the Queen Elizabeth four days later, however, de Robeck suddenly and unexpectedly announced that he was now quite sure that he could not get through without the help of all the troops available.

The sudden change of policy on the part of the naval authorities was rendered even more inconvenient by the fact that Sir Ian Hamilton considered Mudros to be an unsatisfactory base for operations. In his opinion Alexandria and Port Said would be more suitable, as he could bring military help from these places more quickly and in better shape than from Mudros, where facilities were very poor. Thus at the conference of the 22nd two important decisions

SERBIA'S 'COME BACK'

After Serbia had been overrun by the Germans and Austrians, Monastir fell into their hands in November, 1915. A year later the Serbian troops, then forming a part of the Allied forces at Salonica, took an honourable part in its recovery. They are here seen advancing to the attack

Keystone

ONCE MORE INTO THE BREACH

Men of the East Yorkshire Regiment are marching through a French village, after a spell in rest billets, to take their place again in the front line. The regiment from the days of Marlborough held a most distinguished campaigning record

Photo. Imperial War Museum

were reached: first, that no further effort was to be made to force the Dardanelles by the navy alone, and, second, that the base should be transferred from Lemnos to Alexandria. Thus operations for the second time were delayed, giving the enemy time to prepare for an attack which they knew was shortly to be launched. On the 24th Sir Ian and his staff sailed for Alexandria, and the transports bringing his troops through the Mediterranean were directed to follow him thither.

When the concentration of troops was complete Sir Ian had under his command a force of about 80,000 or 90,000 men. The nucleus of this was the 29th Division under the command of Major-General Sir A. Hunter-Weston. It consisted of three brigades composed mainly of regular troops whose units were serving abroad at the outbreak of war. In the 86th brigade were the 1st Lancashire Fusiliers, the 2nd Royal Fusiliers, the 1st Munster Fusiliers, and the 1st Royal Dublin Fusiliers; the 87th infantry brigade included the 1st King's Own Scottish Borderers, the 2nd South Wales Borderers, the 1st Border Regiment, and the 1st Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers; the 88th infantry brigade was composed of the 4th Worcesters, the 1st Essex, the 2nd Hampshires, the 5th Royal Scots, a territorial battalion, a squadron of the Surrey Yeomanry, and two batteries. The 63rd Royal Naval Division comprised a brigade of Royal Marines and two naval brigades.

To these forces was added the British army in Egypt, consisting of 16 battalions of Australian and four of New Zealand infantry commanded by Sir William Birdwood, and the East Lancashire Territorial Division, comprising the Manchester brigade, in which were the 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th Manchesters, the East Lancashire brigade, consisting of the 4th and 5th East Lancashires and the 9th and 10th Manchesters, and the Lancashire Fusilier brigade, comprising the 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th Lancashire Fusiliers. There were also some Indian troops. The French contingent consisted of a body of troops drawn from the Armée Coloniale and the Foreign Legion, under the command of General d'Amade.

Between March 18 and April 25, the day on which the landing on Gallipoli was effected, the Turks, under their German commander, General Liman von Sanders, were busy making their preparations to defend the peninsula. There were three courses of action open to the British: a landing on the Asiatic shore, or on the southern extremity of the peninsula, or on the Bulair isthmus, where a successful landing would have cut the communications, both by land and sea, of all the troops on the peninsula. Liman von Sanders did not know in which of these three districts the attack would be made, and he therefore divided his force, the Turkish 5th army, into three equal parts, each consisting of about 50 guns and 20,000 men.

Contrary to the Turkish commander's calculations, Sir Ian Hamilton had in fact only two alternatives open to him. A landing on the coast of Asia was ruled out on instructions from Lord Kitchener. Thus he had to choose between the southern extremity of the peninsula and the Bulair isthmus. He chose the former. After reconnaissances he selected five beaches as landing places. These were the beach at the north-east corner of Morto Bay, designated Beach S; the beaches on each side of Cape Helles, that on the east being called Beach V, and that on the west Beach W; the beach above Cape Tekke, known as Beach X, and the beach due west of Krithia, called Beach Y. The landings at V, W and X were to be the main operations, those at beaches S and Y being only to protect the flanks and harass the Turks.

Besides the landings in the neighbourhood of Cape Helles, further landings

HEAVE HO!

It is no easy matter to pull this howitzer off the road and up the sloping, broken ground into position. It is essential that the task should be accomplished with the greatest possible speed and the gun camouflaged before enemy airmen have a chance to notice its arrival

were to take place near Gaba Tepe, opposite Maidos. These were to be made by the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, afterwards known as the Anzacs. In addition, a landing was to be made by the French near the ruins of Troy, on the Asiatic shore, and the Royal Naval Division was to pretend to land at Bulair. These feints were only to detract the enemy's attention from the main attack.

About 150 ships were necessary to transport these troops from their Egyptian base to the scene of operations, and by April 21 they were all assembled in Mudros Bay to await suitable weather. The spectacle was impressive. Ships varying in size from the Queen Elizabeth to the fishing boats of the islanders were collected into a great fleet of transports, and they were protected by an imposing array of warships. For three days they waited for the calm weather so necessary for the landing.

The army had to disembark in face of an enemy who had known for the past two months that a landing would be attempted. Food, water, guns, horses and ammunition and a thousand articles necessary to keep an army in the field had to be landed, and arrangements had to be made to remove sick and wounded. These operations depended on the state of the weather, and a rough sea would leave half the army on shore, whilst its main force and supplies were held off the coast.

On the morning of Friday, April 23, the weather conformed with requirements, and in the evening of that day the first transport steamed towards Gallipoli, followed by others, their decks thick with khaki-clad figures. The liners transporting the Australasian division steamed towards Gaba Tepe, where they arrived about 1 a.m. on Sunday morning, April 25. The men were all served with a hot meal, and a little later the troops fell in on deck, and in complete silence were embarked in the boats waiting to take them ashore.

According to plan the Anzacs were to land near Gaba Tepe and strike across the peninsula in the direction of Maidos. The landing was to take place before dawn without the aid of any preliminary bombardment from the escorting warships. The plans provided for successive landings of about 1,500 men at a time.

At about 1.30 everything was ready; the boats were towed towards the shore by steam pinnaces. About 10 minutes to five, as the leading boats approached the beach, an alarm light flashed out on the hill, to be followed almost immediately by a burst of scattered rifle and machine-gun fire from the Turks on the shore. Happily most of the bullets went high, but many men in the crowded boats were hit. As soon as the boats grounded the Australians, without waiting for orders, leapt into the water and, wading ashore, formed up roughly and charged at the line of flame marking the first Turkish trench. The men of the landing party had been warned not to fill their magazines until daybreak, as a hot rifle fire from them would have given the enemy's batteries the target they were vainly searching for in the darkness. The Australians, therefore, used only their bayonets.

So fierce was the charge that in a short time the enemy front trench had been taken and a Maxim gun captured; but the defenders of the second line trench, cunningly dug in the cliff behind

Photos: Imperial War Museum

GERMAN 'PILL BOX'

Among the formidable obstacles that the Allied troops had to overcome in their advances on the Somme in 1916 were the German machine gun posts known as "pill boxes." Built of concrete, these were very difficult to destroy

LEAVE AT LAST

These officers and nurses bound for a fortnight's leave are boarding a steamer that will take them from Boulogne across the Channel to England. These crossings were made with escorts of destroyers as a precaution against submarine attack



C.3 IN THE FIRING LINE

Stranded in a recently evacuated woodland trench, this German has no option but to surrender. The appalling demands which the war made on German man-power led to men of inadequate physique, such as this soldier, being put into the front line

the bay, directed a terrible fire upon the beach and the boats. The Australians, however, their blood thoroughly up, threw down their packs and, climbing from rock to rock, cut through the barbed wire protections and carried the position at bayonet point.

When day dawned it was found that a fortunate mistake had been made, for instead of landing at Gaba Tepe as arranged, the boats had turned in the darkness towards Sari Bair, a great mass of sandstone rock rising about 1,000 feet above the sea. The actual beach on which the landing was effected was in a cove just south of Ari Burnu, and later named Anzac Cove. Owing to the fact that no landing in this quarter was expected, only a small Turkish force was on guard. The Australians, therefore, forced their way inland towards Sari Bair.

In the meantime further troops were being landed; by half-past seven about 8,000 men had been put ashore, and by two o'clock, in spite of steadily increasing artillery fire, the whole of the leading Australian Division of 12,000 men had disembarked. By now word had reached Mustapha Kemal Bey, one of the Turkish commanders, that enemy forces were landing in the neighbourhood of Ari Burnu and were marching on Sari Bair. He immediately ordered his best regiment, the 57th, to march to meet them. He had not far to go, and before an hour had elapsed he met the Turkish covering forces retreating before the Australian onslaught.

Ordering his men to deploy and attack, he himself helped to place a mountain battery in position. He walked unharmed in the midst of a hail of bullets, and directed operations so well that at one point he almost succeeded in outflanking the attackers. Seeing that his troops were still inadequate to deal with the onslaught of the Australians, Mustapha Kemal, on his own authority, ordered the 77th Regiment to reinforce him. Further reserves were also drawn from the southern part of the peninsula.

In his book on the Turkish dictator, "Grey Wolf," C. H. Hamilton describes how Mustapha Kemal, afterwards president of the Turkish republic, averted what would otherwise have been a serious blow to the Turkish and German cause. Referring to the landing of the Australians at Ari Burnu, he says:

> Mustapha Kemal knew nothing of this. He had ordered his best regiment, the 57th, to parade at 5.30 a.m. to carry out an ordinary practice manoeuvre up one slope of Chunuk Bair. As he was moving up the hillside he saw a line of Turks, skirmishers, coming over the hilltop. "What are you doing?" he shouted. "The English have landed. We are the advanced pickets. We have been forced to retire!" "Where have they landed?" "At Ari Burnu." "Fix bayonets and turn about," he ordered. A few minutes later came word from the 9th Division on his right confirming the news and asking for a battalion to cover up their left flank . . .
>
> He had only a small scale map handy. It did not even show Ari Burnu on it. With this in one hand, a compass in the other and a gendarme to guide him, he hurried ahead with 200 men. The ground was steep, covered with boulders and broken into ravines. The men could not keep up with him. When he reached the top there were only a few left. Directly below him, halfway up the last slope not 400 yards away, he saw the head of the Australian column advancing . . .
>
> As the units of the 57th regiment arrived, out of wind and exhausted by the climb, he re-formed them himself and pushed them forward. A battery of guns arrived. He helped to wheel the first gun into position. Continually under fire, he was a raging madman of energy. On his own responsibility and without orders, he called up his second regiment and threw it into the fight. He called up a third and last and threw it in also.

But at the critical moment the New Zealanders came up to the help of the Australians, and after retiring from the third ridge of Sari Bair to their earlier position on the first ridge, they dug themselves in. Then the Indian troops disembarked, and after the second rush of the Australasians the combined and strengthened force of the Australians, New Zealanders, and Indians again advanced to the third ridge after repulsing some furious counter-attacks by the Turks. As twilight fell the Turkish reinforcements

KEEPING IT CLEAN

With pail and an outsize in mops these men of a heavy howitzer team are swabbing the breach and barrel. The effort needed to ram the mop home typifies the power of this howitzer, which can only be got into position by means of a light railway

RETURNED EMPTIES

The shell cases seen dumped in this photograph will later be melted down and put to further uses of war. In the later stages every soldier returning from the line was encouraged to find and pick up some piece of salvage which could be again utilized

Photo, Imperial War Museum

HEAVY GOING

With mud well over their fetlocks, packhorses and mules plod steadily on up towards the guns. In the frequent wet spells which turned the whole battlefield into a sea of mud these animals were widely used, as in this photograph, as ammunition carriers

Photos: Imperial War Museum

TRAINED TO GUNFIRE

This photograph shows a 4·7-inch gun of the Royal Garrison Artillery in action near Bécourt Wood. An ammunition train is passing it at full gallop, accentuating the impression of rapid motion. The horses were specially trained to gunfire



Photo: G.P.A.

DOWN—AND OU

Behind the German lines a British aeroplane has been shot down, and its gallant pilot has given his life for his country. The exploits of the flying "aces" on both sides were among the most thrilling and chivalrous incidents of the War

began to arrive, and by 10 o'clock all available men and artillery had been brought against the Australians. The Turkish counter-attacks were strongly supported by a heavy bombardment of the Australian position from well-placed batteries which the naval guns of the British warships could not reach.

By midnight on the 25th the position appeared so critical that Sir William Birdwood, after consulting with his brigadiers, was inclined to call off operations and re-embark his men. Sir Ian Hamilton, however, sent a definite order to "dig in and stick it out." Birdwood, therefore, withdrew his troops to the first ridge, and during the night his staff devoted all their energies to strengthening the position and getting some field-guns ashore.

On Monday a fresh attack was launched by the Turks, but it could not shake the Anzacs in their trenches. Moreover, the Queen Elizabeth and seven other battleships steamed up to take part in the battle. Whilst the Queen Elizabeth stood well out to sea so as to get a howitzer effect with her guns, the other warships came close in shore and concentrated on the Turkish batteries. Then, as the Turkish infantry moved forward to attack, they were met with a terrific bombardment. By Monday afternoon the Turkish attack was definitely repulsed, and the position at Sari Bair was secure.

On the evening of April 24 transports of the Royal Naval Division steamed to a rendezvous five miles south-west of Xeros Island in the Gulf of Xeros, to create a diversion by a feint landing at Bulair. By daylight they had reached their destination, and about 5.30 two escorting warships, the Dartmouth and the Doris, began to bombard the Bulair lines. In order to make the feint more realistic it was decided to land a platoon of the Hood Battalion on the shore under the cover of darkness. There they were to light flares and shoot off rifles and machine-guns. This manoeuvre, it was thought, would have the effect of preventing reinforcements being sent to strengthen the enemy at the various landing places in the west and south of the peninsula.

The proposal, however, was abandoned when Lieut.-Commander Freyberg, R. N. D., volunteered himself to swim ashore and light flares. His offer was accepted, and when darkness fell the gallant officer set out on his dangerous venture. Painted black, and

RUNNING THE GAUNTLET

These cross roads behind the line in the Ypres salient were a favourite target for the German guns and became known as Hell Fire Corner. It is not difficult to realize why all forms of transport should move as quickly as possible when approaching this spot

HEAT OF THE DAY

Faced with the task of transporting machine-guns during the hottest part of the day, these British Tommies have exercised their ingenuity by rigging up a makeshift barrow. They also find it useful for carrying their own kit and rations

Photo: Imperial War Museum

well greased, he slid into the water and struck out towards the shore. Before him he pushed a small canvas raft with the flares, and he was armed only with a small revolver and a sheath knife. After swimming for two hours he reached the shore, where he was able to get close to the enemy and light his first flare. Immediately a burst of machine-gun fire broke out, but fortunately he was not wounded. After lighting his other flares Freyberg set out on his return journey. The ships showed no lights and he had to guess his direction. However, after a further two hours in the water he was picked up, almost dead with cold. His exploit had achieved its purpose, for it was not until the night of the 25th that Liman von Sanders realized that the operation was only a pretence. For this feat Freyberg was awarded the D.S.O., the first of a series of decorations which ultimately included the V.C.

A short time after the Australians had begun their attack near Gaba Tepe, the landings in the extreme south of the peninsula were started. In order to assist the British troops the French Colonial Division, under General d'Amade, steamed towards Kum Kale, its object being to land on the Asiatic shore and silence the Turkish batteries, which, by firing across the Straits, commanded all five beaches on which the 29th Division was about to land. The French general selected for his landing place the most historic battlefield in the world—the plain of Troy, stretching below the hill on which Troy stood, to the mouth of the river Dumruk, or Simoeis. The landing was made west of the river, where the French transports poured the marines and Senegalese troops into small boats early on Sunday morning. The boats were towed by trawlers and torpedo craft to the mouth of the river under a fire of shells and bullets from the ruined citadel of Kum Kale. Some distant German batteries at In Tepe were also trained on the French, but in spite of this they gained sufficient mastery of the position to avert the danger of Turkish artillery, operating from this point, seriously hampering the British landing. The next day this force re-embarked and joined the British force on Beach S.

But these were secondary operations only. Sir Ian Hamilton's plan was to make his great effort at Cape Helles, where five beaches had been selected as landing places. For convenience these were marked on the map S, V, W, X, and Y, reading from east to west.

Here the plan of attack was different from that at Ari Burnu. No surprise in the darkness was possible, for the beaches were protected by wire entanglements cunningly erected beneath the

WATER, WATER EVERYWHERE

Hopes of a comfortable night's lodgings have been rudely shattered for this Canadian when he returned to his tent. The heavy rains that flooded the trenches and made the battlefields a sea of mud also caused a great number of deaths from sickness

'Canadian Records'

STICKS AND STONES

The engines of war have done their task of destruction thoroughly, and only the stumps of trees have withstood the onslaught of the heavy shells seen bursting here. In the foreground is seen a hastily constructed gun emplacement, the gun camouflaged by sacking

Photos: 'Canadian Records'

water. Moreover, the cliffs at Cape Tekke, Cape Helles, Sedd el Bahr, and De Tott's Battery, at the eastern point of Morto Bay, rose high above the sea and offered the enemy the finest possible field for direct gun-fire. The defending troops were supported by light field-guns and 6-in. howitzer batteries in formidable numbers, working with marked ranges which completely swept all the landing beaches.

It was hoped that a preliminary bombardment of the enemy positions by the battleships, including the Queen Elizabeth, would master the enemy's fire, but as the ships apparently used shrapnel shell, against which the German engineers had skilfully made deep trenches, the extraordinary volume and fury of the naval bombardment did not in most cases have an effect commensurate with the tremendous effort made.

HOW IT WORKS

After the Machine Gun Corps had been formed the infantryman, provided with Lewis guns, saw little of the superior weapon of precision so familiar to him earlier in the war. Here a Canadian machine gunner is explaining some points to "foot-sloggers"

What was needed was high-explosive shell in large quantities, as only by the use of such could the enemy's earthworks be reduced. The greatest success in the preliminary bombardment was obtained in the neighbourhood of Beach X, north of Cape Tekke. This was due to the bold tactics of the captain of the Implacable, H. C. Lockyer. At dawn the covering ship, the Swiftsure, started a fierce fire against the cliffs. At about 5.30 the Implacable, with her 12-in. and 6-in. guns, closed for action. She came within about 500 yards of the shore and smote the cliffs at point-blank range, in spite of the fact that in so doing her crew were under fire from the Turkish trenches. So fierce was the bombardment that before long the enemy's trenches had been smashed.

When the bombardment was over the 2nd Royal Fusiliers landed on the beach, followed closely by the 1st Border Regiment, the 1st Inniskillings, and C and D Companies of the Anson Battalion of the Royal Naval Division. By a fierce charge the British troops carried the heights above Cape Tekke, and began to advance inland. While so doing they were badly worried for a time by a Turkish battery at the village of

Photos: Topical

REFRESHMENT ON THE ROOF

A halt is called in the activities of these women while tea is served to them. Their task of painting the roof of one of the Gas Light and Coke Company's gasometers at Bromley in Kent at least gives them a chance of getting some fresh air

Krithia, but once again the Implacable came to the aid of the troops. The position of the battery was signalled to the battleship and soon the hostile guns were put out of action.

At Beach Y the landing was also carried out with success. The disembarkation at this point was more of a surprise to the enemy than the operations round the end of the peninsula. Here the three light cruisers, the Dublin, Sapphire and Amethyst, assisted with their guns. Their shallow draught enabled them to come close inshore, and although their guns were of comparatively small calibre, they were used to such effect that when the British force, consisting of the 1st King's Own Scottish Borderers and the Plymouth Battalion of the Royal Marine Light Infantry, made their landing they met with little or no opposition and were able to obtain a firm footing on the heights.

Very different was the famous Lancashire landing on Beach W, the next to the south. Here the 1st Lancashire Fusiliers, with whom were Lt.-Col. Moorhouse with B Company of the Anson Battalion of the R.N.D., after a heavy bombardment from the fleet, were towed to the shore, but the position which they were assailing was one of magnificent natural defensive strength. The troops had to land on a stretch of sand with the enemy holding in front of them a crescent of broken, rising ground which enabled them to pour down upon their attackers a flanking fire from both sides and a frontal fire from the centre. Moreover, the German engineers had much improved the natural advantages of the ground by building shrapnel-proof trenches and erecting masses of barbed-wire entanglements.

The Turks held their fire until the moment the boats touched the beach, but when they began the effects were terrible. In face of the most severe rifle and machine-gun fire the men waded ashore, battered their way through the wire, and with amazing coolness re-formed along the shore. They were unable to advance, however, and had it not been for a fortunate accident the attack would, in all probability, have been arrested indefinitely. But the boats landing the company detailed to support the left flank of the Lancashires, instead of discharging their troops as arranged, landed them under the shelter of some rocks beneath Cape Tekke. Here the soldiers met with little opposition, and by scaling the rocks they were able to attack and silence the Turkish machine-guns which were sweeping the beach. About the same time the cliffs on the other side of the bay were carried, and the commander on the beach, taking advantage of this brief relief, ordered his men to advance to the shelter of the cliffs. At about 9 o'clock another battalion, the 4th Worcesters, was landed. The reinforced covering column then worked its way up the valley and cleared the enemy from their central position. The British troops now held the crests commanding the terrible death-trap of Beach W, and it was possible to disembark stores and ammunition and remove the killed and wounded.

Although troops had been successfully landed all round the southern part of the coast, they were not able to make any appreciable advance. At Beach Y the men tried to work inland, but they were outflanked and punished so heavily that they were re-embarked on Monday morning. At Beach X the troops also moved forward during Sunday morning, but they were checked after having penetrated inland for about 1,000 yards. At this point the landing force from Beach W should have joined up with

CLEAN SWEEP

Yet another of the tasks performed by women is shown in this photograph of a suburb of Birmingham. There was no lack of volunteers for the job of sweeping the city's streets, though the clothes worn do not seem designed for labour of this kind

BUSINESS AS USUAL

In many jobs, some of them being manual labour, the substitution of women for men resulted usually in very little loss of efficiency. This photograph was taken in the Somers Town yard, then the chief goods depot in London of the Midland Railway

Photos. Topical

INTENT ON HER TASK

This woman munition worker is busy at work on a lathe, carefully regulating by a tap the drip of water. Piled high behind her are shell cases in various stages of completion. Munition factories employed a high percentage of women

them, but, as has been seen, the landing there had been delayed, and in consequence the right flank of the troops advancing from Beach X was exposed. The men, therefore, were obliged to retire towards the cliffs, where a fierce battle raged all Sunday night. The British were victorious, however, and the troops north of Cape Tekke again advanced on Monday morning.

The landing on Beach S, on the other side of the peninsula, was effected with considerable success by the 2nd South Wales Borderers. Here the position was battered by the naval guns and then carried by a landing party of 700 men at the point of the bayonet. Although the enemy howitzers swept the beach with shrapnel, the troops were in a fairly safe position, and by swarming up the hill they made progress round the shoulder of the eminence on their left. By 10 o'clock in the morning they reached the old battery on the top and in the afternoon they dug themselves in on the plateau, from which vantage point they were able to hold the 2,000 Turks opposed to them. This force, which formed the right wing of the invading army, was relieved by the French troops as soon as the demonstration against Kum Kale was completed, and was re-embarked to strengthen the British line farther west.

The worst of all five landing places in the south lay between De Tott's battery and Beach W. This was Beach V, lying under the old castle of Sedd el Bahr and extending towards the high cliff that rose sharply from the foreshore round Cape Helles. In width the beach was only a few hundred yards, and round it swept the strong current of the Dardanelles, making any landing extremely difficult. In many respects similar in formation to Beach W, it was elaborately protected by a system of trenches and barbed wire entanglements, and the broken walls of the village of Sedd el Bahr, to the left, had been skilfully worked into the enemy's system of earthwork defences.

Behind the village stood a hill, later known as Doughty-Wylie's. It was about 140 feet high, and here the enemy had further fortifications. Besides the defences already mentioned, there were others on the foreshore. Here elaborate barbed wire barriers had been erected close to the water's edge, and even in the sea itself entanglements had been fixed. It was against this formidable position that the British troops had to advance. No cover against enemy fire was available and they came forward in little boats against a swift current.

Landing methods such as were used on other parts of the peninsula were obviously out of the question for disembarking the troops on Beach V, and other means, therefore, were used. An old 4,000-ton collier, the River Clyde had been specially prepared for the task; great doors had been cut in her sides, and her bridge had been turned into a fort by means of steel plates. Into her bows casemates had been built from which machine-guns could fire. Filled with 2,000 troops composed of the 1st Dublin, 1st Munster Fusiliers, 2nd Hampshires, and a platoon of the Anson Battalion of the R.N.D., the old ship approached the beach on the morning of April 25. She was accompanied by a string of lighters, towed by a steam hopper, these being intended to form a sort of pontoon bridge between the ship and the shore along which the men could disembark.

The commander of the River Clyde had been instructed to run his ship ashore on Sedd el Bahr beach as high as possible, but as he approached the current swung her out of her course and she went too far eastward, close to a reef of rocks. Here the water between ship and beach was too deep for the men to wade through, but the steam hopper beached herself alongside as arranged and bridged the gap. Meanwhile, a covering party of Dublin Fusiliers in eight tows were approaching the shore, but they were held up on the submerged wire and submitted to a hail of machine-gun fire. All the men would have perished but for the fact that there was, near the water's edge, a sandbank about five feet high, and under the lee of this the survivors dug themselves in.

All this time the River Clyde was rattling under a tempest of bullets and shrapnel. One of the gangways was destroyed as soon as it was lowered, and,



Map of the Gallipoli peninsula showing where the British, Australian and New Zealand troops made their landings in April, 1915. Inset, Cape Helles and the surrounding district, showing the five beaches chosen by the British for their landings

'TRAMP! TRAMP! TRAMP!

This photograph calls up memories of the song first sung during the Boer War, " Tramp, tramp, tramp, the boys are marching." There is a splendid cheerfulness about these Australian troops, magnificent and intrepid fighters, as they march up to the front line

LIFTS BACK TO BILLETS

The British captured the village of Guillemont in the course of the Somme fighting in July, 1916. Here some of the men who took part in the attack are returning to rest billets, the journey in lorries being a welcome alternative to a long weary march

M227

UNDER THE RED CROSS

At a wayside dressing station, with an armoured car drawn up alongside, the wounded are coming in after an attack. The very lightly wounded walked unaided down from the trenches, others were able to walk after attention at the first aid posts in the line, the rest are borne on stretchers

UP TO THEIR KNEES

The part played by the mud in the battles of the Somme is well illustrated here. The horses pulling this ammunition limber, with its freight of shells, are wallowing in a sea of mud. In such conditions rapidity of transport in the front area was an impossibility

WARTIME WAITERS

These men of the Royal Irish Rifles, who form a ration party, are resting in a communication trench on the Somme front. Stores were brought up to within a mile or half a mile of the front line, whence they were fetched by men detailed for the task

although the machine-guns from the casemates and bridge replied, they could not quell the enemy's fire. Some men of the Fusilier brigade, under General Napier, made a bold attempt to reach the foreshore, but the short-range fire of the Turkish machine-guns swept them off the planks as they ran. Nevertheless, a few of the men managed to reach the shore and get under the cover of the sandbank, while successive platoons of the Dublins and Munsters continued to pour out of the River Clyde until restrained by their officers

It soon became apparent that any further attempts to land by daylight were bound to fail, and would probably mean the entire destruction of the Fusilier brigade as well as the 2nd battalion of the Hampshires, working with them. Moreover, the brigadier, General Napier, had been killed, and it was therefore decided to postpone further efforts until nightfall. So the River Clyde remained all day by the beach with nearly 2,000 men imprisoned within her holds.

Meanwhile, the successtul landing ot the Lancashire Fusiliers on Beach W had to some extent eased the situation. A battalion of infantry there scaled the steep slopes of Cape Helles and managed to entrench on the crest. It was hoped that they would be able to work their way towards Sedd el Bahr and help in the operations there, but the German engineers had foreseen everything and erected strong fortifications, which held up for a time the British efforts to carry out this movement.

By Sunday night, however, the men from Beach W had managed to work forward far enough to get some command over the Turks holding up the landing on Sedd el Bahr beach, where, in the darkness of Sunday night, the remaining troops from the River Clyde at last managed to join their surviving comrades on the shore. Under cover of darkness the British troops worked their way forward into part of the ruined castle and shattered fort, whilst the centre of the line firmly established itself on the shore. The position, however, was still critical, as the landing place was exposed to Turkish fire, and a further advance was therefore necessary if any results were to be achieved.

Accordingly, at dawn on the 26th orders were given for an advance to be made on the village of Sedd el Bahr. Assisted by preliminary bombardment by the fleet, the remnants of the Dublin and Munster Fusiliers and of the Hampshire Regiment moved forward. By 9 o'clock they had stormed the castle, then by hard fighting through the ruined village they drove the Turks back and advanced into the open country farther inland. Here they were checked in front of a strong redoubt held by large numbers of the enemy.

Before launching an attack upon this formidable position the weary troops paused, while the redoubt was subjected to an intensive bombardment from the battleship Albion. As soon as this was over they advanced again, and, although their losses were terrible, they stormed and took the redoubt. The success of this attack was due in large measure to the efforts of an intrepid British staff officer, Colonel Doughty-Wylie. He came ashore at the most critical moment in the attack; most of the officers in command of the operations had been killed, and the men, with no one to lead them, were bewildered and disheartened. Carrying only a small cane, he walked into the tempest of fire, cheered and rallied the men and formed them up for the charge. At his orders they fixed their bayonets and, leading them with his cane, he took them up the fortress hill and fell dead in front of them. Inspired by this noble example, the Fusiliers passed over his body, cut through the barbed wire, bayoneted the Turks, and captured the heights. In honour of the man who led them they called it Doughty-Wylie's Hill.

Mr. Winston Churchill, in "The World Crisis," sums up the results of the first two days as follows:

> As a result of . . the continued pressure of the British attack from its various lodgments on the enemy, a continuous arc was established by the evening of the 26th along the whole coast from "V," "W" and "X" Beaches, and a junction was effected with the single battalion landed at "S."

During the 26th and 27th the British line was reinforced by the remainder of the 29th Division, the Royal Naval Division and the French Division, and on the latter date the line pushed forward, gradually straightening the arc. By the 28th the British line ran right across the southern end of the peninsula from a point about two miles north of Cape Tekke, on the western shore, to De Tott's Battery on Morto Bay, an opening of the Dardanelles.

On the 28th a general advance was ordered in the direction of the village of Krithia, but although the British fought valiantly, they were not strong enough to carry the Turkish position. During this attack the whole of the Turkish reserves were thrown into the line; they were even drawn from Bulair, in the north, and had an army been available for an attack in that quarter it would most certainly have settled the issue of the whole campaign. The opportunity, however, was lost, and for the next three months the British troops struggled in vain to reach Krithia and drive the Turks from the heights around Achi Baba.

The first big drive for the Turkish positions began on May 6. Into this nearly 50,000 British and French troops, supported by about 70 guns, were thrown. The Turkish defending force numbered about 30,000, but so well did the enemy hold to his ground that when the battle ceased on the night of the 8th he had yielded up only a few hundred yards. The Allied losses in this battle were out of all proportion to the advantage gained; the British lost nearly 15,000 in killed and wounded and the French about 4,000.

During the next fortnight a little progress was made, and on May 25 the Royal Naval Division and the 42nd Division advanced a distance of about 100 yards. Later the whole British line was helped forward by the admirable work of the engineers, but all this slow movement of approach towards the hostile mountain fortress was suddenly complicated by a series of naval disasters.

Some German submarines worked their way down to the Dardanelles in the third week in May, and all British naval dispositions and transport work were abruptly checked. On May 13 the Goliath, an old battleship engaged in protecting the flank of the French army, had been torpedoed by the Turkish destroyer Muavanet-i-Miliet. This disaster was followed by the torpedoing of the Triumph on May 26 and of the Majestic on the 27th. The position then became serious.

The steamers which had been supplying the troops with food and ammunition could no longer be safely used, and it seemed at first as if the Germans and Austrians had only to send half a dozen more submarines to the Dardanelles in order to maroon the troops on the Gallipoli peninsula. The situation, however, was relieved by sending the transports to Mudros Bay and conveying the necessary stores across the 40 miles of water between Mudros and the peninsula in mine-sweepers and other shallow-draught vessels. The battleships so necessary to assist the military operations were protected by submarine defences, whilst destroyers and patrol boats kept a constant watch for further underwater invaders.

While the navy was busy dealing with the menace of the submarines Sir Ian Hamilton was preparing another attack on the Turkish positions. This was launched on June 4 along the whole front at Helles by men of the 29th, 42nd and French Divisions, supported by the 2nd Naval Brigade. After a

LAND LAID WASTE

The pleasant countryside of the Somme valley was entirely devastated by the battles that raged over it in the summer and autumn of 1916. Here can be seen the line of an evacuated German trench. The chalk soil of this area became a complete quagmire in the wet weather which accompanied many phases of the battles

Photo: Imperial War Museum

preliminary bombardment the troops moved out and stormed the trenches in the centre of the Turkish line, while the French troops on the right gained some ground, only to be driven back by counter-attacks. This caused the Naval Brigade to fall back, for the French retirement had exposed their flank.

At this moment it looked as if the Turks were about to roll up the whole of the attacking line, for when the Naval Brigade was compelled to retreat under a terrible fire, they in turn exposed the right flank of the Manchester Brigade on their left. The situation, however, was saved by the magnificent fighting of the Manchester men, who, although they were obliged to retire, had weathered the storm long enough to avert disaster. The net result of the day's operations was an advance to a depth of about two or three hundred yards. On both sides the losses were severe; the Turkish amounted to 10,000 men, and the British also suffered very heavily.

On June 21 an important attack was made by the French. It was delivered against Haricot Redoubt, a maze of trenches and communicating saps, with machine-gun emplacements which commanded the top of the ravine of Kereves Dere and threw a deadly enfilading fire along the Allied front. At dawn the attack began with the 1st division, forming the right wing, storming through a Turkish advanced trench. Fierce fighting followed, but so strongly did the enemy counter-attack that the French were obliged to fall back. The 2nd division meanwhile succeeded in penetrating two enemy defensive lines and capturing the redoubt. But when their comrades on their right retired they were outflanked, and the situation looked critical. The French commander, General Gouraud, however, was not to be denied; he urged his 1st division to further attempts, and by the evening, after fighting of the most desperate and bloody nature, the lost ground was regained and the situation eased. All through the night the Turks counter-attacked, and their violent efforts to regain Haricot Redoubt did not cease until June 23, by which time some 7,000 of them lay dead or wounded in front of the French firing line.

After the blow against the Turkish left General Sir A. Hunter-Weston, commanding the 29th division, resolved to hammer at the enemy's right. On June 28, therefore, after having been reinforced by the 52nd division, he made a general attack on the left of the Helles front. Here the enemy position was one of great strength owing to the deep ravine running between Krithia and the sea. Near the sea the Turks had a formidable system of five lines, prolonged inland by two trenches. The ravine, the famous Gully Ravine, stretched inland in the neighbourhood of Gurkha Bluff and twisted in a north-eastern trend between overhanging hills. There was a good water supply in the ravine, which increased its value.

General Hunter-Weston's plan of attack relied for its success on a peculiar pivoting movement. His design was to hold the enemy at a spot about a mile from the coast and, on this pivoting point, to swing his left flank upwards and through the Turkish positions. The movement began by the 1st Border regiment of the 87th brigade rushing a redoubt known as Boomerang, and a few minutes later the brigade stormed three lines of Turkish trenches. The Royal Scots also advanced and captured two trenches in front of them. Then, as the first British wave spread out and flattened over the conquered



GRIM GIAN

The cloud of smoke rising from the muzzle of this French heavy howitzer shows that a shell has just been fired. So also do the gestures of the French officers in the foreground, blocking their ears to shut out the deafening noise

HANDLE WITH CARE

Having arrived at railhead this French monster shell is rolled with the greatest care along planks to a waiting wagon or lorry. Thence it is carried to the howitzer emplacement, whence it is fired on the last stage of its brief but devastating existence

WINDING ROAD

The shell-ploughed waste behind the front line in France and Flanders was treacherous going for the troops. Men might easily meet their death in the mud-filled shell holes, and a winding path of "duck boards" was laid down to give them a safer passage

Photo: Topical

ROLLING UP TO RAILHEAD

When guns of large calibre were employed the transport of the shells presented a difficult problem. It was solved by laying down light railways to transport them to the railhead on their journey to the gun positions

ground, troops of the 86th brigade pushed through the three lines captured by their comrades and bayoneted the Turks out of their last two lines of trenches. It took scarcely more than half an hour for the two brigades of the indomitable 29th Division to carry all five Turkish lines, and their swift hammer stroke was followed by the success of the Indian Brigade, which secured a spur running into the sea from the rearmost Turkish trench. Altogether the enemy was driven back along the shore for about 1,000 yards, enabling the British left flank to establish itself high up the coast and prevent any enfilading fire against its centre.

The success of this attack caused considerable anxiety at the Turkish headquarters. General von Weber, then commanding the southern zone, favoured a withdrawal of his troops to a position on the plateau of Kilid Bahr, but he was overruled by Liman von Sanders and ordered to counter-attack instead, being reinforced by two fresh divisions for this purpose. The first of these counter-attacks was delivered on July 5; it was preceded by the customary artillery preparation by the batteries on the European and Asiatic shores of the Dardanelles. As soon as this was over the Turkish advance began. The first to approach the British lines were inexperienced levies, but they were shot down at point-blank range and very few survived.

The principal attack was made at a point where the British Naval Division joined with the French. Here some 50 Turks managed to gain a footing in one trench, but they were swiftly destroyed. The battle continued until noon, but not a single British position had been seriously menaced, although their losses were heavy. The cost of the enemy effort was also grave, upwards of 6,000 being lost in dead and wounded of all ranks.

Photo: Keystone

HUMAN RETRIEVER

The French are searching this wood for dead and wounded Germans. Their search is rewarded by the sight of this dead German lying in the path much as in peace time a pheasant that had been slain by a sportsman's gun might lie

FINAL RIDE

In any of the more violent periods of activity at the Front there was inevitably a shortage of stretchers A wheelbarrow is the only makeshift that this French soldier can manage for carrying a dead German to his last resting place

On July 12 Sir Ian Hamilton delivered another furious assault on the lines around Achi Baba. Here he used a new instrument of attack, consisting of an armoured car fitted with iron hooks attached to short chains. The plan was for a number of these cars to advance on the enemy's wire entanglements, fling the hooks over the obstacle, and then drive back at full speed, thus clearing an opening for the troops to advance through. The attack, however, when carried out, met only with moderate success.

While these attacks and counter-attacks were taking place in the south of the peninsula the Australians and New Zealanders, now known as the Anzacs, were being severely attacked in the neighbourhood of Anzac Cove. The Australasians were perched upon the cliff below Sari Bair, where their immediate purpose was to hold up as many of the enemy force as possible, thus lessening the pressure on the 8th army corps and the French army corps along the Krithia front. They also

LINK IN THE BELGIAN LINE

This temporary bridge looks none too safe, but it was vitally necessary to establish communication between the two banks of the Yser, when it was impossible quickly to build securer bridges. Though quite a short stream, the Yser played an important part in the war

Photos: Antony D'Ypres

kept open the gateway to the vitals of the Turkish positions along the Straits, but the British commander designed this rather as a demonstration than a serious line of attack.

On May 18 General Liman von Sanders came to Sari Bair and, using about 30,000 troops, attempted to close the gateway to the Narrows. After a severe bombardment lasting 20 hours the German commander-in-chief launched before dawn on the 19th a great infantry attack against the left flank and centre of Anzac. Again and again masses of Turkish infantry rushed the Anzac positions, only to be thrown back. At about 5 o'clock in the morning the Turks brought up fresh guns to intensify the already severe cannonade, and after four and a half hours of fighting the Turkish infantry on the British right flank began to press hard. This attack, however, was so severely handled by the Australians on the right that the column swung away and tried to advance towards the left. But the British fire was so thick that it could make no progress and was obliged to discontinue the attempt. In this battle the Australian losses were small, only about 100 being killed and 500 wounded. The Turkish losses, however, were very severe, several thousand being lost in killed or wounded. Another fierce attack on the Anzac position on June 29 was equally unsuccessful despite heavy reinforcements.

All these attacks in the south and at Anzac Cove, however, did little to forward the Allied cause. The gate to the Narrows was still strongly held, whilst Krithia and the heights of Achi Baba, in the south, remained in enemy hands. The enemy's main works of defence protecting the Dardanelles forts were as secure as ever, and the prospect of a decisive British stroke was still as distant as it was when the troops first landed.

LAST GASP

The German in the foreground of this photograph of a battlefield strewn with bodies is a good example of the horror of sudden and violent death. Even though he is dead the position of his body still seems to suggest an intolerable suffering

CHAPTER 40

WAR IN MESOPOTAMIA

Great Britain, with the assistance of her Indian Empire, sent a force to the head of the Persian Gulf in November, 1914. This landing developed into a campaign of considerable magnitude against Turkey and of varying changes of fortune

THE position of Turkey at the opening of the Great War has been aptly compared by a recent historian of that conflict, Mr. C. R. M. F. Cruttwell, to "a great Asiatic lying prone, with his head in Europe, his body in Asia Minor, his right leg in Mesopotamia and his left in the Sinai Peninsula." Fortunately for her opponents, she possessed certain great disadvantages when confronted with the problems of carrying on war. She lacked both railways and good roads. Her head in Europe was joined to her body in Asia Minor by a vulnerable neck, where Constantinople stands, and, as she had no frontier in common with her Allies, the difficulty in obtaining reinforcements from the Central Powers was a grave handicap.

Before the end of 1914 Turkey was involved in three campaigns, and two of these were undertaken by Great Britain. The opening one, the attempt to force a way through the Dardanelles, has already been narrated, as has the attack by Turkey upon the Russian positions in the Caucasus. The third is the invasion of Mesopotamia, here described.

This campaign suffered from the outset by being an unwanted child, a baby whom nobody would hold. It was "the foster-child of both Simla and Whitehall, the acknowledged child of neither." At its inception it was intended to confine its operations to a purely local demonstration at the head of the Persian Gulf, amounting to an occupation of Abadan island, with a threefold object; to check the intrigues of Enver Pasha; to assure the Arabs of British support against Turkey; and to protect the pipe-lines of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

The estuary that opens into the Persian Gulf, known as Shatt-al-Arab, is formed by the confluence of the rivers Tigris and Euphrates. A mile and a half wide at the mouth, it narrows down to 600 yards at Basra, 62 miles upstream. At the island of Abadan, where the estuary runs into the sea, is the terminus of the 140-mile pipe-line of the Anglo-Persian oilfields, running from Maidan-i Naftun in the Bakhtiari country.

During October, after a consultation with India, the British government decided that an Indian expeditionary force, known as force "D," should be sent to the Persian Gulf to carry out this programme. This consisted of a brigade from Poona, comprising three native battalions and one British—the 2nd Dorsets, together with ordnance, commissariat and field ambulance. This force was placed under the command of Brigadier-General W. S. Delamain. Numbering 4,731 officers and other ranks, the force embarked at Bombay and arrived off Bahrein, in the Persian Gulf, on October 23, 1914. It was, however, considered unwise, although Turkey was obviously preparing for war, to land British troops at Abadan before hostilities had definitely begun, and instructions were issued by the Admiralty to suspend disembarkation until further orders.

Meanwhile, the armoured sloops Odin and Espiègle were patrolling the Persian Gulf, though carefully keeping outside the three-mile limit. On October 29 the Goeben and Breslau, accompanied by Turkish destroyers, entered the Black Sea and bombarded Russian ports, with the inevitable result that on the next day the British, French and Russian ambassadors in Constantinople demanded their passports and left the Turkish capital.

On October 31, 1914, Delamain was ordered to be ready to move at short notice, while the Admiralty instructed the Odin and the Espiègle to commence hostilities against Turkey, the former being ordered to silence the enemy guns at Fao and to accompany Delamain's expedition to the mouth of the Shatt-al-Arab, the latter to engage the guns situated opposite the oil works and to protect British interests along the river. Of the two ships which had accompanied Delamain's transports from Bombay, the Ocean was to facilitate the landing of the expeditionary force, and the Dalhousie to remain at Bushire and maintain wireless communication until Fao should be captured.

The official proclamation of war with Turkey was issued on November 5, 1914, and on November 6 the naval guns fired the first shot in the Mesopotamia campaign. About 10 a.m. the Odin



Map of Mesopotamia, the land between the rivers Tigris and Euphrates, that was invaded by a British and Indian force towards the end of 1914

ON FOREIGN SOIL

Across the fertile fields of Champagne a German column is advancing, a small portion of the vast horde that from 1914 to 1918 was settled upon North-Eastern France. The Germans were during the war in possession of nearly a tenth of France, including some of the richest industrial districts



Photo: G.P.A

RAID AT DAWN

Isolated raids, bearing no relation to any general scheme of attack, frequently occurred on the Western Front. Here a French raid is being made as dawn breaks on a shallow German trench. The German in the foreground is protected by an armour-plated shield

found the range of the Turkish forts at Fao, and in less than an hour the guns were silenced. By 3.45 p.m. the covering party and reinforcements were safely landed, and they proceeded to occupy the fort and town. The following day the landing force was re-embarked, the 117th Mahrattas relieving it as garrison; the transports made their way some sixteen miles up the river, and on November 8, 9 and 10 the troops were landed at Sanniya, about two and a half miles from the oil works. So far no resistance had been met with, except by the Espiègle, which on October 9 was fired on near Mohammerah, but sustained no damage.

Although the general had intended to advance by land as far as Shamshamiya, beyond the junction of the river Karun, news of the advance of a Turkish force, and the absence of expected reinforcements from India, caused him to stay where he was in order to protect the oil works.

BIG PUSH

This scene in Rumania shows a German field airship detachment having great difficulty in pushing their apparatus over a destroyed road. Their opponents, who were under-equipped and badly led, suffered, in addition, from a total lack of any air force.

Photo: Mondiale

A Turkish attack took place during the early hours of November 11. The enemy force, led by Sami Bey, numbered 600, and after some sharp fighting it was driven off with the loss of 80 dead and wounded, as opposed to a total of ten British casualties. Three days later Lieutenant-General Sir A. Barrett arrived in Mesopotamia to take charge of the operations, and with him came eighteen transports laden with reinforcements. The two brigades with him were the Ahmednagar under Brigadier-General W. A. Dobbie, and the Bilgaum under Brigadier-General C. I. Fry.

From India Barrett received the following orders: "Your objective is Basra. If after discussion with and taking over from Delamain you consider your present force strong enough, you will move on Basra."

Having received information concerning movements of Turkish troops near Saihan, about four miles away, Delamain was entrusted by Barrett with the task of dispersing them, so on November 15 he advanced to the attack. Both the enemy's first and second positions were captured, and before long the Turks were retreating northward. Delamain then returned to his camp.

Two days later Sir A. Barrett decided to advance against the Turkish position at Sahil, near the junction of the river Karun and the Shatt-al-Arab, and in the early morning a British force left the camp and marched north-west across the open desert, their advance followed on the river by the Espiègle and Odin, together with the armed yacht Lewis Pelley and an armed tug, the Sirdar-i-Naphte. At Sahil the enemy force, amounting to 3,500 Turkish infantry, 350 gendarmerie and about 1,000 Arabs, were driven from their position by the assault of Delamain's brigade on their left and the frontal

PREPARING THE WAY

German storm troops have brought up a minenwerfer of the Keil and Pöhlberges type into position. A mine has just been thrown, while most of the men crouch in what cover they can find before making the final assault on the enemy lines

CAPTIVES FROM THE SKY

Though occasionally they succeeded in avoiding capture, the great majority of pilots forced down behind the enemy lines who escaped death were taken prisoner. These two British aviators, though captured, have at least preserved their lives

Photos: G.P.A.

attacks of the brigade under Major-General C. I. Fry, the 2nd Dorsetshire regiment in particular distinguishing itself in capturing the old fort, from which they drove the Turks early in the afternoon. Soon afterwards the enemy were in full retreat everywhere, though the British, unused to the slippery and clinging mud of the country, were prevented from pursuing them rapidly, and at 3 p.m. the action came to an end. The enemy was able to retreat in comparative safety on account of the screening action of a violent sandstorm. The British camp was then established on the river bank at Sahil.

On November 20 Barrett was able to appreciate the extent of his victory when news was brought to him that the Turks had evacuated Basra and retired up the Tigris in the direction of Amara. The immediate results of this information were the occupation of Basra by the British on November 21, and the dispatch of reinforcements to Mesopotamia by Enver Pasha. The ceremonial entry took place ten days later and a proclamation was read in Arabic by Sir Percy Cox, political agent to the expedition. This appeared to give satisfaction, promising as it did, among other benefits, immunity for all Holy Places. But the people were held back from too riotous enthusiasm by thoughts of what might happen to them if the Turks came back.

After Basra came a pause while the Indian Government made up its mind about a further advance. For the moment they were definitely against Baghdad as an immediate objective owing to the weakness of the force and its lack of transport both by land and water. Sir Percy Cox strongly advocated a pronouncement that Basra would be permanently occupied by the British. This would create a favourable effect among the Arab tribes and keep to their allegiance those inclined to waver between the two combatants, according as one or the other seemed to be gaining the upper hand. But the Government of India, nervous of the susceptibilities of Britain's allies, declined to sanction this declaration, on the ground that no occupation of any conquered country could be announced as permanent before the end of the war.

British movements and projects were largely dependent upon Arab co-operation, a handicap which had existed on a previous occasion in 1887, when Sir James Outram had taken a British expedition up the Shatt-al-Arab to operate against the Persians in Mohammerah. Ibn Saud, the emir of Nejd, whose relations with the Indian Government were of the friendliest kind, had assured Sir Percy Cox of his faithful allegiance to the British side. His desire was to see the Turks cleared out of Basra, Mosul and Baghdad. Unfortunately, the Arabs were not trustworthy, and effective assistance from them was not to be expected.

It was at this point that the original operations, undertaken in the first place for purely defensive purposes, grew like a ripple from a stone cast into the water. Security had demanded the occupation of Basra, and Basra was in British hands. To defend Basra it was necessary to occupy and fortify Qurna. From Qurna an advance to Amara became imperative; with Amara in Britain's possession, it was seen that by holding Kut any Turkish advance down the Tigris could be checked. From Kut to Baghdad was but one more stage in an advance planned without due consideration of the difficulties involved or the means available.

After their defeat at Sahil the Turks had retreated upstream as far as Qurna. On December 3 Lieutenant-Colonel Frazer proceeded up the river with a small force transported in four river steamers, Malami, Mejidieh, Blosse Lynch and Salami, belonging to Messrs. Lynch, a company which for half a

CROWN PRINCE

Only his father the Kaiser was more generally execrated during the war by the British public than the German Crown Prince, Frederick William. Though given a high command on the Western Front at the outbreak of war, he exercised little control over military strategy

BRAINS OF AN ARMY

Three German staff officers at General Headquarters are seen poring over a map of the battlefields, while another telephones. In such rooms as these reports from the front were discussed and plans of campaign decided upon

Photos Doren Leigh, Ltd



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EVERY LITTLE HELPS

German schoolboys are here seen bringing offerings of copper, gilt, silver and other vessels, instruments and ornaments to be melted down for munition purposes. The efficacy of the Allied blockade forced the Germans to adopt methods such as these

century had conducted steam navigation on the Tigris. The military force was accompanied by two warships and also by two armed launches, and at daybreak on December 4 the troops disembarked on the northern bank of the river Shuwaiyib at its junction with the Shatt-al-Arab. From there they advanced upon the Turkish position covering Muzair'a, on the left bank of the river opposite Qurna. Reconnaissance was carried out by infantry scouts, as no cavalry had been transported, but lack of cover and the effects of mirage added to the difficulty of their work.

The mirage is a well-known phenomenon of the desert. "In the haze, or mirage," says Edmund Candler in "The Long Road to Baghdad," "it is difficult to tell if the enemy are horse or foot, or to make any estimate of their numbers. Everything is magnified. A low-lying mud village becomes a fort with walls 20 feet high, a group of donkeys a palm-grove . . . There is not a cavalry regiment with the Force which has not, at some time or other, mistaken sheep for infantry."

But before noon the enemy was driven from Muzair'a, the 110th Mahratta light infantry taking many prisoners and two field-guns. Under cover of heavy fire from rearguards, the Turks crossed the river and took up their position at Qurna. The draught of the British sloops was too great to permit them to advance farther up the stream, so the naval officer in charge ordered forward his armed launches but heavy gun-fire stopped them from approaching Qurna, and it became obvious that without artillery support the British could not cross the river. Frazer, therefore, decided to return to his landing point on the river Shuwaiyib and await reinforcements.

These arrived, under the command of General Fry, on December 6, but meanwhile the Turks had also been reinforced, and were back at Muzair'a. The next day General Fry's troops carried that place at the point of the bayonet, while the British ships kept up a continuous artillery duel with the Turkish guns at Qurna. Early on December 8 preparations were made for crossing the river, and three men of No. 17 Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners, Havildar Ghulam Nabi, Lance-Naick Nur Dad and Sapper Ghulam Haidar, bravely swam across the Tigris with a log-line for the construction of a flying bridge, over which the 110th Mahratta light infantry passed. The 104th Rifles, farther upstream, crossed by means of two mahailas, native boats of a length varying from 30 to 80 feet, and rigged with a lateen sail. Joining forces on the other side of the Tigris, the two battalions, further action being judged impossible with the approach of darkness, decided to bivouac on the river bank.

Arrangements were made to attack Qurna the following morning, but just before midnight a small steamer, with the vali of Basra, Subhi Bey's chief staff officer, on board, sailed down the river to the British ships and surrendered the town. Accordingly, on November 9, after General Fry had arranged for the surrender, the two British battalions entered Qurna and took prisoner the garrison, consisting of 45 officers and 989 other ranks.

Qurna, honoured in Mahomedan legend as being on the site of the Garden of Eden, was strategically of importance, lying as it did at the confluence of the Tigris and the Euphrates, and its occupation closed the first phase of the campaign in Mesopotamia. Thus at the end of 1914 the British had gained complete control over the delta, the passage to the two great rivers and the navigable waterway of the Gulf. All immediate danger of Turkish interference with the oilfields, on which the British navy was so dependent, was at an end, and the British successes had disposed some of the neighbouring Arabs in her favour.

Towards the end of December, however, General Barrett heard that the 4th Turkish army corps, some 36,000 strong, was moving from Syria with the possible destination of Basra. This threatened attack necessitated the dispatch of further reinforcements from India, and another brigade arrived on February 7, 1915. Even this proved insufficient, for General Barrett was by this time aware that he could no longer rely upon effective Arab co-operation, and he was obliged to send some of his troops to Ahwaz, up the river Karun, to protect the pipe-line, threatened by a revolt of the Bawi tribe.

By the middle of February the rising of the waters of the Tigris led to extensive floods, and the inundation of the area around Qurna and Muzair'a compelled General Barrett to withdraw his troops by degrees to Basra. By the beginning of March it became evident from information received that large forces of Turks and Arabs were concentrating in the north, and on March 5 the secretary of state for India telegraphed to the Government of India, urging the necessity of sending more troops to the aid of General Barrett, and at the same time relieved the viceroy and commander-in-chief from any responsibility which might come about owing to a further depletion of India's military reserves. On March 7 the viceroy notified Lord Crewe, the secretary of state for India, that he would send the 33rd infantry brigade under Major-General Gorringe.

In view of the increased strength of the Mesopotamian expeditionary force, the Indian Government decided, but without obtaining the consent of the India Office, to reorganize it as an army corps of one cavalry brigade and two infantry divisions. General Sir John Nixon, at that time commanding

REST BEFORE RAID

These Germans are resting in preparation for the night's task ahead of them, when they will undertake the perilous duties of a raiding party. It was popularly believed that German troops, before embarking on so hazardous a duty, were given a chemical stimulant

the northern army in India, was placed in command, and landed on April 9. Unfortunately, although the strength of Force "D" was now doubled, the medical equipment was inadequate for a single division, and no addition had been made to the river transport.

The British position in Mesopotamia in the spring of 1915 therefore was not very secure. The Turks lay across the three rivers, their right on the Euphrates, their centre on the Tigris, and their left on the Karun. One danger spot to the British was Ahwaz on the Karun. It lay in the territory of their ally, the sheikh of Mohammerah, and through the region passed the precious oil pipe-line. The Turks were threatening Ahwaz from Amara on the Tigris, a hundred miles across country in a north-west direction, and a brigade on the Karun was detailed to keep these activities in check.

But a more imminent danger lay in the enemy preparations to recapture Basra. The battle of Shaiba, fought on April 12–14, decided the fate of that port, which remained in the possession of the British. On the morning of April 11 General Fry was advised that an advance guard of Turks and Arabs were moving towards Shaiba, an entrenched camp held by the British as an outpost to the west, covering Basra, and it quickly became known that the enemy, some 22,000 strong, were planning an attack to take place that night. The assault was actually launched at 5 a.m. on the morning of April 12, when the Turks made four determined attacks upon the camp. All were repulsed, but, with the numerical superiority of the attackers, matters might have gone ill for the British but for the timely arrival of General Mellis, who had reached Basra a few days previously with the 30th brigade from Egypt.

Part of this force was embarked in bellums, small native craft about 20 feet long, resembling Venetian gondolas, and in these they crossed the inundated ground to Shaiba. At times, when the water became too shallow to permit of effective paddling, officers and men would get out into the water

NO SIGNS OF LIFE

A German shell has done its work thoroughly. Men and horses forming part of a British ammunition column have been killed outright on the spot, and when the Germans advance one of their number vainly searches for wounded among the débris

Photos: G.P.A.

'Canadian Records'

GOOD COMPANIONS

It takes more than the mud and desolation around them to damp the spirits of these two Canadians. With the trenches behind them they look forward to a dry billet, a sing-song, a rum ration and even the possibility of a bath

and push their boats. Taking over the command from General Fry on the morning of April 13, General Mellis successfully took the offensive, obliging large bodies of Turks to surrender.

Having cleared the vicinity of Shaiba of the enemy, Mellis decided to move out on April 14 and attack the main body of the Turks, who were in position at Barjisiyah Wood, midway between Shaiba and Shevaibda. There he gained a brilliant victory, and it was later estimated that the enemy losses amounted to nearly 6,000 killed and wounded. The total British casualties during the day's fighting were 161 killed and 901 wounded.

The result of this operation was to consolidate the British position at Basra, restore the initiative to the British and minimize for a time the likelihood of any effective action on the part of the Turks. Their army had retreated in confusion across the desert to Khamisiya, nearly a hundred miles distant. They had fought bravely, but received practically no assistance from their Arab allies, who now turned upon them in customary fashion and harassed their retreat.

With the taking over of the command of the expeditionary force by Sir John Nixon, the operations in Mesopotamia now entered upon a new phase. This force was divided into two divisions, one under Sir C. Townshend, the other under Sir G. F. Gorringe. On April 22 Townshend arrived at Basra and took command of the 6th division. He was ordered by General Nixon to advance to Qurna and find out the dispositions of the Turkish forces north of that village, with a view to attacking them and proceeding up the Tigris. General Gorringe was sent up the Karun river with a cavalry brigade and two infantry brigades from the 12th division to disperse any enemy force and to establish communication with Ahwaz. General Gorringe's force pushed on to Illa and demonstrated towards Bisaitin in order to assist General Townshend's advance up the Tigris. So effective was this operation that the Turkish forces opposing him were greatly delayed in their march to Amara, and when at last they did reach that place it was only to find General Townshend in occupation.

To return to the operations along the Tigris. On May 11 the success which had attended the advance of General Gorringe against the Turks in northern Arabistan decided Sir John Nixon to sanction the offensive up the Tigris. General Townshend proposed to carry out a frontal attack in strength, while a detachment on the eastern bank of the river followed, ready to carry out an enveloping movement. The troops were to move up the river in 372 native bellums, in the art of navigating which the battalions had been training for some time past. In addition, rafts were provided for machine-guns, and five pieces of artillery were mounted on barges. The naval flotilla, consisting of the Espiègle, Odin, Clio, Lawrence, Sumana, Shaitan and Miner, with three naval guns mounted in horse-boats, was detailed to co-operate.

On May 31 "Townshend's regatta," as it was dubbed locally, moved slowly up the river. Edmund Candler remarks that this "was probably the most amphibious action that has ever been fought. Not only the navy but the army was afloat." In their flotilla of long, narrow boats, some of which were protected by an armoured shield, the men, ten in each, punted their way over a mile through thick reeds and sprang to land in water waist-deep.

Ever since dawn on this day the warships and heavy artillery at Qurna had carried on an intensive bombardment of the Turkish positions at One Tower, Gun and Norfolk Hills. Until the advance was well under way the Odin remained in the Shatt al Arab, about a mile below Qurna, from which position it could enfilade the enemy batteries on One Tower Hill. The Lawrence and the Miner were stationed in the Euphrates, due west of Qurna. When the battle was under way, these ships moved up the Tigris in support.

After the preliminary bombardment, and when the mine-sweeping bellums

Photo: Imperial War Museum

SUPPORTS MOVE UP

British support troops move up over hard-won ground near Ginchy to relieve or support the first waves of an attack on the German trenches. Until the enemy guns find the range again this former No Man's Land is a place of comparative safety

THEIR DUTY DONE

Noise, mud, rats and vermin were probably as much hated and feared by the men in the trenches as the enemy's shells and bullets. All have contributed to the weariness of these Canadian soldiers, who have just emerged from a spell in the front line

'Canadian Records'



BRITAIN'S TRUMP CARD

The tank was the chief innovation contributed by Britain during the War. Though not at first used to the best advantage, they later proved of great value. The scene here is after the action on the Somme in September, 1916, in which they first appeared

had cleared the way, the infantry, who had landed, were deployed about a mile south-east of the Turkish positions, and advanced to the attack.

The 22nd Punjabis and the 1st Oxford and Bucks L.I. carried the enemy's advanced positions on One Tower Hill and Norfolk Hill at the point of the bayonet. Meanwhile, the 103rd Mahratta Light Infantry were advancing upon Gun Hill. All the guns of the naval force, the machine-guns, and rifle-fire from the infantry on One Tower Hill now swept this position, and by 11.30 a.m., before the Mahrattas had come to grips with them, the Turkish garrison surrendered.

The infantry re-embarked in their bellums, and during the next two days the chase up the river continued with unabated vigour. When it became evident that the Turkish retirement was more in the nature of a rout, General Townshend and Captain Nunn, the senior naval officer, decided to push on ahead and see what was happening at Amara. So, accompanied by Sir Percy Scott, they transferred to the paddle-yacht Comet and steamed up the river in advance of the infantry, followed by the armed launches Lewis Pelley, Sumana and Shaitan. That evening they dropped anchor about six miles above Qala Salim without having sighted the enemy. Early the next morning they proceeded on their way, but when about twelve miles from Amara, General Townshend wondered whether it might not be advisable to call a halt and await his men in case the Turks should decide to defend Amara. Captain Nunn was in favour of proceeding, and after some hesitation the general said he would "go on and chance it." With the Shaitan scouting ahead they continued up the river.

Not until she came within three miles of Amara did the crew of the Shaitan see signs of the enemy, but then, on turning a bend of the river, Turkish troops were observed entering a barge on the right bank. A shot from the Shaitan sent them flying up the bank in wild disorder The launch pushed on past a bridge of boats, and a body of some 1,500 men were seen to be retreating westward along the bank of the Tigris.

Past Amara, full of troops, steamed Shaitan, and without any exchange of shots continued her course for another half-mile, when she hove to by the bank. There over a hundred men, all fully armed, surrendered to her. The officers were taken on board, and the men, after giving up their rifles and ammunition, were told to march downstream again, keeping up with Shaitan, which now descended towards Amara. A little farther downstream another body of Turkish soldiers, a hundred and fifty strong, surrendered in like manner, and, to quote the official history of the campaign, "walked unattended along the bank until they reached the bridge of boats, where they sat by a coffee-shop on the right bank until time could be found to take them into custody."

The crew of the launch comprised only eight sailors under the command of Lieutenant Mark Singleton. They had put to flight over 2,000 Turkish soldiers, and actually captured 11 officers and 250 men. For this smart piece of work, in the best tradition of the British navy, Lieutenant Singleton received the Distinguished Service Order.

On the arrival of the Comet at Amara, a superb piece of bluff delivered the town into British hands. General Townshend and Captain Nunn gravely accepted the surrender of a garrison of 700 from Turkish authorities, who little dreamed

'Canadian Records'

TEA FOR TOMMY

Canteens organized by the Y.M.C.A. and other charitable institutions were found quite close behind the front line, well into the danger zone. These soldiers welcome mugs of hot strong tea just after they have come out of the trenches

BEATING THE CAMEL

The camel carries its own water supply across the desert, but this British soldier, with his food container strapped on his back, has gone one better. This device, however, proved too cumbersome to be widely adopted

'Canadian Records'

MEDICAL INSPECTION

The health of the troops was the care of the regimental doctor and the opportunity was taken of a rest period to give the battalion an overhaul. No unit of the British forces had a better health record than the New Zealanders, who are here seen paraded for a medical inspection

Photos: Imperial War Museum

that their immediate support consisted of twenty-two men of the Comet and some lascar stokers.

In spite of a temperature rising to well over 100°, and despite the difficulties of navigating the shallow and reed-infested river, within three days the British force had reached its objective, ninety miles upstream, with comparatively small loss of life. During the naval operations the Turkish gunboat Marmaris was put out of action and the Bulbul was sunk. British captures included four river steamers, eleven barges, seventeen guns, and 1,773 prisoners.

The British forces in Mesopotamia were now distributed at four main points: Amara, Qurna, Ahwaz and Basra. Sir John Nixon next proposed, with the approval of the Indian government, to advance upon Nasiriya, nearly 70 miles due west of Qurna, on the river Euphrates. It was a focal base for the Turks for an attack upon Basra and, moreover, standing at one end of the Shatt-al-Hai, it closes communications between the Tigris and the Euphrates.

At the beginning of July, 1915, a mixed force under General Gorringe set out to the Euphrates by way of Hammar Lake. Carrying out amphibious warfare, through floods and creeks and lagoons, the troops, in torrid weather and prey to a myriad flies and mosquitoes, arrived at the end of the third week of July, 1915, in front of the Turkish position at Majinina Creek, about seven miles from Nasiriya. Their numbers had been greatly depleted by sickness, but the arrival as reinforcements of the 18th infantry brigade and its artillery during July 19 and 20 enabled Gorringe to attack with hopes of success.

The battle began about half-past four on the morning of July 24, 1915. For half an hour the brigades had been moving forward, but before the infantry charged, all the howitzers, field, and mountain guns bombarded the enemy's foremost trenches with high-explosive shells. For a full hour the batteries continued to smash up the enemy's entrenchments and gun positions; and then the 2nd West Kents advanced through the date groves and jumped into the Turkish trenches, shooting many of the enemy at point-blank range and bayoneting the remainder. By 10 a.m. the enemy had been driven from every

SHELLS BY THE TON

It is no easy task to load these 15-inch howitzer shells on to their wagon, nine men being required for the task. The 15-inch howitzer, one of the heaviest guns, normally fired a shell weighing nearly a ton

GAS MASK PARADE

These men of the Irish Guards might be going to a masked ball. Actually they are undergoing gas-mask drill behind the lines on the Amiens–Albert road. They are wearing the P.H. helmet fitted with goggles, which was a forerunner of the box respirator

Photos: Imperial War Museum

position south of Maiyadiya Creek, on the east bank of the river. On the west bank the 30th brigade under General Mellis was equally successful in capturing the whole of the Turkish position north of Majinina Creek. The Turkish force now retired upstream to the trenches behind Sadanawiya Creek, covering Nasiriya, whereupon General Gorringe ordered his troops on both banks to advance, accompanied by the armed launches.

The Shushan pushed up to the bend in the river at Sadanawiya and shelled the Turks so heavily at close range that they soon fled in disorder. Pursuing her way up the river, she met a Turkish "Thorneycroft" launch, which she set on fire with a direct hit. Night was now falling, and the naval flotilla dropped anchor for the night near Nasiriya.

HAVEN FOR A HEAVY

The share taken in the fighting by heavy guns increased rapidly. This photograph of a giant British howitzer being mounted in a wood behind Albert gives an idea of the work to be done before they were ready for action

At 6 a.m. the next morning the Shushan received a visit from the chief Arabs of the town, who invited the British to occupy Nasiriya, from which the Turks had fled during the night. General Mellis thereupon advanced with a body of Gurkhas and took over the place. On July 28 his Majesty the King sent the following message to General Nixon: "The splendid achievement of General Gorringe's column, in spite of many hardships and intense heat, fills me with admiration."

An uninterrupted series of victories, such as our force had hitherto enjoyed, seemed, in the eyes of the authorities at Simla, to warrant a further advance, and on July 27 the Viceroy telegraphed to the Secretary of State: "Now that Nasiriya has been occupied, the occupation of Kut-al-Amara is considered by us to be a strategic necessity." This objective was evidently intended to be a further step in that advance to Baghdad which was the lodestone of political as well as military hopes. After some exchange of communications the Secretary of State gave his consent and accepted the military arrangements.

Kut-al-Amara, half way between Amara and Baghdad, commanded the lower reaches of the Tigris and also the communication with the Euphrates by way of Shatt-al-Hai. Its occupation would naturally consolidate the British position on both rivers, and permit of a reduction in the garrisons at Nasiriya and Amara. On the other hand, an advance to Kut meant an extension by

FACING A NEW TERROR

The horror of gas is vividly shown by this photograph taken on the Eastern Front. Lachrymatory gas shells were first used against the Russians in January, 1915, but for some time the fact of the temperature being below freezing point nullified their effectiveness

Photo: Topical

some 150 miles of our lines of communication, with consequent difficulties of supply.

The Turks, under the command of Nur-ud-Din, had constructed the most formidable position the British had yet faced, astride the river, seven miles downstream from Kut. "Well traversed and well concealed," says General Moberly in his official account of the campaign, "their trenches afforded a clear command over the ground in front of them, which was flat and devoid of cover. The front of the position was covered by formidable barbed wire entanglements, military pits and land mines, while behind were miles of communication trenches and underground chambers. . . . Gun emplacements of brick and mortar had been constructed, offering alternative positions for batteries and connected with one another by broad communication trenches."

There was, however, one defect in the enemy position. The only means of communication between the forces on the right and left banks of the river was a bridge of boats some five miles to the rear. On September 26 General Townshend, in command of the 6th division, got into touch with the enemy, whose strength was estimated at about 6,000, three-quarters of whom were Arabs. He established his headquarters near Nukhailat, on the left bank of the river; while General Delamain encamped with his troops on the opposite side of the river, and by pitching as many tents as he could muster endeavoured to give the impression that his was the main force.

The attack began on the morning of September 27, when Generals Fry and Delamain, on the left and right banks respectively, demonstrated against the enemy with a view to ascertaining the disposition of his troops. General Delamain's feint deluded Nur-ud-Din into thinking that the main British attack was certainly directed upon his right flank, and accordingly he kept his reserves on the right bank of the river. But during the night of September 27–28 the British general moved all his men save two battalions over the Tigris and joined General Townshend's force on the other side. His orders were now to try and turn the enemy's left flank and rear. The Turkish position on the left bank of the river was divided into three sections separated by marshes. The left flank, or northern section, of the line was separated from the centre by Suwada Marsh; Horseshoe Marsh intervened between the centre and the right wing on the river. Therefore General Delamain was first of all to envelop the enemy trenches north of Suwada Marsh, then to sweep down on the western side of the marsh and attack the flank of the centre section while General Fry attacked frontally.

Early on the morning of September 28 a column of troops under General Hoghton, consisting of his own brigade (the 17th) and two battalions of the 16th brigade, moved off northwards to make the first attack on the left flank of the Turks. By 4.45 a.m. the column had reached its position of deployment at the south-west corner of Suwaikiya Marsh. It should then have headed due west between Suwada and Ataba Marshes, but in the darkness it lost direction, and at sunrise General Hoghton found himself marching northwards through the passage between Ataba Marsh and Suwaikiya Marsh. He decided that, rather than retrace his steps, it would be preferable to pass

round the northern side of the marsh and come down in the enemy's rear.

Meanwhile, General Delamain had placed his troops just over a mile north-east of Northern Redoubt, and as soon as he saw General Hoghton's column coming down the western side of Ataba Marsh, having found out from his patrols that Northern and Centre Redoubts were not held in any great strength, he immediately launched an attack against this position. It met with stubborn resistance, and the 117th Mahrattas sustained heavy casualties, but, assisted by the 103rd Mahrattas, whom General Hoghton had detached from his column, they carried the Northern Redoubt in little over an hour. Centre Redoubt fell into British hands soon afterwards.

The Turkish resistance now concentrated around Southern Redoubt, but continuous efforts, culminating in an assault by the 1st Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry, the 119th Infantry and the 103rd Mahratta Light Infantry, delivered that stronghold into the hands of the British at 12.45 p.m., together with 300 prisoners. In the meantime, General Hoghton had come into contact with an enemy force advancing from the south-west, but, supported by the 76th Field Battery R.F.A., his infantry soon put them to flight. After a short rest, Hoghton resumed his march southward, but when within two miles of the river he came under heavy fire from the Turkish guns at Kut, which caused many casualties. It was now 3.30 p.m. Since 2 a.m. Hoghton's column had been on the march. Exhausted with the heat and dust, suffering tortures from lack of water, most of the men were, in the words of their leader, "cooked." Hoghton therefore retired towards Suwada Marsh, where he met Delamain, who was advancing to support him, and there he halted.

During the events related above General Fry was attacking the centre section of the Turkish position, between Suwada Marsh and Horseshoe Marsh. The British artillery found great difficulty in ranging accurately owing to the dust and the mirage, and progress was slow, but by 4.30 p.m. the infantry were within nine hundred yards of the enemy trenches. Now General Delamain, who had rested his men for a time, resumed his march round the south-west corner of Suwada Marsh to assist General Fry by attacking the enemy from the rear, but the sight of Turkish reinforcements hurrying from the south caused him to change his plans.

With amazing rapidity both brigades, which had seemed about to drop and die for want of water, wheeled to their

Photo. Topical

MEN FROM THE NORTH

The Letts, a distinct race, whose land, Latvia, was at the beginning of the war a Russian province, fought faithfully for the Tsar. Their independence was recognized after the war. Here some of them are seen in readiness to advance



The first struggle for the possession of Kut took place in September, 1915. Our map shows the position of the Turkish forces during the enveloping movement of a British column

FORGOTTEN MEN

Photo: G.P.A

Mown down by the machine-guns of the enemy, these Italian soldiers lie forgotten in the stress of battle on the slopes of the Julian Alps near Cividale Scenes such as this were common in the Caporetto campaign, which so nearly proved fatal to Italy

PART OF THE PROLOGUE

While the preliminary bombardment, sometimes lasting for days, is in full swing, these Italian soldiers, soon to form part of the first wave of a new attack, are resting quietly. The Italian offensive of 1916 resulted in the capture of Gorizia

right and, in spite of their exhaustion, in one long, splendid charge, during which they had no time to fire, they broke in among the Turks with the bayonet, routed them in a single violent effort, captured all their guns, and shot them down as they fled in the gathering darkness towards the bridge of boats.

It was all over in an hour, and the troops, overtaken by the night, dropped down exhausted on the scene of their victory. As a result, Nur-ud-Din was able in the night to evacuate his fortress and move his troops across the bridge of boats to the southern bank of the Tigris.

The next morning General Fry's scouts learned that the Turks had withdrawn from all their positions east of Kut and were in full flight up the river to Baghdad. During the fight the British had captured more than 1,700 prisoners and 13 guns, and inflicted heavy losses upon the enemy both in men and material. The British casualties between September 26–28 amounted to 1,233, of whom only 94 were killed. Turkish casualties, apart from prisoners, amounted to nearly 3,000.

"The troops under the command of Major-General Townshend," said Sir John Nixon, "displayed the highest soldierly qualities and worthily upheld the reputation they have earned during this arduous campaign."

During the night the senior naval officer, Lieutenant-Commander Cookson, endeavoured to break through the barrier formed across the river by the Turks, and which consisted of a *mahaila* and two lighters, linked by wire hawsers. With lights extinguished the three armed tugs moved up the river, but were soon observed by the enemy's rearguard, and were fired at from both sides of the river. Nevertheless Cookson drew alongside the barrier in the Comet, and, in General Townshend's own words, "found that he could not send a man over the ship's side to cut away the obstruction because it meant certain death, so he took an axe and went himself." He fell, riddled with bullets, and died a few moments later.

The Comet's small crew having been reduced by fourteen casualties, the ships retired for the night, and when they steamed up again at daybreak they found the Turkish rearguard had departed, and as a British party had blown up the obstruction during the night, the flotilla proceeded to Kut-el-Amara, where British cavalry were already in possession.

FLIGHT FROM THE FOE

The evacuation of the civilian population was, at one time or other, a task imposed upon nearly all the Allies. These Italian families, with their belongings, are being given lifts on transport wagons

Photo: Topical

CHAPTER 41

IN THE THIRD ELEMENT

The extension of warfare into a third element, the air, was perhaps the greatest novelty of the Great War. This began almost on the first day of hostilities and on all fronts increased in magnitude and intensity as the struggle proceeded

ALTHOUGH far from realizing the immense possibilities of air warfare, Britain had not neglected the new arm. In April, 1912, the Royal Flying Corps was constituted by royal warrant; it consisted of a naval wing and a military wing. In time the naval wing dropped out of use as an official name, its place being taken by the Royal Naval Air Service; and the Royal Flying Corps became a sufficient description of what was a distinctively military body. After several fatalities in monoplanes, an order was issued by the War Office forbidding the use of monoplanes in the Royal Flying Corps, and training work at the Central Flying School at Upavon was delayed by this ban.

An experimental branch of the Royal Flying Corps was formed in March, 1913, under Major Herbert Musgrave, to whose work is due much of the success of British aviation. In the spring of 1914 a headquarters flight was placed at his disposal. When the War came the headquarters flight was broken up, but the wireless section was attached for a time to No. 4 Squadron, and in September, 1914, a headquarters wireless unit was formed at Fère-en-Tardenois, in France, with Major Musgrave in command. From this unit the whole wireless telegraphy organization of the Royal Flying Corps was gradually developed. The unit was enlarged in December, 1914, and became No. 9 Squadron, stationed at headquarters.

The Royal Flying Corps took the field with the British Expeditionary Force in August, 1914, under Sir David Henderson. As has been related in an earlier chapter, the original force consisted of 105 officers and 755 other ranks, with 63 aeroplanes. Of these 36 were flown over the Channel with singularly few mishaps. After a brief period at Amiens, the majority of the corps moved to Maubeuge and began to carry out reconnaissances over Belgium. The early reports of the observers gave valuable information as to the movements of the German troops.

During the retreat from Mons the headquarters was moved from Maubeuge to Le Cateau, and afterwards to various other places. These constant retirements of base, which involved the almost daily transport of large quantities of material, placed a heavy strain on the ground personnel, and it is greatly to their credit that the pilots were able to continue their reconnaissances without serious interruption. Besides following the movement of the German advance, they were also able to watch the positions of the British in retreat and inform the corps commanders of the state of their rearguards. Later valuable work was done in the photographing of enemy positions, and the early photography of the Royal Flying Corps was the forerunner of that immense photographic map of the Western Front in thousands of sections, constantly renewed, which played a great part in the later stages of the War.

With the improvement both in material and organization, and the increase of artillery power, the airmen of the Allies were able to show to better advantage. The work of the aerial scouts went on incessantly. They preceded both armies in the long race to the sea which began west of the Aisne in the third week in September and ended on the Yser in the second week in October, strategical reconnaissance being by far the most important part of their work, while tactical observation and photography also occupied them continually. There was also the unceasing work of directing the fire of the artillery. Now and then, when occasion offered, the airmen came out in large machines, carrying a store of bombs, with which they tried to injure the railway communications of the foe.

In October a terrible new aerial weapon was introduced by the French. It was a piece of steel rod a third of an inch in diameter and about seven inches long. One end was pointed like a pencil for an inch or so, while the other end was machined out for five inches like the feathers of an arrow. They were packed in boxes of fifty, and released by the aviator opening the bottom of the box with a string. The speed at which the aeroplane was travelling distributed the arrows thoroughly, while the force of gravity endued the missiles, as they fell from a great height, with horrible power. By lying flat on the ground a fighting man could often escape the effect of a bomb, unless it made a direct hit, which was improbable. But men lying flat, or even crouching, beneath a shower of aerial arrows only exposed more surface to the missiles. The effect on cavalry was worse than on infantry, for there was a larger surface to hit.

Aerial scouts, meanwhile, continued their work of reconnaissance over the contending armies. They were not always successful. An extraordinary case of an entire German army corps being overlooked by British airmen took place in the movement towards Arras. Two hostile army corps were seen marching through the forest at Vermand. A sharp look-out was kept on their movements. One corps was traced as it went to reinforce the German troops at St. Quentin; the other, however, vanished in a mysterious manner. A similar disappearance of a German army corps under the eyes of aeroplane scouts occurred some time before at Compiègne. In both instances it is supposed that the large mass of 30,000 to 40,000 men concealed themselves in a forest, where their movements could not be observed by the aerial scouts. Then they left the woods in small numbers at different times and collected at a prearranged rendezvous. But the fact that the Germans had to undertake this lengthy and difficult operation of marching an army corps to a forest and scattering it, and then arranging for it to join together again by a timetable, is a telling example of the way in which the aerial reconnaissance of the Allies increased the difficulties of the enemy.

About the middle of October, 1914, there was a series of German aeroplane raids on St. Omer, Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne. But though the popular imagination was impressed by these bomb-dropping exploits, this was only an incidental purpose of the enemy airmen; their real business was to learn about the movements of British troops. The German general staff expected the landing of a stronger British reinforcement than the 7th division and the 3rd cavalry division under Sir Henry Rawlinson. It was feared that a considerable number of British Territorials would at once be transported to help in strengthening the seaward flank of the Allied line.

During this early period of the War a German cavalry division was defeated by a few airmen. The large force of horsemen were pursued and harassed from the sky during the whole of October 15, and as evening drew on a well-aimed bomb attack completed their discomfiture. But it was not always so. On the same day a chase occured at St. Omer, in which three

FAMILIARITY BREEDS CONTEMPT

Although a bomb from an enemy aeroplane is bursting on the road near, these British soldiers, who form part of the Allied force assembled at Salonika, remain quite unperturbed. They are gazing skywards, watching the efforts of the enemy pilot to avoid the shells of the anti-aircraft guns

VOLUNTEERS FOR VENIZELOS

The resentment aroused by the Bulgarian invasion of Greek territory made it possible for the provisional government set up by M. Venizelos at Salonika in 1916 to raise an army of volunteers. Their activities were well concealed by the many hidden valleys, such as this, in the hilly, scrub-covered country

CAVALRY IN WAITING

Somewhat reminiscent of a meet in one of the English shires, these British cavalrymen await the chance to be up and doing. The cavalry had few opportunities on the Western Front, but on occasions, notably at Mons, on the Somme, and during the German advance of 1918, they rendered invaluable service

British aeroplanes tried to hunt down one German machine. Two of the British machines proved to be slower than the German, and the other one met with an accident and had to give up the chase This was one of the first signs of a general improvement in German aeroplanes which caused the Allied commanders a considerable amount of anxiety. Several things seemed to show that the superiority in the air won by the Allies at the beginning of the War was partly due to the fact that their opponents were at first using old machines which they had kept at their frontier stations. They had mainly old-type Taube monoplanes, Aviatik biplanes, early-type Albatross, and L.V.G. biplanes. These were heavy and slow, and many of them had only four-cylinder engines of 70 h.-p.

In the middle of October a large supply of superior machines arrived in the German lines. Some of them had been built before the War, others had been completed after it had started. The effect of this sudden and important improvement was soon remarked. British pilots were surprised to discover that many of the German airmen began to climb better and fly more quickly than they used to do. The British air service had, in fact, only a few machines that could keep up with them.

By modelling their new machines on those of the British the Germans had largely recovered their lost ground. Their latest type of tractor biplane was almost indistinguishable from the British machine by an untrained observer. The Ago tractor resembled the Sopwiths or Avros, the new Aviatik, Albatross and L.V.G. looked like the British B.E.'s. The popular chart contrasting the silhouettes of German and British machines, and issued with the authority of the British Government, was therefore misleading. The old-fashioned Taube especially, so continually mentioned in English newspapers, was rarely employed by the enemy. The new Aviatik seems to have been the common German machine.

Progress in construction, however, had continued in England. British airmen had the Sopwith Scout, the Bristol Scout, the remarkable Avros, so light and yet so strong, and the new Martinsyde Scout, possessing some fine qualities. Later the royal aircraft factory developed a small machine with the then enormous speed of well over 100 miles an hour.

With the same enthusiasm as the British, the French aviators in their improved machines harried the enemy almost continuously. M. Pegoud, the brilliant exponent of "looping the loop," was one of the French aces. He took to night flying over the German lines, doing terrible damage in the darkness, and using a petrol flare on returning to land behind the trenches. Sergeant Louis Noel, the Hendon flier, also became remarkable for his nocturnal flights. The whole of his squadron followed his example in habitually flying at night, much to the annoyance of the Germans, who would not imitate him. Noel, in the winter of 1914, was working on the Reims sector, where he achieved a great success, for it was largely by his efforts that the German fortress of heavy guns west of the city was put out of action.

In November, 1914, a combined squadron of British and French airmen made an attack upon the forts of Lille. On November 4 they blew up Fort Englos; the next day they destroyed Fort Carnot. The forts were being used as magazines by the Germans and were important as points of support in the enemy's line of entrenchments. Their sudden destruction by aerial bombardment was an affair of some significance.

The raids of the flying men of the French and British armies were seldom so spectacular in interest as the expeditions of some of the Royal Naval Air Service aviators. They worked for the most part against the railway communications of the enemy, dropped bombs upon the motor transport columns of the German army, or attacked the German headquarters—striking at the brains of the enemy's forces.

When the battles of the trenches reduced modern warfare to strange new conditions the French had a machine ready for raids on the enemy trenches and communications. It was a large metal-built biplane, with a motor of 200 h.-p., and carried only a couple of very heavy bombs, charged with a new secret explosive. These great bombs weighed about 130 pounds. A smaller bomb of 20 pounds weight could be carried in larger numbers. In the first experiment one of them made a hole in the ground ten yards wide and five feet deep. They were used for breaking down railway bridges and attacking trains. They were also employed in breaking up the permanent way so as to delay the supply of food, ammunition and other stores.

When the Germans got new machines, about the middle of October, 1914, they adopted the same tactics. In the middle of November especially they devoted much attention to the British Army Service Corps, killing men and transport horses. It seemed as though the British had then lost for a while the supremacy of the air through not having enough fast and powerful aeroplanes to attack all the German pilots who approached their lines.

In the first week of December the German airmen were again active. They attacked the town of Hazebrouck, hoping to destroy one of the British headquarters, but only killed three children and three adult civilians. More effectual was their bombardment on December 7 of the junction of the Armentières–Dunkirk and Ypres–Calais railway line. Their bombs were small, and the damage they did was slight, but the operation was well planned. It showed, at least, that the Germans grasped the lesson of the Allies' repeated attacks upon their communications. British airmen had previously attacked the German headquarters at Thielt on November 1. It was reported that the kaiser narrowly escaped death on this occasion, when thirty-two bombs were thrown round the building in which he met his generals.

Military air raids on either side however, did little more than secure some local destructive advantage. Owing, perhaps, to the lack of machines and pilots, men could not be spared from reconnaissances and artillery direction duties in order to make a grand air attack on some point of importance. As cavalry reconnaissance was prevented on both sides by the barrier of the trenches, it was left to the spy, the trench raider, and the airman to obtain any information as to the movements of the enemy. The airman became, therefore, exceedingly valuable. It is not too much to say that he dominated the battlefield. It was to escape his observation that the life of the artillerymen became a laborious round of digging holes and hiding from sight. The entrenched infantry had continually to burrow deeper and to conceal their burrows by all manner of devices in order to escape the notice of the airman. His bombs and air arrows were comparatively of small importance. What made him so terrible was that he was the eye of distant batteries of hidden howitzers.

The indirect fire of the howitzer depended for its value on aerial control. The trench protected the soldier fairly well from the direct fire of ordinary field-guns. If he could also have avoided the almost vertical bombardment of high-explosive howitzer shells, the character of the fighting would have been changed It was the heavy German guns and howitzers, directed by aerial observers, that saved the enemy's main line of railway communications at St. Quentin and east of Cambrai. And when the

Photo: Imperial War Museum

WHAT PRICE GLORY?

These Italians have achieved glory on the heights of the Tyrolese Alps. But the price they have paid is a big one, for the defence of their country has entailed the sacrifice of their own lives, and they lie still unburied on the rocky ground

HOSPITAL TRAIN

The railways for many miles behind the lines were busied almost entirely with hospital trains after a heavy engagement. Here badly wounded Austrians lie on their stretchers across the sleepers beside the train that will carry them to the base

Photo: G.P.U.

Photo: G.P.A

FRESH FIELDS

The Austro-German break-through on the Isonzo front carried their armies into country such as that seen here, hitherto untouched by the War. The Italians are making a desperate counter-attack on a hastily improvised Austrian trench

trenches along the Aisne were prolonged to Arras, Lille and Nieuport, the long-range howitzer and its flying controller was still the master-spirit of the campaign, for his vision reached 100 miles or more over the opposing front. No reconnoitring cavalry or scouts on motor-cycles could have accomplished what he accomplished. Beneath his eagle eye the fog of war was dissipated. The old grand, decisive element in strategy—the use of new large forces in unexpected times or places—became impracticable

The Germans effected one overwhelming thing of this sort at the opening of the war in the west by their vast, swift concentration of armies from the Sambre and Meuse, and the British army afterwards took General von Kluck by surprise by hiding in the forest near Paris and chasing away his aeroplane scouts But with these two exceptions, and the evasion of certain German army corps from aerial reconnaissance by scattering in thick woods, the mystery of war no longer obtained in the western field. From November, 1914, to February, 1915, British Army airmen are said to have flown altogether 100,000 miles. They always attacked any enemy craft which they sighted, except on the occasions when they were on some special duty from which they could not turn aside.

Early in the campaign, under Mr. Churchill's direction, the Royal Naval Air Service proved to be as efficient as the other branches of the British naval force. This may partly have been due to the fact that the Admiralty relied less upon the royal aircraft factory than did the War Office, and kept the enterprising private aeroplane makers going by Admiralty orders. Many of the best machines of the Sopwith company and the Avro company were taken up by the Naval Air Service and put to excellent use. Naval aircraft patrolled the east coast, the North Sea and the Straits of Dover by daylight. The small airships often kept aloft for twelve hours, and with the assistance of seaplanes working from a carrier steamer, the naval airmen kept continually under observation all the waters off the enemy's western coasts. This laborious, unending unspectacular reconnaissance work, carried out, as the war proceeded, in bitter, dangerous weather, constituted the most important achievement of the men of the Royal Naval Air Service.

Weather stations on the edge of the Atlantic made it possible to foretell fairly the conditions of the air in the North Sea and the Channel. Thus British naval airships were able to operate with comparative safety. But as soon as the war broke out the English meteorological department kept its main weather information a secret, and in particular ceased to transmit to the Continent the facts gathered in observing stations in Ireland and elsewhere. The result was that Great Britain, through its happy position on the edge of the storm-brewing Atlantic Ocean, was as supreme over Germany in regard to aerial operations as in regard to naval operations.

This was probably the chief reason why no squadron of Zeppelins attempted throughout all the autumn, winter and spring of 1914–15 to bombard London. Not only had they to face the attacks of aeroplanes and heavy anti-aircraft gunfire, but they had to take the immense risk of meeting adverse weather conditions. Nearly all anti-cyclones, representing mainly stable weather conditions, spread from the European continent to the British islands. Nearly all cyclones, representing weather disturbances, sweep across the Atlantic and affect the wind conditions in Great Britain a day before they spread to the Continent. This supremacy in weather lore greatly aided the success of the British Naval Air Service.

The German airships were superior in range of action. When the weather seemed settled they could venture far out into the North Sea, and there, at a height beyond the reach of British destroyers' guns, they could watch the movements of ships and telegraph their observations by wireless to the German naval base The smaller patrolling British craft, with a less range of flight, could not operate from the British coast and keep all the waters between Denmark and the Netherlands under constant observation. Britain had to use steamers fitted up as aircraft

SMOKE, STONES AND SLAUGHTER

An Austrian mine has blown a huge crater in the Italian defences holding this mountain slope. Before the smoke has cleared away or the Italians can rally the Austrian troops pour over the rocks to finish off the deadly work that the mine has begun

Photo: G.P.A

carriers in order to approach the German naval bases and to watch what went on round there.

The naval wing at Dunkirk throughout 1915 constantly performed good work, in spite of the fact that in June of that year the Germans brought out another new model, an Aviatik, which made rings round the fast British scouts. The Belgian coast was frequently raided by No. 1 Wing of the Royal Naval Air Service, and other British naval airmen in the autumn of 1915 made extended flights over the North Sea and bombarded the German shore at vulnerable points.

The Germans left no stone unturned in their efforts towards supremacy in the air. They copied the fine features of the fast scouts and battle-planes which had been invented by British manufacturers. They also copied the Morane-Saulnier and other French machines, and extended their own private aircraft works in an ambitious manner. Dr. Hansen, who was in London just before the outbreak of war, took back with him drawings of the new Bristol scout biplane, which, with the latest Morane-Saulnier monoplane, was manufactured in a new aircraft factory in Cologne.

Baron von Skoda, the maker of the famous 12-in. Austrian howitzer, established a large aircraft factory near Vienna, and a Dutch crack pilot, Anthony Fokker, undertook to manufacture Morane machines in Germany, and also those of his own design. The Bristol company's works at Halberstadt were commandeered, and much extended; and many other German factories were greatly developed, and in many cases set to work on standardized designs in order to supply German needs.

To an appreciable extent the work of the British air force in Flanders and France during the spring and summer of 1915 was influenced by the course of events on the Russian front. In April, 1915, the German staff thinned its western lines of fast, scouting aeroplanes, in order to exercise an overwhelming superiority in the war against the Russians. A more defensive attitude was maintained against British and French airmen, and German battleplanes were less frequently seen over the British trenches. But the service of Britain and her Allies was severely strained by the sudden appearance towards the end of April, 1915, of swarms of the fast new German Albatrosses, followed by the improved Aviatiks and twin-engined battle-planes carrying guns. On the Dunajec front, especially, the Russian army was blinded, and Mackensen was able to prepare and deliver his terrific blow with such effect that it was a complete surprise. Great as was his heavy gun power, its destructiveness was enormously increased by his superiority in aerial power.

As far as the French were concerned they continued to make daily reconnaissances along the front. As the submarine and airship bases in Flanders were the main objective of the British, so the French directed their chief efforts to German supply bases and headquarters. A French aviator dropped bombs on an ammunition column near Middelkerke, and then bombarded the Kursaal at Ostend. Early in March another airman destroyed the powder works at Rottweil, which is situated nearly 100 miles from Belfort. The station of Metz was damaged, and other successful raids were carried out at Vigneulles, Ghent and Friedrichshafen. In May a French squadron did much damage to an explosives factory at Ludwigshafen,



Photo: Keystone

REMAINS UNBURIED

A direct hit on a trench by a heavy shell caused terrible havoc, the force of the explosion travelling along and tearing men literally limb from limb. This ghastly relic is all that was left of a German soldier who has been caught by a French shell

TWO MORE OF THE TEN MILLION

In this shell crater two more Germans have died, thus helping to swell the ghastly total of wasted human life. As artillery technique improved casualties on both sides increased, the death roll of the Somme, the scene here, Passchendaele and later battles on the Western front assuming ghastly proportions

FAR EAST TO NEAR EAST

The Allied force, with its base at Salonika, commanded by General Sarrail was extremely heterogeneous in its composition. Here is a bivouac of French colonial troops from Cochin-China, who rubbed shoulders with British, French, Serbians and Russians

Photo: Imperial War Museum

and an early morning raid took place in June on the headquarters of the German crown prince. A raid on Brussels was followed by an attack on Karlsruhe as a reprisal for the bombardment of open British and French towns. French aviators also carried out successful raids on a gas factory in Alsace, the station of Freiburg, the petrol works between Hagenan and Weissenburg, the station at Dettweiler, and the aviation sheds at Pfalzburg. Considering the activity of the French aviators, their losses during the summer were small.

Aerial activity developed in the northern corner of the Adriatic following the entry of Italy into the war. The Italian airmen bombarded the Austrian railways, attacked Pola, the Monfalcone dockyard, the torpedo works and submarine factory at Fiume, and made frequent assaults on the dockyards at Trieste. The Austrian aviators did not meet with much success. Venice was protected by a squadron of French seaplanes, and a German aeroplane was brought down in the lagoon. Austrian aeroplanes dropped bombs on Cettinje, and the Serbian arsenal at Kragujevatz.

The Germans soon made more spectacular use of the most impressive of their airships. The first Zeppelin raid on England took place on January 19, 1915, when the Norfolk coast was bombarded. On April 14 a more serious attack was made in Northumberland, the airship proceeding over Blyth, Wallsend, and South Shields, and dropping several bombs without, however, doing much damage. The following night a Zeppelin visited Essex and Suffolk and dropped bombs on Maldon and Lowestoft. On April 16 a biplane dropped bombs at Faversham and Sittingbourne, in Kent. Later in the month a Zeppelin attempted to visit Northumberland again, but failed, and early on April 30 another airship dropped bombs at Ipswich and Bury St. Edmunds. On May 10 the Zeppelins began a new serious succession of raids. About three o'clock in the morning bombs were dropped on Southend and the neighbourhood in great profusion. The Zeppelin apparently carried a load of 5,000 lb. and nearly one hundred bombs of 50 lb. each were used. Oblivious of danger,

SHELTERED FROM SUN

The fighting troops were exposed in the course of the Palestine campaign to extreme heat. Not only are the wounded heavily sheltered from the sun, but the men of the Red Cross unit wear special flaps to protect the backs of their necks

Mondiale

GOURAUD RETURNS

General Gouraud, the figure apart in the foreground, lost his right arm while in command of the French forces at Gallipoli. He is here seen taking the salute of part of his new command, the French Fourth Army, after his return to the Western Front

Photos: Topical

people were all anxious to see a Zeppelin in action, and crowded out into the streets to watch it, so that if the anti-aircraft batteries had poured shrapnel shell around the invader, the falling missiles would have killed more townfolk than did the bombs. On May 16 a Zeppelin attacked Ramsgate, dropping bombs in one of the most crowded parts of the seaside resort, killing two people and injuring one. On May 27 there was another raid on Southend, in which three persons were killed and three injured.

On May 31 the Zeppelin raiders at last approached their principal goal. The outlying district on one side of London was reached, and bombs were dropped at places in Essex and Kent. The German commander claimed to have reached Finchley. Three large fires and many small fires broke out, but the British authorities reported that not all the fires could be definitely connected with the airship attacks. Only seven persons, however, were killed, among them being a child of eight who was coming home from a picture palace with a girl of sixteen. Thirty-three persons, however, were injured. No public building was destroyed, but the damage to private property was considerable.

During June further raids took place. On June 4 a visit was paid to Kent, Essex, and the East Riding of Yorkshire, where several people were injured. Two days later an attack was made on Hull, Grimsby and the East Riding, when 24 people were killed and 38 injured. On the same night one of the raiders, LZ37, was caught over Ghent by a young British airman, Flight Sub-Lt. Warneford, and brought down in flames. For this single-handed act of skill and bravery Warneford was awarded the Victoria Cross.

On August 9 a squadron of airships attacked the east coast, claiming to have bombed Norwich. The night was very dark, and a thick fog over some of the coast towns rendered night flying by the British airmen very difficult. One Zeppelin was seriously damaged by gun-fire from the British land defences, and in the morning of August 10 some enemy patrol ships found it and towed it towards Ostend. But a squadron of French seaplanes from their base at Dunkirk attacked the crippled monster. It was first hit by one of the British naval pilots, but the French airmen dropped upon it twelve 4·8-in. incendiary bombs and six 3·6-in. bombs. They quite destroyed the

USED THROUGH THE AGES

Catapults were a prominent feature of warfare in ancient times. A modern version of the same instrument, known as a "lance bombe," is here seen being got ready for action by the French. The position from which the bomb is thrown can be clearly seen

Photos: Topical

LAST COUNT

All but the dead have been evacuated from this German trench. French orderlies, who are wearing the badge of the Red Cross, have followed up their front line troops and are now counting the number of graves that will be necessary for their fallen foes

DEATH SCENE AT THIEPVAL

Deep in a shell crater near Thiepval two German soldiers lie dead Beside one is the stretcher which he has been helping to carry, while the other bears on his coat a disc which shows that he had already been wounded before the final tragedy

NIGHT FLIGHT

Brilliantly lit up by the rays of a powerful searchlight, this French light bombing plane is ready to start. Night attacks on enemy bases behind the lines were more frequent than the more risky long-distance attacks on German cities and towns

structure by an explosion of its gas, and then turned on the port of Ostend and dropped 49 explosive bombs among the vessels that were occupied in patrol work. Thus this particular Zeppelin raid, in which 35 persons had been killed or wounded and only immaterial damage done to property, was not a success for the Germans, who had now lost more than twelve Zeppelins, without counting any hit by the Russians or any loss of Parsevals. This was the minimum verifiable loss of rigid airships on the Western Front and the full losses of Zeppelins were probably greater.

There was another raid on the east coast on August 12 by two Zeppelins that came over at 9.30 p.m. and 11.45 p.m. They killed and injured 30 persons and destroyed fourteen houses. The British aircraft patrols went up, but could not overtake and outclimb the enemy airships, though one Zeppelin was thought to have been hit. Again, on August 17, the eastern counties were raided by three Zeppelins, one of which was struck by a British motor-gun. Again the British air patrols went up, but could not find and overtake the enemy. All the ten deaths and 48 injuries occurred among civilians.

On September 7, according to the German statement, the western part of the London district was attacked, and large factories and harbour works in the eastern counties. Between September 7 and September 8 the loss of life in the London district was heavier than in any previous raids. Fires broke out, though happily were got under control, but during the night of September 8 damage estimated at £500,000 was done to London. The German airship, commanded by the redoubtable Mathy was first perceived moving at a fairly low level in the clear radiance of some of the London searchlights. She was caught and held in their beams, but the guns were unable to destroy her.

At this period the system of attacking airships with aeroplanes had been practically abandoned. There was for some time a lack of nocturnal landing-places, with proper signal lights, and if any airman rose at night over London he was only able to land in very hazardous circumstances. The defence of the capital appeared to consist of anti-aircraft guns of short range, firing almost useless shrapnel, because there were no high-explosive or incendiary shells available. Most of the men who manned the guns worked all day in banks and business offices, and were given no practice against kites or balloons.

On Sunday, September 12, the Zeppelins, according to the official German statement, tried again to reach the docks of London. The next night a Zeppelin crossed the east coast. In neither case was anyone injured, and very little damage was done. The anti-aircraft guns, fixed and mobile, were in action and beat the raiders off. In the meantime, Sir Percy Scott was appointed to the gunnery defences of London.

Both soldier and sailor gunners took part in the anti-aircraft artillery work along the coasts, and for some months the Admiralty and the War Office worked together without any close organization. Neither, seemingly, wanted the entire responsibility for failures to stop the nocturnal raiders. As the army relied mainly on the royal aircraft factory for machines, they could not mount their pilots with the efficiency needed for aerial bomb attacks upon the raiders. The War Office, moreover, could not spare flying officers for raids on airship sheds between Emden and Hamburg, Antwerp and Düsseldorf. Yet in the end it was the War Office that took over the defensive work against hostile aircraft, though the sea patrols and Naval Wing exercised more or less control over the waters which the Zeppelins had to cross in reaching England.

The last Zeppelin raid of the year took place on October 13, when Zeppelins again visited the London area and the eastern counties; but, except for one chance shot, the damage was reported to have fallen wholly on property unconnected with the conduct of the war. The darkening of the metropolitan area helped to prevent the enemy from discovering the exact position of places of importance, but his bad marksmanship was still more attributable to the height at which he flew—some two miles—and to the speed with which he passed over the vast tract of dim streets. On this occasion the killed amounted to 54 and the injured to 107.

CHAPTER 42

AUBERS AND FESTUBERT

In the summer of 1915 the British made several assaults on the German lines. The most important of these were at the Aubers Ridge and Festubert in May. Other attacks, including one at Hooge are also described in this chapter

WHILE fighting around Ypres was still in progress, a combined Franco-British offensive took place farther south. After the battle of Neuve Chapelle General Joffre had asked Sir John French to co-operate in an allied offensive in the direction of Douai, and the first action in which the British 1st army was involved is known as the battle of Aubers Ridge. While the French 10th army was to make Vimy Ridge its objective—the first step in any advance over the plain of Douai—the British troops were to attack towards Aubers Ridge and La Bassée with a view to hindering the transfer of German reinforcements from the north on to the Douai plain. How the French attack fared is described in a later chapter.

The British plan of attack consisted of two separate assaults north and south of the village of Neuve Chapelle. The attack on the south was to be carried out by the 1st and Indian corps with the object of securing the line Rue du Marais–Lorgies–Ligny le Grand–La Cliqueterie Farm. Simultaneously the 4th corps was to attack north of the village and secure the line La Cliqueterie Farm–Fromelles–Rouges Bancs. Thus the two forces would converge after breaking through the enemy defences at their two assaulting positions, three and a half miles apart, and in this manner it was hoped that an immense number of Germans, together with their guns, would be cut off in the triangle formed by the convergent advance.

The offensive was ordered for the morning of May 8, but owing to rain and heavy mist it was postponed for twenty-four hours, and at 5 a.m. on the morning of Sunday, May 9, the preliminary bombardment of the German lines began. The British commanders were full of optimism with regard to the issue of the battle. They fondly imagined that, profiting by the lessons of Neuve Chapelle, they would be able to penetrate the enemy's defences with comparatively little loss. It never occurred to them that there were others who might derive equal profit from that conflict, but before the day was out they had to learn yet another lesson.

The Germans had no intention of undergoing a similar set-back to that which they had experienced during the early hours of March 10 on account of the weakness of their defences. Not only had they augmented the garrison of the trenches opposed to the British 1st army front, but they had also devoted the intervening two months of comparative tranquillity to fortifying their line by increasing the size and strength of their parapets, constructing formidable entanglements, and building strong points in every bend and salient of the front line, from which they were able to enfilade advancing infantry with machine-gun fire. The support and communication trenches were overhauled just as thoroughly, and the German position was by now immune from destruction by all except the heaviest calibre shells, and these were just what the British lacked. The total weight of shell fired by the British during the battle of Aubers Ridge was practically the same as that expended on the bombardment of March 10: the German defences were three times as strong.

After a mere forty minutes of bombardment, far from sufficient to reduce the enemy defences, the infantry attack was launched. To meet the onslaught the Germans brought up men whom they had been concentrating in Lille. From their unbroken fortified lines they brought to bear such an extraordinary number of machine-guns that nothing but some hundreds of thousands of high-explosive shell could have blown a clear path for the British infantry. As it was, the wire was insufficiently cut and prevented any successful infantry advance, whilst the German breastworks suffered very little damage.

To the south of Neuve Chapelle the assaulting troops both of the 1st and



Map of the district north of La Bassee showing Aubers Ridge and Festubert where the British attacked the Germans in May, 1915. Inset, the larger area extending from Ypres to Lens

WAR'S WEAVERS

In prepared positions barbed wire was often laid out to a depth of many yards. As a rough and ready means of fortifying captured positions, transportable barriers such as the chevaux de frise, here shown, were made and carried forward by the attacking troops

Photos: Topical

of the Indian corps were checked by the wire. Through one of the few gaps that had been made in it a number of the 1st Northants and the 2nd Royal Munster Fusiliers entered the German trenches. Not one of them ever returned. Unable either to advance or go back, the assaulting battalions were forced to establish a line in the middle of no man's land. A second attempt, preceded by a further bombardment of the enemy position, was again a failure. A third artillery bombardment did no more than bring forth a sharp reply from the enemy batteries with consequent heavy casualties among the British troops.

By 8 a.m. Sir Douglas Haig was informed of the failure to make any progress. He decided that another attack would have to be made. He had information that the French on his right were progressing well, and he was not aware of the full extent of the failure of the first attacks of his own divisions. Zero hour for this new attack, originally fixed for 12 noon, had to be postponed until 2 p.m. and finally until 4 p.m. on account of the difficulties of reorganization. Again the assault proved futile, being held up everywhere by the German machine-gun fire, and by 5 p.m. it was decided that the attack should be abandoned.

The 4th corps in front of Fromelles, though its attack at first achieved minor successes, finally met with the same costly and discouraging repulse, and at 6 p.m. General Haig decided to break off the battle. The British losses in a single day amounted to 11,619. Such was the cost of underestimating the strength of the German defences, defences which the inadequate ammunition supply of the British artillery could never hope to reduce. The brief British bombardment merely served as a warning to the defenders that an assault might be expected.

Though breaking off the action at Aubers Ridge, Sir John French still sought the opportunity for offensive action elsewhere. General Joffre continued to impress upon him the importance of driving the enemy from French soil, which, if it were not done quickly, he said, would mean the loss of the war.

SPY IN SUBURBIA

The execration in which espionage was held by civilians is well illustrated by the epithets chalked on the gate of this house in the suburbs of Paris. One of its inmates was arrested as a spy and neighbours have given natural, if childish, expression to their hatred

SINEWS OF WAR

Without the work in progress in this and countless other munition factories the war could not possibly have been carried on. This photograph shows a French factory, manned by men specially picked for the task and exempt from active service

He appears to have been impatient of the situation at Ypres, forgetting, perhaps, that he had promised the British commander that he would throw his reinforcements into the salient to recapture the ground lost by the French. The British failure at Aubers Ridge had, in fact, released German troops to withstand the French attack which proceeded farther south, and Sir John French agreed to relieve a French division and at the same time to attack once more about Festubert.

The point selected for the new offensive was a salient which protruded between Neuve Chapelle and La Bassée with its apex reaching within half a mile of the village of Festubert. The front chosen for the first attack lay between Festubert and Richebourg l'Avoué, and the date for beginning the offensive was fixed for May 12. Sir Douglas Haig had at last come to the conclusion that success could only be obtained by a systematic reduction of the enemy's defences, involving a long and methodical bombardment. Accordingly, he asked for a postponement of the infantry assault until May 15, so that a systematic shelling of the German trenches and back areas could take place for a couple of days beforehand.

The main attack was ordered to be carried out by the 1st and Indian corps, whose first objective was to secure the line Festubert–La Quinque Rue–La Tourelle–Port Arthur, and consolidate this position if successful. After the long and carefully directed bombardment had been carried out, at 11.30 p.m. on May 15, under an overcast sky, the darkness of which was barely relieved by a new moon, the assaulting battalions, each man wearing a white patch on chest and back, left their trenches quietly for the attack. The 6th brigade on the right wing walked across no man's land and secured the first enemy trench in front of them without meeting any serious resistance. Unfortunately the 5th and Garhwal brigades were unable to surprise the defenders in the same way. Warned by bursts of fire from the Jullundur brigade in support at Port Arthur, the Germans opposite Richebourg l'Avoué were on the alert. No sooner had the assaulting troops left their trenches than the sky was ablaze with flares, light-balls and searchlights, shedding a clear white light over a very large area. The only troops to reach the German trenches in this sector were the 2nd Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, but they had to abandon all attempts to bomb their way up the enemy trenches.

A further assault was carried out three hours later, but in the interval the Germans were able to reorganize their position, and nothing came of it. Farther south an attack by the 7th division, launched at the same time, was more successful. In spite of considerable opposition from machine-guns, the assaulting battalions, the 2nd Queen's and the 1st Royal Welch Fusiliers, succeeded in reaching their first objectives, the North Breastwork and the Orchard respectively. By 7 a.m., after successful bombing up the German trenches, the 22nd brigade was in complete possession of its objective. On its left the 20th brigade carried the German front trenches, but though the right wing progressed somewhat farther, its left was checked by a counter-attack.

Thus by 9 o'clock on the morning of May 16 the two assaults had only partially succeeded, for the converging attacks of the 2nd and 7th divisions had not joined up. A further attack

MORE SINEWS

In France, as in Britain, women played a strenuous part in war work, and the production of shells in many munition factories throughout the country was left in their hands. In this factory a number of them are busily engaged in fitting fuse caps

Photo: Topical

Photo: G.P.A.

'ROUNDED WITH A SLEEP'

At times in the War a great offensive by one side or the other would break right through the entrenched lines of the enemy into open country beyond. These two Frenchmen have paid with their lives for their hopeless defence of an unfortified hillside

was therefore launched from the centre that morning, with the object of joining up the inner flanks of these two divisions. This and a further attempt during the afternoon failed.

Meanwhile the 22nd brigade was making further progress, having captured another half-mile of enemy trenches, but owing to the exposure of its left flank at the Orchard, and by reason of the failure of the effort to fill the gap, the officer in command was obliged to order a withdrawal on to La Quinque Rue. Reviewing the situation, it was plain to General Haig that the southern offensive was meeting less effective resistance than was experienced by the Indian corps to the north. Accordingly, he gave instructions for the attack to be resumed by the 1st corps only on May 17, with the object of filling in the gap between the flanks of the 2nd and 7th divisions, and securing a line from Festubert to the Cour d'Avoué Farm.

During the night of May 16–17 the German troops lying between the South Breastwork and the Ferme du Bois withdrew to a new line more than a thousand yards to the rear, a fact of which the British remained in ignorance for some days. At the same time they received strong reinforcements, the new position being held by twice the number of troops defending the old line. So successful was the bombardment of the German position on the morning of May 17 that those among the German troops who had not yet effected their retirement hoisted white flags and promptly surrendered. Unfortunately for them they were fired upon by their own batteries while advancing towards the British trenches, and almost all were killed. This did not prevent another batch of over 400 from surrendering.

In consequence of this wholesale surrender and of the German withdrawal, a British assaulting party, consisting of the 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers and the 2nd Green Howards, found no difficulty in advancing along and to the north of the Rue des Cailloux. Shortly after 10 o'clock in the morning they occupied the former German trenchworks known as the Quadrilateral, south-west of Cour d'Avoué Farm. To their north the 6th brigade advanced in the direction of the farm, but were checked within 300 yards of their goal by heavy enfilade fire from the unsuspected new enemy line.

Sir John French now decided, in view of the course of events, that the final objective of the 1st army should be transferred from Aubers Ridge to La Bassée with the object of gaining the south side of the canal. In this case the immediate objectives were to be Chapelle St. Roch and Violaines. Further attempts were then made independently by both the 2nd and 7th divisions to gain ground southwards, but in vain. The 21st brigade suffered heavily by fire from the new enemy position, and the 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers were unfortunate enough to be caught by the shells of the 2nd divisional artillery. An attack by the 5th and 6th brigades towards Cour d'Avoué Farm had to be broken off through lack of support. Darkness then compelled the attackers to dig in where they were, and the rain that fell steadily throughout the night turned the improvised trenches into mud-holes.

The weather cleared on the morning of May 18, and General Haig ordered the attack to continue at 4.30 p.m., preceded by a two hours' artillery bombardment. This attack was carried out by the 4th (Guards) brigade under Lord Cavan, but had to be abandoned after heavy losses. During the night of May 18 the 1st corps was relieved by the 47th, 51st and Canadian divisions, and though during the next few days no serious operation was undertaken, the Canadians managed in some places slightly to advance their line.

On May 24 the 140th brigade and the 2nd Canadian brigade attacked the

SALUTE TO BRAVERY

High decorations such as the Victoria Cross, the Medaille Militaire or the German Ordre pour le Merite, were presented normally by the King, the President or the Kaiser. In many cases the officer of highest rank on the spot conducted a temporary investiture. This French soldier is being decorated in the front line

South Breastwork, which barred the road to Chapelle St. Roch. A battalion of the Canadians were successful in entering the German trenches, but machine-gun fire on both flanks compelled them to evacuate the captured position that same night. The following evening the 47th division attacked between Givenchy and Festubert towards the Rue d'Ouvert. With the 1/23rd and 1/24th London Battalions in the van, the assault reached the German support trenches, making an advance of nearly a quarter of a mile on a thousand-yard front. There the attackers hung on despite enfilade artillery fire from German batteries. Further advance proved impossible owing to the strong resistance of the new enemy line, and during the next two days the British consolidated their new position. By May 27 the battle of Festubert had come to an end.

The result of this battle was to demonstrate once more how ineffective even the finest infantry can be unless adequately supported by its artillery. The Germans had been forced from their front-line trenches, and if only their new line could have been attacked at once, instead of allowing them time to reorganize, the initial success might well have been followed by a more spectacular advance, for something like panic had seized the Germans, and only the employment of rigorous repressive measures by their officers prevented a general flight. As it was, lack of ammunition again prevented the British from exploiting their local successes and proved to the harassed German commanders a valuable gift of time in which to build up their defences. Moreover, without high explosives in sufficient quantity to silence the numerous enemy machine-gun posts, the British suffered heavy casualties, losing 16,648 officers and men as opposed to German casualties of about a third of that figure.

With the ending of the 2nd battle of Ypres and the battle of Festubert the four months which were to elapse before the battle of Loos began were devoted, on the British front, to trench warfare, with the exception of some fighting round Givenchy and near Hooge. On other fronts this period witnessed a continuation of the German advance into Russia, the first and second battles of the Isonzo, the landing at Gallipoli, the advance in Mesopotamia, and the surrender of German South-West Africa, all of which events are related in detail.

During the summer of 1915 Lewis guns were issued to the infantry for the first time, and during the months of July and August large orders were placed for Stokes mortars and Mills hand-grenades. Readjustments were made in the positions held by the British expeditionary force, most important of which was that which left Sir John French in command of the defences of the whole of the Ypres salient. During this period, too, there was a welcome addition to the B.E.F. in the arrival of thirteen newly-formed divisions from England. The requests of the French for further offensive action to support their attacks had now to be treated with considerable reserve, for lack of ammunition made an attack on a large scale impossible. All that Sir John French could sanction were minor offensive actions requiring the minimum of artillery preparation.

On June 15 the 4th corps was called upon to carry out an assault in the direction of Violaines with a view to assisting General Foch's operations farther south. During the two days preceding the attack the German position was subjected to a slow and methodical

POLITICIANS AT THE WAR

In the course of his duties as Minister of Munitions, Mr. Lloyd George had frequently to consult with the French holder of the same office, M. Albert Thomas. These two men, whose work did so much to overcome the shortage of ammunition, are here seen inspecting a captured German trench

GUNS AT THE TROT

Field artillery in a hurry showed a fine recklessness, and wherever the state of the road allowed it, the drivers urged their horses forward at breakneck speed. Neither of these British gun teams, riding neck and neck, would draw rein, in spite of a possible collision with passing French wagons

TROPHY ON TRIAL

British and German guns differed in calibre, and those captured were often valueless. This German field-gun, being tested by British artillery officers, is more likely to adorn an English square than be turned against its original owners

bombardment, in which the R.F.C. rendered valuable assistance by air observation. Just before zero hour a mine was exploded under the enemy position in front of Chapelle St. Roch, and at 6 p.m. the infantry advanced. The attack was made by the 21st and 154th brigades, and though it achieved no element of surprise, it succeeded in penetrating the German line at several points. But the strong points still held out and the fight developed into a bombing contest, a species of warfare for which the British were as yet ill-equipped. By 4 o'clock in the morning all the assaulting troops had been forced to retire. Two attempts were made to re-occupy the ground, both of which were fruitless. Then, as the French had been held up, orders were given to the 1st army to hold their ground and not attempt any further advance.

Another important engagement took place at Bellewaarde on June 16. This operation was carried out by the 2nd army in order to assist the attack at Givenchy. As will be remembered, during the 2nd battle of Ypres the Germans seized and held the Bellewaarde ridge, and the objective of this attack was to recapture that important point of observation. The assault was made by the 9th and 7th brigades of the 3rd division. After a bombardment lasting two hours the first line of attacking troops advanced and captured the German front line without great difficulty. Unfortunately, in an excess of zeal the third wave rushed forward before the order was given, following close upon the heels of the second, and the advancing troops ran into the barrage of their own artillery. Inextricable confusion resulted, though certain units succeeded in reaching the second and even the third line of German trenches.

After a desperate struggle with bomb and bayonet in the labyrinth of trenches the British were obliged to fall back upon the first line they had captured, after successfully repulsing a heavy counter-attack. A supporting attack by two companies of the 3rd Worcestershire and 2nd Royal Irish Rifles was stopped by machine-gun, rifle and shell fire. An advance by two companies of the Royal Irish Rifles from Railway Wood was similarly checked. By 6 p.m. the action was ended, the German front line trenches having been captured for a distance of about half a mile. The Germans retained possession of the ridge, with its advantages for observation. The British casualties amounted to 3,531 officers and men. The scene of other minor operations by the British forces during July and August, 1915, lay around the village of Hooge in the Ypres salient.

At 7 p.m. on July 19 the British successfully exploded a mine underneath a German enclosed work on the outskirts of Hooge, and the crater formed was at once occupied by men of the 4th Middlesex. The attack, unheralded by gun-fire, completely surprised the enemy, and they were rapidly driven back some three hundred yards by bombing parties. Unfortunately, much of the ground won had to be abandoned when the attackers exhausted their supply of hand-grenades, but they managed to consolidate the captured trenches in the vicinity of the mine crater.

Two further assaults upon the enemy line near Hooge were made on July 22, but both failed. A German counter-attack took place on July 30, when at 3.15 a.m. two companies of the 8th Rifle Brigade, holding the line on each side of the crater, were enveloped in flame and smoke, while a lurid glare lit up the scene with its crimson light. For the first time the Germans were using against the British troops in this sector of the line the Flammenwerfer, or flame thrower. This was a portable cylinder containing an inflammable mixture, which, lighted at the nozzle connected to the cylinder by flexible tubing, sprayed jets of flame upon the opposing troops like water from a hose-pipe. Fortunately, owing to its small range, this terrible weapon was not frequently used. At the same time trench mortars poured bombs on the British front. Under cover of the sheet of flame and bombs the German infantry assaulted

THE SKIRL O' THE PIPES

The London Scottish who went into line at Ypres on October 29, 1914, were the first infantry Territorial unit to see active service in the Great War. The first battalion, led by its pipes and drums, is here seen on the Doullens–Amiens road

Photos : Imperial War Museum

and seized the advanced British line, after which they forced their way into certain of the support-trenches, making a total advance of some hundreds of yards. There they consolidated their position. In the afternoon four British battalions attempted a counter-attack, but were repulsed with heavy loss leaving 50 officers out of 90 on the field. On the following night the Germans renewed their attack with liquid fire and a deluge of shells, behind which their infantry advanced, but without achieving really serious progress. It was decided that a serious effort would have to be made to recover the ground lost, which was of tactical importance. The 6th division was therefore brought up for the attack.

In order to achieve some element of surprise, during the week preceding the assault the German trenches were subjected to half an hour's shelling every day at varying times, so that when the attack was finally launched the enemy took the preliminary bombardment merely for the usual daily "strafe." At 3.15 a.m. on the morning of August 9 the 16th and 18th brigades assaulted and recovered the lost ground without much opposition, capturing in the process 11 machine-guns and 133 prisoners. The position was at once consolidated, and a German counter-attack successfully repulsed. But the British casualties amounted to over 2,000.

Thus ended the minor actions of 1915, in which no appreciable ground was gained. Undoubtedly they were of help to the French, to satisfy whom they were mainly initiated. If they had any other value it lay in the experience which they gave to the British commanders and to regimental officers in the field of the exigencies of a new type of warfare. It is, for instance, of interest to note that during the action at Hooge experiments were made for the first time with steel helmets.

PEEPING TOMMIES

The absence of fixed bayonets shows that these Australians are not standing to their lines on formal sentry duty. The periscope observer has spotted German movement and the rifleman and Lewis gunner are waiting for the signal for a few pot shots

CHAPTER 43

GERMANS REGAIN GALICIA

To support their Austrian allies the Germans organized a powerful force under Mackensen and made a great drive through Galicia in the summer of 1915. The gains made by the Russians in the autumn of 1914 were almost completely lost

THE problem which had so seriously occupied the German high command in September, 1914, the problem of whether Germany should throw her weight against east or west, had not ceased to be pressing in the spring of 1915. Rather it had intensified, for the lack of a definite decision in France or Flanders, in an attempt to reach which Germany had sacrificed her Austrian ally, had resulted in the development of a situation in the east which was occasioning growing concern in Berlin and in Vienna panic.

This, however, was not the least of the German anxieties. Italy's demands on Austria were daily more onerous and more minatory. Her entry into the War on the side of the Allies was a question of a few weeks only. Serbia was still unconquered and defiant, and until she was subdued the attitude of the still neutral Balkan States, even now inscrutable, would become progressively hostile. More serious still, she closed the road to Germany's only ally, Turkey, who with depleted ammunition and muddled administration was in poor case to resist the terrible threat on Constantinople which the British ships in the Dardanelles had unmasked.

It was this last factor that finally persuaded Falkenhayn temporarily to abandon his project of breaking through in Flanders and to succour Turkey. His decision was to prove momentous: Germany's position seen from the Eastern front already appeared so hopeless that English correspondents in Russia were even then suggesting that Italy's entry into the War should be prevented. Confident predictions of a speedy end to the struggle appeared everywhere in the Allied press. Never was such optimism so unfounded. Germany was facing the blackest hour before the dawn, but the dawn, for her, was to prove radiant with 1916 as a year of triumph.

Ever since the prestige of the popular idols, Hindenburg and Ludendorff, had robbed him of his precious reserve of four corps to win the spectacular but strategically valueless victory of the Winter Battle, Falkenhayn had toiled in patience to build up another and larger reserve, and with such ingenuity had he worked, drawing one battalion from here and another from there throughout the Western front, that he saw he could count on 14 corps of first-class troops by the end of April. With them he proposed to smash Serbia and open a road to Turkey.

That could be done, he argued, in a few months, and then he would turn back his victorious forces and fling them upon the British in Flanders. He calculated that he still had sufficient time to achieve these two results before the mass of enthusiastic but raw recruits thronging the parade grounds of the British Empire could finish their training, and before the enormous industrial power of the Allies had been speeded up to a point at which it was



Map illustrating the great Austro-German campaigns that resulted in the conquest of much of Poland, including its capital Warsaw, and the recovery of nearly all the province of Galicia lost by Austria in 1914

MANUAL LABOUR

Shortage of transport animals and the often impassable state of the country for motor vehicles frequently compelled the artillerymen to become their own beasts of burden. Even the rough track of this Decauville railway does little to lighten their labour

pouring an overwhelming stream of munitions and supplies into the fighting line. Once more speed became the essence of the contract, and Falkenhayn prepared to make his new weapon so enormously powerful that it could snatch a decision in the shortest possible time.

But when Falkenhayn conferred with the eastern commanders and with Conrad von Hotzendorff, he could win no support for his proposal to settle with Serbia. Hindenburg and Ludendorff were still persuaded that Russia could be beaten to her knees by one powerful blow delivered from East Prussia against Dvinsk and Vilna. To seize those two places was to cut the Russian lines of communication with all the armies to the south and to open the door for a march on Petrograd.

But neither Falkenhayn nor Conrad were under such illusions: they realized that immense effort and much time would be required to achieve such a result, the success of which could never be guaranteed. Conrad favoured a vast encircling movement from north and south, but the failure of a similar design earlier in the year had shaken his confidence; and when Falkenhayn poured cold water on the idea, Conrad produced from his brilliantly fertile mind a plan which at once captured the imagination of the clear-seeing German chief of staff and persuaded him to modify his original intention.

He was further encouraged in this decision by the terrible plight of Austria. The immense efforts which she had made to relieve Przemysl and to crush the Russian front in Galicia had wrought nothing but her own exhaustion. Her armies, which had been battling without ceasing for weeks on end, were on the point of collapse, but in spite of her heroism she had been unable permanently to halt the slow but ominous advance of the able Brusiloff, whose 8th army—at terrible cost, it is true—was inch by inch still forcing its way through the Carpathian passes. Conrad intimated in no uncertain terms that unless the long promised German

DELIVERIES DAILY

Animals could often travel where limbers and waggons would become hopelessly bogged in the mud, and the vital supply of ammunition was in such cases entrusted to horse and mule transport, which carried the shells in special holsters such as these

COLD STEEL

The air of tension which invariably preceded an attack can be observed among these men of the Lancashire Fusiliers, fixing their bayonets in the assembly trench before moving up to the front line. The signpost thrust into the parados clearly points the way

Photo, Imperial War Museum

aid were forthcoming and the appalling danger to Austria from the Russian advance were averted, then Austria would be compelled to make a separate peace. The statesman in Falkenhayn realized the gravity of such a step and Conrad had his way.

His plan was simplicity itself. He pointed out that in her advance Russia had spread herself out along a swelling line that became the more dangerous the farther she advanced. Conrad urged that Falkenhayn should strike at the centre of the Russian position with all his might, and he confidently predicted that it would collapse.

Falkenhayn at once grasped the possibilities that would result from a break through of the Russian line south of the Polish salient. The poor state of lateral railways at the back of the Carpathians forbade, as much as the mountains themselves, any rapid advance in that area, and Falkenhayn therefore chose the section of the front, some 25 miles wide, between Tarnow and Gorlice. This section was held at the beginning of April, 1915, by the wearied Austrian 4th army. During the terrible fighting earlier in the spring this army had been heavily engaged, but as the Russian energies had gradually become more concentrated on forcing a passage through the mountains, fighting north of Gorlice had slowly subsided and a period of quiet descended on this front.

It was here that Falkenhayn, with immense secrecy, began rapidly to prepare what in 1915 was the most powerful weapon of war the world had seen. Enormous masses of first-class German troops were railed back from France through Germany and in the utmost secrecy concentrated behind the Austrian 4th army. Nothing was left to chance. The most minute details were studied with care, and Falkenhayn prepared to strike the Russian line with a sledge-hammer of overwhelming power. He was taking enormous risks, but in his view the high stakes justified his game. Conrad, in return for the German

FOOTWAYS IN FLANDERS

Duckboards provided the only safe and efficient foothold through the mud and the shell-holes behind the lines, and hundreds of miles of them were laid across shell-torn ground. The men of this Highland regiment are unloading new boards for repairing a track

Crown Copyright

MUDDY PLAYGROUND

These British soldiers have been detailed to take bundles of wire up to the line, and their expressions suggest that childhood proficiency with wooden hoops on concrete is but of slight help in trundling wire hoops over mud

Photo: Imperial War Museum

aid, which was in fact proving more generous than he had ever hoped, had undertaken to ensure that the Serbian front should remain adequately held, and that in the event of Italy declaring war she should do no more than break her teeth on the Isonzo. Falkenhayn was, however, not easy about the position in the west, and he impressed upon Conrad the temporary nature of the operations he was planning. So soon as he had thrashed Russia to a point at which he felt she could not again become a grave menace until long after a decision had been reached elsewhere, then he would turn his victorious new armies, crush Serbia with lightning speed, and then fling them, flushed with triumph and irresistible, upon the French and British forces hard pressed on the Western front.

MORTAL COILS

Numerous arrangements of wire entanglements were tried on the front and considerable practice in preparing and laying out the various designs became necessary. These soldiers are being instructed how to prepare a light system of wire defences

Crown Copyright

A new 11th German army, consisting of 10 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions and the reinforced Austrian 3rd army of 11 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions, was to be the spearhead of the attack. Boroevic commanded the latter, and General von Mackensen the former. His immense organizing ability, great courage and exceptional gifts of leadership well qualified him for the operations in prospect; the able Colonel von Seeckt was his chief of staff.

But the attack was to be no overwhelming rush of mere numbers. Falkenhayn relied much more upon the immense scientific and mechanical superiority of Germany over Russia, and his preparations justified in the result his confidence. The German thoroughness and ingenuity he showed in carrying out his plans were never better exemplified in the whole war. He collected behind the German 11th and the Austrian 3rd armies an unprecedented park of artillery numbering some 250 heavy guns, including several of the 17-in. howitzers used in Belgium, and over 700 field pieces. This concentration was later in the war surpassed often by both sides, but at the time it was considered phenomenal. Over 3,000,000 shells of every calibre were conveniently dumped to feed this forest of cannon.

With the troops liberated by the German 11th army Conrad was able to strengthen his other forces, and by the end of April there were no less than

THIS WAS A VILLAGE

Longueval, seven miles east of Albert, was in the centre of the Somme fighting of July, 1916. A mass of rubble, through which a column of ammunition limbers is picking its way, bears silent witness to the terrible effect of the British bombardment

Photo: Imperial War Museum

IN THE WAKE OF CONQUEST

Tanks were first used in the War on September 15, 1916, in the battle of the Somme. These supports, crossing a captured German trench near Flers, are moving across ground over which, a few hours earlier, the first British tank had slowly lumbered

7 armies in line on the Austrian front from the Nida to the Rumanian border. North of Cracow was the Austrian 1st army along the Nida stream, and then to the south-east stretched the 4th Austrian, Mackensen's 11th German and the Austrian 3rd armies, which held the front to the Carpathian passes.

Along the mountain heights were the 2nd Austrian army and von Linsingen's German southern army, while in Bukovina was Pflanzer-Baltin's group, later remodelled as the Austrian 7th army. The northern armies in East Prussia and Poland were rapidly regrouped, and the authority of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, the Eastern command, was extended to Woyrsch's detachment operating south of Lodz. These two generals, who for so long had considered the Eastern front their own preserve, were far from pleased with the way in which the control of affairs had been taken out of their hands, and were still clamouring for reinforcements with which to strike at Vilna.

Falkenhayn peremptorily ordered them to do as they were told; he required them to make a diversion in order to distract enemy attention from the real danger point, and for this purpose provided them with 3 cavalry divisions, which were to sweep through Courland and Lithuania and, by menacing the most sensitive spot in the Russian front, compel the grand-duke to draw troops from other points in order to resist their inroads. These operations, which began late in April, were largely successful in their design and played no small part in preventing the effective reinforcement by the Russians of their southern front. They were, in fact, gradually extended in scope and led to the formation of another German army under von Below, known from the area of its operations as the army of the Niemen. Its exploits will be chronicled below.

Nor was this the only diversion which the resourceful Falkenhayn planned. Anxious about the weakened line on the Western front, he resolved to disturb and confuse the Allies by striking before he was struck. To this fact was due the historic gas attack at Ypres, April 22, 1915, and, as Mr. Winston Churchill has pointed out, the failure of the Germans to exploit the chaos and panic its use created in the Allied line was due entirely to the absence of the German reserves, which were then concentrating against Russia. Once again Russia had performed the most signal service to her Western allies.

The only risk against which Falkenhayn had not taken precautionary measures was the British threat to the Dardanelles; in this sphere he could do nothing. But just before Mackensen launched his thunderbolt news was received that for some utterly mysterious reason the naval attack had not been pressed and that the Narrows were still unconquered. Difficult as the news was to believe, it filled Falkenhayn with thankfulness; he had undertaken an enormous responsibility in deciding as he had, but it was to his sagacity and iron resolve more than to any other factor that Germany owed her escape from the terrible calamity which appeared to hang over her in early 1915.

AN ELDER STATESMAN

As Foreign Secretary Mr. A. J Balfour, afterwards Earl of Balfour, was often in France. He is seen at the front chatting with a British officer

'MY LORD MAYOR'

The Lord Mayor of London during 1915-16 was Sir Charles Wakefield, who as Lord Wakefield became famous for his active interest in aviation. Honorary colonel of the 2nd battalion London Regiment, Royal Fusiliers, he is here inspecting rations at Chamblain-Chatelain

Photo: Imperial War Museum

It would have been thought that the immense preparation behind the Tarnow–Gorlice line could not have escaped the attention of the Russian generals. But although in fact many reports and rumours were handed in, nothing was done by the staff to verify them. In this area the Russian 3rd army under Radko Dmitrieff had been comparatively undisturbed for weeks. Dmitrieff disposed of some 200,000 men on a dangerously wide front, but he had done nothing to ensure his position; his defences consisted entirely of two, and in a few places three, lines of trenches, useless against even light artillery.

Nor had Dmitrieff prepared any reserve positions. His undefended batteries had not been moved for months, and even inefficient Austrian gunners had been able to get their range with accuracy, and Mackensen's German artillerymen, on taking over, were able to sight their guns without even firing a shot. In the vast No Man's Land, some 3,000 yards wide, the inhabitants were still grazing their flocks. Their removal

appears to have suggested nothing to the Russian staff, which failed even to discover the presence of Germans in the line opposite them until April 27.

Russia was in any case ill-prepared for the crushing blow she was about to receive. The immense efforts which the grand-duke had made to force the Carpathians had exhausted his southern armies and hopelessly depleted his small reserves of ammunition. The whole war machine of Russia was breaking down; the corruption, the inefficiency and the incompetence which for so long had continued unchecked throughout the vast empire was now taking its toll. Disorder and chaos reigned supreme. The shortage of supplies of every description was pathetic and calamitous; the shortage of rifles, guns and ammunition was worse. Only the flow of dogged Russian peasantry remained unabated.

Already, according to Sir A. Knox in his book, "With the Russian Army, 1914–1917," nearly 2,000,000 Russians had perished in the awful holocaust of the Eastern Front. Still their fellows were fed to the German cannon. Armed often with oak cudgels, young Russian recruits of four weeks' training were flung in masses as a wall of human flesh against the might of modern howitzers. Whole battalions, ill-fed, ill-clothed, ill-organized, waited in the trenches with empty hands until a rifle dropped from the dead fingers of a comrade. Russia had done her industrial best and vast efforts had been made, but the hide-bound bureaucracy of an autocratic despotism was utterly incapable of meeting the urgent and overwhelming calls made on the country's reserves after the outbreak of war. At this critical moment in her history Russian commanders, on threat of court-martial, were compelled to limit each gun to three shells per day.

The grand-duke had for a long time been acutely conscious of the crisis he would have to face in a few weeks when his ammunition was exhausted, and had striven desperately to force his way into the Hungarian plains, where it would be possible to employ his superior mass of troops with the greatest effect. Everything, therefore, had been done to aid Brusiloff's 8th army, and valiantly it had responded, but towards the end of April the terrible strain of nearly four months' continuous fighting and the appalling losses had slowed up the advance. There was, however, high hope in Brusiloff's mind of a break-through within two or three weeks, and the grand-duke had viewed with complacence the slight advance farther east of von Linsingen, who after the most desperate fighting had succeeded in storming the courageously held points of Zwinin on April 9 and of Ostry on April 25.

But by now Mackensen was ready. Hindenburg and Ludendorff were pushing their cavalry rapidly towards Mitaw, and the Stavka were becoming seriously alarmed. Russian reinforcements were hastily trailing up to the Riga–Kovna line. The 10th German army south of the latter place also made a surprise attack on Suwalki, and another was launched on Warsaw, preceded by a gas attack, by the 9th army. All of these were feints, but they succeeded admirably in their purpose of diverting Russian attention from the danger point, and in weakening the southern front. Dmitrieff's 3rd army was actually called upon to provide the reinforcements that Brusiloff needed in the Carpathians.

On April 28 Mackensen pushed forward the Austrian 4th army on his left, and on May 1 he began a systematic bombardment of the Russian position opposite his front. All day the shells fell on the Russian line, and under cover of this preliminary bombardment reconnaissances were completed, the engineers cut what wire they could reach, and the German attacking troops were massed in close formation in their forward positions. All day the Russians had been confined in their inadequate trenches suffering severely but being almost incapable of reply. Their morale had already been seriously shaken, but worse was to follow.

At 6 a.m. on the next day Mackensen opened his real attack. For four hours every gun in his line was worked as fast as human hands could serve it. It is estimated that over 700,000 shells fell on the Russian line, ten to every yard of front. The Russian batteries were blown out of existence, with their trenches and all their defensive positions. Any reply was impossible, and the German troops stood out in the open watching the effect of their artillery fire. What few of the Russians who were left alive and unwounded by this torrent of shell, were dazed to the point of insanity, and when, finally, the 40,000 German troops poured out of their trenches at 10 o'clock and charged swiftly across no man's land, they met no opposition.

The German official account gives a vivid picture of their reception: "Here and there," it says, "loam-grey figures jumped up and ran back weaponless in grey fur caps and fluttering, unbuttoned greatcoats, until there was not one remaining. Like a flock of sheep, they fled in wild confusion . . ."

Only where isolated coppices on the slope of a hill had given some protection against the murderous fire did the Germans encounter resistance. But the few handfuls of shaken Russians could do little to stem the giant columns in field grey which poured on to and round them. The Russian 3rd army had ceased to exist: its remnants of frantic and demented men were flying eastward in chaos and hopelessness. Desperately Dmitrieff strove to bear up under the enormous pressure of the German advance: he flung his few reserves into the battle-line with reckless zeal, and valiantly they tried to hold up Mackensen's advance. They could do little, however, and although they sold their lives and their positions dearly, winning precious seconds for their comrades to escape and to re-form out of reach of German guns, the attack continued with almost unabated speed. By the end of the day the second and last line of Russian defences was carried and the Germans were through into open country.

There seemed no hope whatever of staying the advance; on the banks of the Wisloka, 20 miles in the rear, Dmitrieff, however, made a stand. The 3rd Caucasian corps had been sent forward with feverish speed, and here, in spite of the lack of trenches or prepared positions, in spite of the lack of adequate artillery support, they succeeded for five precious days, from May 3 to May 7, in holding up Mackensen. But by then the German heavy artillery had been ponderously rolled forward, and the German general was able to smash his way over the river at Jaslo, on the 7th, and at Frysztak and Rymanow on the 8th. Once more the advance continued; but the slight delay had enabled some order to be brought out of the terrible confusion in the Russian forces, and their retreat became steadily more orderly. They were able to contest each forward thrust with growing stubbornness, and their destruction of roads and railways in their rear became devastatingly thorough.

The immense forethought which had characterized every stage of the German advance had not neglected such eventualities, and Mackensen's engineers were so well handled that repairs and even improvements were carried out with lightning speed. But the German attack largely depended upon its mass of artillery, and the movement of the great guns and of their shells, some weighing over a ton, could not be effected at more than a sober speed. It began to be clear that the rate of advance would be slowed up, and desperate efforts were made to smash a real gap in the enemy line through which cavalry could operate. They failed. In spite of the most terrible hammering the Russian line held, thin and strained to

SERVICE AT SEA

It was an established rule that all troops on board transports in waters known to be infested by submarines should always wear cork life-jackets. Even while playing during a church parade the men of the regimental band, seen here, wore lifebelts

BRITAIN'S SURE SHIELD

It was the strength of the British Navy as much as any other factor which finally broke Germany's resistance, for its merciless blockade slowly starved her into submission. This view of the 2nd battle squadron steaming in line ahead in the North Sea, taken from the cleared decks of the flagship H.M.S. Queen Elizabeth, followed by H.M.S. Orion towing her observation balloon, well conveys the majesty and might of the great ships

'AND THE STATELY SHIPS GO ON'

In Scapa Flow, the great naval harbour of the Orkneys, the British Navy possessed a spacious base. Here there was ample accommodation for the whole Grand Fleet and excellent opportunity for gunnery practice and manoeuvre.

COALING

The number of oil-burning vessels in the Grand Fleet rapidly increased during the War, but the majority still relied on coal. This scene on the deck of the battleship H.M.S. Bellerophon, filling her bunkers from a collier at Scapa, illustrates how unpleasant a job coaling was

breaking point, but continuous, and the retreat went on ever more orderly. The 3rd army, despite its losses, still managed to cling round its reinforcements and to keep some contact with the Russian forces on its left and right. But the full effect of Mackensen's drive was at last being realized by the Russian commanders. In its retreat the 3rd army had exposed the flanks of Brusiloff's 8th army in the south and of Evert's 4th army to the north.

The Austrian 3rd army, co-operating with Mackensen's 11th, had pushed forward with equal rapidity, and threatened Brusiloff's forces with disaster. His retreat became precipitate, and by the 9th the Austrians had re-entered the deserted Dukla and Lupkow passes. Bitterly now Conrad regretted that he had not followed Falkenhayn's advice in the middle of April and drawn back his armies from the Carpathians in order to tempt the Russians ever farther south and west. Had Brusiloff at this time been through the mountains and deploying into the plains beyond, no power on earth could have saved his forces from utter destruction. As it was, he was able to fall back in comparative safety, thus preserving the Russian line.

On the north of Mackensen the Austrian 4th and 1st armies had pressed hard on Evert's 4th Russian army as it fell back to conform with the retreat of Dmitrieff, but had been quite unable to do more. Here the combatants were more evenly matched, and, indeed, the Austrians had to fight desperately to hold their gains. Had they failed, then Mackensen's far-advanced forces would have been in great danger of a terrible attack on their unprotected flank and rear. But there was small risk of a seriously planned counter-attack; the whole energies of the Russian command were given to the task of keeping the line intact, and it was something in the nature of a miracle that they succeeded as well as they did.

In the south, round Koziowa, Shcherbacher offered a stubborn resistance to Linsingen, and farther east Lechitski was able even to force Pflanzer-Baltin to retire. The crisis seemed past and the Stavka had time for reflection as to their best method of defence. It was clear that nothing as yet could stay Mackensen, and every advance he made rendered the then Russian line more and more precarious. A retreat on an enormous scale was clearly inevitable, and it says much for the clear forethought of the Russian leaders that before the end of May they had set in train preparations for a retirement to that line, hundreds of miles in the rear, where eventually the Austro-German advance was, at the end of the year, brought to a halt.

Meanwhile, conditions in Galicia were serious enough. The German battering-ram was steadily pushing forward at a speed of some six miles a day, and as it crashed through one defence after another the flowing tide of Austrians spread out farther on each side. All the provinces which Russia had overrun in such high hopes in the previous October and November were yielded up, and by May 14 Mackensen had reached the San. He had covered some 90 miles in a fortnight, had taken nearly 150,000 prisoners with over 100 guns and 300 machine-guns, and had inflicted appalling casualties on his enemy. Farther to the north and west Kielce had fallen and the Russians were retreating on Radom. The Austro-German line ran from the upper reaches of the Pilica, west of Ilza and Opatow, to Tarnobrzeg on the Wisloka, thence to Nisko and down the line of the San in front of Sieniawa, Jaroslaw and Radymno, curving dangerously round Przemysl to a point near Sambor, and then south-east to the Pruth.

Falkenhayn had to decide whether or not Mackensen had done enough. Italy was on the point of entering the war—she did so on May 24—and the position on the Serbian front was far from pleasant. In the west the French and British were attacking violently and the landing at the Dardanelles had been effected. The German success in Galicia had been quietly echoed in the far north, where the cavalry had won daring successes; but the war situation as a whole was still threatening, and Falkenhayn's decision to continue Mackensen's offensive must, in the circumstances, be called bold to the point of rashness. Events, however, were to prove its wisdom.

Having decided on his course, he first suggested to the Eastern commanders that they should strike heavily at the northern face of the Polish triangle, but they were still set on their great project of cutting the Russian lines north of Kovna and declared the Polish plan impracticable. Falkenhayn, therefore, threw all his reserves into the Galician front, giving Mackensen four fresh corps, and instructing him to push on as fast and as far as possible. By May 20 a new concentration had been effected, and Mackensen was in a position to smash in the Russian opposition on the San, which daily had been growing ever fiercer. In the Sieniawa–Jaroslaw line, indeed, Russian counter-attacks had quite held up the advance, while in the angle of the San and the Wisloka the Austrians had had to fight desperately to hold up attacks which more than once threatened to break through. Russia, it seemed, had rallied: but how ephemeral was that hope, and how much the fortunes of the entire southern front hung upon Mackensen, the next few days were to show.

Mackensen had flung forward his left wing on May 17, and after desperate fighting had seized a bridgehead at Jaroslaw. All attempts to clear the ground in front and make room for his troops to deploy were, however, foiled by the grim determination with which the Russians clung to their positions. On May 24, after an intense bombardment from his huge siege train, Mackensen tried again. The German masses were flung over the river in an impetuous stream and, led by the Prussian guards, hurled themselves on the Russians.

The latter, numbed by the bombardment and very short of ammunition, wavered and at last broke; the line of the San was conquered and Przemysl was doomed. At the same time a vigorous forward movement by Von Linsingen and the Austrian 2nd army had pushed Brusiloff back and back until he had halted the advance on the strong line of the Dniester. The fortress was thus threatened on both flanks. For a long time it had been the Russian intention to hold it to the last, and some attempt had been made to put it in a real state of defence. Wiser counsel had finally prevailed and steps were taken to evacuate it. On account of the fact that it had been injudiciously used as an advanced depôt, it was packed with stores of all kinds, and the desperate attempts made on north and south of the city to hold up the Austro-German advance had been largely dictated by the necessity of giving enough time to complete the removal of its supplies.

By May 30, however, Mackensen's howitzers, which had been brought by rail south from Jaroslaw, were in range of the south-western and northern forts. Within two days the giant guns had smashed the forts into a mass of rubble and twisted steel, and the Germans from the north and the Austrians from the south-west were closing in rapidly. Further resistance was impossible, and involved the useless sacrifice of brave lives. During the night of June 2 the last Russian left the city, and at 3 a.m. on June 3 the German and Austrian forces entered it in triumph. The third and last siege of the fortress was over, and never again throughout the course of the war was its peace to be troubled.

Its fall released the Austrian 3rd and 2nd armies, for Mackensen had so shortened the front of his operations that his 11th army was now in direct

RUSSIANS AT SALONIKA

The Franco-British expedition to Salonika in 1915 eventually spread from the Adriatic to the Aegean seas. On the Allies' side, Greeks, Serbians, French, British and Russians formed a cosmopolitan force under General Sarrail. This contingent of Russian troops is resting by the roadside on its way to the front

contact with Von Linsingen's southern army, and the Austrian forces were transferred to the north-west, where they brought a long-overdue relief to the hard-pressed Austrian 4th army. The Russians had striven with some success to check the enemy's advance into south-western Poland, but the pressure from the south exerted by Mackensen's advance was reproduced in the west, where Woyrsch's detachment battled furiously towards Radom. The Austrian reinforcements in the Wisloka–San triangle turned the scale, and during the remainder of June and early July the Russians were slowly forced back, surrendering Opatow, Ilza and Radom in turn, until they finally rested on the line of the Pilica and on the chain of fortresses down the Vistula.

With failing supplies of ammunition, but with dogged courage, the Russians in the south had striven desperately to fling back the German advance. They had re-formed in front of Grodek after the fall of Przemysl, and had launched a series of heavy counter-attacks at Von Linsingen and Pflanzer-Baltin's 7th army. But by June 16 all these had been repulsed with enormous losses to the attackers; it is estimated that Russian casualties from all sources, between May 1 and June 16, had reached the almost unbelievable figure of 390,000, besides over 300 of their precious guns.

By the latter date they were again on the defensive, as Mackensen's great battering-ram was moving towards Lemberg. After three days' terrible fighting the Russian line was again driven in at Rawa Ruska, and two days later, on June 22, the Austrians entered the Galician capital. The Russians had, during their nine months' occupation, done little to implement their promises to the inhabitants. Their troops had behaved with gross licence, and the authorities appeared to have devoted their major energies to proselytizing with savage brutality in the interests of the Russian Orthodox Church, heaping on the head of the archbishop of the city indignities compared with which the insults offered by the Germans to Cardinal Mercier were trifling. It was small wonder that the population received the victors with every sign of genuine enthusiasm.



Photos: G.P.A.

SALUTING THE ENEMY

The Russian armies were seriously crippled by an acute shortage of guns and ammunition, and consequently the pieces of artillery they had were guarded with exceptional care. The field gun, here shown, is helping to defend a Russian position on the Styr

Two days before Lemberg fell Von Linsingen had, after ten days of fearful carnage on both sides, captured Drohobycz and Stryj and the Russians had fallen back to the Dniester. A German thrust eastward had checked Lechitski in his attack on Pflanzer-Baltin, who, in turn, had been able to advance as far as Halicz. But the fall of Lemberg turned the Russian position and a hasty retreat over the Dniester became imperative. By the first week in July Brusiloff had drawn his army back into comparative safety on a line running up the Sereth, a tributary of that stream from Nizniow. Farther north the Russians were desperately seeking a new line of defence based on positions running from Radom to points south of Opole Krasnik and Zamoscz.

The first part of the long retreat had been achieved, not without frightful loss and suffering, but with real success. In spite of all that had happened, the Russian line still held; but the position of the Polish salient in the centre was clearly precarious in the extreme. It jutted out to a point west of Warsaw in a narrow head, which appeared to be gripped firmly by the German pincers of Ludendorff and Hindenburg on the north and Mackensen on the south. It became an urgent question whether the sides could be made to hold long enough for the head to be withdrawn from the noose which Falkenhayn had so nearly cast round it.

The German command had reason to feel pleased. Russia had been dealt

SLEEP OF DEATH

The vast plains of Poland were the scene of many deadly patrol encounters between the ill-armed and unruly Russian forces and the better equipped and more disciplined Germans. These two dead Russians bear mute witness to some forgotten skirmish

Photos: G.P.A.

TOUR OF INSPECTION

On a tour of inspection on the Eastern front one of the Russian generals is having explained to him by an officer on the spot the tactics and positions to be adopted. His staff stand a little apart an interested audience of the conference

a terrible blow: fresh masses of her manhood were even now on their way to swell the vast numbers of Russian prisoners whose patient toil in German munition factories was so largely instrumental in enabling her to prolong the war for so many tragic years. Galicia had been freed and the menace to Austria averted. In the north the cavalry operations under the command of Von Lauenstein which had done so much to ensure the success of the southern venture by drawing off Russian reinforcements to this danger spot, had progressed well. Some severe fighting had resulted round Shavli in early May, and the Germans had penetrated in a number of daring cavalry raids far into the Russian zone. One of these, on May 7, had captured Libau on the coast without the loss of a single man, securing valuable stores of iron and barbed wire and receiving the surrender of the garrison.

But the Germans, though reinforced from time to time, were numerically too weak to do more than battle fiercely to hold their gains, of many of which they were dispossessed by heavy Russian reinforcements. As was inevitable, once started, the fighting grew in volume, involving one area after another. The Germans were compelled to add infantry divisions to their cavalry, and finally to turn the heterogeneous mass of troops into an army, the army of the Niemen, which was put under General Otto von Below, his place at the head of the 8th army being taken by General von Scholtz. Hindenburg and Ludendorff were still intent on a vast encircling movement through Mitau, to descend on the Russians at Dvinsk, and they strove hard to force a way for their cavalry. But the Russians resisted strongly, and, although Windau was cut off and captured, lost little of moment.

Throughout May and June the fighting continued, while intense preparations were made by the German 10th army for an attack on Kovno. As will be revealed in a later chapter the attempt had to be postponed for a month. But the advance in Lithuania and Courland was continued, and by July 18 Tukhum had fallen. But although the segment on the German left wing had been ironed out (their line now running due south to Shawli and thence along the Dubrisa) the 5th Russian army, under Plehve, who had taken over command in this area on June 10, was quite unshaken and the threat to Riga was not serious.

WHITE FLAG

The labour of thousands of Russian prisoners in German munition factories and on the land was a considerable factor in the prolongation of the War. These Russian troops signalling their surrender will swell the captive labour at Germany's disposal

CHAPTER 44

ITALY DRAWS THE SWORD

After nearly a year of hesitation Italy joined the Allies in May, 1915, thus freeing France from a possible peril on her south-eastern frontier. The following chapter describes the earliest fighting between the Italians and the Austrians

UPON the outbreak of the Great War Italy was an unknown quantity in the European situation. Bound to Germany and Austria by the Triple Alliance, it seemed to many that she must inevitably fall into line beside them. Yet there were complex forces at work within her which to the last moment seemed as though they might sway her in either direction or disintegrate her people in civil war.

Before the outbreak of war between Prussia and Austria in 1866, the king of Italy had allied himself with Prussia and his troops attacked the Austrian possessions in that country. Although defeated, the king received as the reward of his assistance the province of Venetia, till then an Austrian possession. Lombardy had been gained five years before, so the only district peopled by Italians that remained under Austrian rule was the mountainous region of the Trentino and Trieste, at the head of the Adriatic. This area was known as Italia Irredenta, and its union with the rest of Italy was one of the aims of Italian policy.

The emergence of Germany after the foundation of the Empire in 1871 created a new state of affairs in Europe. In 1882 Bismarck formed the Triple Alliance between his own country, Austria and Italy. The inducement offered to Italy was security against any revival of Austrian aggression, protection if necessary against France, and the economic advantages to be obtained from the friendship of Germany. It is worthy of note that the compact of 1882 between the three countries stated that "the treaty was not in any case directed against England."

Italy could hardly ever feel that, in a political sense, she had gained substantially by the alliance; in fact the central empires took very little account of her interests unless their own were directly furthered thereby.

At the beginning of the 20th century Italy's relations with France became more friendly, but the Triple Alliance was still maintained, and in 1912, in spite of the fact that there was no love lost between Austria and Italy, it was renewed. During the years that immediately preceded the outbreak of the World War, relations between Italy and Austria became strained, owing to Austria's treatment of her Italian-speaking subjects and to the hostile attitude of the Austrian military party; and when, in 1913, Austria approached Italy on the subject of making war on Serbia, ostensibly as a measure of self-defence—the very scheme, in fact, which matured in 1914—Italy definitely declined to be a party to such action.

When Austria issued her ultimatum to Serbia on July 23, 1914, Italy was not consulted, although the German authorities urged that this should be done. As, however, Austria had disregarded the terms of the treaty by pursuing a policy of aggression, Italy held that no obligation rested upon her to support her Teutonic allies. On August 3, therefore, Italy declared her neutrality. Moreover, in view of a clause in the treaty previously mentioned, she afterwards declared that it was not applicable to a war in which Great Britain was involved.

This caused considerable indignation in Berlin, where, a few days earlier, demonstrators outside the Italian Embassy had acclaimed their Italian ally. Actually this declaration of neutrality on the part of Italy had rendered the Allies one invaluable service: it had released for the struggle against the German invaders a number of French troops which otherwise must have been kept on the Italian frontier. Meanwhile, in the breathing space afforded by this declaration of neutrality, the fleet was moved to Taranto, and partial mobilization of the army was carried out.

Following on serious socialist outbreaks in June, 1914, aiming at a federal republic, a government of moderates under the leadership of Antonio Salandra succeeded the conservative government of Giolitti. This was reconstructed in October, 1914, with Baron Sonnino as foreign minister and Signor Orlando as minister of the interior. In sympathy it tended to favour the Allied cause. But the new pope, Benedict XV, by not espousing the cause of Cardinal Mercier, by a series of peace notes timed to suit the Austro-Germans, and by treating all the belligerents as being on the same moral level as regards war aims and conduct, caused deep indignation and made it appear that the Vatican remained true to its Austrophile policy.

Nevertheless, according to the historian Luigi Villari, Italian sympathies were mainly with France and Britain. In "The Italian Front" he says:

> That public feeling was predominantly on the side of the Entente is shown by the formation of bands of volunteers who went to fight on the French side. Early in November, 1914, the Italian legion, four battalions strong, first came under fire in the Argonne, and in January one of its officers, Bruno Garibaldi, grandson of the great Garibaldi, was killed in a bayonet charge; a few days later his brother Costante also fell in action, while four other brothers fought in the same unit.

Italian neutrality meant that an important element was missing from Germany's plans, and there began a long campaign of intrigue in Italy, carried



Map of the frontier between Italy and Austria. The earliest struggles took place in the Trentino, but the warfare soon spread to the course of the Isonzo river, where many battles took place

Photo: G.P.A.

PRICE OF INVASION

After declaring war in August, 1916, the Rumanian army advanced into Transylvania. Their success was short-lived, however, their force being routed by Falkenhayn and driven back over the Carpathians. Here are seen Rumanian dead along the railway embankment at Kronstadt, a city now called Brasov, in Transylvania

NO REPLY

Means of rapid communication became vital early in the War, and both sides built up an intricate telephone system behind their lines. That the service was not without its risks, the mutilated body of this German telephone operator killed at his post on the Somme graphically shows

Photo: Topical

Photo: G.P.A

WAR MAKES NO DIFFERENCE

As a corollary to an earlier photograph showing German wounded prisoners being treated before their less badly injured captors, this photograph shows a wounded English prisoner receiving first aid from a German medical officer

out with vast expenditure of money and energy. German agents strove to counteract the effect upon popular feeling of those who believed in the necessity of Italy's intervention on the side of the Allies. The country was now divided. Few, indeed, wished to join with the Central Powers, for Germany's invasion of Belgium had created a bad impression. The Catholic party advocated neutrality out of hatred of France and Russia, and a certain sympathy with Catholic Austria; the socialists, because they opposed the waging of war. On the other hand, other parties, including the republicans, the democrats, the nationalists and irredentists, were all in favour of joining the Allies. Mussolini, then the editor of the *Avanti*, resigned from that paper and founded *Il Popolo d'Italia*, in which he espoused the cause of intervention. Demonstrations in favour of war took place in various parts of the country.

Sent as ambassador to Rome, Prince von Bülow made desperate efforts on behalf of Germany to prevent any outbreak of war between Italy and Austria. As the price of her continued neutrality Italy demanded various concessions from Austria, and the prince was greatly hampered in his negotiations by the understandable unwillingness of Austria to concede such claims. On April 8, 1915, Baron Sonnino, the Italian foreign secretary, enumerated the Italian demands in return for which his government would maintain neutrality. These included the cession of the Trentino, the eastern frontier to include Malborghetto, Plezzo, Tolmino, Gorizia and Comen, reaching the sea at Nabresina; the establishment of Trieste and district as an independent State; the cession to Italy of the Dalmatian islands of Lissa, Lesina, Curzola, Lagosta, Cazza and Meleda; the renunciation of Austrian interests in Albania and recognition of Italian sovereignty over Avlona. He also demanded that all territorial concessions should come into force immediately.

Though Germany favoured acceptance of these demands, Austria rejected all save a slight extension of the Italian frontier. But Baron Sonnino refused to abate one jot or tittle of his claims, even when the German emperor sent a telegram to Prince von Bülow referring to the dire consequences for Italy if she entered the War on the side of the Allies. By this time it was obvious that Italy would have to take part, for if she held aloof she would stand to lose, whichever side won. Prudently speculating on which side of the fence to jump, she made overtures to the Entente with a view to ascertaining what her intervention would be worth. On April 26 the treaty of London was concluded between Italy, France, Russia and Great Britain, by which, in return for her military aid, Italy was to be given the Trentino and the upper Adige valley, Trieste, Gorizia, Istria, the islands of Lussin and Cherso, Valona, Dalmatia as far as Cape Planka, Avlona, the Dodecanese, and a share in the eventual partition of Asia Minor. In addition, in the event of the creation of a separate State of Albania, it should be placed under Italian control.

It was now quite clear that the Italian government was determined upon war, but for a moment the hopes of the neutral party ran high. On May 13 Antonio Salandra, the Italian premier, feeling that he was not receiving the unanimous support of his country and bitterly opposed by the partisans of Signor Giolitti, his predecessor in office, tendered to the king his resignation. On May 15, as no one else was able to form a ministry, the resignation was declined and Salandra returned to office. The interventionists had won. Such was the temper of the people at this stage that had any other minister attempted to form a cabinet, he would almost certainly have been called upon to quell a civil war.

When Signor Salandra entered the Chamber upon the reopening of parliament on May 20, 1915, he was greeted with indescribable enthusiasm, and took his seat amid shouts of "Long live the

Photo: G.P.A

WALKING THE PLANK

Upon the resourcefulness of the Engineers and the speed at which they worked, the issue of battles often depended. Crude pontoon bridges such as the one across which these German troops are safely walking were often thrown over streams in less than fifteen minutes

war!" On the following day a bill conferring extraordinary powers upon the government in the event of war was passed by the Senate by 262 votes to 2. An appeal by the premier to all parties to sink their differences and unite for the good of their country was greeted with cheers and acclamations. War was declared between Italy and Austria on May 23, 1915. Unfortunately for Italy, three weeks before this a French newspaper's disclosure of the signing of the treaty of London had given Austria ample warning.

To cope with the impending menace, Austria had sent every man who could be spared from the Russian and Serbian fronts to the Italian frontier, until by May 23 more than 300,000 men were in position. They were mostly Tirolese and Hungarian territorial troops, supported by first-line regiments in positions of importance.

Upon the declaration of war Count Luigi Cadorna, who had in 1914 succeeded General Pollio as chief of the general staff, was appointed commander-in-chief of the Italian armies in the field. The main difficulty with which he had to contend was the fact that Italy's northern frontier had been so drawn through the Alps as to leave Austria in full possession of every advantage offered by the mountain passes, either for offence or defence. Therefore Cadorna's plan was necessarily based upon holding these northern heights and launching his offensive eastward, for it was clear that the great barrier of the Alps precluded the possibility of any great offensive action to the north.

Cadorna's dispositions were as follows. The Italian 1st army, consisting of five divisions and ten Alpine battalions under the command of General Brusati, was ordered to carry out a limited offensive in the Trentino in an endeavour to shorten the line and secure good positions for defence. On his right General Nava, commanding the 4th army, made up of five divisions and seven Alpine battalions, was given the task of attacking the enemy lines of communication in the Val Pusteria. General Lequio, with an infantry division and sixteen Alpine battalions, called the Carnia force, was to attack in the direction of Tarvis. The 2nd army, eight divisions under the command of General Frugoni, and the 3rd army, made up of six infantry and three cavalry divisions, led by General Zuccari, were to take the offensive along the river Isonzo.

The fact that Italy was able to mass against the Austrian troops in a numerical superiority exceeding two to one was tactically of small importance. What counted was guns, and especially heavy siege guns. The Austrians had their heavy artillery placed on every dominating height, fed by railways, defended by machine-gun redoubts on the mountain sides, with light quick-firers sheltered in caves or galleries hewn from the rock. The Italians had still to build mountain fortresses from which their guns could work, a very difficult task.

In order to realize why Italian progress soon became painfully slow, it is necessary to visualize the natural obstacles which impeded every advance. Italy's frontier in the Alps was so located as to prove of the greatest strategical disadvantage in time of war. It ran near the southern edge of the mountain ranges, giving Austria all the advantages of a natural and almost impregnable bulwark, while at the same time her troops could sweep down upon the plain of Piedmont with little difficulty. Almost inaccessible summits, reaching in places to a height of over 9,000 feet, were observation posts from which every movement on the Italian frontier could be instantly detected. Even in those parts where deep valleys had been worn away by constant stream and ice erosion since the glacial period, the Italians had to move ever upwards to enter hostile territory.

Only at the extreme east did the frontier line descend to the plain and

Photos: G.P.A

QUEER CARGO

The canals of Belgium and northern France provided excellent means of communication, and their possibilities for offence and defence were rapidly exploited by the belligerents. The German crew of this converted barge are inspecting its powerful gun

run for some 30 miles across comparatively level ground as far as the Adriatic. But even in this sector progress into Austrian territory was checked a few miles east of the frontier by the mountain ranges which border the Dalmatian coast. Moreover, the river Isonzo, flowing from the glacial valleys in the mountains through the marshy and often inundated plain lying just east of the Venetian frontier on the Adriatic, provided Austria with a natural line of defence.

On her mountain fortresses Austria had spent some millions of pounds, her engineers had devoted years of unremitting labour, with full and exact knowledge of every recent development in artillery practice and an acquaintance with the modern theory of fortification.

PRISONERS' FIRST DUTY

After any offensive the tragic task of bringing in the wounded was performed as speedily as possible and prisoners were always required to help. These British soldiers have been detailed to aid their wounded captors back to a dressing station

Italy's military forces on the eve of the War amounted to four armies, plus the Carnia command, the cavalry corps, and various surplus troops at the disposal of the supreme command. These were made up of 14 army corps, comprising 35 infantry divisions, one division of bersaglieri, four of cavalry, and two Alpine groups. The total effective strength amounted to 23,039 officers and 852,000 other ranks. After the completion of mobilization these figures were increased to 31,037 officers and 1,058,042 other ranks.

Unfortunately, in equipment Italy's army was, for a great power, singularly inadequate. The total strength of her ordnance at the time of her entry into the War amounted to 1,797 guns of small calibre (mountain guns and light field-guns), 192 field-guns, 132 siege howitzers and 618 machine-guns. Her air force consisted of five dirigibles and 108 aeroplanes. Of Italy's 35 divisions, 14 were engaged upon this front, 14 held the three hundred miles of front between the Stelvio and the Carnia, while 7 were kept in reserve with a view to being transferred to the Trentino or Julian fronts as circumstances should dictate. The enemy forces on the Italian front amounted to 20 divisions.

In accordance with Cadorna's plans the main offensive of the Italian army

CABINET MEETING ABOARD *Photo: Topical*

M. Venizelos (left) set up his provisional government at Salonika in October, 1916. He is here seen conferring, on board the Greek vessel Hesperis, with Generals Danglis and Zimbrakakis and Admiral Condouriotis, all members of his government

was concentrated on a front of some 60 miles between Tarvis, at the eastern end of the Carnic Alps, and the mouth of the river Isonzo. But even the Isonzo front was only favourable for attack in comparison with the insuperable difficulties of the northern Alps, for along the river, and especially near its source, rocky peaks towered nearly 8,000 feet above the valleys. Moreover, the river itself, when in flood, places a natural obstacle in the way of advancing troops.

With great speed the Italian 3rd army moved across the Friuli plain, through Udine, Palmanova and S. Giorgio, where two railway lines ran into the Isonzo valley and the Torre valley. Here the covering troops had moved forward over the frontier at midnight on May 24, and in a single day they captured nearly all the towns and villages between the frontier and the Isonzo river, from Caporetto, lying below the steep slopes of Monte Nero, to the hamlet of Belvedere, southward on the Gulf of Trieste.

Although Italy had been unable to make full use of the element of surprise, Austria, nevertheless, was not expecting any great offensive action until the Italian mobilization was fully completed. Also the Austrian chief of staff, General von Höfer, made the mistake of despising the men opposed to him, and essayed to hold his front with too few troops. The result was that the Italians were able during the first days of fighting to make themselves masters of various important localities, particularly along the Trentino sector, where they captured the Tonale Pass, Ponte Caffaro, Monte Baldo and Monte Pasubio. On the Isonzo front they occupied Monte Koziak, Monte Libussina and Monte Pleka, as well as Cormons, Versa and Cervignano. Farther north, in the Carnia, the Freikofel was finally captured by the Italians.

Mountain skirmishing continued until the end of May, by which time Italian troops had crossed the Lessini mountains and, penetrating nearly ten miles into Austrian territory, had taken the town of Ala, and brought up heavy guns against the Rovereto forts. Further advances were also made in southern Trentino towards the towns at the head of Lake Garda, and along the Sugana valley towards Trento. Five railway lines spread from Austria southward through the Trentino. Never designed for purely commercial transport, they were intended to provide lines of communication to enable a vast Austrian army, in case of necessity, to leap upon Verona and all the rich, busy cities of Lombardy, thus beheading Italy by cutting off her chief centres of industry. For this reason, among others, Cadorna was anxious to secure possession of the mountain passes, for each pass was a Thermopylae, where a battalion with a couple of quick-firers and half a dozen machine-guns could hold back an army corps for days.

On May 29 a vigorous attempt was made by the Austrians to regain possession of the Monte Croce pass, which had fallen into Italian hands. On a foggy day, under cover of the mist, the enemy massed a strong force by the railway from Villach and brought them to Mauthen, from which they made five stubborn attempts to regain the pass. The Alpini and bersaglieri swept away each wave of assault by musketry and machine-gun fire at close range; then, leaping up after the last attack, they drove the enemy down the valley.

This was but the beginning of the battle of Monte Croce, and the struggle continued day and night. After the Freikofel, the Italians captured the pass of Valentina and the pass of Oregione, 7,590 feet high, overlooking the wooded Gail Valley. The last pass was conquered by the Alpini, who climbed over the white mass of Paralba and fought their way down to the high saddle. The Austrians brought up another army corps, and on the night of June 14 made a great attempt to break through the rampart of Italian valour and turn the Carnic Alps, according to design, into a gateway for a flank attack on the main Italian army. Oregione's saddle, the snowfields of Paralba, and all the peaks and wild ravines extending to Monte Croce and Freikofel were dappled with groups of fighting men, some shooting from rocky cover, others trying to get home with a bayonet charge delivered at close quarters from some fold in the limestone. On Paralba, some 8,840 feet high, the Austrian troops were on Italian territory; but they were soon caught on the flank and threatened towards the rear, and were scattered towards the Steinwand, a mountain above the Gail valley.

On May 30 the Italian army on the Cadore sector captured the beautiful village of Cortina, lying 4,000 feet high amid some of the most superb scenery in Europe. Most of the fighting took place on the great northern mountain height, crowned by the glaciers and snow-fields of Tofana, and around the Cinque Torri, a line of apparently inaccessible peaks. By June 9 Falzarego pass was won, and in the closing battle, in which the enemy lost lightly, a footing was obtained on an important strategical position, three miles beyond the pass, on the Sasso d'Istria, close to the point at



Photo: Topical

MORTAR PIT

The Salonika area was the scene of much fierce fighting, but the front lines of the belligerents never became such formidable field-fortresses as in France. In some places the line was a series of sand-bagged posts such as hide this trench mortar

which the Dolomite road bends southward through its ravine and goes in two tunnels under the mountains.

The principal operation on the Isonzo front was the attack upon Monte Nero. This terrible bulwark, towering nearly 7,000 feet high, would not only afford the Italians a strong position east of the river, but would enable them to prevent any effective movement of the right wing of the Austrian forces assembled along that sector. After two unsuccessful attempts on May 28 and June 4, a further determined effort to capture the position was carried out on the night of June 15–16. The attack was made by the Alpini of the Italian 2nd army which had been placed under the command of General Etna.

PUFFING BILLY

Light railways played a large part in transport at Salonika, and their lines covered a wide area. This little train, whose engine is reminiscent of a famous precursor, is being used to evacuate a British dump that has caught the enemy fire

Although the enemy positions were stubbornly defended, the Alpini gained possession of the highest peak of the mountain shortly after midnight, taking prisoner a whole battalion of Hungarian troops who had been sent up as reinforcements. But while the bridgeheads of Gorizia and Tolmino remained in Austrian hands the enemy still commanded the river from Tolmino to its delta, and therefore the Italians concentrated their efforts upon an offensive from Plava, a village lying between those two bridgeheads, to the sea.

The problem that confronted the Italians was the difficult task of crossing the Isonzo under heavy fire and seizing the strongholds on the heights of the Carso plateau, which dominated the river; but finally, after many fruitless and costly efforts, the river was crossed at Plava, and Hill 383, overlooking the Isonzo, was captured by troops of the 3rd division on June 17.

Meanwhile the Italian 3rd army, although it failed to cross the river at Gradisca, met with more success at Monfalcone. This town had become the third most important port in Austria-Hungary, and in its yards warships were still being built for the Dual Monarchy. Monfalcone itself had been bombarded by the Italian fleet on

Photos: Topical

BY CANDLE LIGHT

Comfortable quarters were an immense aid to the well-being of the army, and experience taught the men how to make them as comfortable and convenient as possible under the prevailing conditions. These Australian artillery officers, reading their mail, are evidently enjoying warmth and comfort in their temporary home

May 30, when a chemical factory, in which asphyxiating gases were being made, was destroyed. The bombardment was continued by light cruiser squadrons on June 7. Then the castle of Duino, the magnificent residence of the Hohenlohe family, standing on the edge of the sea, nearer Trieste, and defended by three batteries of artillery, was shattered and set on fire.

The design was to threaten an advance on Trieste by the sea-road leading down through the pleasure palace of Miramar. The destruction of Prince Hohenlohe's castle was calculated to make the Archduke Eugene, who was in command of an Austrian army, anxious about the probable line of Italian advance. Some of his troops were therefore collected hastily, above Duino, in preparation against an Italian landing; but not an Italian landed. It was all a feint. The actual attack was launched from the opposite quarter, straight across the Isonzo, on June 8. Monfalcone was taken and the brigade of grenadiers seized the line between the castle and Aris.

After a week's pause, during which reinforcements were brought up, fighting was resumed between Tolmino and the Adriatic, but a series of attacks upon Podgora, Oslavia and Peuma, lasting from June 23 to June 26, failed to dislodge the enemy from their stubbornly defended lines. On July 5 the hill of Podgora, directly covering Gorizia, and forming the barbican of the defence system of the city, was again assailed. Although the Italian infantry charged with superb intrepidity, and managed to penetrate the enemy defences at several points, the Italians lacked sufficient large-calibre guns effectively to reduce the concrete defences erected by the Austrians.

Neither the 10th nor the 11th corps of the Italian armies were able to make much headway against the enemy positions on the Carso plateau, which was found to be almost unassailable without sufficient artillery preparation. Gorizia could not be taken, and the way to Trieste remained barred until the Italians could wrest at least a portion of this natural fortress from the enemy. The Carso plateau is a tableland of rock, from four to six miles broad, running parallel to the coast a few miles inland. Rising in places to a thousand feet, seamed with deep, narrow, winding gullies, with precipitous sides dominating the surrounding land, it is a natural castle of rock, from which artillery can command Gorizia and all the lower reaches of the river Isonzo.

To scale the sheer sides seemed impossible, added to which the natural defences of the position had been augmented by a long period of scientific fortification. Moreover, the western extremity of the plateau is separated from the main portion by a deep ravine called the Vallone, so that even if the Italians secured a footing on the western edge of the Carso, as soon as they proceeded eastward they were presented with a task of even greater difficulty.

By about July 7 the first of the eleven battles of the Isonzo came to an end. The Italians had lost nearly 15,000 men, killed, wounded and prisoners. Ten days later the second battle of the Isonzo began. The main objectives were again the summit of the Carso and Podgora on the lower Isonzo, and the district around Monte Nero in the river's upper reaches. In spite of fierce and reiterated assaults in the Monte Nero sector, the enemy could not be dislodged from his positions, and farther south Podgora still defied all attempts

FETLOCK DEEP

The mud in the Somme valley was never quite so bad as it was in Flanders, but as this picture shows, it could be terrible. An Australian transport train is standing in a field so churned up that road and grassland have become indistinguishable

Photo: Topical

WITH THE AUSTRALIANS

These Australian limbers are being loaded up behind the lines with shells for the guns and boxes of cartridges for rifles. In the foreground lie a heap of shells in special holsters for horse and mule transport over difficult ground

to capture it. The sole Italian success of any importance was the capture of the plateau of Doberdo, which, although of no great strategical value, was of value in so far as it enabled the Italian guns to be better placed for an attack upon the Carso. In this battle the Italians lost nearly 34,000 killed and wounded, but the Austrian casualties were estimated at nearly 47,000.

During the months of August and September there was little save desultory fighting on the Italian fronts, but at the beginning of October preparations were made for a resumption of the offensive along the Isonzo. Although in this battle the Italians were numerically far stronger than their adversaries, munitions had to be doled out with such parsimony, and the technical equipment of the attacking force was so inferior to that of the Austrians, that mere numbers counted for little.

The battle began on October 18, and, as before, attempts were made, by means of operations at the northern and southern extremities of the river, to outflank Gorizia. On October 26 the Italians took Globna and Zagora, but failed to capture the important position known as Hill 383, and a further effort two days later was again repulsed. In the Carso sector, although various localities changed hands frequently, no real advance could be made. In fighting from November 10–12, a few trenches were captured.

By the middle of November the Italian army was, to all appearance, like the Franco-British forces on the Western Front, in a position of stalemate, but, though offensive action had temporarily come to an end on the Isonzo, the picturesque work of Alpine warfare was carried on in the Carnic, Dolomite, and Trentino mountains, at many points above the snow line.

Close above the Tonale pass lies one of the greatest glacier systems in Europe. The vast crown of ice extends from alp to alp for more than twenty miles. The broadest part is that which stretches for some six miles to Monte Adamello, 11,640 feet high. There are several easy paths over or by the glaciers, and the Alpini had seized and fortified these. But as they were watching the Austrian valleys eastward, while the infantry of the line hauled up big guns to dominate western Trentino, a force of Tirolean mountaineers, in July, 1915, came over the glaciers by a new track, and penetrated a few miles into Italian territory.

Just north of the Alps of the Adamello group was the upper part of the lovely Giudicaria valley. Italian troops seized one of the northern passes by a surprise attack and worked forward towards the forts defending Riva and Arco. All the country south of the Ledro valley was gradually won by fierce artillery actions, the duels between the Austrian forts and the mobile Italian batteries being followed by infantry attacks. A striking victory, which had decisive consequences, was the attack on Pregasina, by the edge of Lake Garda, undertaken under unfavourable weather conditions in the second week in October, 1915.

At the same time a similar advance was made along the eastern lands of Lake Garda and down the Lagarina valley. As October closed, forces on either side of the lake were pressing on Riva, battering its fortified heights and bombarding the defences of Rovereto, which barred the road to Trent. Brezzecca, taken on October 22, 1915, was a place sacred to the memory of Garibaldi's exploits in 1866, and the joy of wresting this historic spot from their old oppressors was felt by every Italian soldier. In some places the largest siege-guns were pulled to the tops of mountains by human force, and it took the combined efforts of hundreds of men to do this. To transport supplies

Photo: Imperial War Museum

KILTS IN COLUMN

Highland regiments retained a picturesqueness which all the drabness and horror of modern war never quite killed. The 2nd battalion Gordon Highlanders is seen marching along the Becordel–Fricourt road, later to earn laurels in the Somme offensive

over rivers, precipices and ravines, transportable telpheric railways accompanied those troops. North of Cortina, fierce fighting took place during October around Monte Cristallo, which remained in the hands of the Italians. Attempts were then made, but without result, to gain access to the Sexten valley.

By this time winter conditions were setting in, and the Italian soldiers suffered severely from frost-bite, especially those whose lives had been spent in the sunny lowlands. Numerous problems had to be solved concerning the supply of food, shelter and water at these tremendous heights, and for rendering habitable the frozen entrenchments of the mountain line. In those localities sleighs and animal conveyances were necessary, while labour parties were incessantly engaged in keeping clear the ways of communication.

The last important action to be fought before winter set in was an attempt to capture the Col di Lana, which dominated the Cordevole valley. Several attacks upon this eminence had already been made, but all had proved failures. General Nava, the commander of the Italian 4th army, was superseded by General di Robilant, who launched his attack on October 23. The assaulting column, led by Peppino Garibaldi, attacked first of all the outposts, known as the Pannetone and the Cappello di Napoleone. These positions were carried between October 28–30, and a week later the main position was attacked. A system of trenches and galleries began on the eastern slopes and wound in a spiral up the height, so that the Italians at the western foot were completely mastered. If they tried to charge up the steep, an avalanche of rock would fall on them. This method of repelling an Alpine attack had been elaborated by both sides. Masses of rock were drilled, filled with sticks of dynamite and other explosives, with an electric detonator which an observation officer could fire when he thought the enemy were clustered sufficiently thickly on the lower slopes, thus wreaking great havoc and destruction amongst them.

The bomb and the high-explosive shell were useless against the Austrian Col di Lana works, which had been excavated

THE FLAMING TANK

Few substances were proof against the terrible chemicals used in liquid fire. This British tank has been caught in its advance by the jet from a flame-thrower. Despite its steel sides, its fuel contents were ignited and it is burning furiously

Photo: G.P.A.

Photo: Topical

RAILS 'FOR THE DURATION'

To meet the enormous needs of the British army in France, and to relieve the overburdened French railway system, a vast amount of railway building was undertaken by British engineers. Work is here in progress at the railhead of a three-line track

deeply in the solid rock. Colonel Garibaldi attacked this marvellous system of defence by engaging corps of skilled engineers, who had helped to drill and blast the great railway tunnels on the Swiss frontier. Under his direction they tunnelled right through the mountain into the Austrian galleries low down on the reverse slope where a hostile battery was working. When the fumes of the last blast of dynamite cleared away, a strong force of bombers leaped from the jagged hole at the end of the tunnel, cleared all the neighbouring galleries, and then, constantly fed by supports, smashed their way up and down the mountain.

But, although the Italians managed to reach the summit and capture the surviving defenders, a heavy bombardment from the neighbouring summits forced them to relinquish the crest and entrench themselves on the southern slopes, while the Austrians once again established themselves on the heights. Not until the following April was the Col di Lana entirely captured. By the end of the year the Italians had lost 66,000 killed, 190,000 wounded and 22,500 prisoners of all ranks.

To cope with this situation the Italians had to create at top speed a new armament. They took as their field-gun the French 75 mm., newly improved by its inventor, Colonel Déport, and they built 6-in. and 12-in. howitzers for attacking the Austrian forts. But an army of a million men needs 4000 guns, and the twenty-five Italian army corps required also several siege trains of great power. This ordnance could not be turned out in a year, even with help from other countries, and Italy, without coalfields, was not a steel-making nation.

No naval operations on a large scale took place between Italy and Austria during 1915. Two Italian cruisers, the Amalfi and the Garibaldi, were torpedoed, but the main Austrian navy stayed in port. The Austrian cruiser, Helgoland, with five destroyers, made a raid on Durazzo on December 28, but was driven off by Italian ships from Brindisi. During this action one of the Austrian destroyers was sunk by a mine and the Helgoland damaged.

POWERFUL BUT POWERLESS

Steam tractors were used in numbers on the Western front, their great power and the purchase afforded by the tread of the large wheels making them particularly suitable for heavy work. Their weight was a drawback and in the mud they sometimes came to grief

Crown Copyright

HUMAN CLAY

It is difficult to believe that this mutilated figure, lying on the filthy mud of the battlefield, was once a man. Nothing could furnish stronger condemnation of modern war than this mute evidence of a single example of its ghastly horror

TEAMS DEAD AND ALIVE

Horses and mules performed invaluable services during the War and their reward was, only too often, the fate which has overtaken this team. Transport drivers had little time for sentiment, and here they have already secured new animals for their limbers

Photos: Imperial War Museum

CHAPTER 45

SUBMARINE WARFARE

Between the battles of the Dogger Bank and Jutland the dominant feature of the war at sea was the German submarine campaign against merchant shipping and the efforts of the British Navy to foil it

LIKE the aeroplane and the airship, the possibilities of the submarine as an engine of war were largely unknown at the outbreak of hostilities in 1914. Each maritime nation had built ships of this kind, and it has already been narrated how in the first hours of the war British submarines penetrated into the Bight of Heligoland, while both sides used them in the naval fights in the North Sea.

In August, 1914, Britain had 74 submarines and Germany 33. France had also a considerable number. Others were in course of construction, and from that time onwards they were built, especially by Great Britain and Germany, very rapidly indeed, each model being larger and more powerful in every way than its predecessor.

The British boats were distinguished by a letter denoting the class, followed by a number. The German boats were known as U (*Unterseeboot*), also followed by a number. Early in 1915 the most powerful British submarines belonged to the H class. They could steam from 15 to 18 knots on the surface and 10 when submerged, and could cruise for 3,000 miles without refuelling.

The use of the submarine was soon linked with the vexed question of the blockade. To blockade an enemy's coasts so that ships could neither enter nor leave her harbours without permission and, if necessary, examination, had long been regarded as a legitimate act of war, and was carried out as, for instance, by Nelson, by stationing warships near the coasts and harbours of the blockaded country. In 1914, however, the conditions of naval warfare, in which the mine, the torpedo, the long-range gun and the submarine were dominating factors, prevented a blockade of the older and closer kind, and in this sphere of activity, as in others, fresh problems arose.

International law regarding blockade was contained in the Declaration of Paris, 1856, to which all the European belligerents save Belgium were signatories, and one of its clauses stated that a blockade to be legal must be effective. Since absolute blockade, as has been shown, was impossible, the British determined to enforce their control by closely guarding the northern and southern entrances to the North Sea, thus making it into a war zone. A system of examination of all neutral ships followed inevitably, and neutrals complained that this was a travesty of a legal blockade.

In this area, where control could be made fairly complete, the effectiveness or otherwise of the British blockade turned upon the interpretation which Great Britain put upon the vexed phrase, contraband of war. The Declaration of London, drawn up in 1909, had divided contraband goods into three classes—absolute contraband, conditional contraband, and free goods.

Absolute contraband was rigidly confined to war material and articles used exclusively for purposes of war. Conditional contraband included foodstuffs, fuel, bullion and specie, and articles capable of employment either for warlike or peaceful purposes. Free goods included textile material, metallic ores, rubber, manures, and machinery.

But the Declaration of London had not been ratified by the British government, which immediately war was declared issued a proclamation specifying articles which would be treated as absolute and conditional contraband espectively. These lists were identical with those in the Declaration of London, except that aircraft and their accessories were transferred from the conditional to the absolute list.

At first the Germans were loth to fall foul of neutrals, and submarines played little part against merchant shipping. British merchantmen were attacked, however, but only 10 were sunk by German submarines in the first six months of the war, or to be exact, to January 31, 1915, while a further 14 were sunk by mines. This meagre result may have helped to convince the enemy that more drastic measures were necessary, even at the risk of offending neutral nations. Another reason was the action of the British government in extending its definition of contraband.

On January 26 the German government announced its intention of taking possession of all stocks of corn and flour, thus making it impossible to distinguish between foodstuffs intended for civilians and foodstuffs intended for the military and naval forces. Great Britain declared all this contraband, and thus gave Germany an excuse for declaring that she was being subjected to a hunger blockade. In accordance with this decision the American steamer Wilhelmina was stopped off Falmouth and the fate of her cargo referred to a prize court. In deference to America no decision was given, but by agreement the foodstuffs were sold to the Belgian Relief Commission.

The German case for the blockade was set out in a document issued on February 4, two days after the official organ of

CONCRETE CAPITULATES

German pill-boxes were often the scene of desperate battles, for long after they were isolated their defenders continued to resist with marked bravery. This German machine gunner has paid with his life for his defence of a concrete stronghold

Photo: Imperial War Museum

EXHORTATION TO BATTLE

No general officer was more vigilant of the efficiency of his troops than General Sir Beauvoir de Lisle, who made a brilliant début in the war as a cavalry commander. He is here seen addressing a battalion of the famous 29th division, of which he was at one time commander, before one of the battles of the Somme

Photo: Imperial War Museum

the German government had warned all neutral shipping against approaching the coasts of Great Britain on the ground of the serious danger that it would incur. The document of February 4 gave a long list of grievances arising from the exercise of British sea power.

In consequence of these violations of international law by Great Britain and the dereliction of duty by neutral powers, the German government stated that it was necessary to adopt measures of reprisal and that these would assume the following form :

Germany hereby declares all the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland, including the entire English Channel, an area of war, and will therein act against the shipping of the enemy. For this purpose, beginning February 18, 1915, she will endeavour to destroy every enemy merchant ship that is found in this area of war, even if it be not always possible to avert the peril which threatens persons and cargoes. Neutrals are, therefore, warned against further entrusting crews and passengers and wares to such ships. Their attention is also called to the fact that it is advisable for their ships to avoid entering this area, for, though the German naval forces have instructions to avoid violence to neutral ships, in so far as they are recognizable, in view of the misuse of neutral flags ordered by the British Government and the contingencies of naval warfare, their becoming victims of attack directed against enemy ships cannot always be avoided. At the same time it is especially noted that shipping north of the Shetland Islands, in the eastern area of the North Sea, and in a strip of at least thirty sea miles in width along the Netherlands coasts, is not in peril.

This campaign was not entered upon without misgiving. Even Grand Admiral von Tirpitz was far from confident about it and wished to confine it to the Thames estuary only. The advice of other sailors and politicians was, however, accepted by the kaiser, and the new form of warfare began. Colonel J. F. C. Fuller, who denounced very strongly the attempts to starve the Germans into surrender, in his book, " War and Western Civilization," says, " Not only was this use of the submarine a political blunder, but also a naval one, for the simple reason that Germany did not possess sufficient submarines to gain decisive results, and once this campaign was launched complete surprise was at an end."

The difference between the British blockade and the German submarine campaign that was an answer to it was the vital one that the latter seriously endangered the lives of neutral seamen because it could only be carried out by the use of the submarine. The submarine could destroy but, except to a very limited extent, it could not take the crews of the captured vessels on board, while in the North Sea, at least, the German boats could not remain long on the surface, still less could they convey their prizes into port.

Neutrals had already received a warning of what they might expect under this new policy. On October 20, 1914, a British steamship, the Glitra, was torpedoed and sunk off Stavanger, and the Norwegian firm that owned her cargo claimed compensation. The case was heard in the prize court at Hamburg, but the verdict was given against the Norwegians.

The organized submarine blockade was not due to start until February 18, but it really began at the end of January. On the 31st of that month half a dozen British merchantmen were attacked. Some were torpedoed in the neighbourhood of Liverpool and some in the English Channel ; among the latter was the steamship Tokomaru, which was bringing from New Zealand



Photos : Topical

BLUES IN BLIGHTY

Over 2,000,000 British soldiers were wounded in the War and the blue uniforms of those who were convalescent became familiar sights at home. These men, one of whom has finished his soldiering for good, have just attended a service in S. Paul's Cathedral

LADIES IN WAITING

Almost invariably the first request of a wounded soldier was for a cigarette, and nurses in the forward dressing stations did their best to meet this need. In spite of his severe head-wounds this soldier can prop himself up to get a light from the obliging corporal

RATIONS ON THE ROAD

The feeding of the troops called for immense powers of organization from the commissariat and for great courage and endurance from the transport men. In all weathers and over all roads, often in face of great danger, wagons such as are here depicted went forward

97,000 carcases of mutton. No warning was given in this instance, but the crew were saved by French torpedo boats.

On February 1 an attempt was made to sink the British hospital ship Asturias. This vessel, carrying a staff of doctors and nurses, was making for Havre to embark wounded British soldiers and bring them across to England. In accordance with the Hague conventions, she was painted white, with a broad band of green running from stem to stern, and huge red crosses in prominent positions on her sides. It was still fairly light when, at about five o'clock in the afternoon, the conning tower of a German submarine was sighted at a distance of about five hundred yards, and immediately afterwards the track of a torpedo was seen making directly towards the ship. The master immediately altered his course, and rang down to the engine-room for full speed. Thus the torpedo missed its aim.

On February 10 the steamer Laertes, bound for Amsterdam, was intercepted in the North Sea by a German submarine and peremptorily ordered to stop. Instead of doing so the Laertes clapped on extra speed and proceeded to steer an erratic course, hoisting the Dutch flag. On February 15 the Dulwich was torpedoed and sunk off Havre, two lives being lost. On the 16th the Ville de Lille, a French steamer, was sunk off Barfleur. On February 19 the Cardiff steamer Cambank was attacked without warning off Anglesey. On the same day the campaign against neutral shipping was opened by the torpedoing off Folkestone of the Belridge, a Norwegian ship carrying oil from New Orleans to Amsterdam. Fortunately the vessel was towed into the Thames. The Germans said she had been torpedoed by mistake.

On March 1 the British Government announced retaliatory measures against the submarine blockade. Hitherto, although the enemy's shipping had been driven from the seas, commerce was still carried on with German ports by neutrals. In the Commons Mr. Asquith reviewed the policy and added :

> Germany is adopting these methods against peaceful shipping and non-combatant crews with the avowed object of preventing commodities of all kinds, including food for the civil population,

UNENDING STREAMS

Before any great offensive the roads behind the lines were crowded with columns of troops and transport. These British soldiers on their way up to Guillemont to take part in the Somme battle, 1916, may march for miles past returning empty transport

Photo: L.N.A

CARTRIDGE CARAVAN

An enormous consumption of ammunition accompanied the British offensive on the Somme in 1916, and fresh supplies were constantly needed. Throughout the offensive mule trains, such as this carrying cartridges, were to be met on all the roads behind the Somme area

from reaching or leaving the British Isles or Northern France. Her opponents are therefore driven to frame retaliatory measures in order, in their turn, to prevent commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving the German Empire. These measures will, however, be enforced by the British and French Governments without risk to neutral ships or to neutral or non-combatant lives, and with strict observance of the dictates of humanity. The British and French Governments will therefore hold themselves free to detain and take into port ships carrying goods of presumed enemy destination, ownership, or origin.

On March 11 the necessary order in council was issued. Its principal provisions were:

(I) No merchant vessel which sailed from her port of departure after March 1, 1915, shall be allowed to proceed on her voyage to any German port.

(II) No merchant vessel which sailed from any German port after March 1, 1915, shall be allowed to proceed on her voyage with any goods on board laden at such port.

(III) Every merchant ship which sailed from her port of departure after March 1, 1915, on her way to a port other than a German port, carrying goods with an enemy destination, or which are enemy property, may be required to discharge such goods in a British or Allied port.

(IV) Every merchant vessel which sailed from a port other than a German port after March 1, 1915, having on board goods which are of enemy origin or are enemy property, may be required to discharge such goods in a British or Allied port.

Fortunately for the nation the British government accompanied its words with deeds. Energetic measures were taken to protect shipping, and these met with a considerable amount of success, at least for a time, this being proved by the fact that the rate of insurance for merchantmen and their cargoes remained low. Perhaps more remarkable is the fact given in the "Official History" that up to March 18, 1915, no fewer than 600,000 men and 150,000 horses with all their stores had been conveyed to France alone.

The protective measures took various forms. The narrow seas were constantly patrolled by destroyers, armed trawlers and other craft, and it was computed that soon some 3,000 vessels were engaged in this task. They were grouped into 21 divisions, each with its own base and area of operations. A yacht squadron was formed, and these ships soon made their presence felt, especially round the coasts of Ireland. Merchantmen were forbidden to send out any wireless messages when within 100 miles of the coast, and in no case to

WEARINESS OF WAR

Men and beasts were often called on for the most exhausting efforts and at times every chance halt became a welcome opportunity for rest. These transport men of the Devonshire regiment and their horses afford striking proof of the daily strain of War

Photo: Imperial War Museum

WAYSIDE CROSSES

In this little graveyard beside the broken railway line," somewhere in France," lie the bodies of some dozen British soldiers. Unmoved and unseeing the transport flows steadily along the near highway. Such clusters of crosses were too plentiful to attract attention

Photos: Topical

WAITING LINES

Before going up to take over a section of the line, relieving troops were generally given an afternoon off duty. These men of the London Rifle Brigade, having discarded their packs and rifles, are taking it easy in the relative comfort of the reserve trenches

KING AND PRESIDENT ON THE SOMME

During the battles of the Somme King George paid one of his frequent visits to the front. He is here seen on August 9, 1916, with Sir Douglas Haig, General Foch, M. Poincaré and General Joffre, at whose headquarters he is being entertained

disclose their positions. Arrangements were made for correcting false positions when these were sent out, by means of a code. Tugs were supplied to sailing ships, and vessels were ordered only to proceed along channels which were continually swept for mines.

Other steps included the extinction of lights and the removal and alteration of the positions of buoys. This was done both in the English Channel and the North Sea, and orders were issued that ships must be brought in by pilots. Minefields were laid in certain areas and harbour entrances were similarly protected. Merchantmen were armed, and a system of decoy ships was instituted. These flew the merchant flag until they sighted an enemy, when they hoisted the white ensign and at once opened fire—a proceeding long regarded as a legitimate act of war.

The most pressing task was to prevent the submarines from getting into the narrow seas and along the trade routes. If, for instance, both the exits of the North Sea could be sealed, the German submarines would be unable to get out and prey upon British and neutral shipping, whether from east or west. To close the southern end of this sea the Admiralty relied upon patrols, minefields and the new device of indicator nets. The Dover patrol had its headquarters at the seaport of that name, and across the seas between it and France a line of nets held in position by drifters was placed.

To seal the northern exit of the North Sea was more difficult. The sea between the Orkneys and the coast of Norway was patrolled, but some hostile submarines got through and were therefore dangerous to shipping in the Irish Sea and the English Channel, both important highways of trade.

To close the northern entrance to the Irish Sea, the narrow channel between Scotland and Ireland, an area 30 miles by 12 miles was heavily mined. Therein navigation was forbidden, all shipping being directed through a passage three miles wide between Rathlin Island and the Irish mainland. Farther south, patrols watched the line between Holyhead and Kingstown, and a further patrol, with Milford as its headquarters, watched the southern exit, where indicator nets were used. The Irish Sea was thus made fairly safe, but it was not possible to secure equal immunity for ships using the south-western approach, the track along the Irish coast taken by all shipping from America. Special attention was given to defending the entrances to the Clyde, the Mersey and the Bristol Channel.

Mr. Churchill sums up the efforts made during the year 1915 thus:

> In addition, every form of scientific warfare against submarines was perseveringly studied. Already the microphone or hydrophone for detecting the beat of a submarine propeller in the distance had been discovered; but at this date it was only in an experimental condition. Bomblances, explosive sweeps, Actaeon nets (or necklaces of explosives) were eagerly and simultaneously developed. A close and fruitful union between the scientist, the inventor, and the submarine officer was established, the best brains of the navy were concentrated on the problem, and no idea, technical or tactical, was spurned by the Admiralty's staff.

Under these conditions the warfare continued, and while the new burden on the British navy was very heavy indeed, the U-boats did not come off scatheless. For instance, off Beachy Head, on February 28, Captain J. W. Bell in the Thordis sighted a submarine. In a few minutes the track of a torpedo was seen coming towards the vessel, but it passed clear. In order to force the submarine to dive, Captain Bell turned bows on and made straight

for the enemy. A moment later a severe jar was felt and quantities of oil appeared on the water. It was at first believed that the submarine, the U 6, had been destroyed, but it was learned afterwards that she had succeeded, although damaged, in returning to port.

On March 4, near the entrance to the Thames, another submarine, U 8, was attacked, and this time there was no doubt about the issue. She was signalled in the early afternoon by the destroyer Viking, and the rest of the flotilla soon joined in the chase. A little after two o'clock an indicator buoy moving fast to the eastward gave away the submarine's position, and presently her periscope came to the surface, as though she was in trouble with the nets; but she managed to get away. An hour later she was again seen by the Maori, farther to the westward, moving down the Channel, and mines were exploded across her track. The submarine shot up to the surface nearly vertically, stern first, being finished by other mines, which destroyed her conning tower.

Another enemy submarine, the U 12, was destroyed on March 10 off the Firth of Forth. She was first seen by an armed trawler on March 6, and a hunt was organized. The submarine escaped, but four days later was sighted farther south, and three destroyers, Acheron, Attack and Ariel, were sent in chase. She discharged two torpedoes at the Attack, and as she came to the surface to see the result was discovered by the Ariel (Lieut.-Commander J. V. Creagh), which charged full speed at her. The submarine dived, but the Ariel, keeping dead on her course, sped over the spot where she had disappeared, and as she did so struck the periscope and bent it completely over in such a way as to blind the submarine. She came to the surface again, and the Ariel and other destroyers immediately opened fire on her, maintaining it until the crew came out of the hatches with their hands raised in token of surrender. Eighteen of the crew of 28 were drowned.

In the following statement the Admiralty on March 26 recorded another success. "The Admiralty have good reason to believe that the German submarine U 29 has been sunk with all hands." As the Grand Fleet was returning to Scapa, an alarm of submarines was given, and the track of a torpedo was seen to pass just astern of the Neptune. At the same time the Dreadnought caught sight of a periscope and steered directly for it, handled with such precision that she struck the U-boat before she could dive. As the great bulk of the Dreadnought passed over her, a conning tower reared out of the water for just long enough to allow the figures 29 to be clearly seen. Her commander and crew were lost, the former being Weddigen, the destroyer of the Cressy, Hogue and Aboukir.

On March 13 the Hanna, a Swedish steamer carrying coal from the Tyne, was torpedoed without warning off Scarborough, nine lives being lost, and on March 25 the Dutch steamer Medea was captured and sunk by U 28 in the English Channel. In the case of two other Dutch steamers, Batavier V and Zaanstroom, which were seized by U 28 on March 18, the German submarine was able to take them into Zeebrugge for examination, as they were quite near the Dutch coast.

U 28 soon got round the British coasts, and was next heard of near the mouth of the Bristol Channel. There on March 27 and 28 she destroyed three steamers. One of these was the Aquila, which, refusing to stop, was overhauled, and her passengers and crew given only four minutes to take to their boats. Before this was over fire was opened. The steamer Falaba, outward bound from Liverpool and carrying nearly 200 passengers, was another victim. The submarine gave them only ten minutes to get into the boats and then sent a torpedo into the ship, which was sunk with a loss of 123 lives, some of the casualties being due to the fact that the force of the ship's explosion overturned some of the relieving boats.

The losses in April included five fishing craft and several merchantmen. The latter included the Harpalyce, a Belgian ship, fifteen lives being lost, and the Katwijk, a Dutch vessel, sunk without warning also between Dover and Ostend. Off St. Catherine's in the Isle of Wight the tug Homer was convoying a French ship when a submarine was sighted. Instead of obeying the order to stop the Homer cast off the tow and attempted to ram the enemy. She was unsuccessful, but both she and the French ship succeeded in reaching port.

The German efforts to sink British transports met with remarkably little success. In the first ten months of the war only one vessel of this kind was hit, this being the transport Wayfarer, laden with horses, that was torpedoed 100 miles off the Scilly Isles on April 11. She was towed into Queenstown, only five lives being lost, and all the 763 horses being got safely ashore.

We now come to one of the major incidents of the War. On May 1, 1915, the giant Cunard liner Lusitania was due to leave New York for England. She crossed the Atlantic without incident at a speed of 21 knots. As she came into the British waters she reduced speed to about 18 knots, so that she might arrive off the Mersey at such a time as to be able to proceed straight in without waiting for the tide. Four wireless warnings of the presence of submarines were dispatched from Valencia on May 6 and May 7, but the huge ship steamed along the south coast of Ireland, only a few miles off the coast, without taking the trouble to steer a zigzag course.

It was past midday of May 7, and many of the passengers were at lunch. The look-outs had been doubled, and Captain Turner was pacing the bridge, anxious, no doubt, but confident. Suddenly from the other end of the bridge there came the cry, "There's a torpedo!" Captain Turner rushed across, but it was too late to do anything to save the ship. The tragedy was over, so far as the ship was concerned, in eighteen minutes. She was struck just about 2.22 p.m. She gave a final lurch and disappeared just about 2.40. There was no ship in the vicinity at the time, but fortunately there were watchers ashore, and with all possible dispatch a swarm of vessels was sent out from Queenstown. But the rescuers arrived only to save those who had been fortunate enough to get into the boats or to find some other sure means of keeping afloat. There had been nearly 2,000 people on board the Lusitania, and of this large company 1,198 were drowned.

About this time, perhaps a little earlier, it was reported that German submarines of the latest type were passing from the North Sea into the Mediterranean, a menace not only to British, Belgian and neutral shipping, but also to the warships engaged off the Dardanelles. Before anything of a defensive nature could be prepared a single German U-boat—U 51, under Lieutenant von Hersing—showed what serious injury could be done to an unprotected fleet.

About eight o'clock on the morning of May 25 Hersing sighted the Swiftsure off Cape Helles and ran within three hundred yards of her, but being met by rapid fire disappeared without firing. The Majestic and Agamemnon were quite close to the Swiftsure, and it has never been explained why the German did not release a torpedo. Later he tried a shot at the Vengeance, but missed, and then came up again and caught the Triumph as she was steaming slowly near the Anzac position. The battleship had her nets down at the time, but they were useless. Two terrible missiles either cut through them or went beneath them. The great ship listed, and in about eight minutes rolled over and turned upside down. Then after floating for half an hour bottom upwards she disappeared in a great cloud of steam. Most of the crew were saved, all but

ON ACTIVE SERVICE

The Prince of Wales, who saw active service in France, Egypt and Italy from November, 1914, until the end of the War, won the admiration of all the Allied armies for his intrepid coolness under fire. His constant attention to his duties on the staff led to his mention in despatches by Sir John French in 1915, and later by Sir Douglas Haig

SALVAGE FOR RE-SHAPING

The consumption of copper, which with tin was the principal raw material in the manufacture of cartridge cases, became enormous during the War. A salvage corps was therefore formed to collect the discarded cases from the battlefields and dump them, as seen here, behind the lines. They were then shipped to England, where they were melted down and used again

DESOLATION BUT NOT DESPAIR

Even the face of nature was battered beyond recognition by modern explosives. With its riven trees and torn earth, this was at one time a peaceful woodland in the valley of the Ancre. British troops are here seen walking ankle-deep through the mud

WAR'S CARPENTRY

Millions of cubic feet of timber were shipped to France by the British Timber Supplies Department during the War. These Australian troops are busily engaged in loading planks into a service lorry for use in lining trenches and other purposes

3 officers and 70 men, as a trawler and destroyer went at once to her aid.

The submarine that sank the Triumph was perceived, and pursued until nightfall by the British destroyers, but Hersing escaped in the darkness, and on May 27 again approached the Anzac position. Here the Majestic was acting as a heavy battery in support of the Australian and New Zealand troops. Something like 12 destroyers were ranged about the battleship to protect her against underwater craft. But the German submarine officer got under her guard and his torpedo sank her in a few minutes. About 760 officers and men were saved, only about 40 being killed.

There seems to have been only one German U-boat besides Hersing's operating off the Dardanelles at the close of May, 1915, but quite a large flotilla collected later in the Mediterranean. Many of the vessels appear to have been built or assembled in the Austrian ports along the Adriatic coast; others made the long voyage from Germany. The U-boats changed their flags according to circumstances. Even the Bulgarian flag was used by the German submarine officers, who, owing to their greater skill, controlled nearly all the boats.

It was not only the British navy that suffered losses from submarine action. The French navy that was charged with the duty of confining the Austrian fleet in its Adriatic harbours was exposed to similar risks. On December 21 a German submarine, reached the southern end of the Adriatic, and there, after lying in wait for some time, succeeded in stalking the French Dreadnought Jean Bart. She fired two torpedoes, one of which missed its mark by 100 yards, but the other struck the battleship and tore a huge rent in her side. Fortunately her bulkheads and watertight doors stood the strain, and she was able to make her way into port.

Three days later the French submarine Curie, a small but modern vessel of 390 tons, made a plucky attempt to enter the harbour of Pola with the object of attacking the Austrian ships within. She safely passed the outer defences, and was creeping slowly along towards the inner harbour, when she was suddenly fouled by a heavy steel net rigged across the entrance. In extricating herself from this obstruction the submarine rose to the surface, and the Austrians, having been warned by the movements of the buoys supporting the net, immediately opened a heavy fire which rapidly smashed in the sides of the submarine and sent her to the bottom. All the crew were picked up, with the exception of the commander.

The second submarine attack on the French fleet was more successful than the first. On the night of April 26–27 the armoured cruiser Léon Gambetta was steaming slowly across the mouth of the Adriatic, en route to Malta. Without any warning a terrific explosion occurred in the neighbourhood of the engine-room. A few minutes later, when the ship was already heeling dangerously, a second torpedo struck her, and she began to settle down rapidly. One or two boats full of men got away, and one or two were swamped as the ship disappeared beneath the waves. All the officers had gathered on the bridge and not one of them was saved, but 137 of the crew were picked up.

The German submarine successes in the Mediterranean were rivalled, however, by those of the British boats which began to operate in Turkish waters soon after the declaration of war in November, 1914.

On December 13, 1914, in B 11, Lieutenant N. D. Holbrook earned a V.C. by diving under five rows of mines and torpedoing the Turkish battleship Messudieh. The extraordinary difficulties which he overcame in contending with the strong current in the narrow strait, and in keeping his boat on a true course, were illustrated by the disasters which befell Lieutenant-Commander T. S. Brodie in submarine E 15. His boat was swung out of her course by the Dardanelles current, and stranded at Kephez Point on April 17, 1915. Brodie was killed; most of his crew were captured; and it was feared that the fine submarine would fall almost undamaged into the hands of the enemy.

But this was not to be. Lieutenant R. E. Birch, in a small boat, B 6, made two very enterprising reconnaissances off Kephez Point on the same day and, though shelled by the Turkish batteries and very seriously endangered, saved his ship and brought back valuable information. Thereupon Commander Eric Robinson, with the picket-boats of the Triumph and Majestic, made a night expedition to Kephez Point on April 18 and torpedoed E 15.

Altogether four British submarines, including E 15, were lost in the Dardanelles. AE 2, the submarine of the Royal Australian Navy, was sunk by Turkish warships in April, 1915, when trying to enter the Sea of Marmora. The E 7, missing since September 4, 1915, was caught in nets off Nagara just before entering the Sea of Marmora. Her commander, A. D. Cochrane, tried hard for twelve hours to free himself, but in vain. A depth charge damaged his ship, so having destroyed his confidential papers he came to the surface and surrendered. E 20 was sunk in the same waters on November 5, 1915, four officers being taken prisoner. This disaster was a direct result of the capture by the Turks of the small French submarine, Turquoise, in the Sea of Marmora on November 7. Taken almost intact, she was put into service by the enemy, who discovered on board a diary giving particulars of a rendezvous with E 20. As a result the appointment was kept by a large German submarine, UB 14, which sank the unsuspecting British vessel, only nine of her crew being saved.

But some achievements of the British submarines in the Sea of Marmora were on the credit side of the account. Lieutenant-Commander E. C. Boyle, in command of E 14, made a voyage through the Dardanelles on April 27, 1915, during which he sank a Turkish gunboat before entering the Marmora Sea. In wider and more tranquil water he opened operations on April 29 by sinking a Turkish transport. Four days afterwards he destroyed another Turkish gunboat. On May 10 he attacked two large transports escorted by destroyers. His torpedo got home on the larger of the two. An entire infantry brigade and several units of artillery—in all about 6,000 Turkish soldiers—were drowned. On May 13 he forced a steamer to run aground, and on May 18 he returned safely to his base, having been recalled to give his successor the benefit of his experience.

The Germans tried to net the Straits against the British submarines and brought their best submarine officer, Hersing, to Constantinople to devise more defensive measures. But no defence was found against the daring underwater attacks.

On May 24, 1915, Lieut.-Commander M. E. Nasmith in E 11 sank a large Turkish transport, and then chased a supply ship filled with stores. A small store-ship was next met and forced to run ashore, and as a crowning exploit the British submarine officer penetrated into the harbour of Constantinople and torpedoed a transport lying alongside the arsenal. The Goeben, Breslau and other warships were, however, protected by boats moored alongside them, and could not be reached.

On August 5, Lieut.-Commander Nasmith, in his second passage of the Straits, submerged to 110 feet and charged the net, which broke. An hour later he had torpedoed a transport; at dawn next morning he was attacked by an aeroplane, but was able a few hours later to sink a gunboat. On the 7th he was in action with troops ashore. On August 8, 1915, he sighted and sank the Turkish battleship, the Barbarousse Haireddine.

Lieut.-Commander K. M. Bruce, with Lieutenant W. B. Pirie, likewise made a

PONTOONS FOR POILUS

Across this rapidly built pontoon bridge French light infantry are advancing to take their share in the fighting, evidently some distance away. The pontoon bridge probably saved several miles of marching

prolonged cruise in the Sea of Marmora, during which they did much damage to enemy shipping. Very remarkable was the feat of Lieutenant G. D'Oyly Hughes, serving in submarine E 11. On August 21, 1915, he swam alone from the submarine to the shore near the Ismid railway and blew up the brickwork of the line. Down to October, 1915, it was reckoned that there had been sunk in the Dardanelles and the Marmora Sea, mainly by British submarines, one battleship, one destroyer, five gunboats, 11 transports, 44 steamers, and 148 sailing vessels.

While telling heavily against the Turkish military and naval power in the waters of the Dardanelles and the Marmora Sea, British submarines bore equally heavily upon Germany in the Baltic, where E 1 and E 9 began to operate in the autumn of 1914. They remained there throughout the winter. Their successes were not spectacular, although they harassed the German ships considerably and E 9 damaged and probably sank a destroyer. Other German losses, including the cruiser Friedrich Karl, were due to mines.

In the spring and summer of 1915 the Germans were able to bring strong naval forces to the Courland coast to help the advance of the army under General Below. On March 23, for example, seven German battleships and 28 torpedo craft cruised off Courland, shelling towns, villages and roads used by Russian troops, and Libau was captured on May 7. Early in June German surface warships, with submarines and reconnoitring aircraft, began to appear off the Gulf of Riga, and the Russian minelayer Yenisei was torpedoed and sunk on June 4. On the other hand, three German vessels were sunk, and soon afterwards an attempt to storm Windau from the sea was defeated by Russian torpedo boats, which sank a German minesweeper.

In August, in response to appeals from Russia, two other British submarines, E 8 and E 13, were sent to the Baltic. Just before they arrived, on July 2, Commander Max Horton, in E 9, had torpedoed the battleship Pommern. This action took place during the fight between the German warships Roon and Bremen with four destroyers and a Russian squadron. The German ships were damaged and two old battleships came to their rescue. As these approached, apparently from Libau, Horton placed himself in their way and at a distance of four hundred yards fired two torpedoes. Each found a mark on the Pommern, but the submarine was forced to dive quickly in order to avoid being rammed by a destroyer. The damage done to her made a month's rest at Revel necessary. There was a fog during this fight in which the German minelayer Albatross was cut off and in a damaged condition was forced to beach herself on the coast of Gothland, her crew being interned.

E 8, under Commander N. E. Laurence, played a part in a naval action in the Gulf of Riga that lasted from August 19 to August 21. A German battle-cruiser squadron, including the Seydlitz and Moltke, was acting as a supporting force to the ships engaged near Riga, and the British submarine succeeded in stealing quite close to them. Laurence released a torpedo at the Seydlitz, and narrowly missed her; then he fired at the Moltke, and struck her in the bows. She was, however, able to get safely to Hamburg.

On the same day, August 19, as the Moltke was torpedoed there occurred the first disaster to the submarine flotilla operating in the Baltic. E 13, under Lieut.-Commander Geoffrey Layton, who was promoted rear-admiral in 1935, was passing in darkness through the Sound,

Photo: G.P.A.

'THE TIGER' INSPECTS

M. Clemenceau, an implacable enemy of Germany and a mordant critic of his colleagues and his opponents, thoroughly earned his nickname of the Tiger. Premier of France 1917–20, he took a passionate interest in the War, and repeatedly visited the Front

THEIR LAND VOYAGE

The building of pontoon bridges, an essential prelude to any rapid advance across the Somme country, cut up as it was by streams and canals, depended upon an adequate supply of materials. These pontoons are being taken to the French engineers

Photo: Topical

'HAPPY LANDING'

Observers in captive balloons faced the danger of being shot down, and also the risk that their craft would break loose. This pilot is descending by parachute

but he grounded in the early morning on the Danish island of Saltholm, near Copenhagen, in the southern mouth of the Sound. At 5 a.m. a Danish torpedo boat appeared by the island, and the officer gave the commander of E 13 twenty-four hours in which to get the boat refloated. At the same time a German destroyer arrived on the scene, and stayed close to the E-boat until two more Danish torpedo craft came up.

The enemy vessel then withdrew, but at nine o'clock in the morning two German destroyers steamed in from the south, and at a distance of 300 yards one of them fired a torpedo, which hit the bottom of the sea close to the stranded British boat and exploded. At the same time the enemy destroyer opened fire with all her guns and machine-guns. The helpless British crew was taken unawares. The E-boat was in Danish waters, with three Danish torpedo craft anchored close to her, and in her stranded condition she could not fight. Her men were cut down by shrapnel and machine-gun bullets while struggling in the water, and fifteen of them were killed before one of the Danish torpedo boats steamed between the submarine and the German destroyer and the Germans withdrew.

In the Baltic itself there was little more fighting before the winter set in. In November, during an attack on Libau, the German cruiser, Friedrich Karl, struck a mine about 30 m. from Memel, and a little later her successor as flagship, the Prinz Adelbert, went ashore in the same neighbourhood and was out of action for three months—a fate which also befell the cruiser Augsburg, which struck a mine east of Bornholm. No success at this time was placed to the credit of the British submarines E1 and E9, which were still in the Baltic, but they served a useful purpose in keeping the Germans on the move—a utility that may be measured by a remark made by Prince Henry of Prussia, "I consider the destruction of a Russian submarine will be a great success, but I regard the destruction of a British submarine as being at least as valuable as that of a Russian armoured cruiser."

SHOT DOWN

Once hit by a tracer bullet a kite balloon became a mass of flames floating earthwards. These two French soldiers are rescuing the observer's basket

Photo: Keystone

CHAPTER 46

SOUTH-WEST AFRICA

One of the interludes in the main struggle of the Great War was the conquest of the German colony of South-West Africa, a task accomplished by the forces of the Union commanded by Britain's former enemies Generals Botha and Smuts

THE colony of South-West Africa, acquired by the Germans in 1884, and artificially divided into amaraland in the north and Namaqua-nd in the south, extended over an rea of 320,000 square miles, roughly e size of Germany and Italy together. ossessing a western seaboard of about oo miles, it was bordered on the north y the Portuguese colony of Angola and n the east by the British protectorate f Bechuanaland; on the south the range river separates it, for the last hree or four hundred miles of its course o the sea, from the Cape Province.

The Germans had administered the ountry with efficiency but with harsh-ess. The latter quality had led in 1909 o an extensive rebellion of the Hereros, native tribe numbering some 85,000, nd this was only crushed after a bitter truggle. The colony thereafter enjoyed eace, but there remained a feeling of ntense antagonism in the minds of the Bantus, Hottentots, Bushmen, and other atives, who numbered about 200,000 against the 15,000 German settlers, and this was to make the task of defending the colony doubly difficult.

German efficiency, however, though it did not bring good relations between whites and natives, brought a large measure of prosperity. The two seaports, Lüderitz Bay in the south, and Swakopmund, half-way up the coast, were extensively developed—though the latter was rivalled by the neighbouring British settlement of Walvis Bay—and the colony had been given a railway system. From Swakopmund a line ran east via Karibib to the capital, Windhoek, which was situated almost in the centre of the country; thence it ran south via Gibeon to Keetmanshoop, about 150 miles north of the Orange river, and finally it proceeded due west, through Seeheim, to Lüderitz Bay, 200 miles distant. From Seeheim a branch line ran to Kalkfontein in the extreme south-east of the colony, and in the north a narrower gauge railway had been constructed north-east to Grootfontein, a centre of the copper mining industry.

Such was the country which, at the request of the British colonial secretary Mr. Lewis Harcourt, Louis Botha, the prime minister of the Union of South Africa, on behalf of the people of South Africa, agreed to attack at the outbreak of war. The home authorities offered a loan of £7,000,000, but no troops.

The German preparations for war were, as elsewhere, fairly complete. Colonel Francke, the German commander, had a nucleus of trained troops numbering 2,500. To this he was able to add a considerable number of men recruited from amongst the German colonists, many of whom, old soldiers who had served against the Hereros and had settled in the colony, needed little military training. But he dared not attempt to mobilize any African force, in view of the hostility with which the natives were filled. Throughout he had to rely upon his small white army, which numbered probably under 9,000. Yet, though small in numbers, this force, well equipped with rifles and machine-guns and field-guns, and including an extremely efficient camel corps, represented a formidable enemy.

In addition to these advantages Francke had two factors in his favour. The first was the nature of the country. The western seaboard and the eastern border consisted of almost impassable desert; there was everywhere a lack of water, and the country was not such that an invading army could live upon its produce as it passed through.

The second factor was the possibility of a revolt among the Boers. As an encouragement to them, Dr. Seitz, the governor of the colony, issued a manifesto on the outbreak of war, declaring that Germany made war "not on the Boer people as such, but on the English and their adherents." He hoped, therefore,

ROAD TO DOOM

From 1915 onwards Champagne was the scene of terrible fighting. Many of these French soldiers, on their way to St. Marie à Py, will help to swell the thousands of lives which were wasted in vain efforts to smash the German lines in this area

that friendly Boers would hold up the projected invasion, but in the meanwhile it was clearly impossible to defend the seaports, and accordingly, early in August, 1914, Swakopmund and Lüderitz Bay were abandoned and all works of naval importance were destroyed, their garrisons, with their stores, retiring to Windhoek.

In pursuance of their undertaking the South African Government sent a mixed force by sea under Brigadier-General Lukin to Port Nolloth, the first troops being disembarked on August 31, 1914. From Port Nolloth, which is some way south of the mouth of the Orange river, a railway ran east to Steinkopf. There a military force under Lieutenant-Colonel Maritz was stationed.

German skirmishing forces had, late in August, crossed the Orange river at various points, and early in September the South African forces received information that the Germans were about to occupy Raman's Drift, one of the two places where the river could be crossed, in force. To prevent this the 4th South African Rifles, under Colonel Dawson, made a forced march of 60 miles from Steinkopf, and on September 15 surprised and captured the German garrison. First blood had been drawn by the South Africans, and though a small force was captured by the Germans at Nakob on September 17, this was more than counterbalanced by the landing, without resistance, of a force under Colonel Beves at Lüderitz Bay on September 18. A further success was gained near Kolmanskuppe on September 27 by the Rand Light Infantry and the Imperial Light Horse, part of the Lüderitz Bay force, but on the previous two days the Germans had gained their first notable success when about 200 British troops under Colonel Crane were surprised and overwhelmed at Sandfontein, north of Raman's Drift.

Treachery was suspected as the cause of this disaster. Trouble had been brewing among a section of the Boer population, and the resignation of Beyers from his post as commander-in-chief, not made public until September 21, crystallized the growing opposition to Botha's policy. Its leaders, however, Beyers, De Wet, and Delarey, hesitated to take action, and the accidental shooting of Delarey, who, while driving in his car through Johannesburg, was mistaken for an escaping gangster, on

SOUP PARADE

Soup was one of the stock items in the rations of the French army and great attention was paid to its regular supply. Orderlies are carrying containers of soup to their regimental mess in a ruined village

Photos: G.P.A.

HELL'S KITCHEN

Smoke screens were used regularly in all theatres of war, both to mask an attack or to cover a retreat, but their dependence upon favourable winds limited their use. These two Germans, taking advantage of suitable wind direction, are tending special smoke-fires

eptember 15, upset their maturing lans. Botha, well aware of the danger f revolt, suspected the loyalty of Maritz, ho, in the war against the Hereros, had eld a commission in the German army, nd the disaster at Zandfontein tended o confirm his suspicions. Accordingly, e sent Colonel Brits to replace him. This action precipitated the rebellion. aritz refused to hand over his command. Major Bouwer, sent by Brits to effect the change, was made prisoner and then some days later sent back with an ultimatum in which Maritz threatened to invade the Union of South Africa unless the Government gave facilities for a meeting between him and Beyers, De Wet and the other opposition leaders. Bouwer reported in addition that Maritz had come to an agreement with the Germans, who were supplying him with ammunition, and that the loyal members of his force had been arrested and sent as prisoners over the border.

CUTTING AN EXIT

anes were generally left in the wire through which the defending oops could debouch before attacking. If there were no lanes, paths ad to be cut, and this German is busy with his shears while his comrades wait to move forward

Botha at once proclaimed martial law. The Union forces acted promptly, and between September 15 and 30 the Imperial Light Horse, under Brits, collaborating with a commando raised by Colonel Van Deventer, defeated Maritz in a series of engagements culminating in the break-up of the latter's force at Schuit Drift. With Maritz's collapse the chief danger of German intervention vanished.

De Wet in the Orange Free State and Beyers in the Transvaal had been unprepared for Maritz's precipitate action, and it was not till September 23–24 that they raised their standards of revolt. Between them they collected a force of about 10,000 men, but they had totally underestimated the strength of loyalist feeling in the Union. Within a few weeks Botha, ably assisted by Jan C. Smuts, was at the head of a force of 40,000. Its nucleus was provided by the troops recalled from Lüderitz Bay, but the great majority were volunteers, many of them of Boer extraction.

Beyers was defeated in the Transvaal on October 28 at Rustenburg, and after a second decisive defeat at Gruis Drift, in the Orange Free State, on November 7, his force was completely broken up. De Wet gained a small initial success at Winburg on November 7, but five days later his force was scattered at Mushroom Valley, 18 miles distant. De Wet

Photos: G.P.A.

BOLTS FOR THE BLUE

Defence against aeroplanes became a vital necessity on the Western front, and important positions, such as ammunition dumps, were always protected by well-placed anti-aircraft guns. These two German gun sections have been speeding unwelcome visitors on their way

IN ENEMY SERVICE

Tanks in danger of capture were generally totally disabled by their crews, but nevertheless, a number of them passed undamaged into German hands. This captured British tank has been pressed into service against its late owners

himself escaped and endeavoured to reach the shelter of German South-West Africa, but on December 1 he was captured while making for the Kalahari desert. Beyers, in the north of the Orange Free State, survived a week longer, but, having been defeated at Bothaville on December 7, was pursued and lost his life by drowning while trying to swim his horse across the Vaal river on December 9. His death marked the final collapse of the rebellion, the remaining rebels being surrounded and captured within a few days. The Government acted with clemency, only one rebel being put to death.

The outbreak of the rebellion had caused the postponement of the invasion of German South-West Africa, but after its collapse Botha was free to mature his plans. On Christmas Day a body of South African troops, under Colonel Skinner, re-occupied Walvis Bay, which had been in the possession of the Germans since the beginning of the War. On December 31 the Union Government announced that they proposed to commandeer men for the coming campaign, for, as their communiqué said :

> In view of the danger of invasion, it will be necessary to employ much larger forces than at first intended, in order to destroy the enemy and rebel forces, so that they may never again menace the peace of South Africa.

On January 14, 1915, Swakopmund was occupied, and was found deserted, but undamaged. The Germans, however, had sown the place with mines, and before these had been discovered and removed two troopers of the Imperial Light Horse had been blown to bits. Lüderitz Bay was likewise taken and the two German ports were in Botha's hands, but there were other entrances into South-West Africa, and these, too, had to be secured. The Orange is crossed at two main drifts—Schuit Drift and Raman's Drift—and the latter of these had been seized by the South Africans during the rebellion. In January, also, an attack was made on Schuit Drift, which was seized.



Photos. G.P.A.

CATERPILLAR EXPRESS

The evolution of the tractor during the war was both varied and rapid, and an immense number of types, each adapted to different conditions, served the contending armies. This German model was particularly useful for field work

Early in February the four principal gates into the German colony were held by the Union forces, and Botha could press forward. The plan proposed was an enveloping advance on Windhoek from the coast and from the south, the railways to be taken on the way. For this purpose the Union forces were divided into two armies, called the northern and the southern. The former, commanded by Botha himself, was to assemble at Swakopmund, and march along the railway to the German capital.

The southern army, that was under General Smuts, was entrusted with a more complicated task. For the first part of this it was divided into three columns. One, under Sir Duncan Mackenzie, was to advance inland from Lüderitz Bay, while another, under Colonel Van Deventer, was to move across the Orange and along the railway leading from Kalkfontein. The third column, under Colonel Berrange, was to start from Kimberley, and, after crossing the Kalahari Desert, was to clear the enemy from the south-eastern section of the colony. In the neighbourhood of Keetmanshoop the three were to unite, and Smuts was to lead them northwards to join Botha.

During the period when this circle of steel was being drawn around the Germans they made one effort to break through. At Kakamas, on the Orange, a British garrison stationed there to

TANK TRAP

The Germans never overcame their fear of the tank, nor ceased their efforts to evolve an effective defence against it. These soldiers are busily constructing what will prove, it is hoped, an impregnable barrier to the dreaded machine

Photo: G.P.A.

FOLLOWING THE FLAMES

Flame-throwers, perhaps the most horrible of all weapons, were used primarily in defence on account of their short range. Attacking infantry, however, often carried them for use at close quarters, and this German assault is being led by a flame-thrower unit

protect Schuit Drift was suddenly attacked by about six hundred Germans on February 5. At eight o'clock in the morning big guns and Maxims opened fire upon the station, but the defenders were ready, and in a short time the assailants were beaten off. The casualties were slight. On hearing of the engagement, Colonel van Deventer marched out from Upington to cut off the retreat.

Swakopmund had been a very busy place since its occupation by the British. Men and stores were landed there in considerable quantities, and a railway line, protected by blockhouses and sea walls, was built along the few miles of coast which separate the port from Walvis Bay. Early in February Botha left Cape Town to take over the direction of operations, and on his way he called at Lüderitz Bay, near where Sir Duncan Mackenzie's men had been encamped for some time past.

On February 12 Botha reached Swakopmund, and on the 22nd his army moved out. On the 23rd Nonidas and Goanikonites, two stations on the line to Windhoek, were occupied without serious fighting. Nearly a month was then spent in preparing an advanced base. Botha was ready for another advance on March 10. Two brigades of mounted men left Husab, he himself accompanying the first, which was commanded by Colonel Brits. Its object was to attack Riet, an important place south of the railway, which commands the high road to Windhoek, where the enemy was known to be in strength; and to complete its work, the Bloemhof commando was ordered to move its flank, to seize the dominating height of Schwarze Kopje, and to cut off the German retreat.

The brigade came in front of the German position, which was a strong one, at daybreak on the 20th. Its right rested on the Swakop and its left on the foothills of the Langer Heinrichberg, while its guns commanded both the main road and the river. A frontal attack was necessary, but the South Africans advanced without flinching, their progress being assisted by the guns of the Transvaal horse artillery. At length they reached the German lines, and after a sharp engagement the enemy was driven out in disorder. Unfortunately the Bloemhof commando failed to reach its allotted place, and so the retreat was unhindered. Snipers did good work in preventing the Germans from destroying the water-holes.

The second mounted brigade, meanwhile, was carrying out its part of the programme, which was to seize an important section of the line running to Windhoek. For this purpose it was divided into two columns. One, under Colonel Celliers, cut the line between Jakalswater and Sphinx, and seized a train full of supplies, and then attacked Jakalswater itself. There, however, the German position was strong, and the assault failed; but it served the secondary purpose of preventing the enemy from sending assistance to other parts of the field. Forty-three prisoners were taken by the Germans. The second division of this brigade, led by Colonel Alberts, marched against Pforte, another station on the line, where the Germans had taken up a position. An encircling movement was carried out successfully, and the position was surrounded.

For the next five or six weeks Botha was busy clearing the railway system of the enemy. Two main lines ran from Swakopmund, the northern to Grootfontein, Tsumeb, in the north of the colony, and the southern to Windhoek. The main line of advance for the Union force was along the second of these, but to prevent any attack on its flank

Photo: Imperial War Museum

ENTER THE CONQUEROR

Rumania paid dearly for her support of the Allies. Within just over three months of her declaration of war, Bukarest had fallen. Field-Marshal von Mackensen, the German General, is here seen making his triumphant entry into the Rumanian capital

PIT PARTIES

Conditions of open warfare prevailed on the Russian front long after the lines in the West were entrenched, and defensive positions were often slight and temporary. These German storm troops are holding a line of shallow pits before a further advance

Photo: G.P.A.



Photos: Topical

IN THE TOILS

Barbed wire was the last, but by no means the least, of the terrors that confronted attacking troops. These men of the Wiltshire regiment, having braved the perils of No Man's Land, are forcing their way through largely uncut wire

it was necessary also to hold the other. For fifty miles this was secured, and to guard it the Kimberley regiment was stationed at Trekkopje, then the railhead of the Union advance.

While Botha had been making this satisfactory progress in the north, the southern army had not been idle. The column commanded by Sir Duncan Mackenzie cleared the Germans and took some stores from one or two places in the neighbourhood of Lüderitz Bay, and then without difficulty seized a substantial stretch of the railway line. On February 22 the advanced guard was at Garub, a station 70 miles inland, which was occupied without opposition. Having reached Garub, Mackenzie had the worst of his march behind him.

Some 15 miles beyond Garub is Aus, the principal resting-place for the caravans journeying from north to south, and in searching the country between the two places the Union forces had a stiff task. The difficulties were not lightened by the action of the Germans, who had filled up the bore-holes and poisoned some of the wells. Towards the end of March they blew up the railway and prepared to evacuate Aus. The position was naturally strong, and the Germans had added considerably to its defences. Mines had been laid, trenches dug, and the passes through the hills fortified, but everything was abandoned without a struggle. This was partly due to the skill of the advancing force. On the night of March 30 a body of mounted infantry marched silently out, and in the morning was in possession of two of the important passes giving access to Aus. The British entered the place on the following day without many casualties.

The southern column, under Colonel Van Deventer, was equally successful. Safely across the Orange at Schuit Drift, he swept over a wide district in the south-east of the colony, occupied a group of stations, including Ukamas, Nabas, Jerusalem, Vellor, and Heirachabis, and before the end of March had seized two or three German camps.

On March 30 Colonel Van Deventer reached Warmbad, a little town 25 miles from the frontier, and occupied it. From there he pushed along the line so rapidly that two days later

HANDS UP!

Thiepval, three miles north of Albert, was the centre of terrible fighting during the Somme offensive. Numbers of Germans were captured in this neighbourhood, and here a batch of them are passing down a trench with their guards

Photo: L.N.A.

WIRE WORK

Gun-fire was repeatedly demolishing the wire defences of the front lines and steady replacement was necessary. Barriers such as the wooden trestles which these British soldiers are wiring were prepared in great numbers behind the lines to fill gaps

s men entered Kanus, a station sixty-ve miles to the north.

Van Deventer established his head-uarters at Kalkfontein, a station some venty-five miles north of Warmbad, nd here on April 11 he was joined by nuts. The task immediately before nem was that of driving the Germans om the slopes of the Karas Mountains. he plan adopted was to advance in three columns. Deventer himself marched near the railway and to the west of the mountains, while a second detachment moved to the east of them; somewhat in the rear and acting as a reserve was a third column, which took the road through the hills. The manoeuvre was completely successful. Threatened on all sides, the enemy withdrew, and the region passed entirely into the hands of the South Africans. On April 18 a mounted brigade, under Colonel Villiers, occupied Seeheim, the place where the line from Kalkfontein joins the railway from Lüderitz Bay.

Deventer's column was by this time in touch with Colonel Berrange's force, which, it will be remembered, had set out from Kimberley. British Bechuanaland had been crossed without hindrance, and in March the enemy was first sighted near the border. At Hasuur, fifteen miles north-west of Rietfontein, on April 1, Berrange captured an entrenched position, and from there he fought his way steadily westward to the town of Keetmanshoop.

Keetmanshoop, the business capital of German Namaqualand and the eastern terminus of the railway line, nearly two hundred miles from the coast, was now surrounded. On April 19 the Germans quietly vacated it, having first rendered the telegraph and telephone wires useless, and on the 20th it was occupied by the British.

The next step was for Smuts to concentrate his whole force, but first it was necessary for Sir Duncan Mackenzie's column, which had reached Aus, to join the others. This junction was effected during May. From Aus there was no need for Sir Duncan to keep to the railway line, for it was already cleared of the enemy; and so, with his mounted men, he struck out to the north-east. The towns of Bethany and Beersheba were occupied, and the railway line was reached on April 24 at Aritetis, a station seventy miles north of Keetmanshoop. Once on the railway line Mackenzie

'SOUND AN ALARM'

ells, gongs, and particularly Klaxon horns, the steady noise of which uld penetrate the intermittent crash of shells, were used to signal gas attack. Whenever the wind was in a quarter favourable to the enemy, the alarm, as here, was manned by a sentry

Photo: Imperial War Museum

ALL TOGETHER BOYS

Stranded lorries were common sights along the shell-torn roads behind the lines, and passing infantry were often called on for help. These Canadians on Vimy Ridge, having carefully removed this lorry's load, are lending a willing hand in shoving it out of a pot-hole caused by a shell explosion

Photo: 'Canadian Records'

began to act in conjunction with Deventer against the enemy retreating from Seeheim and Keetmanshoop. On the 22nd part of Deventer's pursuing force had come up with the Germans at Kabus, 20 miles to the north, where an indecisive engagement had taken place. The Germans, about 600 strong, beat off the attack and continued their retreat. The Union force lost 22 men taken prisoners.

Mackenzie learned that the Germans who had fought at Kabus were taking train at Gibeon, a station forty miles to the north of Keetmanshoop, and at once he decided upon his method of attack. His whole force approached within two miles of Gibeon, and a small party was dispatched to destroy the railway to the north of that place. One brigade, the 9th, was sent forward to engage the enemy, but it was unequal to the task before it, and, having suffered severe loss and left seventy prisoners in the hands of the enemy, it fell back upon the main body. This skirmish took place during the night of April 27, and on the following morning Mackenzie attacked the Germans.

The battle of Gibeon was soon over. The Germans were driven from the field and pursued for about twenty miles, only the rocky and difficult nature of the ground preventing the destruction of the whole force. As it was, the seventy prisoners captured the previous day were rescued, and seven officers and two hundred men were captured, as well as two field-guns and several Maxims. In addition, the cutting of the railway line delivered into the hands of the victors a train, a number of transport wagons, and a quantity of live-stock, under the circumstances a most valuable acquisition.

Botha was faring well in the north. After the fighting around Jakalswater on March 20 the northern army halted in order to organize its supplies, and it was not until May 1 that Kubas, thirty miles nearer Windhoek, was occupied by Colonel Brits. It was hastily evacuated by the Germans, and around it miles of entrenchments were found, and over 100 contact mines discovered and removed. Botha dispatched a small force under General Myburgh, who was ordered to sweep round to the south and envelop Karibib. He struck at Otjimbingwe, which is only 60 miles from the capital, and a skirmish there resulted in the capture of twenty-eight prisoners. On May 5, as the result of this operation, the important railway junction of Karibib was reached and occupied, whence a march of 20 miles took the army to Johann Albrechtshöhe, and a further ten to Wilhelmstal.

Windhoek was now almost in sight, as the van of the army under Myburgh was rapidly approaching it. On May 10 Botha, who was then at Karibib, was informed by telephone that the place was prepared to surrender. With a small escort he set out at once in his motor-car, and on reaching the capital on the following day he was met by the burgomaster, with whom the terms of capitulation were arranged. On the 12th a detachment of the Union forces under Myburgh formally entered the town. Botha took up his station before the courthouse, from the steps of which a proclamation was read.

Before the arrival of the British the German troops had withdrawn to Grootfontein, which, it was stated, was now their capital. However, some 3,000 Europeans, mostly women and children, remained in Windhoek, and with them were 12,000 natives. The valuable high-power wireless station, situated about a mile from the town, was found intact, and a quantity of rolling-stock also fell

Photos: 'Canadian Records'

FATHER CHRISTMAS—

Good spirits amongst the British troops at the front were as unfailing as they were, in the circumstances, remarkable. The inscription chalked by this Canadian on his howitzer is more grim than seasonable, but it is clear he has amused his comrades

—AND HIS PRESENTS

Fritz will hardly appreciate these Christmas gifts, but this Canadian joker is seemingly unperturbed by the reflection that they may be returned with interest. The Canadians earned a reputation for their determination both in fighting and joking

MAKING A LONG NOSE

The final order to attack frequently set a welcome end to a period of almost unbearable strain for the assaulting troops. One at least of these Canadians climbing from their trench for their advance into No Man's Land is challenging the enemy in no uncertain manner

Photo: Topical

into the hands of the British. The government of the capital was entrusted to Colonel Mentz.

By now the major operations were over. These had been carried out with a maximum of skill and a minimum of loss. Water was always scarce, often very scarce, as may be inferred from this quotation from a divisional order: "It has been observed that water is being used for washing purposes. This practice must cease immediately." The dust storms and heat were very trying. As one soldier said: "Every day we have awful dust storms lasting for hours, and the shade temperature always over 100 degrees." Sometimes tents were blown to ribbons, and the sand came along at times like sleet.

As already stated, near Aus Sir Duncan Mackenzie found the wells of drinking water had been poisoned, the only extenuating circumstances being that warning notices had been affixed to them. At Swakopmund, in January, the British on seizing the town discovered that six wells had been poisoned by means of arsenical cattle dip. On his arrival Botha took up the matter, and on February 23 he wrote to Colonel Francke, the German commander, drawing his attention to the fact that such an act was contrary to Article No. 23 (*a*) of The Hague Convention, and informing him that, if the practice was persisted in, he would hold the officers concerned responsible and he would be reluctantly compelled to employ such measures of reprisal as might seem advisable. In reply, Francke defended the action.

In May the position of the Germans in the colony was quite hopeless. With the fall of Windhoek, the whole of the country south of the capital had been lost to them, and they had been driven into the difficult country to the north, where they were cut off from their supplies and surrounded by hostile natives. Although Francke had a force that was still well equipped, it was hopelessly outnumbered. Under these circumstances Dr. Seitz, the governor,

QUALITY OF MERCY

A fine humanity and superhuman courage characterized the work of the ambulance men in all the armies. This wounded captured Tommy has had his wounds skilfully dressed by these German orderlies, while his more fortunate comrade watches solicitously

Photo: G.P.A.

Photo: L.N.A

STRANGE SHELTER

Temporarily disabled, this monster tank has lurched on to its side down a bank by the side of a railway. These men of the Manchester regiment, lying in comparative safety in its lee, are taking full advantage of the welcome and unexpected shelter it affords

commenced negotiating with Botha for terms of surrender. A conference was held at Giftkuppe on May 21, but as Botha demanded only unconditional surrender, this was refused.

Botha began operations for completing his work without delay. One column marched along the railway towards Grootfontein, while others swept the country to the south-east of it. A few days after the occupation of the capital Colonel Mentz came up with a party of Germans at Seeis, thirty-seven miles to the east, and there, without loss, he took 152 prisoners and several wagons full of provisions, guns and ammunition.

DEATH MOST SUDDEN

Tanks were impervious to rifle and machine-gun fire; but although they were poor targets for artillery, they stood no chance against high explosives. This tank has been literally blown to bits by a direct hit. In the foreground lie some of the supporting infantry

Photo: G.P.A.

About the same time General Manie Botha had a skirmish with the enemy about fifteen miles from Wilhelmstal, and a mounted brigade had one somewhat farther to the east. Meanwhile, on the railway line Botha occupied the station of Omaruru, about 80 miles from Windhoek, and a day or two later he was in possession of Kalkfeld, 40 miles farther north. This place had been entrenched and prepared for resistance, but as a result of flanking movements the Germans abandoned it. On June 26 Otjiwarongo, a station on the railway, and Okanjande, a town eight miles to the south, were occupied, while wide encircling movements gave possession of the district around Waterberg.

At Otavi, some fifty miles beyond Otjiwarongo, the railway line forks, one branch going to Grootfontein and the other to Tsumeb. Near Otavi are extensive deposits of copper, and as soon as the Union forces were securely planted at Okaputu and Omarasa, two intermediate stations, they made a dash for the railway junction at Otavi. At 6.30 on the evening of June 30 Manie Botha, with the 5th brigade, left Okaputu, and at dawn on the following morning his scouts came into touch with the enemy. Later in the day a general action developed near Osib, and before nightfall Otavi was occupied. At this place there was a good supply of water, and so arid was the

Photo: Canadian Records

'UP SHE RISES'

Tanks were constantly being tried out behind the lines in France, and numerous experiments were made to test their capabilities. These Canadians have joyfully obeyed the order to act as a test load on this tank as it climbs out of a sunken road

ON TOW

Mechanical transport alone made possible the speedy conveyance of some of the enormous weapons of destruction to which the War gave birth. This small but powerful tractor is easily pulling a heavy gun which would otherwise require a quite unwieldy team of horses

Photo: Imperial War Museum

neighbourhood that the possession of this town practically meant the possession of the surrounding country.

From Omarasa, five miles south of Okaputu, another mounted brigade—the 6th—led by General Lukin, had set out at the same time as the 5th, and between the two came General Botha with the headquarters staff. Unlike Manie Botha, Lukin did not have to fight, and this skirmish near Otavi was the last real stand made by the Germans.

To the west of the line to Tsumeb two columns were sweeping through the country. At Asis Myburgh had left the railway, and at Gaub, sixteen miles south of Tsumeb, he had met a body of Germans. What followed can scarcely be called a fight, for with only one man killed Myburg took 86 prisoners, and on July 8 marched right into Tsumeb, where 500 or 600 more surrendered. He also captured some field-guns, and released a number of South Africans who had been captured. Brits was moving in a still bigger arc. On June 30 he left Otjistasu, five miles west of Otjiwarongo, and, passing through Outjo and Okakeua, he reached the German port of Namutoni. There he took 150 German prisoners, seized their supplies and, like Myburgh, liberated a number of prisoners. It was then officially stated that all the Union prisoners in German hands had been released.

Dr. Seitz was soon in communication again with General Botha about a surrender. Botha presented his terms in the form of an ultimatum, and on the stroke of time the terms were accepted, and at two o'clock on the morning of July 9, at a spot described as Kilometre 500, on the railway between Otavi and Khorab, the conditions of the capitulation were signed by Botha, Seitz and Francke. All the Germans surrendered unconditionally.

The terms of surrender provided that the officers should be released upon parole, and the men interned. Reservists were allowed, upon surrendering their arms and signing a form of parole, to return to their homes and their civil occupations. Civil officials were allowed to retain their homes, but not, of course, their positions. Government property and all warlike stores became the property of the Union.

The details of the surrender were supervised by Brigadier-General H. T. Lukin, and a revised estimate of the number of prisoners gave it as 204 officers and 3,293 other ranks, of whom rather less than half were regulars; 37 field-guns and 22 machine-guns were given up at this time. The formal surrender took place at Otavi, where the prisoners began to arrive on July 11. Several of them were wearing a cross, not of iron, but of black cloth edged with white cord, this being apparently the nearest approach they could get to the decoration so dear to the Kaiser's heart. They stated that their provisions were almost at an end. Of the victorious troops two brigades remained with Lukin to look after the prisoners, arrangements were made for the others to return to the Union.

At a cost of 1,769 casualties—less than many a single day's loss suffered by British armies in Flanders—General Botha had captured a territory over 300,000 square miles in extent, and had brought 15,000 whites and 200,000 natives under the rule of the British Empire. Before the surrender the damage done to the 1,400 miles of railway had been made good, and a regular service of trains was running. Moreover, the line from Upington in Cape Colony was in June extended to Kalkfontein, thus linking up the Union system with the German one.

The casualties includes those incurred during the rebellion in South Africa in 1914. The number of deaths was only 427, while 782 were prisoners of war, of whom 31 were officers.

The Germans suffered even less, and, although no accurate figures are available, not more than 150 were killed and 200 wounded.

Photo: Topical

THE KING-EMPEROR

During the War His Majesty was a frequent visitor to France and Belgium, where his presence did much to encourage the troops. He took a keen interest in the course of the War, and is here seen inspecting a recently captured German trench

NOT THEIR PROPER TASK

Cavalry played an important rôle at Mons and during the retreat, but the development of trench warfare on the Western Front later paralysed their activities. In the Somme battles they fought only one cavalry action, acting, dismounted, on other occasions as infantry in the line. They are here seen on the march near Hardecourt Wood in September, 1916

Photo: Imperial War Museum

CHAPTER 47

FRENCH FRONT IN 1915

Between the two offensives in Champagne, which are dealt with in separate chapters, there was a good deal of fighting, especially in Artois, during the year 1915, along the long front that extended from near Lille to the Swiss frontier

DURING the whole of 1915 the French carried on, simultaneously with their main offensives, in Champagne and Artois, a series of subsidiary operations of local importance, from the Argonne to Altkirch.

Ever since the autumn of 1914 the Germans had repeatedly harassed the French by a series of attacks in the wooded heights separating the valley of the Aisne from that of the Aire, doubtless with the object of forcing their enemy south of the railway line which runs from Verdun to Châlons via Sainte-Menehould. Once in their hands, this railway would facilitate communication between their army in Champagne and that in the Meuse. They had captured, in September, 1914, Vauquois, a village three miles south-east of Varennes, in the Argonne. Situated at the northern extremity of the high land running between the river Aire and its tributary, the Branthe, it was by its position an unrivalled observation post, and the Germans turned it into an almost impregnable fortress.

Such a thorn did it prove in the side of the French troops that in February, 1915, General Sarrail decided that Vauquois must at all costs be recaptured, and a preliminary attack for the purpose of reconnaissance took place on February 17. On February 28 the main attack was launched. After a violent artillery bombardment, which laid the village in ruins, the French advanced slowly, every yard being sharply contested, until they were driven back by a strong counter-attack. At three o'clock in the afternoon a further assault was successful in occupying the southern part of the village, but with the arrival of further reinforcements from Cheppy the French were again driven back.

On March 1 the attack was renewed with a greater number of troops, and at 2.35 p.m. the assaulting regiments entered the village, from which four successive counter-attacks failed to dislodge them. Further fighting took place until March 5, when the Germans, after a final counter-attack, left the village in the hands of the French.

During the early part of 1915 an attempt was made to reduce the salient at St. Mihiel, which ever since September, 1914, had caused much anxiety, and into which at this time the German forces from Metz had driven a wedge between Verdun and Toul, its apex reaching across the Meuse at St. Mihiel. This spearhead was strongly held by reason of the German occupation of the fort of the Camp des Romains, just south of St. Mihiel, and the guns of which commanded the surrounding country. The German objective had been to drive in a similar wedge from the Argonne forest, and thus, the two apexes meeting, Verdun would be encircled, but the crown prince found himself powerless to complete the loop around the French citadel. Had he done so, the breaking of the eastern line of fortresses would have brought the Germans round the eastern flank of the Allied armies and compelled those armies to withdraw in haste south of Paris.

The advance from the Marne, when the crown prince's army was thrown back by the French forces under General Gouraud and General Sarrail, caused the breakdown of the German plan, designed by Moltke and the German staff long before the outbreak of hostilities. When the retreating Germans, in the middle of September, 1914, made a firm stand along the Aisne and the Suippes rivers, all that remained of the main German plan of attack was the wedge driven through the heights of the Meuse by the army of Metz.

Early in 1915 Joffre decided that an attempt would have to be made to reduce the St. Mihiel salient, the



Map of the region around the French line, which in 1915 extended from near Lille in the north to the Swiss frontier in the south. Near Reims it turned east to pass in front of Verdun, and then by Toul and Belfort to its end, some 400 miles in all



Photos: Humphrey Joel

IN SAFE WATERS

Submarine commanders were ordered, when practicable, to manoeuvre on the surface, thus conserving their oxygen supplies and their electric batteries. Scapa Flow, the principal base for the Grand Fleet, provided waters of almost complete safety

continued existence of which constituted a permanent source of danger to Verdun. Between Verdun and Metz, bounded by the Moselle and the Meuse, runs a vast plateau, seamed with watercourses, forming ponds and lakes of considerable size. There are also many patches of woodland amid the moist and fertile farm-lands of the Woevre. as the flattish upland between the Meuse and the Moselle is called.

Westward, above the sunken Meuse, is the line of hills known as the heights of the Meuse, on which lie isolated fortresses connecting Verdun and Toul. Then, running in a north-easterly direction along the highway from Commercy, through Pont-à-Mousson, are more hills, the most important of which, in the circumstances of the war, was the wooded height known as the Bois-le-Prêtre. The German wedge rested chiefly on the marshy ground between the heights of the Meuse and the hills connecting with the Bois-le-Prêtre.

From Metz a railway ran to Thiaucourt, and from there the Germans had laid down a track passing through the village of Vigneulles along to St. Mihiel. North of Vigneulles was the ridge of Les Eparges, the eastern termination of the heights of the Meuse, and to the south lay high ground along which was situated the main road from Pont-à-Mousson to Commercy. By means of the new railway connexion a large number of very heavy howitzers was brought up to the heights around St. Mihiel, and the entire plain of the Woevre was transformed with remarkable speed into a fortress of earthworks, wire entanglements, machine-gun redoubts, and artillery pits, garrisoned by the larger part of the army of Metz. The Woevre thus became a grand extension of the entrenched camp of Metz. It was both the barbican of the Lorraine fortress and the gate by which half a million or more German soldiers could be sent forward.

The French could not attack the salient at its apex on account of the strong defence afforded to the Germans by the fort of the Camp des Romains. Their only hope was that, pressing upon the sides of the salient, they might so squeeze it together that, held in the grip of their pincers, they could threaten the German communications with St. Mihiel.

The key positions on either side of the salient from which this pressure could be exercised were, on the west the

HAULED OUT OF ACTION

A naval gun's working life is extremely short, for the expulsion of the shell rapidly destroys the rifling in the barrel, necessitating constant replacement. This 6-inch gun, part of the armament of the Queen Elizabeth, is being hoisted on to the lighter for overhaul and repair

Photos: Humphrey Joel

SEA, SMOKE AND SKY

The use of smoke as a screen for attack or defence was developed to a fine art in the War, and particularly at sea, where fast-moving destroyers were excellent instruments for its diffusion. Here is one putting up a screen in the North Sea

hill of Les Eparges, and on the east Bois-le-Prêtre. The possession of Les Eparges, which dominated the northern part of the salient, was of vital importance in any attack upon Vigneulles. It had fallen into the hands of the Germans in September, 1914, and they had made it almost invulnerable.

The heights of Les Eparges extend about a mile from end to end, and at each extremity the Germans had constructed a large bastioned redoubt. On February 17, 1915, the French attack began with the explosion of mines under the western bastion, after which progress was painfully slow and bought only at the price of heavy casualties after four days of incessant counter-attacks. Further attempts upon the summit on March 17 and March 27 brought the French gradually nearer the crest. On March 27 a single battalion of Chasseurs charged from the conquered trenches towards the summit, and though the colonel and all the company commanders were wounded, a new point of vantage had been secured from which to prepare for the final attack on the crest.

On the afternoon of April 5 a final bid was made for the summit. After heavy rains the hillside was a morass, and though considerable ground was won after a furious hand-to-hand struggle throughout the night, a strong counter-attack at dawn compelled the French battalions to retire. Yet again, as soon as night fell, the French infantry charged forward into the trench on the east of the summit, and also climbed up some way on the west. They fought all night, winning another five hundred yards.

Although slow, the progress of the French troops was in the circumstances worthy of great praise, for the Germans, in addition to having the advantage of position, were able, by means of a tunnel they had driven through the mountain of clay from the village of Combres to their defences near the summit, to bring up reinforcements quickly and without interference from the French batteries. For three days and nights, on clay soil that had become a quagmire into which men sank up to their thighs, the French troops, wet through, remorselessly bombarded by the heavy batteries in the Woevre, their mud-clogged rifles useless, stabbed and bombed their way to the top of the hill.

The German commander, in an endeavour to carry out his plan of

PERILOUS SEAS

The waters of the North Sea, sown with mines and infested with submarines, were perilous indeed. Here the Orion is patrolling in the wake of the Queen Elizabeth, to whose gun turret is attached a Carley float, a rapidly launched life saving device



holding Les Eparges at any cost, sent out his last supports by the tunnel from Combres village; but as the troops debouched from the other side of the tunnel, the French howitzers caught them with shrapnel fire. Every man was swept away before he could reach the trenches held by the French infantry.

At length, on the morning of April 9, the exhausted men tenaciously holding the portion of the ridge they had so gallantly conquered were relieved by fresh troops, who, on account of the inclement weather and the appalling state of the ground, had taken no less than fourteen hours to arrive. A final attack began at three o'clock in the afternoon upon the little triangle of ground at the eastern extremity of the ridge, which was all that remained in the hands of the enemy. In fog and rain the fresh troops charged forward, and after a hand-to-hand struggle which lasted for seven hours, by 10.0. p.m. the spur of Les Eparges was completely won. Over fifty thousand men fell on this single hill-side in the course of the repeated attacks. In the eyes of the French historian, General Palat, the advantages that accrued from the captured position were far from commensurate with the tremendous sacrifice involved.

Other attacks upon the salient proceeded at about the same time. An offensive begun in April in the Bois d'Ailly, two miles south of St. Mihiel, continued until May, and after a successful beginning petered out without any decisive result. Another, at Bois-le-Prêtre, near Pont-à-Mousson, led to nothing but futile loss of life.

To sum up, the French efforts during the spring of 1915 to reduce the St. Mihiel salient were, in spite of a few local successes, abortive, both on account of insufficient preparation and because they were carried out during the most unpropitious season of the year. The French command still pinned its faith upon their "seventy-fives," and had not yet realized the vital importance of more heavy artillery. An eminent French writer, M. Victor Margueritte, has described in his book "*Au Bord du Gouffre*" how, at a meeting at the Elysée on March 21, 1915, the question of heavy artillery was placed before General Joffre. The commander-in-chief argued that it would need at least six months for the army to be supplied with heavy artillery, and when someone present ventured to speak of the next winter's campaign, Joffre retorted with indignation: "But, my dear sir, the War will be over by October."

Meanwhile further local actions had taken place in Haute-Alsace. At the close of 1914 the army of Lorraine was strongly entrenched on the east bank of the river Meuse. Its left wing occupied Bois-le-Prêtre, just beyond Pont-à-Mousson. The line, passing to the east of Nancy and Lunéville, reached the Vosges at the Col de Donon and then proceeded south till its right wing rested some five miles west of Altkirch. Here, in the difficult mountainous country of the Vosges, fighting was incessant—not the trench warfare of Flanders and Champagne, but sporadic combats along the frozen hill-sides, a form of action in which the Chasseurs Alpins excelled.

The French right-wing movement through Alsace and Lorraine, attempted during the first month of the War, had been checked by the Germans at the battle of Morhange. During the spring of 1915 an attempt was made to continue the invasion of Alsace-Lorraine, and the opening months of the year saw a continuous struggle for the possession of the mountain of Hartmannsweilerkopf, north-east of the town of Thann, the summit of which dominated the plain of Alsace from a height of nearly 2,000 feet.

The crest had been captured by the Germans on January 21, 1915, but throughout the winter the French still held the western slopes. On Feb. 25 an attack was made for reconnaissance purposes, and on March 26 a vigorous assault by the Chasseurs Alpins won the summit and part of the eastern slope. Counter-attacks continued without respite during the ensuing weeks, and on April 26 the German communiqué announced that the crest was once more in their hands and that they had captured 750 prisoners and a quantity of machine-guns. So elevated a position could not fail to be the object of continued struggle. Attack and counter-attack succeeded each other with monotonous regularity right through the year.

During the month of April, 1915, an offensive against the important railhead of Colmar took place along the valley of the Fecht, and by April 17 the French had carried the ridge overlooking Metzeral. After a month of continuous fighting the town itself fell into their hands on June 22.

The attack then developed farther north at the line of hills a few miles east of St. Dié, known as the Ban de Sapt. There the Bavarians had entrenched after their victory at Morhange in August, 1914. The struggle for the mastery of this menacing position developed into a war between the rival sappers. After much mining and countermining the French eventually cleared the Ban de Sapt and the way lay open for a further advance over the Vosges towards Strasbourg by the army of Epinal. Meanwhile the army based on Toul and Nancy, by its fierce attacks in the wooded region around the Grand Couronné de Nancy, was endeavouring to prepare the way for the old plan, frustrated by the battle of Morhange in 1914, of an advance through Lorraine.

From the middle of April, 1915, General Joffre meditated an assault in Artois, hoping to pierce the enemy line, capture Vimy Ridge, overlooking the plain of Douai, and from there, if successful, to continue his advance towards Cambrai. The attack was to be made by the French armies in the direction of Lens, whilst the British troops were to thrust towards Lille. The French offensive was commanded by Foch, whose group of armies consisted of the 10th under D'Urbal and the 8th under Maud'huy.

Ever since the end of 1914 there had been constant activity in the sector north of Arras, and though unfavourable weather and the state of the ground made major operations impossible, local actions were continuous throughout the spring of 1915. On April 6 instructions were received concerning the projected offensive in Artois. "In view of assuring a liaison with the English right wing," the order ran, "and of supporting and strengthening it, we must reckon upon and prepare for an offensive action on the left of the 10th Army which should be executed simultaneously with the main attack, with the object of strengthening the British offensive at La Bassée, first by artillery support and finally with all arms, in the direction of Lens and Pont-à-Vendin."

On April 19 the army corps concerned received further instructions concerning the attack, and were granted ten days in which to carry out all preliminary preparations; but three days later the first German gas attack took place in Flanders. To cope with eventualities the 153rd division of the 20th corps and two corps groups from the 9th corps were taken from D'Urbal's army and sent north. On the 24th the 152nd division and three more groups from the 9th corps were entrained for Flanders, followed by the 18th division. This unforeseen contingency seriously interfered with the preparations for the Artois offensive.

On April 30 General D'Urbal submitted to Foch his plan of attack. May 3, 4 and 5 were to be devoted to artillery range-finding and to the destruction of specified localities. On May 6 the German strong points were to be heavily bombarded, the fire to continue all night to give the enemy no time for their reconstruction; whilst

THE TOPEE OUSTS THE FEZ

Sir Stanley Maude's brilliant advance up the Tigris in the spring of 1917 placed considerable Turkish territory under British control. Such sights as this British patrol on its rounds were of daily occurrence in the narrow streets of Mesopotamian towns

THE MOMENT AFTER

Fully recoiled, this British heavy howitzer has just speeded a monster shell on a journey of several miles across the Ypres salient. Men of the battery section move forward preparatory to clearing the breech, while those on the right get ready to lift another shell into position. The maximum rate of firing was about once every four minutes

FOUGHT TO A FINISH

Great sacrifices and unending effort were demanded from the troops in the British offensive of 1917, the third battle of Ypres. These men, snatching a moment's rest outside the ruins of a villa in a recaptured town, are clearly near the point of exhaustion

on May 7, preceded by an intensive preliminary barrage, the infantry assault was to be launched at a zero hour.

At the beginning of May the German line running between La Bassée and Arras formed a sharp salient, the apex of which lay across the high plateau, on which stood the fortified chapel of Notre-Dame de Lorette, just north of Ablain. Throughout the winter this promontory of Lorette had been the scene of such frequent and bloody combats that the French called it the Butte de la Mort, or Ridge of Death. To the south of it lay the fortified villages of Ablain, Carency and Souchez. The works were so designed as to be independent of one another and to flank each other, so that the fall of one or two would not involve the evacuation of the whole position. With this group of fortresses the Germans under Prince Rupert held the direct road from Arras to Béthune, and threatened the roads to Aire and St. Pol. It formed a most dangerous salient in the Allied front, in view of the fact that it threatened both Béthune and Arras.

All this system of works, with its underground passages, armoured forts, and light artillery pits, was defended by the fire of hundreds of siege-howitzers, heavy field artillery, and naval guns, sited on and behind the second line of hills to the east running through Vimy, below which, still farther eastward, extended the great French coal-fields.

General Foch aimed his first attack against three points : the hill of Notre-Dame de Lorette, Ablain and Carency, whilst simultaneously an advance was to be made against Lens, through Loos from the north and through Neuville-St.-Vaast from the south.

On May 6, the date fixed for the opening of the offensive, rain fell heavily in the morning, and orders were given to postpone the attack until the 8th. At daybreak on May 7 the mist hung like a blanket over the ground. In the afternoon, faced with an adverse weather report from the Meteorological Office in Paris, General Foch decided upon a further postponement, and advised Sir Douglas Haig accordingly. The next day the weather was fairly fine, and zero hour for the Artois offensive was fixed at 6 a.m. on the morning of May 9. At each point of attack the battle was to open at the same hour and in the same manner.

The morning of Sunday, May 9, was clear and bright, and at zero hour some twelve hundred French guns poured a hurricane of fire upon the German defences, blowing entanglements and parapets to pieces, and concentrating especially on the Lorette spur, which was the key to the general position. The Germans here had six lines of trenches, strengthened by concrete and barred by two or three zones of barbed wire. At every hundred yards the trenches were flanked by machine-gun redoubts. One of these redoubts, north-east of the chapel of Notre-Dame de Lorette, was surrounded by a wolf-pit, lightly covered with turf, with bayonets stuck at the bottom to catch those who fell in. The bombardment levelled many of the German trenches and inflicted severe loss, but did not seriously affect the maze of underground works or the fortified cellars. Many of the machine-gun posts, which needed a direct hit to demolish them, remained intact throughout the battle.

The French commander waited until the attack on the Aubers ridge by the 1st British army occupied the entire attention of the Prince of Bavaria, and then, at 10 a.m., the French infantry advanced to the assault all along the line. Within half an hour the 17th division, to the north, had captured the first and second lines of enemy trenches. Before noon they had advanced two miles, taking ten guns and 3,000 prisoners of all ranks.

On the south, La Targette was captured, together with the important crossroads round which it lay, and during the afternoon fierce fighting took place in an attempt to storm Neuville-St.-Vaast, a stronghold bristling with machine-guns, where the battle raged from house to house.

Meanwhile, the centre and left wing of the Moroccan division, having crossed the Arras—Béthune road, swarmed up the slopes between Petit Vimy and Givenchy, and before noon a patrol of tirailleurs had entered Givenchy itself. From their position in the Bois de Berthonval the 7th tirailleurs de marche advanced no less rapidly. Magnificent in their assault, they swept like a river over the White Works, bayoneted their way straight before them, rushed over the Béthune road, and before half-past eleven had progressed two and a half miles, the greatest advance on the Western front since the beginning of trench warfare.

Before Carency the advance was more difficult, owing to the nature of the ground with its numerous hillocks and ravines. The village itself was strongly consolidated by the Germans and defended by four lines of trenches. Every house was fortified, underground passages linking the cellars of each. The French 70th division suffered badly while trying to advance above ground.

The place was a warren ; the defenders went underground when the French artillery opened fire, and by means of subterranean telephone wires they brought their heavy batteries to bear on anything they could not reach with their own machine-guns. The French infantry had to ferret them out with bomb and knife, with little help from their own artillery. While this mole warfare was going on, the Saxon, Baden and Bavarian troops holding Carency were able to communicate in almost absolute security with Souchez and Ablain by means of deep, narrow communication trenches.

South of the Neuville—Douai road the Germans had constructed a stronghold over a mile in width known to the Allied armies as the Labyrinth, consisting of casemates of reinforced concrete, sheltering cannon and machine-guns, linked up by miles of communicating trenches. There the 26th division was held up by the entanglements, which had been insufficiently destroyed by artillery fire, and during the afternoon the 37th and 79th divisions sought to aid the 26th by turning the north-west of the redoubt. By the end of the day the French had gained a foothold in the southern portion of the fortress, and had managed to penetrate between its northern edge and the village of Neuville.

At the apex of the German salient the fortified position of Notre-Dame de Lorette, well supported by the German artillery, held out against all French assaults from the Bois de Bouvigny.

During the night the French consolidated the positions they had captured, and repulsed a counter-attack upon the Lorette spur. At Neuville and southwards to the river Scarpe the night was relatively calm, but in front of Loos a violent bombardment broke out, followed by a fierce German attack at dawn, which threw the French back at several points. Around the Lorette escarpment a fresh offensive had been planned, but on the morning of May 10 an order came to stand and prepare for a counter-attack, airmen having observed a large assembling of troops around Farbus, a mile south of Vimy.

At 1.15 p.m. three battalions of the enemy were signalled to be advancing towards Liévin, between Lens and Souchez, while eight battalions were heading for Givenchy. Soon afterwards the awaited counter-attack began, but was definitely checked by 4.30 p.m. As the attacking column advanced the heavy German guns deluged the Lorette heights with high-explosive shell, which would have swept away the French infantry had it been exposed. But owing to this timely warning it was the Germans that were caught in

'THEIRS NOT TO REASON WHY'

Both these photographs give a more than adequate idea of the full ghastliness of war. The Germans who lie dead in these trenches have given their lives unquestioningly for love of their country, and the words written of the famous charge of the Light Brigade at Balaclava are equally applicable to them: "Theirs not to reason why, theirs but to do and die".

Photos: Imperial War Museum

Photo: Topical

THEY HAVE THEIR EXITS

In the merciless series of battles that raged in the Somme valley from July to December, 1916, British casualties totalled about 500,000, and the Germans, five of whom are seen here, but little less. The exits of these men have been particularly gruesome

the open by the French guns. As they withdrew under shrapnel fire the French infantrymen made their charge and captured another line of trenches. The German counter-attack had been completely checked, but, on the other hand, no further progress could be made against the flat hill top at the chapel, for German troops were massing at the Souchez sugar factory on the southern slopes, and a further counter-attack was feared. To storm the place from the northern side was impracticable, owing to the effective ranging of the German guns at Angres.

South of Souchez the 77th division found itself in an unenviable position. As it lay along the Arras–Béthune road its front was subjected to a violent bombardment which felled the trees by the roadside like skittles and left the Cabaret Rouge, on the outskirts of Souchez, a mass of crumbling masonry. Lying behind hastily prepared parapets of earth, the division saw its effectives slowly dwindling in the devastating fire, and its commander, General Barbot, mortally wounded by a shell-burst.

Farther south there were repeated attempts to capture the parts of Neuville-St.-Vaast which still remained in the hands of the enemy. Every inch had to be fought for in this village, where every cellar was skilfully utilized.

Neuville was a curious village. The Germans lived some thirty-three feet below the street. The cellars of the houses were strengthened by a topping of cement three feet thick, and underneath the strengthened cellars was a subterranean town, the caverns being connected by large, main tunnel thoroughfares with narrower side galleries.

The garrison troops circulated like moles during the battle, coming up in the most unexpected places. There was one tunnel in particular that ran under the French lines, and in the rear of the attacking troops a hidden German officer studied the French preparations through a periscope and telephoned fire directions to German batteries miles away eastward at Thelus and Vimy. There were indeed German guns and howitzers on three sides of Neuville, and they maintained a furious fire on the French soldiers. But in the long battle of Neuville neither the German nor the French guns were predominant, for it was a battle of cave-men, going on often at a depth to which no shell could penetrate. According to a French official account, "*Les Combats de Neuville-Saint-Vaast,*" the Germans had constructed in various houses machine-gun posts of reinforced concrete, some of which were provided with doors, which were locked behind the gunners.

By the evening of May 10 the 70th division had made some progress east of Carency and taken over 200 prisoners, the road from Carency to Souchez was entirely in the French hands, and some slight progress had been made at Neuville. Enemy counter-attacks had, apart from the early morning assault near Loos, proved in vain, and in the two days' fighting the French had taken over 3,000 prisoners, several cannon and nearly fifty machine-guns. Orders were received for resumption of the offensive on May 11.

During the night of May 10–11 the troops on the Lorette plateau received reinforcements. Then in a fierce attack on May 11 the lower slopes of the Arabs' Spur, commanding Ablain, were won. Meanwhile the troops that were holding the Souchez road advanced northward, captured the Bois de Carency, and cut the communications between Carency and Souchez. The Germans in Carency then had only the route to Ablain open to them. General Foch tried to enclose this by a sudden double attack eastward and westward. But the French troops attacking from the east, over the position that they had conquered in Carency Wood, were surprised by a large and formidable fortification. On a wooded hill was a quarry, hidden amid the trees, excavated out of the chalk hill to a depth of two hundred and sixty feet and strengthened by casemates and bomb-proof caverns. Another regiment was sent up to reinforce the attacking troops, and the battle for the quarry opened with a



Photo: G. P. A.

AWAITING DEVELOPMENTS

Flame-throwers were more regularly employed by the Germans than by the Allies, and particularly where the opposing lines approached more closely. These German troops in a rough forward trench are watching an attempt to "smoke out" enemy positions

surprise success on the part of the French : 250 German soldiers came out into the open on the wooded hill, with the intention of making a stand behind the wire entanglements laid between the trees. But instead of charging, the French colonel sent a message along his field telephone, and the light French guns, in a sharp, intense, massed fire, completely wiped out the hostile troops who had ventured above ground. The first step towards the capture of Carency was successful. To the south of Neuville the 26th division was still hung up before the Labyrinth, but the 37th division captured Neuville cemetery on the road to Les Tilleuls.

On Wednesday, May 12, after a brilliant attack by a battalion of the 21st corps, the chapel of Notre-Dame de Lorette was captured at 5 o'clock in the afternoon. About the same time the village of Carency was taken by the 70th division. It had proved a very arduous affair. The village lay in a hollow, dominated by a wooded hill. The houses formed five groups, one in the centre and the other four admirably placed for defence on the north, west, south, and east. Each group of walled buildings had been transformed by the enemy's sappers into a modern fortress. The shattered brickwork merely served as bullet-proof shelters for machine-guns. The garrison lived far underground at a depth no howitzer shell could penetrate. Tunnels and deep, narrow saps enabled them to be relieved and to be kept well supplied with food and ammunition.

On the hill above them were light field-guns, tubes for firing aerial torpedoes, and hundreds of machine-guns. Other guns were hidden in the surrounding orchards, all the batteries being connected with observation stations on the hill-top. Then in front of this formidable and almost invisible system of fortifications were four lines of trenches, strongly garrisoned by troops who moved in and out through tunnels.

Although more than 20,000 shells had fallen into the village since May 9, and though the French troops had managed to surround it on three sides, every house had to be separately carried before the final victory was won.

On the morning of May 13 a steady rain fell, which continued throughout the day. In the morning Ablain was captured, but during a counter-attack later in the day the Germans managed to regain part of the village. On the whole it seemed that a break-through had been effected at last. General D'Urbal was convinced that the Germans were on the point of yielding, and ordered his subordinates to prepare for a general advance. But although all the enemy trenches in the direction of Vimy had been taken, and the way seemed open for further progress, the Germans had only withdrawn to a distance, leaving in front of them a series of isolated forts and strong redoubts, each of which needed to be taken separately before any general advance could be made. Among these little fortresses the most important were the sugar refinery at Souchez, the eastern portion of Neuville and the vast fortifications of the Labyrinth. Until these had been taken, any advance would be caught by enfilade fire, held up and possibly completely checked.

Now that the fortress of Lorette was in the hands of the French, the capture of Ablain became possible. The straggling village was dominated by the heights of Lorette on the north and by Carency Hill on the south. To add to the difficulty of the attacking army, all the slopes on either side were covered with trees, and under this screen of foliage the enemy was able to manoeuvre troops, machine-guns, and

ght artillery, and the reinforcements ent up from Souchez. The German ngineers had left nothing to chance, ut had driven long, narrow, deep communication trenches to Souchez and ivenchy, down which troops could ass to the firing-line at Ablain and the eighbouring points without being exposed to shrapnel fire. On May 14 eneral d'Urbal ordered the 21st corps o complete the capture of Ablain, but it as not until May 29 that the position fell.

The French progress, so rapid at the eginning of the battle, was becoming ncreasingly slow, for by now the Germans had had sufficient time to bring up einforcements both in men and material. n May 15 the French army continued ts attack against the Labyrinth, Neuille and Souchez, but without any ppreciable success. At this stage the esistance offered by the isolated German ortresses had brought about a deadlock, nd with a view to allowing his wearied roops some repose and to replenishing is supplies of ammunition, General och decided that the general offensive hould be replaced for the time being by urely local operations until his forces ere in a position to renew the general ttack on a large scale. The close of he month was therefore devoted to educing the German strongholds.

On May 25 the Ouvrage Blanc, a ermnan fortified position to the northest of Angres, which had for long hinlered the French advance, was carried y detachments of the 9th corps.

Three days later the 33rd division ained a foothold on the outskirts of blain, and on May 29 the 70th division, under General Fayolle, swept down the northern slopes of the hill, and, using the communication saps made by the Germans, swung against the eastern end of Ablain. After a grim hand-to-hand struggle that lasted all night they crowned the victory of Carency and Lorette by capturing the position at Ablain, thus opening the way for an attack upon the sugar refinery at Souchez, a position which held the entrance to that village.

This sugar refinery was an agglomeration of buildings extending for some two hundred yards along the stream of Saint-Nazaire, and was situated about half-way between Ablain and Souchez. Although the factory buildings had been laid in ruins by the intensive bombardment, the site had been strongly organized for defensive purposes.

Having taken the cemetery of Ablain on May 28, the French organized communications between that position and the village of Carency, and prepared their assault of Malon Mill and the refinery, both of which were captured on May 31. Although temporarily dislodged from the refinery by a midnight counter-attack, the French troops finally established themselves there on June 1.

The first and most important stage of the battle of Artois now came to an end. Although the action had not led to the decisive results which were expected, it had been nevertheless a brilliant success for the French troops and had inflicted heavy losses upon the German army. The German salient was straightened and all but the ultimate defences of Lens broken.

The fighting north of Arras was less intense during the month of June, and most of the attacks were centred round the Labyrinth, where, from the end of May until the middle of June a ceaseless combat with knife and bomb raged day and night in that vast maze of trenches.

Although Joffre had, at the end of May, fixed June 7 for a resumption of the general offensive, on June 4 he decided to postpone it until the Labyrinth and Neuville had been captured.

On June 8, after a month's desperate fighting, the village of Neuville-St.-Vaast

Photos: G.P.A.

SHELLS FROM THE SAAR

The steady supply of shells for all her armies was a tribute alike to Germany's industrial efficiency and to her ability for transport organization. Here is a trainload of heavy shells from the Saar unloaded at a station in Rumania

CANINE COURIERS

Dogs were employed as messengers by the belligerents, and proved of great use wherever it was difficult or impossible to lay down telephone wires. This fine Alsatian is just setting off with a message from a German observation post

Photos: G.P.A.

DEATH OF A HERO

Individuality played a larger part in air combats than in any others, and the courage and chivalry with which they were fought won deserved tribute. Airmen shot down behind the enemy lines were buried by their foes with honour

was entirely in French hands. The struggle had been a bitter one, contested foot by foot. Over 600 German corpses strewed the streets and cellars, and large quantities of rifles and machine-guns fell into the hands of the victors.

Orders were received to launch the new offensive on June 15, but owing to bad visibility the attack could not take place until the following day.

Meanwhile the French sappers drove a parallel, in the ancient way, towards the Eulenburg Passage, one of the principal lines of the Labyrinth. A field of scarlet poppies stretched between the parallel and Eulenburg Passage, and on June 16 the French infantry charged through the poppies suddenly and leaped into the enemy's line. There followed a long struggle in Eulenburg Passage, and on June 18 the greater part of it was in the hands of the French. A violent counter-attack on the night of June 18–19 drove them out, but during the following day they once more installed themselves in the Passage. But although local fighting continued here and there, by the end of the month the Artois offensive had petered out owing to the general exhaustion of both armies, the inroads that had been made in munitions supplies and the awakening of interest in other theatres of war.

During this battle the artillery preparation showed a great improvement upon anything previously attempted, but the French ordnance still lacked guns in sufficient quantity and of sufficiently large calibre to reduce the enormously powerful German defences, whilst the liaison between artillery and infantry was often far from perfect.

The first battle of Artois had also cost the French dear. From April until June, 1915, they lost 143,000 dead or captured and 297,000 wounded: a reduction of nearly half a million in the total of their effectives.

Simultaneously with the battle of Artois, and up to the time of the September offensive in Champagne, the French carried out various minor operations. One of these was the attack made by the French 11th Corps upon Toutvent Farm, between Hébuterne and Serre, on June 7, 1915. The French troops occupied the former village; the latter was in the hands of the Germans. Between the two villages lay the German front line, which formed a strongly organized salient at Toutvent Farm; a salient that was in itself a complete system of defence, complete with listening posts, machine-gun emplacements, covered ways and numerous approaches, the whole being protected by a thick network of entanglements.

The assault was preceded by a long, intensive bombardment, and at 5 a.m. on June 7 the infantry of the French 21st division moved forward, capturing the first and second line of enemy trenches on a frontage of some 1,200 yards and occupying Toutvent Farm. The defenders, who had received neither rations nor munitions for some time on account of the fierce shelling of the rear of their lines, surrendered in masses, some 400 prisoners and four machine-guns being taken by the French. German counter-attacks took place until June 13, but could not regain the lost ground. But the French paid heavily for their advance, their casualties amounting to 10,351 officers and other ranks.

Another action of importance was carried out by the French 6th army on June 6 in an endeavour to reduce the salient south of Quennevieres, between the Oise and the Aisne.

RING OF FIRE

The limited traverse which a simple swivel-mounting allowed to an aeroplane machine-gun proved a great drawback. This German aeroplane cockpit, with its gun mounted by a swivel to a rotating ring, was a marked improvement





Photos: G.P.A.

RAIDER'S QUIET RETURN

Zeppelins continued their raiding activities until the end of the war, their last raid over England being on April 12–13, 1918. The L 113, here seen returning to her hangar at Weynoden, was a much more powerful machine than the early models

HAVOC IN A HANGAR

As a reply to the Zeppelin raids, British aeroplanes carried out numerous attacks on German hangars. This picture shows all that was left of Hall 3 at Ahlhorn after it had been set on fire by a British bomb



CHAPTER 48

POLAND PROSTRATE

Warsaw, one of the objectives of the German offensive in the East, was entered in June, 1915, this being the culminating episode of the campaign against Russia in the Polish theatre of war

THE immense success of Mackensen's drive through Galicia, a drive which culminated in the capture of Lemberg on June 22, 1915, had elated and reinvigorated the peoples of the Dual Monarchy by removing the menace of a Russian invasion of Hungary, had shaken the growing pro-Entente sympathies in the neutral Balkan states, and had encouraged Turkey. The Allies in the West had witnessed the German offensive with a consternation that was but little assuaged by the growing reproaches in the Russian press commenting on the failure of France and Britain to succour Russia as she had succoured them in August and September, 1914. But neither of the Western powers was prepared at that time to precipitate the offensives they were preparing, the French in Champagne and the British around Loos, and they implored Russia to hold on until September, when, they assured her, the German line in the West would be smashed and, as the very least result, Falkenhayn would be compelled to denude his eastern front of troops. They promised, in fact, that the pressure on their ally would be relieved within two or three months.

With this Russia, perforce, had to remain content and, on her own, to devise some means of resistance to the sledge-hammer blows which Mackensen's overwhelming artillery and courageous and disciplined troops continued to rain on her rapidly disintegrating southern front. Her plight was becoming critical. The collapse of Dmitrieff in Galicia had paved the way for a series of disasters which, unimportant as they might be locally, had produced reverberations that threatened the safety of her armies hundreds of miles away. Every step Mackensen took made the position of the Russians crowded in the Polish salient on the bend of the Vistula more precarious. The grand-duke realized that, unless the impossible happened—unless, that is, Mackensen could be driven back — his forces in Poland would be caught between the anvil of Hindenburg's unshakable troops on the north and the hammer of Mackensen on the south. Falkenhayn, with consummate skill, had cast a noose half-round the entire Russian forces, and every second was drawing it tighter. The Russian commander had no thought of saving Warsaw; the whole of Poland, and not only its capital, was clearly doomed, and his entire energies would have to be concentrated on the seemingly impossible task of bolstering up the two sides of the salient long enough to enable his armies trapped in the bottle-neck to escape.

A terrible prospect of a never-ending and hopeless retreat was opening before the Russian troops. They had already suffered untold and largely unrecorded miseries in this summer campaign, and their ill-clad and ill-fed ranks had been terribly thinned by the German guns. In the hearts of the stubborn, weary men was smouldering an ever-growing fire of resentment against that autocratic system which brutally hurled

POLES UNDER A NEW YOKE

Warsaw fell to the Germans on August 5, 1915, and the Poles, subject for over a century to Russian masters, exchanged a Slav for a Teutonic yoke. Here Prince Leopold of Bavaria, commander of the German 5th army, with the senior officers, is seen in the centre of the city

Photopress

hem as so many human missiles, half-armed, ill-organized, and often unsupported even by a single field-gun, against well-manned, entrenched positions defended by massed batteries of heavy howitzers.

The ghastly story of that long retreat, as recorded in the pages of Sir A. Knox's "With the Russian Army, 1914–1917," makes harrowing reading, and produces some amazement, not that the revolution should have occurred, but that its happening should have been so long postponed. Indeed, when the state of her armies, and the acute shortage of guns and rifles and ammunition for both, from which Russia suffered are remembered, her stubborn resistance during the next three months was almost miraculous.

The comparatively slow progress of the German armies on either side is the finest tribute to Russian heroism. To this heroism and to the skill and courage of the grand-duke, who never lost his grip on the situation, Russia owed a debt of gratitude. In spite of the fact that she had yielded cities, towns, fortresses and even provinces, surrendered thousands of square miles of her territory and lost some 2,000,000 of her soldiers, together with vast quantities of priceless stores, guns and ammunition, she was still able to stand at the beginning of 1916, breathless and weakened, but with her line unbroken and her chances of eventual victory but little diminished.

In a previous chapter a detailed account was given of the considerations which prompted Falkenhayn to launch Mackensen's offensive, and in order to make clear the course of events on the Eastern Front after the beginning of July, 1915, it is necessary to summarize the changes, some of them produced by that offensive, which had occurred since May in Germany's war situation.

The chief factor in Falkenhayn's calculations was still the West. He had been able to ascertain that the long-expected counter-offensives by the Allies could not take place until the middle of September, and he could therefore count on some ten weeks of comparative quiet in France. How, then, should he employ Mackensen during that time? He had insisted with unrelenting firmness, to both Conrad and the two Easterners, Hindenburg and Ludendorff, that he would not be committed to an interminable campaign leading German armies into the limitless wastes of Russia, and had warned them that whenever he felt sufficient success had been won he would withdraw Mackensen's troops for service elsewhere. By sufficient success he appeared to imply the crippling of Russia's offensive power for at least some months, but the still vigorous counter-attacks which Russia was making provided Conrad and the Eastern command with powerful arguments that Falkenhayn's own intention had not been realized.

He decided that the Russian campaign should go on, a decision less fraught with risk than it would have been earlier. Italy's efforts to break into Austria had proved as costly as they had been unavailing. The British had failed to capture the Dardanelles by a *coup de main*, and although Turkey's position was still serious it was no longer desperate; she could clearly hold out for some months. Serbia could therefore wait, for the conquest of that unhappy country was less of an end in itself than a means to a road to Turkey. Moreover, the effort of the conquest could be materially lightened by delay, for it was by then known that Bulgaria, so soon as she had gathered her harvest, would attack her hated neighbour Serbia. Struck simultaneously from

Photo: Topical

SPADE AND BUCKET

Mechanical trench diggers, such as this French model here seen at work, were used only in preparing positions far in reserve. Their size and vulnerability made them practically useless near the front line or under aerial observation

TEAPOT TURRET

War might well be called the foster-mother of invention. This strange-looking steel tower captured by the Germans mounts a quick-firing gun for use on a field railway, and was a French reply to the German pill-box. The model proved of small value and was quickly abandoned after being tested in the field

Photo: G.P.A.

Photo: Topical

MASS IN A TRENCH

Few of the troops in the front line had opportunities of attending divine service, but for those in reserve positions it was often possible to arrange a church parade. This photograph well portrays the essential piety of the French soldier

both north and east, Serbia could be overrun in a few weeks.

All these considerations persuaded Falkenhayn to continue his task, already so well begun, of beating the life out of Russia. But although the principle was decided, the method was, as usual, to provoke bitter controversy. The clash of wills between Hindenburg and Ludendorff on the one hand, and Falkenhayn on the other, once again shattered the dignity of a conference called by the Kaiser on July 1–2 at Posen. Falkenhayn, partly because he feared the reputation of the Pripet marshes, where, it was said, whole armies would be hopelessly bogged, and which now lay directly in the path of Mackensen's further advance eastward, and partly because he did not wish his troops to penetrate so far into Russia as to render their speedy recall difficult, proposed that Mackensen should swing north and strike the south face of the Polish salient between Lublin and Cholm. From there he should advance rapidly towards Brest-Litovsk, while Hindenburg, from the north, should thrust strongly at the same place.

But the two Eastern commanders riddled the plan with technical objections, the chief of which was that little of permanent value could be hoped for from direct frontal attacks. These would inevitably be so delayed by the great strength of the Russian fortresses along the Narew in the north and the Vistula in the south, that the enemy would have ample time in which to evacuate their dangerous position. Their opposition sprang, in truth, more from their growing fear that Mackensen, with his successes, was stealing the thunder of their own reputations and from their obsession with the idea of a super-Tannenberg. They urged in consequence that the weight of the attack should be shifted to the north, and that a sweep round Kovno should be made in force, striking the vital Wilno–Dvinsk region of Russian communications, while Mackensen should push on eastwards towards Rafalowka and Sarni.

Falkenhayn summarily rejected this plan, for, although he appreciated its

STRANGE HEDGEROW

The art of camouflage was developed to a high pitch of excellence during the war and was used to conceal everything from dumps to roads from enemy aircraft. These French engineers are screening a road with sheets of rough netting

MOUNTAIN WARRIORS

France possessed twelve battalions of Chasseurs Alpins at the beginning of the War. Light troops specially trained and equipped for mountain warfare, they performed invaluable services in the Vosges. Each man of this battalion under inspection is carrying his crooked alpenstock

THOSE MARVELLOUS MULES

War in the Vosges mountains was free from mud but did not lack its own difficulties. These Chasseurs Alpins have no easy task to get their mules carrying a mountain battery up this rocky path. The Chasseurs Alpins also fought in Italy

Photos: Topical

DEATH IN THE MAKING

Elaborate precautions were taken in munition factories to protect the health of the workers. Gloves were regularly worn in handling rough metal, and in the filling-room the girls were, as here, provided with gauze respirators against the chemical-ladened dust

Photo: Imperial War Museum

possibilities, he foresaw clearly that it would involve him in just that large-scale campaign which the exigencies of the War on other fronts compelled him to avoid at all costs. In this deadlock decision was referred to the Kaiser, Germany's supreme War Lord, who, in accordance with army practice, had either to accept the advice of his chief of staff or to dismiss him. Wisely he chose to retain Falkenhayn, whose plan, in so far as it related to Mackensen, was adopted; but in deference to the opinions of his other two great generals he suggested it should be altered in its relation to the northern face of the salient. He ordered the formation of a new group round Gallwitz's 12th army facing the Narew, and commanded that it should strike south-east at a point not farther north than Falkenhayn had suggested.

With some justifiable bitterness Ludendorff has written in his "Memoirs": "Our General Staff believed that in these operations part of the Russian forces still in the bend of the Vistula could be annihilated. I had to keep my views to myself and hope that the movement I wanted would be carried out when General von Gallwitz had reached the Narew and found that he also could only make progress by means of frontal attacks."

Thus it was that Ludendorff's brilliant plan for a surprise attack on Kovno had to be postponed, and that the promising operations of the Niemen army, though continued vigorously, were denied that support which its successes appeared to warrant. There is little doubt that the Germans had abandoned the chance of an immense strategical victory for the sober but safer certainty of a great tactical success. Yet it is clear the decision was wise, for the consequences in time alone of a vast thrust into the heart of Russia might well have proved as disastrous to the Kaiser as it did to Napoleon.

As a preliminary to renewing the offensive on the new plan, an extensive regrouping of the Austro-German forces was carried out, particularly on the southern front, where Linsingen was put in command of a composite force, the Bug army, as it was called. The Austrian 1st army was, now that the front had been so shortened, brought down from the Wisloka–San area and placed on the right of the Bug army with orders to cover the flank of Mackensen's group, consisting of the Austrian 4th, the German 11th and the Bug army, as he struck northward. The German southern army and the Austrian 2nd and 7th armies were directed to clear the ground to the east, in order to give Mackensen more elbow room, and from this order sprang that series of bloody and largely inconclusive battles fought south and east of Lemberg throughout July. The Russians, sensitive to pressure on their extreme left wing, which they were able to reinforce with some ease from Odessa, took pains that it should not be turned, and not until the whole Polish salient had been evacuated were the Austrians able to push far over the Sereth.

Prince Leopold of Bavaria, the commander of the 9th army facing Warsaw, was put in charge of a new group consisting of his own army and Woyrsch's detachment, which was placed directly under orders from headquarters—probably to give Falkenhayn, who distrusted Ludendorff's intentions, another independent group of armies. But Leopold's forces were, in fact, greatly weakened, for it was not in contemplation that he should do more than follow up the Russians as they were compelled to retreat by the pressure exercised by Mackensen and Gallwitz. The latter, whose 12th army faced the line of the Narew between the Orjice on the north and the Vistula to the south, was heavily reinforced and provided with an immense park of artillery with which to reduce the fortresses in his path.

All this reorganization could not be carried out under the guns of a desperate enemy without some risk, and, indeed, the transfer of the Austrian 1st army nearly precipitated a disaster. The weakening of the front following



Photo: Imperial War Museum

HOME AIR DEFENCE

Protective measures against air raiders, both from the ground and in the air, increased as their menace grew greater. This anti-aircraft station, manned by men of the Royal Naval Air Service, was in the grounds of the Metropolitan Water Board near Mount Pleasant, London

heir withdrawal encouraged Evert, he commander of the Russian 4th rmy opposing them, to thrust forward n a strong counter-attack on July 1. For some days the danger to Mackenen's exposed flank was acute, but by uly 7 the gap was closed. Mackensen, owever, found himself unable to advance with his former speed. He was penetrating a country of marshy plain largely unprovided with railways and having few good roads, both of which means of transport had been systematically destroyed by the retreating enemy. He found that the speed of his advance depended entirely upon the ability of his engineers to construct means of moving his howitzers forward, and the immense difficulties of the terrain quickly showed how utterly he had sacrificed his mobility to his overwhelming gun power. The Russians time and again could retire a few miles out of range of the German heavy guns, dig themselves in, and meet the oncoming German infantry on terms where numbers could be made to count. The Austrian 4th army, under the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, on the left of Mackensen's 11th German army, was held up for ten days before Krasnik on the road to Lublin, and at one time only energetic support from the Germans saved it from being beaten back by a fierce Russian counter-attack.

Meanwhile, Ivanoff, the commander of the Russian southern front, was fighting for time. Immense efforts were being made in his rear to evacuate the country and to destroy whatever might be of use to the enemy. The slow retreat of Russia's armies was terribly complicated by the flight of the entire civil population, a flight which in horror far surpassed anything witnessed in Belgium. Even the grim Ludendorff was forced to write in his Memoirs, "Many of the scenes in the Russian campaign have been indelibly imprinted on my memory," while the pictures given by Sir A. Knox are truly shocking.

Panic-stricken by tales of German cruelties, the Poles fled eastward in a

WAR SCENE AT HAMPSTEAD

Hampstead Heath and Richmond Park were the scenes of much military activity during the war, for they both offered splendid facilities for military preparation. This scene on Hampstead Heath shows the 6th County of London Battery in training

Photo: Topical

READY FOR RAIDERS

Motor lorries mounted with quick-firing anti-aircraft guns, known to the troops as "Archies," played an important part in air defence. These men of an anti-aircraft section near Armentières are running to their stations on the approach of enemy planes

Imperial War Museum

hopeless, purposeless, goalless exodus. They knew not where they would obtain rest or food, or where they were going. The more courageous, who proposed to stay, fared no better, for the Russians, on the plea that only pro-Germans would stay behind, seized all their cattle and food. Faced with the alternative of fleeing aimlessly or starving pointlessly, the Poles generally chose the former course, and along the roads leading east from Warsaw it is still possible to pick out every hundred yards or so the mound or the cross marking the common grave of some few of the thousands of victims of starvation, exposure or disease, which the moloch of war claimed during the course of that ghastly trek.

The blocked state of the roads in their rear, roads which were in many cases impassable, gave the Russian armies to the north and south of Warsaw the choice of being either overrun or of holding up their enemies, and particularly in the south they fought their delaying actions with a fierce courage born of despair. Indeed, it was not until July 16, by which time Mackensen had got his heavy guns forward and Gallwitz had launched his attack on the Narew, that the Austro-Germans were able to make any real progress towards the vital Lublin–Cholm railway line. A crushing artillery fire preceded the attack of the 11th army on the Russians at Krasnostaw, but it was only after desperate fighting that it was able to dislodge its opponents. Its success turned the Russian positions to the west, north of Krasnik, which the Archduke had failed, in ten fierce assaults, to carry, and a retirement of the whole Russian line to positions backing on to the railway became necessary. This retirement permitted Woyrsch's detachment to move up towards Ivangorod and to threaten the fortress from the south. But once again followed a long delay while Mackensen brought up his howitzers to an assaulting position, and it was not until July 29 that he was able to drive the Russians from Lublin and Cholm, which places he entered on the 30th. The same day Woyrsch carried the Vistula crossings south of Ivangorod and rapidly deployed on the east bank of the river. The Warsaw–Kovel railway passed into German hands and another possible avenue of retreat for the Russian forces was closed.



Canadian Records

WITH DEADLY INTENT

In the early days of the war, bombs were carried inside the machine and simply dropped by the pilot or observer. Later, more complicated methods of fixing were adopted, such as is being used by these Canadian airmen

LESSONS IN OBSERVATION

Instruction in the use of optical apparatus was a regular feature of artillery training. These young soldiers attached to an anti-aircraft section of the R.H.A., near Armentières, are being trained in range finding and aircraft observation

Photo: Imperial War Museum

Meanwhile on the north great initial success had crowned Gallwitz's forward move. On July 14 he had captured Przasnysz, and he had advanced to the Narew by the 23rd, when he stormed the strong positions of Rozhan and Pultusk. But here he was held up, and despite his most determined efforts was unable to make good his hold on the crossings until August 7. Before then Warsaw had fallen. In face of the double threat to his communications the grand-duke had speeded up his withdrawal, and the city was almost evacuated by August 3. The Russian forces to the north and west had withdrawn to the inner Blonie lines on that day, and on the day following they abandoned those also. The Russian rearguard marched through the city, and Leopold of Bavaria rode into its streets on the 5th. The fall of the city, just one year after the outbreak of war, was hailed as a triumph of German arms.

On the same day as Warsaw fell the Russians abandoned Ivangorod and slowly withdrew all their forces from the east bank of the Vistula; but for

Photos, Imperial War Museum

SHELL SERVICE

The weight of these shells being brought up to a heavy howitzer battery on a handcart is well shown by the number of men necessary to drag and push the cart up the slight incline

some obscure reason the grand-duke decided to hold the fortress of Novo Georgievsk to the last. His decision is difficult to understand, for, in the first place, the value of Novo Georgievsk was gone once Warsaw was abandoned, and, in the second, the fate of Przemysl and other fortresses at the hands of German howitzers should have disillusioned him as to the possibilities of any worthwhile defence. A possible explanation is that he was willing to sacrifice even more than the 80,000 men of its garrison and its 700 fortress guns if thereby he could delay the German armies even for a few days.

Alexeieff, the Russian commander of the armies in the north of the Polish salient, was conducting his retreat with masterly skill, and the manner in which he massed his forces against Gallwitz, holding him up by one well-planned counter-attack after another, won high and deserved praise from the Tsar. But his greatest efforts could only gain him a few days' grace, and the grand-duke was possibly justified in holding Novo Georgievsk in an effort to impede Gallwitz still further. The fortress was finally invested on August 9, and its siege was entrusted to the veteran conqueror of Antwerp, Beseler. His howitzers made short work of the outer defences and within four days were smashing the great forts to bits. On the 19th the fortress surrendered.

Much more serious than the loss of Novo Georgievsk, however, was Ludendorff's lucky seizure of Kovno. Ever since Gallwitz's offensive had started he had been itching to launch his beloved northern plan; the Niemen army had continued its successes in the north, capturing Shavli on July 23 and Mitau on August 1. The Russian 12th and 5th armies, opposing it, had been sadly neglected on account of the great danger farther south, and Below, despite his comparative weakness, had been able to continue his advance. It seemed as though Riga and Wilno might both be seized if the Germans acted with energy, and Ludendorff, sensing the weakness of the Russian forces on the northern front, began quiet preparations for his projected attack.

Already Falkenhayn was accusing him of failing adequately to support Gallwitz and thereby holding him

STRUGGLE FOR LIFE

Countless animals and many men, especially wounded men, were lost in the filthy slime of the winter battlefields. The desperate struggles of this trapped mule and the efforts being made to release him prove what a terrible menace the mud became

Canadian Records

PADDED WALLS

Wherever possible field dressing stations were protected against shell fire by sandbags. In a recently captured village these Canadians are busily reinforcing the wall of a building which is being used as a temporary hospital

esponsible for the latter's comparative ailure to force the Narew quickly; ut the divisions which Gallwitz awaited vere even then swelling the thin ranks f Eichhorn's 10th army and Scholtz's th army on its right. On August 8 hese two armies pressed forward, taking he Russians on that front, which had emained relatively quiet since the pre-ious March, by surprise. Lomza fell to Scholtz on the 9th, although he was held up farther north by the gallant little fortress of Osowiec, and on the same day Eichhorn attacked Kovno.

The Russians, however, were not unduly alarmed, as it was known that Eichhorn possessed but little heavy artillery, and Kovno was reputed to be very strong They were confident that it would hold out until the end of the month, and their consternation was immense when it fell to what was virtually an infantry assault, on August 17. Its governor, who had quitted the fortress on the day before, was subsequently court-martialled and received the exemplary sentence of a long term of imprisonment.

The consequences of this disaster for some days threatened to be terrible, for Eichhorn had by his success reached a point within 40 miles of the railway by which many of the troops who had been defending Warsaw were retiring, and some 150 miles to their rear. As will be related in a subsequent chapter, Ludendorff hesitated at the critical moment and Eichhorn delayed his advance for a week. The delay probably saved the Russians.

Meanwhile, in the far south Mackensen was toiling slowly across the desolate and devastated country towards Biala and Brest-Litovsk, while the Austrian 1st army, guarding his flank, had extended north-east as far as Vladimir Volinski. His opponent, Ivanov, had not been caught, and it was rapidly becoming clear that the Russian armies had escaped the noose and were even now in process of reforming their front on a line running from the Bobr through Bialystok and Brest-Litovsk down the Bug. They were yet by no means free of all danger, but they had escaped disaster, and every day took them nearer safety. Mackensen's troops were nearing exhaustion, and hopes ran high that on the new and shorter line across the vast Polish plain Russia would at last be able to stand. How this hope was shattered will form the subject of a later chapter.

STRANGE CONTRIVANCE

'his steel protection for a German sniper bears a grim resemblance o the masks so often seen at fêtes or fancy-dress parties. The strange ontraption has been captured and is being examined by a British officer into whose hands it has fallen

Canadian Records

Photos: Crown Copyright

ARE YOU READY?—GO!

These two photographs, taken from an official film, furnish an actual and graphic record of the initial stages of an infantry attack. Above, the waiting line is ready to scramble over the top, and below the men have started on the terrible dash across No Man's Land, two of them being already left behind, shot down before they had even gained the top of the bank

Photos: Crown Copyright

OBSTACLE RACE WITH DEATH

The first obstacle to the attackers is their own wire, which, although it has been cut in places, is still an awkward barrier to speed. While they force their way through the sharp crack of machine-gun and rifle, aimed straight at them, fills their ears, and, as can be seen below, at least two bullets have found their mark at this early stage of the advance

CHAPTER 49

THE SUVLA TRAGEDY

The operations in the south of the Gallipoli peninsula having failed, a fresh landing was decided upon. This was made in August at Suvla Bay and, with the campaign that followed and contained so many tragic incidents, is here described

THE situation on the Gallipoli peninsula after the attacks described in a previous chapter was far from hopeful. By the middle of July, 1915, it was obvious that the original plan had failed, and that if a decision was to be gained before the year ended drastic measures must be taken. In the south of the peninsula the British and French forces were firmly held, being unable to take the strong Turkish line on the slopes of Achi Baba by frontal attack; whilst at Anzac Cove the Australians and New Zealanders could only cling to the small strip of ground they had won so dearly. Entrenched around them in a semicircle, the Turks guarding the road to Maidos could not be shaken The situation was one of stalemate.

Early in July troops which had been promised by Lord Kitchener began to arrive, and in view of this a plan for a new attack was immediately drawn up. Its main object was the straddling of the peninsula from Gaba Tepe to Maidos, thus cutting off the Turkish army from all land communication with Constantinople. In order to achieve this end three separate attacks were necessary, one of them being in a fresh area. The first two were a holding movement at Helles with the object of preventing the Turks from drawing any reinforcements from that sector, and an attack on Sari Bair by the Australians from Anzac Cove.

For the third Suvla Bay on the west coast was selected as the landing-place, and from there it was intended to advance inland towards Anafarta Ridge with the object of assisting the Anzac attack on the right. The bay itself was to be used as a winter base for all troops operating in the northern zone. A feint, similar to the previous one on Bulair, was to be made at Karachali, on the Turkish mainland, with the object of confusing the enemy and holding up for a day or two the movement of their troops.

The concentration of the troops detailed for the new landing was to be complete by August 10, but the 10th, 11th and 13th divisions, forming the 9th corps, arrived in time for the opening of the attacks on August 6. Two Territorial divisions, the 53rd, Welsh, and the 54th, East Anglian, followed. In order to control the operations Sir Ian Hamilton made Imbros, a small island near the mouth of the Dardanelles, his headquarters, and thence he maintained cable communication with headquarters in the three areas and could reach any one of them in less than an hour.

On the afternoon of August 6 the campaign began with an attack by the Lancashire and Lowland Territorial divisions on the Turkish trenches at Helles. Unfortunately, when it was made these trenches were found occupied by a strong force of Turks, who had just been reinforced by two fresh divisions for the purpose of an attack upon the British lines. But although the British attack failed, fighting continued for about a week, the most severe encounter taking place round a plot of ground known as the Vineyard. No advance, however, was made.

Commenting on this operation, the final report of the Dardanelles Commission says:

> No substantial success was obtained by this fighting so far as an advance was concerned, but the result was to keep the Turkish troops in that part engaged and to draw some reinforcements from other parts of the peninsula which could otherwise have been employed at Anzac or Suvla. In view of the fact that the Turks were in sufficient force to resist the attacks at Anzac and Suvla, we think the value to be attached to the subsidiary operations at Helles must remain problematical.

For the purpose of the attack from Anzac Cove Sir W. Birdwood's force was reinforced by the 13th division, commanded by Major-General F. C. Shaw, the 29th brigade of the 10th division, and the 29th Indian brigade. These had been previously shipped to the peninsula by night and cunningly concealed in dug-outs on the shore so that they might escape the notice of the Turks. Thus reinforced, Birdwood had at his disposal about 37,000 men and 72 guns, and he was also supported by the guns from two cruisers, four monitors, and two destroyers. This force was divided into two halves. The first comprised the Australian division, with the 1st and 3rd Light Horse brigades and two battalions of the 40th brigade. The second was made up of the New Zealand and Australian division, the 13th division, less five battalions, the 29th Indian infantry brigade and an Indian mountain artillery brigade. The duties of the first were to hold the existing position and make frontal attacks from it, whilst the second attacked the position at Sari Bair.

The operations began about 5 p.m. on August 6 with an attack on the position known as Lone Pine, its main object being to divert the enemy's attention and draw his reserves from the main attack to be delivered on the heights of Sari Bair. Here the Turks had dug themselves in with all the science their German directors could command. The deep, narrow trenches in the broken highland of sand and scrub were roofed



Map of the coast and country near Suvla Bay, off the Gallipoli peninsula, where a landing was made by British troops in August, 1915

with great logs against shrapnel, machine-gun fire and bombs, the upper heavy timber work forming a road, in which were holes out of which the defending troops could leap for a charge. A row of loopholes in the parapets gave the machine-gun parties and riflemen a large field of fire, whilst leaving them under cover and protected from everything except a direct hit by a high explosive shell.

Against this formidable position the Australians moved forward in three lines. The first was destroyed by enemy fire midway between the trenches, but the others, firmly resolved to reach the enemy, rushed across the open, cut their way through the wire entanglements, lifted the beams covering the entrenchments and leapt down amongst the Turks. So fierce was their onslaught that by 5.47 the 3rd and 4th battalions were well into the enemy's vitals, and a few minutes later the 2nd battalion joined in the fray. Rushing through the trenches, they killed and bayoneted the defending Turks out of their position, and in a short time the whole line of magnificently fortified trenches had fallen into their hands.

At 7 o'clock, however, the Turks made a stubborn effort to regain their lost ground. Attacking both from north and south, they rushed down in successive waves, only to be repulsed. Again, at 1.30 a.m., they came forward, and so fierce were their attacks that part of the 12th battalion, which was being held in reserve by the 3rd brigade, had to be thrown into the line. Later in the day, August 7, fresh counter-attacks began; these continued without respite from 1.30 p.m. until 5, and they were again resumed at midnight and continued until dawn on the 8th. At one time the 4th battalion was forced to relinquish part of the ground it had gained, but the men made a great counter-attack under the leadership of their commander, Lt.-Col. McNaghten. It was not until the 12th that the enemy pressure slackened off, but Lone Pine remained in the hands of the Australians.

Two other minor attacks took place on the 6th and 7th, both being designed to distract the enemy's attention. The first of these was directed against a Turkish trench on the extreme right of the Anzac front, whilst the second was made opposite the Anzac centre on a point just north of Hill 180. Both of these, however, failed, being repulsed with heavy loss to the attackers.

Whilst the attack on Lone Pine was raging the main attempt from Anzac began. The object of this, as already explained, was to make a great assault on Sari Bair, and for this purpose the troops were divided into two covering and two attacking columns, the right and the left. The covering force on the right was instructed to seize Table Top and

Photo: G.P.A.

THE LONGEST SLEEP

Death, "the longest sleep," has overtaken all these Germans, whether in a trench or, as in the photograph below, in No Man's Land. Death by gas poisoning, such as the men above, caught without their gas masks, have suffered, was far from instantaneous and was one of the major agonies which the weapons of war inflicted

Photo: Topical

Photos: Crown Copyright

BREATHER AFTER BATTLE

Mametz on the Somme, some three miles east of Albert, was the scene of much desperate fighting in the summer of 1916. These men of the Manchester regiment are taking a short rest after capturing Dantzig Alley, near the village, on July 1

all the enemy positions commanding the foothills between Chailak Dere and Sazli Beit Dere ravines with the object of opening up these ravines for the assaulting columns and interposing between the right flank of the force on the left and the enemy holding the main ridge of Sari Bair. Meanwhile, the right assaulting column was to move up the ravines of Chailak Dere and Sazli Beit Dere and storm the Chunuk Bair ridge.

The duties of the left covering force were to march northwards along the beach under the cover of darkness and then, turning inland, seize Damakjelik Bair, a hill about 1,500 yards north of Table Top. If successful, this would serve a double purpose, for it would join with the 9th corps, which was to land at Suvla Bay, and at the same time protect the left flank of the left assaulting column, which was to storm Koja Chemen Tepe (Hill 305), the chief point of the whole ridge. The main attack was entrusted to Sir A. J. Godley, commander of the Australian and New Zealand troops.

At 9.30 on the night of August 6 the great attack began with the covering column on the right moving forward supported by a bombardment from H.M.S. Colne. In order to clear the way for the assaulting column it launched its attack on a position known as No. 3 Post, which was connected with Table Top by a razor-back ridge. It was strongly fortified with two lines of trenches and masses of barbed wire and completely dominated the approaches to Sazli Beit Dere and Chailak Dere.

In order to capture this redoubt a cunning ruse was employed. For several nights before the attack was launched H.M.S. Colne threw a beam of her searchlight on to the redoubt exactly at 9 o'clock. This was followed by a bombardment of precisely ten minutes. An interval of ten minutes followed, and then a further bombardment commenced, ending exactly at 9.30. Thus the Turks, when they saw the searchlight, cleared out of their trenches until the shelling had stopped. On the night of August 6 the usual procedure was adhered to, only following closely on the bombardment came the British forces, which, immediately it stopped, poured into the empty redoubt. By

FIREMAN'S LIFT

The far too well known cry of "stretcher bearers" has been sent up once more in this trench, and another victim is about to be carried down to a first-aid post. The stretcher bearer employs, to carry him, the method known as the fireman's lift

Photos: Imperial War Museum

DESERTS OF CONQUEST

In their retreat on the Somme in 1916 the Germans destroyed systematically all that could be of use to the British. Such scenes as this furiously burning dump beside the blown-up railway line were common spectacles to the advancing troops

his ruse the position fell easily into heir hands, and by 11 o'clock they had cleared the whole of the surrounding system of trenches.

Meanwhile a portion of this column carried out an assault on Chailak Dere. Here the attackers were held up by barbed wire of great height and strength, flanked by a strongly held enemy trench. Desperate fighting took place, and the Otago Mounted Rifles lost very heavily. In the end, however, the New Zealand Engineers succeeded in forcing a passage, thus successfully opening the way to the assaulting columns of infantry.

The attack on Table Top is best described in the words of Sir Ian Hamilton, who, in a dispatch dated December 11, 1915, says:

No general on peace manoeuvres would ask troops to attempt so breakneck an enterprise. The flanks of Table Top are so steep that the height gives the impression of a mushroom shape—of the summit bulging over its stem. But just as faith moves mountains, so valour can carry them. The Turks fought bravely. The angle of Table Top's ascent is recognized in our regulations as "impracticable for infantry." But neither Turks nor angles of ascent were destined to stop Russell or his New Zealanders that night. There are moments during battle when life becomes intensified, when men become supermen, when the impossible becomes simple—and this was one of those moments. The scarped heights were scaled, the plateau was carried by midnight. With this brilliant feat the task of the right covering column was at an end.

'FLYING PIG'

Soldiers were always ready with an apt description, and the shell of this heavy trench mortar which these Australians are loading near Pozières well deserved its nickname. The 9·45-inch mortar could hurl its shell up to 1,000 yards

The right assaulting column then advanced; dividing into two, it went up the Sazli Beit Dere and Chailak Dere ravines. At 1.30 the Sazli Beit Dere column met strong enemy forces entrenched on Rhododendron Spur, a point about 500 yards west of Chunuk Bair, and engaged in a hotly contested fight for the position. Meanwhile the other half advanced steadily up Chailak Dere towards the enemy on the ridge of Chunuk Bair. They had not gone far before they encountered opposition which forced them to deploy, but after stubborn fighting, rendered more difficult by the terrible nature of the country, they succeeded in joining their comrades on Rhododendron Spur by 5.45 a.m., when the whole force moved forward up the spur. In face of frequent enemy bayonet charges they eventually reached the top, where they entrenched

and made contact with the left assaulting column. At this point the goal for which they were striving, Chunuk Bair, was only a quarter of a mile distant.

Let us now follow the fortunes of the two columns on the left. The left covering column, after marching along the beach for about a mile and a half, wheeled to the right and advanced up a ravine known as Aghyl Dere. Regardless of the enemy enfilade fire from the right, it cleared the Turks out of every trench it encountered. Here the South Wales Borderers distinguished themselves by their fierce bayonet attacks. The covering column then advanced towards its main objective, Damakjelik Bair, which it carried successfully at 1.30 a.m., thus securing the left rear of the Anzac attack.

Meanwhile the assaulting column, having carried the Chailak Dere ravine at 12.30 a.m., entered Aghyl Dere behind the covering column. On reaching a point at which the ravine divides into two parts it split up, one half following the northern course and the other the southern.

After pressing forwards and upwards over the roughest of country, rolling the enemy back before it as it went, this force came very close to its objective. By dawn the 4th Australian Infantry Brigade was on the line of Azma Dere, the next ravine north of Aghyl Dere, and the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade had captured a ridge about 500 yards short of Koja Chemen, but the crest had not been won. At 7 a.m. the 5th and 6th Gurkhas approached the ridge north-east of Chunuk Bair, gaining contact with the right column of assault, whilst on their left the 14th Sikhs joined hands with the 4th Australian Brigade on the southern watershed of Azma Dere. By this time the enemy was being reinforced all along the line; the attack on the right was checked in front of Chunuk Bair and any further advance on Koja Chemen became impossible.

At 9.30 an attempt was made to advance under the cover of a barrage from the British guns, but the troops of assault, fatigued after their long night's work, were unable to make any impression on the rapidly strengthening Turkish line. They could therefore only hold fast to the ground they had gained.

Mr. Winston Churchill, in "World Crisis," describes this delay as the "cardinal fatality," and says:

> Had it been possible to have leap-frogged the exhausted troops by a wave of fresh reinforcements, the whole crest of Sari Bair might well have fallen before noon into our possession. It had not been found possible to organize this in the face of the difficulties of the ground and of supplies, and meanwhile the direction and scale of the attack were now fully disclosed to the enemy.

At this point we must leave the Anzac attack and turn to the landing at Suvla Bay. Lying about 12 miles north of Anzac Cove, this was an advantageous point for the purpose, being protected by its natural formation, not only against the prevailing winds, but also from submarine attacks. The force on this sector consisted of the 9th army corps under Sir Frederick W. Stopford. It comprised the 11th division, under Major-General Hammersley, and the 10th (Irish) division, under Sir Bryan Mahon, less the 29th brigade. Two Territorial divisions, the 53rd (Welsh) under Major-General Lindley and the 54th (East Anglian) under Major-General F. S. Inglefield, were also available.

As already stated, the primary object of this attack was to secure the bay as a base for all troops operating in the northern zone, but, if possible, an advance was to be made on Buyuk Anafarta in order to assist Sir A. J. Godley in his attack on Koja Chemen Tepe. Sir F. W. Stopford drew up a plan the chief aim of which was to secure immunity from shell fire by the occupation of the high ground from Ejelmer Bay to Anafarta Sagir, and thence to Koja Chemen. Sir Frederick recorded his conviction that it was most improbable that he would be able to spare troops to assist the Anzac force in its attack on Koja Chemen Tepe.

Calm weather favoured the landing, and on the evening of August 6 the 11th division left Imbros for the scene of operations. The plan for landing was simple. The 11th division was to be landed on Beaches A, B and C, the first being inside Suvla Bay and the others just south of Nibrunesi Point. Beach A was apportioned to the 34th brigade and B and C respectively to the 32nd and 33rd brigades.

Two hours before midnight the disembarkation began, the troops being taken to the shore by means of specially designed boats, nicknamed beetles, capable of travelling at about 5 knots and each carrying 500 men besides large supplies of ammunition. Very little trouble was anticipated or encountered. At Beaches B and C the landings were admirably carried out without opposition, but at A it was more difficult. Here Turkish pickets were on the alert. Moreover, some of the boats grounded before they reached the shore owing to shallow water, and the men were obliged to struggle through water in parts as deep as four feet. The lighters came under the flanking fire of the Turkish outposts at Lala Baba and Ghazi Baba. Later a more suitable place was found for landing the troops; known as New Beach A, it was situated about a mile east of Suvla Point.

The difficult situation in which the 34th brigade were placed was soon relieved by the storming of Lala Baba by a part of the 32nd brigade which had landed at Beach B and marched up along the coast. The assault was immediately successful and the 32nd brigade then moved up to support the 34th brigade, who were held up in front of Hill 10, another Turkish outpost. Whilst the fighting was in progress at this point the 11th Manchesters, belonging to the 34th brigade, were advancing northwards, driving the Turks along the ridge of Karakol Dagh.

But unfortunately the generalship was bad, for both at Hill 10 and Karakol Dagh there was confusion among the men of the two advancing brigades. There was no leader to take hold of them and launch them to the attack, and consequently there was some hesitation. Taking advantage of this, the Turks tried to drive the invading force back, but again the 11th Manchesters, acting on their own initiative, took them on the bayonet and, with the 9th Lancashire Fusiliers, broke them and drove them in disorder over Hill 10.

The Turks then retreated in an easterly direction towards the Anafarta Hills. They were pursued by the 34th and 32nd brigades and the 31st brigade from the 10th division. In the fighting that followed the 6th Inniskillings, the 6th Dublin Fusiliers and the 6th Irish Fusiliers distinguished themselves. By nightfall General Hammersley had seized Chocolate Hills, but reported that he was unable to advance farther towards the vital point, Ismail Oglu Tepe. Farther north Sir Bryan Mahon attacked along the edge of Kiretch Tepe Sirt in support of the 11th Manchesters, and succeeded in capturing a number of small Turkish trenches.

At this point a swift and decisive victory seemed probable, for against a comparatively small force of Turks the British had landed an army corps less a brigade, with 12,000 more riflemen coming up as reserves, and a further 12,000 behind them. The attackers had, moreover, a squadron of warships with long-range guns to strengthen the land artillery.

But there was extraordinary mismanagement by some of the generals. Another disastrous fact was the failure of the water supply, but this could have been remedied had the attack been carried out in a proper manner, for the hills where water was plentiful could easily have been occupied in a few hours. But instead of doing this the troops had wasted much energy toiling

LIVING IN HOPES

As on so many occasions in the War, the British command at the battle of Arras hoped vainly to exploit an initial infantry success by an extensive cavalry pursuit. This body of cavalry moved up hopefully through the streets of Arras, but once again the break through was not adequate to permit of their effective use

CONQUERING HEROES

Bapaume, like Peronne a much-coveted prize, fell to the Allies on March 17, 1917, having been previously sacked by the retreating Germans. Here, amid a lurid scene of smoke and ruins, Australians are marching in, their music proclaiming the end of enemy occupation

DELIVERING THE DIXIES

The British organization of ration supplies grew during the War to a high pitch of excellence. These food containers, known as dixies, carried on shoulder-yokes, led to a great economy in the men required to carry rations on the last stage up to the trenches

BUS RIDE TO BILLETS

Weary, but with their task well done, these British troops climb on to the buses which will take them from Arras back to rest billets, They have been taking part in the successful operations in April, 1917. which resulted in the capture of Vimy Ridge

along the edge of Salt Lake in the heat of the day before making an attack on Chocolate Hills. Thus the first 24 hours at Suvla had been virtually wasted, for although successful so far as they went, the attacks were inadequate in scale, especially in face of the very feeble enemy resistance encountered.

By the morning of August 8 the situation had become serious. Sir Ian Hamilton sent a staff officer to review the situation, and he found that, although the enemy was still as weak as on the previous day, the British troops were missing valuable opportunities. On hearing this news, Sir Ian sailed for Suvla Bay, arriving there at 5 o'clock in the afternoon of August 8.

Sir Ian's first action on his arrival was to pay a visit to the commander of the 9th corps, who had taken up his headquarters on board H.M.S. Jonquil. General Stopford seemed confident that the situation was quite satisfactory. He explained the feebleness of the advance by stating that the men were very tired and that the lack of water made it impossible for it to continue that day, but that it would proceed on the morning of the 9th. Sir Ian, however, did not accept this explanation; he urged an immediate advance on Ismail Oglu and Tekke Hills. Stopford raised a number of objections, but Sir Ian, still unsatisfied, paid a visit to the Divisional Headquarters on shore. Here he saw Major-General Hammersley.

Describing this interview in his official dispatch, Sir Ian says:

> I warned him the sands were running out fast and that by dawn the high ground to his front might very likely be occupied in force by the enemy. He saw the danger, but declared that it was a physical impossibility, at so late an hour (6 p.m.), to get out orders for a night attack, the troops being very much scattered. There was no other difficulty now, but this was insuperable; he could not recast his orders or get them round to his troops in time. But one brigade, the 32nd, was, so General Hammersley admitted, more or less concentrated and ready to move . . . I therefore issued a direct order that, even if it were only with this 32nd Brigade, the advance should begin at the earliest possible moment, so that a portion at least of the 11th Division should anticipate the Turkish reinforcements on the heights and dig themselves in there upon some good tactical point.

Although Sir Ian gave his orders at 6 p.m. on August 8, it was not until 4 p.m. on the 9th that the 32nd brigade began its advance. One company of the 8th (Pioneer) battalion of the Welsh regiment succeeded in topping a hill north of Anafarta Sagir, but the rest of the battalion and the 32nd brigade were attacked from both flanks and fell back to a line north and south of Sulajik. The leading company was, therefore, cut off, and very few men succeeded in getting back.

After the retirement of the 32nd brigade a further retrograde movement was necessary to bring it into line with the most forward of its comrades. It is more than likely, however, that if the troops had been pushed up on August 8 when all difficulties about water had been overcome, the Turkish army marching on Suvla would have been thrown back, a connexion with the Anzac army would have been effected, and all the enemy positions on the peninsula dominated. As it was the 11th division made its long-delayed attack on the Anafarta Ridge when the Turks had brought their guns up and been strongly reinforced.

During the night of August 8–9 the general reserve, the 53rd Territorial division, had been disembarked. This was immediately thrown into the fight, but no advance was made. On the 10th the division was again launched against the Anafarta Ridge, but failed to take it. Then, on the 12th, the infantry of the 54th division, which had just landed, were sent against the position, but they too, met with little success.

In the course of this fight a mysterious disaster befell the 1/5th Norfolks. Stationed on the right of the attacking line, they found themselves less strongly opposed than the rest of the brigade, and under the leadership of their colonel, Sir H. Beauchamp, pressed forward. As they advanced the fighting grew hotter and the country more wooded and broken. The colonel, however, with 16 officers and 250 men, continued to push forward, driving the enemy before him. Nothing more was ever heard of any of them. They charged into the forest and were lost; not one of them came back.

On the 15th another attack was launched. The objective was Kiretch Tepe Sirt, and the 30th and 31st brigades of the 10th division made a frontal attack, supported by the 162nd brigade of the 54th division and the guns of the Grampus and Foxhound. After several hours of indecisive fighting, the 6th Royal Dublin Fusiliers charged forward and captured the whole ridge, but unfortunately they could not hold the position and were obliged to retire on the 16th. This assault was of a more critical nature than was realized at the time. Speaking of it Liman von Sanders said:

> If during their attacks on August 15 and 16 the British had captured and held the iretch Tepe, the whole position of the 5th Army would have been outflanked. The British might have then achieved a decisive and final victory. The ridge of Kiretch Tepe and its southern slopes command from the north the wide plain of Anafarta. From its eastern slope the offensive could have been easily continued with decisive results along and covered by the big depression which leads to Akbash and thence right across the Peninsula. . . . There can be no doubt that in view of the great British superiority a complete success had been possible for them.

On August 15 Sir F. W. Stopford was retired from his command and replaced by Major-General H. B. de Lisle.

To return to the Anzac attack on Sari Bair. August 7 was spent in reorganizing the troops for a fresh advance. For the new attack the forces were divided into three columns; the right, under Brigadier-General F. E. Johnston, comprising the 26th Indian Mountain Battery, the Auckland Mounted Rifles, N.Z. Infantry Brigade, two battalions of the 13th division and the Maori Contingent, and the centre and left columns, commanded by Brigadier-General H. V. Cox, containing the 21st Indian Mountain Battery, 4th Australian brigade, with the 6th South Lancs, and the 29th Indian brigade.

The Anzac advance was resumed at 4.15 on the morning of August 8. About two thirds of the distance to the mountain summits had already been gained, but the defenders of these summits had now been strongly reinforced and were fully prepared. However, the column on the right advanced against Chunuk Bair and by daybreak succeeded in seizing a knoll on the south-western slopes of the mountain. Here the 7th Gloucesters suffered terrible losses. So hot had been the fighting that they had had no opportunity to dig trenches, but had merely scraped a few inches of earth out of the ground, and from there they had to withstand attack after attack. In the course of these fights the battalion lost every officer and many senior non-commissioned officers.

Meanwhile the 39th Infantry brigade and 29th Indian brigade, forming the centre column, advanced up the ravines leading to Sari Bair Ridge and extended their ground beyond the farm on the height known as Hill Q. Here the fire was so intense that little progress could be made. The advance of the 4th Australian brigade, on the left, was met by a hail of bullets from well placed Turkish machine-guns, and the troops, after being almost surrounded by the enemy, suffered terribly and had to be withdrawn to their original position. The men, like their comrades all along the line, were half dead with thirst and fatigue, but they held their ground and repulsed attack after attack. Had the Suvla operations been successful the support from that quarter might have turned the tide of battle, but no help came, and whilst the Turks were steadily gaining strength the British

FAITHFUL TO THEIR MASTERS

The unswerving loyalty to the German cause of the native levies under Von Lettow-Vorbeck was a notable feature of the campaign in East Africa. These black troops, marching past their white officers at Kigoma, in Tanganyika, put up a fine and prolonged resistance to the British invasion under General Smuts

Photo: E. & J.

troops, owing to the difficulties of water and ground, could not even be reinforced.

On August 9 the attack was renewed, the troops being rearranged into three columns for this purpose. The object on this occasion was for the column on the right, under Brigadier-General Johnston, to hold and consolidate the ground already gained and to gain the whole of Chunuk Bair and extend to the south-east, whilst the other columns, under Brigadier-Generals Cox and Baldwin, attacked Hill Q. General Baldwin's column was to launch the main attack, the other backing it up.

The whole movement was preceded by a violent bombardment by the fleet. This began at 4.30 a.m. and continued until 5.16, after which the attack began. Part of the right column, consisting of some of the 6th Gurkhas and the 6th South Lancashires, succeeded in reaching a point on the ridge from which the Straits could be seen, and began to pursue the enemy down the other side. They were, however, driven back by artillery fire, which gave the enemy a chance to counter-attack and drive them back from their summit.

Meanwhile General Baldwin's column, which was attacking the same ridge from another direction, lost its bearings and was driven by heavy rifle and machine-gun fire to the slopes leading to the Farm, where an endeavour was made to deploy and advance up the slope. The Turks, however, were too strong and their attack was rolled back, in spite of repeated and valiant assaults.

Attacks against the column holding the knoll on Chunuk Bair were, however, repulsed by the New Zealanders, who managed to stand their ground until the night. When evening fell on the 9th the British line extended along Rhododendron Spur up to the crest of Chunuk Bair, but unfortunately the men had not paid sufficient attention to digging themselves in, probably owing to fatigue, and they were therefore not well placed to meet any attacks. Moreover, the main line had been withdrawn some 25 yards from the crest, instead of being actually on the top, and look-out posts had not been established along the summit.

On the night of August 9–10 two battalions of the New Army—the 6th Loyal North Lancashires and the 5th Wiltshires — returned to Brigadier-General Johnston's brigade on Chunuk Bair. It was then, according to the point of view of the New Zealanders and their British companions, that the great mistake was made. The North Lancashires arrived in good time, but the 5th Wiltshires were delayed by the intricate country and did not come up until 4 a.m. on the 10th. The Lancashire men began to strengthen their trenches, but the Wiltshires were ordered by their officers to lie down in mere scrapings. None of the superior officers of these two bodies of fresh, untried troops grasped fully the needs of the situation. Both battalions should have dug and erected some defence against bombs rolled down the slope.

Photo: Imperial War Museum

STRETCHERS IN THE SUN

One of the battles in the campaign in German East Africa, now known as Tanganyika Territory, took place at Mahiwa, in October, 1917, the native brigade from Nigeria particularly distinguishing itself. Here some of the lightly wounded lie on stretchers, waiting in the sun for their wounds to be dressed

At daybreak on Tuesday, the 10th, the Turks delivered a grand attack on a line Chunuk Bair–Hill Q. First the British line was swept with a hail of shrapnel, and then a large Turkish column of 15 battalions concentrated on the opposite slope and, storming over the crest in a huge mass, broke the North Lancashires and the Wiltshires and then the right flank of the line below. Baldwin's column was obliged to give ground, and it was only with the greatest difficulty and terrible loss that it managed to escape.

Swept by shrapnel and overborne by numbers, the small force withdrew farther down the slope of Chunuk Bair, and the victorious Turks then charged over the crest into the great gully south of Rhododendron Ridge. The gully led between the advanced lines of the Anzac forces and their base on the beach. Had this great attack succeeded there would have been a great British disaster. But here the leaders were equal to the situation; every available man was thrown into the fray, colonels and generals fought side by side, and the Turkish onslaught was stayed.

A great counterstroke was now delivered. The warships, together with the land artillery, brought a terrible barrage to bear upon the enemy. As the successive lines of Turks topped the crest their ranks were torn asunder by a terrible rain of metal. There were 10 machine-guns in the Anzac line, and the remnants of choking, half-dazed Turks who succeeded in penetrating the artillery barrage were caught in a rain of bullets. For half an hour the machine-guns carried on their deadly work, and scarcely a Turk returned to the hills. In that half hour upwards of 12,000 had been killed, but the British losses, too, had been severe, their casualties including three commanders, Generals Baldwin, Cayley and Cooper.

Further Turkish attacks delivered during the day were repulsed, and gradually their pressure slackened and died away altogether. But the British troops were too fatigued to try to regain their lost ground. Sir Ian Hamilton at

Photo Sport and General

IN MEMORIAM

Here two German soldiers, behind the lines, are building and inscribing crosses for their dead comrades. All over the battlefields improvised cemeteries sprang up, witnesses to the ghastly expenditure of human life

one time thought of throwing all his reserves into this battle in the hope of retrieving the situation, but he was prevented from doing this because he feared that the water supply at Anzac was inadequate for additional troops. The grand attack had failed; for the remainder of the campaign the Turks held on to the ground they had won.

General de Lisle's first task on assuming command of the 9th corps at Suvla was to make a survey of the situation. He found that his forces, the 10th, 11th, 53rd, and 54th divisions, only amounted to about 30,000 rifles. He therefore made representations to G.H.Q. for reinforcements, and suggested that his force should be strengthened by bringing over the 29th division from Helles. This was agreed to, and de Lisle made plans to carry on the attack against the Anafarta Ridges on the 21st. His scheme was for the two Territorial divisions to hold the enemy from Sulajik to Kiretch Tepe Sirt, whilst the 11th division, on their left, and the 10th division, on their right, launched an attack on Ismail Oglu Tepe and the ridge running thence to Anafarta Sagir. Birdwood was to co-operate by swinging his left flank forward to Susuk Kuyu and Kaiajik Aghala.

In one of his dispatches Sir Ian Hamilton says that he would have liked to have extended the scope of his attack by ordering an advance of the 9th corps all along the line, but that in view of the fact that many of the battalions had already been too highly tried, he felt it unwise to call upon them for another effort so soon. He believed, also, that once Anafarta Ridge was in his hands the enemy would be unable to reinforce through the gap between the two Anafartas.

The attack was launched on the afternoon of the 21st, but two mischances in the work of part of the 11th division led to another British defeat. The 34th brigade rushed the Turkish trenches between Hetman Chair and Aire Kavak, practically without loss, but the 32nd brigade, which should have connected with the 34th and taken

THE EMPEROR EATS

Breaking off for a while from a tour of inspection of part of the German front line, the Kaiser sits down to a picnic meal with members of his staff. His withered left arm, an infirmity from birth, hangs useless by his side

Photo: G.P.A.

the south-west corner of Ismail Oglu Tepe, failed to reach its objective. It had lost its direction, and instead of moving east it travelled in a north-easterly direction. Although it tried to carry a communication trench from the north-east with utter disregard of life, it never managed to rectify its original mistake. Then the 33rd brigade, sent up in haste to capture the Turkish positions at any cost, fell into precisely the same error, and instead of reaching the vital south-west corner, wasted its effort in a north-easterly and south-easterly direction.

Meanwhile, the 29th division, which set out half an hour after the 11th division, stormed Scimitar Hill (Hill 70), and despite the fact that one brigade was checked by a great forest fire across its front, the division pressed on up the Anafarta valley, until checked by the failure of the two brigades of the 11th division to take their objectives. The 86th brigade of the 29th division tried to carry out the work of the 11th division, but as it moved eastwards across the spur of Hill 100 it was swept by a crossfire of shell and rifle fire from the north and south-east and was obliged to fall back to a ledge near Scimitar Hill.

It was then that the Yeomanry came into action. "The advance of these men," said Sir Ian, "was a sight calculated to send a thrill of pride through anyone with a drop of English blood running in their veins." Under a steady and accurate fire from the Turkish batteries it advanced in open formation across a plain for a mile and a half, moving like men marching on parade, while the Turkish shells made curtains of shrapnel bullets in its path.

The actual attack by the Yeomen did not take place until dusk, by which time they had joined up with the 29th division. The combined forces then pushed up the valley between Scimitar Hill and Hill 100 and captured a knoll near the centre of this horseshoe of heights. But the combined charge of the Yeomanry and the 29th division could not carry the amphitheatre of Turkish trenches on the top of Hill 100. The men were too tired and had lost too heavily to make a second assault, and they were therefore obliged to fall back to their original line. The 29th division lost nearly 5,000 men, and the Yeomen also suffered very heavily during the operation.

The prearranged attack of Major-General Cox, on the right, advanced in three sections. The advance of his left and centre sections succeeded, but the right met with stubborn resistance, although it managed to effect a lodgement on Kaiajik Aghala before nightfall. On the 22nd an additional battalion reinforced this section, and after several attacks and counter-attacks a line from Kaiajik Aghala to Susuk Kuyu was taken up and later joined with the right of the 9th corps.

Towards the end of the month Birdwood again detailed a force under Major-General Cox to complete the capture of Hill 60, an eminence immediately north of Kaiajik Aghala, which overlooked one of the Anafarta valleys. The advance began at 5 p.m. on the 27th after an ineffective preliminary bombardment. The troops used were drawn from the 4th and 5th Australian brigades, the New Zealand Mounted Rifles and the 5th Connaught Rangers.

As soon as the Anzac troops swarmed out into the open they were met by a hot fire from field-guns, rifles and



Photos: G.P.A.

INVISIBLE MEN

The lengths of wire netting covered with sacking or other material toning with the street, and stretched across from house to house, render these two Germans invisible to aerial observers and safe from enemy bombs. This form of camouflage was widely used by both sides in the effort to outwit their enemies

PROBING VITAL SECRETS

The appearance of the tanks was a surprise to the Germans, but with the capture of the first of these new engines of destruction their secrets were revealed to the enemy. Here Germans are testing the climbing power of captured British machines, now re-decorated

ON THE LADIES' WAY

These German troops on their way to the Aisne battlefields are pouring over the famous highway Chemin des Dames, running from Soissons to Craonne. The objective of many French offensives, it was not finally wrested from Germany until September, 1918

Photo: G. P.A

achine-guns. On the right the troops ere held up, but in the centre the ew Zealanders fought their way ubbornly upwards and after four and half hours' fighting took nearly nine-nths of the summit. Then, on the ft, a single company of the Connaught angers stormed the northern com-unication trenches of the Turks. The hole battalion then engaged upon a rious bomb fight along the other nemy trenches. The men drew many f the Turkish supports and were romised the help of fresh troops by idnight. But before the reinforce-ents arrived the enemy commander unched part of his general reserve gainst the Connaught men and drove nem from their trenches as the 9th ustralian Light Horse were coming up. he Australians made a plucky but vain ttempt to regain the lost ground, uffering heavy casualties.

This retreat left the N.Z. Mounted ifles isolated on top of the hill. Their olding was reduced to 150 yards of rench, and all that night and through-ut the next day they were bombed, nelled and blasted with high explosive, nd subjected to repeated bayonet harges. But nothing that the Turk ould do could shake them, and early n the afternoon of the 29th the urkish communication trenches on he left were carried and held by the oth Light Horse. Thus was won an nportant height, from which the at-acking artillery officers gained an utlook over the Anafarta Sagir valley, while the lateral communications between Anzac and Suvla Bay were made safer. This was the last engagement of any importance in the vicinity of Suvla Bay until the evacuation.

The carefully planned operations at Helles, Anzac and Suvla had failed. The Narrows were still out of sight and out of field-gun range, but, despite the failure, Sir Ian Hamilton remained confident that, given sufficient reinforcements, he could yet achieve a decisive victory. But during September the flow of munitions and drafts fell away and sickness began to thin the ranks of the survivors on the peninsula.

The causes which brought about the failure of the Suvla operations have been the subject of much controversy, but there can be little doubt that the fatal delay in advancing during the early stages was the major error. But, according to the findings of the Dardanelles Commission, the whole plan of attack was open to criticism. The country over which it was made, it says, was very difficult, especially at Anzac, and the fact that the main advance had to be made at night greatly increased the risk of failure.

A good deal of the blame must be laid upon Sir Frederick Stopford and General Hammersley. Neither of these commanders seemed to realize the necessity for an advance during August 7 and 8, and, moreover, the leading of the 11th division, which constituted the main body of the attack, was not satisfactory. The lack of water, too, was an important factor in the failure, but this was due not so much to it being unobtainable as to bad staff work. Even so, it must be borne in mind that the whole campaign was carried out under conditions of immense difficulty, and, if in itself it had produced no tangible results, it had at least engaged the major portion of the Turkish army and kept them from carrying out an offensive in other theatres of war

Photos: G.P.A.

WINGS OVER BRUGES

British naval aeroplanes bombed Ostend, Zeebrugge and Bruges on June 1, 1917, dropping over five tons of explosives. The havoc they wrought is illustrated by this photograph of man and beast lying slain in the courtyard of Bruges station

WEIRD TRENCH CUTTER

Used only in the back areas, since it could not be rapidly moved and was extremely vulnerable, this over ingenious German machine was employed for digging reserve trenches. This was effected by means of a chain of buckets on a circular moving band which was propelled by an electric motor

CHAPTER 50

EAST AFRICA: FIRST PHASE

The portion of East Africa now known as Tanganyika, unlike Germany's other African possessions, was only conquered by the British with considerable difficulty. The first campaign is outlined below

THE great district of Africa that is now known as Tanganyika received the attentions of explorers and traders in very early times. From the days of the Phoenicians its rich resources had tempted the adventurers of several European nations, but no permanent settlement was made, probably owing to bad climatic conditions, until the 19th century. In 1846 some German traders appeared at Zanzibar, and after the unification of Germany in 1871 this region appeared to offer a field for the policy of colonial expansion inaugurated by Bismarck. In 1884 the German government made the first move towards founding the colony which was afterwards to become German East Africa. In that year Dr. Karl Peters was sent to negotiate with the native chiefs, and, as a result, in the following year Germany declared a protectorate over the hitherto independent state of Witu.

During the next few years there was a race between Germany and Great Britain to stake claims in East Africa. A chartered company, the British East African Corporation, was formed to counteract the activities of Peters, whose government had granted him a charter of protection. Friction between the two companies inevitably arose, for the sultan of Zanzibar, with complete impartiality, granted leases of territory to both. By 1890 the state of affairs had become so unsatisfactory that the two governments entered into negotiations in order to discover a *modus vivendi*. As a result, on July 1, 1890, a treaty was concluded between Britain and Germany; to this France was also a signatory. According to the terms of this treaty Germany withdrew from Witu and relinquished all claims to other lands north of the colony in East Africa that was recognized as a German possession. Britain established a protectorate over Zanzibar and Pemba and the regions north of the new German zone up to Somaliland, reaching westward from Mombasa as far inland as Uganda. Germany recognized this British sphere, while France obtained recognition of her claims to Madagascar, the Sahara and the Nigerian Sudan.

In one respect the terms of the treaty created much dissatisfaction in Germany. Zanzibar, by far the largest town in East Africa, and having the only harbour of any importance, did not pass into her possession. But with characteristic patience the Germans set about to create new ports at Tanga and Dar-es-Salaam, and in the end they succeeded in building up a colony which a prominent German writer once described as the "jewel of all her possessions."

The territory which by this treaty came under the German flag covered an area of over 368,000 square miles, being twice the size of Germany and 60,000 square miles larger than German South-West Africa. Water covered over 20,000 square miles of it, for the territory, which stretched away from the Indian Ocean between Uganda and British East Africa on the north and Rhodesia and Portuguese East Africa on the south, was bounded along its western border by the length of Lake Tanganyika, and included in its area the southern half of Lake Victoria and the northern end of Lake Nyasa.

The coast extends from the mouth of the Ruvuma in the south to the Umba river in the north. It is chiefly composed of coral, is little indented, and is generally low, partly sandy, partly rich alluvial soil covered with dense bush or mangroves. The coastal plain is from 10 to 30 m. wide and 620 m. long; it is bordered on the west by the precipitous eastern side of a great plateau. This plateau attains its highest elevation north of Lake Nyasa, with heights up to 9,000 or more feet.

A deep narrow gorge traverses the middle of the plateau. In the north it spreads into several side valleys, from one of which rises the extinct volcano Kilimanjaro, the highest mountain in Africa (19,325 ft.). Its glaciers send down rills which combine to form the Pangani river. About 40 m. west of Kilimanjaro is Mount Meru (14,955 ft.), another volcanic peak, with a double crater. South-east of Mount Kilimanjaro are the Pare mountains and Usambara highlands, separated from the coast by a comparatively narrow strip of plain. To the south of the Usambara hills and on the eastern edge of the plateau are the mountainous regions of Nguru, otherwise Unguru, Useguha and Usagara. The country is well watered, but, with the exception of the Rufiji, the rivers, save for a few miles from their mouths, are unnavigable. The largest streams are the Ruvuma and Rufiji, both rising in the central plateau and flowing to the Indian ocean. Next in importance is the Pangani river, which has its head springs on the slopes of Kilimanjaro. Flowing in a south-easterly direction, it reaches the sea after a course of some 250 miles. Into Victoria Nyanza are emptied, on the east, the waters of the Mori and many smaller streams; on the west, the Kagera, besides smaller rivers. Into Tanganyika flows the Mlagarassi. The Kalambo is a comparatively small stream which enters the south-east end of Lake Tanganyika.

The heat is intense in the dry season, and away from the rivers water is completely lacking, while during the rainy season

Map of the district of East Africa now called Tanganyika and formerly a German colony. Its chief port is Dar-es-Salaam, on the Indian Ocean

vast territories are inundated. Under these conditions it is not surprising to find that malaria is widely prevalent. Such a climate obviously made the task of colonization a difficult one, and in 1913 the white population of German East Africa in all scarcely reached the figure of 6,000.

The chief wealth of the country lay in its enormous agricultural resources. The presence of the tsetse prevented the development of cattle farming except in the highlands, but everywhere tropical products flourished. The Germans started plantations in suitable localities, and numerous experiments were made which increased the commercial and agricultural possibilities of the whole country. Native production had been systematized and encouraged, and nothing had been left undone by the colonisers to ensure that German East Africa should be prosperous and contented.

That Germany administered this colony with reasonable humanity and consideration for the natives is proved by the fact that throughout the War the people remained loyal to their rulers. Even in Germany's darkest hour there was no wholesale desertion, though it is true that when the victory of the Allies was assured a certain amount of coolness towards their German rulers was shown by the tribes. The Askari regiments (native levies) which had been raised during the War remained loyal to the end, and native subjects showed a marked reluctance to take up arms against their former rulers.

The German forces in East Africa at the outbreak of war were commanded by a very remarkable man, Lieutenant-Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck. With military ability he combined a power of winning the loyalty of the natives. He had taken over the command of the German forces in East Africa in January, 1914, and he undoubtedly knew long before the outbreak of hostilities that a world war was imminent. He realized that the ports would be blockaded and that he would be cut off from all sources of supplies. He foresaw that he would be compelled to face a long-drawn-out struggle, during which his own resources would gradually diminish while those of the enemy would steadily increase. On the other hand, he had under his command a native army which had reached a high degree of efficiency and discipline. Besides that, the Askari were immune from endemic diseases, which played havoc with the European and Indian troops. He had the further advantage that if he retreated before the enemy he would fall back on fresh sources of supplies, which the attacking force would lack.

Lettow-Vorbeck had under his command a force of about 4,500 Askari and 260 Europeans, the latter being afterwards augmented by the crews of the Königsberg and of the Möwe, the German survey ship sunk during the British attack on Dar-es-Salaam. In August, 1914, there was only a very small force in British East Africa, so that an immediate offensive was impossible. The British troops were, indeed, inadequate for anything but defence. These considerations induced Lettow-Vorbeck to embark forthwith on an offensive, and within fourteen days of the declaration of war a German force had occupied Taveta, on British soil, and threatened at once the communications between Nairobi and the sea and the port of Mombasa. The

Photos: G.P.A.

UNWELCOME SPOTLIGHT

The protection of darkness has been suddenly removed from this Allied aeroplane by a powerful German searchlight, and immediately the anti-aircraft guns will be trained upon it. The spotlight, so coveted by actors and actresses, was naturally hated by night-raiding aircraft

SKY SHIP BRIDGE

The gondola of this German airship, the L 6, resembles in many ways the bridge of a battleship, but these men are sailing close to the clouds, far above the sea. Of a total of 61 German airships commissioned during the war, only 10 were effective at the end

BULGARIANS AT BAY

General Sarrail's mixed force met with strenuous resistance from the Bulgarians during its gradual advance through difficult mountain country northwards from Salonika. Both these photographs show Bulgarians making a last stand, with rifles and machine-guns, on the heights of Monastir. The town fell to the Allies on Nov. 19, 1916, the first place of importance to be recaptured for Serbia

forward policy of Lettow-Vorbeck was for a time hindered by von Schnee, the German governor of the colony, who was overmastered by a fear of a British sea attack upon the exposed ports of his territory. His worst fears were realized on August 8, 1914, when two old British cruisers, the Astrea and the Pegasus, which were stationed at Zanzibar, suddenly appeared before the port of Dar-es-Salaam.

Schnee was panic-stricken at the sight. He at once negotiated for the surrender of the port, but the British commander had not a sufficient force at his disposal to occupy it. He contented himself with landing enough men to destroy the wireless station and with sinking the floating dock and the Möwe. The Germans themselves had closed the entrance to the harbour. Then the British flotilla sailed away, and the same day Schnee departed for a pleasant hill station at Morogoro, leaving Lettow-Vorbeck more or less free to conduct his own affairs. He at once prepared to secure his lines of advance into British East Africa. Vanga, the most southerly port on the coast, was seized, and by a rapid march from Moshi through the gap between the northern end of the Pare mountains and the slopes of Kilimanjaro he took the British frontier post of Taveta. Some other minor operations were carried out by Lettow-Vorbeck, but the chief scene of hostilities was the frontier.

While the commander of the German forces had been preparing for war for some time, the British were not only unprepared, but the greater part of their forces, the King's African Rifles, were at the other end of the colony engaged in quelling a native rising. The British were, therefore, compelled to take up a purely defensive attitude, concentrating all their efforts on raising troops. Among the white settlers two regiments were recruited, one of cavalry and one of infantry, and a remarkable force was also raised by Major A. J. B. Wavell, consisting entirely of Arabs. Major Wavell had made the pilgrimage to Mecca and commanded the complete confidence of his men, who did most useful work until he was killed in action in January, 1916, when his force, deprived of his leadership, quickly dispersed.

Lettow-Vorbeck's only hope of a large-scale success was to take the offensive before the British were reinforced, and he therefore planned to strike at Mombasa from Tanga, supported from the sea by the cruiser Königsberg, which had arrived in African waters just before the outbreak of war. An appeal had been made to the Indian government to send reinforcements to British East Africa, and on September 3, 1914, Indian Expeditionary Force B, as it was officially called, arrived at Mombasa. It consisted only of the 29th Punjabis, but with the force came Brigadier-General J. M. Stewart, who thereupon took over the command of all the troops in the protectorate.

General Stewart at once prepared for an offensive, but before it could be carried out Lettow-Vorbeck launched his attack upon Mombasa. He had no thought of retaining the town permanently, but he hoped, with the help of the Königsberg, to hold it long enough to wreck the port and prevent, or seriously delay, the arrival of fresh British reinforcements.

His intention was that the German land force should leave Vanga on

Photos: G.P.A.

UNEASY ALLIES

Here can be seen Enver Pasha, Turkish minister of war and leader of the Young Turk party, and General von Winckler, who took over command of the enemy troops on the Salonika front in September, 1916 Disagreement between Enver and the German military authorities grew increasingly frequent

WATCHERS UNWANTED

Kavalla, a Greek seaport due east of Salonika, was occupied by the Bulgarians without a declaration of war, in August, 1916, their action rallying many Greeks to the support of the Allies. Bulgarian marines are on guard in the old fort overlooking the town

Photos: Crown Copyright

HALF-WAY HOUSE

For troops on their way up, these dug-outs on the Somme, known as Minden post, are a half-way house, for as well as being dressing stations they are a concentration post for reliefs. German prisoners can also be seen, halted on their way back to the nearest "cage"

September 20 and reach Mombasa on September 29. In the meantime the Königsberg was to steam out of Dar-es-Salaam and disable the two British cruisers. Only a very small part of the plan succeeded. On the day that she left Dar-es-Salaam the Königsberg arrived off Zanzibar and found that one of the British cruisers, the Pegasus, was undergoing repairs in the roadstead. A few rounds from the greatly superior guns of the German cruiser sank the British ship, and the Königsberg proceeded on her way to Mombasa.

But the sinking of the Pegasus was her only success. Rear-Admiral King-Hall with a squadron of ships from the Cape reached the African coast on the following day and headed the Königsberg off from Mombasa. She was compelled to fly, and after a chase lasting a fortnight Captain Looff, the German commander, ran his ship up the mouth of the Rufiji river until she grounded, for he considered that it was better to save her valuable stores and guns than lose everything in an unequal fight.

The German land forces met with no better success. After a three days' march through difficult country covered with dense undergrowth and having large stretches of swamp they reached Gazi, a small town twenty-five miles from Mombasa. They found that it was occupied by a detachment of the King's African Rifles and a small body of Arabs. This force could not be left behind to endanger the communications of the Germans, and it was therefore necessary to attack. The British defence was conducted with great energy. All the white officers were wounded, but the African troops never wavered. For a week they held out, and then, on October 2, some Indian troops from Mombasa arrived at Gazi. Lettow-Vorbeck realized that the position was hopeless, and he was forced to retire with his wearied force to Vanga.

This failure convinced him that to attempt operations on a large scale against an enemy already reinforced and likely soon to receive a fresh accession of troops was hopeless. He determined to use his forces to carry out constant raids on railways and

OUT OF THE FRAY

Another view of Minden post shows stretcher cases being temporarily bandaged during a brief halt at the dressing station before being taken back to the casualty clearing station. Regimental stretcher bearers have handed over their charges to men of the R.A.M.C.



'Canadian Records'

MONSTER MUNITIONS

A heavy motor tractor is needed to pull this load of heavy shells up to the big gun emplacements. These monsters are destined for the heavy howitzers, which fired shells varying in weight from about 300 to upwards of 1,500 pounds

terworks, but he achieved no results any value. Counter-raids by British rces were equally abortive, and it came clear that without a period of eparation little could be done. The rmans still held Taveta and Vanga, t that was the extent of their gains. the other hand, Britain had secured e control of the sea, and the only German warship in African waters was out of action. On the great lakes conditions were about equal, the Germans having secured control of Tanganyika and the British of lakes Nyasa and Victoria.

Meanwhile, further reinforcements were on their way from India. They consisted of 6,000 Indian troops and the 2nd battalion Loyal North Lancashire regiment, under the command of Major-General A. E. Aitken, and in anticipation of their arrival an offensive on a large scale was planned. It was proposed that the troops from Mombasa, under General Stewart, should make a demonstration against Taveta and sweep round north of Kilimanjaro by Mount Longido and attack the western end of the Usambara railway, while the troops from India should be directed straight at Tanga.

COOKS IN SKINS

is scene of culinary activity near Beaumont-Hamel was typical the areas near the front line, where cooking arrangements were essarily somewhat primitive. Three of the soldiers seen here are wearing the sheepskin jerkins issued to the troops in winter

Photo: Imperial War Museum

The transports conveying General Aitken's reinforcements arrived off Tanga on November 11. Unfortunately the element of surprise which would have done so much to ensure success was lacking, for the Germans had captured some Indian mails and learned of the British plans. Lettow-Vorbeck gave orders to the German commissioner to defend the port at any cost. Preparations were hastily made to meet the attack, but they were not complete when the British transports appeared off the shore and demanded the surrender of the German garrison. Auracher, the German commissioner, asked for time to obtain instructions from his superiors, and the request was granted. Lettow-Vorbeck used the time to hurry down reinforcements by rail, and when in the evening the British troops were landed at Ras Kasone, the Germans were fully prepared. The country between Ras Kasone and Tanga was practically all jungle, and through this the British had to force their way.

Unable to make any important advance, they retired, but the next

'Canadian Records'

DOWN THE SUNKEN ROAD

Easily spotted by enemy aircraft and so a constant target for the artillery, sunken roads such as this were on occasions little more than death-traps. Here can be seen limbers and lorries going up towards the line, while German prisoners help to lay wounded men for a rest beside the road

, reinforcements having arrived, attempt was renewed. Though the ance was slow the commander of German troops, Captain Baumstark, ided that Tanga could not be held inst a really strong attack. Accord- y, in the evening he withdrew the n body of his troops from the town, ving only a small garrison. A little r Lettow-Vorbeck himself arrived take stock of the situation. He ckly recognized that the British ps were in a dangerous position. ir only hope of success was to loy in full strength, but the jungle le such a movement wholly im- sible. The troops were unused to noeuvring in such conditions, while much smaller force, estimated at o men, which Lettow-Vorbeck had his disposal was inured to bush fare. He therefore reinforced the ps in the town and disposed the ainder along the line on which the tish troops were advancing.

he British and Indian troops pushed ward on the next day without much osition and entered Tanga. The ting at once became fierce, as the ll German force put up a vigorous stance. Then at three o'clock in afternoon Lettow-Vorbeck made a rise attack on the British flank, ngly supported by machine-gun The British were thrown into con- on, and there was no alternative retreat. The fight in the bush t on until after midnight, but, con- ally harassed by Lettow-Vorbeck's ll force, the British were compelled to tall back further, and they reached their base camp, having suffered a loss of nearly 800 men and 16 machine-guns. The attack failed because those who planned it and executed it were unacquainted with the conditions of bush warfare. Lettow-Vorbeck's small force succeeded because it was handled by a commander who, from long acquaintance with the country, could take full advantage of local conditions.

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FIRST STAGE DOWN

The early days of the Somme offensive brought a terrible total of casualties and only the seriously wounded could be afforded stretchers. Here a stretcher-bearer has hoisted a comrade on to his back on the first stage to the casualty clearing station

General Stewart's attack upon Longido fared no better. His forces had to march across a waterless desert in which the whole advantage was with the defenders. The British attacking force numbered 1,500 men, and they were opposed by 800 Germans. But the Germans had not only occupied a strong position, but had taken care that it should cover the only available water supply. In this case, as in the most critical action of the Gallipoli campaign, the failure of the British command to realize the importance of a sufficient supply of water brought about disaster. The reason for the failure of the Longido expedition was tersely summed up by a British officer: "We marched all night, fought all day, and then, having failed to turn the Germans out, came back here as we had no water."

The opening campaign in German East Africa thus resulted in stalemate. Lettow-Vorbeck held a small portion of the colony, and in spite of the rigorous blockade he had more than held his own. It is true that he had partially lost the command of Lake Victoria and that one of the chief ports, Bukoba, had fallen to the Allies, though it was subsequently recaptured by the Germans. On the west and south-west the British and Belgians had barely succeeded in holding in check the German raids.

Although the British plans had failed, the lessons of the campaign were not lost upon its leaders. No further offensive was undertaken until 1916, the whole of 1915 being occupied with preparations for the new attack.

TERROR OVERHEAD

This group of wounded men lie on stretchers, helpless and unprotected from enemy aircraft, waiting by the side of the road near Mametz for the arrival of the ambulance. The R.A.M.C. stretcher-bearer gazes anxiously skywards

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

MUD THE CONQUEROR

Tanks played a considerable part in the opening days of the Arras offensive in April, 1917. This example of the newest engine of war has, however, come to an enforced halt in a muddy ditch by the side of the road to Fampoux, captured with Hyderabad Redoubt by the 4th division on the first day of the attack

Photo: Imperial War Museum

CHAPTER 51

FAILURE AT LOOS

The most ambitious British offensive in the West in 1915 was made between Loos and La Bassée in September and resulted in heavy losses. The contemporary French offensive in Champagne is described in Chapter 53

SOUTH of the La Bassée canal, stretching from Béthune to Loos, lies a great bare plain, with small villages at rare intervals breaking the monotony of the flat landscape. The melancholy of the country is intensified by the gaunt pylons and great slag heaps of the pit heads. As the British official historian remarks, " a more unpromising scene for a great offensive battle can hardly be imagined." Neither Sir John French nor the 4th corps commander, Sir Henry Rawlinson, were in favour of conducting a large-scale offensive over such ground. " My new front," said the latter, " is as flat as the palm of my hand. Hardly any cover anywhere." However, the British Government had assured General Joffre that his September campaign in Champagne would be adequately supported by the British expeditionary force, and a programme for a simultaneous offensive by the British and French was planned by Sir John French and General Joffre, by which the British were to advance upon Lens and further open the way into the plain of the Scheldt.

The battle-line in France between Verdun and the coast formed a great salient, the apex of which was a few miles south-west of Noyon. Joffre's plan involved a twofold offensive, of which one assault was to be delivered eastward from the Artois plateau and the other northward from between Reims and the Argonne. If these simultaneous operations proved successful, the convergent advance would, it was hoped, cut off the three German armies holding the salient at Noyon by capturing their only main lines of communication, the roads and railways which led from Germany to France through the wide gap which stretched between the Ardennes and the Dutch frontier.

In this scheme the British expeditionary force was to participate, first of all, by taking over some of the French line south of Arras in order to release the French 2nd army for the Champagne offensive, and, secondly, by taking part with the French 10th army in the offensive in Artois. On June 20, 1915, Sir Douglas Haig was asked to submit a plan of attack to be carried out by the British 1st army on the French left, between Lens and Armentières. He replied that the ground was most unsuitable for an attack, that the German defences there were too strong to be effectively reduced by the artillery then at his disposal, that the Germans had the advantage in artillery positions and observation points, and that the open country made the assembly of large numbers of troops impossible of concealment. He further stressed the shortage of heavy artillery and ammunition.

In spite of his plain speaking, he was overridden by the insistence of General Joffre, and the attack was decided upon. Moreover, during a visit to France in August, Lord Kitchener impressed upon Sir John French that " we must act with all energy and do our utmost to help France in their offensive, even though by so doing we may suffer very heavy losses." On returning to London he confirmed his conversation by telegram, telling French " to take the offensive and act vigorously."

Thus, in the words of the official historian, " under pressure from Lord Kitchener at home due to the general position of the Allies, and from Generals Joffre and Foch in France, due to the local situation in France, the British commander-in-chief was compelled to undertake operations before he was ready, over ground that was most unfavourable, against the better judgement of himself and of General Haig, and, as we shall see, with no more than a quarter of the troops, 9 divisions instead of 36, that he considered necessary for a successful attack." In the end it was agreed that the offensive should be launched by all the assaulting troops, both French and English, on September 8.

Meanwhile, the Germans were vigorously engaged in strengthening their position by the construction of a second line with deep barbed wire entanglements and many machine-gun emplacements. The existence of this second line was well known to Sir John French, and he once more attempted to induce Joffre to postpone the date of the attack, but again he was overruled. Yet when the time came to advance, the French were still not quite ready. The labour of bringing up three or four million shells, and transforming the larger part of the French railway system into a gun-feeding machine, required a long time.

But by the middle of September, 1915, Hindenburg's victory at Kovno had released some 1,000 heavy



Map of the area around Loos that was assaulted by the British towards the end of September, 1915. The German front and second lines of defence and the positions of the six British divisions that delivered the main attack are shown

Photos: Imperial War Museum

MENACING THE VERY SKY

This 12-inch howitzer at Salvation Corner, near Ypres, behind the actual fighting line, is ready to hurl its enormous shells on to and beyond the German trenches. Even the hardened transport men on the road are interested in this monster of war

howitzers from service on the German eastern front, and these were immediately dispatched to strengthen the battle-line in the west. And so the result of the long-prepared campaign in France became largely dependent upon the race between the French and German railway organizations. Heavy German batteries passed through the Friedrichstrasse station in Berlin on September 15, the day on which General Joffre issued the army order for a grand offensive, but though by this time the French Creusot guns were placed in position, the necessary organization of the French railways was not completed. On August 31 Joffre sent word to French that the French would not be ready to attack before September 15. Four days later the fateful date was again postponed until September 25.

The Franco-British offensive in Artois was to be supervised by General Foch. The plan was for an attack on a twenty-mile frontage between Arras and the La Bassée canal, in the direction of Le Quesnoy–Frasnes lez Buissenal. Owing to the strong resistance expected from the almost contiguous towns of Loos, Liévin and Lens, it was decided that Lens should not be invested until the attacks from north and south had compelled the defenders to withdraw.

The main assault, delivered between Lens and the La Bassée canal, was entrusted to the British 1st army, under Sir Douglas Haig, and at the same time the French 10th army, under d'Urbal, was ordered to press forward on its right flank on a front extending from Lens to Ficheux, five miles south of Arras. During this advance the British 2nd army, under Sir H. Plumer, was given the task of making a demonstration from Ypres to Armentières, in order to pin as many German troops as possible to that sector, while south of Armentières the 3rd corps, the Indian corps and the 2nd division, all units of the 1st army, were to create a similar diversion against Aubers Ridge and the strongly held German positions north of the La Bassée canal.

The battle was of tactical interest for two reasons: for the first time troops of the new British armies, raised in 1914, were employed offensively;

'SIGNALS' FORWARD

The job assigned to these men of the Royal Engineers was unspectacular but of vital importance and terribly hazardous. Known as "Signals," they had constantly to lay, relay and repair telephone wires, often in completely exposed ground

Photo: Imperial War Museum

'CRY HAVOC!'

It would be difficult to find a better illustration than this photograph for Shakespeare's famous line "Cry 'Havoc!' and let slip the dogs of war." Smoke, splinters and falling masonry follow the explosion of a shell in this shattered and desolate village

and for the first time gas, discharged from cylinders, was used by the Allies against the Germans. After the first German gas attack at Ypres, in April, experiments had been carried out by the British with a view to retaliating in kind, and a special gas service was organized under the direction of Major (later Major-General) C. H. Foulkes, with headquarters at Helfaut, near St. Omer. A special unit, known later as the Special Brigade, was responsible for the installation and discharge of the cylinders and the conduct of gas operations in general. For the battle of Loos more than 400 cylinder emplacements were constructed along the British front, and a printed programme of the different phases of the gas attack was issued to officers. As sufficient gas was not available for a forty-minute discharge, it was arranged to alternate gas and smoke clouds, and as conditions had to be favourable before any release of gas could take place, forty officers from the gas service. stationed in the front line, sent in hourly wind readings throughout the night. It was decided to employ the gas on the whole front of attack south of the La Bassée canal, and to make a simultaneous assault with all six divisions instead of attacking progressively.

GOING UP

Men of the 1st Royal Warwickshire Regiment are moving up to the relief of other troops in a trench near Beaumont-Hamel, where fighting took place during the Somme offensive. The British at first made no progress in this sector of the line

Crown Copyright

On September 19 Haig issued his final operations orders, fixing the date of the 1st army offensive for September 25, with zero hour to be announced on the evening before the attack. The 4th corps was to assault the enemy trenches between the big double slag heap opposite Grenay, called the Double Crassier, and the Vermelles–Hulluch road. Between this road and the La Bassée canal the attack was entrusted to the 1st corps.

There were several points of strategical importance along the enemy front. The slag heap marked on the map as Fosse 8 lay about half a mile inside the German line and commanded all the country to the south. About a mile and a quarter west of Cité St. Elie a stronghold known as the Hohenzollern Redoubt had been pushed some 500 yards in front of the line. This was considered the strongest work on the whole front of attack. Its face was prolonged to join up with

Photo: Topical

SUNSET SILHOUETTES

Behind the lines in Flanders, and finely silhouetted against the evening sky, the members of this working party all unconsciously give the photographer his chance. Standing by a dump of timber, they will at nightfall carry their load towards the line

PAY PARADE

In a village recently captured from the Germans these members of a Canadian R.A.M.C. unit receive their well-earned pay. The captain is assisted in dealing it out by his quartermaster sergeant, while the staff-sergeant is the first in the line

'Canadian Records'

Dump and Fosse trenches by two arms known to the British troops as Big Willie and Little Willie. Other important points were the Double Crassier and the Loos Road Redoubt.

Behind the German front were several mining villages—Haisnes, Cité St. Elie, Hulluch and Loos. Loos lies in a hollow, and to the south-east rise further slopes, the highest point being marked on the map as Hill 70. From Hill 70 the ground falls away eastwards to the hamlet of Cité St. Auguste, about a mile from Lens, and virtually a suburb of that place. All these points were strongly fortified, and there were, in addition, other slag-heaps, pits, and natural features which lent themselves to defence. The most important were the Quarries, the Chalk Pit, and the Pit No. 14 *bis*. The German reserve position was roughly just west of Loos and west of the Quarries. The final position, so far as it was located, ran from west of Cité St. Auguste northwards, behind the string of fortified villages, Hulluch, Benifontaine and Cité St. Elie.

For the battle of Loos the engineering preparations were carried out more thoroughly and on a far larger scale than had hitherto been the case. Working parties had been busily employed upon widening and deepening the communication trenches; "up" and "down" trenches were provided to avoid undue congestion; dumps of material necessary for consolidating captured positions were placed in readiness; ladders were provided for climbing over the parapet during the assault; the rear trenches were bridged to facilitate the advance of reserves; cavalry routes were prepared across the trenches in case of a break-through; aid and observation posts were constructed, and in those places where the distance between the opposing trenches was too wide for an assault "T" heads were dug in front of the parapet and connected to each other to form an advanced assaulting position. A large body of men, no fewer than 8,000, were required to bring up from railhead 5,500 cylinders of chlorine gas, each weighing over a hundredweight.

The first army, to which this attack was entrusted, was at this time organized in five corps, a total perhaps of 250,000 men. In the line were the 1st, 3rd, 4th and Indian corps, and the main assault was carried out by the 1st and 4th under Sir Hubert Gough and Sir Henry Rawlinson respectively. Sir W. P. Pulteney commanded the 3rd corps, and Sir C. A. Anderson the Indian corps. In general reserve was the 11th corps under Lieut.-Gen. R. C. B. Haking. In the 1st corps were the 2nd, 7th and 9th divisions, the last mentioned being a Scottish territorial unit which was replaced on September 28 by the 28th division. The 4th corps consisted of the 1st, 15th and 47th divisions, the 15th being a Scottish division of Kitchener's army and the 47th a London division of territorials. In the 3rd corps were the 8th, 20th and 23rd divisions, while the Indian corps was composed of the 19th, Lahore and Meerut divisions. The 11th corps contained the Guards, 21st and 24th divisions, the two latter being replaced at the beginning of October by the 12th and 46th divisions. The cavalry were provided by a division of three brigades under Sir C. J. Briggs.



Photo: Imperial War Museum

BRITISH TRIBUTE

The decoration of this French general by Prince Arthur of Connaught was typical of many such acts which served further to cement the alliance between the two nations. Prince Arthur was the only son of the Duke of Connaught and first cousin of the king.

The 1st corps operation order dated September 20 began as follows:—

> The first army will assume the offensive on September 25 and advance between Lens and the La Bassée canal towards the line Henin–Liètard–Carvin. The 1st and 4th corps south of the La Bassée canal will attack with the object of securing the line Loos–Hulluch and the ground extending to the La Bassée canal. Immediately after piercing this line units will be pushed forward to gain possession of the crossings of the Haute Deule canal between Harnes and Bauvin. North of the La Bassée canal the enemy will be engaged vigorously in order to prevent him withdrawing troops for a counter-attack. Wherever the enemy gives ground he must be followed up with the greatest energy. The 4th corps will advance with its left on the Hulluch–Vendin le Vieil road, and operate so as to secure the passage of the Haute Deule canal at Pont à Vendin and the Lens–Carvin road south of Annay.

On the morning of September 21 the preliminary bombardment opened, and was continued without a break, both by day and night, until the morning of the attack, and on September 23 a bombing raid was made on the enemy's lines of communication by 34 aeroplanes. By now the stage was set for the great offensive, upon the results of which so many hopes were founded, hopes destined to be disappointed.

The position at this stage of the operations is described in the "Official History: Military Operations":

> As regards observation the Germans held the advantage. In the northern sector both the wheel-house and the dump of Fosse 8, close to the German front line, gave complete command of the whole of the back area of the British lines. . . A similar command over the southern part of the battle zone was given by the combined wheel-house of a fosse and a puits in Loos village, the standards of which were known as the Loos Pylons, or "Tower Bridge." . . . The British heavy artillery strove in vain to destroy these watch-towers prior to the battle. The principal British observation station in the northern sector of the front was the dump of Fosse 9 de Béthune at Annequin on the La Bassée road, a great conical mound rising to a height of 135 feet. . . . In the southern sector the flat-topped slag heap of Fosse 5 de Béthune . . . gave an extensive view of the German defences.

All through the night of September 24–25 orderlies arrived at Sir Douglas Haig's advanced headquarters at Hinges bearing wind reports from the meteorological observers on duty in the 1st army area. As dawn approached, to the dismay of those concerned the wind dropped and its direction became unfavourable for a gas attack in the area round the La Bassée canal. Shortly



Photo: G. P.A.

PATHS OF GLORY

For these two Englishmen "the paths of glory lead but to the grave." The mute uncomplaining heroism of the vast majority of those who lined the Western Front was ill rewarded by the fate that befell these men as they stood on the firestep of their trench

before zero hour Haig doubted the wisdom of releasing the gas under the prevailing conditions, but was informed that it was too late to cancel the arrangements. At 5 a.m. the wind increased slightly, and a quarter of an hour later the commander gave orders to proceed with the attack as arranged.

At 5.50 a.m. the artillery bombardment redoubled in intensity, and simultaneously gas and smoke were released all along the line. A vivid description of the scene is given by Major-General Foulkes, who directed the gas operations, in his book "Gas":

> From the top of the tall wooden tower which had been specially constructed as an observation post in the château grounds an awe-inspiring spectacle was visible, the whole countryside to the front, as far as the eye could reach, being enveloped in what appeared to be a vast prairie conflagration; for, apart from the fumes and dust caused by the artillery drum-fire and the clouds of gas and the smoke from eleven thousand candles, twenty-five thousand phosphorus hand-grenades were spurting out dense white fumes, and ten thousand bombs from the twenty-nine 4-inch Stokes mortars, as well as many thousands more from a hundred and thirty-five catapults, and from 95 mm. and 2-inch trench-mortars, were burning in front of all the German strong points and were enveloping their artillery observers and machine-gunners in an impenetrable cloud.

In front of Loos and in the sector facing the Hohenzollern Redoubt the gas cloud passed steadily over the enemy trenches, penetrating as far behind the enemy lines as their general headquarters, where it remained as thick as a dense fog. In the sector astride the Vermelles–Hulluch road some gas floated back towards the British trenches, causing hesitation among the assembled troops. At places the discharge had to be discontinued after a few moments owing to unfavourable air currents. At 6.30 a.m. the artillery lifted and put up a barrage across the German communication trenches, while the infantry began to advance.

On the right of the 1st army the 4th corps (Rawlinson's) had first of all to capture the German defences between the Double Crassier and the Vermelles–Hulluch road. The assault was carried out by the 15th division in the centre, the 1st division on the left, and the 47th division on the right of the corps front. The attack was entirely successful, save on the right of the 1st division, where some of the gas was blown back, affecting the 2nd brigade, whose attack collapsed.

The 47th division, on the extreme right wing of the 1st army, was ordered to form a defensive flank between the Loos Crassier and the Double Crassier, facing towards Lens and taking in the Chalk Pit. Two brigades, the 140th and 141st, were detailed for this operation, while the remaining divisional brigade, the 142nd, was to stay in position and support with fire. Accordingly, at 6.30 a.m. the 140th and 141st brigades advanced upon their objectives, while the 142nd brigade, remaining in the trenches, drew off some of the enemy fire by exposing a large quantity of dummy figures. The two assaulting brigades—with one battalion, the 1/18th London Regiment (the London Irish), dribbling a football in front of them—broke into the enemy's front line trenches, which they captured at the point of the bayonet.

Advancing steadily over the shrapnel-swept fields to the immense slag heaps known as the Double Crassier, they stormed the German machine-gun positions and pushed on to the cemetery at the western end of Loos, where the fighting became terrific. Along the western edge of the cemetery ran a fortified trench, which was part of the defences of Loos. The Germans had placed their machine-guns behind the burial mounds, using the tombstones as additional cover and raising parapets among the graves. The Londoners who flung themselves on this disturbed resting-place of the dead rapidly added to the number of corpses in the cemetery. Leaping from one parapet to the

other, bombing and bayoneting as they went, they lost many men, but the Germans lost more. Yet so furious was the struggle that it was fifty minutes before the cemetery was cleared of living Germans.

Through this position passed the 1/19th and 1/20th London, advancing towards the southern outskirts of Loos, and in less than half an hour they had occupied the rectangular site called the Garden City. From there they made for the Chalk Pit, which was bombed out and captured. Chalk Pit Copse, however, could not be taken in the face of strong opposition, on account of a shortage of hand-grenades, and this post was not captured until two days later. Not only did the London territorial troops show great personal fighting power, but their officers displayed a skill in leading that provoked the admiration of Sir John French. By getting hold of the cemetery and seizing the chalk pits south of Loos, and by strongly linking these gains with their conquest of the Double Crassier, they formed a firm defensive flank running from Loos to Bully and Grenay.

On their left the 15th division, composed entirely of Scottish troops, were assaulting on a fifteen-hundred-yard front in an endeavour to capture the Lens Road and Loos Road redoubts and advance upon Loos. The assaulting battalions of the 44th and 46th brigades, climbing from their trenches at 6.30 a.m., advanced in line against the first German position. Although the left of the 46th brigade, dazed by a back-flow of gas, hesitated for a moment, one of their men, Piper Daniel Laidlaw of the 7th K.O.S.B., boldly marched up and down the parapet, piping his men out of the trenches to the sound of "Blue Bonnets over the Border" until wounded. Advancing by short rushes through a tempest of shrapnel intensified by a hail of bullets from machine-guns and rifles, the Scots-men took the whole of the first line in about half an hour, and then advanced upon the Loos defences. These they found unoccupied, and the 44th brigade on the right pressed into the village.

The fleeing Germans, in panic at the sudden and unexpected loss of their front line, crowded towards the village, where their officers got them well in hand and put up a rearguard fight. But the advance of the 7th Camerons and the 9th Black Watch through the southern part of Loos swept the defenders away like a mighty wave, and soon the survivors fled from the village, dropping their equipment as they went. The northern part was cleared just as effectively by the 8th Seaforths, and shortly after 8 a.m. the Scottish troops mingled at the eastern end of Loos.

The fighting in the village had been short and fierce. In the little mining town with its rows of small brick houses, the streets, the central square and the gardens were strewn with corpses. Many of the enemy had hidden in the cellars, and parties were discovered there by British search parties three days later. In that village of death some three hundred civilians still remained—men, women and children—who were soon sent back towards the British rear.

Farther to the north the 7th K.O.S.B. crossed the open valley unopposed, and shortly after nine o'clock had reached the Lens–La Bassée Road. Meanwhile the survivors of the 44th and 46th brigades, now thoroughly intermingled, marched out of Loos in the direction of Hill 70. The massive pylons at the



Photo: G.P.A

THE ARMOURED DISARMED

While in hot pursuit this British armoured car has been crippled by gun-fire, and the enemy, counter-attacking, have killed or captured the crew. The Vickers Maxim guns have been disabled and their cartridge belts torn away

AT ALL COSTS

A familiar command during the war was that the position must be held at all costs. These dead Germans, who had been set the task of defending concrete emplacements near Zonnebeke, have duly given their lives in carrying out such a command

Photo: Imperial War Museum

northern end of the Loos Crassier, known familiarly to the soldiers as Tower Bridge, now lay behind them, and in front lay the broad rising down officially called Hill 70.

Here, in the absence of landmarks, the Highlanders mistook their direction, and instead of advancing due east, in the direction of Châlet Wood and Bois Hugo, they moved south-east up the slopes of the hill, so that instead of moving forward with its right flank on Hill 70 and its centre facing Châlet Wood, the 44th brigade was pressing on with its left on Hill 70 and its right facing the Cité St. Laurent. The 46th brigade swung round to conform, and thus the 15th division attack was now facing nearly south astride the Lens–La Bassée road instead of facing eastward parallel to the road.

Seeing the Germans fleeing over the south side of the hill, the impetuous Scotsmen increased their pace and swept up the slope, capturing the redoubt without difficulty. This feat achieved, they poured down the southern slope of the hill, and by this time, although the extreme left of the 46th brigade was advancing eastward upon the Cité St. Auguste, the majority of the Scottish troops were heading due south for the Cité St. Laurent, the northern suburb of Lens. There seems to be no doubt that both men and officers, without noticing in the excitement that they had changed direction, were misled by the remarkable similarity of the two positions when seen from the summit of Hill 70. Each place consisted of an agglomeration of small brick houses overtopped by a tall wheel-house.

This advance had now carried the Scotsmen right into the centre of a semicircle of German trenches forming the enemy second position between the Cité St. Laurent and the Cité St. Auguste. Caught in this pocket, the British troops were subjected to such a heavy cross-fire that not only was their progress abruptly checked, but also an immediate withdrawal became necessary. The officers, aware of the danger, managed to rally the men near them, of whom a certain number were able to retire behind the summit of Hill 70. Some eight hundred or so, however, unaware of the order, instead of stopping and seeking cover, rushed madly on until they were mown down. Caught in the open with no cover, unable either to advance or to retreat, with no supports on either side, the survivors feverishly dug up cover.

Meanwhile, those who had retreated safely behind the shelter of the hill were erecting defences, and, seeing the plight of their comrades below, sent urgent messages back to divisional headquarters asking for the German position to be shelled. But headquarters, unaware of the change of direction which had occurred, could not read the situation aright, and hours passed before artillery support was forthcoming.

By 11.30 a.m. the Germans had rushed reinforcements into the trenches surrounding the Cité St. Laurent. An attempt was made to encircle the Scotsmen who had so recklessly advanced into the pocket of the German defences, but this effort was foiled by a mere handful of men, the survivors of the two left companies of the 9th Black Watch, who kept up an effective fire from the southern end of the Loos Crassier. But with the arrival of further reinforcements the Germans grew bolder, and about 1.0 p.m. they advanced from their position. The few troops at the foot of the hill, badly protected by their extemporized cover, could not hope to stem the advance and endeavoured to retreat. Most of them were either killed or taken prisoner. A fierce struggle then took place for the redoubt on Hill 70, but the British, diminished in number and physically exhausted, were unable to retain the position.

By nightfall the 47th and 15th divisions were holding fast to a line midway between the German first and second lines of defence, extending from the Double Crassier to Chalk Pit Wood. The total casualties sustained by these two divisions during the day's fighting amounted to well over 7,000.

It is now necessary to describe what was taking place immediately to the north, where the 1st division, forming the left wing of the 4th corps, was to push forward on to the Lens–La Bassée road, between Hulluch and Puits 14 bis. The 1st and 2nd brigades of this division were detailed for the assault, with the 3rd brigade in reserve.

Owing to the convex nature of the 1st divisional front, a change of wind to the south during the preliminary gas discharge blew the chlorine over part of the British trenches, and numerous casualties occurred, necessitating the stoppage of the gas attack and the bringing up of second-wave troops to the assaulting position. However, at 6.34 a.m. the leading battalions of the 2nd brigade, the 2nd K.R.R C. and the 1st Loyal North Lancashire advanced to the attack. They were brought suddenly to a standstill by entanglements quite uncut by shell fire, and before they could manage to hew their way through the defenders were reinforced by troops pouring up North Loos Avenue. Unable to make any advance, and discouraged by this unlucky beginning, the assaulting troops began under force of circumstances to retire to their own trenches.

On their left the 1st brigade was more successful. The 10th Gloucestershire and the 8th Royal Berkshire swept right through Bois Carré and La Haie copse respectively and entered the enemy trenches, but when the advance continued only 60 of the Gloucestershire were left. Before 8 a.m. the leading companies of the Berkshire were in possession of Gun Trench, midway between the German first and second lines, two-thirds of a mile from their jumping-off point. The supporting battalion, the 1st Cameron Highlanders, now came up with the advanced troops, and together they pushed forward as far as the Lens road. A small party of men are unofficially reported to have entered the village of Hulluch itself, but no general attack was made upon it in the absence of the 2nd brigade on the right.

The latter force made a second assault shortly after 7.30 a.m. This again proved unsuccessful. The commander of the 1st division, Major-General Holland, was therefore faced with an awkward situation. The hold-up of his 2nd brigade placed the general advance in jeopardy owing to the big gap that now existed between the right wing of the 1st brigade in front of Hulluch and the left wing of the 15th division facing Bois Hugo, an open stretch of over a mile in width.

Finding it hopeless to take the position facing the 2nd brigade by frontal assault, Holland decided to send his divisional reserves around the flank of the 2nd brigade and push ahead through one of the breaks in the enemy defences either north or south of it. Accordingly, he ordered the 1/14th London (the London Scottish) and the 1/9th King's Liverpool, under Lieut.-Colonel Green, to make another frontal attack on the left of the 2nd brigade, and instructed the 3rd brigade to advance north of Green's force through the gap between La Haie copse and the Hulluch road. Once through, they could deploy on the right of the 1st brigade.

Even with the assistance of Colonel Green's troops the 2nd brigade fared no better in their assault upon the Lone Tree position. General Holland, therefore, decided to leave just sufficient of the 2nd brigade in position to hold the line and thrust the remainder through the other gap to the south, through which the 15th division had passed. By this means the two forces were able to envelop the lone German position from the rear, and nearly 600 of the enemy were compelled to surrender. Their magnificent defence against overwhelming odds, by checking

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

Sir Douglas Haig, here seen in the special train placed at his disposal in France, was commander-in-chief of the British armies in France from December, 1915. His campaigns in 1916 and 1917 have been hotly criticized, but his steadfastness during the last German advance and his conduct of the final British offensive won universal praise

IN PERONNE AT LAST

Captured by the Germans in 1914, Peronne was one of the objectives which the British failed to reach in the Somme offensive. The capture, therefore, on March 18, 1917, after two and a half years in German hands, was hailed as a sure sign of approaching victory

LIGHTER SIDE OF WAR

The signboard shows what these British troops have just accomplished, and illustrates as well the unconquerable sense of fun of the British Tommy. The captured trench was part of the German system of defences on the Ancre, which they evacuated early in 1917 when they retired to the Hindenburg Line

ROAR AND RECOIL

The 8-inch howitzers of this battery of the Royal Garrison Artillery fire a shell of about 200 pounds up to a range of some 12,000 yards. They are taking part in a preliminary barrage before an attack by British infantry. Each howitzer had normally a supply of 90 rounds of ammunition at the start of an engagement

the centre of the British advance and braking the momentum of the offensive, played a great part in destroying the British chances of success. These brave foes belonged to the German 157th regiment, under Captain Ritter.

The 2nd brigade and Green's force were now able to advance without opposition across the valley, and by evening had taken up a position along the Lens road, with their right wing upon the northern edge of Bois Hugo and their left some 300 yards north of the Chalk Pit. Unfortunately, owing to their heavy casualties, amounting to nearly three-quarters of their original strength, they occupied less frontage than had been anticipated, with the result that a gap of some 1,200 yards still existed between their left flank and the right of the 1st and 3rd brigades facing Hulluch.

This led to another rather serious contretemps. The latter brigades had not been informed, and were quite unaware of the fact that the 2nd brigade had at last reached the Lens road. Fearing for their exposed right flank, they decided to withdraw it to the comparative security of the German communication trench known as Alley 4, thus further increasing the gap—a gap, moreover, of whose existence divisional headquarters was totally ignorant. Not until the following day was Rawlinson aware of this hiatus in his front.

Meanwhile, the 1st corps had been in action between the Hulluch road and Givenchy in an attempt to secure the passages of the Haute Deule canal from Pont-à-Vendin to Bauvin. Its divisions were the 7th, 9th and 2nd. The 7th division was ordered to assault the enemy position between the Hulluch road and the Hohenzollern Redoubt and advance in the direction of Cité St. Elie. The assaulting brigades were the 20th and 22nd.

The two leading battalions of the 20th brigade, the 2nd Gordon Highlanders and the 8th Devonshire, advanced upon Breslau Trench at 6.30 a.m., but were delayed at first by uncut wire. When they had cut their way through they captured the German trenches without meeting any serious resistance, but their casualties while clearing the entanglements were very heavy. The survivors pushed on, and, though momentarily checked at the German intermediate position called Gun Trench, by 8.45 a.m. the Gordons and Devons reached the Lens road, closely followed by the supporting battalions, the 1/6th Gordons and the 2nd Border Regiment

On their left the 1st S. Staffordshire and the 2nd Warwickshire, the leading battalions of the 22nd brigade, were also checked by wire. But soon after half-past nine they had crossed the valley and reached Cité Trench, the German position covering Cité St. Elie. In view of the strength of the German second position a further advance was impossible for the time being, and orders were given to shell the Cité and to consolidate the ground won.

On the left of the 1st corps, the 9th division was confronted by defences of great strength, including the mine buildings and the dump of Fosse 8, and the strong point known as the Hohenzollern Redoubt. This fortified position had been built expressly to defend the Dump, a huge slag-heap from the top of which excellent observation of the British line was possible. The redoubt, forming a salient towards the British trenches, had been constructed about 400 yards in advance of the German front line, to which it was connected by two long arms known as Big Willie and Little Willie.

Orders were issued to the 26th brigade, on the right of the division, to capture in one rush both the redoubt and Fosse 8. The two supporting battalions would then pass on to the village of Haisnes. "These orders seemed so optimistic," says the official historian, "that several battalion commanders asked if they had correctly understood them, and one officer remarked: 'It seems to be forgotten that infantry don't gallop.'"

Nevertheless, thanks to the effective shelling of the redoubt by two 9·2 howitzers, and owing to the fact that the distance between the hostile trenches at this point was very short, the attack was successful. The assault was carried out by the 5th Cameron Highlanders and the 7th Seaforth Highlanders, while in support were the 8th Gordon Highlanders and the 8th Black Watch. The redoubt was captured, and within half an hour the Seaforths were on their way towards Fosse 8 and the adjacent buildings, from which the Germans fled at their approach. An hour after leaving their trenches they had reached the cross-roads of the Three Cabarets, where soon afterwards they were joined on their left by the Camerons, who extended the line as far as the Corons de Pekin, receiving reinforcements from the supporting Black Watch.

Despite this auspicious beginning, further advance was hindered owing to the failure of the 28th brigade on their left. Here not only had a change of wind blown the gas back upon the assaulting troops, but some of the cylinders were burst by German shell fire, with disastrous results for the men in the immediate vicinity. After this mishap another awaited them. Much of the German wire was uncut, and in front of the enemy trenches was a large ditch filled with barbed wire concealed by turf. Those who did not fall into the trap were held up by the wire entanglements. To make matters worse, they were caught by enfilade fire from machine-guns in an advanced sap called Strong Point, and the few survivors had to beat a hasty retreat to their starting place. Later in the morning another attack was launched, which likewise failed with heavy losses, and this definite check had a fatal effect upon the rest of the 9th division, advancing unsupported upon Haisnes.

About 7.30 a.m. the 26th brigade, in spite of the non-arrival of the 28th, decided to attack Pekin Trench, that portion of the German second line which lay south of the Auchy-Haisnes road, protecting the latter village. In the apparent absence of any enemy troops the British occupied the trench, and there awaited supports before advancing upon the village. Before nine o'clock they were joined by the 12th Royal Scots from the reserve 27th brigade. By this time German reserves had been sent from La Bassée to Haisnes, and the fire that came from the village augured ill for the chances of seizing it.

Moreover, the British in Pekin Trench still had their flanks exposed and their position was far from reassuring. The German batteries began to shell them, while bombing parties advanced against their flanks. The final result was inevitable; by 5 p.m., after suffering heavy casualties, the 26th brigade was obliged to evacuate the position, and retired to Fosse Alley. At nightfall the 9th division held Fosse Alley from the Quarries to the Three Cabarets, and thence their front line passed around the northern side of the Corons de Pekin, the left wing being thrown back with its face towards a settlement known as Madagascar. The 28th brigade ended the day in its original trenches, save for a detachment of the 11th Highland L. I. which had effected a lodgement in Little Willie.

We now come to the 2nd division, lying astride the La Bassée canal. The 19th and the 6th brigades, holding the line between the Vermelles–La Bassée railway and the canal, were to advance through Auchy, while the 5th brigade, north of the canal, was to push forward between the canal bank and Chapelle St. Roch in the direction of La Bassée. Ten minutes before zero hour the 19th brigade exploded two mines under the German trench opposite them, thus warning the enemy and giving him

WOOD REPLACES STEEL

An essential feature to success in the War was rapidity of movement for transport columns behind the line. This destroyed bridge over a canal is being made good, and a French column is passing over even before the sappers have finished their work

MATCHES ARE PRECIOUS

Wisely the centre Frenchman in this photograph gives a light from his cigarette to his comrade, hoarding his precious ration of matches. Ambulance men, the three are passing through a half-ruined village on the edge of the Somme battlefield

PREPARING THE HEAVIES

This battery of 8-inch howitzers, manned by a team of French gunners, is in position for the barrage. The nearest gun is being sighted on its invisible target, while farther down the line can be seen another gun whose elevation has not yet been adjusted

ample time to man the parapet and mow down the attackers. After losing many men, both the assaulting battalions were definitely checked by the uncut wire in front of the German trenches, for the only gap that had been made in it by the artillery bombardment had been repaired during the previous night. At 9 a.m. the commanding officer, Brigadier-General Robertson, broke off the action.

Nor did the attack of their neighbours, the 6th brigade, meet with any better result. The Germans had withdrawn to their support trench, thus leaving a wider area of ground to be traversed by the attackers. Faced with heavy machine-gun and rifle fire, the 6th brigade was obliged, like the 19th, to retire. A further bombardment having failed to reduce the German strong points, it was decided that no attack, by either brigade, should be undertaken until further orders.

North of the canal, the 5th brigade fared just as badly as the rest of the division. The 1/9th Highland Light Infantry (the Glasgow Highlanders) were held up by fire from the Tortoise Redoubt, on the north bank of the canal, while further north the assault in front of Givenchy was repulsed after some sharp fighting at close quarters. At no point in the line had the operations of the 2nd division succeeded.

While the main battle was taking place, certain subsidiary operations were being carried out by the Indian, 3rd and 5th corps with a view to engaging German forces which might otherwise have been sent south as reinforcements. The Indian corps operated around Neuve Chapelle in an attempt to reach Aubers Ridge. Though reaching the German support trenches, they were compelled to retire before dusk owing to a strong German counter-attack by bombing parties. On their left the 3rd corps attacked towards Fournes. Three battalions of the 25th brigade carried the German front line trench between Corner Fort and Bridou Fort, a frontage of 1,200 yards, and captured part of the support trench. Then they also were forced to withdraw.

The 5th corps demonstration took place in the Ypres salient, on Bellewaarde Ridge and around Hooge, but although some slight initial progress was made, by dusk the British were back in their original trenches.

By nightfall on September 25 the 1st army had successfully penetrated the German front-line defences at several points. The British official historian states that :

> The initial success of the 25th September was ample demonstration that the plans of the commander of the First Army were not altogether founded on vain hopes. The 47th division had experienced no great difficulty in forming the defensive flank that was desired, facing Lens ; the 15th division had captured the defences of Loos, passed through the village, and not only obtained possession of Hill 70, but pressed on beyond it, although unfortunately in the wrong direction ; the 1st and 7th divisions had reached the Lens–La Bassée road ; the 9th division had captured the Hohenzollern Redoubt, Fosse 8 and the Dump near by, and had actually broken into the German second position opposite Haisnes. Only the units of the 2nd division, owing to extremely adverse conditions, had failed in their operation and had been obliged to return to their original trenches ; all the other divisions had gained possession of the German first position and advanced beyond it.

It is quite clear that the enemy was surprised by the vehemence of the attack, and had the assault been adequately supported by reserves, it is more than probable that the enemy's second line of defence would have fallen into the hands of the British. Unfortunately, although there were three divisions in general reserve, Sir John French held them too far from the front and they were not handed over to Sir Douglas Haig until the afternoon, when it was too late to exploit the success of the early hours of the morning.

Although Joffre had insisted that all reserve formations should move forward to the attack at the same time as the main assault was delivered, and although Sir John French had assured Sir Douglas Haig that they would be immediately at hand, he actually placed them sixteen miles in the rear. Sir Henry Rawlinson noted in his journal how regrettable it was that the reserve divisions could not be brought up in time to take advantage of the success of the 4th corps assault. "Had this been done," he said, "I am quite certain that we should have broken through the enemy's second system of defences

Photos: G.P.A.

MIDNIGHT MASS

Resting for a while from their gallant labours in defence of Fort de Douaumont, these Frenchmen attend a midnight celebration of Mass in an improvised chapel. The fort, captured by the Germans in February, 1916, was recaptured by the French in October

and been able to send the cavalry on to Pont-à-Vendin and Carvin." Commenting on this in his Life of Lord Rawlinson, Sir Frederick Maurice says:

> Naturally he was bitterly disappointed when he found that Sir John French's plan of battle was entirely different from that which he had been led to believe would be adopted, and when he realized that the lives of his men had been vainly sacrificed owing to a change of which he was not aware until too late.

If Sir Henry Rawlinson was bitterly disappointed, one can imagine the feelings of the commander of the 1st army, responsible for the conduct of the whole battle. Sir Douglas Haig was very bitter at this failure to second his efforts, a bitterness which developed into an irreconcilable antagonism when French, in his dispatch, categorically stated that the reserves were put at Haig's disposal at 9.30 a.m. on September 25.

The general reserve consisted of the cavalry corps and the 21st, 24th and Guards divisions of the 11th corps. At 7.0 p.m. on September 24 the 11th corps began its final march towards the front line, but owing to bad traffic organization the journey took twice as long to accomplish as would normally have been the case. In certain cases "down" roads were used for "up" traffic, and as Sir J. E. Edmonds remarks in the Official History, "it was like trying to push the lord mayor's procession through the streets of London without clearing the route and holding up the traffic." Stoppages were frequent, and the climax of absurdity was reached when the 72nd brigade was stopped near Béthune by a military policeman because the brigade commander did not possess a pass to enter the area. It was nearly 2 o'clock in the morning before the leading brigades, tired out, arrived at bivouacs at Noeux les Mines and Beuvry. They were still five miles from the front trenches.

Twice during the morning of September 25, at 7 a.m. and at 8.45 a.m., Sir Douglas Haig, in view of the success of the first assault, sent messages to the commander-in-chief asking for the 11th corps to be placed at once at his disposal, as had been arranged. It was not until 9.30 a.m. that Sir John French moved these divisions up, and even then he did not place them at once under Haig's orders.

PRINTERS IN UNIFORM

With shells bursting overhead these Frenchmen carry on calmly, in a cellar at Verdun, with the official printing of the many army orders and regulations incidental to modern warfare. During a pause in his labours the printer reads the Echo de Paris

It was not until 1.20 p.m. that the commander of the 1st army was informed that the 21st and 24th divisions had been placed under his orders and were marching up. Delay occurred, and night had fallen by the time they reached the original British front line, and, owing to the state of the ground after the battle, it was past midnight when the leading brigade, the 63rd brigade of the 21st division, reached the Loos–Haisnes road.

Meanwhile, the 62nd brigade of the 21st division, placed at the disposal of the 4th corps, was ordered to the support of the troops on Hill 70. As no precise information was available concerning the situation there, two battalions only were sent forward, the 8th East Yorkshire and the 10th Green Howards. Unfortunately, as no guides had been provided, they lost direction, and instead of passing to the east of Loos, they skirted the west of the village and headed towards Lens. Soon they came into contact with the 1/20 London, near Chalk Pit Copse, but were quickly stopped by machine-gun fire from Germans on the southern edge of the copse, and, suffering heavy casualties, were forced to retire hurriedly. In the meantime the two remaining battalions of the 62nd brigade, the 12th and 13th Northumberland Fusiliers, had reached Loos. Some of them relieved the 9th Black Watch and 10th Gordons on the hill, and others were placed in general support on the Loos–Hulluch road.

On the night of September 25–26 the British, instead of holding a continuous front line, manned a series of isolated positions separated by considerable gaps. In addition, they had suffered heavy losses, the total casualties amounting to nearly 15,500 officers and other ranks.

To the south, the offensive undertaken by the French 10th army had met with but little success, except on the left, where the 70th division and the 21st corps captured all their objectives. But Foch, in view of the advantages gained by the British, decided to resume the offensive the next day in the hope of capturing Vimy Ridge.

To return to the British operations Two counter-attacks by the Germans upon the 4th corps front took place on the night of September 25–26, one on the eastern side of Loos Crassier and another from the Cité St. Laurent. Both were repulsed, as was an attempt to recover three German field-guns from the 1st S. Wales Borderers near Gun Trench. A counter-attack against the 1st corps took place at 1 a.m. between the Vermelles–Hulluch road and Fosse 8, driving the defenders into Gun Trench, which now became the front line in this sector. The Germans were also successful in regaining the Quarries, and forcing the 27th brigade to withdraw to their original front line.

Photopress

FACED WITH FAILURE

So near, and yet so far, this group of German staff officers, with the Crown Prince in the centre, gaze towards the object of their shattered hopes—Verdun. The Crown Prince was overruled when he desired to call off the offensive

IN VERDUN THE VALOROUS

Throughout 1916 the Germans made superhuman efforts to conquer the great fortress of Verdun, but in face of the tenacity of the French they were each time foiled. Here a way is being cleared through the debris caused by the German bombardment

Unaware of the heavy losses sustained by his army, and ignorant of the gaps in the 1st division front, Sir Douglas Haig, in order not to hinder the French offensive, ordered a general assault to be made at 11 a.m. on September 26, between Hill 70 and Cité St. Elie. The weather was very unfavourable, thick mist and heavy rain depriving the British of any assistance from the observers of the Royal Flying Corps.

On the 4th corps front it was decided to attack the redoubt on Hill 70 at 9 a.m. and endeavour to gain the summit before the main attack. After a bombardment of the position three battalions of the 45th brigade charged up the slope, joined by two companies of the 8th East Yorkshire from the Loos Crassier. But the Germans had strengthened their position during the night and all attempts to capture the redoubt failed. Nor could the 45th brigade pass round it, and soon after 10 a.m. the exhausted troops were driven back to their starting

DRUDGERY ON THE DUNES

Fringing the Belgian coast was a line of sand dunes, over whose soft yielding surface the task of moving guns proved a wearisome drudgery. It takes 20 Germans much valuable time and energy to drag this gun and limber into position

Photo: G.P. 1

point. An hour later the German batteries opened out heavily upon the British line with high explosive and gas shell. This proved too much for many of the men, and a number left their ranks and retired through Loos.

Despite the failure to capture Hill 70, General Haking decided that the 11th corps attack should take place as he had arranged upon the enemy position between Cité St. Auguste and Hulluch. Unfortunately, zero hour had been fixed so late in the morning that the enemy forestalled him by counter-attacking at 9.0 a.m. between Bois Hugo and Châlet Wood, overwhelming two outposts near the former place. Soon afterwards the whole front of the 63rd brigade, lying around Chalk Pit wood, was violently shelled, and at 10 a.m. a body of German infantry came across the open to the north of Bois Hugo.

This attack was soon checked by the British field-guns, but about half-past ten the 12th West Yorkshire found themselves caught by enfilade fire from Bois Hugo, into which large bodies of the enemy had crept unnoticed. Taken by surprise, the majority of the Yorkshiremen retreated across the Lens road and past the southern edge of Chalk Pit wood, and in their retirement were joined in error by the 10th York and Lancaster and most of the 8th Lincolnshire. Alone, two companies of the 8th Somerset Light Infantry held their position in the Chalk Pit. The 14th and 15th Durham Light Infantry of the 64th brigade, coming up for the assault as planned, mistook the retreating 63rd brigade for Germans and fired on them. The mistake was soon obvious and the 64th brigade pressed forward, only to meet with heavy fire, and they, too, joined in the retreat.

While the 21st division was thus in full retreat the 24th division, farther north, was preparing to advance. The two leading battalions of the 72nd brigade, the 9th East Surrey and the 8th Royal West Kent, left their trenches at 11 a.m. and, advancing from Lone Tree ridge into the Loos valley as though on parade, exercised a steadying influence upon the retreating 63rd brigade, the majority of whom, in the face of this example, turned again to face the enemy and joined once more in the heroic effort to advance.

Meanwhile, on their left, the survivors of the 1st division failed in an attempt to capture Hulluch. It was quite impossible for them, reduced in numbers as they were, to cross six hundred yards of open country under heavy fire from the houses in the village and take that stronghold with a handful of men. In the face of these difficulties the attack was broken off soon after noon.

Nevertheless this first failure did not check the steady progress of the 72nd brigade and the two supporting battalions of the 71st brigade between Hulluch and the Chalk Pit. They pushed gallantly forward in spite of the heavy fire from Bois Hugo, until they were within three hundred yards of the German second position in front of Vendin le Vieil. But now they had advanced into a deep pocket covered by the flanking bastions of Hulluch to the north and Cité Auguste on the south. This meant that they had to make a frontal assault against a position which, though it consisted of only a single trench, was protected by wire entanglements breast high and nearly twenty feet broad, enfiladed from both flanks and from Bois Hugo. In the



Photos: G.P.A.

SAND AND SUFFOCATION

To the difficulties of an advance over yielding sand, impeding their every footstep, has been added for these German marines the horror of an advancing cloud of gas. The line established north of Ypres in 1914, and stretching to the coast, was held with little variation on either side until the final German collapse

TOUCHING IT OFF

The numerous hollows amongst the dunes on the Belgian coast afforded admirable cover for advanced parties of bomb throwers, for machine-gun posts, and for snipers. Here one of a party of German mine throwers is about to "touch off" a bomb

Photo: Imperial War Museum

ORDEAL BY BATTLE

Over ground battered by the preliminary barrage these Germans advance towards their objective. Almost blinded by the smoke of battle, they are undergoing probably the severest ordeal that they have ever been called upon to face

afternoon, having suffered enormous casualties, they were compelled to retire and retreated across the Lens road into the former German trench Alley 4.

At the same time the 63rd and 64th brigades of the 21st division were also in retirement from Châlet Wood, so that by 1.30 p.m. large bodies of troops were steadily retreating along all the front between the Vermelles–Loos and the Vermelles–Hulluch roads. About 3 p.m., on account of an order issued in error, the troops on Hill 70 were withdrawn to behind Loos. Yet when they were informed that the order for retirement had been issued in mistake, the men, though exhausted by their long spell of fighting and digging, returned to their old position, which, fortunately, the Germans had not occupied. In view of the critical state of affairs and the immediate emergency Sir Henry Rawlinson ordered part of the 3rd cavalry division to garrison Loos.

While the various actions just described were taking place, and the situation was growing desperate, the Guards division, all that was now left of the general reserve, was marching up from Noeux-les-Mines to the battle line, but so great was the confusion and so congested the traffic along the roads in the back areas, that it was four o'clock in the afternoon before it was placed under the orders of Sir Douglas Haig and six o'clock before it reached the neighbourhood of Vermelles. At 11.30 p.m. the Guards moved into Loos, relieving the cavalry garrison. During the night they manned the trenches of Alley 4 and North Loos avenue, bridging the gap between the 47th divisional flank at Loos and the right of the 1st division. Behind the protecting line thus hastily established the survivors of the 21st and 24th divisions were reorganized.

To the south the French army had made no important advance and thus were unable to ease the critical position of the British. Their maximum advance was half a mile when the 21st corps, on the French left wing, crossed the Souchez stream and reached the boundary of Givenchy wood. On their right the 33rd corps captured the village of Souchez, but elsewhere no progress could be made.

At daybreak on September 27 a strong German counter-attack was launched against the 73rd brigade covering the eastern edge of Fosse 8, resulting in the loss of this position and of the Dump. This left the flank of the 27th brigade, which had reoccupied Fosse Alley during the night, exposed to enfilade and reverse fire, so that they were compelled to withdraw into Quarry Trench and Big Willie.

The outstanding feature of the day was the splendid advance during the afternoon of the Guards division on the 4th corps front. It had been decided that another attack on Hill 70 should be made, both frontally and from the north. The 2nd Guards brigade were to attempt to penetrate between Bois Hugo and Châlet Wood and from there carry out their assault upon the northern flank of Hill 70 redoubt, while the 3rd Guards brigade attacked from Loos. During this operation the 1st Guards brigade was directed to advance and hold the Lens–La Bassée road from Pit 14 bis to Alley 4.

To facilitate the advance of the 2nd brigade over the open country in front of Bois Hugo, the 1st brigade threw nearly 150 smoke balls, and at 4 p.m. a thick screen of smoke lay over the ground south of Hulluch. Thereupon the 2nd brigade, its left flank effectively screened, marched across the valley with few casualties. By about 5 o'clock the Irish Guards were in Chalk Pit wood and occupied the Chalk Pit itself. Then the Scots Guards, together with some of the Irish, advanced upon Pit 14 bis, but once they emerged from the cover of the wood they came under heavy fire from the Germans in Bois Hugo. Despite heavy losses they pushed on until they reached the mine-shaft buildings, but owing to the concentration of fire, which precluded the possibility of sending up more men to the pit, the leading troops withdrew to a position stretching along the southern face of Chalk Pit wood with their right wing extending towards Loos.

The advance of the 3rd Guards brigade upon Hill 70 from the west was carried out as steadily as if on parade. No sooner had they left the shelter of the village than they were met by a hail of shrapnel, high explosive and gas shell, but, true to their traditions and training, they moved on without wavering. The attack on the redoubt was carried out by the 1st Welsh Guards, in action for the first time, and two companies of the 4th Grenadier Guards.

As dusk was falling they advanced up the slopes, but when within a short distance of the crest of the hill they were met by a withering fire from the machine-guns in the redoubt, which exacted a dreadful toll. Although within a few yards of the wire entanglements they could get no farther. Attack after attack only led to further slaughter, and so they resolutely consolidated their position on the upper slopes of the hill, only a hundred yards from the redoubt. Here they were relieved by the Scots Guards. At night their right was in touch with the 3rd cavalry division, who bridged the gap between them and the 47th division. Their left flank was left in the air owing to the gap which existed between them and the 2nd brigade at Chalk Pit wood. The French 10th army had meanwhile been checked.

During the morning of September 28, owing to the lack of further British reserves, it was decided that the French left wing should take over the Hill 70 and Loos sector, thereby freeing the

Photos. G.P.A.

FOLLOWING THE ATTACK

Across the fields of Champagne these Germans are dragging a trench mortar into position in support of a newly launched advance. The rapid advance of supporting light artillery was invaluable if newly won trenches were to be held against counter-attacks

47th division and the 2nd and 3rd Guards brigades. On this day the French made some progress, and succeeded in capturing Point 140, the culminating point of Vimy Ridge.

During the ensuing nights working parties were busy consolidating the line and digging new communication trenches, while the relief of the 47th division and part of the Guards division was carried out gradually by the French 17th, 18th and 152nd divisions between September 30 and October 2. The British right flank then rested on the track running from Loos to Puits 14 bis.

On October 1 French saw Foch, and and explained to him that British participation in a renewal of the offensive would hardly be possible until his right flank should be covered by the occupation of Hill 70 and his left by the recapture of the Quarries and Fosse 8. It was eventually decided that the British should try and regain Fosse 8 on October 4, while the French attack upon Hill 70 should be launched the following day. But on account of the time necessary for constructing assembly and starting trenches, as well as for the installation of gas cylinders, and owing to the loss of the greater part of the Hohenzollern Redoubt on October 2, the attack was postponed until October 9.

CRAWLING CAVALRY

Like the French and British, the Germans on the Western Front had frequently to employ their cavalry on foot. Here in open country they substitute a slow creeping advance for a rapid charge and the machine-gun for the sabre

During this intervening period the Germans, as may be imagined, were not idle, and on October 8 they made a strong counter-attack with the object of recapturing Loos and Lone Tree ridge. The assault was carried out at 4 o'clock in the afternoon, but by nightfall it had been repulsed with heavy losses, the only German gain of any importance being about 400 yards of trench between the Double Crassier and the Lens–Béthune road.

The British attack upon the Quarries, the Hohenzollern Redoubt and Fosse 8, originally fixed for October 2, was delayed owing to the effects of the bombardments by the Germans preceding their counter-attack of October 8, and was further postponed until October 13. At noon on that day the bombardment began on the enemy position and continued for two hours. At 1.0 p.m., the

Photo: Topical

VAST SMOKING RUIN

Austrians and Russians fought many desperate battles on the plains of Galicia. These ozokerite mines have been wrecked and set on fire by the Russians before evacuation. Ozokerite in refined form is a wax specially valuable for use at high temperatures

wind blowing from the south-west at five miles per hour, gas was released at several points with successful results.

After an hour of combined gas and artillery bombardment the infantry went over. Unfortunately the results of the day's fighting were disappointing, for once again most of the ground gained in the initial attack was afterwards lost, largely on account of the superiority and greater numbers of the German hand-grenades. Also the infantry in making their attack, possibly through fear of running into the gas, proceeded very slowly, giving the enemy ample time to recover and return to the attack. Detachments of the 138th brigade succeeded in reaching Fosse Trench, but on account of enfilade fire from Mad Point and the Dump the position could not be held. By nightfall on October 14 the general situation was unchanged on the British front and the casualties were very heavy.

Although fighting continued round the Dump for several days, the results did not prove very encouraging, and on November 4 Sir Douglas Haig informed the commander-in-chief that he was compelled to abandon any hope of continuing the offensive, especially in view of the bad weather conditions. And so the costly battle of Loos came to its tragic end.

The British had altogether lost, between September 25 and October 16, 2,013 officers and 48,367 other ranks. Of this total some 800 officers and 15,000 men were killed, or missing and never heard of again. The German losses on the Loos front during the two ten-day periods September 21 to 30 and October 1 to 10 were 441 officers and 19,395 other ranks. As the official British account points out, however, this excludes the periods of heavy fighting on the 13th and following days, and the German returns were computed on a different basis from the British. For example, many doing duty as officers were not included among the officer casualties, and the wounded who died in hospital were not included among the dead. The losses of the French 10th army from September 25 to October 15 amounted to 1,250 officers and 46,980 other ranks.

Thus the battle of Loos, undertaken against the better judgement of the commander-in-chief and the leader of the 1st army, resulted in a stalemate which cost the Allies dearly and evoked bitter disappointment. Yet in spite of the difficulty of the battlefield and the inadequate supply both of men and munitions to undertake a large-scale offensive, the advance of some of the British divisions had been magnificent. But the time had come for the retirement of Sir John French, who relinquished his command on December 17, 1915.

LIVE WIRES BRING DEATH

Barbed wire entanglements along the Dutch frontier were electrified, and on very rare occasions the same thing was found in strong positions in the front lines and around fortresses. These soldiers, unsuspecting, have found sudden death on the live wires

Photo: G.P.A

CHAPTER 52

RUSSIA RETREATS

After their capture of Warsaw and their other successes in Poland and Galicia, the Austro-German forces, as here described, drove the Russians before them all along the line stretching from Riga on the Baltic to Czernowitz in Bukowina

BY the middle of August, 1915, it had become clear to Falkenhayn that the Russians had escaped the trap of the Polish salient and that any chance of cutting off their armies was gone. He had reason enough, however, to feel satisfied with his work: he had inflicted enormous losses in prisoners, casualties and guns on his opponents, he had driven them from practically all the Austrian territory they had overrun and had torn Poland from their grasp. It was, indeed, more than doubtful whether they could stand on their new line based on Brest-Litovsk, and he still had hopes of driving their centre back into the Pripet Marshes, which would divide their armies like a vast wedge and make their lateral communications more than ever a matter of immense difficulty.

All this had been achieved at a comparatively small cost in men and time, and he had been able to avoid entangling his precious resources in an endless campaign in the heart of Russia. It was clear that not for many months could Russia represent a serious danger to German aims, although he confessed to some surprise that, after the thrashing she had received, she was still able, in the daily fighting along her whole line, to strike back with courage and power. The menace to Austria had long since passed, and the objects of the limited campaign he had undertaken had been secured. Indeed, its results had surpassed his hopes, and he could face the immense problems that confronted him in France, in Serbia, on the Austro-Italian frontier and in Turkey with the assurance that at least Germany was in no danger from Russia.

The time had come when Falkenhayn could begin to plan the reckoning with Serbia and face the greater task of dealing with a Franco-British offensive which he knew was scheduled for September, and he advised the commanders on the Eastern front that within a month he would require them to release the divisions he had earmarked for service elsewhere. His action caused the old conflict between himself and Hindenburg, urged on by his chief of staff, Ludendorff, to flare up with renewed violence. The two commanders, who throughout the early summer of 1915 had been condemned to the rôle of passive watchers of events they had neither initiated nor controlled, had too much at stake, both in their ambitions and their hopes, to welcome this order.

At the eleventh hour they had been permitted vigorously to participate in those events which had led to the fall of Warsaw and the conquest of Russian Poland, and the success of their thrust in Lithuania and Courland, and their brilliant seizure of Kovno—an event which in their view had imperilled the stability of the whole Russian line—had raised in them fresh hopes of new and spectacular victories. To have these hopes dashed by being robbed of the means to fulfil them was a blow they could not stomach, and they opposed his orders with every means in their power.

The correspondence between Falkenhayn and Hindenburg in late August and September, 1915, gives a vivid picture of the men themselves and shows by what curious motives great events are so often determined. Hindenburg, for all his astute brain, was blinded to the whole situation by his ambitions, and exaggerated the importance of his own field of operations. He insisted again that, even at this late hour, vast damage could be done to Russia by a well-supported thrust into the heart of the Vilno-Dvinsk region. Falkenhayn did not deny it; he simply pointed out that, as events stood in other theatres of war, Germany had neither the time nor the troops for such an operation, a point of view the correctness of which Hindenburg, with gruff honesty,

'LITTLE FATHER'

Known throughout his vast empire as "Little Father" of his people, the Tsar is here seen, his hand at the salute, with the Grand-Duke Nicholas, inspecting his troops. The Grand-Duke relinquished the chief command to the Tsar in September, 1915

Photo: Topical

THE CURTAIN FALLS

The Little Theatre, in John Street, Adelphi, was one of the buildings to suffer during the German aeroplane raid by night over London on September 4, 1917. This photograph of a stage and auditorium in ruins shows the damage that a single bomb could inflict

admitted some years later in his Memoirs. But his opposition to Falkenhayn's orders at the time was none the less vigorous for being wrong, and it says much for the latter's strength of will that the friction generated between himself and his two influential and obstinate subordinates, working in the closest sympathy, did not produce serious consequences.

Neither this conflict of personalities nor the scheduled withdrawal of troops from the German front in the East prevented the Central Powers from continuing their summer successes, and throughout the early autumn they were able to drive Russia still farther east. The fighting during this period, late August and September, 1915, was practically continuous along the whole of the front, which, after the retreat from Warsaw and the capture of Kovno, ran in a comparatively straight line from Riga, on the Baltic, due south to the Rumanian border, a distance of about 1,200 miles; but for the sake of clarity it is better to adopt three rough geographical divisions and to describe the principal battles in each in turn.

These divisions of the battle line correspond approximately to the three groups of Austro-German armies that were operating against the Russians. The first of these groups, under Hindenburg, extended from the Baltic to a line between Bialystok and Baranowitchi, the junction on the great lateral railway from Vilno to Kiev. The second was the semi-independent command of Prince Leopold of Bavaria and the group of armies under Mackensen which filled the base of the Polish triangle, and the third was the German and Austro-Hungarian forces operating in eastern Galicia and in Bukowina.

The operations of these three groups were largely simultaneous, but they can be followed most easily if the second and third groups are considered before the first. The second of them, namely, the group of armies under Prince Leopold and Mackensen, was rapidly handicapped by the steady withdrawal, after August 17, of troops for the Serbian campaign, and was unable to do more than compel, at the cost of heavy fighting, a Russian retirement. After the forcing of the Lublin–Cholm line in July, Mackensen had continued his northern offensive in the direction of Brest-Litovsk, and after severe fighting had managed to reach the neighbourhood of Wlodawa on the Bug, some 30 miles due south of the great fortress.

His advance speeded the Russian retirement from the Polish salient, and Alexeieff ordered retreat to the Kovno–Brest-Litovsk line. Gallwitz's 12th army, which had already forced the Narew, was pressing close on his heels, and by the middle of the month his right wing was in contact with the advanced left wing of the Austrian 4th army, part of Mackensen's force; once again the Russians had successfully evaded encirclement.

The fall of Kovno, on August 17, jeopardized the safety of the new defensive position based on Brest-Litovsk, and a further retirement became almost inevitable. Any faint hopes that the Russians still harboured of standing on that line were shattered by Mackensen's victory after four days of bitter fighting at Wlodawa on August 18, a victory which gave him control of the river crossing and enabled him to threaten Brest-Litovsk from the rear. For the next two weeks the Russians had to conduct a scrambling retreat, in the course of which they were compelled to evacuate one after another of their fortresses. Falkenhayn had not contemplated an advance east of the Bug, but it was forced upon his local commanders when once their troops had crossed the river.

The Bug army and the Austrian 1st army, which had been protecting Mackensen's extended right flank, had, in keeping contact with the enemy, been drawn farther east. The latter had advanced as far as Kovel, and from there had thrust its cavalry north-east against the left rear of the Russians crowded behind Brest-Litovsk, while the former had pushed steadily eastward across the river into the Pripet Marshes. Nor did these dreaded swamps seriously impede

LETHAL LABOURS

Some idea of the extent of the munition making industry is given by this photograph. Over a huge floor space men and women are engaged in the task of filling, and fitting percussion caps to, shells, which are then loaded on a special trolley train

Photos: Imperial War Museum



the advance. At that time of the year they were comparatively dry and both cavalry and infantry were able to move with freedom across them.

Farther north Gallwitz had reached Byelostok by August 22, and the Russian line was forced into a dangerous salient round Brest-Litovsk. Despite its reputation as the strongest of all Russian fortresses, the arrival of Bescler after the fall of Novogeorgievsk, with his siege train, made it uncertain for a day or two whether the Russians could empty it of its stores before it was captured. They put up a splendid delaying resistance, both on north and south, but the German howitzers rapidly smashed in the outer defences, and by the 25th the impetuous Hungarian infantry were already fighting their way into the south-western suburbs. On the 26th the last Russian retreated through the city, now burning furiously in places, and the whole Russian line fell back to Kobrin, for Gallwitz had seized Byelostok on the same day. Nor was this retreat completed a moment too soon; the cavalry of the Austrian 1st army reached Kobrin a few hours after the Russians had entrenched themselves and prepared their defences.

Linsingen, who was now in charge of these operations, as Mackensen and his staff had been withdrawn some days previously to begin the organization of the army for the Serbian campaign, proved himself at once energetic and resourceful. Throwing forward his right wing on August 30, he succeeded in turning the new Russian positions at Hordec, and after a two-day battle drove them out of their defences.

The Russians, whose object was now to avoid envelopment at the price of any sacrifice of territory, moved back to a second line based on Khomsk, but again were driven out by Linsingen on September 4–6. They then fell back steadily, fighting only rearguard actions and not venturing on an encounter battle. Linsingen, however, was beginning to feel the effects of the steady withdrawal of units from his forces and, even more, of the difficulties of communication in that wilderness of bog. Nor were his troops, many of whom had been in action almost continuously since May 1, in fit case to advance much farther. He occupied Pinsk on September 16, but there he halted, content to consolidate his gains.

Throughout the rest of the war the Germans remained firmly fixed on this line, but the immense difficulties of the terrain in the neighbourhood precluded extensive operations, and this area remained relatively quiet until the end of the struggle. Linsingen had planned to seize the lower half of the Vilna–Kiev railway; the upper half, from Vilna to Baranovichi, was by this time in German hands, and as a lateral means of communication gave them a great advantage over their opponents. South of that point, however, the Russians still held the line which ran across the Pripet Marshes from north to south. The approach of winter and the rains, which turned the ground on Linsingen's front into a quagmire, made any operations against the railway out of the question, and it was left to the Austro-Hungarian forces in Galicia to attempt to seize Rovno and Sarni.

After the capture of Lemberg and the northern swerve of Mackensen's forces at the beginning of July, the Austro-Hungarian troops in eastern Galicia had been left to hold the gains which the Germans had won. Their leader



Photos: Topical

CHURCH PARADE

These members of the Women Army Auxiliary Corps are marching to a special wartime service at S. Paul's Cathedral, London. The Corps, known as "Waacs," was formed in 1917, and was attached to the army, its members enlisting for the duration

DELICATE WORK

Women in all ranks of society plunged eagerly into various forms of war work. These ladies, having undergone the necessary training, have been entrusted with the extremely responsible task of assembling the parts of a shrapnel shell

MORE VAIN HOPES

As has been seen in previous photographs, British commanders, despite overwhelming evidence that they were misreading the situation, continued to pin their faith to a break through by cavalry. Here the Queen's Bays (2nd Dragoon Guards) are moving up behind the Somme front, waiting for the chance which did not come

Photo. Imperial War Museum

Conrad was content to rest on the achievement, and the front in Galicia, which ran from the Polish border down the Bug, thence some miles east of Lemberg to the Zlota Lipa, a northern tributary of the Dniester, and thence along the main stream of the Pruth to the Bessarabian border, remained comparatively quiet for several weeks.

The success of the Austro-German forces in Poland throughout August, however, suggested to Conrad that the Russian line in Galicia was probably only lightly held. He was, moreover, anxious for the safety of Lemberg, the heart of his arteries of communication, and desired also to wrest the last corner of Austrian territory from Russian possession. There can be little doubt, moreover, that Conrad's immense optimism had been stimulated beyond belief by the success of the great Tarnow–Gorlice thrust in early May. At all times his imagination tended to outstrip his powers, and with little or no provocation he was capable of producing a plan magnificent in conception, inspiring in prospects, but quite unrealizable. It is at least certain that the most gratifying pictures of immense conquest were floating in kaleidoscopic confusion before his mind. He saw vividly that Russia was rent and torn by the mighty blows she had endured, and though he would have done well to have remembered that it was a German fist which had hammered his giant enemy into fragments, he could think only that it was his brain which had selected the weak point in the enemy armour. Swept away on the tide of success, he already saw Austrian armies pouring into the Ukraine. The fact that Russian troops still stood on Austrian soil was of small moment.

The proposals for a great invasion of south Russia which Conrad was to make to Falkenhayn in the early spring of the following year were undoubtedly maturing in his busy brain in the late summer of 1915; if they were not, it is more than difficult to account for his sudden and, by military needs, quite unjustified offensive in eastern Galicia. He was counting on breaking through the Russian left wing, and he was reasonably certain that any striking success in that area would win over a terrified Rumania. With her armies at his disposal there was little doubt that he could utterly shatter the Russian forces in the far south, which he was convinced were as demoralized and as disorganized as those farther north. And then what golden harvests lay before him! The Ukraine with all its riches and a path to the distant Caspian were the smallest prizes that could be gathered: his expectations were circumscribed by no more than the limits of his lively imagination. Unfortunately for his plans, Conrad had first to win his initial success and drive the Russians from the last corner of Galicia.

Towards the end of August, therefore, he carried out a regrouping of his armies on this front, bringing the 4th army down from Brest-Litovsk to aid the Austrian 1st and 2nd, the German southern, and the Austrian 7th armies. Ivanoff, the Russian commander of the southern front, had secured virtually an independent command by reason of the Russian retreat to the Pripet Marshes, which divided his forces from those in the north. He possessed three able generals in Brusiloff, Shcherbacheff and Lechitski, the commanders of his 8th, 11th and 9th armies, and although his ranks were depleted, he was in a position rapidly to reinforce them and adequately to supply them from Kiev and Odessa.

In the result the Austrians accomplished little. They began their advance well on August 27 by a vigorous attack on the northern wing of Brusiloff's 8th army defending Sarni and Lutsk, and on the centre of Shcherbacheff's 11th army holding the Zlota Lipa in Galicia. The battle soon became general all along the line, but the distribution of forces was in favour of the Austrians in the north and the centre, and of the Russians in the south. Thus, while Brusiloff and Shcherbacheff were both driven back before the onslaught of the Austrian 4th and 1st armies, Lechitski was able to hold Pflanzer-Baltin's 7th army and even to threaten an envelopment.

By August 30 Brusiloff had been driven out of Lutsk, and the Austrian centre had advanced to within striking distance of Dubno. Throughout the next week the Russians were steadily driven back, and their line in the south was compelled to conform by falling back to the Sereth. The piecemeal arrival of reinforcements from Kiev during this period had given Ivanoff some relief and, aided by dismounted fortress guns, he was able, on September 6, to launch a strong counter-offensive from the neighbourhood of Tarnopol, which, although unable to recover much of the lost ground, held the enemy firmly on that front and compelled the Austrians to reinforce Pflanzer-Baltin's northern wing by the 6th corps, originally destined for the Serbian campaign.

Map of the Eastern Front from Kovno in the north to the frontiers of Rumania, showing the cities and railway lines in the area over which the Russians made a fighting retreat in 1915 Inset, district around the Gulf of Riga



But farther north Brusiloff had been driven from Dubno, and Ivanoff was compelled to throw his reserves into this area as his right wing was being bent back dangerously. By the 12th the Austrians were threatening Rovno itself and the Russian counter-offensive was halted.

With some care Ivanoff had been preparing a special reserve, and a piece of luck enabled him to plan a large-scale offensive. He received a supply of high explosive shells from Kiev, and this temporarily placed him on an equality in the matter of artillery with his opponents. Regrouping his forces in two areas, one the extreme north round Rafalovka and the other the Tarnopol–Trembovla area, he launched simultaneous attacks on the Austrian line.

Just in time the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, in command of these operations, received information of the forthcoming storm and halted his advance. He rushed up reinforcements to his centre, which by desperate fighting managed to prevent a Russian breakthrough, at the cost of a rapid retirement to the Strypa; but disaster overtook his northern wing. Brusiloff's turning movement swept round behind the Austrian 1st army and by the 15th had thrown the Austrians back across the Styr. The success was quickly exploited. Some 20,000 Austrians and many of their guns were seized by the Russian pincers, and by the 23rd Brusiloff had retaken Dubno and Lutsk and was even threatening Kovel. Shcherbacheff and Lechitski had been able to pin down the Austrians in the centre, and the situation appeared so grave that an appeal was made to the Germans, who, realising the grave emergency that might arise, at once dispatched two corps to the aid of their allies.

The appearance of German troops in the line rapidly changed the situation. Brusiloff, anxious for his now dangerously extended right flank, ordered a hurried retirement to a position east of Lutsk, which reverted to the Austrians. This position was based on Dubno and covered Sarni. His withdrawal compelled a similar retirement in the south, and the Russian line fell back to the Sereth. By the beginning of October the line was in process of stabilization and Conrad's dream of a Russian collapse and an Austrian triumph had been utterly shattered.

Intermittent fighting continued throughout the month and well into November, both the Russians and the Austrians seeking to improve their defensive positions by small advances in different areas. Both were exhausted by the terrible struggle, however, and

ONE OF THE MANY

The official figures for British casualties among the troops who took part in the opening day's offensive on the Somme, is 57,470. Here one of the victims is being carried down a communication trench opposite the strong German position of La Boisselle

Crown Copyright

Photos: Imperial War Museum

HORSE POWER UNUSED

Fricourt Valley was the scene of a big cavalry concentration in July, 1916. This remount camp is filled with horses, very few of whom, owing to the lack of opportunities for cavalry during the Somme offensive, tasted the excitements of battle

the bitter winter conditions made extensive operations impossible. Austria had not achieved her purpose of freeing Galicia and of mastering the southern half of the Vilna–Kiev railway, but she had reason to be satisfied with her success, which had eased the pressure on Lemberg, recaptured Czernowitz, and bitten a large piece out of the Volhynian triangle.

Different was the success which had attended the German arms in the far north, where only most desperate fighting had saved the Russian armies from complete disaster. The advance of Hindenburg in the area north of the Polish salient during the latter part of August and September, 1915, was comparable to the drive Mackensen had made through Galicia in May. At every point the Russians were outmanoeuvred and driven back, and at one time their whole front was in imminent danger. Hindenburg and Ludendorff more than justified their great reputations. They almost succeeded in bringing off the stroke which, ever since the spring of the year, they had been clamouring to attempt.

PASSES TO BLIGHTY

In an improvised open-air orderly room in a shell hole behind the lines these young soldiers are being given passes and railway vouchers which will enable them to go on leave. There were no more coveted bits of paper than these to be found at the front

The objects they sought to realize were twofold, and it is necessary to grasp their intention clearly before their autumn campaign can be understood. In the first place, they were anxious to secure the line of the Dvina and to capture Riga, partly in order to open a way to Petrograd in the next spring, but chiefly to provide a strong flank protection for the operations of their 10th and 8th armies farther south. For this end Below's Niemen army was employed.

In the second place, the German command was concerned with a strategical rather than a tactical success. A strong thrust to the south-east from the direction of Kovno and Vilna would place their forces athwart the vital railways leading out of the Polish salient and confine the Russian armies, still to the west of the points they hoped to seize, to few and congested lines of retreat. It was not impossible that a large part of those armies would be cut off and captured. To the achievement of this second aim the 10th and 8th armies were directed. Thus arose two series of operations, independent and yet connected, the first in Lithuania and Courland, where the Germans strove to advance over the Dvina, and at the same time to guard the flank and rear of the second, along the Kovno–Smorgon line, where the German 10th army sought to penetrate the Russian front.

The latter of these operations had been well begun by the capture of Kovno on August 18, the immediate consequence of which was to compel a

FAITHFUL UNTO DEATH

Probably the finest feature of the war was the fortitude shown by the rank and file. These Germans, slain on Pilckem ridge during the horrors of the battles of Third Ypres, obeyed the command to die just as readily as their British enemies

Photo: Imperial War Museum

Russian retirement from the Brest-Litovsk line, as chronicled earlier. But when the project seemed half-realized, Ludendorff hesitated. He wasted a precious week by directing Eichhorn to strike south at Olita, and Russia was able to draw her forces east of the danger point.

Ludendorff had thus been tempted by the smaller, but nearer, prize and had striven to cut off the Russians still to the west of Kovno ; but on August 23 he reverted energetically to his original and vaster plan and Eichhorn was swung eastward again on Vilna. The German 8th army to the south collected the spoils. The gallant little fort of Osowiec was abandoned by the Russians on August 23, Augustow on the 26th, Olita on the 27th, and Grodno, after severe fighting, on September 2. The massing of Russian reserves in front of Vilna and the difficulties of supply and transport delayed the advance for some days, and not until the 10th army had been reinforced was it able to continue its forward move.

Meanwhile, Below in the north had admirably carried out his orders. By the beginning of August he had captured Mitau and Shavli and was able to launch a fierce attack on Riga. His troops, encouraged by the prospect of comfortable winter quarters in the port, fought well and were aided by a naval attack. But nothing of great value was accomplished. The Russians, filled with the liveliest fears of a German break-through, held to their positions with immense courage, but in vain.

By the middle of the month they had been driven back to the river south-east of Riga, and the Germans were able to clear the western bank for some distance. All their attempts to cross, however, were beaten back, and the Russians retained the vital bridgehead at Friedrichstadt. The naval attack had met with ignominious failure. From August 8 repeated attempts were made to land troops in flat-bottomed boats at Pernau, but they were all captured or destroyed by the Russians. Without command of the sea, the Germans could do nothing, and in those waters the Russian navy was supreme. An attempt made by Germany temporarily to wrest the control from Russia cost her dearly.

The British " Official History : Naval Operations," Vol. III, gives an account of these proceedings :

> The details of the affair are obscure. It would seem that, after partially forcing the entrance, the Germans, under cover of the fog that prevailed, endeavoured to land a force in flat-bottomed boats at Pernau in the northern pocket of the gulf, so as to take Riga in the rear. The attempt was made in face of the undefeated naval force which the Russians had on the spot, and the whole of the troops that landed, it is said, were either captured or destroyed. Notwithstanding this blow the operations appear to have proceeded with some loss on both sides. But the day after the Moltke was disabled the attempt to turn the Riga flank was abandoned. It is not, therefore, impossible that the presence of our (i.e. British) submarines in the Baltic was as disconcerting to the Germans as the arrival of theirs at the Dardanelles had been to us. Be that as it may, by the morning of August 21 the German squadrons had disappeared. All that remained on the coast were light forces to see what could be done with the British submarine base. On the 25th and 26th Dagerort was bombarded by two cruisers and a division of destroyers, but without result, and the outcome of the whole affair was that the Russian right remained secure on the line of the Dvina.

The narrative tells that the Moltke, a battle-cruiser, was torpedoed by the British submarine E 1. In a footnote it is stated that the Russians admitted the loss of a gunboat, but that their claim to have destroyed and put out of action eight German destroyers and two cruisers was certainly exaggerated.

In spite of this reverse, Below was able to extend his front farther eastward along the Dvina, and by September 9 was far enough advanced to cover the operations that Ludendorff was planning to the north and west of Vilna. During the week of comparative inactivity which had intervened since the fall of

Photo: Imperial War Museum

THEY GAVE THEIR ALL

Bitter enemies, through no fault of their own, in life, the Germans in the photograph above and the Frenchmen below have suffered in battle a common fate. The Germans lie neglected and unburied on foreign soil; the Frenchmen, lying on the fields of their native Champagne, have been covered with shrouds. The men of both nations have been called upon for the supreme sacrifice

Photo: Topical

'Canadian Records'

PATCHING THEM UP

The Canadians captured Courcelette, on the Somme front, with great gallantry in September, 1916. Here in a trench just behind the newly established front line first aid is being given to the wounded before proceeding to the casualty clearing station

Grodno he had completed the organization, behind the left wing of the 10th army, of a great mass of cavalry, and, having strongly reinforced that army, primarily by the siege troops released by the fall of Novogeorgievsk, he prepared to force a breach in the Russian line for his horsemen.

The daily fighting with the Russians defending Vilna suddenly flared up into a battle centring round the little village of Meishagola, some 15 miles north-west of the city. For three days the German infantry hurled themselves at the Russian line and finally drove the defenders from the village. In an attempt to stay the German advance, Russian troops from both wings were drawn into the struggle, and the chance for which Ludendorff had waited was at last given him. As they moved southward the Russians opened a gap in their line near Vilkomir to the north, and some 40,000 German cavalry streamed through. This movement more nearly brought disaster to the Russian line than any other since the beginning of the campaign in July.

It occurred at an awkward moment for Russia, who was in process of reorganizing her command. As will be related later, the grand-duke Nicholas had been dismissed from his command and sent to the Caucasus, and on September 5 the Tsar had assumed the personal direction of his armies. He had chosen as his chief of staff General Alexeieff, who had so brilliantly conducted the Russian retreat from Warsaw, and in his hands remained the virtual conduct of affairs. Alexeieff's departure robbed the Russian northern armies temporarily of a head, and the German cavalry swept on, feebly opposed by isolated groups of undirected Cossacks. They had reached Svyentsyani by the 12th, Smorgon by the 14th, and were astride the railway at Vileika and Molodechno by the 15th and 16th. They were actually in control of the very railway by which Evert was railing back his army on Lida, and had they been able to hold their gains the consequences would have been disastrous.

At this critical moment, however, Russky, the victor of Przasnysz, was given the northern command. Taking in the gravity of the situation, he launched a well-supported offensive against the rear and flank of the scattered cavalry, from the direction of Dvinsk. The cavalry were driven out of Vidzi on the 20th and out of Smorgon, at the point of the bayonet, on the 21st. Farther east they had already been compelled to retire, and the crisis was passed. They were rapidly driven back, losing many prisoners, and by September 25 the Russian line was restored.

Ludendorff had failed, but by very little. Had his cavalry been able to hold on to Smorgon for a few hours longer, even then he might have succeeded, for his infantry, which had made an immense forced march along the northern bank of the Viliya, were within 15 miles of the place when the Russians reoccupied it. He had shot his bolt; the constant demands which Falkenhayn was making on his divisions and the exhaustion from which the troops were suffering, added to the approach of winter and the difficulties of the terrain, compelled him to break off major operations. His final effort to capture Dvinsk had been beaten off with severe loss on September 14–17, and he had to rest content with Vilna, from which the Russians had withdrawn on September 14; his line was stabilized from Riga down the Dvina to a point west of Dvinsk and thence almost due south through Smorgon and Baranovichi to join up with the central group of armies north of Pinsk.

In Russia the check which had been inflicted by Ivanoff on the Austrians in the south, and the halting of Hindenburg's advance in the north, were both acclaimed as triumphs for the new commander-in-chief; but no amount of whitewashing

RAILHEAD FOR WOUNDEI

This recently constructed light railway siding at the edge of a crater-filled field presents a scene of busy activity. R.A.M.C. stretcher bearers are loading wounded on stretchers on to open trucks, while German prisoners assist

could conceal the immensity of the disaster which Russia had suffered in the year, nor compensate in the least for the terrible losses she had sustained.

The Tsar's assumption of the command of the armies had done little to assuage public resentment against the conduct and the course of the war. The dismissal of the grand-duke was looked upon not only as a military blunder—which it was—but also as a triumph for the intriguing court circles, the pro-German Tsarina and her despicable creature, the sensual Rasputin. At a meeting of the Duma on August 1 an immense spirit of patriotism and loyalty had been in evidence. Eloquent speeches promising help, devotion and service had been made on all sides, but the Tsar had retorted by dismissing the assembly the moment it had passed to the long-overdue task of criticizing the conduct of affairs.

The cumulative result of all these factors was to fan the spirit of revolution in the land, to increase the despondency and war weariness among all classes, and to shake Russia's attachment to the Allied cause. Nor did the comparative failure of the French offensive in Champagne and the British offensive around Loos mitigate Russia's bitterness; she remained convinced that the Allies had coldly witnessed her agonies without in any way trying to help her.

Falkenhayn had not, as hoped, utterly crippled Russia. Brusiloff's offensive in April–June, 1916, was to prove that. But in one way he had done more. He had delivered a blow from the effects of which Russia was not to recover until she had undergone a terrible convulsion that was to change her beyond recognition. And he had much reason to be satisfied with his work. Everywhere during the year he had proved that Germany could strike with crushing effect or defend herself with invincible skill. The triumph was acclaimed with fervour in Berlin and throughout the country, but it was to prove the greatest disaster in German history, for Falkenhayn had merely postponed the inevitable and, by committing the world to three more awful years of war, had, in fact, ensured that the peace terms Germany finally secured were only the more humiliating.

A SNIPER'S CASTLE

This Canadian is examining a captured German sniper's post. Strongly constructed of Krupp's steel, it has proved a deadly menace. The notice alongside shows that snipers in the neighbourhood still threaten danger, as do enemy airmen, spotting for their artillery

Photos: 'Canadian Records'

Photos: 'Canadian Records'

ONCE A BREWERY

In the course of the minor operations which preceded the "Third Ypres" offensive the Canadians took, on June 27, 1917, the village of La Coulotte. Here are the remains of the village brewery being examined, presumably regretfully, by two of the victors

LINE OUT OF ORDER

One at least of the signals in this photograph is giving the very misleading information that the line is all clear. The phrase of the telephone operator, "Line out of order," is an understatement as regards this railway station near Lens

CHAPTER 53

STRUGGLES IN CHAMPAGNE

As part of the plan for a combined offensive in the autumn of 1915, the French attacked in Champagne, while, as related in Chapter 51, the British advanced around Loos

DESPITE the previous checks to the army of Champagne, Joffre was of the opinion that in the sector between the Argonne and Reims the decisive attack on the German lines should be attempted, for it was there that the breaking of the German front would be most disastrous. The offensive he proposed aimed at forcing the enemy to relinquish the great salient at Noyon by breaking through its sides, advancing eastward over the Artois plain and northward from Champagne, the former being a powerful but subsidiary offensive undertaken simultaneously with the main onslaught between Reims and the Argonne.

The German defences had been greatly extended since the French had made their previous thrust in the early part of the year. They comprised two successive and strongly fortified positions. The first was formed of a network of trenches linked up with strong field fortresses. The second, from three to four miles behind the first, was constructed on the reverse slope of the downs, hidden from observation, and protected by the lie of the land from all but vertically falling shells.

The first line of German defence, consisting as it did of simple trenches alternating with strong points, resembled the old fortress system of curtains and bastions. The only method of attack was to penetrate the centre of each curtain and capture the bastions by a flanking movement. But the Germans had already prepared a reply to this obvious procedure. Their communication trenches running from the support to the front line were protected on right and left by barbed wire entanglements. In this manner they could be instantly transformed into flanking defences.

Before a further offensive could be undertaken in Champagne an immense amount of preparation was necessary. The railway from Sainte-Menehould to Châlons was duplicated by following the itinerary Dommartin to Saint-Rémy, and to these lines were joined small-gauge railways to permit of thorough liaison between troops, batteries and rail-heads. Roads were reconstructed and, in view of the scarcity of villages, huts were built in which to billet the reserves. Each division was provided with three ways of communication to the rear: one for up traffic, one for down traffic, and a third to allow a rapid evacuation of the wounded. Large assembly trenches were dug, gun emplacements laid and telephone lines installed in duplicate or triplicate to provide against any interruption of communications. Preparations on so large a scale could not be carried out unseen by aerial observation, and the Germans were early aware that trouble was brewing in that sector. At the beginning of September they had 70 battalions in Champagne. These were gradually added to until they numbered 192. They belonged mostly to the German 3rd army, commanded by General von Einem.

The preliminary bombardment began on the morning of Sept. 22 and continued for three days and nights. Field-guns poured a hail of shell upon the German front-line trenches in an effort to demolish the wire and trench fortifications, while long-range guns dealt similarly with the enemy's second position. In addition, fire was directed against enemy headquarters, billeting areas, supply depôts, and the Bazancourt–Challerange railway, and, by the admission of Falkenhayn, caused "unheard-of destruction, both in and far behind our positions, in addition to very heavy losses in men."

The task of conducting the offensive was entrusted to General de Castelnau,

WAITING THEIR TURN

This French farm in Champagne has become a temporary dressing-station. Wounded Frenchmen wait their turn to be carried inside, where the application of new dressings and bandages will help to make the journey to the base hospital more comfortable

Photo: Topical

commanding the central army group, who planned to attack with the 2nd army (General Pétain) and the 4th army (General de Langle de Cary) on a front comprised between the heights of Moronvilliers and the river Aisne. In the event of success the forward movement was to be prolonged by the 3rd and 5th armies in the Argonne and to the north of Reims. The objectives assigned to the 2nd army were the heights north of the Dormoise valley, including Hill 193, the Butte de Tahure, and Hills 171 and 194, north of Ripont. On its left the 4th army was to occupy Hill 152, south of St. Souplet, Navarin farm and the Butte de Souain. Two cavalry corps were placed in immediate reserve to exploit any break-through.

On September 23 General Joffre issued the following order to his troops :

Soldiers of the Republic,—After months of waiting, which have enabled us to increase our effective strength and our resources, while our adversary has been wasting his, the moment has come to attack and conquer, and add fresh glories to those of the Marne, Flanders, the Vosges and Arras. Behind a hurricane of fire and steel, unleashed thanks to the unremitting toil of our factories of France, where your comrades have laboured for you night and day, you will advance together to the assault, along the whole front, in close union with the armies of our allies. Your driving force will be irresistible. It will carry you, in one effort, right up to the adversary's batteries, beyond the fortified lines in your path. You will give him neither rest nor respite until victory is achieved. Go to it with all your heart, for the deliverance of our native soil, for the triumph of right and freedom.

Zero hour for the attack was fixed for 9.15 a.m. on the morning of September 25. The night before the battle rain fell heavily, and continued almost without pause for four consecutive days, greatly hindering observation from the air. Nevertheless, the attack was not postponed, and at the appointed hour the offensive began along all the sector from Aubérive to the Argonne. The first enemy trenches were quickly captured, but the depth of penetration was very unequal owing to the strong resistance offered at certain localized points, and the action soon developed into isolated engagements.

On the extreme right the 1st Colonial corps gained a footing in the German first line trenches, but was then held up by uncut entanglements and oblique fire from the hills around Servon. However, they reached the foot of the ridge called the Hand of Massiges on account of the resemblance of its spurs to five outstretched fingers, and established themselves in an excavation on the eastern mound, known as the Crater. By nightfall, after incessant bombing attacks, they were in possession of the south-eastern extremity of the ridge, while reserves were working their way up the Ruisseau de l'Etang, a stream flowing along its western edge. Further progress was slow, for the Germans had an elaborate trench system on the "Hand," and the ravines separating the "fingers" were filled with wire entanglements and enfiladed by machine-guns.



The 39th division of the 20th corps soon captured the summit of Maisons-de-Champagne, though its right was checked by a strong point called La Défaite. One party even succeeded in reaching the river Dormoise, passing through the German batteries and killing the gun teams, but was eventually forced back. Of the first line of enemy trenches all that remained was a shapeless track, under which, half buried, lay the severed limbs and mutilated bodies of the defenders. Prisoners began to come in, haggard and weak, some of whom had not eaten for three days, for a French naval gun had destroyed Challerange station and blown up the railway track at Autry. The obstruction caused had hindered the transport of supplies.

The right of the 11th division advanced rapidly, but the centre and left wing met with greater resistance, and though a few isolated parties reached the top of the Butte du Mesnil, in a short time they were annihilated. Upon hearing that Maisons-de-Champagne had been captured, General Balfourier called up two squadrons of cavalry to charge the German batteries holding up the advance at La Défaite, but though they managed to cross the first line of trenches, obstacles insuperable for horses obliged them to dismount.

On the 11th corps front the 21st division was checked at the outset in front of a field fortress lying on the eastern side of the south Mamelle, and by a strong point known as the Trapeze. Here the entanglements, hidden from the artillery by a reverse slope of the ground, had not been destroyed, and the French, after suffering heavy losses, were obliged to retire to their starting point.

The 22nd division, on the left wing of the 11th corps, was more successful. The right brigade reached the copse known, from its shape, as the Toothbrush and pushed ahead as far as the village of Tahure, but was compelled to retire during the afternoon. In order to fill the gap that now existed between the right of the 22nd division and the left of the 21st, General Baumgarten brought up part of his reserves, and the left brigade of the 22nd established itself at nightfall on a spur some 600 yards north-west of Tahure. In this sector also cavalry was called upon, but again proved incapable of advancing.

On the left of the 2nd army the 14th corps, under General Baret, advanced over the level ground east of Trou Bricot, its left flank covered by a subsidiary movement against the southern edge of Trou Bricot wood. The Savoyard and Dauphinois contingents comprising the 27th division of this corps swept over the first German defences, streaming northward, capturing guns and prisoners on their way, until by 11 o'clock they had reached their first objective, Tree 193, just east of the Butte de Souain. One of their regiments was cited in dispatches as having "crossed, under heavy fire, over four kilometres of ground in two hours, capturing ten guns." The 30th regiment attacked York trench and the southern edge of Trou Bricot wood, completely surprising and routing the Germans by an unexpected attack upon their flank and rear skilfully carried out by a sudden converging movement to the left. Early

SEEING FOR HIMSELF

The King, accompanied by the Queen, paid a te days' visit to the front in July, 1917. He is her seen finding out for himself the havoc caused o Wytschaete ridge. Wytschaete, north of the Messine ridge, was the scene of bitter struggles during th British offensive of June–November, 1917

GLORY OF VIMY RIDGE

There was no finer achievement in the whole war than the capture by the Canadians, on Easter Day, April 9, 1917, of Vimy Ridge. Found impregnable by the French in 1915, it was taken by a mixture of organization, steadiness and magnificent dash, and proved an invaluable strong point during the German attacks in the spring of 1918

SHELL-HOLE STRONG POINTS

A lull that gives a deceptive peace has followed a successful Canadian advance on Vimy Ridge, and the victors are consolidating their position. Shell-holes are adapted for machine-gun posts, and machine-gunners, who have moved forward to these opportune shelters, are busily preparing to support a further advance

ROUNDING THEM UP

The German trench systems on the slopes of Vimy Ridge were exceptionally strong and well provided with deep dug-outs. Here Canadians are bringing in prisoners captured in the open and are also searching the dug-outs for any Germans who may still be in hiding, ready to sell their lives dearly

in the afternoon this regiment was in possession of the Baraque, on the Souain–Tahure road, while the 55th brigade of the 28th division captured the Pocket. Most of the Germans in the vicinity of Trou Bricot wood were completely surrounded. Before 5 o'clock in the afternoon the 14th corps had captured 40 officers and 1,260 men.

On the 4th army front the right wing was formed by the 2nd Colonial corps under General Blondlat. The flanking division, General Codet's Moroccans, had to see that contact was maintained with the left wing of the 2nd army, advancing on their right. They rapidly surrounded the Trou Bricot from west and north, while the 14th corps was attacking it from south and east, and liaison was quickly established. In the intricate labyrinth of Bois Sabot deep dug-outs had protected their inhabitants from the devastating fire of the French guns. As the colonial troops advanced the Germans emerged from their underground shelters and offered a stubborn resistance. The staccato rattle of machine-guns from various nests in the wood was from time to time drowned by the terrific explosion of a mine, and before long a series of sharply contested local actions were being fought out amid the shattered trees. Certain units, in their excitement, advanced so rapidly that they ran through the barrage of their own guns. Although completely cut off, the Africans refused to fall back. As though on the open *bled* of their native land, they formed a square and calmly awaited the arrival of their comrades.

In the corps centre the 10th Colonial division, led by General Marchand (the central figure of the Fashoda incident of 1898), captured, in less than an hour, Eckmühl and Gretchen trenches on the Souain–Somme-Py road, and by 10 o'clock were at Navarin farm, having advanced two miles in three-quarters of an hour. But a nest of four machine-guns had thinned their ranks considerably, and Marchand himself, while rallying his men, fell grievously wounded. In the heat of the conflict the units of this division had become hopelessly intermingled, but as the German second position did not appear to be held in strength, the advance was continued, only to be checked by the fire of French gunners falling too short on their own men.

The 15th Colonial division stormed the Palatinate and Magdeburg strongholds and advanced as far as Wilhelm II wood. Unable to gain as much ground as Marchand's division, it formed up in oblique echelon with regard to the latter. The Bois Sabot and the Spandau work were now both in French hands, and cleaning-up parties were dealing with the last defenders. With no time for proper burial the remains of the dead were thrown into the crumbling saps.

In view of the partial success obtained by the 2nd Colonial corps Blondlat informed the 4th army commander that in his opinion the time was now ripe to send up the 6th corps to exploit this advantage. At once de Langle de Cary telephoned to General de Paulinier, commanding the 6th corps, to "push forward without interruption on to the objectives assigned to him, and to collect on his way any units of the 2nd Colonial corps that have been held up, so as to capture at the earliest possible moment the line of defence situated level with Navarin farm." Orders were thereupon given to the 12th and 127th divisions to advance. Further instructions from de Langle de Cary prescribed that in the event of Blondlat, who was engaging all his reserves, being unable to make a breach at Navarin, the 6th corps was to assist him in this operation, at the same time supporting the left of the 15th Colonial division, whose advance had been checked by enfilade fire. By four o'clock in the afternoon the head of the 127th division reached the proximity of the battle front. Unfortunately, for some unknown reason brigade commanders had not been advised of the orders given to General Paulinier, and as previous orders had stated that the 6th corps was not to reinforce the 2nd Colonial corps in attack, but only to pass through the breach when made, this corps took no part in the attack that day.

On the front of the 7th corps the 14th division was called upon to advance over thickly wooded ground, where several German strong points, even when surrounded, resisted stubbornly till late in the day. Nevertheless, profiting by the progress made by the 2nd Colonial corps on its right, the division managed to reach Hills 160 and 164, over a mile north-west of Souain. On the corps' left wing the 37th division rushed forward with Zouave regiments leading the assault and *tirailleurs* in support. The "Zouzous" were hindered from the start by uncut entanglements, and their losses were very heavy. But painfully they worked their way northward, paying but little heed to what was happening on either side of them, and by a total disregard of danger the right brigade reached Hill 139, two miles north-east of St. Hilaire, and the left brigade captured the farm of L'Epine de Védegrange. That night Villaret announced that his corps had captured 700 prisoners and four guns.

The 32nd corps, under Berthelot, was less successful. Although it captured some 700 prisoners and three field-guns, its casualties were very heavy and its progress slight. A detachment of the 42nd division managed to advance about half a mile, but was then thrown back by a strong and determined counter-attack supported by oblique fire from the high ground near Moronvilliers.

On the left wing of the 4th army was the 4th corps under General Putz. The 7th division on the corps' right had been given the task of taking the village of Aubérive, while the 124th division on the left flank had as its immediate objective the Mont Sans-Nom, south-east of Moronvilliers. An attack upon the southern end of Aubérive, carried out by a brigade of the 7th division, advancing astride the river Suippes, was held up almost at the start, and another attack from the west was an equal failure, with the German batteries at Moronvilliers commanding the position. Although isolated bodies of men succeeded in penetrating into the outskirts of the village, no support could reach them and they were quickly destroyed. The 124th division was checked in similar manner by the same German batteries.

It will thus be seen that the greatest advance made by the French during the day was in the centre of the battle front. The second German position had not been penetrated at any point, but was threatened from Navarin farm on the west to a spot a mile east of Arbre 193. Approximately 12,000 prisoners and a vast quantity of material had been captured. Informed of the extent of the French advance, Joffre decided that the results of the operations of September 25 were sufficient to warrant their exploitation, and gave orders for the German second position to be attacked the following morning.

On the whole the situation at the end of the day was distinctly in favour of the French. On most of the front a decided advance had been made, varying in depth from one to two and a half miles. De Castelnau entertained high hopes of pushing through to Vouziers. But, on the other hand, a certain amount of dissatisfaction and disillusionment was experienced among the fighting troops, increased to some extent by the wretched weather and the privations incidental upon all great battles.

At all events the partial successes of the French were sufficiently disturbing to the equanimity of General von Falkenhayn to warrant his discussing with Einem whether it would not be wiser to withdraw his front line. However, upon the arrival of the German supreme command at the scene of action, it was

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CANADIAN TROPHY

Justly proud of their trophy, these Canadians are resting after a successful assault resulting in the capture of a battery of German high velocity guns. The Germans, however, succeeded in putting this gun out of action before taking to flight

DOWN THE LINE

Several of these wounded men seem to be enjoying this novel form of transport, in which a horse does the job of an engine. They have been lucky enough to get a lift on a truck that is returning empty after bringing up supplies

'Canadian Records'

decided that no voluntary retreat should be carried out; but Einem's chief of staff was replaced by Lieutenant-Colonel von Lossberg, and the German 8th army reserves were hurried up to reinforce the 3rd army. In addition, the Germans received help from another useful ally, the weather, for the incessant rain greatly hindered the French offensive.

This French attack in Champagne took place, as was said previously, on the same day as the battle of Loos, and the situation on the battlefield around Perthes on the afternoon of September 25 bore several points of resemblance to that obtaining at the same hour in the district north of Lens. Both the French and British leading divisions had made advances. In particular, the position of the Colonial troops at Maisons-de-Champagne resembled that of the Highland brigade at the Cité St. Auguste at Lens. The men had stormed through machine-gun fire, wire entanglements, rows of trenches, and gun positions, and had reached the last crest from which the valley of the Dormoise and the village of Ripont were dominated. Had supports quickly arrived, the road to Vouziers, Namur, and Liége might have been won. But, apparently, the battalion that reached the Maisons, having lost all its officers and being commanded by a sergeant, had moved on this occasion too quickly.

The French staff could not get more men up there in time, and the half-shattered battalion, caught between two flanking fires from Massiges and Beauséjour, and attacked in front from Ripont, had to leave the heavy German and Austrian batteries it had captured on the crest, and fall back at two o'clock on Saturday afternoon. There was another battalion in a still more advanced position at the entrenchments north-west of the Maisons. The men had held the hill for three and a half hours without help arriving, and it was only at the end of this time that the Germans at Ripont were able to re-form and return to the attack. As a matter of fact, the two wings at the height of the Hand of Massiges and at the Butte of Mesnil could not get forward as quickly as the centre had done. There had been a complete check at Mesnil, and this had thrown the operation seriously out of gear.

On the evening of September 25 the French line between Aubérive and Massiges presented a very irregular appearance. Having hurriedly consolidated the positions they had won, certain detachments were facing due east, while others were fronting in the opposite direction. The next two days were spent in getting the front line into some kind of organized position and in endeavouring to establish contact at all points with the German second line of defence. The 157th division and the 16th Colonial division were sent as reinforcements to de Castelnau, and an extra supply of ammunition was transferred to Champagne.

Photo: Imperial War Museum

DANGEROUS DUMP

Harmless for the moment, but potentially dangerous, these trench mortar bombs have been stacked in a sheltered reserve trench near Fricourt on the Somme

'Canadian Records'

CARRIED MUD FREE

Wounded, but not badly enough for him to lose his cheerfulness, this Canadian is carried by ever willing stretcher-bearers. He is lucky to avoid the appalling mud and slime through which they have to walk, precariously keeping their foothold

On the morning of September 26 the German batteries opened out in a regular and heavy bombardment of the French positions. So heavy was the rain and so low were the scudding clouds that no aerial reconnaissance was possible, and little could be done to check the enemy's fire. At Massiges the garrison of the Hand had been strongly reinforced during the night by detachments of the German 16th corps from the Argonne sector. Hardened fighters, they defended the plateau foot by foot, the machine-gunners remaining at their post until killed, the infantry fighting to the last man. The 1st Colonial corps had to bomb their way through every section of trench, until finally the 2nd Colonial division reached the crest.

The 32nd division, brought up from reserve, captured Mount Têtu, the culminating point of the range of hills north

Photo: Topical

FORWARD THE DRUMS

The drums of a French regimental band are here being carried across a desolate stretch of country behind the lines. The band is moving up to meet troops as they come out of the line and to encourage their weary footsteps by playing them back to rest billets

of Massiges, so that now the French commanded that part of the valley where the Tourbe and the Dormoise flow into the Aisne. From this position they were able to descend into the valley, taking in flank the German strong points north of Ville-sur-Tourbe, and capture large numbers of prisoners, together with stores and material, some 3,000 hand-grenades and two 77 mm. field-guns. Moving eastward, the 8th Colonial regiment took possession of La Verrue and part of the Col des Abeilles, and before long the African troops had captured the crater known as the Ear-hole, in spite of its bombproof shelters and elaborate fortifications.

On the left Balfourier made a determined attack upon the strong point La Défaite with the 39th division, but the name proved prophetic and all efforts to effect a lodgement failed. The 153rd division recaptured Maisons-de-Champagne, and on their left two regiments of the 11th division made some slight progress towards the Butte du Mesnil, securing a foothold in the copse south-west of Zig-Zag wood. The 53rd division of the 11th corps made a strong assault upon Tahure, and by nightfall were in possession of the western outskirts of that village. Farther east, Trou Bricot wood was cleared of the remnants of its defenders, but no further progress could be made against the position at Tree 193, and Vistula trench defied all efforts to capture it.

On the 4th army front the French could do little more than consolidate the positions they had won during the previous day's fighting. Between the river Suippes at Aubérive and the road from Souain to Somme-Py lay part of the German second line of defence known as the parallel of the Epine de Védegrange, a position prolonged in an easterly direction as far as Hill 193, west of Tahure. On September 27 they won the crest of this position, only to find a strongly fortified trench system running parallel on the reverse slope of the downs. Here they were checked, but by September 28 they had won, between Aubérive and Souain, a further six square miles of territory, had inflicted heavy casualties, and captured 3,000 prisoners of all ranks and 44 guns.

On Sept. 28 it seemed that the long awaited break-through was at hand. Driven from their first position, the Germans had everywhere retired to their second lines of defence. Prepared at leisure by the enemy during the summer months, these were constructed in such a manner that by skilful use of the contours of the ground they almost defied observation. Protected by a network of barbed wire and machine-gun posts well in advance of the fire trenches, they presented an almost impregnable front to any attack not preceded by a

LIGHT GUN—HEAVY TASK

The number of men dragging this French trench mortar seems to be out of all proportion to its size. The explanation is not far to seek —mud, the inveterate enemy of all soldiers, that for months on end added immeasurably to the discomforts and difficulties of their lives

long artillery preparation. By the evening of September 27 this enemy line appeared threatened at two points: Hill 201 and Pansy trench. At 6.30 p.m. a telephone message from Captain Miquel, liaison officer between 4th army H.Q. and the 6th corps, reported that Pansy trench was captured and occupied by a battalion of Bro's Colonial division, while a further message, received at 9.30 p.m. from the 7th corps, announced that a rupture was imminent between Lubeck trench and Pansy trench.

About 11 p.m. on September 28, after a day spent reinforcing the attacking division with fresh reserves, and exerting as great a pressure as possible upon the German second line, de Castelnau sent word to Pétain that the right wing of the 4th army had made an important breach in the enemy line, and that in consequence the 2nd army should support, by all the means in its power, every effort to exploit this advantage next day.

Pétain, therefore, gave orders to the 14th corps to deliver a strong assault upon the enemy position in the immediate neighbourhood of Tree 193. That same evening units from the 7th corps were placed at the disposal of the 2nd Colonial corps for an attack which aimed at taking Lubeck and Vandal trenches in the rear from the position in Pansy trench.

On the night of September 28–29 the situation at the point of rupture was not very clear, and the messages received at headquarters from local commanders were frequently contradictory. In Pansy trench there were elements of the 35th and 42nd regiments and some of Duval's chasseurs. A breach had been made in the enemy's second line about 500 yards wide. De Langle de Cary was evidently given to understand that the situation was more favourable than was actually the case, for at 7.45 a.m. on the morning of September 29 the following message was issued by the 4th army: "Four infantry brigades have passed through. Forward all, across the breach." De Langle de Cary's optimism proved infectious, for de Castelnau, an hour or so later, announced to Dubail that three divisions had already pushed through the breach in the Champagne battle-front and that a grand break-through was about to be attempted.

Photo: G.P.A

FIRM FOR FRANCE

Raymond Poincaré, president of France throughout the war, set a magnificent example to his country by his steadfastness of purpose, alike in adversity, stalemate and victory

FOOT SOLDIERS ONLY

After a spell in the front line trenches these French troops march wearily but thankfully back to the comparative comfort of rest billets. That their allies are not far distant is proved by the warning notice in English on the end of the temporary bridge

As a matter of fact no effective breach at all had been made in the German line, and it is quite evident that in the reports sent back by liaison officers the wish was father to the thought. The rupture of the German second line was no more than a slight gap of 500 yards in width, which proved impossible of exploitation. The breach made was too narrow, and just beyond it machine-gun posts dug in the reverse slopes of the hills effectively prevented any troops from passing through. Colonel Duval's chasseurs had found to their cost that it was impossible to debouch from Pansy trench. They had made the attempt, and were met by such a violent concentration of fire that they were obliged to retreat to the shelter of the trench. Nor did the left wing of the 2nd army fare any better.

Apparently it was not until the evening of September 29 that de Castelnau

Photo: Topical

BRINGING UP THE BOMBS

Mills bombs were in constant use in trench warfare. Thrown by hand, they were operated by a five seconds fuse ignited on the removal of a pin, and most accurate timing was required on the part of the thrower to secure deadly results

was made aware of the precise situation, and the sudden shattering of his illusions caused him to change his plans. Rightly perceiving that any further effort to break through without adequate artillery preparations would only lead to disastrous results, he suspended all further offensive for the moment. He estimated that to continue it he would need vast additional quantities of ammunition. In the circumstances it remained for the commander-in-chief to decide whether or not any further action should be at present undertaken.

On October 3 Joffre issued the following order to the armies of Champagne :

> The commander-in-chief addresses to all ranks under his orders the expression of his deep satisfaction at the results so far attained by their attacks. 25,000 prisoners, 350 officers, 150 guns, and materials of war not yet enumerated, are the trophies of a victory the measure of which can be gauged by its effect upon Europe. The sacrifices to which you consented were not in vain. They have contributed to the common task. The present is for us a sure guarantee of the future. Your commander-in-chief is proud to have under him the finest soldiers France has ever known.

The Champagne battle had been fought energetically and without respite from September 25 to 29. The French had successfully occupied the greater part of the first German position, but had been checked from encroaching seriously upon the enemy's second line, and every attempt to enlarge the breach at Pansy trench had failed. After studying the question of a resumption of operations, Joffre decided that " in order that the incontestable victory won by our troops may produce all the results we are entitled to expect, it behoves us to force the second position to which the enemy clings stubbornly, in order to pursue the realization of a strategic rupture, which alone will permit the victory to materialize by forward progress and the conquest of new ground." A renewal of the offensive was therefore decided upon for October 6.

Preparations were carried out under conditions far less favourable than had obtained prior to the offensive of September 25. The sector of the old German second position, now their first line, which the French were to attack had a frontage of about 8 miles. The front line trenches bristled with machine-gun emplacements, and were so cunningly constructed on the counter-slopes of the hills as to be almost impossible to observe by the French artillery, which still received but little help in the way of aerial reconnaissance owing to the continuation of unfavourable weather. The whole trench system was protected by a network of barbed wire so strong that nothing less than prolonged bombardment could cut through it.

In face of this strongly fortified position the French troops were clinging to the ground they had won in trenches hastily constructed on slopes that had once been wooded, but were now devoid of cover of any kind. They were exposed to flanking fire from the German batteries at several points, and on account of the absence of any sheltered approaches it was impossible to mass any number of reserves close to the firing line. Moreover, since the end of September the Germans had been strongly reinforced, and on October 6 were able to assemble 162 battalions between Prosnes and the river Aisne.

At 5.20 on the morning of October 6 the French moved forward once more to the attack. Thick mist, though furnishing the infantry assault with the valuable element of surprise, hindered the artillery and made liaison very difficult. The demolition of the German defences was soon found to be less thorough than reports had indicated. In a single effort the 3rd Moroccan brigade captured the redoubtable stronghold of La Défaite, but, in spite of a heroic stand by the 9th Zouaves, enfilade fire from the Butte du Mesnil on their left and from the Bois du Marteau on their right compelled the French to relinquish the position during the afternoon. The centre of the 2nd army met with greater success. The 22nd division captured Toothbrush redoubt, whilst the 21st closed round Trapeze redoubt on three sides. On the right wing of the 16th corps the 3rd division penetrated into the ruins of what had formerly been the village of Tahure and before noon progressed so far as to take possession of the crest of the Butte de Tahure, north of the village.

The capture of Tahure marked the limit of the French successes. The two wings of the 2nd army and practically the whole of the 4th army were definitely checked by the strength of the German defences. Nevertheless, de Castelnau wished to renew the offensive the next day, hoping still to throw the enemy back over the river Py.

But the preparation and execution of the day's operations had nearly emptied his reserves of ammunition, the element of surprise could no longer be counted upon, and both his armies were exhausted. In the circumstances and in view of the insignificance of the results obtained on October 6, Joffre decided that offensive operations in Champagne should be brought to an end, though local operations of minor importance continued until the middle of November.

With a little more luck de Castelnau might have broken right through the German front. He had cracked the line, but he could not break it. His soldiers had responded magnificently to his orders in a battle fought in mud and rain. John Buchan, in his " History of the War," has aptly described them as uniting " the drive and surge of the Grande Armée and the ordered steadfastness of the men of Marlborough and Frederick."

Photo: G.P.A.

FOREMOST IN THE FRAY

Conspicuous dash and bravery were needed and found in the ranks of the German storm-troops. Heavily laden with equipment, they had to advance over open but broken ground, and against an enemy made aware of their coming by the preliminary barrage

CURTAIN OF FIRE

Whether the demoralizing effect of flammenwerfer was proportionate to their expense, danger and cumbersomeness has been a matter of considerable controversy. But, in any event, the advancing curtains of flame and smoke added yet one more horror to modern warfare

Photo: Imperial War Museum

CHAPTER 54

SERBIA OVERRUN

Towards the end of 1915 the Austrians and Germans, now reinforced by Bulgaria, made a fresh attack upon Serbia. This time the whole of the small country was overrun

FOR nine months, after repulsing the third invasion of her territory since the outbreak of the Great War by routing the Austro-Hungarian forces under General Potiorek in December, 1914, Serbia had played a passive rôle. This was due not only to the exhaustion of her armies and the terrible epidemic of typhus which ravaged the country during the spring of 1915, but also to considerations of policy. The equivocal attitude of her neighbour, Bulgaria, caused Serbia to hesitate before undertaking any immediate offensive into Hungarian territory.

Since the close of the second Balkan war Bulgaria had been an embittered nation. By the boundaries which had been forced upon her by the treaty of Bukarest in 1913, although her coastlines bordered upon two seas, the Aegean and the Black Sea, all her commerce, save that with Russia, had to pass through foreign territory. The only natural outlets for Bulgarian trade to the Mediterranean were either to Kavalla by way of the river Struma, the lower reaches of which were in Greek hands; or to Dedeagach via the river Maritsa, which flowed through Turkish territory. Even on the Black Sea her chief seaport, Varna, was menaced by Rumania's acquisition of the Dobruja, for the Bulgarian railway to Varna lay parallel with, and close to, the Rumanian frontier.

Throughout the spring and summer of 1915 was waged a diplomatic struggle during which Bulgaria was wooed with persistence by the Triple Entente and the Central Powers, both alliances bidding hard for her support. In May the Bulgarian prime minister, Vassil Radoslavoff, gave the British government the price of his country's intervention. The conditions implied territorial concessions on the part of Rumania, Greece and Serbia which these countries felt disinclined to make.

During the summer pressure was brought to bear upon Serbia in an effort to make her accept at least some part of the Bulgarian demands, but she remained obdurate. She was unwilling to grant any such concessions unless the Allies were prepared to guarantee Yugoslav unity in the event of victory, a stipulation which at that time the Allies found themselves unable to accept, owing to their simultaneous efforts to win Italy to their side. Nothing was farther from Italy's wishes than any effort to unite the Yugoslavs, and thus the diplomacy of the Entente was faced with a stalemate.

Germany was better placed for making overtures to Bulgaria, and found that country only too willing to listen to any proposition tending to redress her grievances against her neighbours. Although Turkey had thrown in her lot with the Central Powers, the bitter hatred Bulgaria felt towards Serbia, Rumania and Greece exerted a far more powerful influence than did her traditional enmity with the Turks, and her old friendship for Russia had been estranged by the latter's support of Serbia in the second Balkan War.

Moreover, the path of German diplomacy was made smooth by the unfavourable turn in the tide of the Allied fortunes, for the last thing Bulgaria wanted was to join in the war on the side likely to be defeated. So long as Bulgaria thought that the Dardanelles would be forced her neutrality at least was fairly certain. Thus the unfortunate trend of events in Gallipoli proved a great handicap to British diplomacy.

In July Germany repeated the offer she had made earlier in the year to Serbia of a separate peace, but M. Pasich, the prime minister, rejecting this offer, proclaimed Serbia's unshaken loyalty to the Entente. On the 8th of that month Austria delivered a note to Rumania offering rewards in territory for her neutrality and substantially larger rewards for her early entrance into the war in favour of Germany and her allies. But Rumania was enjoying a prosperous time, the high prices ruling in the neighbouring countries affording her an excellent market for her produce, and she wished to avoid being entangled in the War.

On July 17 Prince Hohenlohe visited Sofia on his way to Constantinople, where he had been appointed German ambassador. The fruits of his visit soon matured in the form of a military convention between Turkey and Bulgaria, by which the former was induced to cede to the latter the strip of territory west of the lower Maritsa through which ran the Dedeagach railway, thereby giving her direct railway communication to the sea within her own boundaries. She was further promised part of the coveted Morava–Vardar valley in return for armed action against Serbia, for it was expected that the conquest of this important position would be an easy matter with German co-operation. On



Map of Serbia and the neighbouring countries of Montenegro, Greece and Albania, in which the remnants of the Serbian army took refuge when their enemies overran their land

September 6 the pact between these countries was concluded. A fortnight later Bulgaria mobilized her army.

At the beginning of October an Austro-German attack was launched upon Serbia by two armies under the direction of Field-Marshal von Mackensen. One, the German 11th army, was commanded by Gallwitz, and its composition was wholly German. The other, the Austrian 3rd army, was led by Kövess von Kövesshaza, an Austrian, and consisted of two Austrian and one German corps. Gallwitz covered the line of the Danube from Orsova to a point opposite Smederevo, where he linked up with Kövess, whose troops extended along the Sava and part of the Drina. Farther up the Drina a third army, an Austrian one, was concentrated near Višegrad.

Meanwhile it became known to the Russian Government that German officers were arriving at Sofia, and on October 4 an ultimatum was sent by Russia to Bulgaria demanding that all German and Austrian officers should be sent out of Bulgarian territory and that the Bulgarian Government should break off all dealings with "the enemies of the Slav cause." The reply to this ultimatum being considered unsatisfactory, not only the Russian minister, but the diplomatic representatives of Great Britain, France and Italy, were recalled from Sofia. On October 11 Bulgarian troops crossed the Serbian frontier.

This time the invading forces were not placed under the command of incompetent Austro-Hungarian generals, but under one of the greatest leaders in the German army. The three Austro-German armies massed on the Sava-Danube line consisted of at least 20 divisions, and their total strength amounted to well over 300,000 men. In addition, Mackensen was provided with some 2,000 guns, many of them pieces of large calibre, for his first task was to cross the rivers, and he relied on his artillery for its accomplishment.

To meet the Austro-German attack the main Serbian army was massed behind the northern defensive line. It consisted of about three-fifths of the total effective strength, which was now hardly more than 200,000 men. With the remainder of his forces General Putnik, the Serbian commander-in-chief, guarded the route to Salonika. To cope with the anticipated Bulgarian offensive the help of Greece was invoked by the terms of the Serbo-Greek treaty of 1913, and aid was expected from and promised by the Entente. A double attack upon Serbia had, indeed, been foreseen by the Allies, and on October 5 an Anglo-French expeditionary force landed at Salonika. At the last moment, however, the whole scheme of Serbian defence was ruined by the attitude of King Constantine, who succeeded in foiling the plan arranged by M. Venizelos.

On October 5 and 6 the Austro-German army heavily bombarded the whole Serbian line on the Danube, the Sava and the Drina, and under cover of their fire made persistent attempts to get across these rivers, but the Serbians drove them back at all points. Fighting raged most fiercely at Ram, Dubravca and Smederevo, on the Danube; in and about Ciganlia, the island of the Gipsies, at Obrenovac, Šabac and Jarak, on the Sava; and at Badovinci, on the Drina. Gallwitz directed a tremendous bombardment upon Ram and Smederevo, the two fortress towns which guarded the approaches to the Morava valley.

After three days' fierce fighting the enemy succeeded in crossing the river barrier, but it proved a costly undertaking, and the invaders' casualties

Photos: G.P.A.

WRECKED ON THE ROOF

Shot down behind his own lines, the pilot of this German biplane met his death when his machine crashed on this roof top. Other Germans have climbed on to the roof to examine the wreckage

FACING A DOUBLE THREAT

This photograph shows a German light quick-firing anti-aircraft gun used chiefly against low-flying aeroplanes. Enemy aircraft, however, is not the only danger these men have to face; their gas-masks protect them from a probably even more dreaded foe



Photo: G.P.A.

SUPPLIES AND RETURNS

This German transport column is moving up to the lines facing the British near Armentières. Two disabled men lie on stretchers by the roadside, waiting for the arrival of the ambulance, while the stretcher-bearers, who have completed their task, stand by

were enormous before they finally established themselves on the southern banks. Aware of the importance of keeping open his communications, Mackensen had secured his main bridge-heads at five places: above and below Belgrade, Smederevo, Ram and Gradište, all grouped around the northern entrance to the valley of the Morava, and four of them situated at the end of Hungarian railways.

On October 8, in spite of the strenuous resistance of the Serbians, aided by naval contingents of France, Britain and Russia, which had been in Belgrade for some months protecting the river front, Kövess's troops entered the northern part of the Serbian capital and took by storm the citadel, an obsolete work in that quarter of the city. During the following two days the Serbians, in order to preserve their capital from complete ruin, evacuated Belgrade and General Putnik began a series of successive delaying actions on the northern front in order to gain time until help should arrive from the Franco-British forces. At Zabrez, near Obrenovatz on the Sava, the famous Šumadija division of the Serbian army repulsed the Austrians on October 10 and captured many prisoners.

In spite of this and other Serbian victories in the region of the three rivers, the advantage generally lay with the invaders, for they had forced the crossing of the frontier. On October 11 headquarters in Berlin announced that on the front between Gradište and Šabac, a distance of more than 100 miles, the passage of the Danube and the Sava had been completed. And at two or three points on the Drina the Austrians had reached its eastern side. In the meantime the enemy brought up large reinforcements, and continued a vigorous offensive east, south, and west of Belgrade.

Mackensen's main effort was concentrated upon securing possession of the Morava valley, for the conquest of this valley and its prolongation up the river Nišava would give the Central Powers complete possession of the railway from Belgrade to Constantinople. The second and complementary objective of Mackensen's forces was the possession of the Vardar valley: first, because it had been virtually promised to Bulgaria in return for her aid, and, secondly, because it formed the main line of communication supplying the Serbian forces fighting in the north and the main route for the advance of her allies.

Bulgaria opened hostilities with Serbia on October 11. She had assembled two large armies on Serbia's eastern boundary, while a third was sent to watch the frontiers of Rumania, of whose intentions she was not sure. On October 14 a Bulgarian army under General Bojadieff attacked Serbia between Negotin and Pirot, whilst a second, under General Todoroff, advanced in the direction of Skoplje, a town of strategic importance as a railway centre and as a point from which a wedge might be driven in between north and south Serbia. Vrania, Kumanovo, Skoplje and Veles, in the absence of a sufficiently large defending force, were captured in less than a fortnight, and thus one of Serbia's arteries was severed at four points.

On October 15 Great Britain declared war upon Bulgaria, and the next day France followed this example. For some days the Allies had been rushing troops by railway up the Vardar valley beyond the Greek frontier, and it was not long before French troops came into action at Strumica station on the Nish railway line, where they drove off a Bulgarian patrol. They then continued northward along the railway as far as Krivolak and Gradsko, a few miles south of Veles, but their numbers were insufficient to make any change in the general situation of Serbia, which was daily becoming more critical.

While these grave events were taking place in the east and south-east of

Serbia, the Austro-Germans continued their advance from the three rivers in the north. After capturing Belgrade Kövess attacked the heights south of the capital, and after three days of intense fighting took Mount Avala on October 18, Obrenovac and Šabac falling shortly afterwards. Putnik steadily carried out his policy of a stubborn fighting retreat, holding his ground as long as possible, causing the enemy everywhere the heaviest losses, and avoiding anything in the nature of a general engagement. But the Bulgarian successes elsewhere weakened his defence by cutting off supplies, for the main artery along which the much needed reinforcements and munitions could pass freely had been severed and the amount that could reach the Serbian army over the rough roads was hopelessly insufficient.

In the face of the slow but persistent advance of Mackensen's troops from the north, the Serbians were forced to retire, but they did so in good order and with undiminished morale. Zaječar was evacuated on October 25, Knjaževac on October 27, and on the right flank General Stepanovitch, commanding the Serbian 2nd army, after repeated attacks from Pirot, was obliged to fall back on Bela Palanka. By October 30 the army of Gallwitz was within a day's march of Kragujevac, the seat of Serbia's principal arsenal and in former times the national capital. Situated on the Lepenca, a tributary of the Morava, it lay half-way between Belgrade and Nish, and on November 1 the Serbian army, in accordance with the instructions of its commander-in-chief, evacuated it, after destroying the arsenal and all its military stores. On this date the enemy line ran from the Bosnian border, south of Valjevo, through Kragujevac, up to Negotin, near the Rumanian frontier. From there it ran south to the neighbourhood of Bela Palanka, towards Vranje and thence to the west of Skoplje

At the beginning of November the Serbians made a desperate effort, by shortening their line, to hold the semicircular front Čačak–Kragujevac–Jajodina–Nish–Leskovac–Kačanik but though the Bulgarians were momentarily checked at Bela Palanka, the relentless advance of the Austro-German army continued. During this time Bojadieff, with the Bulgarian 1st army, was attacking with success in two directions, along the Timok and along the Nissava, with Nish as his objective in each case. Before the month was ended his troops had captured Negotin, Prahovo, Kladovo, Zaječar and Knjaževac, and all the Serbian bank of the Danube was in enemy hands.

In Macedonia the Bulgarian 2nd army was for a while held up, but managed to retain the ground it had conquered with the exception of Veles, which was recaptured by the Serbians on October 22. A week later, however, they were once more driven from the town and withdrew to the Babuna pass, the narrow defile over which the highway ran from Veles through Prilep to Monastir. At the beginning of November the Serbians still held the pass, and so prevented the driving in of the wedge which was to separate the northern and southern Serbian armies, but it was already tragically clear that, in spite of her heroism, Serbia was doomed.

Now the Teutonic armies marched rapidly across the western Morava, while the Serbians took up the position on the arc previously mentioned, running from Čačak to Kačanik. This position ran eastwards along the mountain ranges south of the western Morava, then turned continually southward along the crests on the western side of the Morava-Vardar valley, until it finally ran in a south-westerly direction as far as the gorge of Kačanik. This gorge was the strategic key to the whole Serbian position, for it formed the gateway to the Ibar and Sitnica valleys running in the rear of the Serbian armies, while the railway passing through it to Mitrovica augmented its military value. Should the Bulgarian army once succeed in passing through the gorge it would be in a position to attack the Serbian forces from the rear. On the other hand, if only the Anglo-French troops coming up the Vardar valley could succeed in capturing Veles, they in turn would be

Photos: G.P.A.

WATCH AND WARD

At the door of a well sandbagged hutment used as battalion headquarters this German sentry stands guard. He is fully equipped with steel helmet, breastplate and gas mask container

SAFER THAN CONCRETE

This German quick-firing gun is well camouflaged against aerial observation by strips of matting and branches of trees. It is mounted on a turntable on a light railway, gaining thus an increased field of fire

Photo: Imperial War Museum

FLOODS CALL A HALT

This photograph of the flooded valley of the Ancre gives an idea of the conditions under which the latter phases of the battles of the Somme were fought. An improvement in the weather during November made possible the battle of the Ancre (Nov. 13–18)

able to take the Bulgarian army in the rear. The efforts of the Allies failed, however, to accomplish this task, and the Bulgarians were able to concentrate their efforts upon the Kačanik position.

With scarcely a halt at Kragujevac, the armies of Mackensen crossed the Čačak-Kragujevac road and marched southward on both sides of the Morava. Kövess moved over the Posetza, and the Germans entered Jagodina on November 3. The passage of both banks of the western Morava was forced at Krajevo, and that town, from which the Serbian government had withdrawn in time, was taken by Brandenburg troops on the 5th, after terrible street fighting. Their capture included 130 guns.

Once in possession of the line of the western Morava, Gallwitz pressed onwards down the Morava valley, and seized Paračin, on the Belgrade-Nish railway, after which he effected a junction with part of the Bulgarian 1st army at Krivivir, 35 miles north of Nish. Meanwhile, the other part of Bojadieff's forces continued their advance towards Nish. After a violent battle which raged for several days around the hill of Kalafat, they finally routed the Serbians, who nevertheless withdrew in good order in the face of a much greater number of Bulgarians. The end was inevitable. On November 9 Bojadieff entered Nish, where, it is said, he found still flying the flags of welcome to the Allies who had never come. In some respects the loss of this city was one of the worst blows Fate had dealt Serbia, for not only did its fall have a decided political effect, coming so soon after that of Belgrade, but Mackensen had reached his primary objective, and the Orient railway was now in the hands of the enemy from Germany to Constantinople.

But the Serbian soldiers had not yet shot their bolt. At the gorge of Kačanik, under the leadership of Bojovitch, with dauntless courage they repulsed every attack, and in their defence of the Babuna pass there was something of epic grandeur. The sublime spirit with which this position was defended was nobly expressed by General (then Colonel) Vassitch, when he declared that his small force would continue to fight desperately to the end, and that all Serbians would await without desertion at the foot of their cross the hour of their crucifixion, making their sacrifice live as an example to future generations. Vassitch had only 5,000 men with whom to confront more than 20,000 Bulgarians, who possessed an even greater superiority in artillery. From November 4 to November 6 a terrific fight raged in the deep and narrow gorges of the defile until the struggle ended with the complete rout of the Bulgarians, who were driven through Izvor and back into Veles.

Vassitch knew that it would not be long before the reinforced Bulgarian army returned to the attack, and his one remaining hope was that Sarrail might be able to reach him in time; but though the French advance carried them to within ten miles of the Serbian position, it could not get across the hills, and Vassitch, faced with another and stronger attack, could hold out no longer. On November 16 he was forced to retire in order to escape envelopment on his flank, and fell back on Prilep. Meanwhile, more than half of Serbia was in the hands of the enemy, and the progress of events showed clearly that the overrunning of the rest of the country was a question of but a very short time, for the advance of the Teutonic forces continued without serious interruption throughout November.

From the north and north-east the Serbian main armies were steadily pushed back towards the frontiers of Montenegro and Albania. With the retirement of these armies from the Čačac–Kačanik line in the direction of Peć all danger to the enemy occupation of the Morava–Vardar valley north of Veles was at an end, and the rest of

Photos: Imperial War Museum

WORKERS AND FIGHTERS

The Fricourt road was a scene of constant activity during the Somme offensive. Here weary men of a working party are watching front line troops going up for a relief. The camouflage screen on the left of the photograph was a necessary protection

the campaign consisted in pushing the survivors of the Serbian army westward through Albania to the sea and in driving back the small Serbian southern army and their Franco-British allies towards the Salonika base. The Serbians had no reserves from which to make good their losses, whereas the enemy kept bringing up reinforcements, and this numerical strength, together with the efficiency of his long-range guns, told heavily in his favour.

North-west of Leskovac Stepanovitch was making a successful stand, and on November 11 and 12 defeated the centre of Bojadieff's army, capturing prisoners and guns; but when the Bulgarians counter-attacked a few days later the Serbians were driven back towards Talari. By this time Putnik was well aware that the expected assistance from the Allies would not be forthcoming. He perceived that the only hope of saving his armies intact was by forcing a way to the south through Skoplje, and to do this meant that the Kačhanik pass had to be cleared of the enemy. In this last effort to break through to the south Bojovitch's small army was made up to about five divisions, and on November 10 tried to force the pass. The right of the Bulgarian 2nd army was at first forced back towards Vranje, but with part of the Bulgarian 1st army, brought down from Leskovac, threatening his left, after four or five days of strenuous fighting the Serbian commander retired.

With the collapse of this plan for the retreat of the Serbian armies to the south, there was nothing left for Putnik but to escape as best he could through Albania with what was left of his troops. The Serbian staff immediately withdrew from Mitrovica, together with such members of the government as had remained there and the personnel of the legations of the Allies. Between November 20 and 25 the Serbians made their last stand on the plain of Kosovo Polje, after which nothing was left for them but surrender, destruction or a terrible retreat into the mountains of

OUTSIZE IN 'HOWS'

One of the biggest guns in use on either side, this British 15-inch heavy howitzer stands ready, in an orchard on the outskirts of Engelbelmer village in the Somme battlefield. A complicated system of pulleys and tackle is needed to swing the shell into the breach



Photos: Imperial War Museum

LABOUR PARTY

Actual fighting was by no means the only job which the British soldier was called upon to perform. This immense mine-crater at Beaumont-Hamel is filled with troops armed with pick and shovel, and apparently not averse to their temporary change of occupation

Montenegro and Albania, now in the grip of winter. On November 25 Germany announced the capture of Mitrovica and Pristina.

The main line of retreat of the Serbian army was along the high road from Pristina to Prizren, and the Bulgarians, pressing on quickly in this direction, took the heights west of Uroševac, and also advanced towards Peć, against which town Kövess had sent a detachment. The retreat to Prizren was covered by the Šumadja division. On November 27 the Serbians stood at bay in front of the town, but next day they spiked their guns and fled across the frontier into Albania, leaving some thousands behind as prisoners.

Although Sir Edward Grey had given Serbia the British government's pledge to assist with all its power, "without reserve and without qualification," the Allies had not succeeded, unfortunately, in making good that pledge, and in Serbia's hour of desperate danger the number of Allied troops needed to save her was not within reach. As early as September 23 M. Venizelos had asked the Allies whether, in the event of Bulgaria declaring war on Serbia, they would make good the 150,000 men which Serbia was not in a position to supply to carry out the Serbo-Greek treaty. The Allies had promised to assume Serbia's obligations, yet at the critical moment, when Nish was threatened, there were at Salonika only 35,000 French and 13,000 British troops, and the latter, according to General Maurice Sarrail in his book "Mon Commandement en Orient," were under instructions from London not to cross the frontier into Serbia.

The Serbian forces still fighting in the south, in Macedonia, were inconsiderable, and were already being heavily pressed by the Bulgarians, and so the rout at Prizren and the consequent flight signalized for the time being the end of Serbia. The government, with Pasich at its head, left Prizren, where it had been temporarily quartered, a few days before the débâcle, and arrived without misadventure at Scutari,

CAUTION TO COOKERS

Care of the feet was vital alike where men or horses were concerned, and a high percentage of lamed horses caused chaos in transport arrangements behind the lines. This notice board near Trônes Wood serves as a necessary warning to the careless

Photo. Imperial War Museum

FETCH AND CARRY

This scene of the arrival, at an Army Service Corps dump, of rations, awaited by picked ration parties, took place normally every day. However strenuous the fighting in progress, rations very rarely failed to reach the front line troops

the Albanian capital, on November 30. King Peter made good his escape, and after wandering among the snow-covered mountain paths, reached the Adriatic, whence he was conveyed to Brindisi, and later to Salonika. The Crown Prince Alexander, with the Princess Heléne, succeeded in getting to Cetinje. Marked by horrors unspeakable, the retreat of the Serbian army will remain one of the most terrible in history.

The German supreme command issued a proclamation on November 28 announcing the end of the Balkan campaign. "With the flight of the scanty remains of the Serbian army into the Albanian mountains," it stated, "operations against it are brought to a close. Our object of effecting communication with Bulgaria and the Turkish empire has been accomplished." But although the main Serbian armies were being driven out of their native land, there still remained the small southern one.

With the capture of Brod by the Bulgarians, Vassitch, fearing his retreat might be cut off, withdrew from Prilep and fell back on Monastir, only to be forced to evacuate that town on December 2. The last fight of importance by the Serbians took place near Resan during the next few days, but Vassitch and his brave survivors, hopelessly outnumbered, finally retired on December 5, and, marching round the southern shore of Lake Ohrid, escaped with his men to Epirus. There were some encounters between small groups of Serbians and Bulgarians at Ohrid and Struga, but the retreat of Vassitch marked the end of Serbia's struggle.

Now that Serbia's armies had disappeared the Allied forces were isolated, and Sarrail took the only decision possible when he made up his mind to fall back upon Salonika, and this decision raised a further problem for the Allies. With the conquest of Serbia by the Central Powers they could no longer claim that their presence at Salonika was only to use the line of communication that had been granted to Serbia by treaty, nor could they urge that they were there at the request of the Greek government, seeing that

BETTER THAN NOTHING

On many occasions water was so scarce near the front line that despite orders to the contrary men washed in the probably contaminated water found in shell craters. This Canadian has decided that mud and water is better than nothing

Canadian Records

IN THE WAKE OF RETREAT

The voluntary German retirement early in 1917 to the shorter and more strongly fortified Hindenburg line freed Bapaume and Peronne. The advance towards the latter town by these Canadians is impeded only by the wreckage of the countryside, organized with deliberation by the retreating enemy

Photopress

the policy of Venizelos had been repudiated and his government overthrown. Nevertheless, both on account of prestige and from strategical considerations, the Allied governments had no intention of abandoning Salonika, and their troops remained there, to the annoyance of the Greek government.

Early in December the Franco-British withdrawal began. The retirement was made by echelons after the French had blocked the Demir Kapija gorge against pursuit by mining the railway bridge over the Vardar and blowing up the tunnel running under the cliffs at that point. Although on two occasions the Bulgarians nearly cut off their retreat, by December 12 they had outdistanced their pursuers, and a week later were safely within the defence system of Salonika.

During the retreat of the Serbian armies, although Montenegro had entered the war on the side of the Allies, and despite the fact that its parliament was unanimously in favour of standing by Serbia to the bitter end, the attitude of the Montenegrin ruler remained equivocal. King Nicholas and his sons grew alarmed at the position, and in November, 1915, the crown prince Danilo went so far as to approach the Central Powers, through the intermediary of Baron de Kruiff in Sofia, and offered to cut off the retreat of the Serbian army in return for certain territorial concessions. It was not until the end of December that Montenegro became seriously involved in the fighting, when, after the fall of Mitrovica, Kövess assembled his forces in Herzgovina to attack her from that side. Although the Austrians advanced continuously their main Montenegrin offensive did not begin until January, 1916, when they attacked the chief position in that state, Mount Lovćhen, which commands the bay of Cattaro and guards the road to the capital, Cetinje.

To protect this strategic position, more heavy artillery was required than the Montenegrins possessed, and on January 6 it was severely bombarded by Austrian warships from the gulf of Cattaro. Berane, a town on the Lim, was captured by the Austrians on January 10, and on that same day Mount Lovćhen was surrendered almost without a struggle, whether on account of a shortage of munitions, or whether as the result of intrigue, has never been satisfactorily demonstrated. With Lovćhen in Austrian hands, the Montenegrins evacuated Cetinje, which was occupied by Kövess on the 14th.

Though the people of Montenegro were still staunch in their support of Serbia, the king, without authorization from his government, opened personal negotiations with Franz Joseph, and when he failed to obtain the terms he had anticipated, fled to Italy, and thence to France, still protesting his devotion to the Allied cause. Continuing their advance, the Austrians took Scutari on January 23, and San Giovanni di Medua on January 26, after which they overran the greater part of Albania, including Durazzo. By the end of January, 1916, Austria was in full occupation of Montenegro, and proceeded to disarm the population in a most thorough manner.

Although Serbia had ceased, by the end of 1915, to be an independent country, and fell under the joint administration of Berlin, Vienna and Sofia, her army was not utterly destroyed. Despite dreadful sufferings in the retreat to the coast, more than 100,000 men ultimately reached Corfu.

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'YOUR NAME AND REGIMENT?'

A British sergeant is here seen examining a batch of newly captured German prisoners. Under the terms of international law the only questions that they may be forced to answer are what are their names and to what regiments they belong

GUARD AGAINST TETANUS

A flesh wound in the arm has been the lot of this British soldier, now awaiting attention in a dug-out dressing station at Minden Post on the Somme. The wound will be dressed and an anti-tetanus injection will be given

CHAPTER 55

LAST DAYS IN GALLIPOLI

Here is the third and last of the three chapters that deal with the fighting on the Gallipoli peninsula in 1915. It describes the evacuation, which, carried out with remarkable skill and efficiency, completely deceived the Turks

ALTHOUGH the operations on the Gallipoli peninsula had failed to achieve their object, Sir Ian Hamilton remained confident that, suitably reinforced, he could retrieve the situation and carry his campaign to a satisfactory conclusion. In communicating these views to the secretary of state for war he asked for reinforcements up to twenty per cent and pointed out that unless these were sent to him he could not launch any grand attack. On September 3 these views were put before the Dardanelles committee of the Cabinet by Lord Kitchener, who also informed them that the French Government had decided to land four divisions in an attack against the Turks on the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles, and that in these circumstances it would be necessary to replace the two French divisions at Helles with British troops.

Owing to the fact that no French troops could be spared from the Western Front, however, the project fell through, and in the meantime Bulgaria joined the Central Powers and an attack on Serbia from that quarter became imminent. Thus another element was introduced into the problem, and the question of dispatching an Allied force to Salonika to help the Serbians was raised. This new situation gave rise to considerable differences of opinion amongst the members of the Dardanelles committee, and it was therefore decided to send an officer of high standing to Gallipoli to report fully on the situation. The choice fell upon Sir Charles Monro, and Sir Ian Hamilton was recalled.

On October 22 Monro left to take over his new duties. Arriving on Gallipoli, he made a survey of the situation and came to the conclusion that the forces should be withdrawn. Communicating his views in a telegram to Kitchener, dated October 31, he said:

> With the exception of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, the troops on the peninsula are not equal to a sustained effort, owing to the inexperienced officers, want of training of the men, and the depleted condition of many of the units. We merely hold the fringe of the shore, and are confronted by the Turks in very formidable entrenchments, with all advantages of position and power of observation of our movements. . . . We can no longer count on any action by surprise, as the Turks are in considerably stronger force than they were, and have had ample time to provide against surprise landings . . .
>
> It is, therefore, my opinion that another attempt to carry the Turkish lines would not offer any hope of success; the Turkish positions are being actively strengthened daily. Our information leads to the belief that heavy guns and ammunition are being sent to the peninsula from Constantinople. Consequently by the time fresh divisions, if available, could arrive, the task of breaking the Turkish line would be considerably more formidable than it is at present. . . . On military grounds, therefore, . . . I recommend the evacuation of the peninsula.

In view of Monro's report the authorities at home had to make a momentous decision. They were not helped, however, by the views expressed by some responsible officers of the navy regarding the desirability of renewing the attack from the sea. Foremost amongst these was Admiral Wemyss, who was strongly backed up by Commodore Roger Keyes. A plan for renewed operations had been worked out, with the assent of Sir John de Robeck, and it was thought by these officers that if a number of warships could rush the Narrows a sufficient force would succeed in making the passage, when, in combination with submarines, they would be able to dominate the Sea of Marmora, thus cutting the main Turkish lines of communication.

Although opposed to this scheme, de Robeck felt, nevertheless, that it merited the consideration of the Admiralty, and during October, therefore, he granted Commodore Keyes leave of absence to go to London and explain the plan. At that time, just about to leave for Gallipoli, Lord Kitchener showed considerable interest in this idea and telegraphed to Keyes to meet him for a full discussion. The telegram, however, went astray and the meeting never took place. Keyes himself states in his "Naval Memoirs" that the telegram was held up by a secretary in the Admiralty and that his failure to meet Kitchener, together with Admiral de Robeck's attitude, drove Kitchener to the conclusion that there was no salvation through the navy.

Although the new naval attempt was not carried out, Commodore Keyes was never in doubt that the navy could have achieved its object. In his book he says:

> I wish to place on record that I had no doubt then, and have none now—and nothing will ever shake my opinion—that from April 4, 1915, onwards, the Fleet could have forced the Straits, and, with losses trifling in comparison with those the Army suffered, could have entered the Marmora with sufficient force to destroy the Turco-German fleet.

Faced with these conflicting opinions the Cabinet invited Lord Kitchener to help them in coming to a decision by making a personal inspection of the peninsula. He arrived at the scene of operations on November 9, and after examining the troops and defences came to the conclusion that, although a further assault was out of the question, the troops could at least hold fast to the ground they had gained, unless attacked by heavy reinforcements. He therefore devised a new plan for a landing at Ayas, in the Gulf of Alexandretta, the object being to bar the path of a Turkish invasion of Egypt and to cover the pending withdrawal from Gallipoli. This operation was, however, overruled by the Cabinet, and Kitchener then agreed that the evacuation of Suvla and Anzac should be proceeded with, but recommended that Helles should be held for the present. This, he maintained, would enable the navy to renew the attack if desired.

Whilst these discussions were taking place, the troops were suffering severe hardships on account of the weather. The peninsula and the neighbouring islands, which were being used as bases, were subjected to a series of terrific storms during the autumn and early winter. On November 26, accompanied by a violent thunderstorm, a hurricane flooded the trenches and caused terrible suffering. To add to the torment, a northerly wind of Arctic coldness began to blow on the night of the 27th. Snow followed, and the men, already soaked to the skin, had their clothes frozen stiff on their bodies. In the British lines 280 men were drowned in the trenches at Suvla, whilst many others were frozen to death where they stood. The ghastly climatic conditions were no more kind to the Turks. They had been preparing an offensive on a large scale, but the weather entirely upset their new plan.

On December 7 the Cabinet decided to evacuate Suvla and Anzac and retain the position at Cape Helles. This decision was communicated to Sir Rosslyn Wemyss, who had succeeded de Robeck and to Monro, and although it drew a long telegram of protest from the former, the decision was adhered to and preparations for the removal of the troops were put in hand.

The main difficulty lay in concealing the withdrawal from the Turks and in making such arrangements and dispositions of the forces as would keep them

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MISSING, BELIEVED KILLED

The phrase, "missing, believed killed," appeared daily in the British casualty lists, and on many occasions no further information was forthcoming. Its equivalent in Germany will have been used to describe the fate of these Germans, dead and neglected in a shell crater

IN A CAPTURED TRENCH

The rank and file of both sides had little or no say in the events that led up to the war; but once it was begun they were called upon in the name of their country to die in thousands like these Germans whose remains lie neglected in a Somme trench

'TUMP-LINE' CARRYING

Red Indians carry heavy loads on their backs by means of a strap across their foreheads, a method known as "tump-line." These Canadians employ it to carry heavy rolls of wire netting, barbed wire, and wiring pickets, just unloaded from a light railway

under the illusion that all the British positions were manned in full strength and deter them from descending upon and annihilating the weakened forces which still remained. The wintry weather materially assisted the British commander in his difficult task, for the floods, frost and snow had prevented the arrival of fresh enemy guns and had further damaged the roads

Events which had occurred in other theatres of war, too, assisted Monro. The entry of Bulgaria into the War on the side of the Central Powers and the decisive defeat of the Serbians by the Austrians had opened up a clear route to Constantinople for a supply of munitions. The Turkish commander-in-chief, therefore, decided to delay his attack against the invaders of Gallipoli until he had been supplied with new 12-in. howitzers and other artillery now available. These new weapons could only be slowly pulled into position by bullock teams, and in many places it was necessary to widen the roads.

The evacuation of the Gallipoli peninsula was an operation unique in military history. Never before had a task of such magnitude, in face of such tremendous difficulties, been accomplished. Ninety thousand men, together with some 200 guns, animals and material, had to be spirited away under the eyes of a strong and undefeated enemy whose front lines were not more than 300 yards from the British trenches. Moreover, whilst the Turkish line was fully manned, the British would have to withdraw troops, leaving only a very weak force behind to keep up an appearance of normality. The beaches, too, from which the men and material were to be embarked were within range of the Turkish batteries. The greatest secrecy was necessary in drawing up the plans, and only those in close touch with headquarters had an inkling of what was about to take place. The men on the peninsula knew nothing.

For some weeks before the decision to evacuate was finally reached the commanders in the Near East had been accustoming the enemy to peace and quiet, so that when the guns were withdrawn the silence which was bound to follow would not be noticed. Land guns were used far less than usual, but artillery support from the sea became more frequent. Thus, when the evacuation at last began, the way had been well paved.

The work of withdrawing the troops had to be gradual. Approximately 90,000 men had to be removed, and this could not be done in a single night. Accordingly the whole operation was divided into three phases. The first consisted in the removal of all troops, guns, animals and material not necessary for the defence of the peninsula should a winter campaign be deemed desirable. During the

MORE WIRES TO MEND

The maintenance of telephonic communications was vitally necessary if coordination, both in attack and defence, was to be maintained. These Canadian signallers are performing an invaluable service in repairing trench telephone wires

Photos: 'Canadian Records'

second, or intermediate, stage further troops and material not required for defence during the last stage were to be withdrawn; whilst the last stage consisted of the final withdrawal of all men, munitions, stores, animals, etc., remaining on the peninsula.

Fine weather favoured the start of the operation. The sea was calm, and at night a kindly moon, just sufficiently shrouded by thin clouds, facilitated the work of the navy. During the preliminary stage all the sick and wounded men were removed successfully. With them went numerous guns and animals, all of which were embarked without raising the suspicions of the Turks entrenched so perilously near to the beaches. By December 10 this stage was over, some 10,000 men having been removed.

For the second, or intermediate, stage even greater caution was necessary, for the men and material to be withdrawn were considerably greater. All through this phase a show was made during the daytime of landing men and material of war, but every night far more were removed than had been landed during the day. On shore the usual routine was kept up. Troops could be seen moving to and fro between the bases and front lines, whilst ammunition limbers could still be heard rattling over the roads. Nor were any but the usual ships allowed to be seen off the beaches; others were kept well out of sight of land, ready to be used immediately when required.

The date for the final stage had originally been fixed for the nights of December 19–20, but so well did the navy play its part that it was found possible to begin this a day earlier. For this last stage a great deal of preparation was necessary, for about 20,000 men remained at each of the landing places, and these all had to be removed, together with the last of the guns and material, in the incredibly short space of two nights.

About 100 vessels in all were prepared for the task. These included the Huntsgreen, a large transport, and two old battle-ships, the Mars and Magnificent. These were to be brought up at the last possible moment from Imbros, together with the various small craft such as boarding steamers, ferry boats and motor lighters, the "beetles" which had been used at the Suvla landing. The task of working out the duties of each boat was no small one, but by the morning of the 18th all preparations had been made and everything was ready.

In the evening the British warships at Anzac trained their guns ready to shatter any attack on the weakened British lines, but no enemy movement was discovered, and punctually at 6.45 the "beetles" were waiting at the beaches, whilst farther out to sea the big transports steamed to their allotted positions. At Anzac this was a particularly anxious time, for the enemy line was very close to the beaches and it seemed impossible that such activity as was taking place could pass unnoticed. Moreover, the clouds which veiled the moon were very thin, and it was thought that the Mars, which came within 2,000 yards of the shore, must be seen. In order to prevent this the destroyer Rattlesnake was detailed to dazzle the Turks by throwing the beam of her searchlight across their line of vision, and although she was subjected to a fairly hot fire, the ruse succeeded and the troops were safely removed by 5.45 on the morning of the 19th.

At Suvla Bay the withdrawal had been equally successful. Here the work

Photo: Topical

PROTAGONIST OF THE SOMME

Sir Henry Rawlinson, in command of the 4th army, was criticized for his conduct of the opening offensive on the Somme in 1916. For a while in 1918 a member of the Versailles Council, he returned to the 4th army, acquitting himself brilliantly in the final offensive. He was created a peer in 1919

Photos: Crown Copyright

OVER AGAINST GAZA

Though the British failed to capture Gaza in January, 1917, its fall followed the capture of Beersheba by Allenby in the following September. This British heavy gun was part of the large concentration massed against the former city, largely as a feint

was less dangerous than at Anzac, for the enemy line was farther inland and thus the risk of detection was less. As at Anzac, the embarkation had begun at 6.45 p.m., and the troops were rapidly shipped out to the Magnificent, which was awaiting them. By 3.30 11,000 men and nearly half the guns were well on their way to Kephalos or Mudros.

The most critical day was Sunday, December 19. Nobody could be sure that the Turks had guessed nothing and were not concentrating for an attempt to break through Anzac and roll up what remained of the Suvla Bay forces. The warships remained broadside on to the Turkish positions, the men waiting for the signal for action. But the day wore on, and still the Turks made no sign. They shelled the beach as usual, but the sight that cheered the departing army was the Turkish bombardment of the low hill from which every gun and every man had been removed. It seemed almost too much to hope that the Turks should be ignorant of what was going on almost patently beneath their eyes.

On Sunday night the moon rose on a flat, oily sea, through a slight mist which hung low on the water and flowed on the wind into nullahs and valleys running up into the hills. The commanders anxiously watched the sky for any change in the weather, but fate was kind; the sea remained calm. Again the transports came in, miraculously unattacked in the clear moonlight, and the last men began to leave. The firing-line of trenches from Karakol Dagh, north of Suvla, to Lone Pine Plateau, south of Anzac Cove, was held by picked riflemen, one to seven or more yards. These last ditchers, as they were called, were not so weak as they appeared to be. They had only six old guns behind them, but the guardian fleet had all the ranges nicely calculated to a yard, and could maintain an impenetrable curtain of shrapnel fire for a long period over all the first Turkish line and over the ground across which a charge must be made. There were also thousands of traps and mines with trip-wires, and a very ingenious bomb-thrower awaiting the enemy. But the Turks did not move.

At about 3.30 on Monday morning, December 20, 1915, the embarkation was practically completed, and the rearguard at Anzac exploded a huge mine between themselves and the Turks on Russell's Top, a neck of land between the two ridges along which it was undesirable that the Turks should follow them. The terrific explosion had the desired effect; the Turks thought the Australians were attacking, and kept up a furious rifle fire for forty minutes.

The retreating troops maintained a desultory but effective reply by a series of automatic devices. Along the now vacant trenches were candles and slow matches, so primed as to imitate rifle fire and make a show of activity sufficient to discourage Turkish snipers and patrols from reconnoitring the abandoned lines. About half an hour after the vast mine was fired, forty-five feet deep under the enemy trenches, a great fire blazed out at Suvla and four large store-dumps burst into flame. There was soon one mighty bonfire two hundred yards long. The Anzacs also fired their abandoned heaps of bully beef, and blew up a large motor-lighter, which had run ashore.

Even now the Turks did not move though the bonfires threw a red glow

FEELING THE HEAT

Resting in a trench on the Palestine front, these men of the Norfolk regiment are clad for summer weather. Though the heat never reached the almost unbearable temperature experienced by the British troops in Mesopotamia, climatic conditions in the summer of 1917 were at times extremely trying

Photo: Topical

REAL SAND FOR SANDBAGS

This stretch of desert on the borders of Palestine presented very different problems to the troops from those of the Western Front. Loose sand prevented the digging of deep trenches, but made sandbag filling and emplacement building much simpler than in France

up to the sky. The enemy pitched a few shells on a hill and a beach at Suvla, the total result of which was that one man was wounded. With watchful gait the rearguards came down in Indian file through the saps, followed by the ambulance sections. After many stops and starts, and keeping well within the shadow of the saps, all the last ditchers reached the transports by four o'clock in the morning. The army of Anzac embarked at four o'clock, and the army at Suvla a little earlier. By five o'clock both positions were evacuated.

At daybreak the Turks began a grand bombardment, but instead of trying to reach the warships and transports, they shelled the vacated trenches and the empty beaches, and put large high-explosive shells into the flaming bonfires. The British warships also opened fire on everything that had been left behind.

When the sun began to rise the Turks at last discovered that something was wrong, and trained some of their guns on the bombarding squadron. But their shooting was wild, and they never got within a hundred yards of the nearest ship. As the light grew the amazing truth dawned upon them, and at Anzac men could be seen cautiously venturing out into the open. The two warships, Grafton and Theseus, waited until they had assumed a denser formation, and then suddenly opened fire on them with high explosive, killing and wounding a large number.

The next morning a furious southerly gale sprang up, breaking off all connexion between the coast and the sea. The departing armies had just escaped the storm by twenty-four hours. In the meantime the Turks had become as over-rash as they had been over-cautious. They tried to crowd into the abandoned trenches, with the result that the automatic bomb-throwers, the trip-mines, land-mines, and all the other hidden machines of death caught them by the hundred.

The total British casualties during the evacuation at Suvla and Anzac were one officer and two men wounded at Suvla, and four men wounded at Anzac. Two of the six guns left behind to support the rearguards in case of attack were old howitzers that had served in the South African War, but in any case all six guns were destroyed at the last minute.

The withdrawal was a truly wonderful piece of staff work and organization. Between December 10 and 19 some 83,000 troops, 190 guns, 1,700 vehicles and 4,500 animals had been removed under the nose of the enemy. It is an interesting fact that although provision had been made in various Mediterranean hospitals for dealing with 30,000 wounded, no accommodation of any kind was required.

Whilst the troops at Anzac and Suvla were being withdrawn, the Allied forces south of Achi Baba, at the southern tip of the peninsula, undertook a diversion. The idea was to prevent the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cape Helles for any closing attack upon the Anzac and Suvla forces. This was launched during the afternoon of the 19th and was supported by fire from British monitors. The attack was opened by the monitors shelling Krithia. Later three mines which had been laid under the Turkish lines were sprung and all the land batteries opened fire, while the monitors and destroyers intensified their gunfire. The Turkish gunners immediately replied, but owing to the dust and smoke of the British barrage they were unable to discern any movement of the infantry. Yet, invisible behind the smoke screen, the British soldiers had managed to force a way through their seven galleries, driving the Turkish defenders before them. Then the news came that the evacuation had been successfully carried out at Anzac and Suvla, and the attack was abandoned.

On December 20 Sir Charles Monro telegraphed to Lord Kitchener urging the evacuation of the Helles sector. This, he maintained, would greatly facilitate the reorganization of the Dardanelles army, would lead immediately to reduced expenditure, and would liberate a large quantity of material likely to be of use in other theatres of war. Two days later the evacuation was further urged in a general staff memorandum. On December 23 the War Committee decided to evacuate Cape Helles, and four days later this received the approval of the Cabinet.

The German commanders and advisers of the Ottoman Empire were determined to prevent another withdrawal. By Christmas the Turks around Achi Baba had trebled their supply of ammunition;

they had brought up guns from the Sari Bair area, and the heavy howitzers were being hauled along southward. New squadrons of German airmen were sent to Constantinople, and, reaching the Gallipoli front a few days before Christmas, they began to show unwonted audacity in their scouting work.

It will be seen that the task of evacuating Helles was more formidable than the previous withdrawal. The scheme adopted, however, closely resembled the one already used. It was to be carried out in three phases, and by the time the order for the evacuation came through the preliminary part had been completed. This left on the peninsula about 37,000 men, 150 guns, 4,000 animals and 2,000 vehicles, together with vast stores and ammunition.

In order to prevent the British from departing, the enemy used his new shell supplies in an alarming manner. As soon as the withdrawal from Suvla and Anzac had been effected, he tried to make life intolerable to the men at Helles. Every part of the ground was open to his fire. He shelled the communication trenches along which the troops were to withdraw, and the beaches from which they had to embark.

During the week after Christmas the daily toll of casualties from shell fire became very heavy. So, by way of making the enemy anxious about his store of shells, Major-General Davies, commanding on the Helles front, launched another infantry attack against the Turkish lines. On December 29 a British division broke into the Turkish centre, and captured and held part of the fire trenches. This infantry movement was, of course, prepared by a terrific bombardment, in which the great guns of the monitors joined with heavy howitzers in drenching all the enemy positions with shells. This show of activity by the British had the desired effect. Liman von Sanders slackened his gun-fire, especially at night, when his gunners were likely to waste shells if the beaches were empty.

During the intermediate stage a good deal of trouble was caused by observing aircraft, but this was successfully overcome by the employment of a simple but effective ruse. Whenever an enemy machine appeared all the loading of lighters was reversed, so that to the observer looking down from above it appeared that, instead of loading up guns and material, fresh supplies were in fact being unloaded. The same trick was practised by columns of troops marching down to the beaches to be embarked. They immediately stopped and began marching in the opposite direction. As a result, the only information the Turkish airmen could supply to headquarters was that the British were strengthening their position.

The weather, too, caused a good deal of trouble. Up until New Year's Day it had been fairly good, but on January 2 it began to blow and a fairly heavy sea rolled up. By the morning of the 4th, however, more than 6,000 men and 40 guns had been got away, and the sea calmed somewhat. During this spell of calm the opportunity was seized to strengthen the breakwaters at the embarkation beaches. The weather broke again in the evening, but thanks to the improvements at the beaches a further 3,000 men and a large number of animals were safely embarked.

The date for the final evacuation was fixed for the night of January 8–9, by which time the navy would have to deal with 15,000 men and 40 guns. On January 7, 1916, however, it looked as though the Germans had discovered all that was going on. At eleven o'clock in the morning the British position on both sides of the great ravine was swept with gun-fire which continued for hours, while the British replied as vigorously as their weakened gun power would permit. At three o'clock in the afternoon the enemy's fire suddenly assumed great intensity. It lasted only half an hour, so as to maintain the surprise effect and prevent reserves from being brought up.

At half-past three the enemy fired two mines on Fusilier Bluff, which overlooked the sea at the extreme end of the British line. The left of the British line was shrouded in black smoke, trenches were blown in at many points, and several communication saps were blocked. But the Turks who came out were not many, and they were shot down. A real assault was only attempted opposite Fifth Avenue and Fusilier Bluff, where the Staffordshire successfully broke up the movement. At the same time the Turkish trenches were enfiladed by fire from British destroyers.

This check forced the commander of the Ottoman forces to the conclusion that the British were firmly fixed at the entrance to the Dardanelles. The weakness of his infantry forbade him attempting another attack, and in his heavy bombardment he had spent so much ammunition that he had to be very careful in using what remained. Thus he was compelled to await the arrival of further supplies, and while he waited the evacuation continued.

The battle of the Bluffs, as it came to be known, ended on the evening of January 7, and by dawn on the 8th most of the field-guns and howitzers which had been used against the Turks had been taken to the beaches and shipped on gun lighters. January 8 was the critical day. It broke clear and calm with a perfect sea for the last act, but about four in the afternoon a gale began to blow up, and by nightfall it had reached a speed of 35 miles per hour. This was a time of peril, for had the Turks known it, all the remaining forces were at their mercy.

The last stage of the evacuation began at 1.30, but by this time the situation was growing alarming. A heavy sea running into W. Beach threatened to hold up the work, but by dint of much exertion it was found possible to take off more men and guns, although several of the valuable horses, forming the gun teams, had to be destroyed. Meanwhile the troops originally marked for evacuation at Gully Beach were having an equally anxious time. Altogether there were about 700 of them, and two "beetles" and two steamboats were detailed to take them off. Owing to the swell the first "beetle" was driven ashore; but the second, handled with great skill, managed to embark about 500 men and get safely away. The remaining men had to march two miles to W. Beach, where they arrived in time to catch one of the boats from that place. For about an hour a few lighters waited, looking for stragglers.

As the last of the lighters was getting clear the adjacent magazine was blown up, and some of the débris showered down on to her and killed a seaman. This was the only life lost. All the bonfires, munition dumps and bomb stores were sprung, and in a few minutes the beach was in flames from end to end.

The impossible had once again been performed, and it was not until the magazines were blown up and the bonfires blazing that the Turks realized that the foe had once again slipped through their fingers. Apparently the enemy commanders were confident that no evacuation could be carried out under such unsuitable weather conditions, and in consequence their vigilance slackened. But they had not reckoned on the ability of the British navy to overcome all difficulties that barred the path to success. As at Anzac and Suvla, the Turks poured their fire into the empty trenches and on the blazing beaches, but they only wasted their ammunition, for not a single man remained.

In man power the whole expedition had cost Great Britain a heavy price —31,015 killed, 73,357 wounded, and 7,623 missing or taken prisoner. In return for this great loss nothing was gained, for the only successful part of the whole campaign was its end—the brilliant evacuation.

TWO WAYS ACROSS

The task of multiplying means of communications across the Scarpe was a vital one for the success of the Arras offensive. Here British soldiers are crossing the stream by pontoon boat, while others cross by the understructure already built

BY RAIL AND RIVER

At Blangy, by the side of the river Scarpe, the scene of one phase of the battle of Arras, was a Decauville light railway. Moored to a landing-stage are two pontoon boats. British gunners are waiting to transfer shells, brought thus far by rail, on to the boats

ARRAY OF ARMS AT ARRAS

The fighting branches of the army are well represented in this photograph of a midway phase in the battle of Arras. Infantry pass beside a captured communication trench; a battery of 18-pounder field-guns is in action; in the middle distance is a tank; and in the far distance a squadron of cavalry

THUNDER IN LEASH

Though no big naval action took place after Jutland, the battleships of the Grand Fleet conducted, despite the submarine menace, periodic sweeps of North Sea waters, during which they carried out battle exercises. The guns in the foreground are those of the Queen Elizabeth, and following her is the Orion

CHAPTER 56

ARMENIA CONQUERED

In the winter of 1915–16 the Russians took the offensive in the Caucasus region. Under the Grand-Duke Nicholas they won successes which temporarily gave them possession of Armenia

THE failure of the Turkish offensive in the Caucasus in the winter of 1914–15, described in chapter 17, was followed by a lull in activities on both sides, the Russian commitments in Poland and Galicia precluding any great exploitation of their victory, and the winter snows being a further bar to operations on any large scale. Between May and the end of July, however, the Russians embarked upon a series of small-scale engagements; the passes into Armenia were firmly secured, and Tartum, a mountain village inside the Turkish border, was occupied.

More important, a Russian force farther to the east struck into the angle of Caucasia, Armenia and Persia, captured the villages of Melassgird and Dutak, just north of Lake Van, and threatened the town of Bitlis. Thence a Russian detachment crossed the border into Persia, occupying Urmia and neighbouring villages. Both from the Persians and Armenians the Russians received a warm welcome.

The strategic position thus acquired was not exploited during the rest of the year 1915. From Bitlis it might have been possible to strike down the Tigris to Mosul, and from Urmia, with the benevolent neutrality of a large section of the Persians, contact might have been made with the British force advancing on Bagdad. Alternatively, an advance westwards from Bitlis down the East Euphrates river might have resulted in the complete encirclement of the Turkish forces standing round Erzerum. The Russians, however, considered themselves too weak to attempt anything further, and winter set in with no change in the situation save that by September Mahmud Kiamil, the Turkish commander, had increased his forces to about 58,000 trained soldiers and some 20,000 recruits.

In September, 1915, the Grand-Duke Nicholas, deprived of his position as commander-in-chief of the Russian armies, was made viceroy of Caucasia, and shortly afterwards he became commander-in-chief of the Russian forces in that district. As his chief of staff he was fortunate enough to have General Nicholas Yudenitch. Both men realized that an early offensive was in every way desirable. The Russian position was for the moment a strong one—made stronger by the withdrawal in October from the Turkish 3rd Army of two divisions for the reinforcement of the Mesopotamian army. But elsewhere Russia had suffered grievously in 1915—a fact which made a rapid success somewhere of vital psychological importance. In addition, a Russian advance might be of the greatest assistance to the British forces in Mesopotamia and Gallipoli. Finally, the Russian gains in the previous operations needed to be consolidated.

Erzerum was the obvious objective of any such offensive. Reputedly the largest fortress in the Turkish empire, it was the chief town of Armenia and by far the most important road junction of the district. Its capture would mean a menace to the safety of the whole of Anatolia, and would render the position of the Turkish forces in Armenia untenable. The difficulties in the way of the Russians were immense. Kars, the only possible base for the offensive, was 130 miles distant by a track which, blocked in the winter by snow, bore the courtesy title of road; the weather would be arctic, and the average altitude of the advance about 4,500 feet. Though the strength of the prepared defences of the fortress was to prove largely illusory, its natural fortifications—mountain ranges of from 10,000 to 12,000 feet in height on the north, south and south-east, and lesser hills on the east—proved formidable barriers; indeed, the Turks considered they made the fortress invulnerable.

But, in truth, the problems of defence were also acute. The rigours of the climate applied to Turks as well as Russians; and whereas Kars was only 130 miles distant, and there was a railhead at Sarikamish 50 miles nearer, the nearest Turkish railhead was over 400 miles away. Supplies, it is true, could be brought from Trebizond, the Black Sea port only about 100 miles distant, but the Turks had by no means full command of it, and during the latter part of 1915 a force of Russian light cruisers and destroyers had destroyed a number of Turkish ships.

The grand-duke and Yudenitch prepared their plan of campaign with commendable secrecy, and when the offensive was launched on January 11, 1916, the Turks were taken unawares. The possibility of an attack in winter had been too lightly dismissed, and many of the outer defences of the fortress had been almost denuded of the guns with which, with German aid, they had been equipped; and though after the capture of the fortress the Russians claimed to have taken 100,000 prisoners, it has been established that the total Turkish forces holding the whole of the front from the Black Sea south-eastwards to Lake Van, a distance of about 200 miles, was little in excess of 50,000 men. Moreover, there was small chance of reinforcements until the spring. The Turks suffered the additional misfortune that at the critical moment Mahmud Kiamil was summoned to Constantinople and his German chief-of-staff, Colonel Guse, went on sick leave. Abdul Kerim Pasha, who took over the command of the Turkish army, proved no match for the Russians.

The Russian attack was launched in three columns. The main force in the centre advanced up the Araxes

Map of the scene of fighting between the Russians and the Turks in the winter of 1915–16. The area covered includes Armenia, much of Mesopotamia and the northern part of Persia

Photo: Imperial War Museum

UNRESTRICTED WARFARE

The submarine menace assumed in 1917 terrible proportions, and though the adoption of unrestricted submarine warfare brought America into the war, it also nearly starved Britain into defeat. Here is seen the effect of a submarine attack on a merchant vessel

valley, along the Kars-Erzerum road, stormed the strongly fortified position of Azankai, 9,000 feet above sea level, captured the village of Keupri-Keui on January 16 after a desperate struggle, and by January 18 was at Hassan Kale, only 20 miles from Erzerum itself. Here, under the command of Generals Lastouchkin and Vorobeioff, it awaited the arrival of the heavy artillery, much of which had to be man-hauled over the almost impassable tracks.

Meanwhile, from the north a second force executed a brilliant turning movement from the direction of Kara Gobek. This had to capture a number of fortified heights situated in lofty mountain positions, and it needed some days' fighting before the Turks were driven out, mainly by a series of night bayonet attacks. The Turkish 10th corps, which had been brought up from the left, confronted the Russians here. The Russians cut the corps in two, and forced themselves between part of it and Erzerum, thus preventing it from sharing in the defence of the fortress.

The Turks were thus forced back upon the strongly fortified heights of Deve Boyun to the north and north-east of Erzerum. Upon this position the Russians, greatly superior in artillery, rained a terrific bombardment. The great mountain of Karga Bazar was stormed by night in a blizzard on January 26, and by February 11 Russian troops were established within twelve miles of their objective.

The fate of the fortress was sealed by the attack of the third Russian force under Yudenitch himself, from the direction of Lake Van. To the south of Erzerum the Turkish line, considered impregnable owing to the height of the mountains and the lack of any roads, was held only by Kurdish irregulars. The Russians accomplished miracles of endurance and marching speed, broke right through, and by February 12 Yudenitch was outflanking the main southern defence of Erzerum, Fort Palandeuken. From the positions thus achieved it was determined to capture the fortress by assault, since a siege in mid-winter was a clear impossibility. For five days the battle for the inner ring of forts raged, but on February 16, 1916, amid scenes of carnage, Erzerum fell.

The capture of Erzerum had more than strategic importance. It was the first notable victory gained for many a day by Russian armies, and as such was calculated to put heart into the Allies after the disasters of 1915. The Russians grossly exaggerated their success, but equally did the Turks minimize their defeat. A total of 600 prisoners, the number mentioned in the Turkish *communiqués*, was certainly as far removed from the truth as the 100,000 which the Russians claimed, and in their desire to minimize the extent of the disaster the Turks at first suppressed the news of the loss of Erzerum entirely, and later referred to it as a voluntary evacuation.

That it was far from being anything of the sort was proved by the disordered nature of the Turkish retreat to the west. Vigorously pursued, despite the appalling weather conditions, they lost the town of Mamakhatun, and within eight days had been driven back beyond the Euphrates. At Kotur, more than 50 miles west of Erzerum, and at Baiburt, more to the north, the demoralized remnant of the Turkish forces, now commanded by Wahib Pasha, who had superseded the absent Mahmud Kiamil, and reinforced by the 5th corps from European Turkey, rallied, and, though in the retreat they had lost most of their artillery and equipment, succeeded for a while in checking the Russian advance. But the respite could only be a temporary one, for the grand-duke and Yudenitch were insisting on the dispatch of adequate reinforcements, and their lines of communication were the shorter.

To consolidate their position it was necessary for the Russians to capture Trebizond. This Black Sea port possessed an excellent harbour, and not only would its occupation strengthen

STAND AND DELIVER

The gun of this German U-boat is firing across the bows of a merchant vessel, giving her a chance to surrender before being sunk. After the beginning of unrestricted submarine warfare no such chance was given, ships being sunk without trace, "spurlos versenkt"

Photo: Imperial War Museum

Photo: G.P.A.

HUNTER AND QUARRY

Caught in the open sea by a German U-boat, this merchant vessel rides helpless, from a torpedo in her bows, on the waves. Her crew have been taken off and the U-boat is about to deliver the coup de grace to its unfortunate victim

Mondiale

HELL LET LOOSE

This photograph shows the moment that a German high explosive shell bursts in front of the French line. The violently torn and twisted barbed wire and the great cloud of fumes give some idea of the force of the explosion. Such scenes of destruction occurred almost every second during a bombardment.

the Russian grip, but it would provide also an alternative and shorter line of communication by sea. Accordingly, on March 4 a Russian force was landed at Atina, 60 miles east of Trebizond. The Turkish troops in this neighbourhood were commanded by a German, Major Hunger. After an initial defeat on the Kalopotamos river, on March 8, they offered considerable resistance, and it was not until a month later that the Russians reached the main line of the Turkish defences. In front of it ran a small river, the Kara Dere, on the Trebizond side of which was a ridge of high ground rising in places to a height of 2,000 feet. The Turks had strongly fortified this position, and it was impossible to outflank it. It could only be taken by a frontal attack, and the Russians did not reach the summit until April 15. Then the Turkish army retired into the city, and three days later another Russian force was landed to the west of Trebizond. The Russians were soon only twelve miles from the fortress, and on April 18 the remnants of the Turkish garrison deserted the city and fled south.

Meanwhile, the Russians had progressed to the south and south-east. A swift advance through Persia, begun by General Baratov in December, 1915, took them as far as Kermanshah, nearly due east of Bagdad and under 200 miles distant; their cavalry, indeed, made contact with the British forces on the Tigris, but too late to render assistance in the attempt to relieve Kut-el-Amara, and later their troops occupied Ispahan, the chief city of southern Persia. Another and stronger force, operating in the Lake Van district, captured Mush and, in the beginning of March, succeeded in storming Bitlis by night during a fierce storm. This latter achievement isolated the Turkish forces operating in the neighbourhood of Urmia, and a further advance to Khizan opened the way to the fertile valley of the Tigris and to Mosul.

Thus by the middle of April the Russians had gained, under conditions of great difficulty, a series of startling and complete victories, giving them an enormous advantage in morale, and had virtually conquered the whole of Armenia as well as effectively permeating into Persia. The position of their forces, at the gateways of Mesopotamia and Anatolia, opened up immense potentialities for the spring and summer. Two main factors prevented the complete exploitation of victory. First, the real peril to which Turkey in Asia had become exposed stimulated Enver Pasha and the authorities at Constantinople to take steps to reorganize the Turkish forces. Secondly, Brusiloff's June offensive stopped the flow of reinforcements of which the grand-duke and Yudenitch were in need. A third factor was the ever-lengthening lines of communication.

Enver Pasha determined to send the Turkish 2nd army, hitherto kept back in Europe, to the assistance of Wahib Pasha's troops. The command of this was entrusted to Izzet Pasha, and an ambitious plan for a counter-offensive was elaborated. It failed completely, mainly because Enver underestimated by nearly two months the time it would take to transport the army to the theatre of operations along a single-gauge railway already in use for the Mesopotamian and Palestine campaigns. The Russians, realizing that heavy Turkish reinforcements were on their way, anticipated their arrival by dealing a smashing blow at the barely reorganized 3rd army. The latter had gained some successes in May, recapturing Mamakhatun, on the Erzerum–Erzingan road, and Surmene, a coast town just east of Trebizond. but in July the Russians counter-attacked with complete and devastating effect. The Turks lost Baiburt and, more important, Erzingan, and were thrown back, a routed rabble, into Anatolia.

The belated arrival in August of the Turkish 2nd army held up any further Russian advance, but it achieved little else. Based on Kharput and Diarbekr, it recaptured Mush and Bitlis, but the Russians regained both almost at once. Elsewhere in Armenia the position had developed before the winter into one of stalemate. Only in Persia, in the late summer, did the Turks gain any notable successes. The Russians, who had advanced as far as Khanikin, about 80 miles from Bagdad, and Rowanduz, the same distance from Mosul, were driven back on to Lake Urmia; and though they continued to hold a line south-west in the direction of Kermanshah, they lost effective control of a large

FIGHTING FROM RUIN TO RUIN

The village of Vauxaillon-en-Laonnois was amongst those evacuated and laid waste by the Germans during their retreat to the Hindenburg Line. These Frenchmen, firing from the cover afforded by the ruins, will show no mercy to the rearguard left to delay their progress

Photo: Central Press

QUIET DAYS

Except during an actual offensive there were long periods of comparative peace on all sections of the Western Front. These Frenchmen in a chalk trench in Champagne have little to fear

portion of Persia and the possibility of effecting immediate further contact with the British forces.

The closing months of 1916 saw only spasmodic activity on both sides and no change in the general situation. The Russians were firmly established in a far from hostile Armenia and had a footing in north-west Persia. The grand-duke had every reason to be satisfied with the result of the year's campaign; scantily reinforced in the later months, he had yet held the whole of Armenia. The outbreak of the Russian revolution, and the recall of the grand-duke by Kerensky in March, 1917, make it impossible to say whether the victories of 1916 could have been further exploited. The Turks suffered far more severely from disease and cold in the winter than did the Russians, and did little to remedy the inadequacy either of their commissariat or lines of communication; and it is improbable that they could have made much resistance to a sustained Russian offensive.

But, as far as Anatolia was concerned, the natural formation of the country would certainly have proved a most formidable obstacle, and, in addition, the Russians would have been operating in a bitterly hostile area. It was a far cry from Erzingan to the shores of the Bosporus. To the south the prospects were more pleasing. Kurdistan was nearly as disaffected towards the Turks as was Armenia, and beyond lay Mosul, Bagdad and the British. An effective junction between the two Allies in the spring of 1917 might well have brought Turkey to her knees.

The grand-duke had, indeed, decided upon this latter plan of campaign before his recall. He was succeeded by Yudenitch, who himself relinquished the command in August, 1917. By this time disaffection had so spread among the troops that any Turkish attack must have been successful. None such was forthcoming, however, during 1917, and the Russians remained in Armenia until the armistice signed by the Bolshevists in December. The subsequent Turkish advance through the Caucasus is described in a later chapter.

WEARY AT REST

This natural cave in the hillside in front of Craonne on the Aisne front proved a natural dug-out. Only 300 yards from the German lines, French troops sleep in comparative safety and relative comfort

Photo: Mondiale

CHAPTER 57

VERDUN ATTACKED

With Russia exhausted by the efforts made in 1915, the Germans were able to mass more troops in the West, and early in 1916 they began to attack Verdun. In spite of fierce fighting lasting longer than any other battle in the War 'they did not pass'

OF historic importance since the time of the Roman conquest of Gaul, the city of Verdun lies on the river Meuse close to the western confines of that plain of Lorraine which for centuries has been a battle-field in the wars between France and her eastern neighbours. During the 10th century Verdun was conquered by the emperor Otto the Great, and, like Toul and Metz, was placed under the temporal authority of its bishop. The three cities were restored to France in 1552, and Verdun was a sentinel town on France's eastern frontier until it fell to the Prussians in 1792. Soon restored to France, in the Franco-Prussian war it was again besieged and was forced to capitulate on November 8, 1870. It was returned to France in 1871.

The treaty of 1871 wrested Metz from the French, and it was not long before Germany had made of it one of the most powerful entrenched camps in Europe. To counter this menace, the French engineers, completing the work of Vauban, turned Verdun into a fortified entrenched camp some thirty miles in circumference. Barring the direct road to Paris, it became a main buttress of France's eastern defence system, being linked to Toul by a line of forts stretching along the heights of the Meuse, that great escarpment which acts as a magnificent natural barrier against invasion. To the north and south of this great plateau scarp, the defences of Verdun and Toul respectively formed a barrier before the two breaches in this protecting ridge, the valley of the Meuse and the gap of Toul.

In a little book called "Croquis Lorrains," published in 1907, the military historian Henry Bordeaux wrote in a moment of far-sightedness:

> At the very foot of these Heights of the Meuse it is permissible to suppose that an immense battle will be fought, where some day perhaps the fate of our country will be decided. These sterile fields of the Woëvre will one day be fertilized with thousands of corpses.

The first serious attempt on the part of the German armies to break through this natural barrier took place in September, 1914, when the French 3rd army, pivoting on Verdun, was forced southward on either side as a result of the German effort to envelop the position—an effort which met only with partial success—at a point some miles south of Verdun, where the ridge was partly worn down by erosion. Here the enemy were able to push across the Meuse, but, owing to their failure elsewhere, there remained the famous salient of Saint Mihiel, which stood immovable during four years of fighting. But in spite of the maintenance of this salient, it proved possibly of tactical importance to the Germans.

After this failure to encircle Verdun the Germans for more than a year undertook no further operations against that fortress, and military activity in that sector during 1915 was almost non-existent. This period of calm led to a grave neglect of the defences in that sector. No less a person than Pétain bears witness to this fact, for in "La Bataille de Verdun" he says:

> Between the forts and beyond them was nothing but dilapidation: trenches innumerable, mostly fallen in, and tangles of broken barbed-wire. . . . Here the fighting dragged along, languishing; at rare intervals one caught the sound of the bursting of a shell or a grenade, but the invisible troops did not awaken at the echo of these sounds. It was the calm preceding the storm.

In August, 1915, the French authorities came to a momentous decision with regard to their fortress. The short and



Map showing the scene of the nine months struggle during which the Germans tried in vain to capture Verdun. The thick line shows the battle-front on Feb. 21, 1916, while the principal forts defending the city are also indicated

Photo, Imperial War Museum

BEFORE THE CURTAIN RISES

German storm troops, ready for the attack, are seen behind a lurid smoke screen, waiting till it lifts for their final dash. One of them can be seen sending off a dog with a message tied on its collar reporting progress to rear headquarters

frail resistance offered by Belgian forts in 1914 had created in the minds of the high command a doubt as to the efficacy of the fortress in modern warfare. Furthermore, in view of the French shortage of heavy artillery, it was considered judicious to dispose otherwise of the resources in men and armaments at present immobilized in the forts. Accordingly, Joffre persuaded the government to withdraw troops and guns from the fortresses, and a decree to that effect was issued on August 5, 1915.

The decree rendered available for service with the armies in the field 165 battalions of infantry, 40 companies of sappers, 41 horse batteries, 134 field batteries, 1,114 machine-guns, 1,814 field-guns, and 2,313 heavy guns, together with a large supply of ammunition. As Palat remarks in " La Grande Guerre sur le Front Occidental " :

> Such an advantage was not to be disdained, but it appears to have been largely balanced by serious drawbacks. In a few months Verdun was stripped of nearly everything that had contributed to its strength. A fort as important as that of Douaumont had neither garrison, material nor munitions, nor even, by an unpardonable blindness, the flanking guns of its moats. It is permissible to believe that these facts did not remain unknown to the Germans, and helped to decide their offensive.

In place of a ringed defence, a single trench position was established beyond the forts, with a subsidiary trench line in the rear for the reserves. The district was thus transformed into a field system similar to other sectors of the Western front, and the " fortified region of Verdun," as it was called (referred to in army documents as the R.F.V.), covered a front of about 60 miles, linking up with the French 1st army on its right and with the 3rd on its left.

Photos: Imperial War Museum

A DOG'S CHANCE

This German wolfhound has been given the chance to show the results of his training. Strapped to his back is a coil of telephone wire, one end of which is held by his master, and which he is going to lay over the ground in front of him

Nevertheless, Verdun was still recognized to be a point of strategical importance, and General Herr was appointed commander of the fortified region and governor. At first he was placed under the orders of General Dubail, commander of the eastern army group, and it was not until three weeks before the German offensive opened that he was transferred for orders, more logically, to the commander of the central army group, General de Langle de Cary. " Never swap horses while crossing a stream " is a saw the French authorities would have done well to profit by, for when the attack was delivered the new headquarters knew practically nothing of local conditions.

From time to time, during the autumn and winter of 1915, the French high command drew freely upon the troops of the R.F.V. as reinforcements for the battles in Champagne and elsewhere, and on several occasions Herr was obliged to point out that the continued reduction of his effectives obliged him to hold his front line with dangerously few men. Moreover, as has been said before, the regional defences had been neglected during a year of calm.

On the other hand, it was remarkable how impervious were the forts to the deluge of steel. When the French finally recaptured the Fort de Vaux and Fort Douaumont, which had fallen into the enemy's hands, it was extraordinary how little they had suffered from the effects of the thousands of shells which had been hurled upon them. Not a gun-turret was destroyed, and most of the casemates were still habitable. As B. H. Liddell Hart so aptly remarks in his " History of the World War " : " It was a grim jest of fate that the French should have thrown away their shield for a target, through a hasty assumption that fortresses were valueless."

The neglect of the Verdun defences was known to many. Lieutenant-Colonel Driant, deputy for the Meurthe-et-Moselle, who commanded two battalions of chasseurs in the sector north of Verdun, informed the army commission, of which he was a member, about it, and their report, confirming what he

CANINE MERCURY

Though not equipped with wings, this German messenger dog takes, like Mercury, the winged messenger, to the air while leaping a trench on his way to deliver a message. The message can be seen attached to his collar

Photopress

INTO NO MAN'S LAND

The Germans, unlike the British, went "over the top" with rifles slung, so that they could throw their bombs unimpeded. They carried also tools for entrenching. Here German troops take advantage of a shallow trench before plunging into the open

stated, was brought to the notice of General Galliéni, the minister of war, who at once took the matter up with Joffre. The commander-in-chief's reply, whilst dismissing the allegations as unfounded, said:

> I cannot allow soldiers under my command to bring before the Government, by any other channel than the hierarchic one, complaints or protests concerning the execution of my orders. Neither is it befitting for me to defend myself against vague imputations the source of which I ignore. The very fact that the Government is willing to receive communications of this sort . . . is calculated to disturb profoundly the spirit of discipline in the army.

Joffre went on to say that if such a state of things continued he would resign. The letter therefore amounted to an ultimatum; and although Joffre's star was already becoming dim in governmental circles, even his opponents dreaded the effect of so drastic an action at that moment, and his assurance that "this organization is, on the whole, much stronger and more complete than that of our adversaries" was accepted.

The situation was all the more disturbing because Herr's staff was gathering information which pointed to a German offensive on the Verdun front in the not far distant future. The reports of prisoners and deserters, coupled with the increasing activity apparent on the enemy's railways and roads and in the back areas, confirmed these suspicions. But in spite of Herr's anxiety, and although the chief of the intelligence branch at French headquarters strongly affirmed that the blow would be dealt in the Verdun sector, the operations branch was just as sure that the offensive would be delivered in Champagne, and refused to allow itself to be hypnotized by Verdun. The result was that Herr received as sole reinforcements two territorial divisions, which Dubail assured headquarters "would give every security."

The auguries proved true, for German headquarters had decided to attack. The German nation was growing restive under the huge sacrifices it was making to achieve victories which did not seem to bring the end of the war within sight. Therefore, when the imperial general staff found that the advent of winter and their own successes had relieved the tension on the Russian and Balkan fronts, they decided the time was ripe to strike with all their might at the French. France had suffered severely during fifteen months of warfare, called upon, as she had been, to shoulder the heaviest share of the burden of defending the western front. The German supreme command considered that if with one deadly blow the French line could be broken, the French army would possibly collapse, in which case France must make a separate peace.

The French were obliged to keep a large percentage of their troops in reserve, ready to reinforce the Anglo-Belgian front if called upon, and at the end of 1915 they held the 320-mile front from Péronne to the Swiss frontier with 58 divisions in line against 70 German divisions. Moreover, the German superiority in artillery was still tremendous, especially in heavy guns, for the great French howitzers were only beginning to come from Creusot.

General von Falkenhayn, in his book "General Headquarters, 1914–1916, and its Critical Decisions," mentions a report on the military situation which he presented to the Kaiser at Christmas, 1915. After examining one by one the possibilities of achieving final victory by an offensive against Great Britain, Russia and Italy, he dismissed them all. His report begins by saying that France had been weakened almost to the limits of endurance, both in a military and economic sense, and concludes:

> As I have already insisted, the strain on France has almost reached the breaking point, though it is certainly borne with the most remarkable devotion. If we

succeed in opening the eyes of her people to the fact that in a military sense they have nothing more to hope for, that breaking point would be reached and England's best sword knocked out of her hand. To achieve that object the uncertain method of a mass break-through, in any case beyond our means, is unnecessary. We can probably do enough for our purpose with limited resources. Within our reach behind the French sector of the western front there are objectives, for the retention of which the French general staff would be compelled to throw in every man they have. If they do so the forces of France will bleed to death—as there can be no question of a voluntary withdrawal—whether we reach our goal or not. If they do not do so, and we reach our objectives, the moral effect on France will be enormous. . . The objectives of which I am speaking now are Belfort and Verdun.

The considerations urged above apply to both, yet the preference must be given to Verdun. The French lines at that point are barely 12 miles distant from the German railway communications. Verdun is, therefore, the most powerful *point d'appui* for an attempt, with a relatively small expenditure of effort to make the whole German front in France and Belgium untenable.

Photo: G.P.A.

ILL-FATED RULERS

Like the Kaiser, with whom he is here seen, Charles, emperor of Austria from November, 1916, was fated to lose his thrones. He was forced to abdicate as emperor of Austria on November 12, 1918, and as king of Hungary on November 16

It was clear that, from the German point of view, once Verdun and its forts were taken, they would meet with no other such defensible position between them and Paris. Though Falkenhayn, in his post-war statement, denied that his primary object was a break-through, most critics are inclined to think, after studying his *modus operandi*, that this belated explanation of his intentions was put forward merely to cover up the failure of his original plan. Pétain is of the opinion that Falkenhayn hoped to effect the double enveloping movement that had been checked in September, 1914, and, by drawing a net over the defences, to bring off a new Sedan, "hoping, by this manoeuvre, to make an immense breach, so that the exploitation of such a success, before a French army cut in two, might afford the imperial forces a handsome perspective of victory."

A matter of tactical importance in the choice of Verdun as a point of attack was the German superiority of communications in that area. Of the three railways which served Verdun before the war, the most important, the main line from Paris through Châlons and Sainte-Menehould, was under fire from Aubréville to Dombasle; the line from Sedan was lost in 1914, and the only safe line left was the narrow-gauge Meuse railway running to Verdun from Bar-le-Duc. The Germans were able, at the end of 1914, to use four standard gauge lines. With their usual foresight and industry, by the end of the following year they had completed six additional standard gauge railways, as well

RUTHLESS IN RETREAT

During their retreat to the Hindenburg Line the Germans deliberately and completely laid waste the districts they evacuated. Bapaume and Peronne were sacked, buildings were utterly destroyed, orchards totally ruined and wells poisoned. Here German soldiers are busily engaged in breaking down a wall

Photo: Imperial War Museum

Photo: Sport and General

ANTI-AIRCRAFT ON THE ARCH

Anti-aircraft measures, such as the searchlights on Apsley Gate, Hyde Park Corner, were taken firstly against the Zeppelin menace. Later a worse danger arose from the more effective raids of squadrons of German Gotha aeroplanes

as a number of light railways. Thus when the offensive was foreseen the French, unable to transport men and material in sufficient quantities by rail to the threatened area, were obliged to have recourse to road transport on a large scale. Fortunately the organization entailed was admirably carried out.

The preparations for the Verdun offensive were carried out by the Germans in masterly fashion, for, though the French were aware, by information from various sources, that an attack was impending, they had no inkling of the ant-like activity which reigned opposite them. At the beginning of 1916 the German front line opposite Verdun was held by their 5th reserve corps. During the first week of February battery after battery took up its position, carefully hidden from observation, without firing any ranging shots, and eight picked divisions relieved the 5th reserve corps, which thereupon remained in the second line. No assaulting trenches were dug in advance of the main trench line, although No Man's Land was in places over half a mile wide.

The German command decided that the main feature of the attack should be a shattering artillery bombardment, not protracted so long as to lose the important advantage of surprise, but making up for its comparatively short duration by the number of guns employed and the rapidity of their fire. For this purpose there were placed at the disposal of the crown prince, who was in command of the attacking force, some 1,400 guns to cover a frontage of attack limited to eight miles in width, and the normal supply of ammunition was quintupled. About 640 were heavy guns, among them the famous Austrian gun—the 15-inch Skoda howitzer. So sure was the enemy that his artillery would overwhelm the French, that he dared to return to old-fashioned methods. Instead of digging gun pits for the lighter artillery, the Germans placed hundreds of pieces of ordnance side by side, confident that the hurricane of fire would overwhelm the French before they could make any adequate reply. The German lines had the advantage of being densely wooded, and the evergreen firs formed a splendid cover for the vast artillery preparations.

To parry the coming blow, General Herr had in line between the Meuse at Brabant and the Jumelles d'Ornes, the sector where the offensive developed, two divisions, the 72nd and 51st, commanded by General Chrétien, some 130 field-guns and 140 heavy guns, the latter all of old pattern. Between Bar-le-Duc and Verdun lay two divisions in reserve.

The great attack had been planned for February 13, but, fortunately for the defenders, bad weather and poor visibility made artillery work impossible, and it was not until a week later that conditions improved sufficiently to warrant a start. The respite was a godsend to France, for the road from Bar-le-Duc to Verdun, later to achieve immortality as the *Voie Sacrée*, was on February 20 placed under the control of an automobile commission and reserved exclusively for the circulation of a double file of motor transport, and the rules and regulations with regard to speed and the questions of organization came into force at noon on February 22. This saved Verdun. By February 26, 51 motor groups, with a total of 3,500 lorries, were assembled in the region. During March 6,000 wagons passed along the road every day, an average of one every fourteen seconds, transporting each week some 90,000 men and 50,000 tons of material.

After a tempestuous week of gales and rain, on the morning of February 21 the clouds rolled away and a wintry sun shone on the frozen swamps of the Meuse valley. At four o'clock Verdun had been awakened from its sleep by a 15-inch shell, which fell close by the cathedral. It was the signal for battle, a battle that was to last longer than any other in the history of the world, for the storm that broke on February 21 did not spend itself until the middle of

'WRENS' AT WORK

The Women's Royal Naval Service, popularly known as the "Wrens," was established in November, 1917, by the Admiralty, and its personnel rose to over 5,000. These women are fixing the glass floats on to the wire netting used for mine sweeping

Photo: Imperial War Museum

the following December. At a quarter past seven the German artillery opened out in a drum fire. Shells of every calibre and of every kind fell like a hailstorm upon the French position.

The fire first concentrated on the small sector of advanced entrenchments near Brabant on the Meuse and Haumont; shells fell with terrible precision every few yards, with the result that the trenches were obliterated. In each small sector of the six-mile northward bulge of the Verdun salient the work of destruction was done with surprising quickness. After the line from Brabant to Haumont was smashed the main fire power was directed against the other end of the bow at Herbebois, Ornes and Maucourt. Then, when both ends of the bow were severely hammered, the central point of the Verdun salient, Bois des Caures, was smothered in shells of all sizes, poured in from east, north and west. In this manner almost the whole enormous force of heavy artillery was centred upon mile after mile of the French front. When the great guns lifted over the lines of craters the field artillery, placed row after row in front of the wreckage, maintained a fire curtain over the communications.

Fortunately the commander of the central army group, de Langle de Cary, was a wise and experienced soldier. Foreseeing the German method of attack, he had given instructions that the forward positions should be lightly held. "Not only must we count upon the front line, in an attack, being wiped out by the artillery," he had said, "but even the whole of the trench system constituting the first position. Therefore one should not hasten to bring up all one's effectives to the front lines or reinforce the first position, in order that sufficient reserves may be maintained for the defence of the other positions."

The effect of this tactical device was to leave very few French troops exposed to the hurricane fire, and to minimize the losses which the Germans had been sure they could inflict upon the enemy. In every case the fire-trench line before Verdun was almost empty, and in many cases the real defenders of the French line were men with machine-guns hidden in dug-outs at some distance from the positions at which the German gunners aimed. The batteries of light guns, which the French handled with the flexibility and continuity of fire of machine-guns, were also concealed in widely scattered positions. The main damage caused by the first intense bombardment was the destruction of all the telephone wires along the French front. In one hour the German guns ploughed up every yard of ground behind the observation posts and behind the fire-trench. Communication could only be slowly re-established by messengers.

Photos: Imperial War Museum

THE SPHINX KEEPS HER SMILE

In the course of an air raid on London by German machines on the night of September 4, 1917, a bomb was dropped on the Thames Embankment by Cleopatra's Needle. This photograph shows some of the damage done. The Needle and the Sphinxes were chipped.

By three o'clock in the afternoon the German fire reached a terrifying intensity and the wooded hills behind the German trenches belched forth a continuous sheet of flame. The French artillery replied heroically, but such was its inferiority in numbers and weight that its effect on the course of the battle was negligible. In their efforts to create a death zone in which no troops could possibly remain, the Germans deluged the triangle Brabant–Ornes–Verdun with some 2,000,000 shells. At 4 p.m. the fire ceased.

The infantry advanced with assurance, but not yet in masses. At first only patrols advanced, followed by bombing parties and flame-throwers, to test the strength of the French position before the main body should move forward. In spite of the violence of the bombardment, the French troops had clung on desperately wherever they could, and the Germans saw, says Louis Madelin in his book "Verdun," "rising from this chaos of churned-up earth, of broken trees and bloody furrows, spectres with staring eyes and hair on

THE PICCADILLY FRONT

Swan & Edgar's shop on the corner of Piccadilly Circus, London, suffered from a Zeppelin raid on the night of October 19, 1917, and Piccadilly itself resembled a battlefield on the Western Front. The damage was done by a 100 kilogram bomb

Photos: Imperial War Museum

KEPT IN RESERVE

Behind the lines near Fricourt this detachment of the 6th Dragoon Guards are resting while their horses feed. The lot of the cavalrymen during the Somme battles was a dull one, consisting in the main of spells of waiting behind the lines for the chance that so seldom came

end, blue with cold, mud-clogged and terrible. Chrétien's corps . . . . . were going to sell their lives dearly."

After the German patrols came the second line, compact masses of men, followed by a third and supporting wave bringing with them machine-guns and trench mortars, but by the time darkness fell only the foremost of the French trenches had been occupied. The first attack surged round the Bois des Caures, the Bois d'Haumont, Herbebois and the Bois de la Ville, isolated from the rear by an intensive barrage. Towards 5 p.m. the Germans penetrated into the Bois des Caures, but they were met by the heroic resistance of the 56th and 59th battalions of chasseurs, led by that same Colonel Driant who had pointed out the weakness of the Verdun defences. With 1,200 men he withstood the assault of four regiments of the German 21st division, numbering over 8,000 men, supported by seven batteries of field-guns and 40 heavy batteries. The chasseurs, though surrounded, held the wood for nearly twenty-four hours.

It is invidious to single out for special mention any one detachment when the exploits of Driant's men were being emulated everywhere. Petain wrote:

> The soldiers of the 30th corps gave proof of astonishing and almost incredible valour. . . . Officer and simple soldier alike, aware of the grandeur of their task, went through with it stoically. Lost in a furious sea, knowing that none could hear their signals of distress, they strove to stem the tide which engulfed them one after another, preferring death or horrible captivity to the freedom they could have found in retreat. Our men suffered and endured beyond all efforts of the imagination; they did their duty with simplicity and without boasting.

When the attack ceased on the 21st the Germans had gained but little ground, and their small advance had been dearly bought. But the battle was only beginning, and the pressure upon the French lines was to become greater and greater as time went on. Meanwhile, reinforcements were being rapidly rushed up the Souilly–Verdun road in lorries, while columns on foot were marching towards the front line by various itineraries. But, hindered by the constant shelling of the back areas, by the evacuation of the wounded and by the constant stream of supply convoys, it was a question as to whether they would arrive in time.

JOY RIDES

Freed, after two and a half years, from the German yoke, the inhabitants of the village of Vraignes give a warm welcome when the British pass through in March, 1917. The joy of one little girl is obviously marred, however, by anxiety for her safety



Photos: Imperial War Museum

A DUMP GOES UP

Arras, just behind the British lines, was the starting-point for the successful offensives on Vimy Ridge and the line of the Scarpe in April, 1917. This photograph shows the destruction by a German shell of an ammunition dump in the town

Fortunately, Chrétien had wisely kept back a large part of his corps reserve to provide for a counter-attack.

Snow fell heavily during the night, and before dawn on February 22 the Germans resumed their attack. Thanks to their flame throwers they managed to penetrate up the ravine between Brabant and Haumont. The latter village, though flattened out by intensive fire, resisted for some time. Its principal stronghold, fortified with concrete, finally gave way under the repeated shelling, burying 80 men, several machine-guns and a large store of ammunition. Attacked from the east, north and north-west, the survivors of the 362nd regiment, led by Colonel Bonviolle, held the village till nightfall. The Germans eventually succeeded in working their way into it and, taking the colonel's command post in the rear, set fire to it with their flame throwers. The colonel and his staff, who were using their rifles with the last defenders, nearly perished in the flames, but succeeded in escaping through the German barrage, after which the colonel rallied the remainder of his men at Samogneux, close by. He reported

> All my effectives have disappeared in the formidable storm of shell from the enemy's heavy artillery, which, for two days, has burst upon them and annihilated them both in the trenches and in the dugouts. The order was to hold out to the end; it has been carried out.

LESSER FRUITS OF WAR

These British soldiers are examining a dump of "pineapple" grenades and stick bombs left behind by the Germans. The scene is part of the Arras–Cambrai road captured by the British during the battle of the Scarpe in April, 1917

From the early hours of the morning the battle raged fiercely round Herbebois, where the Germans captured the north-east corner of the wood, but could penetrate no farther. In the Bois des Caures, Driant's chasseurs still resisted heroically. The trenches were filling in rapidly under the stupendous shelling, the communicating saps were completely destroyed and the inextricable tangle of fallen trees and shattered undergrowth made movement difficult.

The Germans attacked down the Flabas road, that cuts through the middle of the wood, and soon debouched on to Ville road, which skirts its southern edge. Late in the afternoon the situation became critical. Driant, finding his line of retreat threatened and anxious to save as many of his men as possible, gave the order to retire on Beaumont. When they finally reached Vacherauville the next day the survivors numbered 7 officers and 110 men—all that

MUSCLE VERSUS MUD

This photograph gives some idea of the appalling conditions under which the British 1917 offensive in Flanders was undertaken. Here British gunners are trying to move an 18-pounder field-gun, stuck in the mud, near Zillebeke

Photo: Imperial War Museum

Photo: Imperial War Museum

READY AND WAITING

The Arras offensive in the spring of 1917 was one of the very few battles during the middle period of the war when cavalry were employed over the crater fields. Their efforts were almost completely baulked by the mud, barbed wire and enemy machine-gun fire

remained of 1,200. Driant, whose last words had been *Au revoir, bonne chance,* lay dead on the field.

Now the German fire redoubled its fury and an avalanche of shells swept the French positions at Anglemont, Mormont farms and Wavrille. The Bois de la Ville was lost, and, with earthworks swept out of existence, open warfare came again into its own north of Verdun, where the French gunners fired over open sights at the advancing waves of infantry. At the end of the day the position of the 30th corps was grave. The front of the 51st division had been broken by the loss of Bois de la Ville; the 72nd division had been forced to retire on to a line Brabant–Anglemont farm–Hill 240 south of Beaumont, and a continuous and well directed drum fire had caused very heavy losses.

During the night of February 22–23 the French, acting on the orders of the local commander but unknown to General Chrétien, evacuated Brabant. Upon the news of this withdrawal reaching head-quarters, instructions were immediately issued to counter-attack and recapture the village, but in view of the exhaustion of the troops the order was later countermanded.

On the morning of February 23 the fighting was concentrated around Wavrille, for the Germans made a terrific effort to capture the Bois de la Wavrille and Hill 351, lying between Herbebois and the Bois des Fosses, from which they would be able to enfilade the French position between Beaumont and Hill 344. At 11.45 a.m. a strong enemy force penetrated into the west of the Bois de la Wavrille, turning the first French line and capturing many prisoners. Four companies of the 310th and 327th regiments, in the south part of the wood, were compelled to retire to the Bois des Fosses.

A counter-attack was ordered, but the Germans were in force in the Bois de la Wavrille and the French were thrown back. It looked as if Herbebois would be submerged under the advancing waves of German infantry, and, to avoid their centre being enveloped, the French were obliged to fall back on Le Chaume, a wood on the western outskirts of Ornes. On the western wing of the battle sector Samogneux, although heavily bombarded, still remained in French hands. By nightfall the French line ran from Samogneux through Mormont farm and Beaumont along the

AN ENEMY INVENTION

This German aeroplane, brought down behind the British lines, is an object of interest to these Canadians. Its wings, made of corrugated aluminium and practically fire and weather proof, were a German invention, and enabled it to be left for long periods in the open

'Canadian Records'



Photo: L.N.A.

TOMMY TURNS POSTMAN

This photograph shows the arrival at railhead of a consignment of mails for British troops in the battle area. By splendid organization the great difficulty of speedily tracing the exact whereabouts of recipients of letters and parcels was largely overcome

northern edge of the Bois des Fosses to Le Chaume. On the Woëvre front the original line still remained intact.

At 3 o'clock in the morning of February 24 Samogneux was captured, but its conquest proved a doubtful blessing to the Germans, for their right flank was more than ever exposed to French bombardment from the Mort Homme on the left bank of the Meuse. When the Germans had decided to launch their offensive against Verdun, the crown prince had taken the view that both sides of the Meuse should be attacked simultaneously with powerful forces; but Falkenhayn would not release a sufficient number of troops, and the attack was launched on the east bank only. As a result the Germans suffered tremendous casualties from the French artillery, which enfiladed them from the opposite bank.

In an attempt to take Verdun at any cost the enemy was pushing ahead in continual rush attacks, following the line of least resistance rather than making sure of his footing. Across the river at this point the French held several lines of dominating heights, from which they poured a flanking fire into every hostile force advancing from Brabant and Haumont. The nearer the Germans came to Verdun, on the Côte du Poivre sector, the more terribly they suffered from the fire across the Meuse.

Upon receiving news of the loss of Samogneux the French command instantly set about organizing the Côte de Talou and the Côte du Poivre for defence, for the German objective was now to break the French position at Hill 344. At the same time a barrage was set up to hinder a German sortie from Samogneux. At 10.55 a.m. word came through from a listening post at Forges, on the left bank of the river, that at 11 o'clock the Germans would assault Hill 344 in strength.

Chrétien at once ordered Bapst to counter-attack before the enemy could get under way and reinforced the 72nd division with five battalions. It was 2 o'clock in the afternoon before the Germans succeeded in debouching from Samogneux, and for an hour they were employed in breaking the stubborn resistance of the 3rd tirailleurs near Champneuville. But before night they were masters of Hill 344 and had thrown back the defenders on to the Côte de Talou, and in addition captured Beaumont and the Bois des Fosses and gained a footing in Le Chaume.

The German advance was now more menacing. At 2.30 p.m. strong forces were concentrated near Louvemont, threatening the Côte du Poivre, almost the last dominating position in the defence of Verdun. On the right wing of the sector the garrison of Ornes were attacked from three sides and were obliged that evening to profit by the darkness and withdraw to Bezonvaux. By nightfall the Germans were masters of most of the French second position.

During the afternoon of the 24th de Langle de Cary arrived at Dugny and, seeing that the progress of the enemy was menacing the divisions in the Woëvre plain, decided to shorten the line by withdrawing these troops to the foot of the Heights of the Meuse, a retirement which was performed without hindrance the following day. For a time a complete evacuation of the right bank was contemplated, but this proposal was vetoed by Joffre.

Meanwhile Joffre's chief of staff, General de Castelnau, left Chantilly and arrived at de Langle de Cary's headquarters. Finding Herr's staff despondent and the situation critical, he at once sent for Pétain to take command. Pétain, who at the outbreak of the war was a colonel, was not long in obtaining the command of an army. He was, as C. R. Crutwell remarks, " a true soldier of France, absolutely unspotted by politics, always giving his real opinion bluntly, without respect of persons, with a wonderful understanding of the *poilu* in all his moods."

On February 25, while he was on his way, came the news of the fall of Fort Douaumont. Falkenhayn, in his Memoirs, relates how the 24th Brandenburg infantry regiment stormed this fort, the strong and reputedly impregnable north-eastern pillar of the Verdun defence system. What really happened would be almost ludicrous but for the effect this loss was bound to make upon the French. On the afternoon of the 25th the Brandenburgers of the Prussian 3rd corps had succeeded in dispersing a force of Algerians defending the glacis of the ravine in front of the fort.

A company, commanded by a certain Lieutenant Brandis, halted momentarily, hesitating to attack a stronghold probably held by a large garrison. Finding no opposition, he pushed forward with his men and, after crossing the moat unscathed, penetrated into the central keep. There, to his stupefaction, he found the casemates open, and upon entering with his men saw only a working party of territorials who, by the delicious irony of fate, were busily engaged in dismantling the guns in tardy execution of the decree of August, 1915! In such fashion did this dominating position fall into German hands, but this did not prevent the German *communiqué* from announcing its capture by assault in the presence of the kaiser.

At 11 p.m. Pétain took command of the defences of Verdun. His first act was to telephone to Balfourier. The conversation, as he recalls it, was as follows:

Hallo! This is General Pétain. I am taking command. Will you tell your men? Hold firm. I have every confidence in you.

Very good, general. We'll hold on. You can count on us, just as we count on you.

So ended the first and most critical phase of the battle of Verdun.

Photos: Imperial War Museum

THE FIGHTING FIFTH

The Northumberland Fusiliers, known the world over as the Fighting Fifth, put into the field during the War a total of 52 battalions. They are here seen celebrating an advance near Albert in October, 1916, during the operations culminating in the capture of Le Sars

CLOWNS OUT OF KHAKI

The lure of the stage is well shown by this photograph of the concert party of the 51st Division, known as the "Balmorals," performing for the Black Watch at Bailleul aux Cornailles. These entertainments were an invaluable tonic to the spirit of the troops



Battle front of the region of Verdun before the German offensive of 1916

CHAPTER 58

VERDUN DEFENDED

As here described, the German attempt to capture Verdun did not succeed, but it was continued with remarkable pertinacity, only to be met, however, by a defence as glorious and determined as any in the military history of France

ON February 26 General Pétain officially took over the command of all troops in the fortified region of Verdun, and established his headquarters at Souilly. He found himself faced with the twofold problem of defence and supply, but fortunately he possessed a genius for organization. With regard to the first problem, he immediately drew up a "position of resistance" to be defended at all costs, and divided his army into four groups to cover this line in the following manner: On the left bank of the river, Bazelaire's group (two divisions and two brigades) from Avocourt to the Meuse; on the right bank, Guillaumat's group (2 divisions) from the Meuse to Douaumont village; Balfourier's group (3 divisions and 3 brigades) from Douaumont to Eix; and Duchêne's group (4 divisions and 2 brigades) from Eix to Paroches.

He then issued his first operations order, which ran thus:

> The mission of the 2nd army is to check at any price the enemy's effort on the Verdun front. Every strip of ground won by the enemy must give rise to an immediate counter-attack

The 51st, 72nd and 37th divisions, which had held up the German advance, were placed in reserve, and the 1st, 13th and 21st army were on their way up to the battle front. At the same time Joffre dispatched to Verdun the 33rd corps from the northern army group.

With the arrival of Pétain order grew out of chaos. He reorganized everything: the services of the narrow-gauge railway, the forts, the air services, the water supply, depôts, hospitals and billets. He buttressed the haphazard line which constituted the French first position by successive intermediate positions, and trebled the number of guns. A factor of vital importance, especially as regards supply, was the maintenance in good repair of the road from Bar-le-Duc to Verdun. The alternation of frosts and thaws, coupled with the exceptionally heavy traffic, was working havoc with the surface. Pétain's first question on the evening of the 25th was: "Will the road hold?" The commander of the engineers responsible for its upkeep asked for 24 hours in which to give his reply. On the night of February 26 his answer was: "The road will hold." "Good!" replied Pétain; "otherwise I should have given orders to evacuate the right bank." Henceforward, day and night, as many as 6,000 lorries passed along the "Sacred Way" every 24 hours.

From February 26 to March 5 there was a period of relative calm, during which the Germans moved forward their artillery over the crater-studded ground. This respite enabled Pétain's troops to establish themselves solidly in their new positions before the German offensive was renewed. On March 1 and 2 the groups of Guillaumat and Balfourier were called upon to repulse a fierce assault on the sector between the Côte du Poivre and the village of Douaumont. The line held, but this resistance on one fixed line of defence was compared by Pétain to a prodigy of equilibrium on a tight-rope. Fearing his front might be pierced at any moment, he hastened on the construction of a second position from Avocourt through Fort Marre, north-east of Verdun down to the Fort du Rozellier. The forts were now re-garrisoned and a commander appointed to each.

The Germans had experienced a bitter deception. In spite of their advance during the first few days, the thunderbolt attack had not led to the anticipated result, namely, the rupture of the French line and the capture of Verdun. For a moment Falkenhayn considered the possibility of renewing the offensive elsewhere, but after consideration he decided to continue it at Verdun.

The position of the German troops on the banks of the Meuse now made the crown prince's original plan of a

CHARIOTS OF ASSAULT

The French, who started their investigations into the possibility of the tank independently of, but later than, the British, called their machines "chars d'assaut." Specializing in light and medium weight tanks, they used them first in Nivelle's ill conceived and disastrous spring offensive of 1917

combined attack on both banks of the river essential. The French line on the left bank ended at Forges. The German advance on the opposite bank had brought their line on the right bank to Vacherauville, four miles farther south. Thus the German troops on the latter bank were exposed to reverse and enfilade fire from Bazelaire's batteries on the Mort Homme and Hill 304, from which it was imperative to rescue them.

In order, therefore, to prepare the way for a further advance upon Verdun, it became necessary for the Germans to flatten out the dangerous French salient on the left bank by taking Mort Homme and the contiguous positions. This salient was, indeed, particularly vulnerable, since it could be shelled from three sides. Pétain knew this, and from the date of his arrival at Verdun, his first daily question to Bazelaire was: "Are you being attacked?"—"Not yet."—"Then we shall pull through. They don't know their job."

But on March 6 the offensive recommenced, with a repetition of the same merciless bombardment of the French position as on February 21, only this time the effort was concentrated between Béthincourt and the Meuse. Now, however, the region of Verdun had 22½ divisions at its disposal, 9 of which held the first line between the Meuse and Les Eparges. By nine o'clock in the morning the Bois des Corbeaux, Forges and the trenches in the vicinity were flattened out. Shortly after 10 a.m. the German infantry advanced and captured Forges. Bazelaire, in view of this speedy conquest and alarmed at its revelation of weakness, issued the following order:

Forges did not offer the resistance one has a right to expect. Until further light is thrown on the matter, I must conclude that the commander of this sector has not done his duty. He will, therefore, be tried by court-martial. Resistance must be carried out to the extreme limit. We must be animated by one single resolution—triumphantly to stop the enemy or die. Artillery and machine-guns will open fire on any troops who retreat.

The enemy's advance was greatly facilitated by falling snow, which hindered local commanders from observing the progress of the battle. Nevertheless, the French resistance stiffened around the Côte de l'Oie and Hill 265, until the Germans were forced to devote a whole division to the attack on the latter spot. The village of Regnéville fell during the afternoon, and Pétain advised Bazelaire not to attempt to recapture either of the lost villages, but to hold a line from Béthincourt to Cumières. By nightfall the French still held Béthincourt, the Bois des Corbeaux and the Côte de l'Oie.

At 7.0 a.m. on March 7 the German bombardment again intensified. Shortly after 11 o'clock Cumières and the Bois des Corbeaux were attacked, the village changing hands several times during the course of the day, while a similar duel took place for possession of the wood. Debouching from the ravines between Forges and Béthincourt, the Germans sought, by passing over the western slopes of the Côte de l'Oie, to penetrate from the east into the Bois des Corbeaux and the Bois de Cumières, from whence they could launch a flanking attack upon the Mort Homme. During the afternoon they captured these woods, but could not issue from them. Simultaneously a local attack by the German troops in the Woëvre resulted in the capture of Fresnes.

The next morning two battalions of the French 92nd regiment, under

Photo: G.P.A.

SHORT AND SAFE CUT

Well over six feet in depth, this communication trench provides most necessary shelter for troops going up to the front line. These trenches, cut straight wherever possible, provided the safest means of communication between the various lines of defence

WELL WIRED IN

Both French and Germans—though not British—put wire over the top of trenches to guard against the danger of sudden raids. This precaution was taken mainly in advanced posts, but sometimes support and communication trenches were similarly protected

Photo: Central Press

HEAVILY LADEN

The toil of a march up to the front line was made more wearisome by the equipment carried. These French troops on a foreign front, almost bowed down by the combined weight of overcoat, rifle and equipment, may well be envious of the adjacent group of cavalrymen

ENTER THE FRENCH TANK

The knowledge that in this tank they have a novel and powerful support cheers these French troops holding a support line. This model, with its comparatively small caterpillar undercarriage, stands midway between an armoured car and the British heavy tank

Photo: Keystone

Lt.-Colonel Macker, counter-attacked. The colonel wished to make himself spruce for the fray. In the absence of water he shaved himself in the dregs of a bottle of wine. Shaven and smiling, inspiring confidence in all around him, he calmly lit a cigar, then, raising his cane, gave the signal to start, himself marching between the first and second waves. By half-past nine the French were again in possession of the Bois des Corbeaux, and during the whole of the following day withstood frontal and flank attacks, shelled from the north and taken in reverse by the German artillery on the right bank.

On March 10 the 92nd regiment was overcome by a large enemy force and driven out of the woods, the colonel being killed; but again the Germans could make no further headway against the Mort Homme. Now the German offensive was resumed on the right bank, with the object of capturing the Fort de Vaux, and Pétain was obliged to reinforce Maistre with two divisions from reserve. On March 9 regiments of the 3rd Brandenburg corps launched a violent attack against both the village and the fort, gaining a foothold in the east of the village. They attempted to storm the fort by the northern slopes, but were checked and dispersed by fire from the French trenches a few hundred yards in front of the stronghold. That night the German *communiqué*, owing to the misunderstanding of a telephoned report, announced that the armoured fort of Vaux had been captured in a brilliant attack by the 6th and 19th Posen regiments. They anticipated the event by no less than three months, but, as Captain Liddell Hart says:

The cream of the jest was that both the divisional commander who made the report, and the officer who had *not* taken the fort, received from the Kaiser the highest Prussian order, *Pour le Mérite!* A bad telephone is not without compensations.

The news thus imprudently published, the Germans were forced to make a further effort to substantiate it, and during the two following days fresh batches of men were vainly hurled against the defences of the fort. On March 10 the commander-in-chief himself visited Verdun and issued the celebrated army order which read:

Soldiers of the army of Verdun! For three weeks you have experienced the mightiest assault the enemy has hitherto launched against us. Germany counted upon the success of this effort, which she believed to be irresistible, and to which she devoted her finest soldiers and her most powerful guns. She hoped that the capture of Verdun would revive the courage of her allies and convince neutral countries of German superiority. She reckoned without you! Night and day, in spite of a bombardment without precedent, you have resisted all her attacks and held your positions.

The struggle is not yet over, for the Germans need a victory. You will know how to wrest it from them. We have munitions in abundance and numerous reserves. But, above all, you have your indomitable courage and your faith in the destinies of the Republic. The eyes of the country are upon you. You will be those of whom it shall be said: "They barred for Germany the road to Verdun!"

Had the attack on Vaux succeeded, the French position at Douaumont could have been turned.

During the next few days attention was focused once more upon the left bank of the Meuse, where, between

Photo: Keystone

THIS ONCE WAS REIMS

Reims, one of the most famous of French cities, suffered tragically from the effects of German bombardment during the war. The magnificent Gothic cathedral was severely damaged (see page 34), and the archiepiscopal palace and the town hall were destroyed. The Germans were never able to capture the city

Photo: Harlinque

MARSHAL OF FRANCE

Marshal Fayolle commanded the French 6th and 1st armies during the battles of the Somme. Later he commanded the French troops in Italy. He was made a marshal of France in 1921

March 10 and 15, a furious struggle took place around the Mort Homme, a long denuded crescent-shaped plateau on which the French still maintained a desperate defence. After four days of repeated and fruitless attacks the Germans, on March 14, assaulted the position with some 25,000 men. The attack was magnificently received by Debeney's 25th division, which had just taken over the sector, in spite of an avalanche of gas and lachrymatory shell. After prolonged fighting the Germans dislodged their opponents from spur 265 at the north-west edge of the plateau, but the French still clung to Hill 295 and the remainder of the ridge. Then followed a confused struggle for possession of the plateau, during which three German *communiqués* announced the conquest of the Mort Homme.

Finding it impossible to capture the position by frontal attack, the German commander tried to turn it from the west, and on March 20 launched a fresh assault from the Bois de Malancourt. The preliminary bombardment opened at 7.0 a.m., and fire was kept up on the French line between Avocourt and Hill 304 until about three o'clock in the afternoon. The attack was carried out by the 11th Bavarian division, who fought magnificently, and in a few hours captured the Bois d'Avocourt and the Avocourt redoubt, taking over 2,500 prisoners. The Bavarians after their exploits under Mackensen in Galicia, had upon their first appearance in the Verdun sector won the first unqualified German success on the left bank.

Bazelaire's left wing was thus taken in flank and the positions of Hill 304 and the Mort Homme menaced. On March 29 the Avocourt redoubt was recaptured, but on the following day Malancourt fell, and soon afterwards Haucourt passed into German hands. The situation was serious. Pétain's own account is worth quoting. He says, in his book *La Bataille de Verdun :*

> The situation remained extremely precarious, during the second fortnight of March and the beginning of April, on the whole of the sector on both banks between Avocourt to the west and Vaux to the east. Pushing forward his 20 shock divisions, now simultaneously, now successively, the enemy commander strove to open a gateway in our lines to bring matters to an end. To do this, the crown prince disposed of two attacking groups which he never ceased to use vigorously: on the west General von Gallwitz, and, on the east General von Mudra. Why this utilization on the eastern wing of a general who had always advocated the western attack, and who knew, better than anyone else, the advantages of the front between the Meuse and the Argonne? I have often wondered . . . Normally, General von Mudra should have remained on the left bank so as to profit by his extensive knowledge of the ground. There he would certainly have made the most of our failure at the Bois de Malancourt on March 20, and possibly would have succeeded in compromising seriously our resistance on Hill 304.

In view of the situation on the left bank Pétain adopted the only sound move. On March 31 he withdrew his line south of Béthincourt along the stream called Forges Brook and on the lower slopes of Hill 304. On the same day the battle broke out again around Vaux, and the village fell into the hands of the Germans. During the two following days the enemy sought to make the most of this local success by penetrating up the ravine north of Vaux and into the Bois de la Caillette, from which position they menaced Fort de Vaux and Douaumont village.

It was important to stop this infiltration before any encircling movement of these positions could be successfully accomplished, and on the morning of April 3 Mangin's 5th division counter-attacked, recovering the greater part of the Bois de la Caillette. By April 5 the Germans had been driven back to Vaux and their manoeuvre frustrated. Now the focal point of the enemy offensive is again transferred to the left bank, for the German attacks were made in alternating phases from left to right flank, for which reason the French call the combats of March and April "the battle of the wings." At the beginning of April the crown prince's army had been increased to 25 divisions with a view to a fresh attack, and by April 8 a vast mass of men, together with hundreds of guns, was concentrated on the left bank of the Meuse between the village of Béthincourt and the Bois de Cumières.

Pétain's report of his withdrawal behind Forges brook was viewed with disapproval at French headquarters, and the general was ordered to attack and restore the original line as quickly as possible. He replied :

> The situation on the left bank is not bad. I hope to bring about a complete stoppage of the enemy advance, but choice of position is a factor of great importance. I therefore ask for your complete confidence in me, and that you will not allow yourselves to be unfavourably influenced by occasional small and premeditated withdrawals.

Joffre decided to see for himself what was happening and hurried to Souilly.

Before he arrived the Germans had opened their new attack upon Mort Homme. For some time the situation there had been confused by local infiltrations and the rapid alternation of attack and counter-attack. The eminence was a dominating observation point. Eastward it overlooked all the German positions in the Douaumont sector, and northward it kept watch over all the woods occupied by the Germans from Forges to Cuisy. It was the eastward outlook which made the Mort Homme an objective of the highest importance to the Germans, for they could not make a frontal attack upon Verdun or recover fully the power of making mass attacks on the Douaumont positions until they had captured this plateau and thrown back the French batteries that enfiladed from across the Meuse every German advance on the Côte du Poivre–Douaumont line.

On April 9 regiment upon regiment took part in the great battle for the Mort Homme, and the Germans made a colossal attack upon a frontage running from Haucourt to Cumières. At the same time they launched a flanking assault from Avocourt and made a demonstration on the right bank from the river to Haudremont Farm to draw off some of the French fire.

The infantry attack was launched at noon on a beautiful Sunday morning of real spring weather. As the Mort Homme, under the deluge of shells, smoked like a volcano with innumerable craters, some 40,000 Germans emerged from the woods at Béthincourt and Malancourt and stormed up the long western slopes of Hill 304.

But the wonderful French "75," used like a machine-gun by Pétain's soldiers, broke every German column within 100 yards of the trenches. Then, as the grey flood ebbed from the western slopes of Hill 304, a stronger German attack was launched against Mort Homme on the eastern side of the nine-mile front. Here the Germans had only 700 yards of ground to take in order to reach the high northern boss which the French used as an observation post. Another huge body of German troops charged from the woods in dense columns, but the French turned hundreds of guns upon the grey masses, smashed them up completely, following them into Bois de Corbeaux and Bois de Cumières until the entire force was routed.

Throughout the day attack after attack was hurled upon various points, during which the Germans won a few hundred yards of advanced trench. Those few yards of trench were all that the German commander had bought with some thousands of lives.

When Joffre arrived at Souilly he was shown Pétain's army order, which was read to the troops the next day. It ran as follows :

> April 9 is a glorious day for our arms. The furious assaults of the crown prince's troops have everywhere been broken: infantry, gunners, sappers and airmen of the 2nd army have rivalled each other in heroism. Honour to you all! The Germans

A VERY GALLANT KING

No sovereign has borne misfortune with greater dignity than Albert, King of the Belgians, who was killed while mountaineering, February 17, 1934. Oates, the explorer, has been called in his epitaph "a very gallant gentleman"; of Albert it may be said that he was "a very gallant king"

ALBUERA TO ALBERT

At the battle of Albuera, on May 16, 1811, the men of the Middlesex Regiment, answering the appeal of their colonel to "die hard," lost 423 men out of 575. Known since then as the "Die Hards," they showed the same spirit more than once in the Great War. One platoon is here seen returning from the trenches near Albert



CITY OF CROWNS

For some centuries the kings of France were crowned in the cathedral at Reims, one of the most glorious examples of Gothic architecture in the world. As shown in this photograph, much of the city, with the cathedral in its midst, was seriously damaged by artillery. The towers, the cathedral's chief glory, have been destroyed

will, without a doubt, attack again. Let each one watch and labour to attain the same success as yesterday.

The order ended with the now famous words: *Courage, on les aura !*

For several days the battle raged, but it was quite clear that the enemy had failed, for Pétain's powers of resistance had been tested almost to breaking point, but it was the Germans who were broken. The violent onslaught of April 9 marked the culminating point of the German effort. After 50 days of furious fighting they were no nearer to Verdun than they had been at the end of the fifth day of battle. The period of high tide was at an end.

During the rest of the month of April constant attacks were made, but they were purely local offensives and executed without any general strategical plan. At the end of the month Pétain was appointed to succeed de Langle de Cary as commander of the central army group, the command of the 2nd army being given to Nivelle, who, like his predecessor, was a colonel at the outbreak of the war. In his farewell Pétain could truthfully say:

One of the greatest battles in the annals of history has for more than two months been waged around Verdun. Thanks to you all, leaders and soldiers, thanks to the devotion and abnegation of men of all branches of the service, a tremendous blow has been struck against the military prestige of Germany.

Unsuccessful in their attempts upon the Mort Homme, the Germans sought to capture Hill 304, and on May 4 a battle began which lasted for five days. Every section of trenches they won was recaptured by French counter-attacks. Fighting then became desultory until the 17th, when the battle broke out again to the west of the Mort Homme. The struggle was desperate, and before long the Bois Camard and the ravine of La Hayette were blocked by corpses. On May 21 the Germans captured Cumières and reached the summit of the Mort Homme, occupying the French front-line position on a frontage of a little over a thousand yards.

Once again we must turn our attention eastward. Upon assuming command of the central army group, Pétain had received instructions to arrange for the recapture of Douaumont Fort. Therefore, while the French still maintained their attitude of rigid defence west of the Meuse, Nivelle, on the other side, took the offensive. Towards the end of April, as the result of a series of local actions, the Germans had thrust a salient into the French line west of Douaumont, from which they threatened the French positions at Thiaumont Farm, on the one side, and in the quarries and Bois d'Haudromont, on the other. Nivelle, therefore, prepared to reduce this salient and, if possible, to carry by assault the ridge and fort of Douaumont. Its execution was entrusted to the 5th division under Mangin.

The attack opened on May 22 after an intensive artillery preparation, during which the French hurled 1,000 tons of explosives a day for a week upon 150 acres of ground. The 129th regiment was directed to assault the fort itself, while the 36th and 74th regiments were to cover its advance by clearing the German positions in the ravines to the right and left of the hill. At 11.50 a.m. the infantry advanced, and within ten minutes the 129th regiment had captured three lines of trenches and penetrated by a breach into the south-west angle of the fort. In less than half an hour three-quarters of the superstructure was in French hands, and by one o'clock it seemed that they would soon obtain complete mastery of the fort.

Unfortunately the wings were held up and left the attackers on the fort "in the air." Nevertheless, the 129th held on all day, fighting desperately in the moats and passages, and, when relieved next morning had not yielded an inch of the ground won. Meanwhile the Germans had brought up two new Bavarian divisions, and on the 24th the fort was retaken by a counter-attack.

Simultaneously with this operation fighting still continued around Mort Homme. After the capture of the summit on May 21, the Germans drove a small salient into the French line between it and the ravine of La Hayette. On the 29th, with the help of five fresh divisions, they captured the French trenches in the Ravin des Caurettes, and by the end of the following day had pushed the French back as far as Chattancourt. The enemy now had certain appreciable advantages both in observation and artillery position, but the French line still remained unbroken.

The German offensive was destined to end where it had begun, on the right bank. Despairing of breaking through the French position on the west of the Meuse, the German command again turned its attention eastward, towards Vaux, which, since the loss of Douaumont, had become the key of the French defence north-east of Verdun, covering the glen of Vaux and the approaches to the great fort of Souville.

From Vaux a great ravine ran from east to west as far as the village of Fleury, providing cover for a large attacking force. On the north of the ravine was the Bois de la Caillette, which the French had captured on March 31 and lost on April 2. South of the ravine lay the Bois de Chapitre. It was only four miles from Vaux Fort to Verdun, and owing to the long ravine a considerable part of the distance was sheltered from direct fire.

East of Douaumont Fort the Germans had possessed for months, in Hardaumont Wood, an excellent means of approaching to the ravine, for a number of smaller ravines ran from the wood down into the long, deep gorge. But the French were so firmly established from the south-east of Douaumont to the Vaux gorge that the area of attack was practically reduced to the mouth of the ravine.

The German assault, after a long and violent bombardment, was made on June 1, and opened brilliantly. In a short time the enemy were in possession of the Hardaumont salient, which secured their position on the ridge of Douaumont and gave them excellent observation. Then across the slopes of Douaumont ridge they penetrated into the gorge of Bazil, turned south along the Ravin des Fontaines and overwhelmed the French positions in the Bois Fumin, a few hundred yards west of the fort. For a while they found themselves halted by the strong points R2 and R3 on the western edge of Bois Fumin, but these positions fell when all the defenders were either killed or wounded. The next day the attack continued between Vaux pond on the left and the village of Damloup on the right until the fort itself was isolated. Henry Bordeaux, in his celebrated story *Les derniers jours du Fort de Vaux*, describes the spectacle of the trenches as related to him by Captain Delvert.

Everywhere the stones are veined with trickles of scarlet. Here and there large pools of violet and viscous blood are slowly coagulating. On the parados of the trenches, in the brilliant sunshine, lie corpses stiffening in their blood-soaked garments. All around are masses of débris: empty "bully" tins, torn haversacks, splintered helmets, broken rifles, all bespattered with gouts of blood. A pestilential smell invades the air. On top of that the Boche sends over lachrymators which help further to render the atmosphere unbreathable. And the heavy sledge-hammer blows of the shells fall all the while about us.

The fort, under constant bombardment for a hundred days, was a chaos of crumbling masonry, cracks and fissures, its moats half-filled with the débris from its walls. In the deep cellars the little garrison of 250 men was commanded by Major Raynal, who, though twice badly wounded during the war and classed unfit for further active service, had demanded a post which, though not requiring great activity, would have its risks. From June 2 the numbers of the garrison were swollen by a continuous stream of wounded and of infantry hard pressed

Photo: 'Canadian Records'

SHELL HOLE SIESTA

This shell hole provides a resting-place for Canadian troops on their way up, affording shelter as well as support for weary backs. Whether a plane overhead is friend or foe occupies the attention of one of the men

by the enemy. Soon there were over 600 men crowded into the interior, a fact which, in view of the dwindling rations, added very considerably to the difficulties of the defence.

Bordeaux has told of the hourly progress of the fort's dying agonies; of the heroism with which, deprived of water, encumbered with wounded, cut off from the rest of the army and submerged by the enemy, who invaded the superstructure, for five days Raynal achieved the impossible. It was at dawn, on June 2, that the Germans gained their first footing in the exterior of the fort, after a fierce encounter which drove the small French force back into the inner precincts. At three o'clock in the morning a pigeon fluttered from the fort, bearer of the following message: "The enemy is all around us. We are still holding out."

The Germans made two breaches in the flanking casemates and tried to force a passage. Outside, the village of Damloup had fallen, and further grey masses swarmed up the slopes. In the afternoon a second pigeon was released. The message ran: "The enemy has seized the north-east and north-west casemates. I am battling in the corridors. Numerous refugees and wounded. Officers and men are doing their duty well."

Batches of Germans continued to climb the heights and poured over the fort. At 2.0 a.m. on June 3 Raynal communicated by lamp signalling as follows: "Situation unchanged. The enemy working above and around the structure. Bombard the fort with small-calibre shells." Already the water supply was running low, for the numbers within the fort greatly exceeded those provided for. Raynal feared, too, lest the sight and proximity of the wounded and dying might demoralize the garrison. At noon the next day a tired pigeon fluttered feebly back to its cot. Its message read: "We are still holding out, but are undergoing a very dangerous smoke and gas attack. We are in urgent need of liberation; see that we obtain optical communication with Souville, which does not reply to our signals. This is my last pigeon."

The liberation of the last pigeon and the failure of the system of visual signalling meant that Fort de Vaux was truly isolated from the world. For the rest of the day no further signal could be perceived from the fort. Meanwhile, inside that stronghold the drama is still played out, as this account by a survivor bears witness:

In the semi-obscurity of the fort the struggle went on. The atmosphere was close and infected. At every moment our barricades would be blown up and the struggle with bombs would continue. We wouldn't yield a foot. But the continual explosions made the air unbearably hot, and the smell made it almost unbreathable. Yet still we fought on. We had placed machine-guns at angles of the passages, and they did good work. It was then that the Germans, having managed to blow up a barrier, threw jets of liquid fire among us. The heat and the surprise caused a momentary hesitation. But Lieutenant Bazy, who was there with a machine-gun, jumped forward so rapidly that before we could recover from our surprise he was standing in the middle of the passage and, all alone, fighting the Boches with hand grenades. The flames licked his boots, and, being already wounded, his left arm was bandaged; but that didn't hinder him. Unable to speak on account of the thick and acrid smoke, he set us an example. Once recovered from our stupor, we placed ourselves at his side . . . . The Germans discharged gas, and the heavy clouds lay stagnant in the corridors. In spite of all their diabolic inventions they could not advance. It was superb! They shouted to us in French: "Surrender, or you will all be killed." We replied by throwing bombs in their faces.

In spite of the danger, the inmates of the fort were obliged to open the armour-plated windows of the central court to breathe a little fresh air. Luckily the machine-guns the Germans had placed on the fort had been destroyed that morning by French artillery fire. The stretcher-bearers profited by this to take the dead out into the southern moat and clear the

infirmary of its accumulated filth. The following night that task became impossible, and the dead must remain with the living to rot unburied. It became very difficult to give the wounded anything like adequate attention.

In the French lines volunteers offered to try and reach the fort. None succeeded, but during the night of June 4 two signallers from the fort managed to evade the German outposts and escape to the French lines to try and re-establish communications. At half-past seven Vaux could speak once more: "The enemy is working on the west of the fort at a mine with which to blow up the vault. Get on them quickly with your artillery," reads the first message. It was followed later by: "Do not hear your guns. Are attacked with gas and liquid flame. Are at the last extremity."

The water was rationed to a quarter of a litre for each man, even for the wounded tossing in their fever. The fort waited impatiently for that deliverance which never came. At nightfall another appeal for immediate help was signalled, and at the same time a young man, the *aspirant* Buffet, succeeded in leaving the fort unobserved and reaching the French lines to give the local commander details of the situation. In spite of the risks he had run he volunteered for the even more hazardous task of returning to the fort with instructions for Raynal. It was decided that, should he succeed, the fort's projector should end its next signal with the words *Vive la France!* At twenty minutes past eleven on the night of June 5 Fort de Vaux spoke again: "Intervene before complete exhaustion. *Vive la France.*" Souville replied: "Received your message. Courage."

Efforts to relieve the fort were unceasing, but though the Germans were held in place their position was so firmly consolidated that the French were powerless. Early on the morning of June 6 a partly undecipherable message is received: ". . . without having attained objectives. Enemy machine-guns above the fort. These should have been destroyed by shells."

The rest of the story cannot be better told than in the words of Bordeaux:

The Fort de Vaux, after the failure of the last attempt to deliver it, no longer knows how many hours or minutes it has to live. In a message which reads like a last will and testament, the commander cites the names of his valiant comrades in arms and renders homage to his men. At half-past six the signals transmit this message:

I have no more water, in spite of the careful rationing of the preceding days. I must be freed and receive water supplies immediately. I think I am at the end of my strength. My soldiers—men and officers alike—in every circumstance have done their duty to the end. (There follows a list of special mentions.) I hope you will again intervene energetically before we are completely exhausted. The chief's duty is fulfilled. He has forgotten only himself.

Then the fort is silent. During the whole of the 6th the watching signal posts record no further message. Is it dead, is it living? Is it captured, is it still free? Nobody knows. The anguish of uncertainty tortures and excites the whole army . . . Without delay a fresh offensive is set on foot. A regiment of Zouaves and a regiment of colonial infantry have arrived in the sector, and, as soon as a thorough preparation allows, will enter in line . . . And at half-past eight in the evening general headquarters sends to the army this telegram, to be transmitted by signal to the fort: *The commander-in-chief addresses to the commander of the Fort de Vaux, to the commander of the garrison and to their troops, the expression of his satisfaction for their magnificent defence against the repeated assaults of the enemy.*—JOFFRE.

Amid the flashes of guns and rockets, in the fracas of the tempest which shakes the hill, the message is sent. But the fort does not reply. A sheaf of red rockets can be seen above it. Is it dead, is it living? Is it captured, is it still free? At nine o'clock the voice of the commander-in-chief is heard again, dominating the hurricane of

Photos: 'Canadian Records'

'BEAUTIFUL SOUP'

Here soup is being supplied to Canadians just out of the line at a field kitchen in the battle area. Their smiles show that they echo the sentiments sung by the Mock Turtle in "Alice in Wonderland," "Soup of the evening, beautiful soup"

'I AM QUITE WELL'

The imminence of danger has little effect either on the equanimity of this Canadian letter writer or on the capacity of his companions to sleep in uncomfortable positions. The scene is a front-line trench during a period of "all quiet"

Photo: Keystone

'ALL THEIR WEARY MARCHES DONE'

American troops, mingled with French battalions, first came under fire near Nancy in October, 1917. Here are seen two of the first Americans to make the sacrifice and suffer the common fate of over 10 millions of many nationalities

steel and fire: *The commandant Raynal is made commander of the Legion of Honour.* Everything possible must be done to transmit this order. Such is the wish of the commander-in-chief. In vain Vaux is called by reiterated signals: Vaux replies no more. Then, suddenly, at daybreak on the 7th, at ten minutes to four in the morning, Vaux, re-awakened, appeals. The signal posts can seize but three words: *Don't abandon us.* "Don't abandon us"—the last gesture of the moribund who clings to the beloved's hand. And then no more. The Fort de Vaux will not speak again

Raynal was received by the crown prince and allowed to retain his sword. Fort de Vaux, captive, had to await until, in November, it should return in glory to the French lines.

Masters of the fort, the Germans endeavoured to thrust forward, and the situation remained grave for the French. Preparations for the Somme offensive were under way and it was imperative that the French troops should hang on until then. The Germans also knew that their time was growing short and they made a final stupendous effort. The fighting spread to the Bois de Nawé; the Ravin de la Dame was lost, Thiaumont fell, and the grey masses drew ever nearer to Verdun. June 23 was a day of crisis. In a last supreme effort the Germans launched regiment after regiment upon the French positions between Damloup and the Bois de Nawé. The storm troops advanced in dense masses, while behind them the supports packed the ravines. Once they gained a foothold on the Froideterre plateau Verdun would become untenable, with all the bridges of the Meuse under direct observation. They broke through the French defences near Souville, but were shot down.

For another 19 days this terrible struggle went on, but the resistance was epic in its grandeur. The German advance could be measured only in yards. Their casualties were enormous, and with sardonic humour a French officer remarked: "The cost of ground around Verdun is rising." On July 11 the last wave broke upon the French defence before the turning of the tide. On that day the German infantry made an assault on a large scale, closing upon Damloup Hill, Fumin and Le Chenois Woods, Vaux, Chapitre Wood, Fleury village and the coveted ground south of Thiaumont.

Nivelle and Mangin had no reason to expose their men to great wastage. They gave ground at last at Damloup, as this position was exposed to flanking fires. It had been held while the shattered wood behind it, Laufée Wood, was strongly entrenched and linked more firmly with the three wooded heights running north-westward and known as Le Chenois Wood, Fumin Wood and Chapitre Wood. These four woods, seamed with trenches, dotted with redoubts and lined with deep communicating ways, formed the real defences of the two old forts, Souville and Tavennes, rising immediately behind them. The enemy was badly defeated in all the woodland battles, and though he got a footing in Chenois and Fumin Woods, the French returned in the night and recovered most of the ground.

After the vain grand attack of July 11 the chief of staff to the crown prince concentrated two fresh divisions for a different attack. He tried a knife-like drive along a very narrow front, at the village of Fleury, directly against Souville Fort. But on July 12 the French light field-guns and machine-guns broke the funnels of fresh troops that came up the slopes to the fort. The inclines were held impregnably, and at the close of the day all that the Germans gained was a little ground at the cross-roads between Vaux and Fleury and round the broken ruins of Sainte Fine Chapel.

This great but fruitless effort exhausted the forces under the crown prince. Before his chief of staff could arrange another operation the British army broke the second German line on the Bazentin ridge and compelled Falkenhayn to collect men and guns from Verdun and pour all available shell towards the Somme. The pressure on Verdun was relieved, and the famous French boast, *Ils ne passeront pas,* had been vindicated.

EVERYDAY OCCURRENCE

The dash across No Man's Land has ended fatally for these two French soldiers. In front of the barbed wire defending the German front line, with their objective only a few yards off, they have been mown down by machine-gun bullets

COMMON-ROOM OF DEATH

Behind a newly won German line a grim scene is being enacted. A communal grave is being dug, casualties having been too severe and time being too precious to admit of separate graves for each man Some of the bodies are being searched for identification

Photo: G.P.A

CHAPTER 59

RUSSIA STILL RESOLUTE

In spite of heavy reverses, already recorded, Russia made renewed efforts against the common enemy in the winter of 1915-16. These efforts, however, were more costly than successful

IT was not without plausible reason that Falkenhayn, towards the end of 1915, dismissed Russia from his immediate concerns. Germany had during that year inflicted on her a series of blows before which her armies had reeled back in defeat and slaughter. Along the whole length of the vast line running from the Baltic to Rumania his success had been uniform ; German soil had been liberated, an Austria in despair had been revivified, and only a small corner of her territory remained in Russian hands. All Russian Poland, with its chain of fortresses, had passed into the hands of the Germans.

Signs of acute demoralization in Russia's armies had multiplied steadily, and the shortage of guns, rifles and ammunition from which she had suffered appeared, if anything, to have grown worse. If her line still held, if, in spite of everything she had endured, the territory she had yielded, the prisoners she had lost, the fearful carnage her armies had suffered, she was still able to present an unbroken front to her enemies, that fact was as much an accident of geography as an indication of her strength. She had not, it could be admitted, been utterly smashed, but she had been beaten to her knees and could be disregarded as a serious military factor.

Nor was the evidence on which Falkenhayn based his conclusions one whit exaggerated. Rather did it fail to disclose the full tragedy of Russia's position. Desperate indeed as her case appeared to outward showing, its appearance was better than its reality. The clumsy machinery of her autocratic government, too long controlled by the worthless creatures of a corrupt court, was scarcely able to organize the energies of that vast and unwieldy empire in times of peace and had quite broken down under the enormous strain of war. Deeply planted seeds of revolution, growing with sickening speed in a soil fertilized by misery and disaster, were portents of a ruin which the blindness of the administration failed to recognize, and which its incompetence did nothing to avert. Chicanery, nepotism and inefficiency characterized all the highest offices and were faithfully copied in all governmental posts. Only in the ruthless and brutal suppression of every sign of discontent did her rulers show any ability or firmness.

In these circumstances, that Russia was able to continue even a show of resistance after nearly fifteen months of war was a source of considerable wonder to those of the Allied statesmen who saw clearly the realities of her position. It was common knowledge, however, that she was in desperate straits, and immense efforts had been made to help her By whatever route was open, munitions from the world's factories were being poured into her territories, French and British officers were busy training her levies, organizing her transport and marshalling her vast, if potential, resources. Whatever the influence and wealth of France and Britain could do to avert her imminent collapse was done. Too often, however, incompetence or corruption ruined the aid that was forthcoming, or stupid indifference refused it when offered. Official Russia was still a proud partner in the Allied cause and, refusing to be disciplined like a schoolboy, insisted with energy upon her status.

Nor had the assumption of supreme military authority by the tsar in the previous September done anything to improve the military situation. His action had been viewed by all classes with profound distrust and construed as a triumph for the pro-German faction at court. Continued reverses after he took over his duties had only further undermined his falling prestige, and his new chief of staff, General Alexeieff, possessed none of the qualities which would have given new life to the demoralized armies and peoples of Russia. A brilliant theoretical soldier and a conscientious and hard-working organizer, he was too little known and too taciturn to command from his subordinates the esteem and affection they had given the popular grand-duke, and his very attentiveness to small details imposed a strain upon his health from which his abilities and his equanimity rapidly suffered.

In spite of the help which she had received, Russia's recuperation was very slow. More than assistance, however, she

MIRACLE OF TRAINING

The horsemanship of the Cossacks was unexcelled in any theatre of the war. This photograph shows how they could train their horses to lie on their sides, shamming dead, and so provide cover for their masters in otherwise open country

Photos: G.P.A.

LINE BLOCKED

Following the collapse of organized resistance on the Russian front, the Germans had to cope with bands of pillaging irregulars This photograph shows German gunners blocking the railway line along which such troops may be approaching

required what only the enemy could give her, a breathing space. In this she was fortunate. The campaign against Serbia, Falkenhayn's growing preoccupation with the west, and Austrian plans for the overthrow of Italy, all combined at the end of 1915 to relieve the pressure on Russia's exhausted armies. The war on that vast 600 mile line turned from one of offence into one of position, and after the middle of November a strange quiet settled on the trenches, a quiet broken only by fitful raids and local skirmishes. For over a month the total casualties on both sides scarcely exceeded 200 a day, and in this interval of blessed rest the almost inexhaustible reservoirs of Russian man-power were filling the ranks of her broken armies, while her factories, speeded up to an undreamed-of activity, were pouring a steadily broadening stream of rifles, guns and munitions into the fighting line.

CONTENTED IN CAPTIVITY

Having suffered ill fortune in battle, three of these Russian prisoners try their luck at cards. For the most part badly officered and ill equipped, they frequently found better conditions in captivity than in their own front lines

Russia's old imperial armies had gone, swept away in the carnage of Tannenberg, the Masurian lakes and a hundred other fatal fields. In their places stood rank upon rank of peasants and workers, but now no longer flung unarmed and untrained to the German cannon. Their new officers were drawn from the professional, legal and educational classes, men better fitted to understand and therefore to command these new troops. Russia, battered, crippled, seething with discontent and rife with corruption, could still face the dawn of a new year with a spirit from which all hope was not departed, could still confront her enemies with serried masses whose strength and efficiency grew daily.

A conference of all the Allied powers was held early in December, 1915, when plans for the offensives to be set in train during the coming year were discussed and settled. The serious reverses which had been suffered on all fronts had done much to compel a unity of counsel, the lack of which had so gravely prejudiced Allied aspirations in the early part of the war, and it was decided that the spectacular but costly "side-shows" were to be abandoned in favour of a major offensive launched on the Central Powers from all sides and at the same moment. Britain, France, Italy and Russia were each to strike with all their might at

A NATIONAL HERO

Aged 67 and on the retired list in 1914, Hindenburg became during the war the idol of the German nation. Later, his deep sense of duty won him, as president of the Reich, universal esteem

prearranged times, and it was hoped that the advantage of interior lines which the enemy possessed might thereby be nullified.

Russia's share in this campaign was to be an immense drive in the northern section of her line against Dvinsk and Vilna, with the object of separating the German from the Austrian forces and pinning the former into an ever smaller area against the Baltic, while a supporting movement in the south was to hold the Austrians firmly in their positions. The date was fixed for the end of June, and preparations were set in hand.

But long before then events compelled Russia to activity. The imminent conquest of Montenegro by Austria threatened a further reverse to the Allied cause in the Balkans. A happening of small account in itself, it might, nevertheless, prove the feather which should tip the scales in the eyes of Rumania, and that vacillating country might at last decide to fight and throw in her lot with Germany. To distract Austrian attention from Montenegro, and to make a great parade of Allied power on Rumanian frontiers, Russia was implored to stage a demonstration attack in Bukowina. Russia complied, and Ivanoff prepared an offensive.

He had under his command Brusiloff's 8th, Shcherbacheff's 11th and Lechitski's 9th armies, comprising nearly 500,000 men, and his front extended from the Pripet marshes to the Bessarabian border. Opposed to him were the group of armies under Linsingen in the north, Böhm - Ermolli's group, Bothmer's southern army and Pflanzer-Baltin's 7th army, in all about 450,000 men.

But, although the battle which broke out on this front on December 23 extended almost over the whole line, it did not in fact assume serious proportions except in the far south round Czernowitz, where Shcherbacheff's and Lechitski's armies fought furiously for the Bukowinan capital. Ivanoff desired little more than a local success, and would have been well pleased with the capture of Czernowitz, an event which would undoubtedly have produced significant reactions in Rumania; but if his armies were able to drive in the south wing of Pflanzer-Baltin's army, and thus turn the whole of the Austro-Hungarian front, he was prepared to exploit his success. In the end not even his limited objective, Czernowitz, was won, and he was unable to secure a bridgehead over the Dniester.

The fighting began with a reconnaissance attack on the Austrian right wing, which was driven back with loss on December 23. The Austrian commander had received information of troop movements from his aircraft, and was well aware of the forthcoming storm. His defences had been carefully strengthened and his rested troops well organized. Reinforcements were already on their way, and although he was surprised by the weight and power of the Russian bombardment, which began on the 26th and continued uninterruptedly throughout the 27th, he had little cause to feel any anxiety about his position.

The mass attack followed on the 28th. Serried ranks of Russians hurled themselves with mad bravery on the Austrian lines at Toporowce, some few miles north-east of Czernowitz, and the most desperate hand-to-hand fighting followed. Ably supported by their powerful artillery, the Austrians held grimly to their lines, and time and again flung back their opponents with heavy losses. Gradually the fighting spread northwards as far as the Strypa river, and continued fiercely for several days. After a new hurricane bombardment on New Year's eve, the Russian infantry won a small reward for their valour. They got into the enemy trenches at Rarance and drove the defenders back nearly a quarter of a mile on a 1,000 yard front.

Lack of reserves prevented the Austrians from counter-attacking, but this success was all the Russians could win. The artillery duel blazed on for another two weeks, and periodically the Russian infantry renewed their assaults; all was in vain. The strongly held enemy line resisted all pressure, and as Ivanoff was in no position fruitlessly to waste either his munitions or his men, he was compelled to allow the battle to die down. By January 17 the short fierce struggle was over. It

Photo: G.P.A.

HEAT OF BATTLE

Austrian machine-gunners and riflemen are desperately defending a line amid the rocks and trees of the Isonzo front in the early autumn of 1917. A few weeks later it will be their turn, supported by their German allies, to drive the enemy before them

Photo: G.P.A

FLAMES HERALD AN ADVANCE

Flammenwerfer were used on the Italian as well as the Western front, as this photograph of Austrian troops advancing behind a curtain of flame and smoke on the Isonzo front depicts. There were eleven battles on the Isonzo before the Italian collapse at Caporetto

Photos: G.P.A.

THROUGH THEIR OWN GAS

Led by an officer, these German storm troopers come through their own cloud of phosgene gas Their unexpected appearance before the gas reaches the British lines gives them the advantage of surprise, even though the surprise effect of the gas is wasted

had involved no major issues, and had made no demands on any reserve troops on either side. Nearly 170,000 casualties and some 6,000 prisoners had been lost by the Russians, who had purchased thus dearly only a few yards of worthless ground. Austria had reason to be satisfied. The attack had not interfered with her short and victorious campaign against Montenegro, and could in no way have influenced Rumanian opinion towards the Allied cause. Her commanders were, if anything, only confirmed in their belief that Russia's fighting spirit and offensive power were both exhausted.

But this section of the front was to be the scene of one more drawn-out local struggle before it was suddenly to become the object of amazed attention for the whole world when, in June, Brusiloff's brilliant and surprise offensive burst across it. Russian movement was grievously hampered by the lack of a bridgehead over the Dniester, and Ocna and Uscieczko on that river had been the scene of bitter fighting in the New Year offensive ; but the Austrians had held stubbornly to their riverside positions. Fitful attempts were again made by the Russians on the bridgeheads during February and early March, but it was not until March 19 that a surprise attack, carried out with immense bravery, gave the Russians a hold on the south bank of the river at Uscieczko, from which position the Austrians were unable to drive them. This incident, small as it was, was not without consequence later in the year, for Brusiloff's offensive was materially assisted by the possession of this river crossing.

Meanwhile Russia sickened. Not all the vast piles of war material dumped by the Allies at Murmansk and Archangel, not all the toil and agony of thousands of war prisoners and Chinese coolies driving a railway southward to pour these stores on to the battlefields, not all credits granted by Britain and America, not all the repressions and the ceaseless vigil of secret police could cover her weaknesses. With her autocratic government, her inflexible bureaucracy and her almost feudal social structure, Russia was a pitiful anachronism in modern war.

POISON LINE

The first use of gas projectors by the Germans on the Western front occurred against the French early in December, 1917, over a year after the British Livens projector had made its appearance. The gas compound used in the bombs was phosgene and chloropicrin

IN HER WAR PAINT

The method of camouflage known as dazzle painting was widely employed by the navy during the war. This photograph shows H.M.S. Ramillies, a battleship which, completed in 1917, displaced 29,300 tons and carried 8 15-inch and 12 6-inch guns

SAFETY OF SCAPA

Units of the 4th battle squadron of the Grand Fleet are here seen at practice exercises in Scapa Flow. The anchorage there was so big that ordinary fleet exercises could be performed without incurring the dangers of mines and submarines in the open sea

Photo: Humphrey Joel

CHAPTER 60

ACTIVITY AT SEA

This chapter tells the story of the war at sea from the autumn of 1915 until Jutland. It deals with the activities of the German submarines and the measures taken to counter them

IN the late summer and autumn of 1915 the German submarines were continuing their work of destruction both in home waters and in the Mediterranean, and the task of curbing their activities placed a heavy strain on the naval forces of Great Britain. Craft of all kinds were used in this work, varying in size from the small, fast motor-launches, or M.L.'s as they were known, to the large scouting cruisers.

One of the most successful methods of destroying enemy submarines was by means of decoy or "Q" ships. These vessels were usually small merchantmen of the type used in coastal trading. They were specially fitted with concealed guns and, flying the flag of a neutral nation, cruised in areas where submarines were most active. As soon as the enemy submarine came to the surface with a view to examining the vessel, the crew took to the boats, leaving only the gunners on board. Then, when their quarry came within range, the neutral flag was struck, the white ensign was hoisted, and the guns that were already trained on their unsuspecting assailant began to fire.

One of the best known of the "Q" ships was the Baralong. She earned fame in connexion with the sinking of the submarine U 27 on August 19, 1915. On that day news reached the Baralong that the White Star liner Arabic had been torpedoed and sunk without warning about 50 miles south of old Kinsale Head. The Baralong, therefore, immediately steamed towards the scene of the disaster, and at about 3 p.m. a large vessel was sighted steering an erratic course. A few moments later a signal was received saying that she was the Nicosian, of the Leyland line, and that she was in danger from a swiftly pursuing submarine.

Another signal, received a few minutes after the first, informed the Baralong that the Nicosian had been captured and that there were two submarines. The Baralong at once went to her rescue, hoping that the submarine was the one which had destroyed the Arabic earlier in the day. Before the British vessel was able to get close to the Nicosian a submarine appeared and began to shell the latter ship as her crew were lowering the boats, but, seeing another vessel, the German altered his course so as to train his guns on the interrupter. Thereupon the Baralong's commander changed his direction and made for the Nicosian's boats, as if to effect a rescue. At this moment the submarine disappeared behind the Nicosian, and whilst out of sight the Baralong hoisted the white ensign and trained her guns on the spot at which the German was likely to reappear.

As soon as the submarine came round the Nicosian's bows the Baralong's guns fired. The enemy, totally surprised, was hit in many places and mortally damaged. Her crew jumped clear just as she turned over and slid below the surface. It was at this point that the episode which caused so much controversy began. As the Baralong was busy clearing the Nicosian's boats, several of the German survivors swam to the

SHELLED BY SISTER SHIP

Mock battles were staged by the Grand Fleet during gunnery practices. Battleships fired at each other from immense distances, eliminating risk by deliberately "throwing off" their sights to so many degrees ahead or astern of the target. This shell, fired from many miles away, bursts well astern the supposed enemy

Photo: Humphrey Joel



Nicosian and managed to scramble aboard. The Baralong's commander therefore, fearing that the Germans intended to scuttle the ship, which contained a cargo of mules and fodder, ordered his marines to shoot. Even so, a number of men managed to get aboard, and a search party of marines was immediately ordered to follow and round them up. At first no signs of them could be found, but after extensive searching the marines found them in the engine-room, where, believing them to be the men responsible for the sinking of the Arabic, they shot them dead. The Nicosian was then taken to Bristol.

The German government published a somewhat distorted version of the affair. The sum of the allegations was that the crew of the Baralong murdered the men of the submarine as they were struggling in the water, and in a series of notes sent to the American ambassadors in London and Berlin the German government demanded that the British government should try the officers and crew of the Baralong for murder.

In reply Sir Edward Grey offered to submit the case to the arbitration of a board of American naval officers if Germany would, at the same time, agree to the investigation of three atrocities committed within 48 hours of the Baralong incident. These were (1) the torpedoing of the Arabic without notice, whereby 47 non-combatants were drowned; (2) the attack made by a German destroyer on the helpless crew of the British submarine E 13, stranded in Danish waters as related in a previous chapter (45); (3) the firing of a German submarine on the unresisting crew of the steamer Ruel, after the men had taken to the boats. Germany, however, refused to entertain the British proposal.

About this time the First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. A. J. Balfour, wrote his famous letter concerning the U-boat campaign. The concluding paragraphs are as follows:

It is true that by this method of warfare many inoffensive persons, women and children as well as men, neutrals as well as belligerents, have been robbed and killed. But it is not only the innocent who have suffered. The criminals also have paid heavy toll. Some have been rescued and are prisoners of war. But from the very nature of submarines it must often happen that they drag their crews with them to destruction, and those who send them forth on their unhonoured mission wait for their return in vain. Herein lies the explanation of the amazing change which has come over the diplomatic attitude of Germany towards the United States. Men ask themselves why the sinking of the Lusitania, with the loss of over 1,100 men, women and children, was welcomed throughout Germany with a shout of triumph, while the sinking of the Arabic was accepted in melancholy silence.

Is it because in the intervening months the United States have become stronger or Germany weaker? Is it because the attitude of the President has varied? Is it because the arguments of the Secretary of State have become more persuasive? Is it because German opinion has at last revolted against lawless cruelty?

On September 23 the Baralong encountered and sank the German submarine U 41, this being the last encounter in the south-west area for quite a considerable period. The diminution of German activities, however, was not

Photos: G.P.A.

DISASTER AT SEA

Merchant vessels of all nations were exposed to constant danger, especially in the narrow seas, from mines and torpedoes. Here a ship has struck a floating mine, and within a few moments will have sunk, alone in the open sea

SUNK BUT SAVED

The task of this German submarine has been achieved, its victim, a merchant vessel, having been sunk by a torpedo. Boats are bringing alongside the crew of the doomed ship, rescued from death by drowning but destined for an irksome captivity

LAST BOAT LEAVING

This photograph shows the last moments of the French liner, Sontay, sunk in the Mediterranean on April 16, 1917. Fire has broken out on the lower deck after the impact of a torpedo, and the last members of the crew are clambering over the sides. Their further adventures are shown in the two succeeding photographs.

entirely due, as many thought, to the watchfulness of the British patrols. It was due in part, first, to the transference of submarine activity to the Mediterranean, and, secondly, to the attitude of the United States after the sinking of the Arabic, in which American lives had been lost.

In spite of the slackening of German activities in home waters, there was no relaxation of vigilance; rather the reverse. At both ends of the North Sea the British patrols maintained their ceaseless watch. In the north the 10th cruiser squadron of 24 armed merchant ships under Rear-Admiral D. R. S. de Chair, and in the south the Dover patrol under Commodore Tyrwhitt, never relaxed their hold. At the same time submarines operated in the Bight of Heligoland, and on December 22 E 16 sank a German ship between the rivers Ems and Weser. In October a new minefield was laid down by the British off the mouth of the former river, and similar steps were taken in other places.

Outside the North Sea, however, the patrols were not quite so successful. The losses appear to have been heaviest in the Mediterranean, where the Germans were using a new and smaller type of submarine. These were sent overland in sections to a port on the Adriatic, where they were put together and sent out to do their deadly work.

On September 14, 1915, occurred the first loss of a British transport in the War, when the Royal Edward was torpedoed in the Aegean Sea with the loss of over 800 lives, most of the 500 drowned soldiers being drafts for the 29th division. Only a few days before the Southland, carrying the same number of Australian soldiers, had been torpedoed, but she managed to reach Mudros with the loss of 40 lives. Five days after the Royal Edward was sunk, a German submarine, operating to the south of Greece, caught another British transport, the Ramazan, and sank her by gun fire, causing the loss of 300 men. Another transport, the Marquette, carrying Indian troops and a number of nurses, was torpedoed in the Gulf of Salonika by the U35 on October 23, when 100 lives were lost.

On November 5 the same vessel attacked the steamer Tara in the Gulf of Sollum and sank her, 35 of her men being killed. The survivors were handed over to the Senussi. The troopship Mercian was shelled by a U-boat on November 10, and 103 men were killed or injured, but the ship was not sunk. A French steamer, the Indien, was also torpedoed and sunk by a U-boat in the Aegean Sea on September 8. In the same waters the Provincia was destroyed on October 3, and a French transport, the Calvados, was torpedoed and sunk off Algiers on November 4, 1915.

The Italian passenger liner Ancona, proceeding from Naples to New York, took on board passengers and cargo at Messina. The passengers were mainly Greeks and Italians going to the United States to settle there, the majority being women and children. At one o'clock in the afternoon of Sunday, November 7, 1915, as the liner was steaming between Sardinia and Tunis, a submarine appeared and fired a shot across the bows. It was a live shell, and, without observing any of the formalities accompanying the right of search, the submarine, while gaining rapidly on the steamer, continued to shell the Ancona when she had stopped. A torpedo followed and sank the liner in seven minutes, more than



SWIMMING FOR THEIR LIVES

The Sontay, seen on the opposite page before she sank, has now disappeared. This photograph shows the approach of a rescuing French gunboat. In the surge those who could not find room in the boats swam desperately for their lives

HELPING HAND

Many of those who were compelled to swim from the torpedoed Sontay were rescued. It was fortunate that, though the disaster occurred 100 miles from land, help should have been so near. Here the gunboat's crew are helping the survivors on board

Photos: Imperial War Museum

EAST MEETS WEST

Sir Douglas Haig, as commander-in-chief of the British armies in France, is seen introducing Lieutenant-General Sir Pratap Singh to General Joffre. Sir Pratab was ruler of the state of Orchha, which, founded in 1048, has a population of over 300,000

300 men, women and children being lost. These included about 20 American citizens, and a note of protest was sent by the United States. The submarine flew the Austrian flag, and was afterwards acknowledged by the Vienna authorities to be one of their vessels; but some Italian naval officers maintained that it was a German U-boat. On the same day, and near the same spot, a French transport, La France, bringing invalided soldiers back from Mudros, was sunk by a submarine.

Another French passenger steamer, Ville de Ciotat, was torpedoed. She was passing Crete on Christmas Eve, bound from Japan for Marseilles, with 135 passengers and 181 officers and men. It was ten o'clock in the morning, and a minute after passing near a Greek steamer a terrific explosion shook the ship, and a submarine flying the Austrian flag appeared on the surface a short distance away. The crew worked steadily, and lowered five lifeboats and two rafts before the vessel sank. Seventy-nine lives were lost, including the women and children in one boat which capsized.

About the same time one of the newest liners of the Nippon-Yusen fleet, the Yasaka Maru, was torpedoed without warning just before she entered the Suez Canal. Happily, the ship did not sink for 49 minutes, and all the passengers and crew were saved. This was the second Japanese steamer torpedoed in the Mediterranean.

On December 30, 1915, the P. and O. liner Persia was attacked and sunk in five minutes. There were over 500 persons on board, and 334 lives were lost. Eleven of the survivors, including Lord Montagu of Beaulieu, were picked up after being thirty-two hours without either water or food. Soon afterwards another Japanese steamer, the Kenkoku Maru, was torpedoed. There was also an attack on an American tank steamer, the Petrolite, on December 5, 1915. This ship was shelled in the Mediterranean by a submarine flying the Austrian flag, and the shelling continued, as in the Ancona case, after the steamer had stopped. The submarine then came alongside, and the commander offered to buy supplies. The captain of the Petrolite refused to sell, and the Austrian officer thereupon seized one American sailor and held him as hostage, while some of the submarine crew boarded the steamer.

There was one note of humour in the history of enemy submarine work in the Mediterranean. On December 7, 1915, the Austro-Hungarian ministry of foreign affairs sent an appeal to Sir Edward Grey through the American embassy in London. Certain Austro-Hungarian subjects—chiefly women and children—were being repatriated from India in the British steamer Golconda, and an Austrian petition was forwarded to the British Government, pleading that the Golconda should be specially protected from the German and Austrian submarine attacks, and adding:

> The imperial and royal government will hold the British Government responsible for the lives and well-being of these passengers, the majority of whom are better-class people.

Sir Edward Grey sent a reply which concluded:

> It is needless to add that his Majesty's Government does not propose to take any precautions on behalf of Austro-Hungarian subjects which it does not take on behalf of its own, and that if they suffer any injury from submarine attack on the part of his Majesty's enemies the responsibility must rest solely with those who have made

NO BITTERNESS HERE

There was, among the men at the front, far less bitterness felt for the enemy than at home. These men of the R.A.M.C. handle this German prisoner just as carefully as they would someone who was fighting on their own side

Photos: Imperial War Museum

TINNED WATER

Pumped up from a neighbouring stream through a pipe line similar to the one seen in the photograph below, water is being rationed out in petrol cans. These cans were specially disinfected, the water being thus rendered safe but somewhat unpalatable

TAPPING THE RIVER

British soldiers are lowering a pipe line into the river Ancre, while on the other bank others are filling petrol cans. The supply will be run to neighbouring troughs or to a water cart, thus saving the labour of carting water in small amounts

Photos: Imperial War Museum

FOOD FOR THE COMPANIES

This scene behind the lines shows the arrival from the base and the preliminary distribution of rations. Company quartermaster-sergeants of a Scottish battalion are busily engaged in the task of portioning out the supplies to be consumed by their companies

such attacks part of their ordinary methods of warfare. The proper and sufficient protection from this danger is that Austria-Hungary and Germany should observe ordinary rules of humanity in their methods of warfare.

During this autumn the British Admiralty decided on an attack on the Belgian coast, still in the occupation of the Germans. On October 22–23 three monitors, supported by ten destroyers, about 50 armed trawlers and other craft, approached Zeebrugge and bombarded that port; on September 7 a stronger force bombarded Ostend. Neither operation was very successful, although a little damage was done. In September the monitors, assisted by a larger one, Marshal Ney, bombarded the coast batteries between Ostend and Nieuport, and later those between Knocke and Blankenberghe; but, here again, with no great success. The ships were withdrawn on October 2, and the "Official History" sums up their work.

As a measure of what such coastal work under modern conditions was worth, the operations were inconclusive. The defective gun mountings in the first four monitors, the failure of the Marshal Ney's engines, the breakdown of the observation arrangements, and the shortage of ammunition deprived the test of most of its value. These drawbacks were in themselves enough to deprive the attempt of any chance of real success, and the result could not be regarded as satisfactory. In so far as the operations were intended to destroy the German submarine bases and coast batteries they had failed.

During these months the Grand Fleet was being strengthened by the arrival of new units. It was joined by four battleships of the Queen Elizabeth class, the most powerful then afloat, several cruisers and other craft. It suffered losses, however, some of a temporary, but one or two of a permanent nature. On August 28 the cruiser Argyll, while making for Scapa, ran on the Bell Rock, near Dundee, in thick weather. The officers and men were taken off by destroyers, but the ship was lost. On December 30, the Natal was blown up while lying in the harbour at Cromarty — a mishap due, so the inquiry proved, to defects in some of her ammunition. On this occasion the loss of life was heavy.

The work done by the British patrols during the year 1915 can best be summed up by the following quotation from the "Official History of the War, Naval Operations," Vol. 3:

During the year 1915, in all weathers and in spite of submarines, an area of 220,000 square miles had been regularly patrolled. No fewer than 2,281 vessels, in and out, had been visited, besides 817 fishing craft, and of the total of over 3,000, 743 had been sent in for examination. So effective, indeed, was the control that during the last five months Norway and Denmark had received no more than 77 cargoes which we did not know to be innocent, and only eight vessels that were believed to carry important contraband evaded the patrol, while Germany's outward bound trade, except in the Baltic, was absolutely stopped.

The British losses, nevertheless, were severe. During 1915 no fewer than 1,103 ships of about 1,000 tons were lost by enemy action. Their total tonnage was 855,721, of which 748,914 tons were due to submarines. August and September were the worst months, the losses therein being 148,464 and 101,690 respectively. The best month was April with 22,453 tons.

The year 1916 opened with a mishap to the old British battleship, King Edward VII. On January 6 this ship was on her way to Belfast to refit when she struck a mine off Cape Wrath and sank. At first this was thought to be the work of a submarine, but it was later learned that an enemy vessel, the Moewe, had laid mines across the western entrance of the Pentland Firth, and that it was upon one of these that the King Edward VII had come to grief.

The Moewe, a converted merchantman of 4,500 tons, under the command

FIRST SERVED

This regimental cook has, as the reward of his labour, first dip into the meal he has prepared, and which gives satisfaction, at least, to him. Later hungry men will crowd round to have their mess tins filled from the steaming dixie over which he presides

of Count zu Dohna-Schlodien, left her port towards the end of 1915 and, after laying her first line of mines, passed into the Atlantic and proceeded in a southerly direction. On January 9 she laid mines off Rochelle, and two days later captured the steamer Farringford. By the 13th she had made four more captures in the vicinity of Madeira, three of which she sank. The fourth, the Corbridge, being full of coal, was spared, and in charge of a prize crew was dispatched to a secret rendezvous at Maraca Island, on the north coast of Brazil. Continuing her course to the south, she claimed several more victims and reached Maraca Island towards the end of the month.

There her captain coaled and proceeded on his homeward voyage. One of his captures, the Appam, with a valuable cargo of bullion, was used to carry the numerous prisoners. On February 4 he captured the Belgian steamer Luxemburg, and shortly afterwards narrowly missed meeting the British cruiser Glasgow. On February 7 another steamer, the Flamingo, was captured, and on the following day yet another fell into his hands.

Meanwhile, his presence had become known to the British patrols in that area, but fortune favoured him and he managed to avoid detection, although the Highflyer came near to him at one point. By this time Count zu Dohna had nearly 200 more prisoners, and these he sent away in the Westburn, one of his captures, in charge of a prize crew. For a few days the raider left the recognized trade routes, but on February 22 she suddenly appeared near the Bay of Biscay and captured a French ship, Maroni. Three days later, far out in the Atlantic, the British vessel, Saxon Prince, became her prize, after which nothing further was heard of her until March 5, when it was announced in Germany that she had safely returned home.

On February 28 the British Admiralty learned that a German decoy ship was coming down the Skagerrak. The message was passed on to Scapa Flow, and several ships were detailed to seek her out. This was accomplished by the Alcantara and the Andes, but in the engagement the Alcantara was sunk by a torpedo. By this time the Comus, another of the searching ships, had come up. She took the crew off the stricken vessel and then, with the Andes, concentrated a heavy fire on the German and succeeded in sinking her. She proved to be the raider Greif, which was on her way to the Atlantic.

At the beginning of February, 1916, signs of activity were noticed in the German fleet. Admiral von Scheer had succeeded Admiral von Pohl as the commander-in-chief, and the German naval policy was, on that account, undergoing a change. Scheer believed in a more aggressive strategy, and it was not long before the changes which he brought about began to be felt.

On February 10 the British sloop Arabis was sunk by German destroyers, and a few days later the Arethusa struck a mine whilst returning through the Sledway Channel to Harwich. No mines were suspected in that area, but it was now evident that German minelaying submarines had been busy.

About this time the activity of German submarines in the approaches to the Thames and the Straits of Dover markedly increased. On February 27 the P. and O. liner Majola was sunk near the entrance to Dover harbour, and the Empress of Fort William

Photos: Imperial War Museum

THREE HELP ONE

The task of getting this wounded man down a steep muddy bank to the waiting ambulance requires the efforts of three of his comrades of the Machine Gun Corps. This corps, raised as a separate regiment in October, 1915, was disbanded in 1921

A LITTLE DOG'S DAY

Apparently impervious to the war that is going on all around him, this little stray from a neighbouring farmhouse enjoys a ride in state on an Australian limber returning from the front lines. Such dogs were often adopted as mascots

TALE OF DISASTER *Photo: G.P.A.*

These dead bodies, strewn along the side of a Rumanian road, tell a tale of disaster to that country. Overwhelmed by the combined German, Austrian and Bulgarian armies, the Rumanian forces had a crushing defeat, entailing the loss of Bucharest

struck a mine when going to her assistance. Only one conclusion could be drawn from these incidents: the submarine campaign, which had died down during the latter part of 1915, was being renewed more vigorously than ever. This supposition was strengthened when, on March 24, the cross-channel steamer Sussex was torpedoed by UB29.

The attack on the Sussex caused a renewed outburst of indignation in the United States, as many of the passengers were Americans, and a strongly worded note was dispatched to the German government. This threatened to break off diplomatic relations between the two countries, but the Germans gave way and as a result instructions were issued that henceforth all attacks on commerce should be carried out in strict accordance with prize court rules, which stated that all ships must be searched and passengers removed preliminary to the destruction of the ship. This intervention on the part of the United States acted as a brake on the German submarine activities, for during May the total loss amounted to 64,521 tons against 141,193 for the previous month, and 99,089 tons for March.

On April 24 the Admiralty learned that the German High Seas Fleet had put to sea, and orders were dispatched to the fleet to steam out and try to intercept the enemy. Jellicoe and Beatty, with their big ships, set out from their northerly bases, whilst Commodore Tyrwhitt, with the 5th light cruiser squadron, steamed out of Harwich. The destroyer Melamphus with a number of submarines took up a position from which it was hoped to cut off the enemy on his return. The German ships were first sighted by Tyrwhitt at about 3.50 a.m. steaming in the direction of Lowestoft. He immediately steamed sufficiently close to show himself, after which he turned and retreated southwards, thus hoping to draw the enemy off. But his ruse was not successful, and at 4.10 the battle-cruisers opened fire on Lowestoft. This lasted for ten minutes, during which Tyrwhitt had turned and was again approaching the enemy, who soon made for Yarmouth.

But no bombardment was made on that place. Whether it was that the enemy feared an attack by the British submarines, or whether it was Tyrwhitt's turn to the north, is not known, but the raiding ships soon turned homewards. Tyrwhitt managed to get within 13,000 yards, when he opened fire, but he could inflict no damage on his more powerful opponents, who shelled him for 13 minutes and inflicted heavy casualties on the Conquest. Although some of the British submarines sighted the foe, they were not within torpedo range and could inflict no injury. The damage done to Lowestoft was considerable, some two hundred houses being wrecked, but fortunately the loss of life was small, only three persons being killed.

This chapter may fitly conclude with events in two secondary theatres of naval warfare, the Baltic and the Adriatic. Throughout the summer of 1915, British submarines continued to operate in the Baltic. In E 8 Lieut.-Commander E. H. H. Goodhart made his way into the Baltic, where he found E 9 and where he was soon joined by E 18 and E 19. After many adventures and escapes, Goodhart managed to reach Reval, which after repairs he left for a cruise. Watching off Libau, he succeeded in firing a torpedo at a German cruiser, Prinz Adalbert, which sank as the result. Like the other three submarines, he did a great deal of damage to German shipping, many vessels being captured or destroyed. In November E 19 sank the cruiser Undine, but by the end of the month weather conditions made a return to port necessary.

In December, 1915, there was a naval action in the Adriatic. An Austrian force stationed at Cattaro was ordered to attack the seaport of Durazzo and the raid was carried out on the 29th. The Austrian ships got inside the harbour and did a good deal of damage, but in return one of them was sunk and another seriously crippled. From Brindisi, on hearing of the raid, Italian, British and French warships put to sea. The leading ships, among which was the British cruiser Dartmouth, at length came up with the enemy and a running fight lasted for some hours. The Austrians were obliged to sink their crippled unit, and their largest ship, the Helgoland, was repeatedly hit, but, aided by the oncoming darkness, they managed to escape without further loss.

Photo: G.P.A.

DEATH AND DECAY

By the side of a limber lie the decaying corpses of German soldiers. They have been killed in a French attack on a plateau north of Craonne, known to the Germans as the Winterberg, in the course of the spring offensive of 1917 in Champagne

ON THE EDGE OF SAFETY

On the edge of a dugout which would have given them at least temporary safety, these Germans, victims of the British offensive near Arras in April, 1917, lie dead. Parts of their equipment and their rifles and stick bombs lie scattered around them

Photo: Imperial War Museum

CHAPTER 61

TRENCH WARFARE IN 1916

While the French were desperately holding Verdun, the British army to the north-west had a comparatively quiet time. This chapter tells the story of its activities during the first six months of 1916

THE lack of success of the British campaigns of 1915, together with the terrible loss of life involved, had aroused a feeling of ill-concealed chagrin at home, and it was obvious that the failing health of Sir John French would make the effort of commanding the ever-growing armies of 1916 a task beyond his strength. During the month of December, 1915, the commander-in-chief was prevailed upon by the cabinet to resign from his position as head of the British armies in France and Flanders, and he was appointed field-marshal commanding the home forces and awarded a viscounty in recognition of his services.

On December 17, 1915, he relinquished the command of the British armies on the Western front, and was succeeded by the commander of the 1st army, Sir Douglas Haig. General Sir C. C. Monro was given the command of the 1st army, but during his absence at the Dardanelles, where he was supervising the evacuation of the British troops, the position was temporarily held by Sir Henry Rawlinson.

From the time when Sir Douglas Haig was appointed commander-in-chief of the British expeditionary force until the outbreak of the Somme offensive in July, 1916, the British were engaged in no major operations on the Western front. Nevertheless, trench warfare persisted and allowed no relaxation of vigilance, while local actions occurred from time to time.

At the beginning of 1916 the British troops in France consisted of 38 infantry divisions, of which 2 were Canadian, and 5 cavalry divisions, including 2 Indian. The remainder of the Indian Corps had been transported to Mesopotamia at the end of 1915. The total effective strength was not far short of a million men. This force was divided into three armies, the 1st of these commanded by Sir Charles Monro, the 2nd by Sir Herbert Plumer, and the 3rd by Sir Edmund Allenby. The new chief of the imperial general staff was Sir William Robertson, who insisted on receiving and exercising plenary powers and full authority over the British military operations on all fronts, in spite of a certain amount of opposition from Lord Kitchener.

The line held by the British armies at the beginning of the year was as follows: The 2nd army held a 20-mile front from Boesinghe, north of Ypres, to Armentières; from there the 1st army continued the line southward for 25 miles to Loos; and the 3rd army held a frontage of 22 miles from a point near Ransart, 8 miles south of Arras, to Curlu, on the Somme. Thus the British line was not continuous, for between the 1st and 3rd armies lay the French 10th army with a front extending for 20 miles.

Between the beginning of February and the middle of June nine of the 12 divisions concentrated in Egypt after the evacuation of Gallipoli were transferred to France. The fact that it took four and a half months to accomplish this, when Germany could move 10 divisions from her western to her eastern front in nine days, as is shown in the German official history devoted to railway transport, is an instance of the value of her central position.

With regard to the vital question of munitions, Mr. Lloyd George promised, at an ammunition conference in January, that a quantity of shells sufficient to meet all needs would be available by May. The assurance proved unduly optimistic, and throughout the year great care had to be exercised in their expenditure, especially as a large proportion of the shells and fuses, and even guns, made by hastily mobilized labour, proved defective.

On March 1 a British 4th army was formed, under Sir Henry Rawlinson, and during the next fortnight the length of the British front was increased by taking over from the French 10th army 20 miles of line between Loos and the village of Ransart.

By the spring of 1916 many new units had come into existence with the advent of fresh conditions of warfare. They included the "special brigade," concerned with all matters relating to gas warfare; the "special works park," which dealt in camouflage, anti-aircraft sections, and a meteorological department. Trench mortar batteries, unknown in 1914, were now attached to each infantry brigade. From the original clumsy weapon improvised from brass tubing, firing a bomb extemporized from a tin can filled with a bursting charge and fragments of metal, was evolved a more scientific engine. At the beginning of 1916 a trench mortar battery consisted of four guns: 4-inch, 3·7-inch, 2-inch, firing a stick-bomb,

VIRGIN OF MONTAUBAN

The church of Montauban, in the Somme area, was almost totally destroyed by shell fire in 1916. The statue of the Virgin Mary remained, however, intact, and is here seen, re-erected by British soldiers on the ruins of the church wall

Photo: Imperial War Museum

Photo: Imperial War Museum

LOVELINESS DESTROYED

The ruins of the famous Cloth Tower at Ypres show clearly the extent to which the town suffered from German bombardment. Held desperately but successfully by the British throughout the war, it knew no peace till the closing months of 1918

and a Stokes gun. Later, heavier types were used, until by the end of the year mortars firing a steel bomb, 150 lb. in weight, popularly known as the flying pig, were in service. There was still a serious shortage of anti-aircraft guns, only 67 being available at the beginning of the year; but by July, 1916, that number had been nearly doubled, the newer guns being capable of shelling aircraft at a height of nearly 20,000 feet. At the end of 1915, after the formation of the Machine Gun Corps, the Maxim guns were withdrawn and replaced by Lewis and Hotchkiss guns, the latter being allotted to the cavalry. By the end of June, 1916, each infantry battalion was equipped with 16 Lewis guns and each cavalry regiment with 16 Hotchkiss.

Towards the end of 1915, in view of the difficulty of securing sufficient local labour to carry out the necessary work behind the lines, such as the maintenance of roads and railways, the building of hospitals and huts, sanitary work, the loading and unloading of stores, and the formation of dumps and depôts, various labour battalions were raised, consisting mainly of manual labourers over military age, conscientious objectors, and men unfit for active service in the line. By June, 1916, there were 64 of these labour battalions in France.

Another branch to be affected by the changed conditions of modern warfare was the signal service. In the days of open warfare and scattered units, communications were mainly effected by telegraph, heliograph, flags and dispatch riders. With the introduction of trench warfare a visual method of signalling proved impractical and the telephone soon superseded all other means of communication. But at first even this method was not reliable, for in action the cables, whether laid on the ground or slung from poles, were constantly cut by shell fire. During the early part of 1916 experiments were carried out with cables buried in trenches, and this method of "buries" became generally employed, though, to avoid the penetrating effect of shells, the cables had to be laid at least six feet under the surface. The pigeon service, first organized in 1915, also proved very useful, and gradually expanded, while coloured rockets, indicating definite signals, became a useful agent of liaison between infantry and artillery.

Now that the adversaries were so close together, local features, such as mounds, craters and natural salients, providing cover for snipers or observation posts for the artillery, became of tactical importance to local commanders, and in an endeavour to secure or destroy these positions mining was resorted to on an ever-increasing scale. By the middle of 1916 there were 32 mining companies, comprising some 25,000 men, engaged in this arduous work. These companies were made up of men who had been miners in civil life.

On January 27, 1916, the Military Service Act came into force, making enlistment compulsory for all unmarried men or widowers without dependants between the ages of 18 and 41. The act was applied to married men on May 25. Owing to the comparative ease with

which so many men secured exemption on one ground or another, the results were unsatisfactory, but at least the introduction of compulsory service into Great Britain was not without a disturbing moral effect upon Germany.

Although, from the beginning of 1916 until the battle of the Somme, the British were called upon to fight no action on a large scale, the troops did not remain inactive. Trench warfare, if not spectacular, is demoralizing, nerve-wracking and productive of a steady crop of casualties. As Sir Douglas Haig himself remarks, in his dispatch dated May 19, 1916:

> Although there has been no great incident of historic importance to record on the British front during the period under review, a steady and continuous fight has gone on, day and night, above ground and below it. The comparative monotony of this struggle has been relieved at short intervals by sharp local actions, some of which, although individually almost insignificant in a war on such an immense scale, would have been thought worthy of a separate dispatch under different conditions, while their cumulative effect, though difficult to appraise at its true value now, will doubtless prove hereafter to have been considerable.

On December 19, 1915, the Germans attacked north-east of Ypres with a new gas, phosgene, which proved very deadly on account of its delayed effect, the inhalation of a small quantity often leading to sudden collapse as long as twenty-four hours after an attack. The advent of a new kind of gas was not unexpected, as it had been noticed that the enemy was adopting a new type of respirator with a short cylindrical drum through which the air was filtered. The attack did not succeed in dislodging any of the defenders, possibly on account of the rapidity with which the gas blew over, but the gas casualties amounted to no fewer than 1,069, including 120 killed. In February, 1916, the flannel, or hypo-helmet as it was called, was replaced by the large box respirator, using a canister filled with chemical granules to purify the poisoned air. This was in turn replaced, in August, 1916, by the small box respirator, which was gradually issued to the troops in the field and of which more than 16,000,000 were manufactured up to the time of the armistice.

During the latter half of February, while preparing their great offensive against Verdun, the Germans made further demonstrations in the Ypres salient by way of creating a diversion. One of these local attacks was launched on February 14 against an eminence on the north bank of the Ypres-Comines canal, and just inside the British line, known as the Bluff, a position of considerable tactical importance as an observation post. During the morning of the 14th the spot was heavily shelled, causing the defenders, a platoon of the 10th Lancashire Fusiliers, to take cover in a former German mine gallery, known as the Tunnel, which ran from the Bluff to the canal bank.

Late in the afternoon the Germans exploded a mine under the Bluff, burying the platoon sheltering in the Tunnel, and two other mines under the trenches held by the 10th Sherwood Foresters, a little farther north. The infantry then attacked on a frontage of about half a mile between the canal and a small watercourse known as the Ravine. They captured the Bluff and the front-line trenches of the Sherwood Foresters, but could not take the support trenches. Counter-attacks that evening and the following day failed to regain the lost positions. It was then decided that careful preparations would have to be made and an attack launched in greater strength a fortnight later. This attack was carried out on March 2 by the 76th brigade, after a day's preliminary bombardment of the position, and proved completely successful, recapturing the Bluff and all the old positions.

On the same day British operations took place at the Hohenzollern redoubt, the scene of such fierce fighting at the battle of Loos in September, 1915. At the end of that battle the British had managed to retain only the western portion of the redoubt, and their front line was a communicating trench stretching across the salient of the redoubt and known as the Chord. During the winter of 1915–16 the Germans captured this trench, forcing the British back to the western slopes of the redoubt, where they were under the disadvantage of being at a lower level than their adversaries.

The area was taken over during the middle of February, 1916, by the 12th division, and preparations were made for an attempt to regain the Chord. The 170th Tunnelling Company R.E. had been hard at work since the previous November in driving galleries under the German trenches, and by the end of February had three mines in position. These were blown up towards evening on March 2, forming large craters some thirty feet west of the Chord, and the 8th and 9th Royal Fusiliers advanced, supported by fire from the 35th brigade on their right.

The 9th Fusiliers occupied the German trenches without many casualties and took 80 prisoners, who were just emerging from their dug-outs. On their left the 8th Fusiliers were less fortunate, for they found the Germans manning the parapet, and suffered heavy casualties. Thus the southern half of the Chord was won, but bombing parties failed to dislodge the Germans from the other end. During the next four days the enemy delivered violent counter-attacks, and then, for nearly a fortnight, the fighting was only desultory. At 5.15 p.m. on March 18 the British position was heavily shelled, and after an hour's bombardment the German infantry attacked and recaptured the lost portion of the Chord. No further attempt was made to regain it.

At the end of the month there was a renewal of activity in the region of St. Eloi, a mile to the west of the Ypres–Comines Canal. Here the German line formed a salient penetrating about a hundred yards into the British front. Within it was an artificial eminence known as the Mound, a valuable observation post.

During 1915 mining was carried on vigorously by both sides, 33 mines and 31 camouflets having been blown up in a small area. A camouflet is a mine of small charge, for destroying enemy workings without forming a surface crater. At the end of February, 1916, it was decided that the 3rd division should attempt to flatten out the salient and capture the Mound as soon as mines were in readiness under the German position, and it was considered advisable to launch the attack without artillery preparation so as to profit by the surprise and confusion resulting from the explosion of these mines. Moreover, foreseeing that the craters would themselves form a serious obstacle in the path of the attacking infantry, Major-General J. A. L. Haldane, the divisional commander, arranged that the assaulting battalions should start from the flanks of the sector of attack and, after passing the craters, converge towards each other.

The 172nd Tunnelling Company R.E. pushed ahead with their mining operations, and on March 17 the 3rd division began to take over the sector from the 17th. During the bitterly cold night of March 26–27 the assaulting battalions, the 1st Northumberland Fusiliers and the 4th Royal Fusiliers, moved up into position, while passages were cut in the British wire. At 4.15 on the morning of March 27 the mines were blown up. In the words of the official historian: "The trenches rocked, and to the onlookers it appeared as if a long village was being lifted through flames into the air." At the same time the heavy artillery of the 5th corps set up a barrage behind the salient and upon the front trenches on either side of it, as the infantry advanced towards the German lines. The four central mines had been exploded directly under the German

VILLAGE NEVER CONQUERED

Motor and horse transport, finding the stone pavé a welcome change from the usual Flanders mud, are here seen passing through the village of Vlamertinghe. Just west of Ypres, this village, the scene now of a large British cemetery, remained unconquered by the Germans throughout the War, but suffered terrible damage from shell fire

A FEW HAPPY DAYS AHEAD

Near the village of Contalmaison, on the Somme, wreckage of which can be seen in the distance, two bodies of troops pass each other. The Australian machine-gunners have finished a spell in the trenches, and are bound for a spell in rest billets; while the task of the working party, with picks on their shoulders, is still before them

TRAFFIC JAM ON THE SOMME

Few thoroughfares on the Western front suffered more from traffic congestion or from constant shelling than the Fricourt road in the Somme area. This photograph well illustrates the difficulty of speeding-up traffic, and the effect of a single shell can well be imagined

trenches, while the end ones had formed craters in No Man's Land to protect the flanks of the attack. The day before a German listening post had overheard some remarks concerning the firing of the mines, but, unaware of the proximity of the attack, the officer commanding the 18th reserve Jäger battalion, which was holding the line, gave no instructions other than to withdraw a certain number of men to the support line. According to the German official account some 300 men were killed or buried by the explosions.

The Northumberland Fusiliers lost only one man in reaching their objective. The Royal Fusiliers, on the other hand, caught by machine-gun fire, suffered heavy losses, and, deceived by the change of landscape wrought by the explosions, reached a position which they imagined to be the German trench, but which was in reality a trench in front of the left-hand crater and an old crater, situated in No Man's Land. The German counter-barrage had opened out with remarkable quickness, and consolidating the positions reached under heavy and continuous fire was no easy matter. No immediate counter-attacks took place, but the two craters the Royal Fusiliers had not managed to secure were still manned by Germans. A German counter-attack on March 31 was repulsed, and on April 3 an effort was made to dislodge the Germans from the remaining craters. The attack was carried out by the 8th King's Own at 2 a.m. and was completely successful. In one of the craters were 5 officers and 77 men, who, cut off by fire from their comrades and without food for three days, willingly surrendered. The line was then secured.

On the night of April 3–4 the 3rd division was relieved by the 2nd Canadian division, to whom was entrusted the consolidation and defence of the position. But before they had managed to do much in the way of improving the defences, the Germans launched a counter-attack on the night of April 5, recapturing the four central craters. Much confusion took place, for with no less than seventeen craters close together in a small area, surrounded by shell holes and battered trenches, it became almost impossible for parties to find their bearings. Various counter-attacks were made by the Canadians without success, and heavy shelling continued on both sides for nearly a fortnight, but by April 20 activity in this sector came to an end, with the German front line intact.

In front of Hulluch, in the Loos area, the Germans made two gas attacks on April 27 and 29, neither of which led to any tactical advantage. During the first the British suffered some 500 gas casualties, mostly among the 9th Black Watch, who, says the official historian, "had taken off helmets after the first cloud, by order of their commander (who was gassed and died), in the belief that, having once been exposed to gas, they were of no further use." Three parties of Germans succeeded in reaching the British trenches, but within an hour the assault had been repulsed with heavy German losses.

The second attack also resulted in many gas casualties among the British, especially among the 16th division, although they were wearing their helmets. It was afterwards found that these helmets did not afford sufficient protection against strong concentrations of gas, and the manufacture of box respirators was speeded up in consequence. No infantry attack ensued in this case, for the Germans were hoist with their own petard. They had left their trenches, when the wind suddenly veered round and carried the gas back to their own lines. Caught without masks on, and with no possibility of escape, the Germans suffered numerous casualties from their own gas.

Another gas attack was launched by the Germans on the Wulverghem front, between Petite Douve farm, near Messines, and Spanbroekmolen, on April 30. Some 4,000 cylinders were used and the discharge lasted for twenty minutes, beginning at 12.40 a.m. The cloud was lit up by Verey lights, but when the assaulting parties arrived they were speedily checked by rifle and gun fire. By sunrise the action was over and the Germans beaten off. The total British gas casualties amounted to 562, of whom 89 died.

On May 11 the Kink salient, near Fosse 8, close to Hohenzollern redoubt, passed into German hands. During the afternoon the salient, about 400 yards wide, held at the time by the 13th Royal Scots, was heavily shelled and at 5 p.m. the Germans exploded a mine near Hohenzollern redoubt. The shelling of the salient then redoubled in intensity until soon more than half the Royal Scots were out of action. One shell burst in the dug-out sheltering battalion headquarters, killing or wounding all the battalion staff. With half their effectives casualties and deprived of their commanders, the defenders were unable to resist the German assault which was launched at 6 p.m. Bombing parties from the 45th and 46th brigades came under heavy machine-gun fire and failed to recapture any of the ground lost, nor was a counter-attack at 9.30 p.m. any more successful. Sackville Street, about 350 yards in the rear of the original position, then became the new front line.

Ten days later the Germans carried out a successful operation at Vimy Ridge, where the British had taken over from the French 10th army in March. Nearly all the crest of the ridge was in the hands of the Germans, providing them with excellent observation over the British lines. Behind them, on the Douai plain, the scattered villages and slag heaps of the Lens coalfield district afforded many well-concealed gun positions. Moreover, the comparatively steep eastern face of the ridge enabled the Germans to assemble large quantities of trench mortars and bodies of troops close to the British line under cover and safe from all except high-angle howitzer fire.

The trenches which had been taken over were of the most rudimentary kind, and no organized and continuous front line existed. An extensive mining system covered this area, and for months an underground struggle was carried on by the rival tunnelling companies, until the British miners gradually gained the upper hand. The historian of the German 86th reserve regiment, here holding the German line, confesses that they "could not fight the enemy any longer with his own weapons, for he was superior to us in men and material." After the British had successfully fired nine mines during the first fortnight of May, the Germans decided to make an attack to gain possession of the mine-shafts.

This attack took place on May 21, the day after the 47th (London) division had relieved the 25th, which had just been transferred from the 3rd to the 1st British army. The respective divisional artillery brigades were still changing when the attack took place. After a heavy bombardment of the British line, lasting from dawn until evening, at 7.45 p.m. the German infantry assaulted. Outnumbering the defenders, they swept over front and support lines on the sector held by the 140th brigade, whose artillery could offer them little help owing to shortage of ammunition and to the cutting of all communicating wires. The British were therefore driven back to the reserve line lying along Zouave slope, on the Souchez–Arras road. Once the Germans had obtained possession of the British mine-shafts they made no attempt to advance farther.

A British counter-attack was made on the evening of May 23, after artillery reinforcements had arrived, but of the two brigades detailed for the assault, the 99th and the 7th, the former did not start owing to the strength of the

IRELAND MARCHES PAST

Though he had retired from active military service in 1909, the Duke of Connaught, uncle of the King, paid, in common with the rest of the royal family, frequent visits to France. He is here seen watching the march past of an Irish battalion

German counter-barrage, and the latter, after successfully reaching the old front line, were driven out again. At 12.30 the next morning General Monro, the 1st army commander, ended the attack, and headquarters decided not to proceed with the operations in view of the approaching Somme offensive. However, as the Germans made no attempt to occupy the old British support trenches the 99th and 6th brigades pushed forward a little and constructed a new front line some 300 yards to the east of Zouave slope.

The final operation in which the British were engaged before the Somme offensive was the battle of Mount Sorrel. On the afternoon of June 2 the German 13th corps attacked the Canadian corps front between Hill 60 and Hooge in an attempt to capture the observation posts of Mount Sorrel and Tor Top ridge. The brunt of the attack was borne by the 8th Canadian brigade holding the sector between these positions. The German plan had been carefully prepared during the previous six weeks, and though certain indications led the Canadians to expect an attack, it came sooner than they had anticipated.

Just after one o'clock in the afternoon the Germans blew up several mines just short of the Canadian position; white rockets were sent up, and in bright sunshine four waves of infantry advanced. After some fierce hand-to-hand fighting the enemy captured the whole of the front system from Mount Sorrel to Tor Top and, sweeping beyond it, gained possession of several strong points as well as of a section of 18-pounder guns, the crews of which were all killed or wounded. They then consolidated the position won. Farther north an attack south of the Menin road, with Hooge as its objective, was beaten off.

A counter-attack was decided upon, to take place at 2 a.m. the following

FINISHING TOUCHES

This photograph shows a scene of activity in a deep assembly trench. It is the day before the opening of the Arras offensive of April, 1917, and men are busy fixing scaling ladders. Trench-mortar bombs are stacked along the trench's side

Photo: Imperial War Museum

Photo: Topical

HONOURS OF BATTLE

This photograph shows General Fayolle affixing a decoration on to the colours of a French ambulance unit. It was not only individuals who received decorations for gallantry, military units and even towns and cities such as Ypres and Reims being similarly honoured

day, but at such short notice much difficulty was experienced in assembling the necessary troops. Owing to various delays the assault did not take place until just after 7 a.m., when it was broad daylight. Then occurred another hitch. The simultaneous firing of six green rockets had been the prearranged signal to attack. The rockets were defective and could not be fired simultaneously, with the result that they were not an effective signal. In consequence, the right, centre and left attacks were not made together, but yet they all succeeded in reaching the German lines, though their numbers were insufficient to maintain a hold.

DUG-OUT COMFORT

Six French officers relax in the comparative comfort and safety of their front-line dug-out. Neither the British nor French built dug-outs as comfortable as the German counterparts, which in the Hindenburg line boasted spring beds and dressing tables

For two days the situation remained unchanged, but on June 6 the Germans made another attack near Hooge, during which they captured the front and support trenches of the 28th Canadian battalion. A simultaneous attack on Hill 60 failed. On June 13, at 1.30 a.m., Sir Julian Byng, the Canadian corps commander, launched another and stronger counter-attack upon Mount Sorrel and Tor Top. Preceded by a bombardment that lasted ten hours, and helped by a smoke screen, the 3rd, 13th, 16th and 58th Canadian battalions assaulted in a heavy rainstorm and within an hour had reached all their objectives. 191 prisoners were taken.

The position was consolidated by the engineers and pioneers under terrible conditions, for the intense bombardments of both sides, combined with continuous rain, had converted the ground into a sea of mud, and had obliterated all landmarks. Moreover, the enemy did not accept the new situation without demur. As soon as it was known that the Canadians had returned to their old line, a fresh bombardment began and this continued during the night of the 13th. At 6.45 on the morning of the 14th a counter-attack was made, but this was repulsed. At 9 a.m. the Germans attacked again, but this broke down and no further attempts were made.

CHAPTER 62

SMASHING THE SENUSSI

One of the minor campaigns of the World War was that in which the British, anxious for the safety of Egypt, defeated the desert tribes who were harassing the western frontiers of that country

THE religious sect known as the Senussi owes its foundation to an Algerian, Sidi Mahomed ben Ali es Senussi, who, in 1835, gathered around him a group of Mahomedans who sought to recapture the simplicity taught in the Koran. At first the headquarters were at Alexandria, but later they were removed to Cyrenaica, where, in the mountains near Derna, the *Zawia Baida*, or White Monastery, was built. There the sect gained many adherents from among the Tripolitans and Moroccans, and when, in 1855, a further move was made to the Siwa oasis in the Libyan desert, its numbers had greatly multiplied.

On the death of the founder in 1859 Sidi Mahomed's son, Senussi el Mahdi, assumed control, and under his leadership great progress was made. The Senussi gained in power and in numbers and spread over a large portion of the Sahara from the western borders of Egypt to Darfur in the south, to Bilma in the west, and to the littoral of Tripolitania in the north. In the Libyan desert they cultivated oases, established trade with Benghazi and Tripoli, and maintained law and order amongst the savage Bedouin tribes.

The growing power of the Senussi, however, aroused considerable uneasiness among the Turks, and as a result troops were sent by the pasha of Benghazi in 1889 to its headquarters at Jaghbub. Then, in 1894, as a direct result of the Turkish interference, the headquarters were again moved, this time to Jof, in the oasis of Kufara. Here a new danger arose. The approach of the French to Wadai, a state largely inhabited by the Senussi, drove them farther west, and an effort to organize the tribes against foreign encroachment was made. They fortified Bir Allali, in Kanem, but were defeated by a French column early in 1902. A few months after his defeat Senussi el Mahdi died, and as his son, Sidi Idris, was too young to assume authority, he was succeeded by his nephew, Sidi Ahmed, known as the Grand Senussi.

In 1911 the Italians invaded Cyrenaica and Tripolitania and the Senussi went to the aid of the Turks. After the treaty of Lausanne in 1912, by which the Turks agreed to evacuate Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, Sidi Ahmed continued his war against the Italians and succeeded in preventing them from penetrating into the interior. In 1914 terms of peace were discussed, but these were unsatisfactory to the sheikh, and in 1915 attacks on Italian ports were still being launched.

When Turkey joined the Central Powers an attempt was made to induce Sidi Ahmed to pronounce a *jihad*, or holy war, against the Allies, the idea being that it might result in inflaming religious fanaticism in Egypt, thus seriously embarrassing those countries which had Mahomedan subjects. To attain this end a Turk, Nuri Bey, was sent early in 1915 as an emissary to Sidi Ahmed with instructions to endeavour to embroil him with Great Britain by inducing him to attack Egypt. The Grand Senussi, who hitherto had maintained good relations with that country, did not at first view the suggestion with any favour, and it was not until Italy, his bitter enemy, joined the Allied cause that he began to consider the matter seriously. Eventually the pressure exerted by Nuri Bey prevailed, and on November 15, 1915, an attack was launched against Sollum.

But it was not entirely due to Nuri Bey's persuasive powers that the Senussi made their attack. The Germans played a masterly card earlier in the month. They sent a submarine, U 35, to Bardia as an escort to two sailing ships loaded with ammunition and machine-guns. On board were also some German and Turkish officers. On November 4 the submarine, together with the transports, safely reached Bardia, which was occupied by the Senussi. These officers and guns were offered to the Grand Senussi for use against Egypt, and, thus strengthened, he considered that his forces were now in a position to begin operations.

After carrying out her mission the U 35 left Bardia, and whilst in the gulf of Sollum on November 5 encountered the British armed cruiser Tara, which she torpedoed. About 70 out of her crew of 100 succeeded in taking to the boats, which were taken in tow by the submarine, the men being handed over to the Senussi as prisoners.

On November 15 the Senussi launched the opening attack of the campaign. It was directed against Sollum, a British frontier post on the gulf of the same name, and close to the Cyrenaican frontier. Here the small garrison put up a stiff resistance and successfully repulsed the first attack. The position,



Map of Lower Egypt and the adjacent Libyan desert drawn to illustrate the campaign against the Senussi, and (inset) the invasion of Kordofan

EAST OF SUEZ

This photograph shows British transport proceeding along one of the numerous dried-up river beds, known as wadis, found in the Sinai peninsula to the east of the Suez canal. The British had cleared this peninsula of the Turks by the end of 1916

ON THEIR NATIVE SAND

Camels played a prominent part in the Egyptian and Palestine campaigns. Among the tasks of these ships of the Sinai desert was the carrying of ammunition. Here they are seen in a wadi, loaded and ready to start for the scene of an attack

Photos: Topical

Photo: G.P.A.

WHAT'S UP ABOVE?

In the course of an Austrian attack on the Isonzo the Italians seen in this photograph have been captured. They are being shepherded back through an original Austrian line, captors and prisoners casting glances at an aerial battle in progress above them

however, was precarious, for Sollum was a great distance from the nearest railhead and its communications were extremely vulnerable. For strategic reasons, therefore, it was decided that the force should be withdrawn to Matruh, a post between Sollum and Alexandria. The evacuation was successfully carried out by sea on the 23rd, and on the same day a force was dispatched to reinforce the British troops assembling at Matruh.

Aerial reconnaissance soon showed that the Senussi were gathering in force from the south and moving eastward, and on December 11 a British patrol under Lieutenant-Colonel J. L. R. Gordon, encountered a body of 300 Arabs and drove them westward. Two days later a column of about 1,200 men with machine-guns attacked Gordon's troops at a spot some 24 miles west of Matruh. The British force held its own, but the encounter showed that the Senussi were preparing for a greater effort. They were, in fact, assembling their army at Gebel Medwa, very close to Matruh.

But by this time reinforcements were arriving to strengthen the British forces. The West Frontier force was quickly formed and placed under the command of Major-General A. Wallace. It consisted of a composite cavalry brigade, a composite infantry brigade, and the 15th Sikhs, many of which had been evacuated from Gallipoli. Wallace decided to attack on Christmas Day. The Senussi force at Gebel Medwa numbered about 5,000, and their encampment stretched for some six miles along the road running south-west from Matruh. Against this a column composed of Sikhs and New Zealanders was sent. This force broke camp at 4 a.m. and marched along a rough road to the enemy encampment. Cavalry, consisting of the Australian light horse, accompanied it, and some yeomanry rode out in a wide, sweeping movement with the object of assaulting the enemy's right flank.

The first clash occurred between a column of Sikhs and New Zealanders and an advance party of Senussi, but the latter were in no great strength and retired without much resistance. The British mountain battery then opened fire on the enemy, and in this it was supported by the fire of the Clematis, a British sloop, and some armoured trawlers which had come close inshore. The Sikhs, who formed the centre of the attacking line, with the New Zealanders supporting on both flanks, then attacked.

Three lines of infantry stormed the enemy position. A number of armoured cars in support swept the Bedouins with their machine-guns, inflicting heavy casualties. By two o'clock in the afternoon the enemy, commanded by a Turkish officer, Jafar Pasha, had been driven from the ridges west of Gebel Medwa into the rocky valley of Wadi Majid. Early nightfall made pursuit undesirable, and the enemy escaped, but the British captured their stores.

Towards the end of January the chief Senussi force concentrated at Halazin. In strength it numbered about 6,000, and under the direction of its German and Turkish officers it had constructed a series of well-designed entrenchments. By January 22 Wallace, who had received all his reinforcements, began his advance. Weather conditions were so unsuitable that it was impossible to use the armoured cars, and great difficulty was experienced in moving the artillery. On the 28th the main attack was launched by the Sikhs, but towards noon their right flank was threatened, and two companies of the South African Infantry were sent up in support. A little later an attempt was made to turn the Sikhs' left flank, but it was strengthened by a company of the 1st New Zealand Rifles and the position was saved.

Meanwhile, the Sikhs were steadily advancing in the centre, and by 3 o'clock in the afternoon the enemy's main entrenchments were reached, and, after some good fighting on the part of the Sikhs, were cleared, whereupon the pressure on the flanks relaxed. The Senussi then retired, but once again the British troops were robbed of the fruits of victory. The horses of the mounted troops were too exhausted to pursue the enemy, and as the armoured cars could not take their place no decisive victory was reached. Next morning airmen reported that the Senussi had retreated over twenty miles.

On February 10 Wallace relinquished his command and was succeeded by Major-General W. E. Peyton. At the same time the Sikhs were withdrawn, and the heavy armoured cars replaced by a lighter type. A camel corps was added to the British force, and these alterations made it admirably suited to desert fighting. Meanwhile, the Senussi had continued their retreat and were entrenched on a ridge of the Taref mountains some 15 miles south of the port of Sidi el Barrani. Peyton's first step was to establish an advance base, and he chose for this purpose Unjeila, which was half-way to Sidi el Barrani and had a good water supply. It was occupied without opposition on February 15. On February 20 General Peyton was recalled, and his command taken by General H. T. Lukin.

On February 23 the British force moved out from Unjeila, and two days later arrived within eight miles of the Senussi camp at Agagya. Then on the 26th an infantry column advanced against the enemy position while a force of yeomanry moved round their left flank to cut off their retreat. The British front extended for about five miles, and in the advance the losses were heavy owing to the exposed nature of

Photos: Keystone

EXCELSIOR!

The natural common frontier of Italy and Austria, the Dolomites and the Carnic and the Julian Alps, afforded magnificent defensive positions. Attacking troops were faced with the necessity of scaling rocky and often snow-clad heights, such as these Italians, mounting upwards to victory, are attempting

TO SEARCH THE SKY

One of the many developments of the Great War was the greatly extended use of the searchlight to find enemy aircraft. The acetylene and oxygen gases that feed this searchlight, situated in a roughly constructed shelter on the Isonzo front, are contained in steel cylinders as shown in this photograph

Photos: G.P.A.

THREE ARMS OF BATTLE

A British tank, stranded in an attack, has been captured and turned against its old masters. Its advance through a bank of artificial fog shields a body of infantry and is assisted by a low-flying aeroplane that circles overhead

the ground. Support from the artillery, however, aided the attackers, who succeeded in taking the ridge. At this point the Dorset and Bucks Yeomanry, who had moved towards the enemy's left flank, came into action. Commanded by Lieutenant Souter, they charged and succeeded in routing their foes. In this action Jafar Pasha was wounded and made prisoner.

The victorious troops pushed on to Sidi el Barrani. The port was put into a state of defence and supplies were sent thither by sea and by land convoy. On March 9 Lukin moved out with Sollum as his objective. His first aim was to occupy the passes in the Taret mountains, necessary to prevent the enemy using the escarpment as a screen for an attack on the rear of the column.

On the 12th, two battalions of infantry went forward to carry the Madian Pass and advance eastwards along the heights. The South African Scottish battalion, with the 1st South African battalion in support, went upward to win the heights, while the armoured car battery, which came up from the south-east along the ridge, assisted Fortunately, little resistance was encountered, for the men were parched with thirst, and in no condition to engage a well-watered enemy.

On the 14th it was learned that the Senussi, anxious to evade another meeting with the British, had evacuated Sollum the evening before and retreated to the south-west. Aerial scouts also reported that their camp at Bir Waer was empty. The duke of Westminster, in command of the armoured cars, was then ordered to pursue "with reasonable boldness." Heading his armoured car battery, consisting of nine cars, the duke went forward through the vacated camp at Bir Waer. It took him only half an hour to overtake the enemy, which was watering at Asisa wells, some 20 miles from Bir Waer.

The fighting which followed was short and sharp. Although some 6,000 of the Senussi opposed only 32 British soldiers, they were taken utterly by surprise. The machine-guns from the cars shot down, almost to a man, the Turkish officers and gun crews and then swept forward and entirely demoralized the Senussi soldiers, scattering them in every direction. Most of the Bedouins threw away their rifles and fled, utterly regardless of the direction in which they were going. The chase continued for seven miles before it was abandoned.

It will be remembered that the crew of the Tara had been handed over as prisoners to the Senussi early in November. A letter was found at Bir Waer, written by Captain Gwatkin Williams to Nuri Bey. In it he complained of the ill-treatment to which he and his fellow prisoners were being subjected. The letter mentioned Bir Hakkim as the place where the prisoners were being kept.

It was, therefore, decided to make an effort to rescue these men, and at midnight on March 16 a force of nine armoured cars, five open touring cars and several light cars and ambulances set out. Under the direction of two Bedouin guides they penetrated into the desert in Cyrenaica for more than 100 miles and succeeded in finding and rescuing the captured men.

Part of the victorious force then moved down to the edge of the Moghara plateau and, after closing all routes of supply to the western deserts, opened markets along the line it was occupying. To these markets many of the desert

FALLEN AMONG FOES

Shot down behind the German lines this British airman, wounded in the jaw, is being taken away in a car. The total casualties of the Royal Flying Corps in France during 1917, including prisoners of war, slightly exceeded 2,700



Photo: L.N.A.

ILLUSORY PROTECTION

Part of a reinforcing German artillery column is here seen halted on a newly constructed sunken road behind the lines. The shelter of the hollow is to some extent illusory, the position of such sunken roads being well known to the enemy's artillery

tribes came, and by May, 1916, a large part of the Bedouin army was living on biscuits and dates transported from the coast by their former foes.

In February a second Senussi force under the command of Sidi Ahmed himself penetrated as far as the Dakhla oasis without meeting any opposition. To check these raids British troops were detailed for duty in Upper Egypt. Based on Kharga, and assisted by armoured cars and aeroplanes, this force patrolled a vast area of desert and successfully broke up and scattered the enemy forces. This warfare continued for the remainder of the year, by which time Sidi Ahmed, thoroughly discouraged, had reached the oasis of Siwa. In January, 1917, intelligence reached British headquarters that Sidi Ahmed was preparing to retire to Jaghbub, and orders were given for operations to be undertaken against Siwa and Girba oases by a column entirely composed of armoured motor-cars and supplied by motor transport from Matruh. The latter place was some 200 miles from Siwa, and the road, such as it was, lay across waterless desert. Brigadier-General H. W. Hodgson was placed in command. He planned to attack the Senussi camp at Girba, west of Siwa, with the larger part of his force, and to detach two motor batteries to block the solitary pass at Garet el Munassib that was practicable for camels between Siwa and Jaghbub.

On February 1 all was ready for the swift rush across the waste, and next day all units reached the point of concentration, 168 miles south of Matruh. Early on the 3rd the force successfully descended the pass north-east of Girba, and moved to the attack. The enemy was completely taken by surprise on seeing the motor column, and at once withdrew from his camps to the cliffs and hills in rear, but there he showed that he did not intend to retreat farther without a fight. At Girba the Senussi were 850 strong, with both guns and machine-guns, and they were led by Mohammed Saleh, the general of the Grand Senussi, who himself was at Siwa with four or five hundred men and was already making ready to fly. Owing to the rough nature of the country the cars could get no nearer to the Girba position than 800 yards, but after an action lasting all day and on into the night they compelled the Senussi to withdraw. On the 4th Girba was in their possession, and they took Siwa next day.

The cars which had been dispatched in the direction of the pass at Munassib, with the object of intercepting Sidi Ahmed, had reached a position some 18 miles north of the pass, but there most of this column were forced to remain, as it was found impossible to get the cars down the steep escarpment. Some of the lighter cars, however, managed to get down to Munassib and take up a position threatening the parties coming from Girba.

There is still another part of the campaign to be related before the story is fully told. In February, 1916, just before Lukin broke the Senussi's power at Agagia, the sultan of Darfur, 1,000 miles to the south, began to side with the Senussi. Darfur, the westernmost state of the Anglo-Egyptian territories of the Sudan, had been incorporated in the dominions of the false mahdi in 1883, but the Negroes and Arabs composing the population chafed under the rule of the dervishes and fought desperately for freedom until the British victory at Omdurman in 1898 liberated the country. The hereditary Arab leader of the Darfur people, Ali Dinar, was set free from the mahdist prison and recognized as sultan, under the Anglo-Egyptian government.

Due largely to the power exerted by the older Senussi the Darfur chiefs had

ARTILLERY OF THE DESERT

Photo: Imperial War

The climate and natural features of Mesopotamia provided new and extremely trying transport problems, and it was not till these had been successfully overcome by Sir Stanley Maude that full use could be made of British artillery superiority. Here one 6-inch howitzer has been drawn into position

fought for 15 years against the mahdi and the khalifa and their dervishes of the Sudan. Through the strong influence of this missionary sect the younger Senussi had been able to induce the sultan, in January, 1916, to attempt a movement of invasion towards Khartoum. El Fasher, the capital of Darfur, lies some 500 miles west of Khartoum in a mountainous country watered in the rainy season by tributaries of the Nile and streams flowing towards Lake Chad. As, however, the high plateau is seamed by dry river-courses and broken by innumerable mountains, Darfur is a land of great natural strength.

Not content to remain upon the defensive, Ali Dinar, early in February, 1916, gathered a force at Hilla, a great mountain 100 miles east of his capital. His clear intention was to invade Kordofan, one of the centres of the former mahdist revolt and peopled by Arabs and Nubians. But in answer to this dangerous threat the British sirdar, Sir R. Wingate, made a concentration of a mixed Egyptian force of all arms at Nahud under Colonel Kelly. Colonel Kelly marched in a north-easterly direction towards the enemy's capital, thus menacing the line of communications of the sultan and compelling him to postpone his invasion of Kordofan.

While the sultan was rearranging the disposition of his force, Kelly's column marched from Nahud, in Kordofan, to the Darfur town of Umm Shanga, which was reached towards the end of March. At the same time another part of the column closed round the great mountain of Hilla, where Ali Dinar had made his first concentration. From there the column moved along the lower edge of the Sahara to the town of Abyad, the seat of Ali Dinar's power.

On May 15 Kelly moved off in the direction of El Fasher, and by the 21st he had reached Beringya, five miles north of the Darfur capital. Here an enemy force some 3,000 strong was encountered, and on the 22nd Kelly sent his camel corps on an outflanking movement. Fierce fighting followed, during which a British aeroplane attacked the Arab horsemen, but in the end the enemy was routed and Kelly and his men marched on El Fasher, occupying it early on May 23. The sultan then fled westward.

On May 29, 1916, three envoys appeared in El Fasher with an offer of surrender by the sultan, and with some reservations the offer was accepted, but as the negotiations proceeded it became evident that Ali Dinar was acting in bad faith. A second offer of surrender, which came after the occupation of Kebkabya in September, and the surprise and flight of a force under Zacharia, the sultan's eldest son, in October, led to nothing.

The African prince was merely playing for time, and in the beginning of November an expedition was sent out against him. The force consisted of Sudanese troops and camelry, and was led by Major H. J. Huddleston, of the Dorsetshire Regiment, who on November 3 marched into Kulme, almost without opposition, and received a large number of surrenders. At dawn on the 6th Ali Dinar was surprised at Giuba, 30 miles from Kulme, and was shot through the head as he fled. Shortly afterwards his chiefs and headmen surrendered and all resistance disappeared.

CHAPTER 63

KUT CAPITULATES

After a long siege Sir Charles Townshend and his force surrendered to the Turks on April 29, 1916. The narrative is concerned with the advance to and retreat from Ctesiphon and the attempts made to relieve the beleaguered garrison at Kut

THE gradual and haphazard extension of the Mesopotamian campaign has been described, to the capture of Kut-al-Amara, in chapter 40.

Sir C. Townshend entered Kut on September 30, 1915, and immediately the question of a further advance to Baghdad began to be discussed. The capture of this famous city had been tentatively mooted as long ago as October 8, 1914, when the Viceroy of India wrote to the Secretary of State to the effect that in the event of Turkey entering the war he would be prepared for an attempt to capture Basra, "or even Baghdad"; and Sir John Nixon received definite instructions when he took over the command in March 1915 "to prepare a plan for a subsequent advance on Baghdad."

On October 3 Sir John Nixon wired to the secretary of state for India in the following terms:

> I consider I am strong enough to open road to Baghdad, and with this intention I propose to concentrate at Aziziya.

Fortified by Nixon's misleading optimism, the authorities at home definitely sanctioned the advance on Baghdad on October 23, promising two Indian divisions but specifically refusing to guarantee the date of their arrival. In view of what had gone before, the secretary of state, Mr. Austen Chamberlain, erred in not forbidding any advance before these two divisions were ready in support; but even more culpable was Nixon, who, knowing the difficulties of transport up the Tigris—of which, indeed, he had frequently complained—ordered Townshend to advance before the promised reinforcements had even reached Basra.

General Townshend had moved on immediately from Kut in the wake of the retreating Turks, and by October 5 his force was established at Aziziya, almost midway between Kut and Baghdad. Here he halted and constructed an entrenched camp. The Turks, rallying at Ctesiphon from their defeat, retraced their steps as far as Zor, 15 miles from Aziziya, and thence pushed forward an advance guard of some 1,500 men to Kutuniya. Townshend for a while had fears of an attack, but the Turkish purpose was simply to discourage a further British advance before their defences at Ctesiphon were ready. Skirmishes took place with the Turkish cavalry, but the chief difficulty was the increasing hostility of the Arabs. On October 28 Townshend, now considerably reinforced, drove the Turks from Kutuniya.

In a divisional order issued on October 11, Townshend, while thanking his troops for their successful exertions, stated that at present no advance was to be made on Baghdad. The situation was entirely changed later, and on October 24 he received instructions to prepare for an advance to commence, if possible, by November 14. The next fortnight was spent in the elaboration of plans of campaign and the reinforcement of his troops. The latter, already sorely tried and depleted in strength by a summer campaign in a hot, strange climate, suffered additionally at Aziziya from fever and the local disease known as beri-beri. Townshend himself described them as follows: "These troops of mine are tired and their tails are not up, but slightly down."

The total number of troops available in Mesopotamia at the start of the advance was 25,000. Of these, about 14,000 set forth on the advance from Aziziya, and in view of the long and difficult line of communication from Aziziya to Basra which had to be guarded, it was manifestly impossible to send any reinforcements in the event of a check. Everything was staked on an instant and decisive success. The attacking force consisted of the 6th infantry division, the 30th infantry brigade, a brigade and certain additional batteries of artillery, and 2½ regiments of cavalry. Accompanying it was a naval flotilla consisting of the Firefly—a new gunboat just arrived from England—the Comet, the Shaitan, the Sumana, the Shushan and the Mahsoudi. The high banks of the Tigris above Aziziya were greatly to hamper their fire. Townshend also commanded the service of the following river steamers, the Mejidieh, the Blosse Lynch, the Mosul, the Julnar, and the Salimi, and of a small number of aeroplanes.

From Aziziya to Baghdad was about 46 miles, though more than twice that distance by river. Townshend's force reached Kutuniya on November 18, and Zor on the following day. Little opposition was encountered, the Turks having withdrawn to Ctesiphon. The next stage was Lajj, reached on November 21. Here Townshend, within striking distance of the Turkish position, prepared his plan of attack. Various estimates had been made of the strength of the Turkish forces, but none had been larger than 13,000.

The Turkish position at Ctesiphon lay across the Tigris, but the greater concentration was on the left bank, where a strong line of redoubts linked by trenches was a formidable obstacle. About 3 miles behind was their second line, still ill-prepared, and farther still behind their final line lay on the river Diyala, where it joins the Tigris. Townshend, whose advance had been made up the left bank of the Tigris, decided to divide his force into four columns. Column "B," under Brigadier-



Map of the district lying along the Tigris between Amara and Baghdad. It shows the country over which the forces under Sir Charles Townshend operated and that over which the relieving army advanced early in 1916

Photos: Crown Copyright

ACES OF THE AIR

The courage needed for the hazardous tasks of the airmen in the war is here seen allied to an equally invincible cheerfulness. The centre figure, Lieutenant-Colonel Avery Bishop, a Canadian, who was awarded the V.C., D.S.O. and bar, M.C., and D.F.C., brought down 72 German planes and took part in 170 air battles

General W. G. Hamilton, which included the 2nd Norfolks and 6 guns of the 63rd battery of the R.F.A., was to proceed right behind the Turkish left flank and, in collaboration with the flying column under Major-General Melliss was to attack the enemy's left and rear after the frontal attack had been launched. Column "C," under Brigadier-General Hoghton, containing the 1st Oxford and Bucks L.I., 6 guns of the 76th battery of the R.F.A., and 2 guns of the 86th heavy battery of the R.G.A., was to make the frontal but mainly holding attack; while the chief onslaught, a flank attack on the extreme left of the Turkish first line, was to be delivered by Column "A" under Brigadier-General Delamain, his force including the 2nd Dorsetshires. The attack was to be supported by the guns of the naval flotilla. No troops were in reserve.

The four columns reached their appointed positions during the night of November 21–22. Right at the start, however, by giving permission to Hamilton to commence the turning attack before Hoghton's troops were engaged, Townshend deviated from the original plan of action. Column "B," therefore, assisted by the flying column, moved forward at 8.30 a.m. The troops advanced across open ground, but at 500 yards range a terrific fire was directed upon them from the enemy flanking trenches between their two lines of defence, and the advance was definitely checked. On their right the flying column was similarly brought to a standstill. Meanwhile, Hoghton's frontal advance had been held up 2,000 yards from the Turkish front line.

The first definite success of the battle was achieved by Column "A." Attacking from a point between Columns "B" and "C," Delamain's troops advanced with amazing bravery and drove the Turks in disorder from the redoubt on the extreme left of their line. Thence they permeated farther down the Turkish front line and, collaborating with the now resumed frontal attack by Column "C," ejected the Turks from the whole of their front line position on the left bank of the river. The disorder caused by the Turkish retreat enabled Column "B" to make some further advance, but not to effect the complete turning movement intended, nor did the British cavalry succeed in outflanking the retreat.

Contrary to what had been expected, and, indeed, gambled upon, the Turks rallied, and under the leadership of Jevad Bey, commander of the reserve, first checked the advance of a mixed force under Colonel Clino, that had reached to within 800 yards of the enemy's trenches and then forced it slowly to give way. Townshend sent orders to Delamain to gather all available troops in an attempt to capture the Turkish second line, but the lack of reserves now became a fatal handicap, and by 5 p.m. it was obvious that no further advance could be made that day. Townshend therefore concentrated the whole of his effective force on the Turkish first line.

As the concentration proceeded the Pyrrhic nature of the victory became increasingly evident. The British had

FOR USE UP ABOVE

This photograph shows the observer of a British plane taking on board a machine-gun magazine. The pilot in the forward cockpit controls a fixed double gun firing through the propeller. Low-flying machines often did great damage with their machine-guns among infantry both in and behind the lines



suffered 4,500 casualties out of a total of at most 14,000 men, and less than half the battle had been won. The Turkish casualties were, it is true, as great or greater and over 1,000 prisoners had been taken, but it was by now clear that Turkish reinforcements were nearing the vicinity. In any event, Townshend decided to attempt no further advance.

He was not to be left undisturbed, however, for during November 23 the Turks, in greatly superior numbers, launched a vigorous counter-attack. It was repulsed with heavy losses, and Turkish accounts speak glowingly of the resistance of the British troops; but the strain on the latter, who knew that they could not be reinforced, had become almost unbearable. The relative positions of the two forces were the same at dawn on November 24, but during that day Townshend, with the sanction of Nixon, decided to retreat to Lajj. The retreat was effected without incident during the night of November 25–26, the Turks, whose intelligence service was as defective as was the British, making no attempt to hinder it. At Lajj the troops were rejoined by the flotilla.

From his reports to Sir John Nixon on November 25, it is clear that Townshend thought of retreating no farther than Lajj. "Strategical and tactical reasons insist on Lajj as our advanced point, on which I hope you will direct ships, stores and reinforcements." Yet within a day of arrival at that place he had determined to retreat to Aziziya.

Photos: Imperial War Museum

NEVER QUIET

No immediate fighting is in progress on this stretch of the front line near Ploegsteert Wood, but this sector, one of the most dangerous in the line, was never altogether quiet. Two men of the Lancashire Fusiliers are cleaning a Lewis gun below

This stage of the retreat, a distance of 22 miles, was covered by weary troops in a single march between 4 p.m. on November 27 and 6 a.m. on November 28. Though harassed by Turkish cavalry and Arabs, they preserved a magnificent discipline, but in the following days they were subjected to even severer ordeals. At Umm at Tubul, the next stage in the retreat, reached on November 30, they were caught up by the Turks. The latter stumbled upon them after dark, but no action took place before dawn. The accurate fire of the British guns then paralysed the Turks, who were additionally frightened by an outflanking movement by the cavalry, and the Turkish 13th army corps disintegrated. Townshend, who rightly saw no hope in an offensive action, took the opportunity to retreat farther, and under heavy gun fire Umm at Tubul was evacuated. Qala Shadi, 26 miles distant, was reached the same evening, December 1, and on the morning of December 3 the weary troops marched into Kut-al-Amara.

On the river the British suffered heavily, but for this Captain Nunn, the commander of the flotilla, cannot be blamed. The appalling difficulties of navigation in a river studded with mud banks and shallows made inevitable the loss of ships if a rapid retreat, such as Townshend's withdrawal made necessary, was attempted. Of the vessels, the Shaitan ran aground and was abandoned above Aziziya, and a similar fate overtook the Firefly and the Comet at Umm at Tubul. In addition, three launches, six barges, all the pontoons and many other smaller craft were lost, but a large portion of the heterogeneous flotilla returned in safety, bearing stores which greatly strengthened the possibility of a successful resistance at Kut.

The evacuation of the wounded at Ctesiphon and during the retreat was a difficult problem, and when the terrible conditions on the hospital boats were made known there was an outburst of

TRENCH ARTILLERY

Men of a trench mortar battery are loading, in snow conditions, near Gommecourt, a 9·45 inch mortar. Having only a short range, it was placed close behind the front line, and was used offensively before an attack or defensively to cover a retreat

DINNER IS SERVED

Men of the Queen's Royal Regiment are enjoying, in what comfort they can, the mid-day meal in the front line near Arras. That their dinner may at any moment be violently disturbed, is shown by the careful watch kept by one of their number

anger at home. Townsend deserves credit for what he did, and the commission appointed to inquire into the disaster, said in its report :—

> Notwithstanding the deficiencies of medical equipment and transport, all the wounded were evacuated and all the prisoners were taken to Kut. This was a remarkable military achievement, carried out during a hazardous retreat against overwhelming odds . . . Great credit is due to the medical officers for their devoted work in thus evacuating their wounded, but many of those so moved suffered terribly, as the two prepared steamers could only accommodate a small proportion of them.

The sting of this passage lies in the opening words. It is perfectly true that the wounded were evacuated, and General Nixon, who at the time was ill, telegraphed to the secretary for India on December 7: "Wounded satisfactorily disposed of. . . . General condition of wounded very satisfactory. Medical arrangements under circumstances of great difficulty worked splendidly."

But the other side of the picture is seen elsewhere in the report of the commission, which states that there was a complete breakdown in medical arrangements, and that no effort was made to remedy the lack of equipment and transport that had been patent from the opening weeks of the campaign. For this the authorities in India must bear the chief responsibility. Frequent requests for such articles as mosquito nets and spine-pads and for supplies of anti-toxin were made and ignored, and the medical arrangements at the battle of Ctesiphon were still those of a frontier force. The report goes on :

> We are reluctant to describe the details of the condition in which many of the wounded arrived at Basra, on account of their sickening horror.

Kut-al-Amara has been described by Townshend's senior medical officer as "the most insanitary place the British had occupied in Mesopotamia." Here Townshend's forces stood at bay, and here, by December 7, they were completely invested by the Turks. At Kut the Tigris takes one of its innumerable bends in the shape of the letter U. Upon the peninsula thus formed, of about a mile in width and less than three-quarters of a mile in depth, Townshend occupied an entrenched position, the village—it scarcely deserves the designation of a town—lying at the most southerly end. The Shatt al Hai, a tributary joining the Tigris and the Euphrates, debouched from the former at the south-western corner of the peninsula. On the right bank of the river was the village of Yakasub, known to the British troops as Woolpress village, the only position outside the peninsula which Townshend attempted permanently to hold.

Before the retreat from Ctesiphon it had never been intended to use Kut for more than an advanced base, and on the arrival of Townshend's force the peninsula was inadequately prepared for defence, let alone to withstand a siege. Across the northern end, closing the loop of the river, was a barrier consisting of a mud-walled fort at the eastern end and four blockhouses connected by a barbed wire fence. Behind this first line Townshend constructed two further entrenched lines. All the seriously sick and badly wounded were evacuated, and most of the cavalry were sent back to Ali Gharbi ; of the flotilla only the Sumana, four launches, two motor-boats and six barges were retained.

General Nixon, with his staff, had already retired to Basra. Six thousand

ALARM SIGNAL

When respirators had been perfected, gas attacks lost much in efficacy, if enough warning was given. Hence the importance of this member of the Royal Garrison Artillery, ready to beat the gong at the first sign or report of the approaching cloud

RAIDERS IN WAITING

A party of the 10th Scottish Rifles is waiting for the signal which shall start them on a surprise dash across No Man's Land. Men picked specially for speed and courage were chosen for these raiding parties, few of whose members returned uninjured

'THEY'RE OFF!'

The same men, seen in the photograph above, are launched on their grim adventure over ground swept by bullets. Only speed can give them a chance of reaching the German trenches and bringing back prisoners who may give vital information of the enemy's dispositions

Photos: Imperial War Museum

GIVING UP THEIR SEATS

Though intrepid when faced by the enemy, these British cyclists have fallen easy victims to the wiles of these young ladies of the village of Vraignes. Their bicycles have been appropriated and they are being made to give lessons in the art of cycling

Arabs were, however, permitted to remain within the town; this clemency proved in the long run fatal, for the food they consumed would have enabled Townshend's force to hold out for many weeks longer. In other ways, however, Townshend acted, in the short time available, with speed, energy, and decision.

The Turkish activity commenced on December 8 with a prolonged bombardment, which was continued on the following day. A boat bridge across the eastern bend of the river's loop and near the southern end of the peninsula had been constructed on the 8th, but on the 9th the British were driven from the bridgehead on the right bank, and only the bravery of two British officers, in blowing up the bridge under cover of nightfall, averted the danger of the Turks gaining a footing on the left bank. The 11th saw a gradual Turkish advance towards the British first line, and on the 12th they launched a vigorous attack on the left, which was repulsed with heavy casualties.

For the next ten days there was a lull in the enemy's activities. Townshend's force on December 7 had numbered, inclusive of the sick and the wounded, about 11,500 men, of which about 7,000 were effective infantry. Townshend reported on December 13 that his casualties were averaging 150 to 200 a day. It was with this force—his guns numbered 43—that he had to meet the Turkish onslaught of December 24.

The point chosen for this second and, as it proved, final attack was the mud-walled fort. It possessed vital strategic importance for both sides, for it was the only place from which the Turkish position could be enfiladed, and if the Turks captured it the whole of the British line would be turned and control of the river lost. A preliminary bombardment by 22 Turkish guns pulverized the northern and north-eastern walls, and the north-eastern bastion was rendered almost untenable.

After more than four hours of bombardment the attack was launched with a great numerical superiority. On the bastion and north-eastern wall, held by the 103rd Mahrattas, the Turks gained a footing, and if the stockade behind the bastion, held by 30 men of the Oxford and Bucks L.I., had fallen, the enemy would have gained the day. But with the aid of the gun teams of the volunteer battery, rushed up in support, every assault was repulsed, and at the end of half an hour's hand-to-hand fighting the Turks retreated, as they also did from the north-eastern wall of the fort, where they were repulsed by the 119th Indian infantry, rallied and led by Major A. T. Anderson, commander of the volunteer battery.

A lull ensued throughout the afternoon, but at moonrise the Turks advanced again. Once more the bastion was stormed, once more the stockade became the vital point. For over three hours the situation remained desperately critical, but soon after the arrival of the 48th Pioneers, who had been engaged in the equally vital task of strengthening the second line of defence, the enemy began to waver and at midnight they withdrew. A final attack at 2.30 a.m. was repulsed with greater ease, and, no additional attacks taking place before the end of the year, Townshend was left free to concentrate on the further fortification of his sanctuary.

Meanwhile, preparations were being made for the relief of Kut. Immediately before and after the investment of Kut,

REPAIRS IN DANGER

The task assigned to these British cycle orderlies of effecting bicycle repairs under heavy shell fire on ground devoid of cover, is an unenviable one. The scene is the village of Etreillers, during the Arras offensive in the spring of 1917

Townshend telegraphed to Nixon a series of what have been described as "constant, querulous, and almost hysterical appeals" for relief.

He stated, on December 5, that his rations would last one month for British troops and 55 days for the Indian soldiers, and he urgently stressed the low morale of his men and the danger that Kut would be taken by assault. He at first demanded relief at the latest by the end of a month; and though he modified his demands when assured that the 28th brigade and the cavalry brigade were being concentrated at Ali Gharbi, the impression of dire necessity remained in the minds of General Nixon and his staff. Had anyone outside Kut known that, in fact, even though he was unwise enough to fail to make any rationing orders for weeks after the siege began, Townshend's supplies were to last until the end of April, or that he had grossly underestimated the resisting powers of his troops, the advance of the relief force could have been delayed and would have stood a far greater chance of success.

On his return to Basra in December, Nixon was a sick man, and at the beginning of January, 1916, he was succeeded by Sir Percy Lake, chief of the general staff in India. Before this, however, and while the promised two divisions from England were gradually arriving piecemeal, Nixon had begun to organize a relief force, known as the Tigris corps, under the command of Sir Fenton Aylmer. Both men realized the extreme hazard of an immediate advance, but they cannot be blamed for thinking that Townshend was *in extremis*, or for deciding to attack the Turkish positions below Kut in the first week in January. Their decision was later endorsed by Sir Percy Lake.

The difficulties facing Aylmer were many. Basra was admittedly the best base available, but it still suffered from an acute lack of wharfage as well as from lack of other facilities, while transport, both on the rivers and by land, was woefully insufficient.

A further difficulty was a lack of experienced staff officers, which hindered any rapid reorganization of a heterogeneous force. The 7th division, the backbone of the force, was formed of three brigades, the 28th, the 35th, and the 19th; the 28th was a complete and seasoned unit; but the 35th had only just been organized in India, and the 19th was "an improvized formation with a temporary brigadier and staff, and of its units the 1st Seaforth Highlanders was the only battalion which really belonged to it." All the brigades were new to the division, and most of the commanders and staffs were strangers to each other and to their men. To these handicaps must be added the slight contempt with which the drafts from France at first regarded their Mesopotamian comrades, and a definite home-sickness among the Indian troops who, coming from France, were now so near and yet so far from home.

The official History of the War sums up the situation thus:

> General Aylmer's force lacked . . . the standard of organization and cohesion which is desirable for a body of troops undertaking an offensive in a difficult country . . . operations which would depend primarily upon combination and unity of effort.

Finally, ever present as a handicap, was the difficulty of transport.

On January 3, 1916, there were concentrated at Ali Gharbi sixteen battalions of infantry, seventeen squadrons of cavalry and forty-two guns, as

Photo: Imperial War Museum

AFTER A FORCED LANDING

The pilot and observer of this British B.E. aeroplane, though compelled to make a forced landing near Pozières, have avoided irreparable damage to themselves or their machine and have been lucky enough to land behind their own lines

DEATH ON THE WING

This photograph shows two twenty-pounder bombs being fixed to the wing of a British fighting plane. Carried in a rack on the underside of the wing, they were released by a lever control operated by the pilot from his seat

Photo: Crown Copyright



Photo: Imperial War Museum

ANOTHER WAVE GOES FORWARD

The opening day of the Arras offensive, April 9, 1917, saw very considerable British successes, the first two German lines being over-run. Here troops, hitherto held in reserve, are moving out of support trenches to take over part of the newly-won position

Photo: Imperial War Museum

TOLL OF BATTLE

Advanced dressing stations presented scenes of hectic activity on the opening days of any offensive. In the month of April, 1917, which saw the opening of the Arras offensive, casualties exceeded 100,000. German prisoners here act as stretcher bearers at Tilloy

well as four new gunboats—the Butterfly, the Dragonfly, the Cranefly and the Gadfly—commanded by Captain Nunn. The British troops included the 2nd Leicestershire regiment, the 1/5th Buffs, the 1st Seaforth Highlanders, the 9th brigade of the R.F.A., the 72nd, 79th and part of the 104th batteries of the R.G.A., the 14th Hussars, and the 1/4th Hampshire regiment. The 2nd Black Watch were among the troops who arrived on January 5.

The Turks had prepared formidable lines of defence. The first line at Shaikh Saad, about 25 miles due east of Kut, was on both sides of the Tigris; five miles above Shaikh Saad a second line of defence was made at the point where the Wadi cuts into the Tigris at Ora. Above Ora the great Suwaiqiya marsh runs alongside the left bank at a distance varying from one to three miles from the river. Here three formidable lines of defence were dug astride the river, the right flanks resting on the Umm-al-Baram marsh. These passed, there remained the most complete of all, the Es Sinn line, about seven miles east of Kut, astride the river, with its right flank drawn back to the Shatt-el-Hai, and its left flank running up to, and extending beyond, the Suwada marsh.

The first objective, therefore, was Shaikh Saad, and towards it the 6th cavalry brigade and the 7th division, under the command of Sir G. J. Younghusband, began to move on January 4. The advance was up both sides of the river, Major-General Kemball being in command of the column on the right bank. The total force numbered about 13,000 men. By the afternoon of January 5 the advance had moved forward to Musandaq reach, five or six miles from Shaikh Saad, without meeting anything more redoubtable than hostile Arabs and two squadrons of Turkish cavalry. The first attack on the Turkish position was made on the following day on both banks of the river but the only result was heavy casualties. Aylmer moved up from Ali Gharbi on the same afternoon with reinforcements. A difference of opinion ensued between Aylmer and Younghusband on the plan of attack, and early in the morning of the 7th the former decided that the latter and Kemball should command independently on the left and right banks, reporting direct to him.

The attack was resumed the same morning. On the left bank little could be achieved, the Turkish fire being accurate and continuous; but on the right the gallantry of both Indian and British troops, and in particular of the Leicestershires, had its reward in the storming of the Turkish trenches. January 8 was a day of indecision, but on the 9th a further advance disclosed the fact that the Turks had abandoned Shaikh Saad, which was duly occupied, and had then retired to their second position at Ora. The British casualties, 4,000 in number, were severe; but even more ominous were the difficulties of manœuvring over ground made boggy by the rains and intersected by irrigation channels, the unexpectedly stiff resistance of the Turks, and the fact that the Tigris had risen in flood.

An air reconnaissance on January 11 showed that the Turks had taken up a position between the river Wadi and the impassable Suwaiqiya marsh, thus opening up the possibility of a flank attack which would have been impossible had they concentrated at the mouth of the Hanna defile between the marsh and the Tigris. Aylmer determined to make such an attack with the main body of his force under Younghusband, while the 9th and 28th brigades under Kemball performed a frontal holding operation. Accordingly, after a night march, Younghusband's force crossed the Wadi early in the morning of January 13, while the 28th brigade occupied Chittab fort, driving the Turks from their advanced positions on the eastern side of that river. But, as at Shaikh Saad, both forces met with stubborn resistance.

Opposite Younghusband's force the Turks dug themselves in along a line of watercuts and could not be dislodged; and though late in the afternoon the 28th brigade, assisted by the guns of the gunboats on the Tigris, carried the ground between the Chittab fort and the Wadi, they could get no farther. Darkness fell upon a British failure that cost 600 casualties, though Younghusband reported inaccurately that he had practically encircled the enemy,

Photos: Imperial War Museum

MERCY WELL ORGANIZED

This photograph shows a scene at an advanced dressing station at Tilloy after the opening of the Arras offensive. Casualties are awaiting attention before being placed in the ambulances. The organization of these dressing stations reached a high pitch of efficiency

leading Aylmer to surmise that they were cut off from retreat to the defile, and that the Turks would find themselves surrounded when fighting recommenced.

That this was not the case was seen the next morning when it was discovered that overnight the Turks had retired in good order to a line, 1,350 yards long, of prepared trenches at the entrance to the defile. Aylmer considered—as it turned out, rightly—that it would be little short of madness to attempt a frontal attack without the aid of a powerful enfilading fire from guns on the right bank of the Tigris. When it proved impossible, owing to weather conditions, to construct a bridge over which to carry the guns, he informed Nixon that such an attack would cost him half his force and that he deemed it highly unwise; but in face of a peremptory rebuke from Nixon, who, at Basra, was in no position to judge, he was compelled to attempt it.

The attack, made on January 21, failed, though for a while the daring of the Black Watch who penetrated into the Turkish first line seemed to offer a chance of success. They could not be supported, however, and the British repulse was made more inevitable by heavy rain and frequent breakdown of communications.

For a month no further fighting took place on the Tigris. Immediately after the failure at Hanna, Townshend telegraphed that he had rations for two more months—information that would have been more valuable and as easy to give a fortnight earlier. In the meanwhile, however, early in February, it had been decided that "instructions with regard to military operations in Mesopotamia would issue from the chief of the imperial general staff to the commander-in-chief in India under the authority of the secretary of state for war, in exactly the same manner as to the commanders-in-chief in other theatres." The immediate result was

a quickening of interest at the War Office, and the offer, at once accepted, of an additional division, the 13th, as well as an extra division already promised from India.

On January 28 Sir G. F. Gorringe arrived at Aylmer's headquarters and became unofficial chief of staff to the latter. Gorringe in the previous month had been in command of the small force on the Euphrates, and had succeeded in temporarily stabilizing the British position round Butaniya. Brigadier-General Brooking, who succeeded to him, withdrew his force, with some loss at the hands of the Arabs, to Nasariya. A surprise move by the British on the Tigris on February 22, resulted in Gorringe seizing a position on the right bank at Sannaiyat in rear of the Hanna position, but Aylmer rejected the possibility of throwing troops across the river to block the Turks in the Hanna defile. The ground gained by Gorringe, and on February 24 by Brigadier-General Keary, on the right bank, gave a more advanced position for a march across the desert to the Es Sinn position.

This was, in fact, the next and by far the most daring and ambitious move in the attempt to relieve Kut. Aylmer had been reinforced by the 37th infantry brigade from India and by the first arrivals of the 13th division, and it was decided early in March that an attack on the Dujaila redoubt, the central position in the Es Sinn lines, provided the best chance of success. The element of surprise could be achieved by a night march. Accordingly a force, divided into three columns, was detailed to assemble at the Pools of Siloam, some 12 miles north-east of the redoubt, on the night of March 7. Column "A," which was to carry out an outflanking movement, was commanded by General Kemball, column "B," the cavalry brigade, by Brigadier-General Stephen, and finally, column "C," which was destined for a frontal

BATTLE'S AFTERMATH

Amid the ruins of what had previously been the village of Tilloy, a British working party is busily digging. They are trying to produce some sort of order out of the chaos created by their own guns before the capture of the position

Photo: Imperial War Museum

FOOD FOR THE FOE

German prisoners, captured during the Arras offensive and securely caged in by barbed wire, are here seen, ankle-deep in mud, carrying the rations they have just drawn. After the first few days of the offensive, rain, snow and sleet fell continuously

attack, by General Keary. The time factor was vital, for it was considered necessary to concentrate after darkness, which, calculating by the time usually taken on night marches, left a margin of only one hour if the troops were to be in their positions by dawn. Both Sir F. Aylmer and, at Basra, Sir P. Lake realized that their scheme was a gamble, but, unlike the advance on Bagdad, it was a gamble based on necessity.

The first hitch occurred when the artillery arrived an hour late; the march, timed to start at 9 p.m., did not do so until 10.20. The men then proceeded undiscovered, but far more slowly than had been hoped, and at dawn Kemball's column were still well short of the redoubt. The chance of complete surprise had thus been lost, and Kemball, against the advice of his subordinate, Brigadier-General Christian, delayed all action for an hour after the time, 6.30 a.m., when he had come within striking distance of the redoubt, in order that the whole 2000 men of the attacking force might deploy in the right formation. Whether or not he was justified has been hotly debated; it is in any case an unhappy thought that had he attacked at once the redoubt would have fallen, since, owing to lack of water supply, it was held by only 200 Turks.

When later the British attack was delivered it failed against a strong position now held in force. In the course of the afternoon the 37th brigade got into the redoubt, but it could not be adequately supported. The co-ordination of the British attack was faulty, Kemball having only a confused idea of the progress and distribution of his troops. The next day Aylmer decided to withdraw—a decision hotly criticized by Kemball, who maintained that the Turks had been badly shaken and would in all probability have retired.

One more attempt was made to relieve Kut. Aylmer was superseded during March by Gorringe. By now, with 30,000 troops under his command, the latter decided to attack the Turkish positions at Hanna and Sannaiyat. On April 5, Major-General Maude and the 13th division took the former by a frontal attack, and penetrated to Fallahiya, half-way to Sannaiyat, and at 1 a.m., on April 6, the 7th division endeavoured to continue the advance over ground that was almost under water. A particularly gallant attack by the 28th brigade, led by the Oxford and Bucks L.I. and the 51st Sikhs, reached a line 500 yards from the Turkish lines at Sannaiyat; but after hours of desperate fighting the severity of the Turkish fire, which has been described as a "torrent of death," and the rapid rise of the Tigris, compelled retreat, and another night attack, early on the 9th, was equally unsuccessful.

In a last desperate endeavour, a series of attacks were delivered on the right bank of the Tigris, over nearly flooded ground and in terrible weather, between April 13 and 22, by the 3rd and 13th divisions. The fort at Bait Isa was captured on April 17, but the British could get no farther and a Turkish counter-attack, though unsuccessful and costly, told of the strength of the enemy's resistance. On the left bank no impression could be made on the Sannaiyat lines. Finally, the steamer Julnar, commanded by Lieutenant Firman, R.N., made a forlorn attempt on April 25, to get supplies through to Townshend. She reached Maqasis, about 8 miles by river from Kut, but there struck a cable and surrendered.

Meanwhile, in Kut, Townshend had been in the main inactive, but no further serious attempts were made by the Turks to capture the town by assault. Before the British attacks in January, and again before the action of the Dujaila redoubt, it was suggested to Townshend that he should aid by a sortie. In neither case did he do so, though on the latter occasion it seems that such an action might have had a decisive effect. It must, however, be realized that strict rationing had reduced the fighting power of the garrison. That his force held out as long as it did was largely due to the personality of its leader, who, whatever his faults as a commander, proved an inspiration to the men he led. The condition of the garrison at the time of its surrender may be judged from the fact that troops in the front lines had been too weak to march back carrying their kits. Casualties, during the defence, were 3,776.

Townshend surrendered on April 29, going himself to an honourable imprisonment on the island of Prinkipo, though his men were less fortunate; and so ended the second and disastrous phase of the Mesopotamian campaign. Strategically misconceived, it lacked nearly every military virtue except gallantry. Lack of transport and supplies, the scandalous medical breakdown, want of co-ordination between the various commanders, the rapid alternation of optimism and the deepest gloom: these were some of its less pleasing features.

Nixon's inability to face the facts of the situation and, in particular, his attempt to gloss over the hospital conditions, Townshend's utter lack of judgement, the inefficiency shown by the Indian authorities and the pusillanimous conduct of the India Office, all were made plain by the subsequent investigations, and all contributed to a result whereby thousands of lives—the casualties of the Tigris corps alone amounted to 23,000—were sacrificed in the pursuit of an object, Baghdad, which at that stage should never have been attempted.

Photos: Imperial War Museum

ESCAPE AND WARNING

Three British dispatch riders on a road through an Alpine gorge on the Italian front have narrowly escaped the bursting of a gas shell. Another rider is being warned that he is about to enter the danger zone, guarded by barbed wire and a sentry

BRITISH LEND A HAND

After the Italian disaster at Caporetto, and before the recovery on the Piave, French and British troops were ordered to the Italian front. Here men of the Royal Engineers are seen digging a trench in unaccustomed surroundings on the slopes of the Dolomites

CHAPTER 64

WARFARE IN THE AIR

The story of the war in the air, begun in Chapter 41, is here continued to the spring of 1917. In addition to the fighting over the several battle fronts, the narrative deals with the Zeppelin menace to Great Britain

TOWARDS the end of the battle of Loos, in October, 1915, a marked improvement in the performance of German aeroplanes began to make itself felt. British and French pilots found that their machines were no match for the new, swift aeroplanes with which the German pilots were being supplied, and consequently the successes obtained by the enemy constituted a grave menace. On the Mesopotamian front the situation was much the same, the machines which the Germans supplied to the Turks being superior to those of the Royal Flying Corps and Royal Naval Air Service engaged in attempts to relieve Kut. At the opening of the battle of Verdun the German supremacy seriously hampered the aeroplanes spotting for the French gunners, whilst on the Russian front anti-aircraft devices were so weak that Zeppelins were largely employed by the Germans on daylight reconnaissances.

The main reason for the German ascendancy was the improved Fokker monoplane. A remarkably fast machine, it was able to attain great heights and make long vertical dives. Moreover, most of these machines were fitted with interrupter gear, by which the firing of the machine-gun was synchronized with the engine, thus allowing the pilot to fire through the blades of the propeller. This innovation gave the Fokker a marked fighting superiority.

The Fokker pilots imitated the hawk in their manoeuvres. Hovering over their own lines at a great height, they awaited the arrival of a suitable victim, when, swooping down in one of the long dives for which these machines were renowned, they approached their enemy from an unguarded angle, usually from the direction of the sun, whence they were invisible, and poured a hail of lead into him before he was even aware of the danger. The manoeuvre, known as the Immelmann turn, was perfected by the German pilots. At first most confusing to the British and French airmen, this skilful manoeuvre caused the loss of many machines. But the real danger of the Fokker lay, not so much in its fighting ability as in the moral effect it exercised over its rivals.

But the Fokker was not long to go unchallenged. The French generals, Pétain and Nivelle, took instant steps to obtain machines with the speed and climbing powers of the dreaded enemy, and a number of private French aeroplane-making firms found a free field for development. The result was that French losses rapidly diminished and victories in aerial combat began to increase correspondingly.

In Great Britain, Kitchener proceeded to repair the defects which had arisen in the Royal Aircraft Factory and the methods of the military authorities who relied upon it. Sir W. S. Brancker, an artillery officer with flying experience, was made director of air organization, assisted by Sir J. M. Salmond and Colonel Charlton. The best available material from private and foreign sources was ordered in considerable quantities, and the personnel of the R.F.C. was quickly expanded. A private British machine, the de Havilland, began to be used on active service in large numbers before the improved official F.E. machine arrived. The new Martinsyde, the fighting Maurice and the new Sopwith were placed at the service of the pilots of the R.F.C.

Meanwhile, the Rolls-Royce company had produced a 250 h.p. aero-motor of an original kind. It was fitted into a government machine, and in May, 1915, was entrusted to a pilot who had never flown to France. Being ordered to fly to the front, he lost his way, strayed over Lille, was attacked by German guns, and, coming down, presented the enemy with a valuable sample of the new aero-motor on which Great Britain was largely relying to regain her dominion of the air.

By this time the B.E.2c machine, a product of the Royal Aircraft Factory, had become antiquated owing to the progress made by German, British and French manufacturers, as were the hundreds of British machines manufactured to the order of the government by firms new to the art of aeroplane construction. Some of these firms had been delayed in production by late alterations and even by downright errors in the drawings supplied to them by the Royal Aircraft Factory.

Sir Hugh Trenchard, however, the chief of the R.F.C., devised a method of operation as soon as he obtained from private British firms a few battle-planes capable of assisting the Bristol Bullet pilots and Vickers gun-bus pilots, and manoeuvring against the new Fokker. The old, slow machines were sent out in flocks of from six to 12. High above the weak flock of workers circled two or three of the battle-planes, ready to engage any Fokker that swooped into the field. By the first week in May, 1916, duels in the air began to grow infrequent; instead, combats took place between squadrons of fast fighting machines at high altitudes, while far below them there was often a flight of almost defenceless working planes waiting the issue of the battle.

Gradually the number of British fighting planes increased, the perils of the British scouts, spotters and bombers were diminished, and for a time Great Britain and France held a practical dominion of the heavens. Meanwhile some remarkable battle practice went on behind the British front in the late spring and early summer of 1916. From aerial photographs a good reproduction of the German system of fortifications was constructed on the practice field, and over the lacework of trenches the British infantry manoeuvred in attack, in conjunction with low-flying, directing airmen known as contact patrols.

As a result of organization in the field the R.F.C. was thoroughly rearranged. Six distinct orders of machines were developed. Fighting planes were divided into two classes, one of which operated over the British lines in a defensive manner, while the other swept out over the German lines to attack Fokker pilots, and at the same time protect British working machines. The working machines were, as a general rule, arranged in scouting groups, artillery observation groups, aerial photography groups, bombing raid groups and infantry contact groups.

By the nature of things the fighting pilots came most brightly into the limelight of fame. The tale of their exploits is a long record of singular daring, of daily hazard cheerfully faced and conquered. Chief among them was Captain Albert Ball, who ranked in the summer of 1916 above all French and German fighting pilots in regard to his record of victories. Only 19 years of age, he had taken part in 100 air combats, and had brought down 30 enemy aeroplanes.

Another great fighter was George R. McCubbin. While still a learner he went out with Lieutenant Savage and saw his comrade brought down by the ace of the Fokker fighters, Lieutenant Immelmann. A few days afterwards, on June 18, 1916, McCubbin engaged

HER MAJESTY IN FRANCE

This photograph shows the Queen, on one of her many visits to France, chatting to British troops on the platform of Wimereux station. This little French watering-place, just north of Boulogne, achieved importance in the War as a hospital base, and also, for a short time before October, 1914, as the seat of General Headquarters

A FABLED CITY FALLS

On March 11, 1917, Sir Stanley Maude, here seen at the head of his troops, entered Baghdad, evacuated by the Turks during the previous night. Its capture was made possible by brilliant leadership in a three-months campaign that entirely retrieved the disasters that followed Townshend's premature and ill-fated attempt to take the city in 1915

MODERN GRENADIERS

In a rock-hewn trench on the Isonzo front Austrian soldiers are hurling hand grenades at an Italian position. A primitive type of grenade was in use throughout the 18th century, but fell into disuse in the 19th century. In the Russo-Japanese, as in the Great War, a modern type was a potent offensive weapon

Immelmann and sent his machine crashing to the ground, Immelmann being killed. Captain R. N. Adams, who attacked six enemy machines over the enemy's lines, set one on fire and drove off the others, was another noted pilot. Lieutenant Dirk Cloete first acted as observer to Adams, and later, promoted pilot, saw his former chief engaged with six enemy machines. Diving into the affray, he sent one enemy crashing to earth and helped to fight away the other five, another of which Adams himself brought down.

In fights against odds Captain W. A. Summers as pilot, and Lieutenant W. O. T. Tudor-Hart as observer, appear almost to have topped the list. Quite unsupported, they attacked over the German lines, a formation of 10 enemy aeroplanes. Under constant fire from as many as four hostile machines at one time, they broke up the formation, and, though their own machine was badly damaged, they continued their extraordinary struggle until all their ammunition was expended.

When the Fokker crisis arose in the autumn of 1915, the British pilots often operated scarcely higher than 8,000 feet. In their new Fokkers, with engines of 200 h.p., Immelmann, Boelcke, Wintgen and other German pilots used to wait at an altitude of 12,000 feet and dive down on the B.E. machines. From the end of March to the middle of October, 1916, however, the new British machines enabled the officers of the R.F.C. to recover their former superiority. On some sectors the range of enemy vision extended only a few hundred yards beyond their fire-trenches, while the aerial eyes of the British and French armies ranged over hundreds of miles of German activities. The Krupp works at Essen were bombarded by two French airmen on September 22, 1916; and on November 17, Captain de Beauchamp, in his Sopwith biplane, carried out a raid on Munich.

It was now the turn of the Germans to take steps to recover their lost supremacy. In the first week of October, 1916, the new Halberstadt, with a 240 h.p. engine, and the German Spad, of similar power, soared above the British fighting planes. Possessing terrific speed and extraordinary power of climb, they enabled the German pilots to operate at the amazing working height of 17,000 to 20,000 feet and to swoop upon all British battle-planes that could not cruise at more than 12,000 or 15,000 feet.

Casualty lists began to show that the R.F.C. was again losing heavily, and Haig, in his communiqués, admitted day after day serious losses in machines. In a dispatch written in the last week of December, 1916, the British commander-in-chief significantly remarked:

> I desire to point out that the maintenance of the mastery of the air, which is essential, entails a constant and most liberal supply of the most up-to-date machines, without which the most skilful pilots cannot succeed.

But before these words of warning were published, efforts were made to reform British aeroplane construction. At the beginning of August, 1916, an investigating committee—composed of Sir Richard Burbidge, Sir Charles A. Parsons, and Sir H. F. W. Donaldson—reported on the condition of affairs at the Royal Aircraft Factory at Farnborough. The report revealed a very serious lack of efficiency in organization in all departments, and as a result a thorough reorganization was carried out. In September, 1916, a new superintendent was appointed, and closer relations were instituted between the Royal Aircraft Factory and the many inventive minds in private works.

About the time when the Burbidge committee began investigating the organization of the Aircraft Factory, another committee was appointed, with Mr. Justice Bailhache as chairman, to report on the administration of the R.F.C. Its final report was issued on December 20, 1916, a few days before Haig stated in his dispatch that better machines were still needed. The Bailhache committee found that the military authorities had on occasions greatly delayed the ordering of available high-powered engines.

On the other hand, a high-powered engine, designed by the Aircraft Factory, offered for construction to the Rolls-Royce company and refused by them, was ordered in large quantities from other private firms before the engine had been proved. The committee considered that the feeling of the private manufacturers that their designs did not receive fair treatment and their finished products fair tests, in comparison with those of the Aircraft Factory, could not be removed under the existing conditions. But the most important sentence of the committee's report was that "the later productions of the Royal Aircraft Factory are not, on the whole, so good as some of the machines now produced by private firms."

The fighting organization of the R.F.C. was also the subject of criticism. The committee found that the War had been proceeding for over a year before an aerodrome was fitted up for aerial musketry. No school for air fighting was opened until September, 1915, and the small one then set up at Hythe was inadequate. There were many cases of pilots having to fight in the air without a sufficient knowledge of their weapons. Moreover, the frequency with which machine-guns jammed in the early aerial combats was, the committee suggested, a sign of carelessness in training.

The Bailhache committee found that the loss of the mastery of the air for some six months from October, 1915, to March, 1916, was due to the fact that the old Royal Aircraft product B.E.2c was not so fast or so handy as the Fokker. There were some machines at the front capable of dealing with the Fokker on equal terms, but they were not available in sufficient numbers. In conclusion, the committee recommended that the position of chief of the Royal Aircraft Factory, which Sir David Henderson occupied, should be split up into a fighting command and an equipment directorship. A single equipment department should supply both the army and navy flying services. The continued existence of the Royal Aircraft Factory was recommended, not as a manufacturing establishment, but only as a research and experimental centre. This investigation, with the consequent reorganization of the War Office works and the establishment of an efficient air ministry, came belatedly.

The Admiralty had relied upon private British makers long before the opening of the War, and had given orders that saved some of the best of them from bankruptcy at a time when the Royal Aircraft Factory seemed to discourage private enterprise. Thus the two services, the R.N.A.S. and the R.F.C., were being supplied on different principles, and the conflicting views of their chiefs shook the foundations of the air board, which had been formed in May, 1916, as a breakwater against the strong current of popular feeling in the matter of the air services. Lord Curzon was appointed chairman, but he was unable to impose agreement upon the representatives of the naval and military branches.

The creation of the new war ministry under Mr. Lloyd George, after the fall of the Asquith cabinet in December, 1916, called Lord Curzon away from the air board, and he was succeeded by Lord Sydenham. But the resignation of Lord Sydenham, on December 30, 1916, indicated that the tension in the air board had been increased rather than diminished by the publication of Haig's request for better machines in larger numbers. Thereupon the new ministry made a determined effort to develop the air board into a great air ministry. Lord Cowdray was made air minister, and given the Hotel Cecil as his office. Admiral Vaughan-Lee, the chief of the naval air service, was succeeded by Commodore G. M. Paine, for whom a

Photo: Imperial War Museum

INTERLUDE IN BATTLE

Bad weather greatly impeded the progress of the Arras offensive and, as can be seen from this photograph, caused the flooding of the river Scarpe. Troops, limbers, and R.A.M.C. men are gathered by the river bank behind the lines during a lull in the battle

new position was created as air lord of the Admiralty. Sir David Henderson remained director general of aeronautics, and occupied on the army council a position similar to that which Commodore Paine filled on the board of Admiralty, but the ministry of munitions took over the exclusive control of the production of aircraft for both the R.F.C. and the R.N.A.S.

The crisis of the autumn and early winter of 1916 was not so serious as that of the previous year, for, mainly as the direct result of public agitation, the inventive and organizing genius of Great Britain was roused. Accidents, however, continued to happen. The first de Havilland fighter, answering the Fokker, was shot down by the enemy in the spring of 1916, the day after it arrived at the front. Then, as already stated, the first new government machine, with the first 250 h.p. Rolls-Royce engine, was landed in enemy territory. On January 3, 1917, the first British machine of superior power to the Spad and Halberstadt was likewise given to the Germans. It was a Handley-Page super-aeroplane, with two Rolls-Royce engines, giving together 500 h.p., and its R.N.A.S. pilot lost his way in the mist and landed within the enemy's lines. The loss of this machine showed the enemy what he would soon have to encounter, and proved that the Admiralty, like the war office, was wrong in sending single examples of new types to operate at the front, instead of reserving the machines until a large formation could be sprung upon the Germans.

Photos: Imperial War Museum

VICTORY'S VICTIMS

A suburb of Arras, Blangy was the scene of much fierce hand-to-hand fighting in April, 1917, its lines being desperately defended by the Germans before they retired. Here British wounded are waiting to be lifted into the motor ambulances

While attention was being directed towards improving the British striking power on the fighting front, the defence of Britain against air raids had been rather neglected. On the night of January 22, 1916, a hostile aeroplane flew over the Kent coast and dropped nine bombs in rapid succession, killing one man, and wounding two men, one woman and three children. In the afternoon of the next day, two German seaplanes made another attack, upon Dover, but were beaten back by heavy fire. Again, on February 9, at half-past three in the afternoon, two German seaplanes bombed Ramsgate and Broadstairs, wounding three people.

On February 20 the enemy extended his aeroplane raids, and two biplanes circled over Lowestoft, dropped bombs, and vanished. A quarter of an hour afterwards they returned and dropped more bombs. Five minutes before their return two naval aeroplanes went up, but failed to overtake the raiders At the same time two other German seaplanes were making for the Kentish coast, and after bombing the lightship by the Kentish Knock one of the raiders made for Walmer, where it dropped several bombs. Two aeroplanes went up from Dover, and got over Walmer at 11.15 a.m., 12 minutes before the raider arrived, but again the British machines failed to overtake the enemy. On March 19, four German seaplanes flew over Kent. The first pair bombed Ramsgate, Margate and Westgate, and the second pair flew over Dover, bombed the harbour and the town and then Deal. Five men, three women and six children were killed, and 26 persons injured.

On January 31, 1916, the midland counties were visited by nine Zeppelins, bombs being dropped in Norfolk, Suffolk, Lincolnshire, Leicestershire, Derbyshire

DEADLY RATIONS

This photograph shows British troops near Heninel during the Arras offensive. They have just drawn their ration of bombs, usually limited in a general attack to two per man, and are moving off to the front line, fully equipped with bombs and fixed bayonets

Photos: Imperial War Museum

CAVALRY AND CALVARY

British cavalry are crossing a temporary bridge over the Somme near Crie. They are passing a wayside Calvary, one of many left standing on the battlefields all along the Western front

and Staffordshire. One ship, L 14, penetrated inland as far as Shrewsbury, and a good deal of damage was done at Walsall and neighbouring towns. The loss of life was 70 persons killed and 113 injured, of whom 76 were women and 34 children. On this occasion the L 19, after spending almost 11 hours over Britain, was forced down in the North Sea. The trawler King Stephen sighted the wreck, on which there were a score of men, some armed. Fearing that they might overpower his small crew if he took them aboard, the captain returned to the Humber to report. Unfortunately, however, a gale sprang up, and the airship sank with all her crew before help could reach it.

Three Zeppelins, L 11, L 13 and L 14, dropped bombs on the counties of York, Lincoln, Rutland, Huntingdon, Cambridge, Norfolk, Essex and Kent, on March 5. The only military damage was inflicted at Hull, where a dockshed and a crane were blown up. The casualties, however, were heavy, 18 persons being killed and 52 injured.

On March 25, an attack by seaplanes on Zeppelin sheds in Schleswig was carried out, supported by Sir R. Tyrwhitt and his destroyers. The aerial force, however, was quite inadequate. A week earlier 65 pilots had been sent against Zeebrugge and had met with considerable success. But against the more important Zeppelin base on the Schleswig coast, it seems only five seaplanes were sent. Three of the seaplanes were brought down.

Towards the close of the spring of 1916 reports began to appear in the German and the Swiss press of new and more powerful Zeppelins. They were to carry an increased armament of guns, and a heavier cargo of bombs, and their range of action was to be such as to bring the whole area of the British Isles within their power. From time to time these giants had been observed over Lake Constance, and their immense size and extraordinary speed had

THUNDER ON A STRING

This 8-inch howitzer, in its sheltered emplacement near Wagnonlieu, has just been fired. The smoke emerging from the barrel obscures for the moment the whole line of vision. The gun is effectively camouflaged from the air by netting

Photo: Imperial War Museum

OASIS IN BATTERED YPRES

The cavalry barracks at Ypres was one of the very few buildings to retain, in spite of semi-destruction by shellfire, any value as a shelter. It is here seen in use as temporary billets for Australian troops enjoying a short respite from the horrors of 'Third Ypres'

Photos: Imperial War Museum

WANTON AND VAIN DESTRUCTION

These trees have been deliberately felled by the Germans before they retreated to the Hindenburg line. By similar acts of pointless vandalism they made the whole of the district through which they retreated into a waste land

impressed all who saw them. It was not until the autumn of 1916, when one of these giants, intact but for its outer covering, fell into the hands of the British forces, that details of its construction could be ascertained. The airship in question, L 33, was one of the very largest type. It was compelled by the British artillery fire to make a forced landing in Essex, where the crew, after setting it alight, surrendered.

German hopes of these ships ran high, and were not dimmed by misadventures to the old type of Zeppelin in the spring. On March 31, five Zeppelins raided Lincolnshire, Essex and Suffolk, and 48 persons were killed and 64 injured. The killed included 31 soldiers belonging to the 3rd Manchesters. They were billeted in a chapel at Cleethorpes, when a bomb dropped by L 22 demolished the building.

Of the five raiders, two were hit by anti-aircraft guns. The first, L 13, was hit by a tracer shell near Stowmarket, but managed to limp home. The other, L 15, was less fortunate. It was compelled to descend near the mouth of the Thames, where the crew surrendered to H.M.S. Olivine, which took her in tow until she sank. On the following night two Zeppelins dropped bombs on Sunderland. Considerable damage was done, mainly to shops and houses, and 22 persons were killed and 130, including two soldiers, injured. The raiders on this occasion were L 11 and L 17.

On the night of April 2 Scotland was visited by L 14 and L 22. Bombs were dropped on Edinburgh, but little damage was done. While these two Zeppelins were raiding Scotland, two others crossed the east coast of England and dropped bombs near Ipswich. Most of the bombs were incendiary, but little material damage was inflicted. Altogether 13 persons were killed and 24 injured. Five more raids were made before the month closed. The first took place on the night of the 3rd, but no results were obtained and no lives were lost. On the 5th, two ships bombed Bishop Auckland, the outskirts of Hull and Skinningrove, where a laboratory and iron works were wrecked. In Durham a child was killed and five persons injured, and at Hull four persons received injury.

The next raid came on the 24th. Altogether 10 Zeppelins took part, although two were forced to return home before they reached the British Isles. Apparently these vessels were acting in cooperation with the navy, land objectives being only of secondary importance, for few bombs were thrown and did no damage. One man, however, was injured, and a woman died of shock.

Another raid came on the 25th; five Zeppelins took part, and east Suffolk, Essex, Kent and London were reached. Little damage was done, but the raid is important because of the excellent work done by defending aeroplanes and guns in driving off the raiders. Lieutenant W. Leefe Robinson got near enough to one ship to spray her with bullets, and another officer, Lieutenant A. T. Harris, got within 2,000 feet of another, but was unable to engage her owing to the failure of his Lewis gun. The last raid of the month took place on the 26th. A single Zeppelin visited Kent, but only penetrated a little way inland. Most of the bombs dropped fell into the sea off Deal, and no injury of any kind was inflicted.

The spring Zeppelin offensive came to an end after a raid by nine airships on May 2. On this occasion Scotland, Yorkshire, and Northumberland were

CHAOS AT CAULAINCOURT

Below can be seen another example of German ruthlessness in retreat. The château of Caulaincourt has been completely demolished, and British troops are clearing away sufficient débris to free the course of the river Omignon which flows by the castle walls

Photo: Imperial War Museum

KEEP TO THE WHITE LINE

Australian troops have swept on past this German strong-point in the course of the battle of the Menin Road late in 1917, exterminating its defenders. The tape, laid subsequently, after the advance had stopped, shows the best way up to the new front line

visited with the apparent object of attacking the Humber, the Yorkshire industrial districts and the naval bases in the Forth, the Tay, and at Cromarty. The damage inflicted was comparatively small, and Yorkshire suffered the only casualties, nine persons being killed and 30 injured.

It was whilst returning from this raid that the L 20 met her fate. Caught in a violent storm off the Norwegian coast, she was swept towards Stavanger and struck the coast with great force. Driving on over the land, she crashed into a hill near Sandnaes, broke in two, and fell into the Hafrsfiord. As she became dangerous to navigation, the Norwegian government ordered her destruction, but most of her crew were saved. On the following day a number of British light-cruisers in the Bight of Heligoland, sighted L 7, which was apparently watching their movements, and at once attacked her. The Galatea, firing at a range of 12,000 yards, struck her with a 6-inch shell which broke her back and brought her blazing into the sea. Seven survivors were rescued and taken prisoner by the submarine, E 31, which also completed her destruction.

On the following day, May 5, at the other end of the battle front, near Salonika, yet another Zeppelin was destroyed. This craft, L Z 85, was a military airship of the latest design. On this particular day she ventured within range of the Allied warships, which opened a sharp fire on her and struck her several times. She dropped disabled in the marshes near Salonika, where her crew set her on fire.

The new super-Zeppelins began their flights over England in July. Between May 2 and July 28 there was an interval during which the enemy airships attempted no raids, possibly because the shortness of the nights, and the growing efficiency of the British anti-aircraft artillery made the Germans chary of taking risks. On the night of July 28, however, 10 airships approached the English coast: but only the old L 13 penetrated any distance inland. She came in south of the Humber just after midnight, and crossed the coast at Boston on her return journey about 2.30. Very little damage, however, was done, and no lives lost.

Ten naval airships made an attack on the night of the 31st. Two of these, however, were forced to return, and the others crossed the coast at various points and passed over six of the eastern counties. The Zeppelins flew at enormous heights and dropped bombs at random, apparently without taking any aim. Altogether 56 high explosive and 44 incendiary bombs were dropped, and the only casualties were a few broken windows and one horse and two bullocks injured. On August 2 they reappeared, when six Zeppelins dropped bombs in the eastern counties, again causing only trifling damage. They were heavily fired at, and after this raid L 11 was seen steering in a damaged condition over Dutch territory. On August 8, nine airships appeared at various points between the Wash and the Tweed. The only place to suffer to any extent was Hull, where L 24 dropped several bombs, killing 10 persons and injuring 11. L 11 dropped 13 bombs on Whitley Bay, damaging several houses and injuring three children and two adults. These four raids were remarkable for the timidity of the Zeppelin commanders, who were doubtless finding the improved defences of England rather too alert and efficient for their liking. Another raid by a solitary airship was made on the 23rd. Thirty-four bombs were dropped, but no material damage was inflicted, and there were no casualties.

On August 24, four airships raided East Suffolk, Essex, and Kent. One of these ships, L 31, succeeded in penetrating the defences of London. She entered by the Thames estuary, and on reaching Barking turned to the south, crossed the river at Millwall, circled round Woolwich and returned home via Shoeburyness. Bombs were dropped at Millwall, Blackheath, Deptford, Eltham, Greenwich and Plumstead, killing nine persons, injuring 40, and doing considerable damage to property in these thickly populated areas. Several of the raiders were sighted by airmen; but only one, L 32, was attacked, and this managed to get away.

The greatest raid yet planned was delivered on September 2. Every available

Photos: 'Canadian Records'

'WHO'LL BUY MY ORANGES?'

The oranges which these small French girls are offering for sale will be a welcome and refreshing luxury for troops just out of the front line; and in any case it would be hard for Tommy to resist the appeal of these saleswomen

naval airship was sent out, and in addition several military vessels co-operated. Altogether 16 ships started, 14 of which crossed the English coast. The object of the raid was to lay London in ruins and attack the great manufacturing centres of the Midlands, but it ended in almost grotesque failure. In the eastern and south-eastern counties the airships wandered about, lost in the upper air, evidently quite uncertain of their position, and dropped a large number of bombs at random, with so little result that only 16 casualties were reported. Two of the airships were hit by the British artillery, but were not set on fire. One of them threw overboard many objects, including an observation car and portions of her machinery and armament. Badly damaged, she limped home by way of the Dutch coast.

The squadron of military airships was less fortunate. Two were driven off London by the fire of the anti-aircraft guns. Another attempted to attack by the east. About 2.20 a.m. on the 3rd, which was a very clear starlit night, the enemy was plainly seen by spectators over a vast area near London. Suddenly a faint glow of red showed towards the stern of the airship; it spread with great speed and the whole huge structure began to fall, slowly at first, but gathering momentum and blazing more fiercely as it approached the earth, when it lighted up the whole sky with a blaze that was seen for over 50 miles. The airship was a wooden Schutte-Lanz, S L 11, and the man who brought about its destruction was Lieut. W. Leefe Robinson. He had been patrolling the sky for several hours at a great height, when suddenly he discovered and attacked the airship. He caught no glimpse of his human antagonists on board her, though flashes from the hull showed that the Germans were firing at him. In his report he describes the destruction as follows:

> I flew about 800 feet below it from bow to stern and distributed one drum along it (alternate New Brock and Pomeroy). It seemed to have no effect; I therefore moved to one side and gave it another drum, distributed along its side—without apparent effect. I then got behind it (by this time I was very close—500 feet or less below) and concentrated one drum on one part (underneath rear). I was then at a height of 11,500 feet when attacking Zeppelin. I hardly finished the drum before I saw the part fired at glow. In a few seconds the whole rear part was blazing. When the third drum was fired there were no searchlights on the Zeppelin and no anti-aircraft was firing. I quickly got out of the way of the falling, blazing Zeppelin and, being very excited, fired off a few red Very lights and dropped a parachute flare.

When he landed after destroying his mighty antagonist, Robinson proceeded by car to the wreck of the burning ship, which had fallen at Cuffley, in Middlesex. The bodies of the crew lay about. Some had evidently leapt out, or been flung out, as the airship fell. For this act Robinson was awarded the Victoria Cross. The flames of the blazing airship must have been seen by several other vessels approaching the metropolis, and it produced on these a very marked moral effect. The commanders of the remaining Zeppelins lost heart, and, dropping their bombs hurriedly, made for home as speedily as possible.

The ships which attacked the country north of London met with little or no success. L 22, concentrating on the Humber area, dropped most of her bombs in open fields, whilst L 13,

UNKNOWN WARRIOR

The heroes of the war whose dead bodies were never identified were honoured, later, by national tombs. This photograph shows a humbler memorial on the battlefield to an unknown Canadian. Like the warriors of old, his helmet is placed above the tomb

probably the most successful of the fleet, bombed East Retford and destroyed three gasometers. The casualties, however, were small in view of the magnitude of the effort; only four persons were killed and 12 injured.

Undeterred by the loss of the SL 11, the Germans launched another raid on the night of September 23. On this occasion 11 ships took part, three of which, L 31, L 32 and L 33, were the best and most powerful of the German naval airships. They were ordered to attack London, whilst the older ships were to concentrate on the area between the Wash and the Humber. L 31 and L 32, in order to avoid, if possible, the increasingly efficient defences, approached the capital from the south, whilst L 33, the very newest ship, came in from the north-east.

Of these three super-Zeppelins only one, L 31, under Captain Mathy, Germany's most brilliant commander, was destined to return home. Flying across London from south to north, Mathy crossed Mitcham, Streatham, Brixton and Kennington, dropping bombs as he went. He then jettisoned his remaining bombs over the Lea Bridge Road, doing severe damage to a number of houses and killing 22 and injuring 75 persons. He crossed the coast on his homeward journey at Great Yarmouth.

But the other two ships were less fortunate. L 32, after reaching London about 1 a.m., was heavily engaged by the Dartford defences. The commander hurriedly dropped his bombs and made for home, but was spotted by Lieut. F. Sowrey, who was out on patrol. The story of the SL 11 was repeated, and the huge vessel caught fire and plunged to the ground, painting the sky for miles with a crimson glare. She dropped near Billericay, and burned for nearly an hour. All her crew perished.

The L 33, which came in from the north-east, dropped bombs on Bow and Bromley-by-Bow, damaging many houses, factories and business establishments, and killing 11 and injuring 25 persons. But L 33, coming under a very heavy fire from defences, made off quickly to the north-east. Apparently she had been badly hit, for she jettisoned much of her gear in order to gain height. As she was approaching Chelmsford she was picked out by Lieut. Brandon, of the R.F.C., who engaged her hotly without result. By the time she reached the coast, however, she was losing gas and rapidly descending. She proceeded to sea for about two miles, but her condition was so bad that she was forced to turn back. The great vessel came gliding in at a low speed, almost touching the water, and took the land safely not far from the coast. After setting fire to their ship, the crew marched off on the road to Colchester, which one of them knew well, and, presently, meeting a special constable, surrendered to him.

Of the Zeppelins raiding farther north, only L 17 seems to have inflicted any damage. She dropped eight high-explosive and 11 incendiary bombs on Nottingham, and caused a good deal of damage to life and property. In this raid 202 high-explosive and 166 incendiary bombs were dropped altogether, and the total casualties amounted to 40 persons killed and 130 injured.

The loss of these two airships and the serious damage done to a third caused dismay in Germany. The official report spoke of the "extraordinarily

Photos: 'Canadian Records'

HIS TURN ON WATCH

Sentries were on duty all the day and night in the front line, the normal period of sentry duty being of two hours' duration. This man guards, from surprise attacks of every kind, all the men in his sector of the line

USEFUL IN CAPTIVITY

German prisoners were frequently employed in helping to deal with the wounded. Here, under supervision, four of them (one in a British helmet), act as stretcher-bearers for a wounded Canadian, down the track of a Decauville light railway

Photo: Imperial War Museum

CARPENTERS AT CALAIS

British women crossed the Channel in great numbers, not only to work as hospital nurses, but also to be employed in various workshops. Here the scene is the Tarrant Hut workshops, near Calais, where women are busily engaged in carpentry

heavy fire with incendiary shells" which had destroyed the two airships. The German government had led the German people to suppose that British towns could be attacked and laid in ruins by airships. German opinion was summed up by the Munich *Neueste Nachrichten*, which wrote: "The glorious German aerial engines of war penetrate to England's heart, and London trembles before their attacks, which it is hoped will be more frequent in future."

On September 25 the airships were ordered once more to attack. On this occasion seven Zeppelins crossed the coast, and the main attack was delivered by four ships on Yorkshire, Lancashire and Lincolnshire. Another ship aimed bombs at Dover, but these fell into the sea. One or more of these ships reached the Manchester area, hitherto unreached by them, and flew over Bury and other cotton towns. Bolton was bombed, and although only minor damage was inflicted, 13 persons were killed and 10 wounded. L 22 bombed Sheffield, where nine houses were demolished, 29 persons killed and 21 wounded. L 14 bombed York with little damage to life or property.

The next raid, which occurred on October 1, ended in disaster for the enemy. On this occasion 11 ships left their sheds, 10 of which reached England. Amongst these were three super-Zeppelins, including L 31, commanded by Mathy. But it was to be his last flight. Crossing the coast at Lowestoft at about 8 o'clock, he passed over Chelmsford in an attempt to reach London. He came under such a heavy fire before reaching the capital that he was obliged to abandon his attempt, so he threw his bombs overboard and went off to the westward. These missiles fell on Cheshunt, damaging 300 houses.

Mathy had not gone far before he was spotted by Lieut. W. J. Tempest, who fired a hail of lead into the Zeppelin and set it on fire. The airship capsized with the glowing tip pointing downwards, righted itself, then, with the glow spreading, broke into two flaming balls and finally fell to the ground at Potters Bar. All its crew, including Mathy, perished in the flames.

The other airships farther north met with no success. L 14 and L 16 raided Lincolnshire, and L 24 passed over Norfolk *en route* for London. She only penetrated as far as Hitchin, however, where she jettisoned her bombs, killing one man. L 34, the newest of the super-Zeppelins, visited the midlands, and L 17 dropped bombs around Norwich, but no results were obtained, and after the loss of the L 31 all the ships returned home as quickly as possible.

Unfavourable weather conditions prevented any further raids for some weeks, but on the night of November 27, nine naval Zeppelins crossed the coast. L 24, with the three brand-new super-Zeppelins, L 34, L 35 and L 36, attempted to raid Tyneside, whilst five others made for the Midlands.

The Tyneside airships were soon in trouble. L 34 dropped 16 bombs on West Hartlepool, damaging 40 houses and killing four and injuring 34 persons. She was spotted by Lieut. Peyot, who immediately engaged her, but for some time his bullets produced no result. He followed her for about five miles before he eventually managed to set her alight, and so near was he to the flaming mass that his face was scorched by the heat. The L 34 fell into the sea off West Hartlepool and sank, all her crew being killed. The other two Zeppelins, seeing the fate of their consort, immediately fled, dropping their bombs in the sea as they went.

Meanwhile the other raiders were making their attack. L 16 dropped bombs near Wakefield, and later at Chesterton. Altogether she stayed over England for nine hours, but got away, although she was attacked by two aeroplanes. L 21 was less fortunate; she pushed inland towards the Midlands without being attacked and dropped bombs at random, but on her return journey she began to feel the effects of the strengthened British defences. Aeroplanes chased her and guns opened on her. It seems certain that she sustained some damage, as she travelled very slowly, and may, indeed, have stopped for some time not far from the Norfolk coast, where she evidently succeeded in making repairs. Day was at hand when she was seen voyaging towards the sea, followed by a number of aeroplanes. At a height of 8,000 feet four aeroplanes were in action, supported by an armed trawler. The aeroplanes again had the upper hand. Lieutenant E. Cadbury and Sub-Lieutenants E. L. Pulling and G. W. R. Fane drew closest to her and hit her repeatedly, till the flames swept along her side, and she plunged a hissing mass into the sea.

Later in the morning on which this Zeppelin had been destroyed (November 28), a German aeroplane made an attack on London. It appeared over the capital about noon, and dropped six bombs from a height so great that the occupants of the machine could not have taken any proper aim. These caused only the slightest damage, but inflicted injury on 10 persons. The aeroplane, on its return journey, was brought down by the French at Dunkirk, when it proved to be manned by two naval lieutenants. This raid, small though it was, was important as indicating the real danger which threatened Britain from the air—that of aeroplane attack on the great cities.

The struggle for supremacy in the air which had been raging so fiercely during 1916 continued unabated into the next year. In the early days of

Photo: Topical

OBJECTS OF HATRED

By the Aliens Restriction Act of 1914 the government was given wide power to deal with aliens. Here, in 1917, is seen a batch, heavily protected from a crowd made furious by the submarine warfare, going to internment through the streets of Southend

COMPULSORY VISITORS

Just off the troopship from Le Havre, these German prisoners are being marched along the quay at Southampton, on their way to a concentration camp. Unwilling visitors to our shores, they are watched with silent dislike by the crowd of civilians that has gathered

Photo: Central Press

Photo: Topical

BLIND LEAD THE BLIND

The more expert of these two blinded soldiers at St. Dunstans Hostel, in Regent's Park, London, is acting as guide to his comrade. The work done at St. Dunstans, founded by Sir C. Arthur Pearson in March, 1915, cannot easily be over-estimated

1917 it became known that the Germans intended, by the spring of 1918, to maintain a total of 3,500 machines at their front. This would have required a steady output of 1,350 machines a month. In the first six months of 1917 the Allies on the Western front claimed to have brought down 1,401 German machines and 52 kite balloons, while the Germans claimed to have destroyed 955 machines and 45 kite balloons.

During the early months of 1917, Britain carried the air war into German territory; but despite the skill and courage of the British aces the experiment was a costly one. From 56 in January, British casualties among airmen rose to 119 in February and to 152 in March, while on one single day in April 117 casualties were reported.

April was a very black period for the R.F.C. and the situation became extremely grave. The German scout pilots were aggressive and seldom hesitated to attack the British machines even when outnumbered. The fact that they were equipped with very fine aeroplanes, the Albatros D III single-seater and the Halberstadt, gave them confidence, and the frequent successes which came to them in combats encouraged them to further efforts. In a similar way the scout machines of the British squadrons were at that time definitely outclassed. The little D H 2, which had done so well, was now obsolete; it was too slow and its armament of a single Lewis gun was inferior to the twin synchronized machine-guns of the German scouts.

It was at this time that the German ace Baron von Richthofen and his squadron of picked pilots were showing themselves to be the most formidable of fighting airmen. On April 5 he met Captain W. Leefe Robinson leading a formation of six Bristol Fighters. The German was flying with five other machines—all Albatros single-seaters. The engagement was a short one and the result was disastrous to the British, four out of the six Bristols being shot down, Robinson's amongst them. He was uninjured and was taken prisoner.

On April 7, Richthofen followed his success over the new Bristol Fighters by another exploit. Flying in the Arras area with four other Albatros scouts, he met a flight of six British machines of No. 60 squadron. The latter were of the French Nieuport type; though quickly manoeuvrable, their rotary engines had not the power of those of the Albatros and their single Lewis gun put their pilots at a disadvantage. Consequently, when Richthofen met them over the German lines, they were soon in difficulties and only one pilot succeeded in returning to his aerodrome; all the others were shot down.

The day on which Richthofen won his greatest success was also memorable as the date of the last British raid into German territory made for some months. Under Lieutenant-Colonel C. E. H. Rathborne, naval airmen combined with a French flying force, in a bombardment of Freiburg. Two daylight attacks were made and large buildings were shattered.

Owing to a lack of machines which could equal those of the German fighting squadrons, it was decided by R.F.C. headquarters that the only possible means of checking enemy predominance in the air was by attacking their aerodromes, and a campaign of night bombing was introduced for this purpose. This work was allotted to squadrons 10, 27, 55 and 100, and during April a number of raids were carried out. Douai, where Richthofen's squadron was stationed, was subjected to much bombing and hangars containing aircraft were demolished; other enemy aerodromes at Mouveaux, Provin and Wervicq were also attacked.

But while these raids doubtless disorganized the preparations of the German squadrons and harassed their personnel for a time, the results were not decisive. Moreover, the British bombing planes did not carry out their work without great difficulty, and a considerable number of machines were shot down. In May the tide began to turn, however. The men of the R.F.C., who had been fighting under tremendous strain, with daily losses, were gradually regaining the power that they had lost; the new scout machines of the S.E.5 type, which had been so badly needed, were at last dispatched in quantities, and with their arrival in France the British pilots were able to meet the Germans on much more equal terms.